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This paper provides a comparative analysis of mass and elite orientations towards human rights and democracy promotion in the United States, the European Union, and Turkey. It focuses on importance, general attitudes, relevant actors as well as policies and instruments. Survey data from 2000 to 2012 show that people on both sides of the Atlantic share similar views on what constitutes a good democracy. They equally highlight the value of its electoral institutions, social welfare and prospering economy, while uniformly denouncing the importance of civilian control

of the military and religious interpretations of the law. The role of the main stakeholder seems to be a somewhat conflicting arena. In the US, people trust more the national government than the UN on human rights. Europeans see both the EU and the UN as playing an important role in assisting other nations. When it comes to democracy promotion, both Europeans and Americans approve of election monitoring, initiatives for civil society development and, to a certain degree, economic and political sanctions. Military intervention stands out as the least supported option to promote democracy.

Attitudes Towards Human Rights and Democracy: Empirical Evidences in Europe and the United States

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EU US Turkey Public opinion Human Rights Democracy

Introduction

The promotion of democracy and the respect for human rights are the major aspects of transatlantic relations. Shared values for individual freedom, liberty, and peace, unite nations of Europe and the US in a common goal to preserve these institutions within their borders and beyond.

It had been in pursuit of securing fundamental rights and freedom that the United States was established more than two centuries ago. Its founding fathers entrusted its later generations with a constitution designed to secure the liberties of the American people through a system of separation of powers and the rule of law. Embodying these commitments as well as those captured in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its domestic policies, the US has been a leading representative democracy in the world for decades.

The path of Europe towards democratisation has been a different one, yet no less successful. Established by the Maastricht Treaty and progressing with the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Union undoubtedly deserves its name as the most successful peace and democracy project since WWII. "I don't know any other experiment in human history so advanced in terms of political integration and democracy" stated José Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission addressing the audience at the European Network of Political Foundations forum in Brussels (Barroso 2008). Having set consolidation of democracy, its institutions and norms as an accession condition for the states willing to join the EU, it has nurtured a new European society which embraces different visions of good governance and believes in liberty, human dignity, and the rule of law.

For both the EU and the US promotion of democracy abroad stands among the central issues on the foreign agenda. "We recognize that the advance of democracy is a strategic priority of our age" declared their representatives at the EU-US Summit in 2006.¹ Naturally, it became a political space for a common action

¹ EU-U.S. Summit, Vienna Summit Declaration, 10783/06 (Presse 189), 21 June 2006, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/90176.pdf.

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formally embedded in the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 and the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA). Several institutions such as the Atlantic Council and the Atlantic Treaty Association were also established to foster and reinforce transatlantic ties for democratic support worldwide.

Yet, despite of these efforts, both scholars and politicians express opposing opinions about the strength of this cooperation (Moravcsik 2003, Kopstein 2006, Carothers 2008, Pangratis 2010). Some maintain that, due to diverging views on the means of democratic promotion, relevance of certain perceived global threats and legacies of the past international balance of power, the United States and Europe lack efficient unified strategy in this political plan. However, the transatlantic optimists insist that resting on the shared values of democracy and open market economy, the relations across the Atlantic have strong grounds and a great potential for further development.

As far as the opinion of the people on the issue is concerned, it seems that there are more democracy-promotion-sceptics among both Americans and Europeans than there are supporters. Studies of public opinion of transatlantic communities reveal that public support for democracy and human rights promotion abroad is waning (McFarland and Mathews 2005, Council for a Community of Democracies 2006, GMF 2006). Yet, exactly for these issues the opinion of citizens matters most. With the US and EU's active involvement in the political developments of the last decades – the democratic transitions in the post-Soviet block and the Middle East – a profound understanding of citizens' orientations towards human rights protection domestically and worldwide presents a great interest. Here, the research is providing a comprehensive comparative analysis: cross-country (US vs. Europe) and cross group (public vs. elites) are needed.

The present paper sets out to address this need and provides a full story of transatlantic mass and elite orientations towards human rights and democracy; therefore, its main purpose is two-fold. First, operating with a large collection of survey data, it will take a stock on the existing survey questions on perceptions about human rights and democracy to reveal the most salient issues, general attitudes, relevant actors as well as policies and instruments within this political area. Second, by having a quantitative take on the analysis, it will provide a comprehensive description of the trends in public opinion in the aforementioned topics. The geographical scope of the empirical inquiry is limited to the United States, members of the EU, and Turkey, as it is a member of NATO and an important player in the transatlantic political arena. The cross-group comparison – publics vs. elites – will be presented in all cases for which the data is available. Time wise, this analysis will cover a period from 2000 to 2012 – years of American recovery from terrorist attacks on 9/11, economic crisis, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as further European integration and development.

The paper is divided into four main parts. Part 1 explains the salience of human rights and democratic governance in public reasoning vis-à-vis other political and socio-economic problems. The analysis here is multi-faceted: it places the issue of interest in different contexts, such as global, regional, and national in order to obtain most comprehensive understanding of it. Part 2 primarily deals with general attitudes towards human rights and democratic institutions. It shows how views of Americans and Europeans differ on what constitutes a good democracy, as well as illustrates their general satisfactions with human rights practices and democratic development domestically. Part 3 takes a look at questions of institutional trust in democracy promotion and particularly focuses on the role of the EU. Part 4 analyses support for policies in promoting human rights and democracy in other nations. The conclusion section serves to summarise the main findings of the analysis.

1. Importance of Human Rights and Democracy

With the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, the very term “human rights” came into a wider use both in academia and politics. Nowadays, speeches by political leaders, heads of enterprises, trade unions and non-governmental institutions rarely go without a reference to the commitments to the democratic principles and norms of the UDHR. Each year hundreds of conferences are organized worldwide, gathering international experts and scholars to discuss prospects of global democratic advancements and solutions to combat inequalities. Thousands of books are published to shed a light on yet another new perspective of human rights practices and democratic development worldwide. The question is how much of this importance is actually shared among the ordinary people and especially of those belonging to the transatlantic communities? To make the analysis more comprehensive, this section illustrates salience of human rights issues in public opinion in two ways. First, it questions how far the respective publics see issues regarding human rights and democracy threatening the well-being of global and national communities. Second, it assesses priority that citizens assign to these issues in the policy making. In all cases comparison is done vis-à-vis other contemporary socio-economic issues.

A glance at the data confirms that human rights are among the least worrying problems facing the world today. As the poll conducted by the Gallup International Association in 2005 suggests, only about 3% of Americans and Europeans see human rights as “the most important problem of the world today” (Table 1). In Turkey, this percentage is even smaller – only 2.5%. Overall, the citizens of these countries share much more concern for global problems such as “poverty” (US 21%, the EU 26%, Turkey 26%), “terrorism” (US 19%, the EU 12%, Turkey 15%) and “wars and conflicts” (US 10%, the EU 9%, Turkey 11%). This finding was also confirmed when a more precise question about the world’s problems had been posed by the World Values Survey in 2005. This poll revealed that identically small percentage of Americans (4%) and Europeans (5%) recognized “discrimination against girls and women” as the first most serious problem of the world after “poverty” (53% of Americans and 68% of Europeans), “poor sanitation conditions” (23% of Americans and 11% of Europeans), “inadequate education” (13% of Americans and 6% of Europeans) (Table 2). However, this problem receives triple percentage increase as the second most serious issue facing the world, with slightly larger number of Europeans (15%) than Americans (9%) expressing apprehension. Within the EU, citizens of Finland and Sweden are among those most vocal about female rights’ abuse with respectively 18% and 21% of their population recognizing this issue as the second most serious in the world. In Turkey, 6% and 14% of all surveyed named gender discrimination the first and the second most serious problem of the world respectively, which in overall perspective still remains very low.

Domestically, gender-based discrimination presents a relatively low matter of concern as well. However, here the comparison is only possible for the EU and Turkey since the United States was excluded from the sample. When asked to name the most serious problem facing their own country today, 8% of the surveyed Europeans answered “discrimination against girls and women” (Table 3). Overall, this percentage for Europe would have been lower if not accounted for Sweden, where 30% and 31% of the surveyed see gender discrimination as the first and the second most serious problem facing their country. Consequently, it appears that Swedes share more concern for this issue domestically, than globally. In contrast, Bulgaria and Romania, which were the EU accession states in 2005, have the lowest percentage of citizens perceiving gender discrimination as a vital domestic problem (2% for both Bulgaria and Romania). In Turkey however, gender discrimination ranked third among perceived domestic problems, surpassing concerns for “poor sanitation” and “environmental conditions” - roughly 14% of the surveyed named this issue as the first and second most serious facing their state respectively.

When considered from the policy priority perspective, this issue receives significantly more attention. In the years 2000 and 2010 the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) asked its international respondents to indicate what they believed should be the priority of their state, “the most important thing it [the state] should do”. As Table 4 illustrates, roughly a third of all Europeans and Americans are keen of having “more say in government decisions”. Remarkable is the change that took place in the US in 10 years’ time – if in 2000 the majority of American respondents (38%) chose maintaining order in the nation as their state’s priority, already in 2010 an identical majority (37%) prioritized having a voice in the government decisions. Such change most certainly reflects American public’s general concern with their government’s handling of domestic international affairs following turbulent decade of terrorist attacks of 9/11, war in Afghanistan and Iraq and widespread economic downturn, as well as willingness to directly participate in the decision-making. Also, as compared to Europeans, more Americans prioritised protection of freedom of speech in both sample years. For Turkey, analysis reveals that the majority of its people prioritize “order in the nation” (45%) and “fighting rising prices” (27%), while only 18% would like to have “more say in government decisions” and 10% believe freedom of speech should be a priority.

When asked directly: “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?”, the vast majorities of American, European and Turkish citizens (over 80% of all) were at one with each other to reply “absolutely important” (Table 5).

Moreover, importance that Europeans assign to the progress with civil rights within the EU is also relatively high. Responding to the 2009 Eurobarometer question “Among the following, what do you think should be the top priorities of the European Union for the years to come?” about 29% of Europeans mentioned “advancing on rights of citizens” (Table 6). The issues that also received public recognition as priority in this question were “economic recovery” (72%), “boosting growth in a sustainable way” (44%) and “fighting climate change” (43%).

Analysing these results, we can conclude that although recognising human rights as less threatening for global and national communities than economic instabilities and terrorism, both Americans and Europeans assign a great deal of importance to these issues.

2. General Attitudes towards Human Rights and Democracy

Having established a relative salience of democracy and human rights amidst other issues, the analysis will now proceed with investigating the attitudes towards certain aspects of democracy, public evaluations of democratic development and human rights practices, as well as general public views towards provision of certain types of rights.

What characteristics of democracy do transatlantic communities see as essential? As Table 7 suggests, primarily electoral provisions and civil rights matter: over 70% of Europeans and Americans named “civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression”, “people can change the laws in referendums” and “people choosing their leaders in free elections” as essential characteristics of democracy. For Turkey, this percentage is higher: over 80% of the surveyed highlighted these three items. The social welfare and wealth redistribution are especially vital for the EU and Turkey: 56% and 70% of their respective respondents mentioned that it is essential that governments in democracies “tax the rich and subsidise the poor” and almost 75% of the surveyed emphasised vitality of “people receiving state aid for unemployment”. In contrast, only 30% and 43% of Americans see these

two characteristics as crucial. The role of religion and military control are viewed as far less important features of democracy: only around 20% of Americans and Europeans mentioned “religious authorities interpreting the laws” and “army taking over when government is incompetent” as such. Finally, over 60% of respondents in all surveyed transatlantic societies identified “prospering of the economy” as a crucial democratic attribution.

Moreover, a survey conducted by the PEW Global Attitudes Project in 2009 allows for examination of what Eastern Europeans, whose states underwent a dramatic process of democratisation in the last decades, consider important in the functioning democracy. Looking at the values of Table 8, we can see that much emphasis is attributed to the rule of law: a strong majority of the citizens in all countries named “judicial system that treats everyone in the same way” as very important (ranging from 57% in Slovakia to 80% in Bulgaria). Media freedom and freedom to freely practice one’s religion are among the next important aspects. The salience of electoral liberties and freedom of speech varies by country with the largest support in Bulgaria and Poland (on average 60%) and slightly less support in Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia (on average 45%). Also, only a small share of Eastern Europeans considers civilian control of military an important value of democracy. This analysis confirms that citizens of these young democracies and new members of the European Union are generally in line with the overall European democratic orientations and share similar expectations of liberties provisions from their governments.

Coming back to the transatlantic trends discussion, we find a difference in opinions regarding the choice between “good democracy” and “strong economy”. The results of the PEW GAP poll from 2009 suggest (Table 9) that priorities of Americans and Europeans slightly differ in this respect. The majority of Americans (55%) chose functioning democracy over economic prosperity, whereas majority of Europeans (50%) prefer the latter to the former. This provides evidence that healthy and prosperous economy remains central to the successful nation-building in the minds of contemporary Europeans, just as it was for their previous generations who envisioned the role of the EU first of all as an economic community.

Acknowledging that citizens of the transatlantic states attach a great deal of importance to various democratic provisions, it is particularly interesting to see how they evaluate these developments within their states. The findings of the WVS 2005 poll, questioning respondents “how democratically is this country being governed today?” are quite curious. They revealed that in the US 53% of the surveyed believed that their country is “absolutely democratic”, 29% “somewhat democratic” and slightly less than a fifth (18%) claimed that it is “not democratic at all” (Table 10). For Europe, if we take a look at the average estimates, these numbers are almost identical: 57%, 26% and 18% respectively. Within Europe Finland, Sweden and Spain have the highest share of citizens satisfied with democratic governance: over 70% of the surveyed identified their country as “absolutely democratic”. The least democratically satisfied citizens are found in Bulgaria: 54% of the respondents claimed their country is “not democratic at all”. Also, more than a quarter of respondents in Turkey and Italy pointed out poor state of democracy in their states.

These findings are also consistent with the evaluations of human rights practices within transatlantic states (Table 11). When asked “How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in our country?” an equal share of Americans and Europeans (48%) stated that there is “some respect”, and a slightly larger number of Americans (16%) than Europeans (10%) expressed that there is “lot of respect” for rights in their countries. However, a steady third of the surveyed Americans and Europeans stated that there is “not much respect for rights” in these countries. As in the previous case, Bulgaria has the most pessimistic record: 57% and 23% of its citizens claimed that there is “not much respect” and “no respect at all” for rights in their state respectively. At the

same time Fins, Swedes and Spaniards are again among the most satisfied with their rights records. The same could be said for people of Poland, where 60% of respondents believe to enjoy “some respect” for their rights.

While it could be argued that “human rights” is rather a broad concept, we can also take a look at citizen’s judgments towards specific types of rights - for example, women rights. The PEW GAP 2010 poll revealed that a strong majority of citizens of the five leading European states claim that men have a better life in their society than women (Table 12). In France, 74% of the respondents supported this statement. In the United States and Turkey this percentage is lower: 41% and 34% respectively. The picture is somewhat different when evaluations of the EU *performance* in this policy areas is analysed. The data from the 2009 Eurobarometer shows that the “equal treatment of men and women” received the highest evaluation by publics among other issue areas – more than 40% stated that the EU’s performance in this sphere is “very satisfactory” and 33% said that it is “somewhat satisfactory” (Table 13). In contrast, “fighting unemployment” received the lowest evaluation – more than 50% of the surveyed Europeans stated that EU’s actions in this area are “not at all satisfactory”.

Measuring perceived public influence on governmental decision making, the Program of International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) survey of 2005 revealed that only 16% and 32% of American respondents believed to have an “extremely influential” and “somewhat influential” opinion on the government’s policy actions, while a majority of 51% was less optimistic supporting that their views “are not influential at all” (Table 14).

The findings of this section suggest that, in general, the views of Americans and Europeans on essentials of democracy and democratic governance are largely convergent. What they also show, is that together with similar formal liberal commitments, both the US and the EU public, share comparable high standards for democratic governance and liberal provisions. These higher expectations, originating in developed social capital and values, make these publics susceptible even of minor unlawful conduct, and thus highly critical of governmental provisions in this area. This explains why, on average, we observe relatively lower levels of public satisfactions with democracy and respect for certain rights both in Europe and the United States, despite officially recognised international good-standing of these states.

3. The Role of the Main Stakeholders in the Area of Human Rights and Democracy

The following section sets out to identify the key actors in the sphere of human rights and democracy promotion as well as their role in this policy area as perceived by the respective publics and elites. Assessing data on the issue at stake, it became apparent that the only relevant actors mentioned in the questionnaires were national governments (the US and the EU member states), regional organisation (the EU) and international organisations (the UN and the World Bank). Other international organisations such as USAID and NATO were not mentioned in any of the surveys. Thus, the discussion below will be mainly about the specified actors.

The most relevant question here is: “Who should decide on human rights in the world?” Together with identifying the actors in this sphere, this question also indirectly measures the level of public trust in them, as citizens would prioritise delegating these affairs to those bodies they believe would handle policies with human rights most efficiently. A similar question was included in the WVS 5th wave; the outcomes of the survey are presented in Table 15. As we can see, more people in the United States (46%) prefer national governments to decide on policies concerning human rights rather than United Nations (35%) or regional organisations (19%). Whereas in

Europe, the majority of the surveyed (48%) are more inclined to see the UN taking a lead in this sphere, rather than individual states (34%) or regional bodies (18%). In Turkey, citizens are divided between delegating this task to the governments (45%) and the UN (43%) and have much less trust in regional institutions (13%).

Should the European Union work to guarantee human rights in each member state, even if this is contrary to the wishes of some member states? A strong majority of Europeans - more than 80% - tend to agree with the statement (Table 16). In their view, the European Union should act as a guarantor of individual rights vis-à-vis their nation states.

With regard to the perceived role of the EU in helping to establish democracies abroad, Transatlantic Trends Survey provides us with longitudinal data, reflecting opinions of both publics and elites. As Table 17 suggests, a strong majority of the European citizens (over 65% in all years) believe it is the role of the EU to help development of democracies abroad. Even a larger support for this proposition is found among the European elites - on average 80% of the surveyed replied "it should". The American public, however, is rather sceptical in this respect - among the surveyed 45% in 2006 stated that the EU should lead democracy assistance in other countries, while the other 48%- claimed that it should not.

When it comes to evaluating the role of the US in the same issue - Americans are even less optimistic. Faced with a question whether they believe, "It should or should not be the role of the United States to help establish democracy in other countries?", a majority of 56% consistently replied it "should not" in both years 2008 and 2007, and only about 37% stated it should (Table 18). Earlier in 2005 the support was somewhat higher - 52% stated it "should" and 41% stated it "should not". This suggests that with the United States' growing involvement in political developments of other nations, its own nation grows wary of both financial and political burdens that come with it.

What role do Europeans and Americans assign to the UN in dealing with human rights issues? A significant one. When asked by the Gallup International Association survey Voice of the People in 2000, more than 40% of Americans and Europeans named "protection of human rights" the main aim of the UN (Table 19). This policy area received more recognition as the UN's important mission than "giving humanitarian aid in times of natural disasters" (35% of Americans and 29% of Europeans), "preventing of war by intervention" (31% of Americans and 39% Europeans) and "improving the health of human beings" (22% of Americans and 21% of Europeans). When it comes to the UN intervention in affairs of the states that seriously violated human rights, the vast majorities of both Europeans and Americans - 76% - unanimously agree that the UN should intervene (Table 20). Faced with a more case-oriented question, such as: "Who should have the stronger role in helping the Iraqis to write a new constitution and build a new democratic government, the United States or the United Nations?" more Americans (65%) replied - "the United States" (Table 21) and only 28% named "the United Nations". However, given that this survey was conducted before 2005, when the support for the US democracy promotion abroad was still strong (Table 18), this outcome could potentially look different in the consequent years, for which the support has dropped tremendously.

If the majority of Europeans and Americans trust the UN to decide on human rights, how beneficial do they see cooperation with the UN in this area? Slightly less than a third of the surveyed Europeans (28%) in 2009 mentioned that "cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations may bring the maximum benefits" to the sphere of "human rights and democracy" (Table 22). In fact, it was the third most mentioned area after "poverty" (35%) and "peace keeping" (31%). Americans, however, evaluated cooperation with the UN from

a slightly different perspective. They were asked to express their beliefs if the US “should act on its own” when promoting democracy abroad or work with the UN “because such efforts will be seen as more legitimate” (Table 23). Among the respondents 69% agreed that the US should cooperate with the UN in democracy promotion and only 25% stated that it should act solitarily.

Regarding the role of the World Bank in democracy support, only Americans were surveyed. The largest share of these respondents (52%) believe that “the World Bank should only give loans to poor countries that are democracies or are moving toward becoming more democratic” (Table 24). However, even a larger percentage of them (66%) are assured that “the World Bank should help people in poor countries and not discriminate against some because they happen to live in a country with a non-democratic government”. This, in general, suggests that there is a high approval among Americans of the World Bank’s financial support of democratic developments in countries of the world, regardless of the current political situation in those countries.

The analysis of this section confirms that transatlantic communities assign the EU, the US and the UN a central role in freedom support both domestically and worldwide. It also revealed that Americans are gradually becoming less supportive of the US dominancy in democracy promotion abroad, largely displaying preferences for the US – UN cooperation in these sphere. The next section will follow up on these findings by leading a discussion on public and elites’ support of the approaches to democracy assistance.

4. Policies and Instruments Applied in the Area of Human Rights and Democracy

Do Europeans and Americans approve of their governments’ methods of bringing democracy to other nations? How efficient are these efforts in the eyes of the citizens? What place should human rights protection and democracy promotion take on the foreign agenda?

Tables 25 and 26 provide us with an overview of support for certain democracy assistance initiatives among the EU publics and elites and American general public. In 2006 and 2005 the Transatlantic Trends Survey and European Elite Survey asked their respondents to express their approval of certain political actions of the EU and the US to assist democracy in a state where “there is no political or religious freedom”. Among all suggested policy actions the highest support was attributed to “monitoring elections in new democracies” and “supporting independent groups such as trade unions, human rights associations” – around 70%. In Europe, on average 10% more citizens approved of these actions than in the United States, also European elites displayed the highest level of accord – more than 80% in all years. The least supported initiative was military intervention: the item “sending military forces to remove authoritarian regimes” received approval only from a third of the respondents in the United States and within the European Union, and only from 9% of European elites. In America, “support of political dissidents and political elites” received some weak approval as well – only around 40% of the respondents supported it in contrast to 50% in Europe. Imposing “political” and “economic sanctions” received equal support among some 50% of the European and American public, and 60% of the European elites.

Moreover, we can also analyse how effective some of these and other actions are perceived by American population (Table 27). According to PIPA 2005 poll, the most effective way to help sustaining democracy in other nations is by providing technical aid and assistance during the first elections – 44% and 31% of American respondents stated it will “do little more good than harm” and “a lot more good than harm” respectively. “Bringing

students, journalists and political leaders to the US to educate them on how democracy works” is perceived similarly effective – 68% of public support in total. More than 40% of the surveyed identified “putting diplomatic pressures” and “economic sanctions” as an effective democracy assistance strategy. The “warning of military intervention” and “using military force to overthrow a dictator” are viewed as least effective actions – more than a third identified it will “do more harm than good”.

For Europeans, this question was put a bit differently. They were surveyed regarding human rights issues which they believe should be priority in the EU’s foreign policy agenda. As Table 28 suggests, about 40% of European respondents in 2000 suggested that it should be “economic and social” rights, “human trafficking”, as well as “children and women rights”. A relatively smaller percentage mentioned “freedom of speech” (27%) and “fight against racism, xenophobia and discrimination” (25%). The issue receiving the least attention was the “detention without trial” – only 8%.

Evaluating the EU’s effectiveness in taking action in the sphere of rights’ promotion vis-à-vis nation state, majority of Europeans (62%) “see an added value for action being taken at EU level” (Table 29). In evaluation of the EU’s general performance in “defending human rights in the world” however, there were more Europeans (54%) expressing that it is doing “not enough” than those saying it is “doing enough” (43%) (Table 30) . When asked to point out a topic on which the EU “could communicate in a more efficient way regarding its policy/ actions”, the strong majorities of Europeans mentioned “promotion and protection of fundamental rights, including children’s rights”. Among these respondents, French (91%) were the most concerned with the lack of elaboration in this policy sphere, while Slovenians (55%) were the least concerned (Table 31). Interestingly however, when comparing the efforts of the EU and the United States in “fighting discrimination” and “social disparity” around the world a steady majority in all years (2009, 2006, and 2005) believe that Europe is ahead of the United States (Table 32 and Table 33).

This analysis proves several important points. First, as we were able to see on the example of the American respondents, publics are consistent in their support and evaluations of democracy promotion instruments employed by their states. Second, while communities on both sides of the Atlantic are generally in accord with these tools, they rather disapprove threats of military intervention and military promotion *per se* for the purpose of democracy promotion. Third, although believing that the EU is more efficient in implementing policies concerning human rights promotion than the national states and that is also ahead of the United States in fighting inequalities in the world, the majority of Europeans would like to see more elaboration on policy making and efforts in this sphere.

Conclusion

This paper examined transatlantic orientations with respect to democratic governance and human rights. Drawing on the evidence from survey data, it has established several analytical findings.

First, although seeing issues with human rights as less threatening the world and their countries than poverty and terrorism nowadays, people of transatlantic communities nevertheless assign a great deal of importance to the policy making in this area. Expressing a strong will to live in a democratic state, they are largely eager to have a say in political decision making and respect for their individual liberties.

Second, citizens of Europe, the United States and Turkey share similar views on what constitutes a good democracy. They equally highlight the value of its electoral institutions, social welfare and prospering economy, while uniformly denounce the importance of civic military control and religious interpretation of the legislature. This is also true for the citizens of Eastern European states – the young democracies of Europe.

Third, transatlantic communities keep similar critical tabs on their governments' human rights records. While good majorities of Europeans and Americans believe their states are ruled democratically, they also express concerns about the respect for certain rights, like women rights and political representation in their states.

Fourth, protection and promotion of rights in other countries seems to be an arena of somewhat conflicting views for the communities of interest. In the United States, more people trust national governments rather than regional organisations or UN to decide on human rights, expressing even a weaker support for the US or the EU sole efforts in this area. At the same time Europeans see both the EU and the UN playing an important role in assisting other nations with democracy. However, publics of both societies express much support for the bilateral cooperation of their states with the UN in this policy area. Americans also approve of the World Bank financial assistance for democratic purposes.

Fifth, evaluating methods of democracy promotion worldwide both Europeans and Americans show more support for indirect assistance: they highly approve of elections monitoring, initiatives for civil society development and to certain degree economic and political sanctions. Whereas direct actions like "military involvement" stand out as least supported initiatives for these publics.

Finally, while largely in accord with the EU's democracy assistance actions, Europeans would like to be more aware of the policy making and see more efforts in this sphere.

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Annex

Data Sources: the current secondary data analysis is based on a number of cross-national comparative surveys. Taking into account the differences in surveys methodology we consider important that the reader is aware of the key aspects in the surveys design and refer to them when comparing data between surveys.

Survey	Sample	N	Coverage	Method
Eurobarometer (EB)				
2003	Mass	16,307	AT, BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK	F2F
2004	Mass	29,334	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2005	Mass	29,328	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2006	Mass	29,152	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2009	Mass	30,238	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
European Elites Survey (EES)				
2006	Elite	255	Members of European Parliament and top-level officials of the EU Commission	CATI
2007	Elite	269	Members of European Parliament, top-level officials of the EU Commission and top-level officials of the Council of the European Union	CATI
European Elites Survey (EES)				
2008	Elite	280	Members of European Parliament, top-level officials of the EU Commission and top-level officials of the Council of the European Union	CATI

Table continued from previous page:

Survey	Sample	N	Coverage	Method
European Elites Survey (EES)				
2008	Elite	280	Members of European Parliament, top-level officials of the EU Commission and top-level officials of the Council of the European Union	CATI
Flash Eurobarometer (FEB)				
2008	Mass	27,081	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SI, SE, UK	CATI
Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (GAP)				
2009	Mass	26,397	AR, BR, CA, CN, DE, EG, ES, FR, ID, IL, IN, JO, JP, KE, KR, LB, MX, NG, PK, PL, PS, RU, TR, UK, US	F2F, CATI
2010	Mass	24,790	AR, BR, CN, DE, EG, ES, FR, ID, IN, JO, JP, KE, KR, MX, NG, PK, PL, RU, TR, UK, US	F2F, CATI
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)				
2000	Mass	31,042	AT, BG, CA, CH, CL, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, IE, IL, LV, MX, NL, NO, NZ, PH, PT, RU, SE, SL, UK, US	F2F, CAPI, PAPI
2004	Mass	52,550	AU, AT, BE, BG, BR, CA, CH, CL, CY, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IL, JP, KR, LV, MX, NL, NO, NZ, PH, PL, PT, RU, SE, SI, SK, TW, UK, US, UY, VE	F2F
2010	Mass	41,923	AR, AT, BE, BG, CA, CH, CL, CN, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, HR, IL, JP, KR, LV, MX, NO, NZ, PH, RU, SE, SI, SK, TR, TW, UK, US	F2F, CAPI, CATI, CAWI, PAPI
Program of International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)				
2004	Mass	959	US	CAWI
2005	Mass	808	US	CAWI

Table continued from previous page:

Survey	Sample	N	Coverage	Method
Transatlantic Trends Survey (TTS)				
2005	Mass	11,080	DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, SK, SP, TR, UK, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
2006	Mass	13,044	BG, DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SP, TR, UK, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
2007	Mass	13,053	BG, DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SP, TR, UK, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
2008	Mass	13,022	BG, DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SP, TR, UK, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
Voice of the People (VoP)				
2000	Mass	53,851	AM, AR, AT, BA, BE, BG, BO, BY, CA, CH, CL, CM, CN, CO, CZ, DE, DK, DO, EC, EE, ES, FI, FR, GE, GH, HK, HR, HU, IE, IS, IT, JP, KR, KZ, LT, LU, LV, MK, MY, MX, NG, NL, NO, PE, PH, PK, PL, PY, RO, RU, SE, SG, SK, TH, TR, TW, UA, UK, US, UY	<i>no information available</i>
2005	Mass	53,788	AR, AU, BA, BG, BO, CA, CH, CM, CO, CR, CZ, DE, DK, DO, EC, EG, ES, ET, FI, FR, GH, GR, GT, HK, HR, ID, IE, IL, IN, IS, IT, JP, KE, KR, LT, LU, MD, MK, MX, MY, NG, NI, NL, NO, PA, PE, PH, PK, PL, PT, PY, RO, RU, SG, SN, SR, TG, TH, TR, TW, UA, UK, US, UY, VE, VN, ZA	F2F, CATI
World Values Survey (WVS)				
2005	Mass	67,268	AD, AR, AU, BF, BG, BR, CA, CH, CL, CN, CY, DE, EG, ES, ET, FI, GE, GH, GT, ID, IN, IT, JP, KR, MA, MD, ML, MX, MY, NO, PE, PL, RO, RS, RW, SE, SI, TH, TR, TT, TW, UA, US, UY, VN, ZA, ZM	F2F

Note: The analysis is limited to the US, EU member countries, and Turkey.

1. Importance of Human Rights and Democracy

Table 1. *VoP (2005)*: What do you think is the most important problem facing the world today? (In percentages)

	US	EU	Turkey
Poverty	20.6	25.6	25.8
Globalization	9.9	3.0	3.3
Terrorism	19.4	12.4	14.5
Environment	3.8	5.6	1.8
Wars and conflicts	9.5	8.8	10.5
HIV/AIDS	3.4	4.5	1.3
Economic problems	6.2	6.1	6.9
Crime	1.6	4.3	0.8
Human rights	3.4	3.0	2.5
Corruption	3.2	2.2	2.6
Drugs	7.5	4.5	2.6
Refugees and asylum problems	1.0	2.1	0.3
Unemployment	2.4	7.9	18.3
Educational issues	2.6	1.3	3.1
Religious fundamentalism	2.6	4.7	0.3
DK/RF	3.0	4.0	5.4
<i>N</i>	504	52,706	2,036

Note: EU is EU 27.

Table 2. *WVS (2005)*: In 2000, world leaders agreed on a number of programs to solve the most serious global problems. I'm going to read out some of these problems. I would like you to indicate which of these problems you consider the most serious one for the world as a whole? And which is the second most serious problem for the world as a whole? (In percentages)

	People living in poverty and need		Discrimination against girls and women		Poor sanitation and infectious diseases		Inadequate education		Environmental pollution		<i>N</i>
	1 st	2 nd	1 st	2 nd	1 st	2 nd	1 st	2 nd	1 st	2 nd	
US	53.1	24.5	3.7	9.2	23.4	35.2	13.3	18.8	6.5	12.3	1,203
EU	68.4	16.4	4.9	14.5	11.2	30.8	5.9	14.6	9.6	23.7	10,681
Bulgaria	71.8	17.7	2.8	8.6	13.8	39.7	2.8	11.5	8.8	22.5	945
Cyprus	67.8	13.8	6.7	14.4	15.1	34.8	5.2	18.3	5.2	18.7	1,037

Finland	56.8	20.3	6.4	18.2	10.8	22.4	9.1	13.6	16.9	25.5	1,010
Germany	63.5	16.3	6.9	14.9	10.3	22.9	12.4	23.5	6.9	22.4	2,002
Italy	75.5	13.5	3.4	16.5	10.6	36.3	3.3	12.3	7.2	21.4	996
Poland	74.7	15.4	3.8	14.6	9.9	33.3	2.2	7.4	9.4	29.3	989
Romania	71.5	15.3	3.5	9.5	12.8	41.7	4.8	16.2	7.4	17.3	1,702
Slovenia	66.9	19.4	4.3	12.9	9.8	26.5	4.9	12.5	14.1	28.7	1,001
Sweden	66.5	15.3	6.7	21.4	7.2	19.9	8.8	15.5	10.8	27.9	999
Turkey	62.5	22.5	6.4	13.9	4.9	14.3	16.8	31.7	9.4	17.6	1,338

Table 3. *WVS (2005)*: Which of these problems do you consider the most serious one in your own country? And which is the next most serious in your own country? (In percentages)

	People living in poverty and need		Discrimination against girls and women		Poor sanitation and infectious diseases		Inadequate education		Environmental pollution		<i>N</i>
	1 st	2 nd	1 st	2 nd	1 st	2 nd	1 st	2 nd	1 st	2 nd	
EU	54.8	17.4	7.7	12.5	6.4	19.1	12.5	19.9	18.6	31.1	10,554
Bulgaria	71.6	15.2	1.9	3.1	18.3	48.2	3.7	13.1	4.5	20.4	982
Cyprus	30.1	14.6	12.2	14.7	15.4	19.3	17.8	22.0	24.5	29.4	1,026
Finland	46.9	28.6	4.3	12.0	2.8	6.0	8.0	12.5	38.0	40.9	950
Germany	43.7	22.0	6.9	13.8	2.4	6.7	31.6	27.2	15.4	30.3	1,936
Italy	59.0	18.1	6.3	12.4	3.8	12.2	12.4	20.1	18.5	37.2	993
Poland	79.8	10.2	2.6	9.5	4.1	26.7	6.6	20.8	6.9	32.8	991
Romania	81.1	11.8	1.9	6.0	7.1	43.1	6.7	25.3	3.2	13.8	1,724
Slovenia	59.3	21.0	4.0	10.7	1.9	6.3	11.5	20.7	23.3	41.3	979
Sweden	21.9	14.8	29.5	30.5	1.6	3.2	14.0	17.8	33.0	33.7	973
Turkey	49.0	23.6	13.4	14.8	4.4	9.0	28.3	38.3	4.9	14.3	1,340

Table 4. *ISSP (2010, 2000)*: Looking at the list below please tick a box next to the one thing you think should be [Respondent's country's] highest priority. The most important thing it should do. [Respondent's country] should (In percentages)

		Maintain order in the nation	Give people more say in govern- ment decisions	Fight rising prices	Protect freedom of speech	N
US	2010	30.5	36.9	17.0	15.6	1,256
	2000	37.9	27.0	17.8	17.3	1,087
EU	2010	34.5	29.5	26.4	10.6	17,840
	2000	45.5	25.6	17.1	11.8	17,282
Austria	2010	31.3	26.8	30.8	11.1	1,004
	2000	58.4	17.5	6.2	17.9	983
Belgium	2010	35.9	20.6	32.6	10.9	1,100
Bulgaria	2010	31.2	19.9	45.1	3.8	989
	2000	38.6	26.2	32.6	2.6	918
Czech Republic	2010	32.8	18.3	36.4	12.4	1,402
	2000	46.0	22.3	16.9	14.8	1,188
Denmark	2010	53.6	23.6	4.9	17.9	1,235
	2000	54.9	21.7	5.3	18.1	1,001
Finland	2010	29.2	43.8	17.3	9.5	1,142
	2000	43.9	37.7	10.5	7.9	1,410
France	2010	31.5	28.5	29.8	10.2	2,123
Germany	2010	28.2	42.7	11.8	17.3	1,365
	2000*	39.5	36.8	9.9	13.8	1,473
Ireland	2000	47.7	23.6	18.5	9.9	1,132
Latvia	2010	23.8	33.2	38.8	4.1	973
	2000	49.6	27.8	17.8	4.6	978
Lithuania	2010	19.9	46.5	32.3	1.2	990

Table 4 (continued)

		Maintain order in the nation	Give people more say in govern- ment decisions	Fight rising prices	Protect freedom of speech	N
Netherlands	2000	47.7	15.0	13.8	23.4	1,580
Portugal	2000	35.8	27.0	31.8	5.2	985
Slovenia	2010	37.9	25.4	31.4	5.1	1,056
	2000	35.5	34.3	22.7	7.3	1,028
Spain	2010	32.2	25.6	32.6	21.0	2,499
	2000	41.4	15.8	26.7	16.0	917
Sweden	2010	55.7	22.2	6.8	15.0	1,122
	2000	55.3	24.9	5.0	14.6	1,028
United Kingdom	2010	37.6	32.7	19.4	10.2	840
	2000**	42.9	28.4	22.1	9.0	1,574
Turkey	2010	44.7	18.1	27.4	9.8	1,622

Note: * Values for Germany 2000 are combined averages for Western and Eastern Germany.

** Values for the UK 2000 are combined averages for the United Kingdom and Northern Island.

Table 5. *WVS (2005)*: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? (In percentages*)

	Not at all important	Somewhat important	Absolutely important	N
US	2.5	13.2	84.3	1,205
EU	3.1	8.8	88.1	14,792
Bulgaria	7.6	13.7	78.7	953
Cyprus	2.3	5.0	92.7	1,045
Finland	2.3	8.2	89.5	1,004
France	3.2	11.1	85.7	984
Germany	1.5	5.1	93.4	2,046
Italy	1.7	7.7	90.6	1,000
Netherlands	1.6	8.1	90.3	1,012
Poland	2.9	9.4	87.7	949
Romania	5.0	7.6	87.4	1,653
Slovenia	6.3	16.3	77.4	984
Spain	0.8	9.4	89.8	1,183
Sweden	0.9	1.6	97.5	1,001
United Kingdom	4.0	10.8	85.2	978
Turkey	1.4	4.5	94.1	1,918

Note: *the original scale ranges from 1 – “not at all important” to 10 – “absolutely important”. The table illustrates results from the rescaled categories, namely 1, 2, 3, 4 denotes “not at all important”, 5 and 6 – “somewhat important” and 7, 8, 9, 10 - “absolutely important”.

Table 6. *EB (2009)*: Among the following, what do you think should be the top priorities of the European Union for the years to come? (In percentages)

	EU
Economic recovery	72.2
Boosting growth in a sustainable way	44.3
Fighting climate change	43.1
Helping to create stability in the World	42.9
Advancing on rights of citizens	28.5
Other	1.0
N	26,731

Note: EU is EU27; multiple response.

2. General Attitudes towards Human Rights and Democracy

Table 7. *WVS (2005)*: Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy? (In percentages*)

	US	EU**	Turkey
Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor	30.3	56.2	69.9
Religious authorities interpret the laws	12.0	17.3	36.8
People choose their leaders in free elections	80.2	72.6**	85.7
People receive state aid for unemployment	42.7	74.2	84.0
The army takes over when government is incompetent	19.1	23.5	45.7
Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression	76.3	81.6	83.9
The economy is prospering	60.3	70.4	85.9
Criminals are severely punished	59.3	70.2	75.0
People can change the laws in referendums	68.3	71.5**	85.4
<i>N</i>	1,198	13,528/ 12,539**	1,307

Note: *the original scale ranges from 1 – “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” to 10 – “an essential characteristic of democracy”. The table illustrates results only for the category “an essential characteristic of democracy” *after* all the variables were rescaled with values 1, 2, 3, 4 falling into category “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy”, 5 and 6 – “somewhat essential” and 7, 8, 9, 10 - “an essential characteristic of democracy”.

**Sweden was not included in the sample; EU is Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia, Poland, United Kingdom

Table 8. *GAP (2009)*: Here is a list of things that you can and cannot do in some countries. How important is it to you to live in a country where [INSERT]? Is it very important, somewhat important, not too important or not important at all? (In percentages*)

	BG	CZ	HU	LT	PL	SK
You can openly say what you think and can criticize the (state/government)	56.2	45.8	64.9	38.4	49.9	38.6
Honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties	60.0	55.3	70.5	39.3	50.9	43.1
There is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way	80.6	77.0	79.5	58.9	64.3	57.0
The military is under the control of civilian leaders	26.8	34.5	32.9	19.8	28.6	20.5
(The media/news organizations) can report the news without (state/government) censorship	59.7	65.5	59.5	49.9	51.5	41.2
You can practice your religion freely	57.9	45.2	66.4	46.8	62.6	46.8
<i>N</i>	1,000	1,145	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,001

Note: *Only values for category “very important” are reported.

BG- Bulgaria, CZ- Czech Republic, HU – Hungary, LT- Lithuania, PL- Poland, SK- Slovak Republic

Table 9. *GAP (2009)*: If you had to choose between a good democracy or a strong economy, which would you say is more important? (In percentages)

	Good democracy	Strong economy	DK/RF	N
US	54.5	38.0	7.5	1,006
EU	43.6	50.3	6.1	11,754
Bulgaria	18.2	74.7	7.1	1,000
Czech Republic	43.0	50.4	6.6	1,145
France	72.9	26.9	0.2	1,002
Germany	59.4	35.0	5.6	1,600
Hungary	19.2	73.5	7.3	1,000
Italy	46.8	48.4	4.8	1,005
Lithuania	17.3	77.9	4.8	1,000
Poland	36.7	53.8	9.5	1,000
Slovakia	41.2	49.9	8.9	1,001
Spain	67.6	25.9	6.5	1,001
United Kingdom	56.4	37.0	6.6	1,000

Table 10. *WVS (2005)*: And how democratically is this country being governed today? (In percentages*)

	Not at all democratic	Somewhat democratic	Absolutely democratic	N
US	17.7	28.9	53.4	1,193
EU	17.6	25.8	56.6	14,605
Bulgaria	53.6	27.4	18.9	957
Cyprus	17.1	24.1	58.6	1,047
Finland	6.0	17.3	76.6	997
France	13.6	31.8	54.4	984
Germany	17.5	26.6	56.7	2,031
Italy	27.6	31.3	41.0	973
Netherlands	14.4	28.1	57.4	1,012
Poland	22.7	39.8	37.4	917
Romania	26.0	31.4	42.5	1,590
Slovenia	23.0	35.2	41.6	950
Spain	4.8	24.4	70.6	1,180
Sweden	7.7	13.8	78.3	989
United Kingdom	13.6	31.8	54.4	978
Turkey	27.7	27.5	44.8	1,282

Note: *the original scale ranges from 1 – “not at all democratic” to 10 – “absolutely democratic”. The table illustrates results from the rescaled categories, and namely 1, 2, 3, 4 – “not at all democratic”, 5 and 6 – “somewhat democratic” and 7, 8, 9, 10 - “absolutely democratic”.

Table 11. *WVS (2005)*: How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays (in our country)? (In percentages)

	No respect at all	Not much respect	Some respect	A lot respect	N
US	3.3	32.1	48.3	16.3	1,205
EU	6.7	35.2	48.4	9.7	13,100
Bulgaria	23.2	57.4	13.6	5.8	1,047
Cyprus	9.8	25.3	48.2	16.7	1,007
Finland	0.5	14.9	68.1	16.5	1,996
Germany	2.4	31.6	51.4	14.6	983
Italy	4.4	38.7	52.3	4.6	929
Poland	4.6	30.8	60.0	4.4	992
Romania	12.6	57.1	28.1	2.2	1,669
Slovenia	4.3	49.4	41.4	4.9	1,007
Spain	5.2	31.6	53.4	9.8	1,171
Sweden	0.6	14.9	68.3	16.2	994
Turkey	23.6	38.5	32.2	5.7	1,305

Table 12. *GAP (2010)*: All things considered, who has a better in this country – men or women? (In percentages)

	Men	Women	Same	DK/RF	N
US	41.5	21.5	24.5	12.5	1,002
EU	52.6	15.2	26.5	5.8	3,757
France	73.9	14.7	9.5	1.9	752
Germany	50.0	14.9	28.7	6.4	750
Poland	55.3	14.3	24.5	5.9	750
Spain	44.9	16.7	33.4	4.9	755
Spain	38.7	15.2	36.5	9.7	1,171
Sweden	52.6	15.2	26.5	5.8	994
United Kingdom	73.9	14.7	9.5	1.9	750
Turkey	34.9	27.2	36.2	1.7	1,003

Table 13. *EB (2009)*: Using a scale from 1 to 10, how would you judge the performance of the European Union in each of the following areas? 1 means that the European Union's performance in a specific area is not at all satisfactory and 10 means that its performance is very satisfactory. (In percentages*)

	Not at all satisfactory	Somewhat satisfactory	Very satisfactory
Fighting unemployment	51.4	30.4	18.2
Protecting social rights	36.9	34.0	29.1
Ensuring economic growth	39.9	34.5	25.6
Fighting organised crime	34.7	32.5	32.8
Fighting terrorism	29.1	31.5	39.4
Ensuring food safety	27.9	32.6	39.5
Protecting the environment	28.6	35.5	35.9
Managing major health issues	28.5	35.2	36.3
Equal treatment of men and women	25.7	33.1	41.2
N		26,830	

Note: *The original scale ranges from 0 – “not at all satisfactory” to 10 – “very satisfactory”. The table illustrates results from the rescaled categories, and namely 1, 2, 3, 4 mean “not at all satisfactory”, 5 and 6 – “somewhat satisfactory” and 7, 8, 9, 10 - “very satisfactory”
EU is EU 27.

Table 14. *PIPA (2005)*: How much influence do you think the views of the majority of Americans have on the decisions of elected officials in Washington? Please answer on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 meaning not at all influential and 10 meaning extremely influential. (In percentages*).

	US
Not at all influential	51.6
Somewhat influential	32.3
Extremely influential	16.1
<i>N</i>	808

Note: *The original scale ranges from 0 – “not at all influential” to 10 – “extremely influential”. The table illustrates results from the rescaled categories, and namely 0, 1, 2, 3, – “not at all democratic”, 4, 5 and 6 – “somewhat democratic” and 7, 8, 9, 10 - “absolutely democratic”

3. The Role of the Main Stakeholders in the Area of Human Rights and Democracy

Table 15. *WVS (2005)*: Some people believe that certain kinds of problems could be better handled by the United Nations than by the various national governments. Others think that these problems should be left entirely to the respective national governments; while others think they would be handled best by the national governments working together with coordination by the United Nations. I’m going to mention some problems. For each one, would you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should be decided by the national governments, by the United Nations, or by the national governments with UN coordination? (In percentages)

--- Human Rights

	National government	Regional organizations	United Nations	<i>N</i>
US	46.4	18.9	34.7	1,181
EU	33.7	18.1	48.2	12,457
Bulgaria	37.6	28.8	33.6	894
Cyprus	33.5	29.4	37.1	1,045
Finland	34.4	7.7	57.9	987
Germany	21.9	20.4	57.7	1,962
Italy	29.0	15.9	55.1	934
Poland	50.5	7.3	42.2	971
Romania	51.5	12.4	36.1	1,475
Slovenia	43.8	33.9	22.3	932
Spain	18.8	16.3	64.9	1,040
Sweden	16.6	9.4	74.0	982
Turkey	44.6	12.9	42.5	1,235

Table 16. *EB (2004, 2003)*: The European Union already has a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a European Security and Defence Policy. There is now a debate about how much further these should be developed. Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements? (In percentages)
 --- The European Union should work to guarantee Human Rights on each member state, even if this is contrary to the wishes of some member states.

	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	DK/RF	N
2004	83.6	7.2	9.2	24,791
2003	80.8	7.6	11.6	16,307

Note: EU is EU25.

Table 17. *TTS (2008, 2007, 2006, 2005), EES (2008, 2007, 2006)*: Do you think it should or should not be the role of the European Union to help establish democracy in other countries? (In percentages)

		It should not	It should	DK/RF	N
2008	EU public*	22.6	68.5	8.9	11,022
	EU elites	15.7	81.5	2.8	280
2007	EU public	24.2	66.7	9.1	11,053
	EU elites	16.7	79.6	3.7	270
2006	EU public	24.4	67.3	8.3	11,039
	EU elites	13.1	84.5	2.4	253
	US public	47.6	44.5	7.9	1,000
2005	EU public	20.5	74.4	5.1	9,059

Note: EU is France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania

Table 18. *TTS (2008, 2007, 2005)*: Do you think it should or should not be the role of the United States to help establish democracy in other countries? (In percentages)

US	Should not	It should	DK/RF	N
2008	56.3	37.5	6.2	1,000
2007	56.4	36.5	7.1	1,000
2005	41.3	52.2	6.5	1,000

Table 19. *VoP (2000)*: What would you say should be the most to important aims for the United Nations in the future? (In percentages)

	US	EU
To protect human rights	42.1	47.0
To give humanitarian aid in times of natural disasters	35.3	29.1
To prevent of war by intervention	30.7	39.4
To give humanitarian aid in times of war/conflict	24.1	25.1
To improve the health of human beings	21.9	21.1
To maintain peace by armed forces	17.2	18.7
To develop into a World Government	6.0	6.7
DK/RF	4.1	8.0
<i>N</i>	1,005	53,851

Note: EU is EU 27; multiple response.

Table 20. *ISSP (2004)*: Which of these two statements comes closer to your view?

1. If a country seriously violates human rights, the United Nations should intervene.
 2. Even if human rights are seriously violated, the country's sovereignty must be respected, and the United Nations should not intervene.
 3. I don't know what the United Nations is.
- (In percentages)

	Should intervene	Should not intervene	I don't know what the UN is	N
US	76.2	19.4	4.4	1,399
EU	76.5	19.1	4.4	18,743
Austria	85.9	14.0	0.1	862
Belgium	82.9	12.8	4.3	1,165
Bulgaria	66.9	22.9	10.2	824
Cyprus	40.3	59.6	0.1	726
Czech Republic	57.2	35.9	6.9	1,134
Denmark	94.5	4.4	1.1	1,109
France	83.4	14.5	2.1	1,254
Germany	81.1	17.1	1.8	1,121
Hungary	59.2	25.7	15.1	902
Ireland	87.3	8.8	3.9	964
Netherlands	92.9	5.9	1.2	1,659
Poland	77.3	15.1	7.6	1,091
Slovakia	61.1	33.3	5.6	936
Slovenia	64.9	30.2	4.9	945
Spain	82.5	12.1	5.4	2,087
Sweden	95.6	4.0	0.4	1,215
United Kingdom	85.8	9.4	4.8	749

Table 21. *PIPA (2004)*: What is your impression of the positions of the following people or groups on this question: Who should have the stronger role in helping the Iraqis to write a new constitution and build a new democratic government, the United States or the United Nations? (In percentages)

	US
United States	64.7
United Nations	27.5
DK/RF	7.8
N	641

Table 22. *EB (2009)*: In your opinion, on which of the following global threats and challenges an increased cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations may bring the maximum benefits? (In percentages)

	Mentioned
Poverty	35.4
Peace keeping	30.5
Human rights and democracy	27.5
Global health (access to health, fight against pandemics, aids and other diseases)	24.9
Climate change	24.8
Trade and economic development	22.5
Terrorism	20.4
Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	20.1
Environment	15.1
Education	15.1
Disarmament	12.6
Humanitarian aid	12.5
All of them	1.2
Other	0.2
<i>N</i>	26,731

Note: EU is EU 27; multiple response.

Table 23. *PIPA (2005)*: In general, is it better for the US to promote democracy by:
 1. Acting on its own because the US can act more decisively and effectively.
 2. Working through the UN because such efforts will be seen as more legitimate.
 (In percentages)

	US
Acting on its own because the US can act more decisively and effectively	25.3
Working through the UN because such efforts will be seen as more legitimate	68.6
DK/RF	6.1
<i>N</i>	606

Table 24. *PIPA (2005)*: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

1. The World Bank should help people in poor countries and not discriminate against some because they happen to live in a country with a non-democratic government.
 2. The World Bank should help people in poor countries and not discriminate against some because they happen to live in a country with a non-democratic government
- (In percentages)

	Disagree	Agree	DK/RF
The World Bank should only give loans to poor countries that are democracies or are moving toward becoming more democratic so as to encourage countries to become more democratic.	36.8	52.3	10.9
The World Bank should help people in poor countries and not discriminate against some because they happen to live in a country with a non-democratic government.	23.9	65.8	10.3
<i>N</i>		606	

4. Policies and Instruments Applied in the Area of Human Rights and Democracy

Table 25. *TTS (2005)*: Let's imagine an authoritarian regime in which there is no political or religious freedom. To help democracy, would you support the following actions by the [European Union/United States]? (In percentages)

	No	Yes	I don't think it the role of the EU/US	DK/RF
Monitoring elections in new democracies				
EU public	13.1	81.6	0.9	4.4
US public	25.1	69.4	0.9	4.6
Supporting independent groups such as trade unions, human rights associations				
EU public	13.1	75.9	0.8	4.5
US public	25.1	71.9	0.8	7.4
Supporting political dissidents/political elites				
EU public	36.4	52.5	0.9	10.2
US public	39.7	44.3	0.6	15.4
Imposing political sanctions				
EU public	36.7	53.8	0.9	8.6
US public	33.5	56.0	0.3	10.2
Imposing economic sanctions				
EU public	37.8	53.6	0.9	7.7
US public	27.0	65.1	0.9	7.0
Sending military forces to remove authoritarian regimes				
EU public	60.1	31.4	1.0	7.5
US public	52.7	36.8	1.0	9.5
N	EU public		10,080	
N	US public		1,000	

Note: EU is Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Poland, Slovakia.

Table 26. *TTS (2006), EES (2006)*: Let's imagine an authoritarian regime in which there is no political or religious freedom. To help democracy, would you support the following actions by the [European Union/United States]? (In percentages)

	No	Yes	I don't think it the role of the EU/US	DK/RF
Monitoring elections in new democracies				
EU public	13.8	75.7	2.6	7.9
US public	28.0	67.1	1.0	3.9
EU elites	5.2	91.7	0.0	3.1
Supporting independent groups such as trade unions, human rights associations				
EU public	16.3	72.9	2.4	8.4
US public	23.5	71.2	0.6	4.7
EU elites	12.7	83.7	0.0	3.6
Supporting political dissidents/political elites				
EU public	33.6	47.8	2.6	16.0
US public	43.6	39.4	0.7	16.3
EU elites	17.4	76.7	0.0	5.9
Imposing political sanctions				
EU public	35.7	47.9	2.6	13.8
US public	37.8	51.4	0.7	10.1
EU elites	21.7	71.5	0.1	6.7
Imposing economic sanctions				
EU public	35.5	50.7	2.4	11.4
US public	31.3	60.7	0.7	7.3
EU elites	33.2	62.4	0.0	4.3
Sending military forces to remove authoritarian regimes				
EU public	64.8	21.9	2.9	10.3
US public	55.8	34.1	1.1	9.0
EU elites	82.2	8.7	0.4	8.7
<i>N</i>	EU public		12,044	
<i>N</i>	US public		1,000	
<i>N</i>	EU		253	
elites				

Note: EU is Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania.

Table 27. *PIPA (2005)*: Please evaluate the effectiveness of following methods the US can employ to promote democracy. (In percentages)

	A lot more harm than good	A little more harm than good	A little more good than harm	A lot more good than harm	DK/RF
Helping a government that is having free elections for the first time by giving it aid and technical assistance.	4.5	10.2	44.4	30.5	10.4
Bringing students, journalists and political leaders to the US to educate them on how democracy works.	6.3	14.8	46.1	21.8	11.0
Withholding development aid from countries that are not democratic or are not moving toward becoming more democratic.	12.9	37.2	27.9	10.1	11.9
Putting diplomatic pressure on a government to become more democratic, speak out against its lack of democracy, and encourage other countries to do the same.	12.2	29.1	34.9	11.9	11.9
Pressuring a non-democratic government with some economic sanctions such as reduced trade with the US.	10.9	33.9	34.7	8.6	11.9
Supporting dissidents in a non-democratic country.	18.1	30.1	33.1	5.6	13.1
Warning a government that the US might intervene militarily if it does not carry out some democratic reforms.	39.9	28.6	15.7	4.3	11.5
Using military force to overthrow a dictator.	36.8	24.6	17.1	9.1	12.4
<i>N</i>			606		

Table 28. *EB (2009)*: From the following list of issues regarding human rights, what should be the main priorities for the European Union's foreign policy? (In percentages)

	EU
Economic and social rights	42.6
Fighting human trafficking	37.8
Children's rights	36.7
Women's right	35.7
Freedom of speech	26.7
Fight against racism, xenophobia and discrimination	24.8
Fighting torture	17.3
Lack of fair trial	12.4
Abolition of the death penalty	12.3
Freedom of the media	8.6
Rights of those belonging to minority and ethnic groups	7.6
Fight against detention without trial	7.5
Others	0.5
None	0.5
<i>N</i>	30,343

Note: EU is EU 27; multiple response.

Table 29. *FEB (2008)*: Please tell for each of the following areas if you see an added value of action being taken at EU level compared to the national level alone? (In percentages)

	No, I do not see an added value for action being taken at EU level	Yes, I see an added value for action being taken at EU level
Immigration policy	37.6	62.4
Asylum policy	38.8	61.2
Exchange of police and judicial information between Member States	26.4	73.6
Fight against organised crime and terrorism	22.7	77.3
Fight against drugs abuse	28.2	71.8
Control of external borders of the EU	29.2	70.8
Promoting and protecting fundamental rights, including children's rights	29.5	70.5
Improving access to justice	38.3	61.7
<i>N</i>	29,830	

Note: EU is EU 27.

Table 30. *EB (2009)*: In your opinion, is the EU currently doing too much, doing about the right amount, or not doing enough to promote and defend human rights in the world? (in percentages)

	EU
Not enough	53.7
About the right amount	43.6
Too much	2.7
<i>N</i>	30,343

Note: EU is EU 27.

Table 31. *FEB (2008)*: Please tell me on which of the following topics the EU should, in your view, could communicate in a more efficient way regarding its policy/actions. (In percentages)
 --- Promoting and protecting fundamental rights including children's rights

	Mentioned
EU	80.8
Austria	79.0
Belgium	75.4
Bulgaria	83.9
Cyprus (Republic)	86.7
Czech Republic	69.8
Denmark	84.1
Estonia	79.8
Finland	84.6
France	90.8
Germany	82.6
Greece	95.0
Hungary	71.7
Ireland	88.6
Italy	87.7
Latvia	77.3
Lithuania	68.2
Luxembourg	86.1
Malta	67.1
Netherlands	64.3
Poland	82.3
Portugal	91.6
Romania	89.3
Slovakia	81.4
Slovenia	55.4
Spain	86.0
Sweden	84.4
United Kingdom	83.9
<i>N</i>	23,592

Note: EU is EU 27; multiple response.

Table 32. *EB (2009, 2006, 2005)*: For each of the following, please tell me whether in your opinion the European Union is ahead, behind or at the same level as the United States. (In percentages)
 --- Fighting discrimination

	2009*	2006**	2005**
Behind	23.6	17.2	17.4
At the same level	31.9	27.2	24.3
Ahead	44.5	42.9	42.9
DK/RF	-	12.7	15.4
<i>N</i>	23,349	29,152	29,321

Note: *EU is EU 27; **EU is EU 25.

Table 33. *EB (2009, 2006, 2005)*: For each of the following, please tell me whether in your opinion the European Union is ahead, behind or at the same level as the United States. (In percentages)
 --- Fighting Social Disparity

	2009*	2006**	2005**
Behind	20.6	14.9	15.1
At the same level	26.9	23.1	20.1
Ahead	52.5	49.7	49.5
DK/RF	-	12.3	15.3
<i>N</i>	3,349	29,152	29,328

*EU is EU 27; **EU is EU 25.

THE PROJECT

In an era of global flux, emerging powers and growing interconnectedness, transatlantic relations appear to have lost their bearings. As the international system fragments into different constellations of state and non-state powers across different policy domains, the US and the EU can no longer claim exclusive leadership in global governance. Traditional paradigms to understand the transatlantic relationship are thus wanting. A new approach is needed to pinpoint the direction transatlantic relations are taking. TRANSWORLD provides such an approach by a) ascertaining, differentiating among four policy domains (economic, security, environment, and human rights/democracy), whether transatlantic relations are drifting apart, adapting along an ad hoc cooperation-based pattern, or evolving into a different but resilient special partnership; b) assessing the role of a re-defined transatlantic relationship in the global governance architecture; c) providing tested policy recommendations on how the US and the EU could best cooperate to enhance the viability, effectiveness, and accountability of governance structures.

CONSORTIUM

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