Titolo completo

The African Union-European Union Partnership at a Crossroads

On 24-25 November 2025, the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) will hold their seventh summit in Luanda, Angola. Over the past twenty-five years, their partnership has evolved into a structured framework, from the first Cairo summit in 2000 to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in 2007, to the Joint Vision for 2030 in 2022. Mechanisms such as the AU Peace and Security Council-EU Political Security Committee (PSC-to-PSC) dialogue complement this architecture, but the summit remains the central forum for aligning priorities.

Recently, however, the partnership has been strained. Vaccine nationalism during Covid-19, double standards vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine and the atrocities in Gaza and economic pressures have fuelled African peoples’ distrust towards Europe. A shifting global order has raised further questions about the EU’s role in a post-Western world. The AU, too, has seen its position weakened. Its responses to renewed coups and internal conflicts often appear inconsistent or overshadowed by external interference, a situation compounded by strained coordination with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which are central to delivering locally grounded solutions under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

Both unions therefore approach the Luanda summit at a crossroads. Post-1945 multilateralism is eroding, US engagement is receding, and Africa has become a theatre of intensified competition – notably from the EU, Russia, China, the US and Middle Eastern powers. These dynamics risk marginalising the AU first and the EU next, diminishing their global weight. Renewed political focus on both organisations is essential.

Towards the Luanda summit

Amid systemic uncertainty, the summit will test the AU-EU relationship’s maturity, offering an opportunity to revitalise their partnership. After a year of constructive exchanges – from the 2025 Ministerial Meeting to the latest PSC-to-PSC dialogue – Luanda could consolidate progress.

For the EU, the summit is a chance to reassert itself as a reliable partner. For the AU, it is an opportunity to reaffirm continental leadership and advance African-led solutions to the most pressing continental challenges, including rising conflicts, heightened social and economic vulnerabilities and climate-related issues, drawing on Agenda 2063, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and the PSC Protocol. But both require internal unity: without an integrated Africa, influence remains limited; without a cohesive Europe, credibility erodes.

Europe’s credibility will depend on aligning words with deeds: backing the AU diplomatically and financially, prioritising continental approaches and recognising the AU as Africa’s central interlocutor. Such support is most needed where African leadership is already clear – on climate action, energy transitions and global governance reform, including UN Security Council reform and restructuring the international financial architecture. The G20 and G7 offer opportunities in this sense. France’s upcoming G7 presidency could align with South Africa’s G20 priorities, ensuring coherent backing for African-defined objectives. This, however, requires moving beyond Eurocentric narratives, listening to African priorities, and delivering tangible outcomes. Failure would reinforce perceptions of imbalance. Strengthened AU leadership is essential not only for a more influential Africa but also for Europe’s stability and credibility.

Respecting history and the partner

To turn vision into practice, the Luanda summit must rest on two guiding principles.

First, the EU must demonstrate that it has genuinely come to terms with its colonial legacy by engaging honestly and respectfully with the AU’s theme of the year: Justice for Africans and People of African Descent Through Reparations. As Karoline Eickhoff and Ueli Staeger argue, Europe has yet to fully acknowledge its historical responsibility for the political, economic and structural challenges that continue to weigh on Africa. Confronting this legacy openly and transparently is essential to building a credible and sustainable partnership. Even symbolic gestures of recognition could help rebuild trust.

Second, the EU must stop projecting its own integration model onto Africa and instead recognise the AU’s distinct history, principles and institutions. Acknowledging the AU’s centrality to Africa’s present and future means supporting it politically, diplomatically and materially as the continent’s legitimate voice and a key global actor. Openly supporting the Pan-African project and reinforcing AU leadership is essential to a partnership of equals. While welcome innovations in Europe-Africa relations, initiatives such as the Global Gateway or Italy’s Mattei Plan tend instead to currently prioritise bilateral economic engagement, which risks sidelining continental frameworks and weakening the AU’s coordinating role.

These two principles should anchor the EU’s approach to Luanda and guide the choices made there. But principles must translate into action. Turning symbolic recognition into practical cooperation requires tangible commitments.

Development cooperation and regional integration

A practical way to address both the AU’s theme of the year and one of Africa’s pressing priorities is to strengthen economic cooperation and regional integration. The EU can respond by investing consistently in continental structures and supporting the Pan-African vision of a “united, prosperous, and influential Africa”.

Regional integration can itself function as a form of reparative justice: helping overcome colonial legacies, reducing internal disparities, enhancing economic autonomy and enabling the continent to finance its own sustainable growth. Within this framework, the Global Gateway is the EU’s main instrument, provided it aligns fully with Agenda 2063 and prioritises continental projects such as the AfCFTA.

Africa needs tangible results that show Europe is moving beyond bilateral logics and vertical relations, towards a partnership grounded in listening, respect and mutual benefit. At the same time, the EU must continue focusing on the most fragile states through its commitments to Official Development Assistance. By doing so, the EU would not only help redress historical asymmetries but also demonstrate – in practice – its belief in an Africa capable of acting as a full and influential global actor.

Revitalising peace and security cooperation

Strengthening cooperation on peace and security is central to a more balanced and credible AU-EU partnership. In recent years, the proliferation of sub-regional and bilateral initiatives – along with ad-hoc security arrangements – often driven by external funders, has weakened APSA and eroded the AU’s legitimacy. Coordination gaps between the AU and the RECs, the building blocks of APSA, further complicate the picture. A strict focus on subsidiarity over the principles of “prevailing circumstances” and “comparative advantage” limits the effectiveness of a collective approach, especially when the AU and RECs follow different political agendas.

The AU remains best placed to advance African solutions to African problems. The ongoing review of the AU’s governance, peace and security architecture is a chance to renew its role. Europe should support this reform and recognise the primacy of the AU, with steady, respectful engagement. A stronger, coordinated AU is also in the EU’s interest. Locally owned, context-specific approaches offer the most legitimate and sustainable route to stability. In this perspective, the EU could support Africa’s position on UN Security Council financing for peace operations (UN Resolution 2719), use the European Peace Facility to close resource gaps without diluting AU ownership, and ensure EU-funded missions follow clear political strategies under AU oversight, while discouraging instead bilateral or ad-hoc initiatives that undermine continental cohesion.

Somalia remains a telling case. As the AU struggles to sustain the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM), the EU – its main financier since 2007 – should ensure short-term funding while supporting and preserving the AU’s political and diplomatic leadership. The goal must be a politically inclusive settlement, not the outsourcing of security.

Ultimately, investing in conflict prevention is the most forward-looking and cost-effective strategy. As the AU PSC notes, preventive diplomacy is “the most viable” and sustainable approach to peace. Prevention is morally sound and financially rational. The EU should therefore prioritise AU tools that address root causes – from weak governance to the exclusion of women, youth and vulnerable groups – and strengthen early warning, mediation and political dialogue capacities.

Reinforcing the link between the APSA and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) would enhance the AU’s ability to anticipate and manage crises. Consistent European backing would help anchor the AU as a credible guarantor of African security and turn partnership rhetoric into practice.

Looking ahead

At the Luanda summit, the EU and AU must finally demonstrate that their partnership can move beyond rhetoric. In particular, the two sides should concentrate on three immediate, concrete steps.

First, act jointly where interests converge. Multilateral reform offers the most immediate area for coordinated action. The AU and EU should use the Luanda summit to advance concrete proposals, among others, on UN Security Council reform and the overhaul of the international financial architecture, aligning diplomatic positions and combining efforts.

Second, a Pan-African approach must anchor the partnership. AU leadership should guide peace and security cooperation, with sharper coordination between the AU and the RECs. The EU should provide predictable backing, using the European Peace Facility and ensuring an effective rollout of the upcoming EU Governance, Peace and Security Programme to reinforce the AU’s role in conflict management and prevention.

Third, align European tools with African priorities. The Global Gateway should prioritise flagship continental projects – notably the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) – and support Africa-led integration rather than bilateral or strategic initiatives. Prioritising infrastructure must not come at the expense of renewed attention to human development and fragile contexts.


Michele Collazzo is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Bologna.