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Titolo completo
Securing Ukraine after the War: Nuclear Deterrence and Four Models of Security Guarantees

Autori Polina Sinovets | Adérito Vicente
Data pubblicazione

A durable post-war security settlement for Ukraine will depend on the credibility of deterrence in an increasingly unstable European nuclear order. Russia’s full-scale invasion has exposed the limits of conventional guarantees and demonstrated how nuclear coercion shapes both battlefield dynamics and Western responses. Ukraine’s long-term security is therefore inseparable from the wider evolution of transatlantic and European deterrence frameworks. Ukraine’s future security will unfold along one of four models: ad hoc guarantees led by nuclear powers; full integration into NATO; an EU-based framework centred on European deterrence; and neutrality. Each entails distinct trade-offs in credibility, escalation risk, institutional coherence and political feasibility. A sustainable settlement will ultimately depend on security guarantees that combine political resolve with credible military enforcement. In the absence of such assurances, post-war arrangements risk reproducing the same vulnerabilities that enabled Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022. The durability of peace will rest not on declaratory commitments, but on the capacity and willingness of Ukraine’s partners to uphold them.

Details
Rome, IAI, June 2026, 22 p.
In
IAI Papers
Issue
26|09
ISBN/ISSN/DOI
978-88-9368-408-8; 10.82088/IAIp2609

1. Post-war security for Ukraine in the European nuclear order
2. Four models of post-war security guarantees for Ukraine
2.1 Model I: Ad hoc security guarantees
2.2 Model II: NATO-centred nuclear deterrence
2.3 Model III: EU-based security guarantees
2.4 Model IV: Neutrality
Conclusion
References