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International Security Across the Atlantic: A Longitudinal Comparison of Public Opinion in Europe and the United States

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The paper compares the attitudes and preferences of American and European public opinion along four major dimensions of international security: threat perceptions, sense of community, support for Atlantic partnership and institutions, and orientation toward the use of military force. After a retrospective overview of the relevance of foreign and security policy issues to the public, a thorough review of the existing polling data shows that Europeans and Americans have a similar structure of belief along these four dimensions. They have comparable perceptions of threats, domestic priorities and comparable perceptions of friends and allies and a strong affinity for each other. Europeans and Americans agree upon the relative distribution of power in the world and on the relative importance of economic versus military strength. Most Europeans and Americans are internationalists and Atlanticists. They share a belief in both the necessity and effectiveness of multilateral, common action and international institutions. The only area on which the differences in views seem to be more stable is on the suitability and acceptability of the use of military force, with Europeans giving a higher priority to soft tools than Americans.

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Europe Unites States Public opinion Military Mission NATO

Introduction

The history of transatlantic relations makes abundantly clear that Europeans and Americans, while sharing many interests and values, have also had divergent ideas on specific policies. While this is hardly disputed, several scholars and commentators further claim that, with developments such as the end of the Cold War, the growing unilateralism of American foreign policy and the increasing economic assertiveness of the European Union, the nature of transatlantic relations has now fundamentally changed. Europeans and Americans, it is assumed, would no longer share the same view of the world and, as a consequence, their attitudes on international security issues would be remarkably different (Mearsheimer 1990, Walt 1998/99, Kagan 2002, Kupchan 2002, Ikenberry 2008, Lundestad 2008). This divergence of attitudes comes as no surprise since the Atlantic order is a political arrangement among sovereign states quite different from previous ones in history and, as such, difficult to understand through the traditional lenses of international power politics.

We think that understanding how people structure their view of transatlantic relations and whether Americans and Europeans do so in different ways can contribute to a better understanding of why transatlantic relations are sometimes characterized by tensions and, at other times, by unity of purpose and action. This consideration could in principle be extended to different issue-areas, but in this paper we focus only on security. In particular, we examine the recent evolutions in the state of Transatlantic relations, in order to assess whether and to what extent there is indeed – as is often alleged – a transatlantic gap in the public's perception of international security and whether it is getting wider or not.

Four fundamental dimensions of the transatlantic order are investigated to compare the state of mutual relations and their stability. These dimensions are: 1) a shared definition of threats to the constituted order; 2) a sense of community among the members of this order; 3) support for the main transatlantic institutional mechanisms of cooperation and coordination and, finally, 4) the readiness to use force to defend this order if needed. To these four dimensions we add a fifth element that is the relevance of international security issues to the American and European public.

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The *first* dimension of the transatlantic order is the definition of what are the threats to this order and whether there are differences in the perception of threat that might divide the US and Europe. Perception of threats is often considered to be the litmus test of the differing European and American worldviews (Kagan 2002, Nau 2008). The *second* dimension concerns the sense of affinity and similarity among Europeans and Americans, with particular reference to anti-Americanism – in Europe – and anti-Europeanism in the United States. The *third* dimension is the role of the US and the EU in the world and their relationship. Some scholars argue that the current estrangement is due to structural questions, in particular the position of Europe vis-à-vis the United States (Risse 1995, Ikenberry 2001 and 2008). Included here are arguments derived from the fact that we are today living in a world which is militarily still unipolar but economically multipolar. We want to analyze this issue in some more depth, looking, inter alia, at the issue of multilateralism versus unilateralism, focusing on the appreciation of the NATO alliance and the desire for a common partnership. The *fourth* and last dimension explores differential attitudes on the use of military force in Europe and the United States, both in principle and in specific circumstances.

We have chosen to assess the state of Transatlantic relations on these four dimensions not only because several scholars have pointed to them to argue the existence of a gap between Europeans and Americans, but also because they do seem to constitute indeed different, and as we assume fundamental, aspects of the structure of beliefs of the public. The analysis of these dimensions can, therefore, shed some comparative light on the issue of whether and how the public in the US and Europe have parted company or (continue to) share a common way of structuring their attitudes toward foreign and security policy. Moreover, those four dimensions are also theoretically relevant, since they refer to as many different variables that, in the decades-long debate among Realism and Neorealism,[1] Liberal (Deutsch et al. 1957, Adler and Barnett 1998, Ikenberry 2011) and Constructivist approaches (Risse 1995, Wendt 1999) about the sources, nature and consequences of the transatlantic order, have been referred to as sources of differences and similarities between the two sides of the Atlantic Community.

The paper is organized in four main sections, each focusing on a different dimension of the transatlantic order, preceded by a preliminary section in which the prominence of international security issues in the American and European public agenda is examined.

The analyses in this paper are based on secondary data collected from a number of opinion surveys held in the last ten years (see Table 1). When available, historical trends are reported as well (Tables 14, 20 and 28). For comparability over time, based on the availability of data, European countries are arranged in the following groups: *Europe-7* (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom); *Europe 9* (Europe-7 plus Slovakia and Spain); *Europe 11* (Europe-9 plus Bulgaria and Romania); *Europe 15* (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom); *Europe 27* (Europe-15 plus Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia). When other groups are considered, these are specified in the Appendix. As a general rule, results for Western European countries are displayed either in the left columns or top rows of the tables, whereas results for Eastern European countries are presented either in the right columns or the bottom rows of the same tables.

1 Some examples are Waltz (2000) for structural realism, Ikenberry (2001) for hegemonic stability theory, Bacevich (2002) and Maier (2006) for some variants of theories of empire.

The data seem to show that, of the four elements discussed, the major source of differences among publics on both sides of the Atlantic consists of their different views and attitudes toward the adequacy and legitimacy of the use of military force. In other words, sources of differences between Europeans and Americans seem to bear not so much upon either structural divergences in goals and values, on opposite perceptions of threats or on entrenched animosities, but rather on different assessments of the relative merits of different means and instruments in attaining the commonly desired goals.includes shaping the global institutions of the 20th century to meet the challenges of the 21st" (Obama 2012). Current Secretary of State John Kerry reiterated this view: "we will continue to lead as the indispensable nation, not because we seek this role, but because the world needs us to fill it. Not as a choice, but as a charge" (Kerry 2013). In Hillary Clinton's words: "So we can't allow in this very big complex world that is so demanding to have the United States absent anywhere" (Clinton 2010).

In short, US leaders still see the world through a "Ptolemaic" framework (to use Weber and Jentleson's metaphor) where the United States is at the center. And because US leaders still see the United States as the most powerful nation in the world and as the necessary leader to create collective solutions, there has been little public debate about the need for a changed conception of America's role in the world. Certainly, there is increased talk of "partnership" and "building the capacity of others." But the American body politic has not begun to make the psychological adjustment to a reduced and more consultative relationship with the rest of the world that would need to accompany a shift to a "Copernican" perspective.

The persistent portrayal of the United States as the "indispensible nation" also inhibits transformative change in terms of matching reduced budgets to limited policy objectives in a revised grand strategy for conditions of austerity. The Obama administration's apparent solution is a "light footprint" around the world (Sanger 2012:420-425).

An unanswerable question is the extent to which the strategic vision of the Obama administration will be embraced by future presidents, particularly one from the Republican Party. The current fractures within the Republican Party make it difficult to discern what its opposing vision might be. Historically, however, the Republican Party has been more ardent about American exceptionalism and the need to assert American dominance and less likely to cede control over some international governance issues to other actors. At the same time, however, the analysis herein shows that both Republican and Democratic administrations have created broad-based innovative institutional structures to deal with transnational security threats and leaders from both parties see the benefits of establishing cooperative relationships with China, India, and other important powers.

Whether the American resolve to maintain US global leadership is prescience or denial is beyond the scope of this working paper. It is enough to observe that on the one hand, evidence shows that the US government is adjusting to global shifts: it is creating new forums for more inclusive governance, building affiliation where possible with rising powers, reaffirming old partnerships, working to maintain US legitimacy, and shifting its attention to Asia. On the other hand, the US leadership does not foresee, and it is not preparing itself or the American public for, a Copernican future where the United States is no longer at the center of global governance.

1. International Security on the Public Agenda

A cross-country comparison of the public's agenda shows that security and foreign affairs are not a top priority for Europeans (Table 2). In the last ten years, on average, only 2.0% of the whole Eurobarometer sample mentioned "defense" and "foreign affairs" as the two most important problems facing the country. The average percentage is even lower (1.7%) when Eastern European countries are considered. Although slight variations are observed in the 2003-2011 period, especially in conjunction with critical events (e.g., the war in Iraq in 2003), the samples that exhibit the greatest concern for these issues are in Denmark (5.5%), Slovenia (4.2%), Britain (4.1%), Cyprus (3.6%), and the Netherlands (3.3%). Less than 1% of the interviewed sample views "defense" and "foreign affairs" as a top priority in Portugal, France, Ireland and six out of ten new EU-countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta).

Americans are not more likely to generically mention "international issues" or "problems" as a top priority. However, the role played by their country in international affairs makes them more sensitive to specific issues. Table 3, for instance, displays the percentage of Americans that describe "fear of war", "fear of war in the United States" or "the war in (situation with) Iraq" as the most important problem facing the country. In consideration of the restrictive wording of this question (i.e., respondents are given a single choice), it is worth noticing that these problems are even more relevant than economy in the period between 2004 and 2007.

The gap between the American and European public is narrower when the issue to be investigated is "terrorism". While Americans are particularly sensitive to this problem (see Table 3 for national data), more than 10% of the Eurobarometer respondents perceived it as a top priority until 2007 (Table 4). Both in the American and European case, major increases of this percentage occur in conjunction with deadly terrorist attacks, such as the Madrid bombings in March 2004, the Beslan school massacre in September 2004, the London attacks in July 2005, and the Mumbai train blasts in summer 2006. While strong concern is expressed in the countries that have been targets of these attacks (+45% after the 9/11 tragedy in the United States - Gallup, +8% after the attacks at the Madrid-Atocha railway station in Spain - Eurobarometer and +21% after the attacks on the London transport system in Britain – Eurobarometer), it is worth mentioning that the effects of these dramatic events are not limited to the national public but they spread to other countries as well. After a major terrorist attack, Americans and Europeans are more likely to mention terrorism as the most important problem facing their country, no matter where the attack actually took place.

Terrorism, however, is not the only concern in the post-9/11 world. In late 2002, for instance, the American public's concern with terrorism noticeably decreases as an effect of the imminent war in Iraq. At the beginning of 2003, the economy and the Iraq crisis follow the same pattern, by standing at the top of most people's agendas. Then, in the months immediately following the attack (April-October 2003), the situation in Iraq is not as relevant as it was before the conflict started. On the contrary, American public opinion continues to perceive the economy as the country's most pressing problem. In the following period, the American public's attentiveness to foreign policy does not disappear. Between late 2003 and early 2004, concern about the situation in Iraq steadily increases. The new pattern becomes much more evident in the following months and, in particular, by October 2004. As concern about the economy decreases (from 21% in October 2004 to 10% in March 2005), the American public's top priority becomes the war in Iraq. This pattern is reversed in early 2008, when the economy, as a consequence of the economic crisis, is at the top of Americans' concerns.

In Europe, with the exception of Britain, concern for Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction was far less than the US in 2002. Still, before and after the start of *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, the majority of Europeans considered the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a major threat to their security, no matter if the country in possession of these weapons was Iraq, Iran or North Korea (Table 5). This consideration introduces us to the first dimension of the transatlantic order, that is, the perception of threat.

2. Perception of Threat

Our data do not allow us to say whether the 9/11 terrorist attacks made a significant change in the way people in Europe perceived threats after the end of the Cold War or if they shifted the public order of priorities. Only for the United States, using a similar question asked in 1998 by CCFR, we can make a limited before-after comparison.[2] However, no question similar to the ones examined here has been asked during the Cold War, and therefore we also cannot definitely conclude whether the end of the Cold war has produced a different structure of priorities in threat perceptions. As a final note of cautious, all our analyses of threats are based on close-ended questions, listing a number of specific threats and inviting people to react to them.[3]

To explore the degree of consensus among the US and European public on what are the main threats arising from the international system we proceed in three steps. We first examine similarities and differences in the perception of threats of Europeans and Americans, to gauge how much overlap we find in their assessments. Second, we explore whether Europeans and Americans rank threats differently. Third and last, we explore whether a common overarching structure captures the way people perceive threats among Americans and Europeans.

Our analysis is based on a battery of close-ended questions that list a number of specific threats and invite people to react to them. Table 6 shows the percentages of respondents who deem each of a list of threats as an "extremely important" or "crucial" threat. It offers a first, rough, picture of the similarities and differences in the perception of threats on both sides of the Atlantic and their evolution between 2002 and 2006.[4] The question asked respondents to evaluate each of several possible threats to their country's vital interests over the next ten years.[5] The results represent a mixed picture and supply ammunition both to those who claim a gap does actually exist and to those who, on the contrary, tend to minimize its significance.

Initially, in 2002, there was indeed a wide and significant gap between Europeans and Americans in the number of people expressing concern for a set of threats. A far greater percentage of Americans than of Europeans

2 CCFR 1999. In October 2005, Fox News asked a sample of Americans (N=900) whether "the threat of radical Islamic terrorism today is similar to the threat posed by war with communism in the last century." Quite interestingly, 48% said yes, and 38% no, while 14% did not answer. Apparently, also the American public is divided on the issue. Results are taken from IPoll at the Roper Center (accessed, May 20, 2011).

3 Sterngold et al. (1994) suggest that questions asking straightforwardly how concerned the respondent is might overstate the degree of public concern with public issues. The tendency of implicit presuppositions to inflate the degree of concerns joined with the tendency to agree with statements might possibly have inflated the degree of concern people have for international threats. Because this bias is systematic across years, countries and issues, this does not affect, however, either the comparison or the validity of the structural relationship among variables, but would rather decrease the overall reliability of the results.

4 Due to a change in question wording the comparative analysis of threat perceptions, based on identical questions, cannot go beyond 2006. We discuss in the text the main changes and the reader can find in the Appendix the questions used for the analysis.

5 In 2002 the questions were worded differently in Europe and US. The Europeans were asked to rate the threats as "extremely important", "important" or "not important", while Americans rated them as "critical", "important but not critical", or "not important at all". From 2003 onwards the question asked in Europe was also used in the United States. This change may affect comparability between 2002 and later years in US. From 2008 on the question changed wording, asking "And in the next 10 years, how likely are you to be personally affected by the following threat?" See Appendix for question wording.

considered international terrorism, Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction, a military conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors, China becoming a great power, Islamic fundamentalism and an in-flood of immigrants and refugees to constitute a "critical" threat to their own country. Almost unanimously (91%) the American public considered international terrorism to be a "critical" threat, while only 65 of the Europeans said it was "extremely important", a difference of 26 percentage points.[6] The gap also ran high on China (33 points percentage difference in 2002), Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction (28 points percentage difference) and the Arab-Israeli conflict (24 points difference). Unfortunately, the comparison is not conclusive, since, as mentioned before, in 2002 the question was worded differently in Europe and the US. When we compare priorities in 2003, we see most of these differences decline drastically on most questions. Whether this is an artifact of the changed wording or rather a consequence of 9/11 receding into the past we cannot say.

A comparison can instead be made in the United States between some answers in 2002 and in 1998, to see the extent to which perception of change has been affected by 9/11 and the war on terrorism. Using the CCFR 1998 data for the US, and comparing the five items identical in the two surveys, we find that concern for international terrorism moved slightly up (from 84% in 1998 to 91% in 2002), while Islamic fundamentalism increased substantially (from 40% in 1998 mentioning it as a "critical threat" to 61% doing so in 2002). On the other three items, differences are not large. The percentage of those who consider "Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming to the US" as a "critical" threat went up from 56 to 60 and those mentioning "global warming" went up from 43% in 1998 to 46% in 2002 (CCFR 1999).

However and more importantly, despite the initial absolute differences, the ranking of concerns was strikingly similar across the Atlantic. This was already the case in 2002 and remained so in subsequent years.[7] Both in Europe and the US, international terrorism and Iraq were ranked at the top in terms of concern, while economic competition and political turmoil in Russia were at the bottom of the list. Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction was close behind for both European and Americans, as was "Islamic fundamentalism".

In the overall rank order of perceived seriousness of threats there are a small number of remarkable differences. Americans were relatively more concerned by "power political" threats such as "the emergence of China as a world power", the spread of nuclear weapons and the relations between India and Pakistan. Europeans, on their part, were more concerned about such issues as Islamic fundamentalism, and global warming. But the differences are minor, and on many issues Europeans and Americans thought alike.

Moreover, 2002 was a quite exceptional year, with the Americans still experiencing the immediate impact of the 9/11 events. Looking at the data in a longer time perspective, they probably convey a more sobering message. Contrary to what we could expect, terrorism (and Iraq) in 2002 had not yet structured the perception of threats of the Americans in a similar way as, for example, some argued (e.g., Kagan 2002, Kupchan 2002) the Soviet Union did during the Cold war. Less than one year after the 9/11 events, we could register that the US was a country temporarily deeply uncertain about the threats it had to cope with and in a state of existential *Angst*.

In the years since then (2003-2007) things did change, however. In terms of relative concerns and priorities, Europeans and Americans turned out to have more in common than the proponents of the transatlantic gap

6 The intriguing question why Americans were more concerned in 2002 not only about terrorism - which is self-evident after 9/11 - but across the board defies an easy answer in the context of this paper. The question is important however, since the severity of the perceived threat is potentially an important predictor of the willingness to act. Possibly, the 9/11 attacks were conducive to a more general sense of vulnerability.

7 Using the average percentage reported in Table 6 for the EU and the US, with 17 runs (and 12 runs as critical value with 18 degrees of freedom) on the Wald-Wolfowitz Runs non-parametric test, the two groups show no significant difference.

would claim. For one thing, a systematic decline in threat perceptions among Americans since 2002 has brought them much closer to the perceptions of the average European. This happened, presumably, already between mid-2002 and mid-2003. For terrorism, perception widened again slightly after 2004, but it then followed a parallel path for both Europe and the United States. Between 2003 and 2004, percentages mentioning terrorism as a "very important threat" went up in US from 70% to 76%, while in Europe they remained stable at 71%. In 2005 the percentage of those thinking it was a "very important threat" declined to 59% in Europe and to 71% in US. In 2006, it went up to 79% in US and to 66% in Europe.

A third way of approaching the issue of commonality in threat perceptions between Europeans and Americans is to see whether they look differently at these threats, emphasizing some more than others. To explore the structure of threat perception we run a principal component analysis of these threats for each year, from 2002 to 2006, separately in Europe and the US. Tables 7 and 8 report the factor loading results of the set of structural PCA analysis of the polls conducted between 2002 and 2006, in US and in Europe.[8] Most years, in both Europe and the United States, a two-dimensional factor structure appears as the most appropriate to interpret and synthesize the data. The two exceptions are the United States in 2003 and Europe in 2006, when a three factors structure is statistically compatible with the data.

Two results emerge from this kind of analysis. The first result, reassuring for those who claim a lack of commonality in threat perception across the transatlantic area, is that both in Europe and the United States threats cluster in similar ways. On the one hand, issues related to terrorism, nuclear weapons, immigration, Islamic fundamentalism and military conflicts band themselves together in one group, while threats related to global warming, economy, globalization, Russia and China cluster on the other side. For both the Europeans and the Americans, these two groups of problems represent distinct kind of threats, the first mostly related to standard challenges to the nation-state and the second representing post-modern, globalizing trends.

While referring to the other papers of the Transworld project for an in-depth analysis of the second group of threats (Di Mauro 2014, Peycheva et al. 2014, Puzarina et al. 2014), differences between Europeans and Americans exist with respect to the first group. Tables 5, 9, 10 and 11 provide a cross-country description of the extent to which nuclear weapons, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and immigration are perceived as an "extremely important threat" to the future of Europe and the US. All these issues stand out as relevant factors around which the American address their concerns. In Europe, instead, there are substantial differences, with some countries clearly more concerned than others. Although inter-country variations exist depending on whether the threat is posed by Iraq, Iran or North Korea, the countries that, on average, show the greatest concern for the proliferation of nuclear weapons are Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom among the western member states and Poland, Romania and Slovakia among the Eastern member states. Islamic fundamentalism prove to be at the top of people's concerns in Spain and Germany, whereas international terrorism is considered a relevant threat to Europe in Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Finally, the European countries that express a strong concern about immigration and migrants are Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.

The latter result is confirmed by a trend analysis of the Eurobarometer surveys, which provides a thorough picture of cross-country differences over the last ten years (Table 12). Immigration emerges as a relevant issue not only in Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom (see also Isernia and Olmastroni 2014), but also in Austria,

8 The analysis is based on the polychoric correlation matrix to address the ordinal nature of the data (the variables range from 1=no threat at all to 3= critical/extremely important threat). For a discussion of the advantage of polychoric correlation in PCA see Kolenikov and Angeles (2004). We use the STATA polychoric pca routine implemented by Kolenikow that runs the PCA based on the polychoric correlation matrix with pairwise deletion. The matrix was rotated using varimax.

Belgium, Denmark and Malta.

The evidence on threat perceptions points to one major conclusion: Europeans and Americans overwhelmingly see the world in the same way when it comes to threat perceptions. Perceiving the same threats does not imply, however, that they draw the same conclusions on what to do about them, and particularly whether the use of force is an adequate and legitimate instrument to address them. We will explore this issue below, but let us first turn to the next element, the sense of community across the Atlantic.

3. The Sense of Atlantic Community

A second important source of Atlantic order is constituted by the sense of community existing among democratic countries in the transatlantic area, which affects, in other words, the willingness to cooperate peacefully among the Atlantic partners. A second consequence of a sense of community is that it contributes to create borders, cultural and political, more than legal, which help to define who are we, the "us", as compared to the others, the "them" outside the community. In this section, we explore the extent to which these two elements, one linked to the internal bonds of the community, and the other external, delimiting the frontier between us and them, are still valid in the Atlantic community or whether there are signs of a weakening of these internal bonds.

Our discussion will focus first on the internal dimension of the sense of community: the nature and strength of the bonds between the United States and the European countries. Usually, this discussion has taken place in the frame of debates about the sources, nature and consequences of Anti-Americanism (Everts 2007, Katzenstein and Keohane 2007). Second, we will look at the external dimension, the *we* vs. the *others*, as seen from both the European and US perspective.

As far as the internal dimension of "community" is concerned, data availability suggests that we should focus on affective attitudes toward the United States on the part of Europeans. This not only because available data offer one of those rare opportunities to observe a phenomenon from a long term perspective, tracing the historical ups and downs in transatlantic relationship, but also because this is theoretically appropriate given the preeminent role that anti-Americanism has played in some explanations of the transatlantic rift (e.g., Zakaria 2001, Sweig 2006). We employ a time series of data that measures the "favorability" of the United States among the European countries. This represents a proxy for the evolution of the sense of transatlantic community in Europe as a whole (Chamorel 2004, Everts 2007, Isernia 2007, Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, Holsti 2008, Chiozza 2009).

As Table 13 clearly shows, the Bush era marked a deepest crisis in Atlantic sense of community. The war in Iraq produced a drastic fall in the US favorability rating and left the United States with limited support from its European allies. However, a remarkable increase could be observed in 2009. The election of Barack Obama brought the favorability of the United States right back to the pre-Iraq war average.

The rapid return of positive feelings toward the US after 2008 with the departure of George Bush and the arrival of Barack Obama confirms a historical trend. As shown in Table 14, the net favorability toward the US in Europe has fluctuated (sometimes strongly) over time in the four main Western European countries but on balance it has always tended to be positive. Periods of decline have always been followed by, sometimes equally rapid, recoveries. In that perspective, the sense of estrangement of recent years is not exceptional as such, although it is by far the highest of the entire series. In a few words, Americans and Europeans have always been able

to overcome such crises in the past, and this happened this last time as well. Moreover, the troughs in the American standing among the European public can easily be explained *post hoc* because they roughly coincide with periods of strong political controversy, such as the war in Vietnam in the early 1970s and the crisis over nuclear weapons in the early 1980s.

Looking now in another way at the general orientation toward the United States, we can observe that despite signs of increasing criticism of the US and American policies in Europe (and the other way around), Europeans appear to (continue to) like Americans about as much as, if not even more than, they like each other (see Table 15).

Table 15 reports feelings toward other countries in both US and Europe. Measured in this way, there is little evidence of (growing) anti-Americanism. When asked to rate their feelings toward various countries on a "thermometer" scale from 0 to 100 – with 100 meaning very warm, 50 neutral, and 0 very cold – public opinion in Europe as well as the United States over the years continued to show remarkable similarity in spite of strong criticism of the policies of the Bush administration.[9] The patterns that we observe since 2002 are remarkably stable over time. In Europe, in June 2002, feelings toward the United States were warm and they were at the same rate as those for France, Germany and Great Britain. Americans, on their side, largely reciprocated these warm feelings for the European countries. Americans showed a more neutral feeling toward the EU as an institution, which they gave a 53-degree rating in 2002, than the Europeans, who gave the EU an average rating of 70-degrees.[10]

In 2002 there were no signs yet of any cooling trend on both sides. In most cases, American feelings were a bit warmer than they were in the CCFR survey of 1998 and in no case were they cooler. Of course, things did change somewhat immediately, as a consequence of the Iraq crisis and the dispute on the legitimacy and merit of the war. The most important of these was that the United States initially suffered considerably in terms of the warmth of feelings toward that country.[11]

In the United States, on the other hand, while feelings toward Great Britain remained warm, the criticisms of German and French leaders and the widespread opposition in those countries to the war in Iraq also clearly affected the warmth of American feelings. However, this effect did not seem to be a very lasting one as restoration to the former levels already began in 2004, and remained since then. The Europeans, on their part, remained cooler than before the war.

Whatever the case may be, the matter should be considered from the perspective provided by the fact that compared to how Europeans and Americans feel about other countries in the world, they remain close together and continue(d) to share much cooler feelings toward non-European countries, including definite antipathies toward countries like Syria and Iran.

Thus, in one other poll, Americans on average gave Europeans 58-degrees as compared to 42 for other countries in the survey combined (CCFR 2004). Iraq got the coolest rating in 2002 in both Europe and the United States (respectively at 25 and 23-degrees), with the highest rating at 33-degrees in France and the lowest at

9 One should note that the rating used is a general one and does not make a distinction between a country's people, its leaders, or its policies.

10 This is somewhat surprising given the criticism of European integration and the EU that has become evident in recent years in consecutive Eurobarometer surveys.

11 The 2002 data were collected in June, before the acrimonious debate on what to do of Iraq sparked off. Iraq was not mentioned in the 2003 survey, but it is evident that these feelings were affected by developments since then, as later polls confirmed.

16-degrees in Germany, but it was not included in later surveys. Except for Russia, which is consistently judged more negatively in Europe than in the US, the big exception to this common transatlantic pattern of feelings is Israel. Americans consistently have warmer feelings about Israel than do Europeans. The opposite is, to a lesser extent, true for the assessment of the Palestinians. This is, in all probability, linked to a harsher judgment on Israel's responsibility for the Arab-Israeli situation and to the greater sympathy for the Palestinian cause in Europe. This difference in warmth continued over the years and remained the one major distinction between Europeans and Americans and at the same time a clear exception to the general rule. It is tempting to conclude from these data that in spite of sometimes heated controversies and mutual recriminations Europeans and Americans consider each other to be members of one and the same family, and that the real gap lies elsewhere, between "the West and the rest".

To measure the external dimension of the sense of community, the way we define the "we" as contrasted with the "others", we explore whether perceptions about other countries cluster in the same way in Europe and the United States. Several alternatives are possible. One could be a structure of feelings in which all countries are seen as the "others" and the respondent's own country is seen as distinct from all others. This crucial national divide should produce a one-dimensional factor along which all other countries lie. An alternative perspective, more in line with the Atlantic community thesis, would be to find that both Europeans and Americans see one another as belonging to the same group and the rest of the countries as ganging together in a different group. To explore which of these two alternatives is more appropriate, a set of principal component analysis was made on a feeling thermometer question for the US and EU respectively,[12] asked by Transatlantic Trends Survey repeatedly between 2002 and 2008, when the feeling thermometer question was discontinued.[13] This thermometer asks respondents to assess whether they have warm, lukewarm or cold feelings toward other groups and nations. Tables 16 and 17 report the results. On average, sentiments toward the EU and the US were quite positive, the Iraq crisis notwithstanding, both in Europe and the US. In Europe, the average feeling toward the US in the period 2002-2009 was 56 (on a range 0-100), with a sharp decline from 64 in 2002 to 57 in 2003. It declined only slightly from that score, down to 52 in 2007 and 53 in 2008. In 2009, as part of the so called "Obama bounce" the average feeling toward the US went up again to 60 degrees, while feelings toward the EU both in Europe and the United States remained the same.

The results are reassuring for the supporters of an Atlantic community, although they also show some of the consequences of the transatlantic crisis that occurred during the Bush administration. Looking first at the way Europeans structure their geographical maps, two points stand out.

The first is that the European public sees the US and Europe as part of the same group as compared to other countries like Iraq, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This is clearly the case in 2002 and (again) from 2006 on. The United States and the European countries all lie on the same factor, orthogonal with the second factor where all other countries, some of which clearly perceived as a possible threat cluster together. The second result is that the Bush period was characterized by a severe strain to this sense of we-feelings. Between 2003 and 2005, the main proponents of the Iraq war, the US and the UK, were perceived as sitting separately from both the other European countries and the "other" countries, such as Russia, Iran, China and Turkey. This result seems to imply that, for most Europeans, the crisis did not automatically move the United States among the countries perceived as different or, possibly, as a threat, but rather it moved US (and UK) into a third group

12 Also in this analysis we use the STATA pca routine. The number of relevant factors was decided based on several criteria, such as the Kaiser rule, the scree plot test and parallel analysis based on the Horn procedure and the Ender parallel analysis. The matrix was rotated using varimax.

13 In 2009 the thermometer question was replaced by the favorable-unfavorable question.

together with Israel. In this respect, the case of Israel is quite interesting, since for most Europeans it clearly lies outside the "we-ring" and, both in 2002 and again from 2005 on, once the two-factor solution prevails again, Israel definitely lays with countries such as Turkey, Russia and China.

Moving now to the American image of the world, a different picture from the European one emerges. In the US, the prevalent image of world across the years is based on three groupings. In one lies Europe, with the exception of the United Kingdom in some years. In the outermost groups we find the countries seen as being very different from "us", the United States, including countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia and Syria. Then, there is the second circle made of the countries of the Atlantic community. Finally, two closest allies, Israel and the UK, compose the core group. What the crisis of the period 2002-2007 did do, and only for Europe, was to open a wide gap between the European countries opposed to the war (and to the United States) and those in favor (namely the United Kingdom). Paradoxically, it was in the period of most intense conflict that the three layers view of the world came to be shared by both the American and the European public.

It is also interesting to see how France loads on this structure for the American public in 2003, the crucial year of the war. Quite interestingly, France, the main opponent of the "coalition of the willing" promoted by the Bush administration, weighed positively on both factors 1 and 2, characterizing respectively the Atlantic community allies and the others, pointing to the ambivalent position France had acquired during this contentious year for American public.

In conclusion, we note that the public on both sides of the Atlantic sees the other side as belonging to the same in-group and has a strong sense of attachment to the leading partner of this community, the United States. This sense of community is somewhat different, however, for Europeans and Americans.

4. Atlanticism and Multilateralism

A third possible source of estrangement between Europe and US has been attributed not so much to either a mismatch in threat perceptions or a deterioration of mutual sentiments as to the views which the public on the two sides entertain about the role each of them respectively should play in the world and about the character of the transatlantic relationship. After more than 40 years of unchallenged hegemony in the Western camp, with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new, more elusive, threats, whose nature seems more compatible with the strength the European Union seems to have acquired over time than with the traditional attributes of power, the US leadership may seem less and less indispensable among the European publics than it was in the past.

In this connection, there is a fundamental asymmetry that should be taken into account when discussing relations across the Atlantic. The meaning and purpose of the Atlantic Alliance have always been framed quite differently in Western Europe and in the United States. In the United States, since its inception in 1949, "Atlanticism" was part and parcel of a more general, and comprehensive, view of the international system that, as far as the mass public is concerned, has been rotating all along the Cold War around two major dimensions: internationalism and containment. The first dimension – the traditional internationalism-isolationism continuum – has to do with the need for the United States to be actively involved in world affairs and to exert world leadership in containing threats and deterring enemies. The issue here, at least as far as the United States has been concerned, has never been whether isolationism might come back again. Isolationism, after all, has always

been an elite phenomenon, also in its golden age (Jonas 1966). One real issue during the Cold War, and still now, was rather whether there is enough support in the United States for a foreign policy that accommodates the needs and interests of major allies or rather whether it should go it alone, no matter what this might imply for the allies. The second dimension has to do with the means through which this foreign policy – be it unilateralist or accommodative – should be carried out. On this account, the classical distinction is between cooperative and military instruments in foreign policy and the divide is on the problem of the use of force.

On the European side, the framing of the discussion has always been quite different. The issue in Europe is not isolationism, because no one in Europe wants (or can afford) to be isolationist. In Europe, in different fashions and under different headings, the discussion has traditionally revolved around how distant from or how close European countries should be both diplomatically and politically to the United States. Practically, this has resulted in major cleavages during most of the post-war period, with the left more strongly in favor of a Europe distanced from the United States and the right supporting the opposite. Much less discussed, but analytically similar, has been the question of the means through which to realize one's goals. In Europe, like the US, we can find, on the one hand, those who are more supportive of an Atlantic Alliance joining in arms against a sea of troubles, so to say, and, on the other hand those who favor more economic, diplomatic and non-coercive means.

A critical issue in transatlantic relations is the conflict between the desires of many on both sides of the Atlantic to continue close cooperation and work together through institutions like NATO, while many others are seeking greater autonomy or even want to go separate ways. We refer to this general orientation toward cooperation across the Atlantic as *Atlanticism*. It describes a mutual liking and a general disposition to cooperate through multilateral transatlantic institutions to solve common problems in the security as well as in other areas. To measure this general orientation, we analyzed a set of three questions: a) the desirability of American global leadership among Europeans and a greater role for the EU in world affairs among Americans, b) the desire to work in close cooperation rather than independently and c) general orientations toward NATO. How strong is each of these groups in the various countries and has there been a shift in one direction or another over the years? How does the Obama presidency affect attitudes in this area?

Let us first briefly discuss the available data on each of these indicators and then describe the index that we can construct from them.

4.1 European and American Leadership in World Affairs

A first indicator is the desire for strong EU and US global leadership, measured for Americans and Europeans respectively. Over the years, not only the overwhelming majority of Europeans but also many Americans definitely favored EU leadership next to their own (Table 18). On the other hand, Europeans became markedly more critical or skeptical about the leadership of the US during the Bush era. After a sudden jump in 2002, due to increased expectations about American assertiveness in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, a sharp drop in support for strong US leadership occurred in 2003, and support never bounced back to the considerably higher pre-2002 levels until a new Administration took office in 2009 (Table 19). However, as we saw in Table 14, the trough of the 2000s was not the first we had since this data series recording began. Similar drops in desirability of US leadership occurred in the past, for instance during the Vietnam War and in the early 1980s, in connection with the controversy over the Euromissiles (Table 20). As is the case with the favorability feelings toward the US, the Bush era produced also the deepest and longest dip in the series on US leadership.

In the early 1970s and 1980s, the slump was either shorter – net desirability went down to -9 in 1960, to turn up again to a positive +35 the year after – or milder. In the 1980s net desirability hovered around zero, with the public equally divided among those who desired a strong US leadership and those who did not desire this. In contrast, during the Bush era net desirability for US leadership not only went down deeply, with net favor negatively around -15, but also steadily, remaining negative throughout the Bush Jr. years, from 2004 to 2008. Support for a strong US leadership jumped back again, however, at the outset of the Obama administration in 2009.

Whatever people on both sides felt about the causes of the transatlantic estrangement[14] and about what might be done to remedy the situation, there was widespread agreement in the period 2002-2008 that the transatlantic relationship "has suffered in recent years" (Table 21). It is true that many felt over the years when this question was asked that relations had "stayed the same" but those saying so may well have felt that the relations stayed the same because they could not get any worse.[15] This issue provides another nice illustration of the atmospherics of the Obama bounce. In 2009, very many were seeing or expecting an improvement in the transatlantic relationship, of which there were already indications in 2008. This impression of improvement was widely shared across the Atlantic. Note also, however, that there will always be (a large number of) skeptics who see no change at all, whatever the circumstances.

4.2 A Closer or More Independent Partisanship?

A second way to look at the problem is to see whether Europeans want to see in the future a closer partnership between Europe and the United States or, rather, they prefer each part taking a more independent approach in dealing with world problems. Table 21 describes the trend in answers to the following question: "Do you think that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union should become closer, should remain about the same or should the [European Union/United States] take a more independent approach from the [United States/European Union]?"

The first time this question was asked by Transatlantic Trends Survey was in 2004, amidst the Iraq war and in one of the most acrimonious periods in transatlantic relations, as previous data have abundantly shown. In that year, there was a clear, and remarkable, difference between Europe and the United States. In the United States, a clear majority was in support of a closer partnership with Europe. In 2004, 60% of the American public chose that alternative and only one fifth of the sample (20%) suggested the US should take a more independent approach. These numbers declined between 2004 and now, in part, one can surmise, in reciprocation of the cool attitudes by the Europeans, but majorities or solid pluralities over the years covered by this survey supported a closer partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic.

For Europe, however, the pattern is remarkably different. A majority of Europeans opted in 2004 for a more independent course of action, with 51% arguing that way. In the nine years since then these numbers declined progressively and steadily, however, from 57% to 43% in 2013, with the European public divided between two

14 In 2007 the (mis-)management of the war in Iraq and President Bush himself were mentioned most frequently as the reasons for the deterioration of the transatlantic relations (see Transatlantic Trends 2007).

15 A recent series of annual polls (2006-2008) held among the "European elites" (consisting of members of the European Parliament and officials of the European Commission and European Council) parallel to the Transatlantic Trends surveys showed, however, that there was much awareness at this level of the need of close Atlantic cooperation in spite of equally strong dissatisfaction with the policies of the Bush administrations as at the level of the general public. Likewise, the elites were much more optimistic than the general public that transatlantic relations had improved or at least not further deteriorated since the massive drop in confidence in 2003. See CIRCaP, *Data on Public Opinion and Political Behaviour*, http://www.circap.org/data-on-public-opinion.html.

groups of comparable size. Incidentally, this brings the assessment of the desirability of close partnership to the same level in Europe and in the US.

But what kind of more independent approach do the Europeans have in mind when they answer so? A way of looking at what Europeans have in mind when they think that Europe should take a more independent approach is whether they conceive a future role of the EU similar to that played now by the US or, rather, a completely different one, and then which one. As we described earlier (Table 18), Americans, like Europeans started to do earlier, began to believe firmly that the role of the EU on the world scene should become more prominent, but how this translates in both institutional and policy terms is much less clear. A question was asked in four consecutive years in Transatlantic Trends Survey about whether the US should remain the only superpower or whether Europe should become "a superpower like the US" (Table 22).

In 2002, a majority of 52 of the Americans still thought that the United States "should remain the only superpower". This was a point on which Europeans and Americans clearly diverged, even though the survey found significant differences among Europeans themselves as well, suggesting that there was no clear consensus on these issues. Europeans already in 2002 indicated clearly that they would like the EU to become another superpower, and this feeling became even stronger since then. 65 present of Europeans said in 2002 that the EU should become a superpower like the United States, while only 13 endorsed the view that the United States should remain the only superpower. At the time, only in the case of Germany did a plurality (48), rather than a majority, endorse the idea of the EU becoming a superpower. In all other cases this idea was supported a by clear majorities, ranging from 56 of the British to an overwhelming 91 of the French. However, in two countries – Germany and the Netherlands – a quarter of respondents volunteered in 2002 the response "No country should be a superpower."[16]

If superpower it should be, the one most Europeans had in mind, then and now, is, however, primarily an economic power, which co-operates rather than competes with the US (Table 23, see also Table 21).[17] Moreover, over the years only pluralities were also prepared to increase military spending should this be necessary (Table 24). It is interesting in this connection, however, that those who preferred to reduce defense spending were generally not "free riders" who would gladly profit from American efforts without sharing the burden. Over the years, the view that Europe should also become a superpower (whatever this might imply) became increasingly shared by the Americans (the numbers increased from 33 to 47) and in line with this, the numbers of those who thought that the US should remain the only superpower decreased from 56 to 36. Americans and Europeans in this respect became more similar. Moreover, American proponents of a larger European role also felt by a very large majority that this should be so even if the EU might sometimes oppose US policies (Table 24).

On their side, when Europeans think about a more prominent European role they do only partly aspire to a role that is more independent of the US. In 2007, as shown in Table 25, (small) majorities in all European countries surveyed felt that EU should address international threats together with the US rather than independently (with the exception of France and Slovakia). Over the years, very large and stable majorities (and this was even truer for the Americans)[18] also subscribed to the statement: "When our country acts on a national security issue, it is

16 These outcomes were confirmed by the Eurobarometers 59 and 63 (respectively 2003 and 2005) that showed that over the years around 80 percent supported the notion that "European Union foreign policy should be independent of United States foreign policy," admittedly a different question but one that also hints at the notion that the EU should play an autonomous role in the world.

17 In 2005, 44% of Americans thought that a more powerful EU should cooperate rather than compete (40%) with the US (Transatlantic Trends 2005). See also Table 21.

18 We should recognize, however, that to Americans "allies" might not mean the same as for Europeans, with all that that may imply.

critical that we do so together with our closest allies" (Table 26).

On both sides of the Atlantic there are also some other reservations about their partners, however. As noted already above, support for a leading role of the US has declined considerably since 2003. Some Americans also feel uneasy, however, with the idea of Europe becoming a superpower. Both sides have differing, even sometimes contradictory views, one might surmise, on what a superpower is meant to be. If Europeans want Europe to be a superpower, they say they want it to cooperate rather than compete with the United States and prefer to put more emphasis on the non-military dimensions of power. Americans, on their part, seem wary about this alleged European preference and rather want Europeans to share the military burden of maintaining order in the world (55 wanted it in 2002 to increase its military power and a majority also agreed that one of the benefits of NATO is that it allows sharing the military burden (Transatlantic Trends 2005). At the same time, they show hesitancy about Europe becoming too strong in the process. In 2006 a majority (73%) of Americans also agreed, however, that Europe should concentrate on economic rather than military power.
Americans not only display a greater enthusiasm for a more assertive EU role, but also perceive the EU's influence as already quite strong and rising (Table 27). Asked to rate how much influence the EU has in the world on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 meaning extremely influential, the average American response in 2002 was 6.8 (European's average was 7.1). Of the rest of the countries only Great Britain (7.1) and China (6.8) were seen as more influential. A clear majority of Americans also expected that the EU's influence would rise in the near future. 60 said the EU would be more influential in ten years time (CCFR Worldviews 2002).

Americans also seem ready to show some deference toward the EU and give it a more significant role in important negotiations. For instance, 70 of Americans agreed with the statement that "When dealing with common problems, the US and the European Union should be more willing to make decisions jointly, even if this means that the US as well as Europe will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice" and 27 disagreed (CCFR Worldviews 2002).

4.3 NATO: Still Essential?

One of the victims of the transatlantic estrangement across the board during the Bush administration was NATO, the traditional embodiment of the strategic relationship between both sides of Atlantic. The first test of the resilience of the alliance had of course come with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the motives probably varied, initially majorities on both sides continued to see the organization as "still essential". However, this consensus was subject to considerable erosion over the years, particularly since 2002, as is shown in Table 28.

Although there have always been strong fluctuations in support for NATO over the years, often related to the current temperature of the international climate, this time the decline seemed somewhat steeper and deeper. However, like sympathy for the US, support of NATO seemed on the way to recovery in 2009; an upward shift that continued into the following years.

But, again, there are no differences between the US and Europe in this respect. The patterns and evolution over time are almost identical on both sides of the Atlantic.[19] It should also be noted that, comparing the NATO trend

19 In 2005 Europeans by two to one agreed also with the statement: "NATO is dominated by the United States, Europe should have its own defense alliance separate from the US" (Transatlantic Trends 2005). In 2008, there were signs that the decline of support of NATO had been halted or at least interrupted.

for the four countries (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) on which we have the longest data series available with the trend in support for a strong US leadership, NATO seemed to suffer less during the Bush era than did the US (see Table 20).

4.4 An Index of Atlanticism

To assess the overall degree of Atlanticism, we built an index combining the three items discussed in the section above: whether it is desirable that the United States (in Europe) and the European Union (in the US) exert a strong leadership in world affairs; whether NATO is essential to our country's security and whether partnership between the US and Europe should be closer in security and diplomatic affairs, remain the same or be more independent. Scores on each of these questions were dichotomized and then summated, with an index ranging from 0, measuring "low Atlanticism", to 3 indicating a "high degree of Atlanticism".

Those coded as "low" have answered in Europe that the US leadership is not desirable, that NATO is not essential and that partnership should be more independent. In US, they have answered that the EU leadership is not desirable, NATO is not essential and partnership with Europe should be more independent. On the contrary, those who have the highest score deem the US leadership (in Europe) and the EU leadership (in US) has desirable, NATO as essential and ask for a closer partnership.[20]

As shown in Table 29, *Atlanticism* has been quite stable over the period covered by the available data and quite diverse in Europe and the United States. Americans are more definitely supportive of a close Atlantic relationship than are Europeans. On average, Americans are 20 points percent higher on this index than Europeans. Although European support for a close Atlantic relationship went up by 11 points (from 16% to 27%) with the end of the Bush administration, American support has been around 40 percent for most of the period.

This gap between the two sides of the Atlantic hides a deep variation across countries. Looking at the difference in the Atlanticism Index over time across the countries surveyed by the Transatlantic Trends, apart from Romania, a new NATO member that apparently prides itself to be *plus royaliste que le roi*, the United States is the most Atlanticist country of all. The mean Atlanticist score is 2.01 in the US and 1.56 in Europe, a statistically significant difference.

In the last eight years, two major changes occurred in the degree of Atlanticism. In 2009, Obama gave a boost to Atlanticism in Europe. In 2011 and 2012, instead, a relevant decrease in American Atlanticism was observed. It is worth mentioning that this recent decrease is visible in Europe as well. Here only a few countries continue to score around or above 30 on our index like the Italy, the Netherlands, Romania and the United Kingdom. A middle group is formed by Bulgaria, Germany, Poland and Portugal. A third group of countries clusters at the low end of the spectrum – around twenty or below – and this includes Spain, Slovakia and France.

20 The construction of the index for this paper differs in some respects from the procedure used in earlier publications (Asmus et al. 2004). Scores have been dichotomized into "low" and "high" Atlanticism. All the variables needed to build the Index were present only in 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

5. Attitudes Toward the Use of Force

As the survey data shown so far testify, most Europeans and Americans continue to like one another, to think similarly (in relative terms) about the main international threats to their security and well-being and prefer to keep a close Transatlantic relationship and an active role of both in the world. At the same time they do also sometimes – and sometimes considerably – differ about the central question of what to do about these threats either in general or in specific cases, as we shall see below. The general orientations toward the use of force constitute the fourth dimension along which we can explore the alleged transatlantic gap (Finnemore 2006).

Put very briefly, before we delve more deeply into this question, Americans are more likely to believe in the effectiveness of military force to deal with security threats in general. Europeans are not averse in principle to the use of force, but much less prone to see the appropriate conditions for using it in the present international circumstances. In general, Europeans are also quite willing to use force in a broad range of circumstances, but they give higher priority to soft tools. Where the promotion of international law, humanitarian concerns and justice are at stake, Europeans even surpass Americans in their support for the use of force. Whether this difference springs from fundamentally different worldviews, related to specific historical experiences, or rather from a different cost-benefit calculation of the appropriateness of different instruments is hard to settle definitively with the available data.

To investigate this issue, we will proceed in three steps. First, we will explore general attitudes toward the use of force. We will then examine how attitudes change in connection with hypothetical situations. Lastly, we will move to explore support for the use of force in concrete, historical cases of the last decade. We can thus compare attitudes toward hypothetical questions related to war with attitudes toward actual historical occurrences of the use of force.

5.1 The Acceptance of Military Force in General

We start our analysis with an examination of two questions that address the issue of the acceptance of military force in general, in very general terms: the role of military vis-à-vis economic power in international relations and the role of war in foreign policy.

The question of what constitutes the main or dominant source of power in the international system is a well-known bone of contention. This is an admittedly complex issue, since Realism first started to discuss its source and manifestations. With no pretense to settle the theoretical issue and aware of the limitations of existing secondary data in measuring what we intend to measure, one question first asked in CCFR in 1998 and then replicated in the CCFR-GMF Worldviews 2002 for Europe asked "Which of the following do you think is more important in determining a country's overall power and influence in the world – a country's economic strength, or its military strength?" Despite America's reputation for relying heavily on military power, a majority of Americans, just like their European counterparts, believed that economic strength is more important than military might in determining a country's overall power and influence in the world. In 1998, 65% of the Americans answered that economic power was more important and in 2002 this number was at 68%, while only a stable 26% answered that military power was more important than economic power. On the other hand, in 2002 the percentage of Americans that thought that military might is "more important" was more than double the European figure (26% to 11%).

Since 2003 a similar question was asked every year in a Likert agree/disagree format: "Economic power is more important in world affairs than military power". Over the years Europeans were considerably more likely than Americans to think that economic power is more important in international affairs than military power. These fundamental views remained rather stable over time in the period concerned (Table 30).[21]

A second question measuring general attitudes toward the use of force asks, always on an agree-disagree scale, asked whether "Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice." Table 31 reports the trends for bot h the US and the EU from 2003, when this question was first asked in the Transatlantic Trends Survey, until 2013.

Three conclusions stand out from Tables 29 and 30. First, both Europeans and Americans tend to agree that nowadays economic power is more important than military power, although Europeans are slightly more likely to answer this way than Americans (the average percentage over the last ten years is 69% in US and 84% in Europe). Second, both Europeans and Americans are divided on the issue of war. An average 76% of the Americans agree that war is sometimes necessary to obtain justice, while only 32% do so in Europe. Third, while attitudes toward economic power have remained stable over time, there is a slight tendency of pro-war attitudes to decline over time, in both Europe and the United States, at a quicker rate in the former than in the latter (making the gap among the two sides bigger over time).

While both Americans and Europeans are thus strong believers in the idea that military power has become less and less relevant in present world politics, Americans are still more convinced than Europeans that, sometimes, war might be a tool of foreign policy. This difference is confirmed by other data as well. Americans are more likely to respond affirmatively to other statements referring to the idea that force is indispensable and useful in international affairs. Compared to Europeans more than double the number of Americans (54% in 2004 and 44% in 2005) agreed (strongly) with the statement: "The best way to ensure peace is through military strength". In Europe, percentages were respectively 29% and 23%. More than three-in-four Americans (77%) agreed with the statement "It is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world", while only 59% of the public in nine EU countries[22] did so (Pew Research Center 2007).

5.2 Toward a Typology of Attitudes on the Use of Force

In combination, the two questions referred to above (the relative importance of economic versus military power, and the appropriateness of military force in the pursuit of justice) allow us to develop a general typology of attitudes on the use of international force. By dichotomizing the answers to these two questions into agree/disagree, a simple fourfold typology of attitudes can be developed. We label the four groups yielded by the typology *hawks, pragmatists, doves* and *isolationists* respectively.

Hawks believe that war is sometimes necessary to obtain justice and that military power is more important than economic power. *Pragmatists* are those who too believe that war is sometimes necessary to obtain justice but that economic power is becoming more important than military power. Doves disagree that war is sometimes necessary and believe that economic power is becoming more important than military power. *Isolationists*

21 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that most Europeans think that the role of the EU-as-a-superpower should still be a civilian one. In the 2006 *Transatlantic Trends Survey*, almost 80 percent agreed with the statement: "The European Union should concentrate on its economic power and not rely on its military power when dealing with international problems outside Europe". A plurality also felt, however, that "The European Union should strengthen its military power in order to play a larger role in the world" (Transatlantic Trends 2006).

22 These countries were France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia.

believe neither that war is sometimes necessary nor that economic power is becoming more important in world affairs. The figures for the sizes of the four groups in the period 2003-2012 in the US and each of the European countries for which we have data are given in Table 32. This typology has considerable explanatory power (Asmus et al. 2004).

The data show, first of all, a remarkable difference in terms of the structure of American and European public opinion. While *Pragmatists* constitute the largest group in the US, in Europe the Doves are most numerous.[23] What really makes the American case unique, however, is the existence of a fairly large segment (some 19% of the general public) of the American population that according to our measurement falls into the *Hawk* category. On average, *Hawks* in the US are five times as numerous as in Europe. In contrast, *Doves* are a small minority in the US (15%) unlike Europe, where they form a stable majority. Finally, *Isolationists* are really a marginal group, composing only 5% of the populace in the US and 8% in Europe. The second observation is that most European countries are actually very close together in terms of the typology, which warrants treating them as a whole and comparing them with the United States.[24] Percentages are stable and consistent over the time period under investigation.

5.3 The Use of Military Force in Hypothetical Cases

Transatlantic differences on the use of force also emerge from other questions aimed at tapping attitudes toward the use of military force in a number of more or less specific hypothetical cases.

In 2002, and again in 2004, a very general series of questions aimed at assessing under which conditions the use of force was seen as appropriate, was asked: "For each of the following reasons, would you approve or disapprove of the use of [own country] military troops?" The reasons listed in 2002 and 2004 included a variety of situations including terrorism, to ensure the supply of oil, to help bring peace in a region where there is civil war, to liberate hostages, to assist a population struck by famine and to uphold international law. The surveys show that with respect to the use of force there was still a large degree of transatlantic consensus. In those years majorities on both sides of the Atlantic were ready to use military force for a broad range of purposes (Table 33).

Overall, Americans as well as Europeans strongly supported the use of troops in four of six situations listed: to destroy a terrorist camp, to liberate hostages, to assist a population struck by famine, and to uphold international law. The difference came only in the emphasis on using military force to combat terrorism, with 92 percent of the Americans and 75 percent of the Europeans willing to use it in order to destroy a terrorist camp in 2002, a difference consistent with the much stronger concern reported earlier in this paper among Americans about the threat posed by international terrorism.

Both in 2002 and 2004, there was a marked distinction in the purposes for which one is willing to use military force. A reversal of majorities between Europeans and Americans is visible on those issues which can be labeled roughly as military action for humanitarian and peacekeeping purposes as compared to "war fighting" or, to use another terminology, as "wars of choice" rather than "wars of necessity". In the first of these latter two sets of cases a larger majority in Europe compared to the United States were willing to use force for this purpose.

23 Due to the phrasing of the questions on which the typology is based, the distribution of the answers is sometimes skewed. The figures produced by the typology should be treated therefore as relative and not as absolute measures, which have therefore significance only in a comparative perspective.

24 However, there are some differences within Europe as well. In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands the distribution is more similar to the United States compared to the other European countries. At the other end of the spectrum, countries like Bulgaria, Germany, Slovakia and Spain differ most from the US.

Americans, on the other hand, showed more readiness in 2002 to use force to ensure the supply of oil than Europeans. 65 percent of Americans agreed to the use of force for this purpose, while just pluralities of 49 percent of Europeans felt that way in 2002. In 2004 these differences had disappeared, however.[25]

A more general indicator of support of force in hypothetical cases can be created by treating items mentioned above as a Likert-scale battery of items. Table 34 reports the distribution of this composite index for the US and the EU-5 (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). The distribution is heavily skewed toward those favorable to using force, with 60% of the sample in both Europe and the US approving force in most of the situations mentioned in the list of goals for which the use of force was contemplated. Under certain conditions, Europeans even appeared to be more supportive of the use of force than Americans, including those situations in which humanitarian considerations are prevalent. In contrast, Americans tended to be more supportive of those in which objectives related to direct threats to national interests are emphasized. All of them, however, had to react to a hypothetical list of situations that, it has been suggested, might deflate the level of support for the use of force compared to real, concrete issues (Klarevas 2002: 423-424).

5.4 Military Force in Specific Cases

The limitation of questions like those dealt with above is indeed that they explore the support for the use of military force, so to say, "on the cheap", in a very abstract way and in hypothetical situations. It is therefore hard to predict whether this "permissive consensus" would remain or rather collapse under the pressure of any concrete event. Turning to an inspection of the data resulting from the analysis of the impact of question wording on support of force, we observe a consistent transatlantic gap. Whatever the specific aspect addressed by particularly worded questions, the evidence always is that Americans are more likely to support the use of military by a margin of some 15-20 percent. While, overall, the degree of support amounts to 59 for Americans it is 17 percentage points lower for Europeans at 42. The gap is relatively even stronger, and increases to 36 when reference is made to civilian casualties (about which Europeans are very concerned) and when perceived benefits (a positive boost) or expected costs (a negative factor) are mentioned. Europeans and Americans worry about equally about military casualties, and are almost equally sensitive to references to international legitimacy and to success (Table 35).

Finally, as noted before, things may change when we move from the consideration of hypothetical policy options to specific cases, such as the Afghanistan and Iraq war. In June 2004, for instance, majorities in both the US and Europe (EU-5) still supported having troops engaged in the Afghanistan war – albeit it with an 12 points percent difference between US and Europe (69% to 57%) – while majorities flipped upside down when it came to Iraq, with 57% of the Americans supporting that war in June 2004 and only 34% doing the same in Europe.

25 It is interesting to note that of the seven European countries surveyed, the Germans were the least willing to engage militarily, thus confirming the popular view that Germans are basically pacifists. Although in five of the six cases submitted in 2002 majorities of Germans favored using troops, the percentages were generally at least ten percentage points lower than in other European countries, sometimes even more. In particular, only 40 percent of Germans were ready to use force to ensure the supply of oil, the lowest level among Europeans in this or any other case for using troops

Conclusions

The results presented in this paper are in many ways surprising and worth looking at more closely. In some ways they contradict what some observers would expect to find given the political debates and arguments exchanged on both sides of the Atlantic in recent years. The set of surveys, taken over the 2000s, show that European publics looked at the world in ways that were rather similar to that of many ordinary Americans (including harboring deep reservations about the conduct of certain aspects of US foreign policy). Both sides share fundamental worldviews. Europeans and Americans have comparable perceptions of threats, domestic priorities and comparable perceptions of friends and allies and a strong affinity for each other. They agree upon the relative distribution of power in the world and on the relative importance of economic versus military strength. Most Europeans and Americans are internationalists and Atlanticists. They share a belief in both the necessity and effectiveness of multilateral, common action and international institutions, on moral as well as practical grounds. These views and the similarities across the Atlantic were somehow affected by the divisive realities of the war with Iraq but they did not change significantly over time, and both Europeans and Americans were ready to acknowledge that things had changed with the advent of the Obama administration in 2008.

The only area on which the differences in views seem to be more stable and sturdy is on the suitability and acceptability of the use of military force. In general, Europeans and Americans were in broad agreement in 2002 when it comes to the importance of the war on terrorism and the nature of the Iraqi threat, and Europeans were as willing as Americans in principle to use force in a broad range of circumstances. However, already in 2002, Europeans gave a higher priority to soft tools than Americans and they continued to do so, perhaps even more strongly as they saw the failures in the application of hard power by the Americans, in Iraq and Afghanistan. For Europeans, the use of force is still truly an *ultima ratio* to be utilized only when all other sources of power have failed. The Americans, on the other hand, far from being trigger-happy, were and are much less shy of using forces if circumstances seem appropriate, in spite of failures on the ground. This is what the adherents of the gap thesis would expect.

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Annex

Table 1 *(Data Sources)*

Survey	Sample	N	Coverage	Method
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR)				
2002	Mass	9,000	DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, UK, US	CATI
Eurobarometer (EB)				
2002	Mass	16,012	AT, BE, DK, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK	F2F
2002	Mass	17,041	AT, BE, DK, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK	F2F
2003	Mass	16,307	AT, BE, DK, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK	F2F
2003	Mass	16,082	AT, BE, DK, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK	F2F
2004	Mass	16,216	AT, BE, DK, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK	F2F
2004	Mass	29,334	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2005	Mass	29,328	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2006	Mass	29,430	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2006	Mass	29,170	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HU, HR, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2006	Mass	29,152	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HU, HR, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2007	Mass	30,224	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F

Table 1 ***(Continued)***

Survey	Sample	N	Coverage	Method
2007	Mass	30,281	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2008	Mass	30,170	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MK, MT, NL, PL, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2008	Mass	30,130	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MK, MT, NL, PL, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2009	Mass	30,232	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MK, MT, NL, PL, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2009	Mass	30,343	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MK, MT, NL, PL, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2009	Mass	30,238	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MK, MT, NL, PL, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2010	Mass	30,715	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IS, IT, LT, LU, LV, MK, MT, NL, PL, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2010	Mass	30,780	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IS, IT, LT, LU, LV, MK, MT, NL, PL, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2011	Mass	31,769	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IS, IT, LT, LU, LV, ME, MK, MT, NL, PL, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2011	Mass	31,659	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IS, IT, LT, LU, LV, ME, MK, MT, NL, PL, RO, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F

Table 1 ***(Continued)***

Survey	Sample	N	Coverage	Method
2012	Mass	32,728	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IS, IT, LT, LU, LV, ME, MK, MT, NL, PL, RO, RS, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
2012	Mass	32,731	AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GR, HR, HU, IE, IS, IT, LT, LU, LV, ME, MK, MT, NL, PL, RO, RS, SE, SI, SK, TR, UK	F2F
Pew Research Global Attitudes Project				
2002	Mass	38,263	AO, AR, BD, BG, BO, BR, CA, CI, CN, CZ, DE, EG, FR, GB, GH, GT, HN, ID, IN, IT, JO, JP, KE, KR, LB, ML, MX, NG, PE, PH, PK, PL, RU, SK, SN, TZ, UA, UG, US, UZ, VE, VN, ZA	F2F, CATI
2003	Mass	15,948	AU, BR, CA, DE, ES, FR, GB, ID, IL, IT, JO, KR, KW, LB, MA, NG, PK, PS, RU, TR, US	F2F, CATI
2004	Mass	7,765	DE, FR, GB, JO, MA, PK, RU, TR, US	F2F, CATI
2005	Mass	11,516	CA, CN, DE, ES, FR, GB, ID, IN, JO, LB, MA, NL, PK, PL, RU, TR, US	F2F, CATI
2006	Mass	16,710	CN, DE, EG, ES, FR, GB, ID, IN, JO, JP, NG, PK, RU, TR, US	F2F, CATI
2007	Mass	45,239	AR, BD, BG, BO, BR, CA, CI, CL, CN, CZ, DE, EG, ES, ET, FR, GB, GH, ID, IL, IN, IT, JO, JP, KE, KR, KW, LB, MA, ML, MX, MY, NG, PE, PK, PL, PS, RU, SE, SK, SN, TR, TZ, UA, UG, US, VE, ZA	F2F, CATI
2008	Mass	24,717	AR, AU, BR, CN, DE, EG, ES, FR, GB, ID, IN, JO, JP, KR, LB, MX, NG, PK, PL, RU, TR, TZ, US, ZA	F2F, CATI
2009	Mass	14,760	BG, CZ, DE, ES, FR, GB, HU, IT, LT, PL, RU, SK, UA, US	F2F, CATI
2009	Mass	26,397	AR, BR, CA, CN, DE, EG, ES, FR, GB, ID, IL, IN, JO, JP, KE, KR, LB, MX, NG, PK, PL, PS, RU, TR, US	F2F, CATI
2010	Mass	24,790	AR, BR, CN, DE, EG, ES, FR, GB, ID, IN, JO, JP, KE, KR, LB, MX, NG, PK, PL, RU, TR, US	F2F, CATI

Table 1 *(Continued)*

Survey	Sample	N	Coverage	Method
2011	Mass	5,006	DE, ES, FR, GB, US	CATI
2012	Mass	26,210	BR, CN, CZ, DE, EG, ES, FR, GB, GR, IN, IT, JO, JP, LB, MX, PK, PL, RU, TN, TR, US	F2F, CATI
2013	Mass	37,653	AR, AU, BO, BR, CA, DE, ES, GB, GH, CL, CN, CZ, EG, FR, GR, ID, IL, IT, JO, JP, KE, KR, LB, MX, MY, NG, PE, PH, PK, PL, RU, SN, SV, TN, TR, UG, US, VE, ZA	F2F, CATI
Transatlantic Trends Survey (TTS)				
2002	Mass	9,263	DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, UK, US	CAPI, CATI
2003	Mass	8,013	DE, FR, IT, NL, PT, UK, PL, US	CAPI, CATI
2004	Mass	11,020	DE, FR, IT, NL, PT, SP, UK, PL, SK, TUR, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
2005	Mass	11,080	DE, FR, IT, NL, PT, SP, UK, PL, SK, TUR, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
2006	Mass	13,044	BG, DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SP, TR, UK, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
2007	Mass	13,053	BG, DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SP, TR, UK, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
2008	Mass	13,022	BG, DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SP, TR, UK, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
2009	Mass	13,095	BG, DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SP, TR, UK, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
2010	Mass	13,072	BG, DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SP, TR, UK, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
2011	Mass	14,042	BG, DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SK, SP, TR, UK, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
2012	Mass	15,547	BG, DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, RO, RU, SE, SK, SP, TR, UK, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
2013	Mass	13,049	BG, DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SK, SP, TR, UK, US	CAPI, CATI, PAPI
World Affairs				
2013	Mass	24,622	AE, AR, AU, BE, BR, CA, CN, CO, DE, ES, FR, HU, ID, IN, IT, JP, KR, MX, MY, NO, PL, RU, SA, SE, SG, TH, TR, TW, UK, US, VN, ZA	CAPI, CATI, PAPI

Note: The analysis is limited to the US and the EU member countries.

Table 2 *Defense and foreign affairs in the European public's agenda (%)*

	EU-27	EU-15	AT	BE	DE-W	DE-E	DK	ES	FI	FR	GR	IE	IT	LU	NL	PT	SE	UK	BG	CY	CZ	EE	HU	LT	LV	MT	PL	RO	SI	SK
EB 59.1 (2003)		**6**	**5**	**3**	**5**	**3**	**17**	**16**	**1**	**5**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**9**	**1**	**4**	**14**												
N			*1021*	*1112*	*1050*	*1021*	*1000*	*1000*	*1046*	*1075*	*1003*	*1024*	*1027*	*600*	*1008*	*1001*	*1000*	*1011*												
EB 60.1 (2003)		**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**4**	**5**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**4**												
N			*1010*	*1022*	*1016*	*1023*	*1000*	*1000*	*1018*	*1015*	*1001*	*1014*	*1008*	*587*	*1006*	*1000*	*1000*	*1055*												
EB 62.0 (2004)	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**7**	**2**	**3**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**2**	**7**	**2**	**5**	**1**	**3**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**5**	**1**
N			*1007*	*974*	*1037*	*508*	*1028*	*1023*	*1005*	*1020*	*1000*	*1000*	*1020*	*502*	*1009*	*1000*	*1000*	*1011*	*1004*	*500*	*1075*	*1000*	*1014*	*1002*	*1005*	*500*	*1000*	*1012*	*1000*	*1252*
EB 63.4 (2005)	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**4**	**1**	**5**	**1**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**4**	**2**	**0**	**2**	**5**	**1**	**10**	**0**	**3**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**1**
N			*1000*	*1000*	*1015*	*505*	*1051*	*1024*	*1024*	*1012*	*1000*	*1006*	*1004*	*504*	*1006*	*1005*	*1024*	*1044*	*1018*	*505*	*1083*	*1001*	*1014*	*1003*	*1015*	*500*	*1000*	*1004*	*1045*	*1108*
EB 64.2 (2006)	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**4**	**1**	**4**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**3**	**6**	**1**	**7**	**0**	**3**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**3**	**1**
N			*1020*	*1024*	*1021*	*513*	*1032*	*1015*	*1028*	*1009*	*1000*	*1009*	*1000*	*510*	*1041*	*1003*	*1033*	*1021*	*1001*	*502*	*1161*	*1000*	*1000*	*1020*	*1033*	*500*	*1000*	*1000*	*1034*	*1096*
EB 65.2 (2006)	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**8**	**1**	**6**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**5**	**0**	**2**	**3**	**0**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**1**
N			*481*	*488*	*505*	*259*	*496*	*510*	*516*	*514*	*500*	*498*	*(504*	*256*	*(501*	*519*	*513*	*520*	*511*	*253*	*509*	*514*	*518*	*516*	*511*	*250*	*520*	*475*	*501*	*561*
EB 66.1 (2006)	**2**	**2**	**2**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**8**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**3**	**2**	**4**	**1**	**1**	**6**	**1**	**4**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**11**	**2**
N			*1016*	*1003*	*1018*	*507*	*1003*	*1003*	*1000*	*1007*	*1000*	*1000*	*1006*	*500*	*1018*	*995*	*1013*	*1000*	*1035*	*503*	*1091*	*1000*	*1005*	*1000*	*1015*	*500*	*1000*	*1047*	*1031*	*1023*
EB 67.2 (2007)	**2**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**10**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**5**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**0**	**3**	**1**	**13**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**8**	**3**
N			*1011*	*1011*	*1005*	*508*	*1002*	*1000*	*1038*	*1013*	*1000*	*1000*	*1010*	*511*	*1009*	*1011*	*1005*	*1015*	*1039*	*502*	*1043*	*1005*	*1006*	*1018*	*1013*	*500*	*1000*	*1019*	*1013*	*1106*
EB 68.1 (2007)	**2**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**8**	**1**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**4**	**0**	**4**	**1**	**6**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**3**	**2**
N			*1015*	*1022*	*1001*	*508*	*999*	*1000*	*1033*	*1036*	*1000*	*1007*	*1045*	*502*	*1005*	*1000*	*1003*	*1035*	*977*	*500*	*1106*	*1012*	*1000*	*1016*	*1006*	*500*	*1000*	*1000*	*1009*	*1126*
EB 69.2 (2008)	**2**	**2**	**3**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**5**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**5**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**0**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**5**	**1**
N			*1000*	*1003*	*1027*	*507*	*1005*	*1033*	*1004*	*1040*	*1000*	*1004*	*1022*	*501*	*1041*	*1001*	*1007*	*1006*	*1000*	*504*	*1014*	*1006*	*1000*	*1021*	*1008*	*500*	*1000*	*1019*	*1003*	*1085*
EB 70.1 (2008)	**2**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**2**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**1**	**4**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**2**	**4**	**1**
N			*1003*	*1002*	*1016*	*510*	*1029*	*1000*	*1004*	*1027*	*1000*	*1000*	*1061*	*500*	*1041*	*1000*	*1002*	*1007*	*1006*	*503*	*1026*	*1000*	*1002*	*1011*	*1002*	*500*	*1000*	*1053*	*1006*	*1006*
EB 71.1 (2009)	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**3**	**0**	**3**	**1**	**0**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**6**	**1**
N			*1000*	*1018*	*1006*	*517*	*1016*	*1003*	*1017*	*1035*	*1000*	*1000*	*1060*	*504*	*1044*	*1000*	*1017*	*1005*	*1000*	*504*	*1050*	*1003*	*1023*	*1010*	*1001*	*500*	*1000*	*1043*	*1008*	*1025*
EB 71.3 (2009)	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**2**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**1**
N			*1015*	*983*	*1007*	*514*	*1012*	*1002*	*1012*	*1038*	*1000*	*1006*	*1036*	*530*	*1000*	*1010*	*1068*	*1045*	*1023*	*505*	*1094*	*1006*	*1004*	*1016*	*1008*	*500*	*1000*	*1012*	*1012*	*1065*
EB 72.4 (2009)	**2**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**5**	**1**	**4**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**0**	**7**	**1**
N			*1030*	*1006*	*1000*	*514*	*1006*	*1020*	*1018*	*1005*	*1000*	*1011*	*1036*	*502*	*1004*	*1025*	*1032*	*1018*	*1008*	*506*	*1056*	*1002*	*1023*	*1023*	*1006*	*500*	*1000*	*1021*	*1015*	*1040*
EB 73.4 (2010)	**1**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**3**	**2**	**3**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**3**	**1**	**7**	**2**
N			*1000*	*1013*	*1023*	*492*	*1007*	*1006*	*1001*	*1020*	*1000*	*1014*	*1028*	*505*	*1013*	*1025*	*1050*	*1013*	*1000*	*507*	*1021*	*1000*	*1021*	*1019*	*1003*	*500*	*1000*	*1020*	*1010*	*1027*
EB 74.2 (2010)	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**4**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**
N			*517*	*479*	*524*	*283*	*509*	*511*	*481*	*531*	*501*	*504*	*514*	*256*	*516*	*487*	*506*	*513*	*501*	*251*	*514*	*508*	*496*	*492*	*504*	*250*	*521*	*495*	*496*	*670*
EB 75.3 (2011)	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**4**	**2**	**3**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**4**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**1**
N			*537*	*501*	*514*	*248*	*484*	*529*	*495*	*509*	*495*	*508*	*517*	*250*	*503*	*495*	*514*	*524*	*501*	*251*	*491*	*492*	*503*	*532*	*514*	*250*	*488*	*506*	*509*	*510*
EB 76.3 (2011)	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**1**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**2**	**0**	**0**	**1**
N			*492*	*488*	*505*	*266*	*523*	*517*	*500*	*525*	*508*	*535*	*252*	*470*	*484*	*510*	*502*	*486*	*254*	*518*	*505*	*537*	*492*	*529*	*250*	*509*	*511*	*507*	*502*	*506*

Source: Standard Eurobarometer.

Q: What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the moment? *Defense/Foreign affairs* (% Mentioned)

Table 3 ***War, terrorism and economy in the American public's agenda (% - continue)***

	Economy (in general)	Terrorism	Iraq, Fear of war (in this country)	International issues/problems
Jan-01	7	0	0	4
Feb-01	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mar-01	10	0	2	4
Apr-01	15	0	1	3
May-01	10	0	0	0
Jun-01	10	0	1	3
Jul-01	14	0	1	2
Aug-01	15	0	1	0
Sep-01	22	1	1	3
Oct-01	13	46	10	3
Nov-01	16	37	13	2
Dec-01	19	24	17	2
Jan-02	21	23	8	0
Feb-02	24	24	9	2
Mar-02	18	22	12	2
Apr-02	18	21	8	11
May-02	14	22	7	7
Jun-02	14	33	7	4
Jul-02	20	30	3	3
Aug-02	25	23	5	4
Sep-02	24	19	10	8
Oct-02	29	32	15	9
Nov-02	28	19	14	6
Dec-02	30	18	20	3
Jan-03	26	10	31	9
Feb-03	34	10	35	7
Mar-03	29	13	29	11
Apr-03	31	9	16	1
May-03	33	8	7	1
Jun-03	30	11	8	0
Jul-03	27	8	9	0
Aug-03	26	12	5	2
Sep-03	26	12	11	2
Oct-03	25	8	11	3
Nov-03	20	9	19	2
Dec-03	17	9	17	3
Jan-04	16	10	16	2
Feb-04	21	11	14	2
Mar-04	21	10	11	1
Apr-04	22	13	26	1
May-04	19	12	26	2
Jun-04	19	13	27	2

Table 3 *(Continued)*

	Economy (in general)	Terrorism	Iraq, Fear of war (in this country)	International issues/problems
Jul-04	16	15	26	2
Aug-04	21	18	21	2
Sep-04	21	19	23	3
Oct-04	21	16	23	2
Nov-04	17	13	26	3
Dec-04	12	12	23	3
Jan-05	12	8	25	2
Feb-05	12	9	24	3
Mar-05	10	9	25	2
Apr-05	12	8	18	2
May-05	12	5	21	2
Jun-05	12	8	22	2
Jul-05	10	17	25	2
Aug-05	13	10	27	2
Sep-05	11	6	16	1
Oct-05	15	5	21	1
Nov-05	10	6	23	1
Dec-05	8	6	22	1
Jan-06	10	7	23	2
Feb-06	10	9	22	1
Mar-06	10	9	20	2
Apr-06	10	6	25	3
May-06	11	5	29	3
Jun-06	9	3	27	2
Jul-06	8	7	25	2
Aug-06	8	10	26	2
Sep-06	11	11	24	1
Oct-06	8	11	28	3
Nov-06	10	7	36	2
Dec-06	5	6	29	2
Jan-07	4	6	36	1
Feb-07	7	7	38	2
Mar-07	7	5	35	2
Apr-07	8	5	33	2
May-07	6	7	33	1
Jun-07	6	4	34	1
Jul-07	6	6	35	2
Aug-07	8	5	32	2
Sep-07	11	5	30	1
Oct-07	9	4	33	1
Nov-07	14	4	24	1
Dec-07	13	4	29	1

Table 3 *(Continued)*

	Economy (in general)	Terrorism	Iraq, Fear of war (in this country)	International issues/problems
Jan-08	18	5	25	3
Feb-08	34	4	24	1
Mar-08	35	2	21	2
Apr-08	41	3	23	1
May-08	35	2	15	1
Jun-08	36	NA	20	NA
Jul-08	35	2	18	NA
Aug-08	38	NA	19	NA
Sep-08	41	NA	NA	NA
Oct-08	47	NA	11	NA
Nov-08	58	2	13	2
Dec-08	55	3	9	1
Jan-09	57	NA	NA	NA
Feb-09	57	NA	NA	NA
Mar-09	51	1	6	1
Apr-09	48	2	6	1
May-09	47	2	9	1
Jun-09	41	1	7	2
Jul-09	38	2	5	NA
Aug-09	33	1	3	0
Sep-09	29	1	8	0
Oct-09	26	2	4	1
Nov-09	31	NA	3	NA
Dec-09	26	3	2	1
Jan-10	25	8	2	1
Feb-10	31	4	2	0
Mar-10	24	2	2	0
Apr-10	23	1	2	0
May-10	26	4	3	1
Jun-10	28	1	2	1
Jul-10	31	1	3	0
Aug-10	30	1	1	1
Sep-10	33	1	1	1
Oct-10	35	2	1	1
Nov-10	31	1	1	1
Dec-10	30	2	1	1
Jan-11	26	2	0	0
Feb-11	29	2	1	2
Mar-11	28	2	1	1
Apr-11	26	1	1	1
May-11	35	2	1	1
Jun-11	36	1	1	2
Jul-11	31	0	1	1

Table 3 *(Continued)*

	Economy (in general)	Terrorism	Iraq, Fear of war (in this country)	International issues/problems
Aug-11	31	1	1	0
Sep-11	28	1	1	0
Oct-11	31	2	1	0
Nov-11	30	1	1	0
Jan-12	31	1	0	2
Feb-12	31	0	0	1
Mar-12	31	0	1	2
Apr-12	32	0	1	1
May-12	31	1	1	1
Jun-12	31	0	0	1
Jul-12	29	0	0	1
Aug-12	31	0	0	1
Sep-12	29	0	0	0
Oct-12	37	0	0	1
Nov-12	30	0	0	1
Dec-12	23	0	0	1

Source: Gallup.

Q: What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today? (Open-ended)

Table 4 *Terrorism in the European public's agenda (%)*

	EU-27	EU-15	AT	BE	DE-W	DE-E	DK	ES	FI	FR	GR	IE	IT	LU	NL	PT	SE	UK	BG	CY	CZ	EE	HU	LT	LV	MT	PL	RO	SI	SK
EB 59.1 (2003)		**13**	**8**	**9**	**8**	**5**	**16**	**54**	**2**	**12**	**6**	**5**	**24**	**7**	**7**	**5**	**3**	**29**												
N			*1021*	*1112*	*1050*	*1021*	*1000*	*1000*	*1046*	*1075*	*1003*	*1024*	*1027*	*600*	*1008*	*1001*	*1000*	*1011*												
EB 60.1 (2003)		**8**	**4**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**12**	**51**	**2**	**9**	**4**	**2**	**9**	**7**	**4**	**3**	**3**	**16**												
N			*1010*	*1022*	*1016*	*1023*	*1000*	*1000*	*1018*	*1015*	*1001*	*1014*	*1008*	*587*	*1006*	*1000*	*1000*	*1055*												
EB 62.0 (2004)	**9**	**13**	**6**	**6**	**5**	**4**	**20**	**59**	**6**	**10**	**2**	**7**	**17**	**10**	**12**	**5**	**5**	**27**	**5**	**3**	**4**	**2**	**5**	**3**	**2**	**3**	**6**	**4**	**3**	**4**
N			*1007*	*974*	*1037*	*508*	*1028*	*1023*	*1005*	*1020*	*1000*	*1000*	*1020*	*502*	*1009*	*1000*	*1000*	*1011*	*1004*	*500*	*1075*	*1000*	*1014*	*1002*	*1005*	*500*	*1000*	*1012*	*1000*	*1252*
EB 63.4 (2005)	**6**	**9**	**3**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**12**	**46**	**3**	**5**	**3**	**4**	**7**	**8**	**22**	**2**	**2**	**14**	**3**	**5**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**4**	**1**	**5**
N			*1000*	*1000*	*1015*	*505*	*1051*	*1024*	*1024*	*1012*	*1000*	*1006*	*1004*	*504*	*1006*	*1005*	*1024*	*1044*	*1018*	*505*	*1083*	*1001*	*1014*	*1003*	*1015*	*500*	*1000*	*1004*	*1045*	*1108*
EB 64.2 (2006)	**8**	**12**	**3**	**5**	**4**	**4**	**33**	**31**	**5**	**10**	**1**	**6**	**11**	**5**	**41**	**1**	**6**	**35**	**5**	**2**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**2**	**5**
N			*1020*	*1024*	*1021*	*513*	*1032*	*1015*	*1028*	*1009*	*1000*	*1009*	*1000*	*510*	*1041*	*1003*	*1033*	*1021*	*1001*	*502*	*1161*	*1000*	*1000*	*1020*	*1033*	*500*	*1000*	*1000*	*1034*	*1096*
EB 65.2 (2006)	**6**	**9**	**3**	**6**	**2**	**2**	**28**	**36**	**3**	**4**	**3**	**6**	**9**	**4**	**18**	**2**	**6**	**17**	**5**	**6**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**0**	**2**	**3**	**3**	**2**	**2**
N			*481*	*488*	*505*	*259*	*496*	*510*	*516*	*514*	*500*	*498*	*504*	*256*	*501*	*519*	*513*	*520*	*511*	*253*	*509*	*514*	*518*	*516*	*511*	*250*	*520*	*475*	*501*	*561*
EB 66.1 (2006)	**9**	**13**	**5**	**8**	**8**	**3**	**39**	**29**	**4**	**11**	**3**	**6**	**15**	**7**	**26**	**3**	**5**	**34**	**3**	**2**	**5**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**4**	**4**	**1**	**6**
N			*1016*	*1003*	*1018*	*507*	*1003*	*1003*	*1000*	*1007*	*1000*	*1000*	*1006*	*500*	*1018*	*995*	*1013*	*1000*	*1035*	*503*	*1091*	*1000*	*1005*	*1000*	*1015*	*500*	*1000*	*1047*	*1031*	*1023*
EB 67.2 (2007)	**6**	**10**	**5**	**5**	**8**	**5**	**19**	**46**	**2**	**7**	**3**	**3**	**9**	**4**	**15**	**2**	**2**	**25**	**2**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**4**
N			*1011*	*1011*	*1005*	*508*	*1002*	*1000*	*1038*	*1013*	*1000*	*1000*	*1010*	*511*	*1009*	*1011*	*1005*	*1015*	*1039*	*502*	*1043*	*1005*	*1006*	*1018*	*1013*	*500*	*1000*	*1019*	*1013*	*1106*
EB 68.1 (2007)	**6**	**9**	**10**	**4**	**12**	**8**	**18**	**38**	**1**	**6**	**2**	**4**	**7**	**3**	**10**	**2**	**2**	**17**	**1**	**3**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**4**
N			*1015*	*1022*	*1001*	*508*	*999*	*1000*	*1033*	*1036*	*1000*	*1007*	*1045*	*502*	*1005*	*1000*	*1003*	*1035*	*977*	*500*	*1106*	*1012*	*1000*	*1016*	*1006*	*500*	*1000*	*1000*	*1009*	*1126*
EB 69.2 (2008)	**4**	**6**	**6**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**13**	**32**	**0**	**3**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**15**	**2**	**1**	**13**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**0**	**2**
N			*1000*	*1003*	*1027*	*507*	*1005*	*1033*	*1004*	*1040*	*1000*	*1004*	*1022*	*501*	*1041*	*1001*	*1007*	*1006*	*1000*	*504*	*1014*	*1006*	*1000*	*1021*	*1008*	*500*	*1000*	*1019*	*1003*	*1085*
EB 70.1 (2008)	**3**	**4**	**4**	**2**	**3**	**2**	**12**	**15**	**1**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**2**	**6**	**2**	**0**	**9**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**1**	**2**
N			*1003*	*1002*	*1016*	*510*	*1029*	*1000*	*1004*	*1027*	*1000*	*1000*	*1061*	*500*	*1041*	*1000*	*1002*	*1007*	*1006*	*503*	*1026*	*1000*	*1002*	*1011*	*1002*	*500*	*1000*	*1053*	*1006*	*1006*
EB 71.1 (2009)	**3**	**4**	**4**	**2**	**6**	**1**	**8**	**11**	**1**	**2**	**4**	**1**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**6**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**2**
N			*1000*	*1018*	*1006*	*517*	*1016*	*1003*	*1017*	*1035*	*1000*	*1000*	*1060*	*504*	*1044*	*1000*	*1017*	*1005*	*1000*	*504*	*1050*	*1003*	*1023*	*1010*	*1001*	*500*	*1000*	*1043*	*1008*	*1025*
EB 71.3 (2009)	**3**	**4**	**2**	**2**	**3**	**2**	**7**	**18**	**1**	**2**	**6**	**2**	**4**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**9**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**2**
N			*1015*	*983*	*1007*	*514*	*1012*	*1002*	*1012*	*1038*	*1000*	*1006*	*1036*	*530*	*1000*	*1010*	*1068*	*1045*	*1023*	*505*	*1094*	*1006*	*1004*	*1016*	*1008*	*500*	*1000*	*1012*	*1012*	*1065*
EB 72.4 (2009)	**2**	**4**	**2**	**2**	**3**	**3**	**10**	**12**	**1**	**2**	**5**	**1**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**6**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**
N			*1030*	*1006*	*1000*	*514*	*1006*	*1020*	*1018*	*1005*	*1000*	*1011*	*1036*	*502*	*1004*	*1025*	*1032*	*1018*	*1008*	*506*	*1056*	*1002*	*1023*	*1023*	*1006*	*500*	*1000*	*1021*	*1015*	*1040*
EB 73.4 (2010)	**2**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**3**	**11**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**0**	**5**	**1**	**5**	**2**	**1**	**6**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
N			*1000*	*1013*	*1023*	*492*	*1007*	*1006*	*1001*	*1020*	*1000*	*1014*	*1028*	*505*	*1013*	*1025*	*1050*	*1013*	*1000*	*507*	*1021*	*1000*	*1021*	*1019*	*1003*	*500*	*1000*	*1020*	*1010*	*1027*
EB 74.2 (2010)	**4**	**6**	**5**	**3**	**18**	**17**	**6**	**8**	**1**	**6**	**1**	**0**	**4**	**3**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**11**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**0**	**4**
N			*517*	*479*	*524*	*283*	*509*	*511*	*481*	*531*	*501*	*504*	*514*	*256*	*516*	*487*	*506*	*513*	*501*	*251*	*514*	*508*	*496*	*492*	*504*	*250*	*521*	*495*	*496*	*670*
EB 75.3 (2011)	**3**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**10**	**7**	**4**	**10**	**0**	**6**	**2**	**1**	**3**	**2**	**4**	**1**	**2**	**12**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**3**
N			*537*	*501*	*514*	*248*	*484*	*529*	*495*	*509*	*495*	*508*	*517*	*250*	*503*	*495*	*514*	*524*	*501*	*251*	*491*	*492*	*503*	*532*	*514*	*250*	*488*	*506*	*509*	*510*
EB 76.3 (2011)	**2**	**3**	**2**	**3**	**11**	**7**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**3**	**1**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**5**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**1**
N			*484*	*492*	*505*	*266*	*488*	*517*	*500*	*525*	*523*	*508*	*535*	*252*	*470*	*510*	*502*	*486*	*502*	*254*	*518*	*505*	*537*	*529*	*492*	*250*	*509*	*506*	*507*	*511*
EB 77.3 (2012)	**1**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**4**	**6**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**4**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**
N			*993*	*1076*	*983*	*519*	*1007*	*1006*	*1001*	*1007*	*1001*	*1000*	*1036*	*507*	*1012*	*1010*	*1019*	*1005*	*1016*	*505*	*1002*	*1000*	*1010*	*1019*	*1007*	*500*	*1000*	*1073*	*1023*	*1000*
EB 78.1 (2012)	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**0**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
N			*1031*	*1001*	*1043*	*519*	*1001*	*1006*	*1007*	*1008*	*1000*	*1032*	*502*	*1016*	*993*	*1015*	*1029*	*1002*	*503*	*1003*	*1003*	*1028*	*1011*	*1019*	*500*	*1000*	*1000*	*1014*	*1020*	*1014*

Source: Standard Eurobarometer.

Q: What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the moment? *Terrorism* (% Mentioned)

Table 5 ***Nuclear weapons as a threat to the United States/Europe (%)***

	EU-7	EU-9	US	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	UK	BG	PL	RO	SK
Global spread of nuclear weapons														
2005	55	56	66	51	70	66	51	62	58	52	47	57	56	66
N	*7041*	*9041*	*1000*	*1005*	*1000*	*1000*	*1012*	*1001*	*1000*	*1001*	*1021*	*1022*	*1019*	*1000*
Iraq developing nuclear weapons														
2002	56		85	60		43	62	53		71		49		
N	*2980*		*1121*	*500*		*508*	*516*	*484*		*473*		*499*		
Iran developing nuclear weapons														
2003	47		57	39		36	56	50	52	47		51		
N	*3512*		*502*	*479*		*498*	*507*	*508*	*503*	*523*		*494*		
2006	62	62	75	67	68	53	62	62	69	56	43	64	57	60
N	*3499*	*4499*	*500*	*514*	*502*	*501*	*496*	*521*	*493*	*483*	*518*	*491*	*506*	*498*
North Korea developing nuclear weapons														
2003	50		60	48		42	53	48	57	51		52		
N	*3400*		*499*	*521*		*505*	*493*	*401*	*497*	*477*		*506*		

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

Q: I am going to read you a list of possible international threats to (the US / EUROPE) in the next 10 years. Please tell me if you think each one on the list is an extremely important threat, an important threat, or not an important threat at all. (% Extremely important threat).

Table 6 ***Level of European and American threat perceptions (2002-2006)***

	United States						Europe*						Difference Europe-US						Average Ranking	
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Aver.	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Aver.	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Aver.	US	EU5
Growing power of China	58				44	*51*	19				28	*24*	39				16	*28*	9	12
Iraq developing WMD	85					*85*	58					*58*	27					*27*	1	2
Terrorist attack with WMD			75			*75*			51			*51*			24			*24*	3	5
India and Pakistan	54					*54*	31					*31*	23					*23*	7	10
Iran/North Korea developing WMD**		59			78	*69*		47			64	*56*		12			14	*13*	4	3
Violence and instability in Iraq					61	*61*					48	*48*					13	*13*	6	6
Political Turmoil in Russia	25					*25*	13					*13*	12					*12*	15	15
International terrorism	91	70	76	72	80	*78*	65	69	68	58	70	*66*	26	1	8	14	10	*12*	2	1
Global spread of nuclear weapons				66		*66*				55		*55*				11		*11*	5	4
Large numbers of immigrants	56	38	26	35	45	*40*	38	30	21	26	33	*30*	18	8	5	9	12	*10*	13	11
Global spread of disease (AIDS)			51	54	51	*52*			48	48	35	*44*			3	6	16	*8*	8	8
Globalization	26					*26*	19					*19*	7					*7*	14	13
Economic downturn			41	43	54	*46*			39	42	43	*41*			2	1	11	*5*	11	9
Israel and Arab conflict	66	39	38			*48*	45	46	44			*45*	21	-7	-6			*3*	10	7
Islamic fundamentalism	63	44	51	45	59	*52*	51	48	52	45	61	*51*	12	-4	-1	0	-2	*1*	8	5
Economic Competition	14	12				*13*	17	14				*16*	-3	-2				*-3*	17	14
US unilateralism		21				*21*		30				*30*		-9				*-9*	16	11
Global warming	43			39	47	*43*	53			52	60	*55*	-10			-13	-13	*-12*	12	4
(N)	1121	1001	1000	1000	1000		5001	5012	5011	5041	5006									

Source: CCFR Worldviews 2002, Transatlantic Trends.

Reported for 2002 are the percentages mentioning threat as “critical” in US and “extremely important” in Europe. For other years scores are for “extremely important” in both US and Europe. Percentages are computed including DKs.

* The European average is based on France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and United Kingdom.
** The question was about Iran/North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons. The split difference was significantly different from zero, but the absolute difference was negligible and we collapsed the two variables in one.

Q: I am going to read you a list of possible international threats to (the US / EUROPE) in the next 10 years. Please tell me if you think each one on the list is an extremely important threat, an important threat, or not an important threat at all. (% Extremely important threat).

Table 7 *European threat perceptions (2002-2006)* (*PCA Polichoric correlation with Varimax rotation*)

	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
International terrorism	0.44		0.54			0.47	0.46		0.45	
Islamic fundamentalism	0.43		0.48			0.68	0.59		0.53	
Large number of immigrants	0.14	0.24	0.39			0.54	0.59		0.28	0.16
Iraq developing WMD	0.46		0.46							
Violence and instability in Iraq									0.41	
A terrorist attack on [COUNTRY] using WMD					0.46					
The global spread of nuclear weapons								0.49		
Iran/North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons									0.49	
Military conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors	0.39		0.33	0.28	0.41					
Tensions between India and Pakistan	0.37									
Global warming	0.2	0.15						0.61		0.62
The global spread of a disease					0.58			0.5		0.46
A major economic downturn					0.46		0.22	0.26		0.51
Economic competition		0.6		0.62						
Globalization		0.54								
The development of China as a world power		0.43							0.15	0.29
Political turmoil in Russia	0.18	0.27								
US unilateralism				0.72						
Proportion Variance explained	0.2871	0.1928	0.3189	0.1943	0.2963	0.2580	0.2792	0.2708	0.3182	0.2017
(N)	4311		4677		4767		4731		4685	

Source: CCFR Worldviews 2002, Transatlantic Trends.

Only coefficients greater than .3 have been reported, unless all of them were below this threshold.

Table 8 ***American threat perceptions (2002-2006)*** *(PCA Polichoric correlation with Varimax rotation)*[1]

	2002			2003		2004		2005		2006	
	1	2	3	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
International terrorism	0.5			0.52		0.55		0.54		0.49	
Islamic fundamentalism	0.47			0.47		0.6		0.53		0.4	
Large number of immigrants			-0.65	0.41		0.37		0.46		0.38	
Iraq developing WMD	0.42			0.45[2]							
Violence and instability in Iraq										0.31	
A terrorist attack on [COUNTRY] using WMD						0.44					
The global spread of nuclear weapons								0.39			
Iran/North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons										0.46	
The development of China as a world power	0.33									0.31	
Military conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors			0.5		0.51		0.45				
Tensions between India and Pakistan			0.44								
Global warming		0.59							0.64		0.67
The global spread of a disease							0.59		0.6		0.43
A major economic downturn							0.59		0.41		0.54
Economic competition	0.15	0.26		0.27	0.24						
Globalization		0.59									
Political turmoil in Russia		0.36									
US unilateralism					0.81						
Proportion Variance explained	0.2857	0.1505	0.1190	0.3469	0.1631	0.2889	0.2608	0.3008	0.2634	0.3440	0.1966
(N)		925		815		895		877		902	

Source: CCFR Worldviews 2002, Transatlantic Trends.

[1] Only factor loading greater than .3 have been reported, unless all of them were below this thresholds.

Table 9 ***International terrorism as a threat to the United States/Europe (%)***

	EU-7	EU-9	US	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	UK	BG	PL	RO	SK
2002	62		91	63		60	67	54		74		55		
			100											
N	*3021*		*0*	*500*		*493*	*484*	*516*		*527*		*501*		
2003	69		70	74		65	71	65	69	69		70		
			100	*100*				*100*	*100*			*100*		
N	*7012*		*1*	*0*		*1003*	*1000*	*9*	*0*	*1000*		*0*		
2004	69	68	76	70	72	70	76	57	66	69		73		63
			100	*100*	*100*			*100*	*100*			*100*		*100*
N	*7014*	*9014*	*0*	*1*	*0*	*1006*	*1002*	*2*	*3*	*1000*		*0*		*0*
2005	61	62	72	59	68	55	61	58	76	57		63		62
			100	*100*	*100*			*102*	*100*			*100*		*101*
N	*7014*	*9059*	*0*	*1*	*0*	*1005*	*1001*	*2*	*0*	*1012*		*0*		*8*
2006	67	68	80	67	77	60	68	63	75	68	55	70	65	68
N	*3499*	*4499*	*500*	*514*	*502*	*501*	*496*	*521*	*493*	*483*	*518*	*491*	*506*	*498*

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

For comparability over time, the European average is based on France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and United Kingdom.

Q: I am going to read you a list of possible international threats to (the US / EUROPE) in the next 10 years. Please tell me if you think each one on the list is an extremely important threat, an important threat, or not an important threat at all. *International terrorism* (% extremely important threat).

Table 10 ***Islamic fundamentalism as a threat to the United States/Europe (%)***

	EU-7	EU-9	US	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	UK	BG	PL	RO	SK
2002	48		54	59		48	50	44		57		32		
			112											
N	*2980*		*1*	*500*		*508*	*516*	*484*		*473*		*499*		
2003	44		44	53		51	49	47	39	40		35		
			100	*100*				*100*		*100*		*100*		
N	*7012*		*1*	*0*		*1003*	*1000*	*9*	*1000*	*0*		*0*		
2004	49	49	51	59	60	53	53	55	43	43		40		31
		9014	*100*	*100*	*100*			*100*		*100*		*100*		*100*
N	*7014*		*0*	*1*	*0*	*1006*	*1002*	*2*	*1003*	*0*		*0*		*0*
2005	43	43	45	52	54	48	40	50	46	33		31		35
			100	*100*	*100*			*102*		*101*		*100*		*101*
N	*7041*	*9059*	*0*	*1*	*0*	*1005*	*1001*	*2*	*1000*	*2*		*0*		*8*
2006	55	55	58	62	66	54	59	60	52	55	43	43	38	40
N	*3499*	*4499*	*500*	*514*	*502*	*501*	*496*	*521*	*493*	*483*	*518*	*491*	*506*	*498*

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

Q: I am going to read you a list of possible international threats to (the US / EUROPE) in the next 10 years. Please tell me if you think each one on the list is an extremely important threat, an important threat, or not an important threat at all. *Islamic fundamentalsim* (% extremely important threat).

Table 11 ***Immigration as a threat to the United States/Europe (%)***

	EU-7	EU-9	US	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	UK	BG	PL	RO	SK
2002	35		54	24		30	48	29		54		28		
N	*2980*		*1121*	*500*		*508*	*516*	*484*		*473*		*499*		
2003	28		38	25		22	36	21	38	45		20		
N	*6012*		*1000*	*0*		*3*	*1000*	*9*	*1000*	*1000*		*1000*		
2004	21	23	26	21	25	18	25	15	31	29		18		27
N	*6011*	*9014*	*1000*	*1*	*0*	*6*	*1002*	*2*	*1003*	*1000*		*1000*		*1000*
2005	25	27	35	30	28	18	33	18	38	32		20		25
N	*6041*	*9059*	*1000*	*1*	*0*	*5*	*1001*	*2*	*1000*	*1012*		*1000*		*1018*
2006	28	32	42	28	49	22	35	20	41	42	14	23	25	28
N	*3006*	*4499*	*500*	*514*	*502*	*501*	*496*	*521*	*493*	*483*	*518*	*491*	*506*	*498*

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

Q: I am going to read you a list of possible international threats to (the US / EUROPE) in the next 10 years. Please tell me if you think each one on the list is an extremely important threat, an important threat, or not an important threat at all. *Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into Europe/the US.* (% Extremely important threat).

Table 12 *Immigration in the European public's agenda (%)*

	EU-27	EU-15	AT	BE	DE-W	DE-E	DK	ES	FI	FR	GR	IE	IT	LU	NL	PT	SE	UK	BG	CY	CZ	EE	HU	LT	LV	MT	PL	RO	SI	SK
EB 57.2 (2002)		**6**	**3**	**3**	**1**	**0**	**10**	**7**	**6**	**4**	**1**	**17**	**2**	**21**	**3**	**5**	**6**	**6**												
N			*1018*	*1049*	*1023*	*1016*	*1001*	*1000*	*1005*	*1007*	*1002*	*991*	*1002*	*600*	*1014*	*1000*	*1000*	*1038*												
EB 59.1 (2003)		**12**	**10**	**16**	**5**	**4**	**25**	**17**	**5**	**11**	**6**	**10**	**13**	**10**	**7**	**2**	**12**	**32**												
N			*1021*	*1112*	*1050*	*1021*	*1000*	*1000*	*1046*	*1075*	*1003*	*1024*	*1027*	*600*	*1008*	*1001*	*1000*	*1011*												
EB 60.1 (2003)		**12**	**11**	**18**	**7**	**6**	**22**	**22**	**5**	**9**	**7**	**6**	**14**	**14**	**9**	**3**	**7**	**32**												
N			*1010*	*1022*	*1016*	*1023*	*1000*	*1000*	*1018*	*1015*	*1001*	*1014*	*1008*	*587*	*1006*	*1000*	*1000*	*1055*												
EB 61 (2004)		**14**	**10**	**18**	**8**	**6**	**23**	**20**	**7**	**8**	**6**	**12**	**12**	**17**	**16**	**2**	**11**	**42**												
N			*1052*	*1012*	*1037*	*1032*	*1000*	*1000*	*1027*	*1019*	*1005*	*1001*	*1025*	*619*	*1044*	*1000*	*1000*	*1035*												
EB 62.0 (2004)	**9**	**13**	**18**	**17**	**7**	**6**	**26**	**24**	**5**	**11**	**7**	**6**	**17**	**16**	**6**	**1**	**7**	**30**	**7**	**5**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**4**	**1**	**19**	**1**	**3**	**3**	**1**
N			*1007*	*974*	*1037*	*508*	*1028*	*1023*	*1005*	*1020*	*1000*	*1000*	*1020*	*502*	*1009*	*1000*	*1000*	*1011*	*1004*	*500*	*1075*	*1000*	*1014*	*1002*	*1005*	*500*	*1000*	*1012*	*1000*	*1252*
EB 63.4 (2005)	**10**	**14**	**17**	**18**	**7**	**4**	**30**	**30**	**6**	**11**	**6**	**12**	**14**	**17**	**13**	**4**	**8**	**30**	**8**	**8**	**4**	**3**	**3**	**7**	**2**	**16**	**2**	**3**	**2**	**1**
N			*1000*	*1000*	*1015*	*505*	*1051*	*1024*	*1024*	*1012*	*1000*	*1006*	*1004*	*504*	*1006*	*1005*	*1024*	*1044*	*1018*	*505*	*1083*	*1001*	*1014*	*1003*	*1015*	*500*	*1000*	*1004*	*1045*	*1108*
EB 64.2 (2005)	**10**	**14**	**15**	**13**	**9**	**6**	**28**	**37**	**11**	**14**	**3**	**8**	**15**	**11**	**10**	**2**	**10**	**30**	**5**	**3**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**9**	**4**	**32**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**
N			*1020*	*1024*	*1021*	*513*	*1032*	*1015*	*1028*	*1009*	*1000*	*1009*	*1000*	*510*	*1041*	*1003*	*1033*	*1021*	*1001*	*502*	*1161*	*1000*	*1000*	*1020*	*1033*	*500*	*1000*	*1000*	*1034*	*1096*
EB 65.2 (2006)	**10**	**14**	**17**	**16**	**6**	**8**	**28**	**33**	**5**	**12**	**3**	**10**	**13**	**11**	**14**	**3**	**6**	**33**	**3**	**4**	**3**	**3**	**2**	**10**	**7**	**20**	**2**	**0**	**1**	**2**
N			*481*	*488*	*505*	*259*	*496*	*510*	*516*	*514*	*500*	*498*	*504*	*256*	*501*	*519*	*513*	*520*	*511*	*253*	*509*	*514*	*518*	*516*	*511*	*250*	*520*	*475*	*501*	*561*
EB 66.1 (2006)	**14**	**19**	**22**	**26**	**8**	**8**	**30**	**64**	**6**	**19**	**5**	**12**	**19**	**17**	**15**	**2**	**7**	**40**	**6**	**8**	**5**	**3**	**1**	**9**	**8**	**43**	**7**	**3**	**2**	**3**
N			*1016*	*1003*	*1018*	*507*	*1003*	*1003*	*1000*	*1007*	*1000*	*1000*	*1006*	*500*	*1018*	*995*	*1013*	*1000*	*1035*	*503*	*1091*	*1000*	*1005*	*1000*	*1015*	*500*	*1000*	*1047*	*1031*	*1023*
EB 66.3 (2006)	**10**	**13**	**25**	**11**	**8**	**6**	**16**	**33**	**5**	**13**	**6**	**6**	**25**	**5**	**7**	**5**	**10**	**20**	**2**	**4**	**5**	**1**	**2**	**5**	**6**	**24**	**5**	**5**	**5**	**3**
N			*1029*	*1009*	*1000*	*504*	*1037*	*1000*	*1028*	*1012*	*1000*	*1000*	*1038*	*502*	*1020*	*1004*	*1014*	*1014*	*1023*	*504*	*1150*	*1000*	*1000*	*1025*	*1019*	*500*	*1000*	*1000*	*1019*	*1003*
EB 67.2 (2007)	**11**	**14**	**22**	**19**	**9**	**7**	**23**	**36**	**5**	**11**	**4**	**12**	**14**	**10**	**13**	**3**	**9**	**32**	**5**	**8**	**5**	**3**	**2**	**9**	**5**	**27**	**10**	**2**	**3**	**3**
N			*1011*	*1011*	*1005*	*508*	*1002*	*1000*	*1038*	*1013*	*1000*	*1000*	*1010*	*511*	*1009*	*1011*	*1005*	*1015*	*1039*	*502*	*1043*	*1005*	*1006*	*1018*	*1013*	*500*	*1000*	*1019*	*1013*	*1106*
EB 68.1 (2007)	**11**	**15**	**27**	**19**	**6**	**4**	**23**	**24**	**6**	**14**	**5**	**14**	**13**	**13**	**14**	**1**	**12**	**41**	**4**	**7**	**4**	**2**	**1**	**6**	**4**	**38**	**6**	**4**	**2**	**2**
N			*1015*	*1022*	*1001*	*508*	*999*	*1000*	*1033*	*1036*	*1000*	*1007*	*1045*	*502*	*1005*	*1000*	*1003*	*1035*	*977*	*500*	*1106*	*1012*	*1000*	*1016*	*1006*	*500*	*1000*	*1000*	*1009*	*1126*
EB 69.2 (2008)	**9**	**11**	**14**	**17**	**7**	**4**	**18**	**18**	**7**	**7**	**4**	**5**	**7**	**9**	**17**	**2**	**11**	**36**	**1**	**12**	**4**	**1**	**1**	**4**	**2**	**30**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**
N			*1000*	*1003*	*1027*	*507*	*1005*	*1033*	*1004*	*1040*	*1000*	*1004*	*1022*	*501*	*1041*	*1001*	*1007*	*1006*	*1000*	*504*	*1014*	*1006*	*1000*	*1021*	*1008*	*500*	*1000*	*1019*	*1003*	*1085*
EB 71.1 (2009)	**6**	**7**	**9**	**9**	**3**	**5**	**11**	**7**	**6**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**13**	**8**	**4**	**1**	**4**	**21**	**1**	**12**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**39**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**
N			*1000*	*1018*	*1006*	*517*	*1016*	*1003*	*1017*	*1035*	*1000*	*1000*	*1060*	*504*	*1044*	*1000*	*1017*	*1005*	*1000*	*504*	*1050*	*1003*	*1023*	*1010*	*1001*	*500*	*1000*	*1043*	*1008*	*1025*
EB 71.3 (2009)	**9**	**10**	**15**	**16**	**4**	**4**	**11**	**11**	**8**	**6**	**16**	**3**	**14**	**9**	**8**	**2**	**7**	**26**	**1**	**14**	**5**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**52**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**
N			*1015*	*983*	*1007*	*514*	*1012*	*1002*	*1012*	*1038*	*1000*	*1006*	*1036*	*530*	*1000*	*1010*	*1068*	*1045*	*1023*	*505*	*1094*	*1006*	*1004*	*1016*	*1008*	*500*	*1000*	*1012*	*1012*	*1065*
EB 72.4 (2009)	**8**	**10**	**17**	**18**	**4**	**5**	**16**	**6**	**10**	**7**	**8**	**2**	**10**	**8**	**8**	**1**	**9**	**30**	**1**	**15**	**4**	**0**	**1**	**3**	**4**	**33**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**2**
N			*1030*	*1006*	*1000*	*514*	*1006*	*1020*	*1018*	*1005*	*1000*	*1011*	*1036*	*502*	*1004*	*1025*	*1032*	*1018*	*1008*	*506*	*1056*	*1002*	*1023*	*1023*	*1006*	*500*	*1000*	*1021*	*1015*	*1040*
EB 73.4 (2010)	**7**	**10**	**14**	**16**	**5**	**4**	**11**	**8**	**16**	**6**	**4**	**4**	**12**	**5**	**10**	**1**	**8**	**30**	**1**	**12**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**6**	**5**	**21**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
N			*1000*	*1013*	*1023*	*492*	*1007*	*1006*	*1001*	*1020*	*1000*	*1014*	*1028*	*505*	*1013*	*1025*	*1050*	*1013*	*1000*	*507*	*1021*	*1000*	*1021*	*1019*	*1003*	*500*	*1000*	*1020*	*1010*	*1027*
EB 74.2 (2010)	**10**	**14**	**27**	**27**	**16**	**13**	**16**	**7**	**14**	**10**	**6**	**2**	**12**	**9**	**17**	**1**	**13**	**29**	**1**	**16**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**10**	**4**	**12**	**2**	**3**	**0**	**1**
N			*517*	*479*	*524*	*283*	*509*	*511*	*481*	*531*	*501*	*504*	*514*	*256*	*516*	*487*	*506*	*513*	*501*	*251*	*514*	*508*	*496*	*492*	*504*	*250*	*521*	*495*	*496*	*670*
EB 75.3 (2011)	**11**	**13**	**21**	**29**	**12**	**10**	**12**	**7**	**11**	**14**	**7**	**6**	**24**	**21**	**13**	**0**	**9**	**22**	**1**	**21**	**4**	**2**	**0**	**8**	**6**	**40**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**
N			*537*	*501*	*514*	*248*	*484*	*529*	*495*	*509*	*495*	*508*	*517*	*250*	*503*	*495*	*514*	*524*	*501*	*251*	*491*	*492*	*503*	*532*	*514*	*250*	*488*	*506*	*509*	*510*
EB 76.3 (2011)	**7**	**9**	**12**	**20**	**7**	**6**	**6**	**4**	**7**	**7**	**4**	**6**	**6**	**21**	**10**	**1**	**5**	**22**	**2**	**14**	**4**	**0**	**1**	**6**	**7**	**12**	**0**	**2**	**2**	**0**
N			*484*	*492*	*505*	*266*	*488*	*517*	*500*	*525*	*523*	*508*	*535*	*252*	*470*	*510*	*502*	*486*	*502*	*254*	*518*	*505*	*537*	*529*	*492*	*250*	*509*	*506*	*507*	*511*
EB 77.3 (2012)	**7**	**9**	**11**	**18**	**9**	**9**	**10**	**2**	**7**	**11**	**8**	**5**	**3**	**16**	**3**	**1**	**10**	**23**	**2**	**13**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**10**	**7**	**24**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**0**
N			*993*	*1076*	*983*	*519*	*1007*	*1006*	*1001*	*1007*	*1001*	*1000*	*1036*	*507*	*1012*	*1010*	*1019*	*1005*	*1016*	*505*	*1002*	*1000*	*1010*	*1019*	*1007*	*500*	*1000*	*1073*	*1023*	*1000*
EB 78.1 (2012)	**7**	**8**	**13**	**12**	**8**	**10**	**11**	**2**	**5**	**9**	**7**	**9**	**2**	**8**	**1**	**0**	**13**	**26**	**2**	**9**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**10**	**11**	**20**	**3**	**1**	**1**	**1**
N			*993*	*1031*	*1043*	*519*	*1001*	*1006*	*1007*	*1008*	*1001*	*1000*	*1032*	*502*	*1016*	*1015*	*1029*	*1002*	*1020*	*503*	*1003*	*1003*	*1028*	*1019*	*1011*	*500*	*1000*	*1014*	*1014*	*1000*

Source: Standard Eurobarometer.

Q: What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the moment? *Immigration* (% Mentioned).

Table 13 ***Opinion of the US in nine European countries, 2002-2013 (%)***

		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
France	Favourable	62	42	37	43	39	39	42	75	73	75	69	64
	Unfavourable	34	57	62	57	60	60	57	25	26	26	31	36
	Net	*28*	*-15*	*-25*	*-14*	*-21*	*-21*	*-15*	*50*	*47*	*49*	*38*	*28*
Germany	Favourable	60	45	38	42	37	30	31	64	63	62	52	53
	Unfavourable	35	54	59	54	60	66	66	33	35	35	44	40
	Net	*25*	*-9*	*-21*	*-12*	*-23*	*-36*	*-35*	*31*	*28*	*27*	*8*	*13*
Italy	Favourable	70	60				53					74	76
	Unfavourable	23	38				38					22	16
	Net	*47*	*22*				*15*					*52*	*60*
Spain	Favourable		38		41	23	34	33	58	61	64	58	62
	Unfavourable		55		50	73	60	55	28	28	29	32	29
	Net		*-17*		*-9*	*-50*	*-26*	*-22*	*30*	*33*	*35*	*26*	*33*
United Kingdom	Favourable	75	70	58	55	56	51	53	69	65	61	60	58
	Unfavourable	16	26	34	38	33	42	37	20	24	28	31	30
	Net	*59*	*44*	*24*	*17*	*23*	*9*	*16*	*49*	*41*	*33*	*29*	*28*
Bulgaria	Favourable	72					51						
	Unfavourable	18					40						
	Net	*54*					*11*						
Czech Republic	Favourable	71					45					54	58
	Unfavourable	27					50					37	33
	Net	*44*					*-5*					*17*	*25*
Poland	Favourable	79			62		61	68	67	74	70	69	67
	Unfavourable	11			23		31	24	24	19	19	26	24
	Net	*68*			*39*		*30*	*44*	*43*	*55*	*51*	*43*	*43*
Slovakia	Favourable	60					41						
	Unfavourable	39					54						
	Net	*21*					*-13*						

Source: Pew Research Global Attitudes Project.

Q: Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of the US?

Table 14 ***Average net favorability (favorable*** **minus** ***unfavorable) ratings of the US in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, 1952-2013 (%)***

1950s-1970s		**1980s-2000s**	
1950	-	1980	42
1951	-	1981	32
1952	44	1982	33
1953	40	1983	28
1954	37	1984	22
1955	46	1985	55
1956	45	1986	51
1957	41	1987	47
1958	48	1988	51
1959	61	1989	55
1960	61	1990	60
1961	56	1991	65
1962	54	1992	58
1963	56	1993	51
1964	66	1994	44
1965	55	1995	36
1966	53	1996	29
1967	51	1997	57
1968	50	1998	49
1969	49	1999	55
1970	44	2000	53
1971	40	2001	55
1972	48	2002	38
1973	51	2003	-1
1974	45	2004	-7
1975	39	2005	-3
1976	32	2006	7
1977	48	2007	-8
1978	64	2008	-11
1979	53	2009	51
-	-	2010	55
-	-	2011	45
-	-	2012	32
-	-	2013	32

Source: USIA; Eurobarometer; Transatlantic Trends; Pew Research Global Attitudes Project.

Table 15 *Feelings toward other countries (2002-2009)*

	United States (a)								*EU-7 (b)*								*Diffrence (a-b)*							
Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
United States		92	89	86	85	82	82	84	64	57	57	54	53	53	53	59		35	32	32	32	29	29	25
European Union	53	60	62	56	60	59	57	63	70	71	70	66	67	68	65	61	-17	-11	-8	-9	-7	-11	-8	2
France	55	45	51	53	52		53		62	64	67	64	65		63		-7	-19	-13	-12	-13		-10	
Germany	61	56	61	60	61		61		63	65	66	65	68		66		-2	-9	-5	-5	-7		-5	
Netherlands		65								57								8						
Italy	65	63		63	50					67		66	42					-4		-3	8			
Spain				63	61		59					65	66		65					-2	-5		-6	
Poland	50								58								3							
Portugal		57								60							-3							
United Kingdom	76			72	73				65			63	65				11			9	8			
Russia	55	54	57	53	51	48	48		47	51	51	47	47	44	45		8	3	6	6	4	4	3	
Turkey		47	53	53	50	49	47			46	47	44	42	42	43			1	6	9	8	7	4	
Israel	55	60	60	60	61	61	62		38	43	41	44	44	42	44		17	17	19	16	17	19	18	
Palestinians		39	41	42	37	37	36			43	42	42	38	37	41			-4	-1	0	-1	0	-5	
China		46	49	47	46	46	42			47	50	45	46	44	41			-1	-1	2	0	2	1	
Saudi Arabia		38	43							42	42							-4	1					
Syria		34								38								-4						
North Korea		27	31							33	34							-6	-3					
Iran		31	34	32	27	26	25			34	36	33	28	28	28			-3	-2	-1	-1	-3	-3	
Iraq	23								25								-2							

Source: CCFR Worldviews 2002; Transatlantic Trends.

Scores are mean temperature for each country. Warm feelings ≥ 50°, Cool feelings ≤ 50°

Table 16 ***Structure of feelings toward foreign countries (Europe)***

	2002		2003 - Group 1*			2003 - Group 2*			2004			2005			2006		2007		2008	
Country	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**
EU	0.424		0.425				0.469			0.491			0.432		0.364			0.623		0.455
France	0.403		0.465				0.536			0.589			0.470		0.420					0.484
Germany	0.492		0.440				0.474			0.561			0.395		0.392					0.448
Italy			0.364										0.397		0.373					
Netherlands			0.386																	
Poland			0.244																	
Portugal							0.421													
Spain													0.475		0.367					0.374
China						0.313			0.329			0.380				0.369	0.334		0.349	
India																			0.407	
Iraq		0.692																		
Iran						0.490			0.446			0.513				0.515	0.513		0.483	
North Korea				0.509					0.388											
Palestinians				0.499		0.435			0.409			0.478				0.493	0.515		0.456	
Russia		0.432		0.303		0.265	0.203		0.208	0.208	0.186	0.290	0.149		0.119	0.282	0.270	0.228	0.178	0.233
Saudi Arabia						0.418			0.374											
Syria				0.534																
Turkey						0.327			0.353			0.409				0.405	0.410		0.384	
Israel		0.548		0.314	0.348	0.334					0.471	0.325		0.304		0.329	0.340		0.286	0.135
UK	0.404				0.557			0.634						0.516	0.369					
US	0.434				0.705			0.707			0.830			0.767	0.297			0.660		0.341

* *Group 1*: United States, Russia, Germany, Israel, France, The European Union, Great Britain, The Palestinians, Italy, The Netherland, Poland, North Korea, Syria.
Group 2: United States, Russia, Germany, Israel, France, The European Union, Great Britain, The Palestinians, China, Turkey, Portugal, Iran, Saudi Arabia.

Only factor loading greater than .3 have been reported, unless when all loadings were below this threshold.

Table 17 ***Structure of feelings toward foreign countries (United States)***

	2002		2003 - Group 1*			2003 - Group 2*			2004			2005			2006			2007		2008		
Country	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**3**
EU	0.425		0.371				0.362			0.499		0.312			0.381			0.386		0.471		
France			0.330	0.224			0.351	-0.354		0.461		0.439			0.363					0.438		
Germany	0.541		0.423				0.443			0.553		0.458			0.436					0.440		
Italy			0.368									0.371			0.449							
Netherlands			0.366																			
Poland			0.342																			
Portugal							0.497															
Spain												0.472			0.430					0.423		
China						0.332			0.344				0.434			0.396		0.401			0.351	
India						0.517														0.236	0.193	
Iraq		0.770																				
Iran									0.484				0.584			0.578		0.431			0.637	
North Korea				0.523					0.474													
Palestinians				0.461		0.449			0.399				0.491			0.541		0.439			0.544	
Russia	0.463		0.292	0.181	0.114	0.277	0.213			0.392		0.143	0.196	0.294		0.312		0.412		0.258	0.216	
Saudi Arabia						0.449			0.433													
Syria				0.417																		
Turkey							0.412						0.214	0.250	0.228	0.181		0.371		0.242	0.188	
Israel		0.551			0.814			0.552			0.606		0.160	0.579			0.569		0.649			0.656
UK	0.550		0.241	-0.297	0.214			0.505		0.225	0.360	0.261		0.371			0.453					
US			0.115	-0.335	0.268			0.484			0.591			0.541			0.595		0.691			0.685

* *Group 1*: United States, Russia, Germany, Israel, France, The European Union, Great Britain, The Palestinians, Italy, The Netherland, Poland, North Korea, Syria.
Group 2: United States, Russia, Germany, Israel, France, The European Union, Great Britain, The Palestinians, China, Turkey, Portugal, Iran, Saudi Arabia.

Only factor loading greater than .3 have been reported, unless when all loadings were below this threshold.

Table 18 ***Desirability of EU Leadership, 2002-2013 (%)***

	EU-7	EU-9	EU-11	USA	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	SE	UK	BG	PL	RO	SK
2002	81			79	82		83	89	92	81		79		68		
2003				80												
2004				79												
2005	79	79		73	87	82	82	82	86			67		69		65
2006	76	76		76	88	73	67	82	82	77		65	56	70	66	50
2007	78	78	77	73	86	74	72	81	84	75		71	66	76	67	52
2008	76	75	75	68	86	74	71	83	81	70		60	71	69	70	55
2009	76	77	76	72	88	79	72	83	80	78		61	69	68	70	65
2010	79	78	78	72	87	76	72	85	80	84		73	74	70	70	63
2011	78	77	76	69	87	72	76	85	79	77	78	63	75	69	69	57
2012	71	70	70	63	86	67	76	73	71	74	73	55	78	65	69	69
2013	73	71	71	57	86	56	68	75	72	72	74	60		69	70	69

Source: USIA 2002-2011; Transatlantic Trends; PIPA 2002, 2005-2008.

Q: How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very desirable, somewhat desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable? (% Very desirable + Somewhat desirable)

Table 19 ***Desirability of US Leadership, 2002-2013 (%)***

	EU-7	EU-9	EU-11	USA	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	SE	UK	BG	PL	RO	SK
2002	64			83	68		48	63	75			72		64		
2003	45				45		27	46	57	43		55		53		
2004	39	36			37	18	24	41	59	32		54		39		21
2005	41	39		85	40	22	28	37	58	44		53		42		34
2006	40	37		83	43	19	30	35	51	37		48	21	39	47	19
2007	39	36	36	85	38	18	28	37	52	34		50	22	41	46	16
2008	39	36	36	80	39	18	28	41	52	33		48	25	34	48	19
2009	58	55	55	87	65	42	52	55	67	55		64	30	42	54	32
2010	57	56	55	84	59	44	46	55	69	59		74	42	46	58	35
2011	57	54	54	85	60	35	49	56	70	58	64	66	39	49	56	33
2012	54	52	52	82	60	39	56	49	65	56	59	62	39	38	57	37
2013	58	55	55	77	63	30	53	56	64	57	62	65		50	56	38

Source: USIA 2002-2011, Transatlantic Trends; PIPA 2002, 2005-2008.

Q: How desirable is it that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very desirable, somewhat desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable? (% Very desirable + Somewhat desirable)

Table 20 ***Average net desirability (Desirable*** **minus** ***undesirable) of the US in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, 1961-2013 (%)***

1960s-1980s		**1980s-2000s**	
1960		1990	
1961	26	1991	
1962	18	1992	
1963	29	1993	15
1964		1994	
1965	31	1995	
1966		1996	
1967		1997	20
1968	7	1998	36
1969	43	1999	10
1970	-9	2000	12
1971	35	2001	27
1972	17	2002	30
1973	25	2003	-6
1974	25	2004	-15
1975	-9	2005	-15
1976		2006	-15
1977		2007	-15
1978		2008	-17
1979		2009	26
1980		2010	23
1981	4	2011	20
1982	8	2012	17
1983	-5	2013	23
1984	7		
1985	-2		
1986	0		
1987	-10		
1988	9		
1989	23		

Source: USIA; Eurobarometer; Transatlantic Trends; Pew Research Global Attitudes Project.

Table 21 *US-EU Partnership: Closer or More Independent? (%)*

		EU-7	EU-9	EU-11	USA	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	SE	UK	BG	PL	RO	SK
2004	Closer partnership	33	33		60	31	38	32	30	32	24		35		44		25
	Remain the same	14	13		17	16	8	11	10	10	17		17		12		15
	More independent	51	50		20	51	48	55	59	56	48		44		38		54
	N				*498*	*505*	*500*	*521*	*470*	*517*	*493*		*500*		*501*		*491*
2005	Closer partnership	29	30		53	27	42	21	29	23	25		27		49		35
	Remain the same	13	12		18	15	7	9	6	13	23		21		10		20
	More independent	57	55		26	57	49	69	65	64	49		49		34		36
	N				*480*	*513*	*500*	*516*	*522*	*518*	*472*		*505*		*516*		*508*
2006	Closer partnership	28	28		45	23	34	30	35	17	19		19	24	41	51	17
	Remain the same	15	14		18	20	7	10	7	16	15		19	19	18	16	25
	More independent	54	55		30	56	57	57	57	65	58		57	42	33	23	51
	N				*1000*	*1040*	*1018*	*1028*	*1043*	*1013*	*1011*		*1074*	*1026*	*1027*	*1003*	*1009*
2008	Closer partnership	31	32	33	47	25	37	34	37	26	22		26	37	45	52	25
	Remain the same	16	15	16	19	20	8	9	9	14	17		20	20	21	28	25
	More independent	50	50	48	29	53	52	56	52	58	56		51	35	25	12	41
	N				*1000*	*1020*	*1026*	*1019*	*1033*	*1006*	*1006*		*1123*	*1009*	*1021*	*1017*	*1022*
2009	Closer partnership	40	42	42	48	41	53	36	51	23	30		33	27	46	54	34
	Remain the same	20	19	19	19	25	8	12	10	26	28		27	32	25	21	28
	More independent	37	37	36	27	34	38	49	37	49	37		36	33	20	17	30
	N				*490*	*498*	*533*	*499*	*493*	*483*	*473*		*476*	*476*	*444*	*469*	*486*
2010	Closer partnership	40	41	42	45	35	52	42	53	32	33		30	38	45	56	31
	Remain the same	18	17	18	25	26	9	11	8	20	22		23	25	20	23	32
	More independent	40	40	38	30	39	38	45	38	47	45		45	30	30	17	33
	N				*1279*	*1013*	*1006*	*1002*	*997*	*981*	*993*		*1000*	*945*	*972*	*993*	*963*
2011	Closer partnership	38	39	39	33	33	47	42	50	30	29	25	28	32	40	50	28
	Remain the same	21	20	20	31	25	8	14	10	25	25	35	29	31	26	31	34
	More independent	39	39	38	33	41	43	44	36	44	44	36	39	33	27	15	32
	N				*1000*	*1000*	*1002*	*1000*	*1002*	*1000*	*1000*	*1003*	*1001*	*1012*	*1000*	*1018*	*1004*
2012	Closer partnership	31	32	33	30	25	40	34	43	28	21	23	25	27	35	51	19
	Remain the same	24	23	24	30	32	14	18	9	32	25	38	31	33	29	31	41
	More independent	41	41	39	34	42	43	46	46	37	51	35	40	38	26	15	33
	N				*1001*	*1000*	*1000*	*1000*	*1000*	*1000*	*1000*	*1000*	*1000*	*1007*	*1000*	*1025*	*1005*
2013	Closer partnership	28	28	29	29	25	34	30	36	21	20	23	21		32	43	21
	Remain the same	26	24	25	30	33	10	18	12	32	22	38	31		34	31	43
	More independent	43	44	42	33	40	52	50	49	45	54	34	42		26	21	32
	N				*1000*	1000	1000	1005	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000		1000	1042	1000

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

Q: “Do you think that the partnership between the US and the EU should become closer, should remain about the same or should the [European Union/United States] take a more independent approach from the United States in security and diplomatic affairs?”

Table 22 *EU as a superpower (%)*

		EU-7	EU-9	USA	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	UK	PL	SK
2002	The US should remain the only superpower	13		56	22		3	7	11		20	12	
	The European Union should become a superpower, like the US	65		33	48		91	76	59		56	63	
	No country should be a superpower	18		7	25		4	16	25		17	18	
	N			*710*	*1000*		*1001*	*1000*	*1000*		*1000*	*1000*	
2003	The US should remain the only superpower	9		42	8		5	5	9	7	22	10	
	The European Union should become a superpower, like the US	72		37	70		89	80	65	81	52	64	
	No country should be a superpower	14		5	16		4	13	22	5	17	17	
	N			*1001*	*1000*		*1003*	*1000*	*1009*	*1000*	*1000*	*1000*	
2004	The US should remain the only superpower	9	8	40	10	3	5	6	8	6	21	10	3
	The European Union should become a superpower, like the US	71	67	41	73	74	83	74	76	65	54	69	36
	No country should be a superpower	15	20	8	13	19	10	20	14	18	16	16	57
	N			*1000*	*1001*	*1000*	*1006*	*1002*	*1002*	*1003*	*1000*	*1000*	*1000*
2005	The US should remain the only superpower	10	9	36	12	2	5	7	13	7	20	9	4
	The European Union should become a superpower, like the US	71	69	47	68	76	87	68	68	82	54	71	48
	No country should be a superpower	14	18	8	16	19	7	24	16	8	18	12	42
	N			*1000*	*1001*	*1000*	*1005*	*1001*	*1002*	*1000*	*1012*	*1000*	*1018*

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

Q: In thinking about international affairs, which statement comes closer to your position about the United States and the European Union? (The US should remain the only superpower; The European Union should become a superpower, like the US; No country should be a superpower – volunteered)

Table 23 *Which role for the EU power?*

	Q1: The EU should concentrate on economic power	Q2: The EU should cooperate with the US	N
EU-7	64	80	7041
EU-9	63	80	9059
USA	61	45	1000
DE	66	84	1001
ES	59	80	1000
FR	66	81	1005
IT	61	80	1001
NL	50	87	1022
PT	63	62	1000
UK	52	72	1012
PL	79	85	1000
SK	53	67	1018

Source: Transatlantic Trends 2005.

Q1: Some say that in order for the EU to assume a greater international role it needs to do certain things. To what extent do you agree with the following: b) The EU should concentrate on economic power, even if this means it will not be able to act independently on military issues (% Agree strongly + Agree somewhat).

Q2 (Europe): Do you think a more powerful European Union should compete or cooperate with the US?

Q2 (USA): Do you think a more powerful European Union would compete or cooperate with the US?

Table 24 *EU as a superpower: even if this implies greater military expenditures (EU) or the EU opposed US policies (US) (%)*

		EU-7	EU-9	USA	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	UK	PL	SK
2002	Yes	52			51		53	49	39		58	50	
	No	43			43		44	46	58		37	39	
	N				*477*		*906*	*763*	*584*		*563*	*629*	
2003	Yes	51		83	48		52	54	41	49	1	43	
	No	44		11	49		45	39	54	41	0	47	
	N			*370*	*703*		*897*	*799*	*659*	*807*	*519*	*636*	
2004	Yes	48	48	80	35	48	54	57	39	60	53	46	44
	No	48	47	14	63	44	43	37	58	30	41	45	43
	N			*406*	*733*	*743*	*839*	*736*	*765*	*652*	*539*	*687*	*362*
2005	Yes	45	44	80	35	45	53	48	31	49	51	44	37
	No	52	50	14	64	49	46	48	67	43	43	48	49
	N			*472*	*681*	*758*	*873*	*676*	*699*	*815*	*548*	*709*	*486*

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

Q (EU, USA 2003): Would you be willing for the European Union to be a superpower even if this implies greater military expenditures?

Q (USA 2004, 2005): But what if the European Union sometimes opposed US policies? Would you still favor the European Union becoming a superpower?

Only if Table 22: The EU should become a superpower, like the US.

Table 25 ***Dealing with international threats: independence or partnership? (%)***

	Independently from the United States	*In partnership with the United States*	*N*
EU-7	43		
EU-9	43		
EU-11	41		
France	59	39	949
Germany	40	59	900
Italy	39	59	981
Netherlands	41	57	882
Portugal	37	58	934
Spain	43	56	972
United Kingdom	41	57	950
Bulgaria	33	59	740
Poland	36	58	864
Romania	34	57	640
Slovakia	49	44	622

Source: Transatlantic Trends 2007.

Q: In order to take greater responsibility for dealing with international threats, should the European Union address these problems independently from the United States or in partnership with the United States?

Table 26 ***Dealing with international threats: independence or partnership? (%)***

	EU-7	EU-9	EU-11	USA	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	UK	BG	PL	RO	SK
2004	88	87		86	90	83	91	86	93	75	87		82		75
2005	86	86		88	91	86	90	80	93	80	86		82		74
2006	87	87		91	88	89	91	81	93	78	88	77	86	80	72
2007	85	85	85	89	85	88	90	81	91	76	85	78	85	76	71

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

Q: When our country acts on a national security issue, it is critical that we do so together with our closest allies (Agree strongly + Agree somewhat %)

Table 27 ***Influence in the world (Average on a 0-10 scale)***

	EU	USA	DE	FR	IT	NL	UK	PL
France	5.8	5.3	5.4	6.3	6.2	6.0	5.3	5.5
Germany	6.2	6.1	6.1	6.1	6.5	6.2	5.9	6.3
Great Britain	6.4	7.1	6.2	5.8	6.9	6.4	6.9	6.3
European Union	7.1	6.8	6.8	7.2	7.5	6.9	6.7	7.6
China	5.8	6.8	5.5	5.8	6.1	6.1	6.1	5.3
Russia	6.0	6.4	6.1	5.4	6.2	6.2	6.0	6.3
United States	8.8	9.1	8.7	8.8	9.2	8.7	8.9	8.8

Source: Transatlantic Trends 2002.

Q: I would like to know how much influence do you think each of the following countries has in the world.

0 to ten scale, 0 means it is not influential at all and 10 extremely influential.

Table 28 ***NATO still essential? (%)***

	USA	EU-4	EU-7	EU-11	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	UK	BG	PL	RO	SK
1991	61	58			66		57	61			71				
1992	62	65			65		52				74				
1993	70	64			67		61	60			73				
1994	60	65			76		58	67			77				
1995	64	70			76		68				78				
1996	73	74			69		54	60			71				
1997	61	63			68		53	54			68				
1998	68	61			60		50	64			67				
1999	74	68			71		66	64			70				
2000	68	63			69		57	55			69				
2001	62	65			74		60	65			74				
2002	56	69	69		74		61	68	74		76		64		
2003	59	64			73		56	64			64				
2004	62	64	64		70	55	57	60	71	67	70		52		47
2005	60	58	58		61	48	58	52	68	65	65		47		53
2006	61	56	56		56	49	59	52	66	56	62	58	48	63	45
2007	60	56	56	55	55	49	55	55	66	59	64	58	46	62	44
2008	59	61	61	60	62	60	62	55	70	60	68	54	51	57	47
2009	62	62	62	61	63	61	56	60	77	67	72	50	50	60	52
2010	60	59	59	59	56	57	60	54	72	67	68	60	52	65	64
2011	62	64	62	62	58	61	60	63	73	70	69	63	51	67	57
2012	56	61	59	58	60	56	60	52	71	66	71	58	45	68	61
2013	55	59	58	58	60	52	62	46	72	63	69		47	66	54

Sources: USIA1969-2001; Transatlantic Trends 2002-2010.

Q: Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own? (% Essential).

Europe 4: France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

Table 29 ***Index of Atlanticism by year and country (% "High" on index)***

	EU-7	EU-9	EU-11	USA	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	UK	BG	PL	RO	SK
2005	16	16		46	13	15	7	16	15	18	21		23		21
2006	17	15	18	41	20	12	12	19	15	11	17	13	23	48	7
2008	17	16	19	41	16	12	11	18	18	12	22	18	26	44	12
2009	26	27	25	43	31	24	17	27	21	24	30	14	33	24	36
2010	26	25	27	49	24	22	21	27	28	23	29	30	27	50	19
2011	26	25	27	34	23	20	22	31	27	21	29	25	27	48	23
2012	21	20	23	26	18	18	22	20	30	15	24	25	19	46	16

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

Table 30 ***Economic power is more important than military power (%)***

	EU-7	EU-9	EU-11	USA	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	SE	UK	BG	PL	RO	SK
2003	80			69	85		79	81	79	74		76		75		
2004	84	84		64	87	80	85	88	84	76		79		82		89
2005	85	86		66	90	84	89	82	85	85		79		84		90
2006	87	87		72	88	88	89	87	87	87		84	87	88	87	89
2007	85	85	85	72	86	84	86	87	86	83		82	81	84	78	86
2008	86	86	86	70	86	86	89	89	87	85		81	86	85	81	88
2009	81	81	81	61	87	82	79	81	81	82		76	78	79	75	84
2010	87	87	86	78	91	87	88	86	87	88		85	84	81	80	86
2011	85	85	85	71	90	84	85	84	83	83	84	81	88	81	82	86
2012	81	81	81	74	91	85	87	83	83	77	84	80	90	76	84	86
2013	83	83	83	64	89	84	85	78	83	78	83	80		81	86	90

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

Q: Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following. Economic power is more important in world affairs than military power (% Agree strongly + Agree somewhat)

Table 31 ***Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice (%)***

	EU-7	EU-9	EU-11	USA	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	SE	UK	BG	PL	RO	SK
2003	48			84	39		39	43	60	45		74		46		
2004	42	41		82	31	25	33	35	53	38		69		47		37
2005	36	35		78	29	21	28	27	45	34		64		30		32
2006	35	34		78	26	21	31	28	47	33		65	26	27	33	35
2007	30	29	29	74	21	20	25	23	41	27		59	23	27	30	28
2008	29	27	27	74	20	19	21	22	38	28		62	15	22	26	19
2009	25	24	23	71	19	15	18	16	29	24		55	16	19	21	20
2010	29	28	27	77	23	22	16	19	41	29		61	20	26	22	22
2011	34	33	32	75	28	24	28	22	45	33	42	64	28	30	26	25
2012	35	34	34	74	32	26	30	25	48	27	38	64	29	28	23	26
2013	34	31	31	68	27	17	32	20	41	26	33	59		36	27	22

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

Q: Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following. Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice (% Agree strongly + Agree somewhat)

Table 32 ***The Typology of Power and War by Country, 2003-2012 (%)***

	EU-7	EU-9	EU-11	USA	DE	ES	BE	FR	IT	NL	PT	SE	UK	BG	HU	PL	RO	SK
HAWKS																		
2003	6			21	4			5	4	9	5		12			5		
2004	5	4		23	3	2		4	4	7	3		8			5		2
2005	4	4		22	3	2		3	3	7	2		9			2		3
2006	3	3	3	18	3	2		3	4	5	1		6	2		2	1	3
2007	3	3	3	17	2	3		3	2	4	3		7	3		3	3	3
2008	3	3	2	20	2	1		1	2	3	2		8	1		2	3	2
2009	4	4	4	21	3	3		3	3	4	3		9	3		2	3	3
2010	3	3	3	18	2	2		1	2	4	2		7	3		2	4	2
2011	4	4	4	17	2	2		3	2	5	4	4	8	3		3	5	3
2012	4	4	3	13	2	2		3	2	4	4	3	8	3		3	3	4
2013	4	4	4	20	4	3	4	3	2			3	7		5	3		
PRAGMATISTS																		
2003	41			59	34			33	37	48	36		57			39		
2004	37	35		52	26	22		29	31	44	34		56			41		34
2005	32	30		51	26	19		25	23	38	31		53			27		29
2006	33	31	30	54	24	19		28	25	41	31		55	23		25	31	31
2007	28	27	26	52	20	18		23	22	36	24		50	20		23	26	24
2008	27	25	23	51	18	19		19	20	34	25		52	13		19	22	16
2009	21	19	19	43	16	12		15	13	24	21		42	13		16	18	16
2010	27	25	24	60	21	20		15	17	35	26		52	16		22	18	19
2011	31	29	28	54	26	22		25	20	39	29	38	53	25		26	21	22
2012	31	30	28	58	29	24		26	23	42	23	34	53	26		24	20	22
2013	32	30	30	55	22	18	29	34	21			26	53		21	30		
DOVES																		
2003	37			9	50			46	42	30	37		17			34		
2004	44	46		11	60	56		55	55	39	41		21			39		52
2005	52	54		14	63	64		62	59	47	53		23			55		58
2006	53	55	55	16	64	68		60	60	45	54		25	61		61	53	54
2007	55	57	56	17	66	67		62	65	49	58		28	59		60	50	56
2008	58	59	60	18	68	67		68	68	53	60		26	70		65	56	60
2009	58	60	60	17	70	70		63	67	56	60		30	63		60	55	64
2010	58	59	59	17	68	66		71	68	50	61		31	63		56	58	62
2011	51	53	54	16	63	62		60	62	42	53	46	26	61		51	58	56
2012	50	52	54	15	61	61		60	60	40	53	49	25	60		49	61	62
2013	52	55	55	17	63	66	52	48	63			55	32		58	55		
ISOLATIONISTS																		
2003	8			3	9			11	9	7	8		5			5		
2004	6	6		3	7	9		8	5	5	8		5			4		4
2005	7	7		3	7	9		7	9	6	6		5			6		5
2006	6	6	6	4	8	8		7	8	5	6		4	5		4	6	4
2007	8	8	8	5	10	11		9	9	8	6		7	7		6	7	6
2008	8	8	8	4	10	10		9	8	7	7		7	7		5	9	5
2009	11	11	10	6	9	12		15	15	11	10		8	9		7	9	9
2010	7	7	7	3	6	9		8	8	5	9		5	5		7	9	8
2011	8	8	7	6	7	10		10	9	8	11	9	4	4		6	6	5
2012	9	9	8	7	5	12		8	11	8	15	7	6	2		9	5	4
2013	12	12	12	8	11	13	15	14	13			16	8		17	12		

Source: Transatlantic Trends 2003-2012; World Affairs 2013.

Remaining cases are DK/RF

Table 33 ***Attitudes toward the use of force for various purposes (2002, 2004 and 2007)***

	EU-7	EU-9	EU-11	USA	DE	ES	FR	IT	NL	PT	UK	BG	PL	RO	SK
1) 2002, 2004															
To destroy a terrorist camp (2002)	75			92	62		84	75	70		84		75		
To prevent an imminent terrorist attack (2004)	83	83		92	81	87	92	76	84	78	89		79		43
To defend a NATO ally that has been attacked (2004)	76	75		87	74	69	79	67	86	70	85		73		50
To provide food and medical assistance to victims of war (2004)	91	91		81	94	95	92	85	98	85	93		86		84
To assist a population struck by famine (2002)	88			81	83		89	91	93		90		92		
To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (2004)	70	69		80	65	64	71	66	81	68	74		74		74
To liberate hostages (2002)	78			77	69		83	83	80		82		78		
To uphold international law (2002)	80			76	68		84	83	86		84		84		
To provide peacekeeping troops after a civil war (2004)	79	80		66	84	85	84	77	88	76	81		61		58
To ensure the supply of oil (2002)	49			65	40		46	51	47		61		52		
To ensure the supply of oil (2004)	43	42		44	37	43	50	38	48	57	52		33		30
To remove a government that abuses human rights (2004)	50	50		57	36	55	53	54	53	63	59		48		40
To bring peace to a region where there is a civil war (2002)	72			48	58		76	85	73		75		71		
To stop the fighting in a civil war (2004)	53	56		38	41	70	68	56	56	63	57		45		83
2) 2007															
To provide humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region of the Sudan	80	81	79	75	73	90	88	86	82	84	80	44	71	57	62
To monitor and support a ceasefire in Southern Lebanon	60	60	59	55	45	69	73	66	70	63	65	35	47	47	45
To contribute to international reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan	65	67	66	64	57	81	71	70	75	73	69	39	54	61	44
To conduct combact operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan	32	31	31	68	24	27	36	28	45	30	51	20	20	25	15
To maintain peace and order in post-conflict Balkans	66	68	67	54	60	76	70	73	74	77	66	55	58	58	62
3) 2007**															
EU should commit more troops for peacekeeping missions	67	69	68	85	63	82	80	57	71	78	76	54	54	60	44
EU should commit more troops for combat actions	22	21	20	66	16	13	27	16	26	22	35	13	17	17	5

Source: Worldviews 2002; Transatlantic Trends.

Q1 (2002 and 2004): Now I would like to ask you some questions about when [country] should use its military force. For each of the following reasons, would you approve or disapprove the use of [survey country] military forces? (% Approval).

Q2 (2007): As you may know, some countries have troops currently engaged in different military operations around the world. To what extent, would you approve or disapprove of the deployment of [NATIONALITY] troops for the following operations? (% Approval).

Q3 (2007): The European Union can take greater responsibility for dealing with international threats in a number of different ways. For each of the following, please tell me if you agree or disagree that it is something that the European Union should undertake (% Agreement).

Table 34 ***Support for the use of force in different situations in the US and Europe (2004)***

	EU-5	USA
Never	1.4	0.3
1	1.1	1.1
2	3.0	2.1
3	5.6	5.6
4	9.7	13.1
5	17.7	20.7
6	21.2	19.3
7	21.8	20.7
All circumstances	18.3	16.8

Source: Transatlantic Trends 2004.

EU-5: France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and United Kingdom.

Table 35 ***Aggregate support of military action under different conditions (%)***

	All	US	EU	Δ(US-EU)
Military casualties	49	50	46	4
Civilian casualties	38	54	18	36
Form of military action mentioned	50	60	42	18
Purpose of military action mentioned	53	60	41	19
Objectives/Issues	50	60	42	18
Humanitarian purpose/protection of civilians	46	55	35	20
Unilateral action	53	59	44	15
Multilateral action	43	54	43	6
Positive legitimacy/self-defense	53	57	51	6
Negative legitimacy/no support	40	49	29	20
Prospects for success	53	55	48	7
Perceived benefits	40	57	36	21
Expected costs	44	51	31	20
Overall support score all cases (N=3015)	50	59	42	17

Source: CIRCaP database.

The Project

In an era of global flux, emerging powers and growing interconnectedness, transatlantic relations appear to have lost their bearings. As the international system fragments into different constellations of state and non-state powers across different policy domains, the US and the EU can no longer claim exclusive leadership in global governance. Traditional paradigms to understand the transatlantic relationship are thus wanting. A new approach is needed to pinpoint the direction transatlantic relations are taking. TRANSWORLD provides such an approach by a) ascertaining, differentiating among four policy domains (economic, security, environment, and human rights/democracy), whether transatlantic relations are drifting apart, adapting along an ad hoc cooperation-based pattern, or evolving into a different but resilient special partnership; b) assessing the role of a re-defined transatlantic relationship in the global governance architecture; c) providing tested policy recommendations on how the US and the EU could best cooperate to enhance the viability, effectiveness, and accountability of governance structures.

Consortium

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