PEACE-, INSTITUTION- AND NATION-BUILDING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

TASKS FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

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Index

Preface ............................................................................................................................................. 5

1. Democracy in the Arab Countries and the West,
   by Roberto Aliboni and Laura Guazzone ................................................................. 7

2. Promoting Economic and Political Reconstruction in the Middle East: Room for EU-US Cooperation?
   by Tim Niblock ........................................................................................................... 19

3. Nation-building in the Greater Middle East: The View from Washington,
   by Marina Ottaway .................................................................................................... 29

4. Palestinian Authority Reform: A Key Ingredient to Peace Diplomacy,
   by Mohammed S. Dajani ............................................................................................ 39

5. Third Party Intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
   by Jarat Chopra ....................................................................................................... 49

Appendix 1

Peace-, Institution- and Nation-Building in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, A Conference Report, Rome, 4-5 July 2003 ......................................................... 67

Appendix 2

Activities of the IAI project on Transatlantic Perspectives on Relations across the Mediterranean border ................................................................. 89
Preface

This paper, published in the English series of the IAI Quaderni, presents the proceedings of the conference on “Peace-, Institution-, and Nation-Building in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Tasks for Transatlantic Cooperation” held by IAI in Rome on 4-5 July 2003 within the framework of its “transatlantic relations” programme.

In recent years, the Middle East and Mediterranean have played a growing role in transatlantic relations. To a large extent, this is due to the growing commitment of the American administration towards the Greater Middle East region.

In spring 2003, this commitment led to the US attack and overthrow of the Ba’ath regime in Iraq with a view to establishing a democracy in that country and promoting political and economic reform throughout the region. This move was predicated on a sharp and profound change with respect to previous US policy, which attributed more importance to stability than to political reform. As is well known, this new policy has given way to a heated and at times bitter debate within the transatlantic community and brought about unprecedented splits across the Atlantic as well as in the European Union.

The conference took into consideration a number of key issues relating to the Greater Middle East (the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the European geopolitical vision) and the new US policy: democracy promotion, nation-building, political reform and development policies to support it, and the role of third parties in the special case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These issues were discussed by a distinguished group of Europeans, Americans and representatives of the Middle East and Mediterranean regions with a view to underscoring the possibilities for transatlantic cooperation in a context of divisions and disagreements.

The IAI takes the opportunity to express its deep gratitude to the German Marshall Fund of the United States, which supports the IAI’s entire programme on transatlantic relations; the NATO Division of Public Diplomacy; and the Ford Foundation Cairo Office, which contributed specifically to the organization of this conference.
1. Democracy in the Arab Countries and the West

Roberto Aliboni and Laura Guazzone

This paper takes into consideration two main issues: (a) the status of the debate on Arab democracy and its weak dynamics; (b) the role of the West in fostering or promoting democracy in the Arab world. It concludes by providing some recommendations about the appropriate framework in which a credible and more effective Western policy to promote democracy in the Arab world can be pursued and shared by the parties involved.

1. The Mixed Record of Democratisation in the Arab World

Many Arab countries have experienced a degree of political liberalism at some point in their contemporary history – most notably Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Syria. But none of these experiences has given rise to full-fledged democratic systems, which are in any case a recent and precarious achievement anywhere in the world. Nevertheless the debate about and actual experience of liberalism has a long and diverse history in the Arab countries and cannot be started “from scratch” [Hourani 1962; Binder 1988]. The first Arab experience with liberalism was in the constitutionalist era under Ottoman dominance (1870s-1910s); the second was with parliamentarism under colonial dominance (1920s-1950s). Later on, some countries – particularly Egypt – experienced different waves of political liberalisation and de-liberalisation.

A third and much debated “liberal age” started from around the end of the 1980s and is still in progress. From that date, most Arab countries adopted a few more liberal policies in the political and economic domain – often conceded under popular and international pressure – that contributed to giving the impression of a widened public sphere or, as it was more often phrased, of an Arab world in transition to democracy. From the second half of the 1990s to present, however, the new more liberal policies have been stalled, withdrawn or circumvented in most countries and it has became apparent that Arab regimes have failed to democratise and, in some cases, have become even more repressive and unaccountable.

There is now a growing consensus that it was wrong in most cases to classify recent changes in Arab political regimes as a “transition to democracy” [Salamé 1993; Ayyubi 1995; Korany 1998; Schlumberger 2000], at least in the more technical sense [Carothers 2002]. Significant change did indeed take place in Arab regimes, but it consisted of a modernisation of authoritarianism demanded by fiscal and legitimacy crises coupled with globalisation pressures [Albrecht, Schlumberger 2003]. This change seems to have given rise to a hybrid kind of regime variously known as “semi-authoritarianism” or “liberalised autocracy” [Ottaway 2003a; Brumberg 2003]. Ruled by modernised elites able to manipulate façade democratic institutions in order to stay in power, liberalised autocracies now exist in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain alongside the more “traditional”
secular or religious authoritarian regimes in Syria, Tunisia, Libya and Saudi Arabia.
In other words, in today’s Arab world there are neither democratic systems nor democrati-
sing regimes, there are instead many kinds of autocracies, each functioning differently
within the general framework of authoritarianism. For instance, in all liberalised autocrat-
ies there is a similar trend of ruling elites coopting new social segments to control the priva-
tising economy according to a pattern dubbed “from plan to clan”; the trend may be si-
milar, but the beneficiary groups are different and differently aggregated from country to
country [Ayyubi 1995, pp. 403-409; Ferrié 2003, pp. 22-29].
There is also a growing consensus on the fact that the entrenched regimes of liberalised au-
tocracies represent a new obstacle to democratisation in the Arab world [Albrecht, Schlum-
berger 2003; Brumberg 2003] which adds to the main ones, traditionally being identified
as regional conflict, foreign dominance, socio-economic underdevelopment and political
culture.

2. The Record of Western Efforts to Promote Political Change in the Arab Countries

Western efforts to bring about political reform in the Arab countries have a long history,
whose first episode took place in the wake of World War I, when Wilsonian principles of
self-determination fed the British-fomented Arab revolt. The second episode was in colo-
nial times, when colonial powers declared a mission of political civilisation – with or with-
out a mandate from the League of Nations. The third episode came during the Cold War
years, when Western countries pressured, boycotted and ousted pro-Soviet Arab regimes
to protect and expand the “free world” sphere of influence.
The policies for democracy promotion in the Middle East inaugurated by Western coun-
tries in the early 1990s and the present US drive for regime change are part of this long se-
quence. But they differ deeply from one another. As will be argued in the following sec-
tions, while democracy promotion policies are consistent with the substantive meaning of
democracy, the imposition of regime change is clearly incompatible with the spirit of de-
mocracy.
Historically, Western efforts to bring about political change in the Arab world have al-
ways been motivated by a strategic vision and more short-term political interests (on
which the US and the Europeans often differed) embedded in an ideological platform. As
it will be argued, current Western policies to promote democracy in the Arab world fol-
low this same pattern, with the assumption that the significant difference between now
and colonial times is that the political regimes preferred by the West today are also those
preferred by the majority of the Arab peoples. This assumption cannot be taken for gran-
ted and, to the contrary, the consistency between Western preferences and those of deeply
divided Arab societies remain dubious. As a consequence, Western policies are not that
eyasy to implement.
A useful precedent to focus present predicaments is the anti-Ottoman alliance between the
pan-Arab nationalist elites of the Arab provinces, the Hashemite tribal aristocracy and the
(British and French) allied powers. The short-lived Arab Kingdom established in Dama-
ascus wanted to be “civil, constitutional, decentralised and protect the rights of minorities”


and, on its behalf, Feisal signed (6 January 1919) an agreement with Chaim Weizman accepting the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Thus for a few precious years the political objectives of local Arab elites and Western powers converged and were supported by some common political values: nationalism, self-determination, liberalism and peaceful conflict resolution. But in 1920 the convergence ended, because Western powers found the Arabs “not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world” and established the mandates. However, the history of the Western role in the “Arab awakening” [Antonious 1938] is still relevant and tells us that the combination of anti-status quo Western powers and emerging Arab elites is a recipe “to win the hearts and minds” of Middle Eastern peoples, when it is based on compatible political goals and shared political values.

Is this the case today? What are the shared goals and values that currently underpin Western requests for political reform in the Arab countries? Where are the Arab elites that can credibly lead the reform process? While some argue that Arab public opinion simply does not matter [Ajami 2003] others see a potential partner for Western efforts in the “new Arab public sphere” who express itself in Arab transnational media (from the Internet to al-Jazeera) [Lynch 2003].

In any case, today the recipe is more difficult to implement: not only are the interests of Western powers divided, but the only organised anti-status quo groups in Arab societies seem to be the Islamists. Moreover Western countries and especially the US have a “strong credibility gap” as democratises [Ottaway 2003b] because of their long-standing support for Arab autocracies -which has not ended with 9/11 and the Iraq war [Carothers 2003; MERIP 2003]-, their double standards in managing regional security (from regional conflicts to nuclear proliferation), and the perceived instrumental use of democracy promotion to pressure regimes failing to fall in line with Western policy requests.3

3. Political Reform Towards what Kind of Democracy?

Local political activism, intellectual debates and even opinion polls confirm that there is a clear demand for democracy in the Arab world. On the other hand, democracy is the final goal envisaged by democracy promotion policies adopted by the US and the EU since the early 1990s [Carothers 2000; Gillespie 2002; Bicchi forthcoming]. The apparent convergence of Arab and Western demand of democracy disappears, however, when it comes to the meaning and content of democracy, let alone the ways, timing and responsibility for democratisation. If democracy is indeed to become a shared goal for Western and Arab eli-

1 Requests of the Syrian General Congress, 2 July 1919 [Rossi 1944, p. 75].
2 Art. 22 of the League of Nations Covenant regulating the mandates.
tes, some clarification is in order. The debate about the meaning of democracy in the Arab (and Muslim) world at large is often deadlocked by arguments and counterarguments about the cultural compatibility between Islamic and democratic values, a debate interlocking with the political dilemmas about “allowing” the Islamists into electoral competition or “letting” Western values contaminate local authenticity. Although necessary, these debates are loaded with beliefs and political preferences and, therefore, perpetuate ideological biases and do not help to forge a common ground. They contribute more to creating Middle East exceptionalism than overcoming it.

Possibly a less value-loaded approach is to conceptualise democracy as an entity composed of two distinct elements: “freedom from” and “freedom to” [Sartori 1995]. The former means freedom from tyranny and consists primarily of the structural and legal means to limit and control the exercise of power. It equates with the form of liberal constitutionalism. The latter is what an empowered people “wills and demands”, that is the actual policy contents processed through the liberal democratic political form. The liberal constitutional form -that is the unique blend of institutions and procedures that guarantees the substantive exercise of the “freedom to”- is the universally exportable element. This is because the core support for the liberal political form does not come from Western concepts of individual freedom and rights but from a universal harm-avoidance aspiration (i.e. to be free from harm to one’s life, health and well-being). Instead, country specific contingencies and cultural beliefs play a greater role in determining what is to be decided (that is: contents); therefore the “freedom to” component of democracy cannot be the same everywhere.

If these postulates are acceptable, then the respect of both components of democracy is the acid test for Western efforts to promote democratisation in the Arab world and offer a frame of reference for some of the policy dilemmas that have hindered democratisation in the Arab countries. For instance, a consistent response to Islamic political activism exists, although it is not simple: politically, it requires the integration of Islamists subscribing to democratic rules in a truly pluralistic political game (guarantee of the “freedom from”) [Guazzzone 1995; Hudson 1995]; culturally, it requires the development of Islamic values into policy contents to be processed through the liberal political form (guarantee of the “freedom to”). The latter process will inevitably be long – as always in the cultural realm – but it is already under way and, if an effort is really to be made to promote a liberal Islamic alternative, needs to be realistically supported by the West – as it was the case with Europe’s involvement in Khatami’s “Dialogue of civilisations”.

Finally, the conceptualisation of democracy as a composed entity allows for a better ap-

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5 Our arguments in this section are based on Sartori’s conceptualization as summarized in Sartori 1995.
6 We are aware that this path is rejected by many in the West and in the Arab countries, especially in the light of the prevalence of Arab Jihadism in the second part of the 90’s that led, inter alia, to 9/11. In short our argument is that, to the contrary, because of Jihadism Islamic liberalism must be supported wherever it exists.
7 Islamic liberalism is presently reinforced by two trends: religious secularization, as in Turkey, with its long dated attempts to reconcile secularism and Islamic values in politics, and religious reformation, the transnational debate about the need to bridge Islam and Western values on the basis of an evolutionary interpretation of Islamic religious sciences [Sadri 200].
proach to sequencing and timing in democratisation. As Sartori notes, nations coming to democratisation late are disadvantaged since they are expected to “catch up” quickly and fully. Historically, however, it cannot be overlooked that liberalism predates mass democracy by about two centuries. This does not mean that Arab liberals will have to wait that long, but it means that political reform should concentrate on democracy fundamentals and not waste efforts on mimicking Western policies. In the case of today’s Arab countries, the shared goal of Western and Arab democratises should be to build country-tailored processes of political reform that ensure liberal constitutionalism in its contemporary variant, i.e. measured by the eight constitutional guarantees defined by Robert Dahl.8

4. The Rationale for Democracy Promotion and Double Standards

Against this backdrop, how can a credible and effective Western policy of democratisation be construed? To respond to this question, one can start by asking what it is that gives rise to Western democratic activism today. Why is the West promoting democracy so actively in the Arab world (and elsewhere) – whether it be true democracy or not? In the past, Western efforts to introduce political change in the Arab countries had ideological as well as political motives. Today, while the ideological motives may be similar to those of the past (Wilsonian principles, “civilisation”, modernity, and now democracy), the political motives are obviously different.

If we look at political motives, we see that Western policies to promote democracy are predicated on the strong belief that the expansion of democracy in the world works as a strategic factor in strengthening international security and prosperity, globally and, in particular, for the West. The argument is that democratic regimes, replacing authoritarian (broadly corrupt and incompetent) ones, would be inherently bent on liberalising economies and conducting co-operative, non-aggressive foreign policies.

Thus, the policies to promote democracy have an idealistic background. At the same time, they promote substantive interests. To a large extent, the nexus between democracy and security is an argument stemming from the importance assumed in the Western world by liberal and neo-liberal theories of international relations as opposed to conventional realism. However, governments happen to use the idealistic rationale of liberal and neo-liberal theories as an ideological vehicle to pursue their real and conventional interests. This interplay of idealism and realism affects many Western policies. In particular, however, it affects those devoted to promoting democracy by embedding in them a drift towards double standard.

If we now go back to the question of building a credible and effective Western policy to promote democracy, two points deserve consideration: (a) the double standard inherent in

8 Dahl’s guarantees are: 1) freedom to form and join organizations; 2) freedom of expression; 3) right to vote; 4) right of political leaders to compete for (electoral) support; 5) alternative sources of information; 6) eligibility for public office; 7) free and fair elections; 8) institutions for making government policies dependent on votes or other expression of preference [Dahl 1971, p.3]. Note that Dahl’s definition does not include democratic features that may be given for granted, such as universal suffrage.
these policies, just mentioned; (b) the extent to which the basic nexus between democracy and security (prosperity and peace) really works.

What the previous sections suggest is that, in order to be credible and effective, the West should abstain from holding a double-standard attitude towards the Arab world and, more in general, non-Western countries. Double standards can take different forms. With respect to democratisation, one important form is support for the stability of authoritarian regimes vs. support to democratic reform. Another significant form of double standard concerns support to democratic constitutionalism while opposing the substantive choices democratic institutions may bring about.

If we limit ourselves to commenting on the latter form of double standard, it is clear that in order to gain credibility and become more convincing, Western policies of democracy promotion should in principle respect both elements of democracy: the institutional element (the institutional forms to achieve consensus) as well as the political one (values and goals that peoples choose by means of constitutional forms).

Western activism to introduce liberal constitutionalism – more broadly speaking, pluralist and liberal polities – seems acceptable and is likely to be welcomed by people in the Arab countries. By the same token, the support the West provides to non-liberal, authoritarian regimes to foster its political interest in short-term stability does not seem acceptable and may easily be in contradiction with the alleged aim of promoting democracy.

By contrast, Western activism aimed at introducing values and goals because of their reputed democratic significance is not acceptable. This activism can hurt, delay or prevent transitions to democracy. Doubtless, it may well happen that there is coincidence or convergence between values and goals, as in the case previously pointed out of the short-lived Damascus Arab Kingdom. If this convergence or coincidence is not there, however, Western activism can only complicate rather than solve problems. From another perspective, it is clear that attaining coincidence or convergence is a fundamental political and diplomatic goal in order to couple democratisation in the Arab countries with security in the West.

In conclusion, the main political requirement for the credibility of Western democratises in the Arab world is to respect both components of democracy, not only the “freedom from” element. Imposition of the type of regime to be achieved, the specific stages to reach or the contents to be achieved is not respectful of liberal political form. Thus, for instance, the acquiescence of European powers in the Algerian coup of 1992 had nothing to do with democracy promotion, nor does the preventive exclusion of the Islamist component from the political reconstruction of Iraq or the imposition of a trusteeship on Palestine [Indyk 2003]. In the same perspective, “regime change” as enforced in Iraq with the spring 2003 military campaign is by definition a policy that, at least from a normative point of view, is not respectful of liberal political form and substance.

5. Democracy and Security: Checking Nexuses

The Western argument linking democracy to security is predicated on a set of nexuses that basically suggests that a democratic regime will, by its very nature, be at peace with other
countries and thus pursue liberal policies in the economic as well as other fields. These nexuses cannot be taken for granted. They need to be qualified and are, in fact, still being debated by international relations theorists with no firm results.

In any case, the conclusions pointed out in the previous section suggest that the same democratic form can legitimately bring about different choices and promote different goals and values. While these different choices have to be respected from a normative point of view in order to make Western policies of democracy promotion credible, they can collide with security, the early mover of Western policies to promote democracy. Western support for authoritarian regimes, lest undemocratic Islamist extremism becomes empowered, and strong hesitations in implementing conditionality are examples of how Western security and its democracy promotion can collide. Thus, the nexus between democracy and security requires elaboration. This nexus is at the heart of the matter and deserves throughout consideration. In this paper, we will limit ourselves to a few points.

In its essence, democracy remains what it came to be in Athens during the fifth century B.C., that is a way to solve conflict and overcome the polarised world of tragedy through the use of dialectics. Conceptually, however, the basic aim of a domestic democratic regime to solve conflict peacefully and the foreign policy of this same regime are not the same thing. A democratic regime is by definition dedicated finding a peaceful resolution of domestic conflict in the polity by means of appropriate dialectical means, widespread checks and controls, guarantees and freedoms as well as by building up capabilities. Not necessarily, though, is it also dedicated to peace and co-operation abroad. External conflict may even be functional to solving internal ones. By the same token, there is no stringent relationship between the democratic character of a nation and its aggressiveness, its desire to dominate or to use violent means to assert its own perceived interests abroad. In principle, democracies in themselves are not inherently peaceful. In this sense it would be wrong to believe that if a country becomes democratic it becomes peaceful as well. A democracy moved by strong nationalist feelings, as many European countries were before the First World War, may even be less co-operative and peaceful internationally than an authoritarian regime, like today’s Egypt.

Nonetheless, it would be wrong to overlook that there is a correlation between domestic democracy and peace. Still, it comes from two relatively recent developments that took place in the West because of the interplay of a number of factors, particularly in Western Europe after the end of the Second World War. The approximation of Western Europe to Kant’s model of *pax perpetua* does not stem only from the emergence of democratic regimes in individual European countries, but also from the virtuous combination of developments in domestic democracy, liberal economy and international institutions. It may be that the American umbrella – supposedly allowing Europe to become a “paradise” of political irresponsibility (as conservative American thinkers now say to redefine what François Dûchêne construed as the emergence of a “civilian power”) – has to be added to the equation. Whatever the true substance, the European experience provides the right framework for correlating democracy and security, in that it stresses the need for the simultaneous emergence of domestic democracy, economic liberalisation and international law.

Returning to our topic, if the right correlation is the one just pointed out, this means that Western policies to promote democracy in the Arab world should promote, at one and the
same time, economic liberalisation and the strengthening of international organisations in an integrated policy blueprint. In this perspective, failing to comply with international law is another case of double standard: it damages the credibility of Western policies to promote democracy, weakens liberals in the Arab countries and reinforces public support for authoritarian regimes. In conclusion, the establishment of democracies domestically is a necessary but not sufficient condition for implementing what is called “democratic peace” (democracy in an inter-state context) between the West and the Arab world— or the Third world more generally. Democracy must be connected to a set of international conditions, in particular the strengthening of a cosmopolitan legal organisation. In isolation, the promotion of democracy cannot succeed and, consequently, cannot deliver security to the West.

Another correlation that deserves to be taken into account is the one between democracy and ideologies such as nationalism or socialism. As already said, a strongly nationalist democracy may not be a positive factor for international co-operation. Whether dressed up as democratic or authoritarian, nationalism has played a fundamental role, for instance, in Europe’s political dynamics between the two World Wars and was the source of disastrous conflicts in that region.

There are plenty of examples in contemporary international relations of situations in which policies to promote change, reconstruction and democracy are frustrated by the lack of a political solution to the national conflict (Kosovo, Bosnia, historical Palestine). While the establishment of a democratic regime can broadly help conflict resolution to emerge, the dynamics of democratisation may be seriously obstructed unless a political solution to the conflict is found. In this sense, while the West (and Israel) generally sees the lack of democracy in the Arab countries and Palestine as the main cause of the Israeli-Palestinian (and Arab) conflict, to a large extent the reverse is true: a political solution to the conflict would help democracy emerge in the region and, on the other hand, render Israeli democracy less nationalist.

In general, democracy promotion will be facilitated by successful negotiations on national conflicts, just as conflict resolution will be facilitated by successful political reform. However, democracy promotion should not be regarded directly as a conflict resolution tool. While democracy has to be promoted in the longer term in the framework of conflict prevention, outstanding conflicts must be tackled in the short term with conflict resolution policies. There can be interplay between longer and shorter-term conflict prevention and resolution. In terms of security, however, the West should not confuse the various instruments and timeframes.

Conclusions

There is consensus that trends towards democracy in the Arab world are weak. According to analysts, the West is contributing to that weakness by pursuing ambiguous policies of democracy promotion. At the end of the day, these policies do more to promote the stability of the authoritarian regimes presently in power than to promote democracy. Hence the need to rethink Western policies aimed at promoting democracy in the Arab world.
In this perspective, this paper has tried to set out a normative view on democracy promotion to make this policy more credible and acceptable to the parties concerned – consequently, more feasible and effective.

The paper discusses two main features of Western democracy promotion policies: (a) the need to avoid double standards; (b) the need to consider democracy promotion in a wider context of conflict prevention vs. conflict resolution.

In relation to the former, the paper holds that Western policies should be aimed at consolidating and promoting constitutional forms, while abstaining from interfering when those forms bring about choices predicated on values and goals different from those expected or preferred by the West. This attitude is fundamental to prevent a double standard and its multiple manifestations. In other words, in order to rebuild their credibility as democratisers, what Western countries need is a more transparent articulation of the nexus between their ideals and their interests in the region, embedded in the ‘no double standard’ approach just described.

In relation to context, provided that nexuses between democracy, peace and development are far from automatic, democracy promotion should be regarded mostly as a structural, long-term conflict prevention policy in which successful conflict resolution, economic development and international organisations have to be pursued simultaneously to bring about democracy. These days, democracy cannot be conceived in isolation, but only as part of a more complex set of political, institutional and economic conditions.

Besides these broad conclusions, more specific policy recommendations for democracy promotion in the Arab countries can be drawn from the paper. In particular: a) democracy promotion policies must be redesigned to engage the liberalised autocratic Arab regimes that have circumvented previous attempts at democratisation; b) democracy promotion policies should be tailored more to the specific countries, in particular as regards sequencing (constitutional guarantees first) and the social segments that should be engaged as partners in democracy promotion (i.e. civil society and counter elites are not the same everywhere); c) the integration in the institutional political arena of Islamist political movements which abide by liberal constitutional rules can be approached with a twofold strategy of cultural dialogue with the advocates of Islamic reformation, and political support for Arab governments that allow for controlled integration of Islamists.
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2. Promoting Economic and Political Reconstruction in the Middle East: Room for EU-US Cooperation?

Tim Niblock

1. Perspective

The focus of this paper is on the strategies which the EU and US are pursuing so as to promote the economic and political reconstruction of the Middle East. The central issue is whether EU and US policies are mutually compatible and, if so, whether they should be coordinated. Current developments in Iraq of course provide a focus to this issue, but the concern relates to the region as a whole.

The bringing together in this paper of economic reconstruction and political reconstruction itself reflects a common starting-point in US and EU policy. Both US and the EU policy-makers emphasise that political change must accompany any coherent attempt at economic development in the Middle East. On the EU side, the link between economic and political dimensions has been explicit since the early 1990s. It was first mooted in discussions about creating a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean in 1990/1, when European countries were reformulating their policies in the Middle East following the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The link was not, however, articulated in any formal EU document until the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. This now provides the documentary foundation for EU policy in the Mediterranean. The declaration insists on the importance of political change, deftly interlacing the economic and political. It calls for a “strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures”, where these different elements are conveyed as being mutually-dependent.

Developments subsequent to, and following from, the Barcelona Declaration have given practical effect to the Declaration’s linking of the political and economic dimensions. The MEDA programme, established as the principal financial instrument of the EU in implementing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, was given responsibility for promoting human rights and democratisation as well as economic development and interchange. The association agreements, signed by the EU with individual non-EU Mediterranean countries, all state (in Article 2 of each) that respect for human rights and democratic principles underlies the policies pursued and is an essential element of the agreements. The Associa-

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1 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Italy), The Mediterranean and the Middle East After the War in the Gulf: the C SCM (Rome: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991).
3 See the MEDA Programme website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/meda.htm>
tion Councils, established by each association agreement have a duty to cover these concerns, together with the economic relationship between the two sides. While the countries of the Gulf do not fall within the ambit of the EU’s Mediterranean policy, they are nevertheless covered by a similar EU approach. Indeed, the emphasis on linking economic and political development in the Mediterranean reflects a wider, global, EU policy. It is significant that the EU’s MEDA Democracy Programme has now been integrated into the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), whose scope is world-wide.

On the US side there has, recently, been a similar insistence on linking the political and economic dimensions of development and reconstruction. The US government programme which puts this view most coherently is the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), initiated by President Bush in March 2002. This is a specifically global document, relevant to policy towards all parts of the non-Western world and not just the Middle East. In his speech to the Inter-American Development Bank on 14 March, President Bush said: “Good government is an essential condition of development. So the Millennium Challenge Account will reward nations that root out corruption, respect human rights, and adhere to the rule of law”.5

Two initiatives specific to the Middle East, linking the political to the economic, have been started in the course of 2002/2003, very much in the shadow of the developing crisis over Iraq. The first is the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), whose mission statement brings together concerns for economic, political and educational reform, and also women’s empowerment. The funding proposed is relatively modest ($29 million in FY 2002, $100 million in FY 2003, and $145 million in FY 2004), but it is intended to be accompanied by a realignment of existing US economic assistance programmes in the Arab world – orienting them to these new agendas. Most of the funding provided so far has gone to civil society and private sector projects. The second is the proposal for a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA), put forward by President Bush in May 2003. As MEFTA was described as allied to MEPI (and both were later described as part of the Middle East Initiative in June 2003),6 it may be assumed that it too shared the characteristics of political-economic linkage. President Bush stressed in inaugurating it that “ultimately, both economic success and human dignity depend on the rule of law, and honest administration and justice”.7

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4 In addition to the formal institutions through which the European Commission promotes human rights in the non-EU Mediterranean countries, the Commission also funds the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), which reports on human rights conditions in these countries. Despite the Commission funding, the EMHRN takes an independent line, often criticising the Commission’s failure to pursue human rights issues with sufficient vigour. See Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, “Plan of Action Adopted at the 4th General Assembly”, November 2002.

5 “Millennium Challenge Account: a Presidential Initiative”, August 2002, available on the website of the MCA, at MCA@mca.gov

6 Programmes linked to MEFTA are to be supported with MEPI funding. Details of the Middle East Initiative can be found in the US Department of State’s Fact Sheet on the Middle East Initiative, dated 18 June 2003. Accessed at <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22243.htm>.

7 The counterpart to the EU’s European Initiative for Human Rights and Democracy is the US Human Rights and Democracy Fund, established in 1998. This operates on a world-wide basis and is aimed directly at democratic change, with no link to economic concerns. Its stated aims are to promote democracy through as-
Despite the existence of Middle East specific programmes, US policy on political-economic linkages in supporting development and reconstruction in the Middle East are better understood through the prism of the Millennium Challenge Account. The MCA makes clear the requirements and objectives of policy more explicitly than do either of the other initiatives. In what follows, therefore, the main basis of comparison will be between the EU’s Barcelona Declaration and the US’s Millennium Challenge Account.

The paper will now investigate whether the initial similarity of approach between the EU and the US can constitute a basis for a coordinated policy on economic and political reconstruction in the Middle East. Beyond the shared conception that political and economic dimensions of reconstruction must be seen as mutually-dependent, the two sides would need to hold compatible views on the content of policy, i.e. what political and economic programmes should be promoted, and how they should be implemented. Moreover, any differences in how Middle Eastern states are likely to respond to EU policies, as against those of the US, may also be critical. Such reactions are not necessarily dependent on the content of the reconstruction policies, but may reflect differing regional perceptions about EU/US roles in the region. Regional hostility towards the US could inhibit the effectiveness of its regional reconstruction programmes, and the impact could spread to EU programmes if these are seen to be coordinated with US strategy in the area. On the basis of these considerations, the scope for cooperation and coordination can then be assessed.

2. The Content of Policy: Economic Restructuring, Democracy and Good Governance

There are in fact many respects in which the content of the political and economic reconstruction programmes pursued by the EU and US are compatible, aimed towards common policy objectives. Both the EU and the US, for example, place great emphasis on the need for economic liberalisation, viewing this as the necessary foundation for economic development in the region. The Barcelona Declaration puts this within the context of the projected Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, saying that such a development is dependent on “the pursuit….of policies based on the principles of market economy”. This involves “the adjustment and modernisation of economic and social structures, giving priority to the promotion and development of the private sector.”

The MCA, geared towards helping countries which have a record of commitment to effective development policies, defines the key economic criterion as whether a country has been “pursuing sound economic policies that stimulate enterprise and entrepreneurship – promoting open markets, sustainable budgets, and opportunities for economic growth”. In President Bush’s March 14 2002 speech, he

8 “Barcelona Declaration”, section on “Economic and Financial Partnership: Creating an Area of Shared Prosperity”, sub-section (a).
told his audience: “Sound economic policies unleash the enterprise and creativity necessary for development. So we will reward nations that have more open markets and sustainable budget policies, nations where people can start and operate a small business without running the gauntlets of bureaucracy and bribery”.

There is clearly some difference in perceptions of what is required to make possible the freeing of markets. As would be expected of a programme which will have significant economic and social effects on the EU, and which has been developed jointly with southern and eastern Mediterranean governments, the Barcelona framework gives greater emphasis to defusing any negative effects which may flow from economic liberalisation. Whereas the US document suggests a rather simplistic faith in free enterprise, the EU tends to temper its prescriptions for free trade and economic liberalisation with promises of support for infrastructural development, programmes to aid disadvantaged parts of the population and provide training and re-training for key groupings, and concern for the environment. Nonetheless, there is no incompatibility here. It is worth noting that the MCA also recognises the significance of strengthening the social infrastructure of the states concerned. One of the three main criteria for eligibility for MCA funding, indeed, is “investment in people”, covering “adequate health care, education, and other opportunities that sustain an educated and healthy population”.

Turning to the political agenda, there is again substantial overlap. The pronouncements favouring democracy made by each side have, not surprisingly, much in common. In the Barcelona Declaration the signatories were required to “develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems” and to “respect human rights and freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including the freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion”. President Bush, for his part, has talked of the US promoting “moderation, tolerance and the non-negotiable demand of human dignity – the rule of law, limits on the power of the state and respect for women, private property, free speech and equal justice”.

Making this attachment to democracy operational, however, is not simple. Both sides have encountered similar problems in moving from declaratory pronouncements to the actual achievement of democratic change. There has been a widespread recognition, by both EU and US policy-makers, that punitive measures or negative conditionality are neither practical nor effective in promoting democracy – although the US has been prepared to use sanctions more freely than has the EU. Such a strategy, it is acknowledged, may bring encouragement to those struggling for democratic rights within Middle Eastern states, but it also enables regional governments to defend themselves as the protectors of local customs and culture against foreign pressures. The realities of international politics, moreover, have meant that direct pressure for regime change (with the intended institution of a demo-

10 “Millennium Challenge Account: a Presidential Initiative”.
cratic government) will not be applied on governments which are regarded as friendly and/or strategically critical – which in practice applies to most of the regimes of the area. Within the EU, France has been particularly sensitive to criticism of the human rights records of North African governments, while the US has (until recently) sought to defuse criticism of the democratic deficits in the Arabian peninsula and Egypt. Despite the fears of some southern Mediterranean countries, and the hopes of some democracy activists, then, the EU has not used heavy-handed means to promote its democracy agenda. Where the US has imposed sanctions, the issues have generally related more to issues of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction than to democracy or human rights.

Having generally ruled out punitive measures and negative conditionality (economic sanctions) to promote the political changes which are deemed necessary, the EU and US have both relied on two alternative approaches. The first has been to promote the idea of partnership. In this approach, the EU/US offer the countries concerned a close relationship based on mutual interest. Channels are created within the structure of this relationship where issues of political and economic change can be discussed and promoted. This constitutes the central thrust of the Euro-Med strategy, establishing a “comprehensive partnership among the participants…through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension, these being the three aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership”.14 The signatories to the Barcelona declaration agree to “conduct a strengthened political dialogue at regular intervals, based on observance of essential principles of international law…”15 The association agreements concluded since the declaration all establish Association Councils, composed of representatives from both sides, whose duty it is to oversee all aspects of the relationship – political, cultural and economic. The main channels for influence, however, are the ongoing meetings between EU officials/leaders and government personnel from the southern/eastern Mediterranean state concerned. The European Parliament and bodies such as the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (a EU-financed NGO) play a role in ensuring that EU bodies act on the Barcelona principles.

Youngs has demonstrated that in some cases the EU has indeed been able to influence policy for change within this framework:

The discourse on democracy was not without impact, as Mediterranean governments came to perceive a greater need to legitimise their actions in terms of the idea or norm of democracy. Despite the absence from European policy of any punitive coercion, Mediterranean governments complained that the EMP was increasingly constraining precisely because of the “imposed” democratic discourse.16

Nonetheless, Youngs also shows that the prospect of southern and eastern Mediterranean countries becoming “entrapped” through this democratic discourse, i.e. finding themselves forced to democratise further than they had intended, was remote. Such reforms as were

14 “Barcelona Declaration”, preamble.
15 “Barcelona Declaration”, section on “Political and Security Partnership”.
carried through were often tactical concessions rather than substantive openings to the creation of a civil society. While the partnership concept is particularly associated with the EU (at least as far as the Mediterranean is concerned), it has also recently been adopted by the US. The US Middle East Partnership Initiative, indeed, takes its name from this concept. As noted above, however, the activities of MEPI have so far focused mainly on civil society and the private sector. The Millennium Challenge Account, on the other hand, operates formally on the basis of intergovernmental partnership. The MCA describes its activities as signalling “a new relationship between donors and recipients. Implementation will be based on a genuine partnership between the United States and the recipient country”. Every contract between the US and a recipient country, indeed, is conceived as a contract. The recipient country will be responsible for guaranteeing open private sector and civil society involvement in developing and implementing the contract; maximising the development impact of the aid given; ensuring an open and unbiased process for identifying projects; making it clear that the responsible actors within the country will be held accountable for performance; and monitoring and assessing activities. The US government, for its part, is responsible for providing technical assistance relative to development planning; disbursing the funds effectively; and monitoring progress towards the goals promoted by the MCA. It should be noted that the partnership described here is phrased primarily in terms of the economic objectives, whereas the Euro-Med partnership gives rather more emphasis to political issues. There is, moreover, as yet little indication of the institutional infrastructure through which non-economic issues could be pursued. The “goals promoted by the MCA”, however, do include the political dimensions which were mentioned above.

The second means by which both the EU and the US have sought to promote political and economic change has been through identifying clearly, and making public, the elements which are in need of change. This strategy has fitted well with the partnership strategy just discussed, in so far as the foci for discussion and pressure are made explicit. For the EU side, the MEDA programme has been the main channel through which targets for economic change and reform have been identified. MEDA’s Regional Indicative Programme 2002-2004, for example, covers the measures which need to be taken to make the Euro-Med Free Trade Zone a reality and to ensure that the Association Agreements achieve results. EU concerns have included helping southern and eastern Mediterranean countries develop trade among themselves as well as with the EU. Targeted change covers improving regional infrastructure in transport, energy and telecommunications; enhancing the sustainability of integration through protecting the environment, increasing opportunities for women in economic life, and providing education and training for employment; strengthening the rule of law and good governance; and bringing the Euro-Med partnership closer to the people. As for the US, the Millennium Challenge Account specifies in detail the elements which constitute good performance, and which will therefore determine which countries will enjoy funding. The criteria used for assessing performance are placed in three categories:

governing justly, investing in people, and encouraging economic freedom. Under “governing justly”, six indicators are provided: civil liberties (as assessed by Freedom House); political rights (again assessed by Freedom House); voice and accountability (using World Bank Institute indices); government effectiveness; the rule of law; and the control of corruption. Under “investing in people”, there are four indicators: public expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP; the immunisation rate for DPT and measles; the total public expenditure on primary education as a percentage of GDP; and the primary school completion rate. “Encouraging economic freedom” has six indicators: the country credit rating; the rate of inflation; the budget deficit as a proportion of GDP; the number of days it takes to start a new business; the openness to international trade; and the regulatory quality rating (i.e. measuring the burden on business arising from regulations and bureaucratic corruption).19

While US and EU policy-makers have been engaged in a similar process with regard to highlighting key elements for economic development, there is a substantial difference in character between the two. The EU agenda, rooted in the practical circumstances of the Mediterranean region with which it is dealing, is constituted by measures aimed at improving the current situation in all the countries of the region – whether they are currently performing well or not. The MCA agenda is to identify countries which are both poor and worthy of help, focusing all of the developmental effort on these. This difference is of crucial significance to Middle Eastern states. The first stage of the US MCA, in fact, will be of little relevance to them. Only countries with an annual per capita income below $1,435, are eligible to receive funding, and the only Arab countries which fall into that bracket are Yemen, Sudan and Mauritania. None of the latter countries, moreover, are considered likely to attain the levels required for selection as a “best performer”.20 The relevance to the Middle East of the MCA’s targets for change, therefore, depend on whether they are made operational within the framework of the US’s Middle East specific programmes, MEPI and MEFTA, and in aid provided by the US Agency for International Development.

3. The Political Context for Ongoing Policies

As noted above, similarities between EU and US programmes for reconstruction do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that coordination between them would be valuable. There are political parameters, relating to the record, interests and objectives of both sides in the region, which have to be taken into account. These will be given consideration here within the context of the crisis over Iraq.

On the one hand, the new regional context appears to provide new opportunities for the US and EU to promote a common agenda for political and economic change. The prospects for such change are now greater than before. The regimes of the region face new challenges to their legitimacy. The record of authoritarianism, with all its weaknesses and injusti-

19 The information in this paragraph is taken from the testimony of Treasury Under Secretary John B. Taylor before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 4, 2003. Accessible at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/js80.htm
ces, has been made public, and the social, political and economic effects of authoritari-
anism have been made explicit. Among populations there is a general mood that most of the
existing regimes are devoid of legitimacy, lack the ability to bring about effective econo-
mic restructuring, and need to be replaced by regimes which are accountable to the popu-
lations, reflective of the values inherent in society, and purged of corruption and nepotism.
Yet, before accepting the conclusion that now is the time for concerted EU/US action to
bring about economic and political change, some further dimensions of the contemporary
situation need to be considered. First, popular criticism of Middle Eastern governments
does not necessarily translate into support for external involvement. Indeed, part of the an-
ger currently directed by Middle Eastern populations towards their own governments
stems precisely from the perception that they have failed to resist such involvement. The-
re is likely to be increased sensitivity to external pressures, especially those coming from
the US and/or Britain. Populations may view the US’s championing of democracy in a ra-
ther different light than they would see that of the EU.
Second, a critical need within the Arab world at the moment is for governments to find new
bases of legitimacy. The economic and political strategies pursued by the governments of
the region should lead to a strengthening of their legitimacy rather than undermine this.
The concept of legitimacy has both domestic and international dimensions, and the practi-
cal reality is that a government which fails to respect one dimension of legitimacy will not
be taken seriously when it promotes the other. In the past, the Arab states have themselves
suffered from this problem. Their claim that international legitimacy should be respected
on the Palestine issue was undermined by their own lack of constitutional legitimacy. The
issue now relates to the Western side. The legitimacy of the military action undertaken by
the United States and Britain is widely questioned within the region, as well as outside.
Pressures from the US for democratic change within the region may be more effective than
before, but they may also be perceived as being less legitimate. Again, regional states may
prove to be more receptive to pressures for democratisation coming from the EU than from
the US, even though the latter pressures may be more direct and threatening.
Third, the ability of external powers to exert influence on the Arab states of the Middle
East is inevitably closely linked to developments in Palestine/Israel. How regional states
perceive the US and EU in the near future will depend on progress in the implementation
of the Road Map. For the moment, EU and US policies appear to be aligned, given that the
Road Map emerged from the collaborative setting of the Quartet. The continuation of this
alignment, however, is not assured, given that there is little sign that the Road Map will be
implemented. If Arab states attribute responsibility for any failure more to the US than the
EU, due to US support for Israel, the political dynamics of the two sides’ relationships with
Arab states will be affected and will grow more different. The advantages of reconstruc-
tion/development policies operating within a collaborative context will clearly be lessened.

4. Conclusion

This paper has shown that US and EU strategies for reconstruction and development in the
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern region have much in common. There is no deep ideo-
logical divide between the approaches taken. Each side can learn from the experience of the other as the process of political and economic change in the region advances. Nonetheless, there is little to be gained by seeking to coordinate policies in this field. There are significant differences in the interests and objectives of the EU and US in the region. The attempt to coordinate development strategies in such a context may be counter-productive. EU programmes could be weakened by identification with a US policy framework at variance with the EU’s own regional objectives. The varying perspectives from which the US and the EU see the region may be summarised as follows:

The EU’s central concern in the region is with stability and security (founded, of course, on economic and political systems which serve the interests of the populations). The proximity of the area to the EU means that the EU’s own social, political and economic stability is dependent on this. While the US also clearly favours stability in the region, its objectives are wider and more varied. Some of these latter objectives (especially those which relate to Israel, the war on terrorism, and US oil interests), do not cohere well with regional cooperation and security – at least in the short term.

In its relations with the Middle East and Mediterranean, the EU is rightly pursuing a comprehensive approach to partnership – creating a zone of peace and stability in which all states participate. US perceptions of partnership have been more restrictive, separating acceptable partners from states whose governments need to be confronted (at the extreme end, the “axis of evil”). The partnership envisaged by the MCA, moreover, is only being offered to the world’s poorest countries. In the Mediterranean/Middle East, the EU is seeking political and economic change from countries which are not necessarily poor. Indeed, the per capita incomes in some of the states is higher than that in some EU states. The dynamics of the relationship, and the character of the approach, will therefore need to be substantially different.

The EU is in a stronger position than the US to emphasise the importance of legitimacy and constitutionality. This stems not only from recent political developments over Iraq, but also from the nature of the EU. As a rule-based grouping of quasi-sovereign states, there needs to be continual justification of policy in terms of the legal basis. While this may at times inhibit effective policy-making, the EU has been keen to project the value of its legally- and constitutionally-bound model of political interaction. It is a model which can contribute to the Middle East’s contemporary political development. The EU has an interest, therefore, in keeping its own policies separate and distinct.

While the US and EU can learn from each other’s experience in reconstruction and development, and should recognise that they are both interested in promoting political and economic change within comparable frameworks, therefore, their actual programmes should remain distinct and uncoordinated.

21 The one state which was not able to participate in the Euro-med partnership was Libya, but this stemmed (formally at least) from the UN Security Council resolutions which had imposed sanctions on the country.
3. Nation-building in the Greater Middle East: 
The View from Washington

Marina Ottaway

Nation-building is a nebulous and often misused concept, surrounded by a great deal of controversy. Literally, the term refers to attempts to develop a sense of common identity or nationhood among the citizens of a country. For example, nation-building was a great concern for newly decolonized countries in the 1960s. Today, the term is most often applied to efforts by outside intervenors to put in place new political and administrative systems and shape a new civil society in post-conflict countries. In the latter interpretation, nation-building is a controversial idea on both sides of the aisle. Intervenors are reluctant to commit financial and human resources to a task that appears endless, but at the same time fear that without nation-building post-conflict countries will sink into chaos. The countries that are targets of nation-building want help in reconstructing, but question whether interventions by the UN or by individual states amount to a new form of imperialism.\(^1\)

Often forgotten in the current controversy over nation-building by outsiders is that most efforts to shape political and administrative systems and society itself are carried out by domestic political actors. For example, the international community has a nation-building strategy in Bosnia, and it has devoted to it an unusually high level of resources for an unusually long period of time. But in implementing its strategy the international community has to contend with the conflicting agendas and vested interests of Bosnian groups that do not necessarily share the vision of a united, multi-ethnic, and democratic Bosnia.

In this paper, the concept of nation-building will be used very broadly to address attempts by both outside intervenors, primarily the United States, and by domestic political actors to reshape the countries of the Greater Middle East. Specifically, the paper will discuss the competing nation-building agendas that are evident in Afghanistan and Iraq, and also the more modest reform attempts in other countries of the Greater Middle East.

1. The United States and Nation-building in the Greater Middle East

The idea of nation-building was originally rejected by the Bush administration as a political quagmire into which the United States should not venture. During his presidential campaign, George W. Bush made frequent disparaging remarks about nation-building. When the attack of September 11 revealed the costly consequences of Afghanistan’s neglect after the Soviet withdrawal, President Bush was forced to accept that nation-building could not be avoided. In a sharp departure from its original position, the administration pledged that it would rebuild Afghanistan and later Iraq into democratic countries after removing their offending regimes. Eventually, Bush’s ambition to reshape the Middle East extended beyond these two countries targeted for military intervention. The stated goal of the administration became the promotion of democratic change in the entire region. As envisaged

by U.S. officials, this democratic change would be the outcome of a broad process of socio-economic transformation encouraged by the United States. In December 2002, both Secretary of State Colin Powell and Policy Planning Bureau Director Richard Haass outlined a vision of democratic transformation in the Middle East that started not with political reform, but with a free market economy, educational systems reform, and a more active civil society, including women’s empowerment.

At least in theory, the United States is thus currently committed to two forms of nation-building in the Greater Middle East: the comprehensive rebuilding of Afghanistan and Iraq, where it has brought about regime change by force, and the reforming of countries where the old regimes have not been eliminated, but where the United States nevertheless intends to bring about political change through economic and social reform programs, as well as through direct political pressure. Only the most inflexible and intractable countries of the Middle East—countries like Libya and Syria—appear excluded from this broader nation-building effort. Even in Iran, the Bush administration still hopes that regime change may be brought about by a domestic popular uprising.

The expansive and sanguine view of nation-building in the Middle East the Bush administration is espousing in theory is not matched by de facto commitment of financial resources and personnel. As practiced, nation-building is a far more modest affair than the rhetoric suggests. It is faltering in Afghanistan, is off to a bad start in Iraq, and seems to consist of a scattershot of separate projects that do not add up to a strategy in the rest of the Middle East.

1.1 Nation-building after Regime Change: Afghanistan and Iraq

From the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, the Bush administration committed itself to rebuilding, acknowledging that the country’s neglect after the Soviet withdrawal had contributed to the rise to power of the Taliban and to Al-Qaeda’s ability to make into its operational base. This history, U.S. officials declared, would not be allowed to repeat itself.

Two years after the overthrow of the Taliban, the pattern of U.S. and, more generally, international commitment to Afghanistan amounts to far less than rhetorical statements would lead an observer to expect. The formal political reform process set in motion by the Bonn conference of November 2001 is on track and the United States and other members of the international community are determined to keep it that way.

Thus, the formal process is moving in an orderly fashion through the planned steps: the formation of the initial interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai at the Bonn conference; the convening of an emergency loya jirga in June 2002, which confirmed Karzai in power as president in the transitional government; the setting up of a constitutional drafting commission in October 2002 and of a constitutional review commission to promote discussion of the constitutional draft throughout the country in April 2003; and the beginning of the training of the new Afghan army. There is no reason to believe that the next steps will not take place on schedule: the constitutional loya jirga to review and adopt the constitutional draft is scheduled for October 2003, and general elections for mid-2004.

Behind this orderly formal process there is a chaotic, uncertain reality that the commit-
ment of the international community is inadequate to modify. Security in the country has remained precarious all along and is now deteriorating in many areas, hampering relief efforts and making a mockery of the idea of nation-building. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is only deployed in Kabul and its 5,000 soldiers are barely sufficient to maintain security even there; the 11,500 American and coalition troops still in the country are engaged in hunting down the remains of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in selected areas. While they do some relief and rehabilitation work to win hearts and minds, they are not engaged in a systematic attempt to provide security for ordinary Afghan people. Much of the country is thus left to its own devices.

This means that areas controlled by a strong warlord are reasonably secure, and areas where no single figure has a monopoly over means of coercion are not. The worst problems continue to occur in Pashtun areas, where the warlords of the Northern alliance have no control, remnants of the Taliban still hide out and find supporters, al-Qaeda figures operate, and U.S. troops continue to mount operations with the help of local leaders willing to cooperate with the Americans but not strong enough to impose their peace.

The Karzai government remains extraordinarily weak. Only 4,000 men have been trained so far for the envisaged 70,000-strong new national army, while there are about 200,000 men under arms in Afghanistan, most under the control of regional warlords.2 Karzai is also undermined by the unwillingness of many donors, including the United States, to channel aid through the Afghan government rather than international NGOs and private contractors. The policy was justified by expediency in the initial emergency situation – international NGOs that had operated in Afghanistan under the Taliban were much better prepared to distribute food, provide rudimentary health care, and start rebuilding the villages than a new government that had to reinvent itself from scratch. But by continuing to bypass the Afghan government, the international community is making it difficult for it to increase its capacity, let alone its legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

Furthermore, many donors have not delivered all the aid they originally pledged. The transitional government’s budget for Afghan fiscal year 1382, which began in March 2003, indicates a gap of $181 million in the ordinary budget and of $596 million in the development budget between money required from donor sources and the amount pledged thus far. These are high percentages: the ordinary budget for 1382 is $550 million and the development budget is $1.7 billion.3

Most importantly, the Karzai government is undermined by the reality of the power distribution in the country. Warlords have not been disarmed, forcing the president to make room for them in his cabinet or to accept them provincial governors. Warlords are growing rich by collecting customs revenue on goods coming into the country and exporting drugs, while the government coffers remain empty, dependent on foreign assistance. Donors’ contributions to the government’s budget total $296 million, which compares unfavorably with the $446 million in grants disbursed through international NGOs.4 At the same time,

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provincial customs houses under the control of warlords maintain control over most of the estimated $600 million of customs revenues and other taxes raised internally.\textsuperscript{5}

What is troubling about the situation in Afghanistan is not that the processes of nation-building and state-building are still incomplete—given the complexity of the task two years would be grossly insufficient even under a best case scenario. Rather, the problem is that, if present trends continue, nation-building will never be successful. If the warlords continue to consolidate their military and financial base and the international community allows this to happen, and aid continues to bypass state institutions and be channeled through international institutions and NGOs, then the Afghan state will never be reconstructed into the united, multi-ethnic, democratic entity that is the stated goal of the international intervention.

One explanation given for the scant commitment by the United States and other countries to the reconstruction of Afghanistan is the all-consuming preoccupation with Iraq. The explanation is inadequate. Undoubtedly, the war in Iraq has absorbed a lot of attention and is a costly endeavor for the United States, but even in Iraq reconstruction was never adequately planned, and as a result efforts are faltering. This suggests that the real problem is not that Iraq caused Afghanistan to be forgotten, but that there is a lack of commitment to and know-how about nation-building on the part of the United States. The Bush administration has pledged to reconstruct Iraq as a stable and democratic state, making it into an inspiration and model for other countries in the Middle East. What is happening on the ground does not correspond to this vision.

Although an assessment of nation-building in Iraq can only be highly tentative at this point, some trends are well-established and unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, barring a major crisis. The first trend is that the reconstruction project has not been internationalized but remains strictly in the hands of the United States. Of the other members of the so-called international coalition, Britain is playing a supporting, secondary role, while others are at best providing small numbers of troops and personnel to military and civilian operations controlled by the United States. The United Nations, and even the less controversial IMF and World Bank, also appear to have been relegated to the most marginal positions compatible with the wording of Security Council Resolution 1483. While the Bush administration by the late summer 2003 was willing to envisage a more important role for the UN, it still appeared unwilling to give that institution any real military or political control. Even domestically, control over the Iraqi occupation is highly centralized in the hands of a few high officials at the Pentagon, who refused to share even information with other departments and with the US Congress. Centralized control may increase efficiency, but it reduces available financial and human resources. It has also created an early backlash by Iraqis against the United States. Yet, in the absence of a clearly spelled out program for a transition to Iraqi governance comparable to what the Bonn conference provided for Afghanistan, Iraqis are being asked to trust the U.S. to rebuild their country physically, economically, and politically without being told what that the U.S. intends to do.

The second notable feature of U.S. nation-building in Iraq is that the U.S. vision for the country appears to be in conflict with the demands and vested interests of the majority of major politically players identifiable at this point. The United States has outlined a vision

\textsuperscript{5} New York Times Magazine, June 1, 2003.
of a liberal, reasonably democratic, secular, federal Iraq within its present borders, with the units comprising the federation being defined by geography, not by ethnicity or religion. Theoretically, a state constituted along those lines would be highly desirable. In practice, there is extreme confusion in the ranks of the Bush administration about how such a state might be built. Even more seriously, this vision may not be compatible with Iraq’s historical and present political reality.

It is already abundantly clear that the American agenda it is not compatible with what the major organized political groups want. It clashes with the agenda of the Kurds, who essentially want independence, although they are too astute politically to press for it at this time. It clashes with the agendas of both Shi’a and Sunni clerics, who are divided by conflicting visions of an Islamist state but are in agreement on the rejection of a secular one. It probably also clashes with that of many secular Shi’a politicians whose concern with power is greater than their concern for democracy. U.S. differences with this latter group can probably be glossed over – as long as such politicians remain friendly, the United States will probably disregard their scant commitment to democracy, just as it is willing to disregard the scant commitment to democracy of the warlords safely ensconced in the Karzai government and in the provinces of Afghanistan. But the agendas of Kurdish parties and Islamists are an open challenge to the United States that cannot be tolerated.

Other aspects of the American nation-building project for Iraq are still extremely vague. The Bush administration remains torn between two conflicting imperatives: ensuring the success of the reconstruction, and transferring power quickly to an Iraqi government before the tension caused by the occupation gets out of hand. Unfortunately, the two imperatives are irreconcilable, leading to the uncertain policy and abrupt changes of direction that have characterized the occupation so far. To maximize the probability of Iraq turning into a stable and reasonably democratic country, the United States has no option but to embark on a prolonged and forceful occupation. This is the lesson of Germany and Japan; it is also the lesson of Bosnia, where seven years of international occupation have not yet brought the country to the point where stability and democracy would be maintained without a continuing international presence. To minimize the possibility of a popular Iraqi backlash, on the other hand, power needs to be transferred back to the Iraqis quickly. However, that means that, as in Afghanistan, the U.S. capacity to transform Iraq will be reduced greatly and the country will de facto be reconstructed by the political groups that have already asserted themselves as major players: the Kurds in the north, Shi’a clerics in the south, the remnants of the Ba’th party and the Sunni clerics in the middle, and formerly exiled political groups trying to carve out a role for themselves against better established political forces all across the country. The possibility of a stable and democratic outcome does not appear good if these are the groups that will determine how Iraq is to be reconstructed.

1.2 U.S. Initiatives in the Greater Middle East: MEPI and the Muslim World Project

U.S. attempts to rebuild a less dangerous, more friendly, and more democratic Middle East extend beyond the headline-grabbing war and subsequent reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq. More quietly, the United States has also launched an effort to bring about democratic
change in the rest of the region. The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is a central aspect of this effort. MEPI is a nation-building project, because it sees political reform not as an isolated activity, but as integral part, indeed the outcome, of a series of interrelated socio-economic changes. Richard Haass, then director of the Policy Planning Bureau at the State Department, set forth the rationale for such engagement with the Middle East on December 4, 2002 at the Council on Foreign Relations: “Hence, for elections to be a true reflection of the people, they must be embedded in societies where there are strong and mature civil institutions and a diffusion of power. Elections should accompany the development of civil society (...) democracy takes time. It takes time for ideas to sink in and for political processes, institutions, and traditions to develop. Democratization is best measured not in weeks or months, but in years, decades and generations.” Democracy, in other words, requires a comprehensive nation-building effort, which involves the economy, the culture, and the society before it involves a direct tackling of political reform.

Programs initiated under MEPI so far accurately reflect this idea of nation-building, although the limitations of the funding provided for MEPI and the enormous ambition of its mandate have resulted not in a systematic, well-thought out, and comprehensive nation-building effort, but rather in a scattershot of initiatives. Such initiatives may be linked in an overall comprehensive framework in the minds of those who devised them, but to an outside observer they look more like a series of random activities extremely unlikely to make a significant difference.6

MEPI was initially funded at a paltry $20 million in the FY 2002 supplemental appropriations to jump-start its first initiatives. The administration asked an additional $200 million for MEPI and the broader Muslim Outreach program in the FY 2003 supplemental appropriations in order to strengthen current projects. Additionally, the administration will request $145 million for FY 2004.7 While not insignificant when compared to other U.S. assistance programs, these figures are still very small when compared to the ambitious goal of bringing about significant change in the economy and the educational system, and thus the culture and civil society, particularly that concerning women, of all Middle East countries. (Since this is not a development assistance project, but one of socio-political transformation, there are no eligibility criteria based on per capita income to exclude the rich countries of the region.)

The activities MEPI has implemented or is implementing at present are distinctly modest some are, in fact, considered to be pilot projects, slated to increase in scope in the future. Significantly, these activities appear to be chosen at random, without an underlying overall vision. In the field of education, for example, MEPI is spreading its efforts broadly: Concerning education, it has committed funds to create links between Arab and US universities, to improve pre-school education, to promote the teaching of English, and to improve techniques of adult teaching and the quality of the reading material used. To promote economic reform and private sector development, MEPI has provided technical assistance

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6 For more information visit the MEPI web site at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rt/mepi/

to Arab members of the WTO to help them comply with WTO criteria, has launched group training programs for small business entrepreneurs, and is supporting reform of commercial laws in some countries. In the realm of civil society and promotion of women rights, MEPI has brought Arab women with political ambitions to the United States to learn about political campaigning and to observe elections, it has helped NGOs in Yemen observe elections, and it has provided leadership training to student leaders from the Middle East and North Africa. The list could continue.

MEPI, in other words, has chosen to focus on very traditional, project-based activities rather than on broader programs or policies. Even if such projects increase in number, they will no more force significant change in any country in the future than similar projects have done in the past.

2. Nation-building from within: The Challenge to the United States

The effectiveness of MEPI in promoting socio-economic and political change in the Middle East looks even more doubtful against the background of past and present domestic nation-building efforts to which the countries of the Middle East have been exposed, from the fall of the Ottoman Empire to this day. Governments, political parties, and religious organizations have long tried to shape the countries of the Middle East to fit their particular view. The Middle East is hardly virgin territory for nation-building. Some of the contemporary domestic nation-building initiatives, particularly those by radical Islamist organizations, are antithetical to the U.S. vision for the Middle East and inimical to its interests. Others are more in line with American goals, for example the modest steps toward political liberalization taken by some the leaders of the smaller Gulf countries. Whether compatible with U.S. goals or not, there is much nation-building taking place in the Greater Middle East over which the United States has no control.

Indeed, the scope of the United States’ cautious and piecemeal efforts to shape a new culture and politics in the Greater Middle East pales in comparison to the attempts carried out by Arab governments and political organizations. I have already discussed the domestic forces with which the international community has to compete in rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq. Similar powerful forces exist elsewhere. Such forces can be divided schematically into three broad categories, with very strong variations from country to country: Arab governments, Islamist parties, and, far behind, democratic forces.

All Arab governments are engaged, more or less explicitly, in nation-building. The fact that these efforts do not take the form of the modernization and democratization project the United States and other industrial democracies would like to see does not mean that Arab governments are not trying to transform their countries. For many of these countries, this is not a new phenomenon. The earliest nation-building attempt in the Greater Middle East was undertaken by Kamal Ataturk in Turkey in the 1920s and 30s. Somewhat more recently, to mention just some of the most obvious cases, both Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and the Ba’th parties of Iraq and Syria tried to transform their countries along secular and statist lines, as did the FLN in Algeria, and to a large extent they succeeded. The Shah of Iran undertook his “white revolution” to modernize the country, unleashing a reaction that
eventually cost him the throne and brought to power shi’a clerics with their own nation-building agenda. King Hassan of Morocco undertook a more cautious modernization of the country, as did King Hussein of Jordan; both managed to retain control and pass the throne – and the problem of nation-building – on to their sons. Muammar Ghaddafi has attempted to reshape Libya repeatedly according to his rather quixotic and ever changing views. Even the Gulf monarchies, admittedly the most conservative and slow acting of all Arab governments, engage in some degree of nation-building. The Saudi royal family has allowed the Wahabi religious establishment to control social life and religious and political thinking in the country, while carrying out a slow attempt to modernize the economy and introduce at least a degree of modern technical education. Other Gulf monarchies are experimenting with limited degrees of political and social modernization. Far from being immutable entities shaped by primordial trends and an archaic interpretation of Islam, Arab countries are the products of remarkable nation-building efforts.

In the last two decades, the countries of the Greater Middle East have also been deeply affected by the nation-building project of Islamist organizations, both Shi’a and Sunni. From the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 to today, Islamist organizations have had an explicit project to reform society and the polity. The impact of Islamist organizations has been profound everywhere. To be sure, the impact has been greater in countries like Iran and Afghanistan, where Islamists are or have been in power, or in a country such as Saudi Arabia, where the government has allowed them to control social customs and education. But Islamist groups have also become a political force to be reckoned with in all countries of the Greater Middle East, including some of the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. Most insidiously, they have had a very deep, visible, and extremely complex impact in countries like Egypt or Turkey, which only two decades ago appeared to be quite secularized.

Domestic democratic organizations in the Middle East are by far the weakest nation-builders: they have a project, but they have limited capacity to implement it. Beginning with the impact of colonization, many countries developed a social stratum of modernizers, influenced by western ideas about politics, economics and social relations. In Egypt in particular, this stratum became quite influential in the 1920s and 1930s, seeking to develop a modern entrepreneurial economy, fighting for women’s rights, and developing a modern educational system and thus a professional class. This was also the stratum that led the resistance to British control and, in so doing, created a common bond of nationalism with other segments of the population, becoming very influential. However, once the British presence dwindled after World War II, this liberal and democratic intelligentsia lost the capacity to create a broad-based movement and lost its influence.

One of the goals of MEPI, and indeed of earlier democracy promotion activities by USAID and a number of American NGOs, is the strengthening the democratic elements in Arab societies and enhancing their influence. MEPI funding will undoubtedly help specific organizations of civil society or even political parties. It is much more doubtful that even an increased number of projects will be able to reverse the tremendous disadvantage under which such organizations operate at present and make them into a force capable of counterbalancing the influence of incumbent governments and Islamist organizations.
Conclusions

The United States’ ambition to rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq into modern, secular, and reasonably democratic countries and to steer the entire Greater Middle East toward democracy is unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future. First, there is a chasm separating the U.S. rhetorical commitment to nation-building in the two countries where it has intervened militarily and what it is doing in practice. Second, the low key – and low cost – approach of the Middle East Partnership Initiative will not bring about much change. It is an approach based on the implementation of narrowly focused, small projects in many countries, rather than on a politically more demanding and risky, although potentially more rewarding, attempt to engage Arab regimes and political organizations of all types in dialogue over reform. In the meantime, incumbent governments and Islamist political organizations are pursuing their own nation-building projects, which conflict with each other and with the U.S. approach. Nation-building in the Greater Middle East is a battle the United States is not guaranteed to win.
4. Palestinian Authority Reform: A Key Ingredient to Peace Diplomacy

Mohammed S. Dajani

1. Introduction

A major controversy erupted recently regarding Palestinian Authority (PA) reform which raised the following questions: Did Arafat promise PA reform out of personal convictions, to improve his public image, to consolidate his power, to blame others for his mistakes and failures, or due to domestic and outside pressures? What would give Arafat strong incentive to introduce genuine reform? Will President Arafat allow premier Abbas to succeed where he had failed? Why is Arafat using the language of reform? How much PA reform is needed? How much will be allowed? Would it be window dressing as some PA officials plan or a heart transplant as the Israeli and Americans hope or an overhaul for the whole system as the Palestinians aspire? What comes first: PA reform or peace settlement? Which constitutes the major impediment to a successful peace process: Lack of PA reform, as the Israelis affirm or continued Israeli occupation, as Palestinians maintain? Is PA reform a precondition for peace, a component of the peace process, or an unrelated issue to the peace process? Will resumption of final status negotiations detract or bolster PA reform?

The PA Reform Agenda is to design a work plan for reform that is detailed, well-articulated, solid and feasible. The aim of PA reform is to establish a political system that is democratic, transparent, accountable, reliable, efficient, productive, stable, rational, and peace oriented. The objectives are to provide better public services, to ensure more productivity, to affirm rule of law, to acquire good functioning public management apparatus, to develop skilled resources in the civil service, to have an honest transparent and accountable government, to prevent waste of limited resources, to stamp out corruption, and significantly to restore public confidence.

The PA reform means different things to different people: For the PA, it means looking good facing the Palestinian public and the world. For Israel, it means resolving security problems by ousting Arafat and undermining the PA. Sharon’s concept of “reform,” “was to change the character and performance of the PA to solve Israel’s security, and his own, political problems.” For the United States, it means empowering civil society, Arafat’s marginalisation & eventual replacement, and emergence of more peace-minded leadership. For the Europeans, it means creating a modern viable transparent government. European donor countries have contributed substantially for the PA and so they want to be sure that

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1 In this paper, I am using the term “Palestinian Authority Reform” rather than “Palestinian Reform” which is a misnomer since who is being targeted for reform in this case is the political system of the Palestinian Authority including its bureaucracy and the laws and regulations that govern its day-to-day activities rather than the Palestinian society as a whole as the term “Palestinian reform” may imply.

their money is spent properly. Thus to them reform means transparency and accountability. For the Arab states, it means pursuing diplomatic efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the Palestinians, it means modernizing the government, enforcing accountability, transparency, and efficiency, and establishing strong sustainable democratic institutions.³

A number of factors spurred the current reform movement. Pressures for PA reform came from within and without. Domestically, the main reason was Palestinian dissatisfaction with the general performance of the PA, its inability to provide better public services, and the growing corruption within the public service. Calls for PA reform came from a wide spectrum of the Palestinian society, mainly, senior officials, legislators, security heads political leaders and activists, civic & non-governmental organizations, educators, academicians, and ordinary citizens. In the last few years a diverse group of Palestinian reformers has arisen; members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, prominent non-governmental organizations, intellectuals, scholars, and academicians. A public opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and Gaza during 15-18 May 2002 showed that:

- 91% support fundamental changes in the Palestinian authority,
- 85% support the unification of the security services,
- 95% support dismissal of ministers,
- 83% support holding elections in the next few months,
- 92% support adoption of a constitution.
- But only 48% support, and 43% oppose, changing the Palestinian political system so that power would reside in the hands of a prime minister while the office of the president would become ceremonial.
- 83% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions,
- 89% support a democratic political system,
- 95% support periodic elections,
- 82% support the election of the head of the state for a limited period only, 85% support full freedom to form political parties,
- 82% support free press without state censorship,
- 78% support a judiciary independent of the executive branch.

In his speech to the Palestinian Legislative Council on May 15, 2002, PA President Yasser Arafat promised genuine PA reform conceding that “all administrative, ministerial, and security agencies had to be revamped after many of their flaws had been exposed”. He asserted: “I insist that a new and full formula for the authority, its departments, and agencies

³ See: May 13, 2002 Edition 17, www.bitterlemons.org: “Real reform means free elections” by Ghassan Khatib [Palestinians have not forgotten Israeli attempts to impose an alternative, collaborative leadership against their will]; “With a little help from their friends?” by Yossi Alpher, [Palestinians need to sweep out the ills of Arafat’s mafia rule because it serves their own interests – not ours; “Reform and resistance” by Jamil Hilal [What Sharon means by “reform” is a process of neutralizing Arafat. What Palestinians mean by “reform” is tidying the fight against occupation. Reform for them is envisaged as the separation of powers, the promulgation of a modern constitution or basic law and the holding of presidential, legislative and local elections.
be introduced so as to affect restructuring and reform on a stronger basis and to set up the state of Palestine.” Following his speech, Arafat in June 2002 took action to confirm his seriousness on this matter approving a series of measures to improve PA performance. But the measures taken proved to be “too little too late”. In an unprecedented move, the PA cabinet was pressured to resign.

In his speech before the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) on April 29, 2003 outlining the work plan of his newly appointed government, Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas affirmed:

“The government will continue to implement and develop its reform plan – mainly the reform plan adopted by the Legislative Council through a joint committee between the Council, the government and in cooperation with all relevant parties including civil society. The government will build the ministerial cabinet with professionalism and with work ethics that will improve the work of all executive authority institutions in order serve the public interest. One of the most important steps in this regard is the implementation of the financial and administrative components of the civil service law.”

The general approach to peacemaking since the Oslo Accords in September 1993 has been that Palestinian internal affairs were irrelevant to peace diplomacy. Since Yasser Arafat was viewed as the anchorman of Palestinian peace diplomacy, his authoritarianism and the corruption of his system was not only inherent in the deal but even welcomed, in the belief that an unrestricted authoritarian corrupt political system would do the most for maintaining Israeli security and serving Israeli interest. This division between foreign and domestic issues did not work. Ultimately, Arafat sought to deflect attention from his domestic nonperformance and the spreading corruption within all PA institutions and agencies by dumping in the sea of violence Palestinian dissatisfaction with his performance and anger at all the missed opportunities.

On more than one occasion, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stressed that PA President Yasser Arafat is the leader of a “corrupt entity that must be reformed.” He announced before the Israeli Knesset that his government will not hold any peace talks with the PA because “it is a corrupt dictatorial regime.” He indicated that with a different PA - one that is more democratic and less corrupt - Israel would show more openness for concessions in the future. He specified two conditions for peace talks to be resumed: (a) a complete halt to terrorism; and (b) deep reforms and transparency in all areas of the PA. In their response to this demand, Palestinians affirmed that Sharon is unlikely to ever offer any concessions and that by shifting the focus to reform the PA, he is putting off indefinitely any negotiating process with them.

Internationally, The Europeans exerted much pressure on Arafat to adopt the reform agenda. The Rocard Report entitled “Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions”, prepared by a task force and released in June 1999, produced recommendations for the PA to re-

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form its institutions. The report generated international and domestic attention and put much pressure on the PA to pursue reform more seriously. However, international calls for PA reform intensified following Arafat’s failure to conclude a peace deal with Israeli Prime Minister Barak at Camp David in July 2000; his perceived decision to launch the armed uprising of Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, and his inability or rather his unwillingness to put an end to violence targeting Israeli civilians and the military which Palestinians view as a justified “resistance to occupation”.

On the American scene, Washington stressed its agenda of “reform-first sequence”. The “Arafat Accountability Act” was introduced to U. S. Congress on May 9, 2002. It called for:

1. Imposing sanctions on the PLO for its support of “acts against Israel”.
2. Freezing PLO’s assets in the United States.
3. Preventing PLO members, including Arafat, from entering the United States.

Although the act was not passed into law, yet it was a clear signal to Arafat of the hard times to come if he would not adopt the reform agenda. On June 24, 2002, U. S. President George Bush, in a public statement identified two preconditions for the establishment of a Palestinian state:

1. “A new and different Palestinian leadership untainted by terror and corruption;”
2. “An entirely new political and economic institutions.”

The three phase-implementation roadmap, presented to Israel and the Palestinians by the U.S., provided details on this reform component. On their part, the Quartet (US, EU, Russian Federation and the United Nations) underscored reform of PA political, civil, and security institutions as “an integral component of peace making.” They emphasized “the critical need to build new and efficient Palestinian security capabilities.” For that end, the Quartet established in July 2002 an international task force for PA reform. Its objective was “to develop & implement a comprehensive reform action plan for the PA.” The PA reform task force was composed of the Quartet (US, EU, Russia, and UN), Norway, Japan, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Its role was to monitor and support implementation of civil reforms, and to guide the international donor community in its support for PA reform agenda. The main objectives of its action plan were fourfold:

1. to highlight PA commitments,
2. to establish benchmarks,
3. to identify obstacles to reform, and
4. to specify areas for donor assistance.

Seven reform support groups worked to operationalize the reform plans and to monitor implementation. They covered the following fields, civil society, elections, financial accountability, judicial and rule of law, market economics, local government, and ministerial & civil service. The target spheres for Palestinian reform were the following:

1. Security reform,
2. Constitutional reform,
3. Economic reform,
4. Judicial reform,
5. Administrative reform,
6. Governance reform,
2. Security Reform

On the Security level, reform was needed to address the following problems:

- Multiplicity of security agencies,
- Loose restraints on security actions,
- No democratic accountability,
- No legal framework to govern the structure and operation of security services
- Involvement in matters unconnected with security, such as tax collection, dispute resolution, and business.

Security reform aims at taking clear and unequivocal policies against violence & terrorism, making visible efforts to arrest and disrupt individuals and groups planning and conducting terror attacks, taking moves to dismantle the infrastructure that supports terrorism, and adopting concrete actions to end incitement. The Security reform agenda includes consolidating all different security agencies into one structure, one budget, and one chain of command. Also, to have security apparatus answer to a civilian authority where the Minister of Interior would have authority over all security functions, and to ensure that security heads have limited mandate, limited term of office, enjoy no special legal privileges, and are forbidden by law from getting involved in business, interfering in domestic politics, making investments for personal gain, and using the media to advance political careers.

Arafat still exercises complete control over the security organization. The newly appointed Minister of State for Internal Security Affairs, Mohammed Dahlan, is expected to spearhead the war on terror by Abu Mazen’s government against the armed militants from Hamas, Jihad Islami and Fatah. Dahlan is expected to collect illegal arms from these militants, rebuild the preventive security services appointing new commanders in the West Bank, and train a new security force to halt the armed Intifada (which is the central agenda of Abu Mazen’s government).

3. Constitutional Reform

During the past century, constitutions have become an important hallmark of statehood and sovereignty throughout the world. Thus Palestinian constitutional reform aimed at drafting a modern constitution that is based on:

1. Principles of democracy,
2. Political pluralism,
3. Rule of law,
4. Independence of judiciary,
5. Protection of individual freedoms & human rights,
6. Ability to constrain the authority of the head of state and to limit his tenure in office,
7. Transfer of authority from the president to the prime minister.

Efforts of Palestinian Constitutional reform efforts focused on two documents:

1. *The Basic Law* legislated by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) to serve as a provisional temporary interim constitution to govern the Palestinian Authority. It was adopted by the PLC in 1997. However, Arafat ignored it because it limited his powers. But under mounting pressure to reform, Arafat approved it on May 29, 2002 and went into effect on July 7, 2002. Yet Arafat still ignores it. The basic law defined the character of Palestine as a parliamentary democracy, delineated its branches of government, and determined its capital, flag, citizenship requirements, and the role of religion. In its preface, it calls for the Right of Return for all Palestinians in the Diaspora. The Palestinians are not taking the Basic Law seriously since it has been on the books for more than a year “without visible result”.7

2. *The Constitution of Palestine*, a permanent constitution for future State of Palestine. In its Declaration of Independence of 1988, the PNC called for “a democratic, secular constitution with a parliamentary government”. In September 1999, the PLO Central Council (PCC) established the Constitution Committee, to draft a constitution. The Palestinian Authority is still working on a revised draft constitution for a Palestinian state that still needs to be completed.8 This constitution is viewed by drafters as a document that would organize the future state, proclaim society’s fundamental values & principles, and outline Palestinian positions on final status issues: refugees, borders, and Jerusalem.

The proclaimed main features of the Draft Constitution are its representative democracy and political pluralism, based on the rule of law; its parliamentary system; its establishment of three separate branches of government – Executive, Legislative and Judiciary; its system of checks and balances; its liberal orientation (emphasizes rights, accountability and gender equality); its legal mechanisms to ensure that political authority are exercised through clear legal channels. However, in reality the Constitution confuses politics with law and contains much contradiction:

a. The Constitution includes policies not found normally in other constitutions such as: *Article 3*: “Palestine is a peaceful state, condemns terror, occupation and aggression; and *Article 13*: “The State of Palestine shall strive to apply the legitimate right of return of the Palestinian refugees to their homes”.

b. The political system proposed by the Constitution is in reality neither parliamentary nor presidential system. *Article 8* states that: “The Palestinian political system shall be a parliamentarian representative democracy”. However, the Prime Minister was appointed by the PA President9 rather than elected by the people and the cabinet includes appointed ministers who are not members of the PLC. *Article 14* states that “half the members of the Council of Ministers at most shall be members of House of Representatives”. It is not a presidential system since power is shared between the President and the Prime Minister who in some cases have similar po-

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8 The Constitution Committee which started its work on drafting this Constitution back in 1999, had modified its drafts many times, but the work is not finished yet. In February 2001, the Committee published the first official Draft Constitution in booklet form making it available to the public through internet publication and newspapers. The latest version of this constitution dates to April 22, 2003.
9 On February 14, 2003, PA President Arafat declared his approval for the institution of a prime minister’s post. The Basic Law was amended to include this major modification.
Palestinian Authority Reform: A Key Ingredient to Peace Diplomacy

wers as the President. For example Article 88 gives both the President and the Prime Minister the right to dissolve the House of Representatives.

c. Policy is normally made by the legislature in the form of laws and is carried out by the executive branch with the judicial branch supervising all breaches to the constitution. In this conception, administration is execution, carrying out the laws passed by the legislature with a clear distinction existing between legislative and administrative powers. The judicial restraints public administrators from unconstitutional, illegal, and arbitrary acts. In the proposed Palestinian political system, there is no separation of powers among the three branches of government and the three branches do not exercise check and balance. Chapter 3, Article 64, stipulates that the three public powers are independent: “The relationship among the three public authorities on exercising their powers, shall be of independence.” However, one power, the executive branch, includes members of another, the legislative branch, and has the power to dissolve it; and it appoints members of the third, the judicial branch. Article 88 states: “In case of necessity, the President of the State or the Prime Minister may propose dissolution of the House of Representatives before the Council of Ministers. If such proposal is being accepted by a two-third majority of the total membership of the Council of Ministers, the President of the State shall declare the House of Representatives dissolved”. At the same time, the House of Representatives has the power to remove the Prime Minister.

d. While the Constitution protects the rights of the majority, it includes no article that would guarantee the rights of the Christian minority. Article 7 states: “The principles of Islamic Shari’a shall be a major source of legislation.” Article 186 allows the Constitution to be amended by simple majority of people which may infringe on the rights of the minority who would have no say in such amendments.

e. True to the Arafati form of governing, the Constitution ignores the issue of the vice-presidency.

In sum, there still exists no ratified operational Palestinian Constitution that would make a statement of differences between legislative, judicial and administrative powers and which would prevent one branch of government (executive) to encroach upon the powers, functions, and duties vested in the other two branches of government (legislative ad judiciary). As a result in the Palestinian scheme of government, law-making, law-implementing and law-interpreting entities are so far practiced by the Executive, and the PA President in particular.

4. Economic Reform

The PA reform on the economic and financial level is needed for many reasons including:

1. Opaque nature of PA finances,
2. Finances are micromanaged by PA President Arafat,
3. Large portion of PA budget in secret personal accounts,
4. No PLC & MOF (Minister of Finance) oversight of public expenditure & econo-
mic activities,
5. No systematic policies on public expenditures,
6. Weak internal audit,
7. Hiring does not follow set procedures,
8. No accountability & no transparency,

The main objectives of the economic reform are to consolidate all public finances, to ensure MOF and PLC oversight of all public expenditure, to strengthen internal audit capacity, to establish the concepts of transparency and accountability as a matter of routine rather than an exception, and to obtain full public disclosure of PA budget & holdings.

Dr. Salam Fayyad who has been serving as the PA Minister of Finance since October 2002, has shown strong commitment to transparency and proper accounting practices instructing extensive audits of PA accounts. In January 2003, he submitted the first publicly disclosed PA budget that was approved by the PLC.10 In late February 2003, he published a detailed report on PA financial and investment activities.11 One important reform move he took was the direct deposit of police salaries in local bank accounts. This measure stripped Palestinian security chiefs of the control they had over their forces’ pay, which helped them to collect salaries on the payroll for non-existing employees in order to build unaccountable fiefs. Complicating his work is Israeli withholding of PA funds as a tool to punish the Palestinian leadership and people for their resistance to the Israeli military occupation.

5. Judicial Reform

So far, PA President Arafat has failed to act on many pieces of legislation passed by the PLC. Thus judicial reform is important to establish a strong & independent judiciary, to create a new supreme judicial council, and to have state security courts abolished. Some initiatives are taken to establish a new liberal legal framework and to pass some liberal laws. Under severe pressures and four years after the PLC passed it, PA President Arafat on May 18th, 2002, signed the Judicial Authority Law which established an independent and accountable Palestinian judiciary.

6. Administrative Reform

There is a general lack of managerial skills and knowledge in public administration management among PA civil servants. This prompted calls for PA administrative reform to address the problems of weak institutions, unclear procedures, duplication of functions, competing chains of command, weak delegation of authority, inadequacy of formal procedures, insufficiency of information flows, inadequacy of routine audit, and the overweight ci-

vil service body.

7. Governance Reform

The primary focus of the PA efforts at governance reform at the present time focuses on the development of a new system of governance, and the building of local capabilities and a competent civil service necessary to meet future challenges of social and economic development in a democratic state. The reform priorities include the following objectives:

- Strengthening the technical, financial and managerial capabilities of the central as well as local government.
- Building up a legal basis for public administration to enhance public sector accountability.
- Creating within Palestinian institutions solid capacities for research, policy analysis and policy implementation which will enhance economic and social development.
- Emphasizing public-citizen collaboration to achieve security, law and order.
- Forming a broader, more honest, and more technically competent cabinet.

The major initiative in this field was the Democracy Bill, signed by PA President Arafat on May 28, 2002, pledging the creation of a democratic government. The bill guaranteed political and personal rights for the Palestinians, established a separation of powers among executive, legislative and judiciary branches, and called for presidential elections.

8. Elections and Local Governance Reform

The aim of the reform in this area focuses on building democratic mechanisms through electoral process and to introduce financial accountability procedures and mechanisms. The term of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and PA President expired a full three years ago in the year 2000 since the 1996 elections of the PA President & PLC stipulated a four year term for both. The legislature initially had 88 members, but two have died and one has resigned. Another member, Marwan Barghouti, is at present in an Israeli prison while he stands trial on charges of involvement in a string of fatal attacks on Israelis. So far, no elections were held for the local governments since the PA took charge.


Initiative One: Public Administration Development Strategy

There is an urgent need to establish a PA Public administration development strategy aiming to address all institution-building goals, problems and obstacles at all levels within the context of Palestinian priority objectives. It would call for reorganization and implementation to empower the functions performed by PA Ministries and other public institutions through the development of a unified modern administrative system consistent with
defined roles, responsibilities and authorities that are firmly enforced and clearly identified in a civil service manual.

**Initiative Two: Public Administration Institute**

There is an urgent need to establish a Public Administration Institute to conduct training activities:

- To promote and develop human resources,
- To increase efficiency of civil servants,
- To enhance managerial and operational capacities of civil servants,
- To build substantive knowledge within public sector,
- To facilitate exchange of knowledge and skills among various PA ministries and agencies,
- To promote and strengthen governance structure,
- To design modern policies and working procedures.

**Initiative Three: Anti-corruption Task Force**

True reform cannot be achieved without eliminating corruption. Corruption cannot be eliminated without removing those who practice it. Corrupt official cannot be removed without enforcing stiff anti-corruption laws. Anticorruption laws cannot be enforced without instituting an anti-corruption task force. Thus the primary focus of the PA at the present time should be to create an anti-corruption task force whose aim is to investigate corruption cases and bring to court all those civil servants accused of corruption.

**PA Reform: Ray of hope or a big dream?**

No doubt, conducting PA reform would greatly contribute to the foundation for self-rule and would provide the nuts and bolts of day-to-day efficient administration, and would ensure financial accountability and operational transparency, essential for the continuing progress of the peace process. The core of PA reform agenda is to establish clear procedures, a sound legal basis, and good fiscal transparency: Is this too much to ask? Is it impossible to achieve? Since we stand on the threshold of the post-Oslo era, PA reform becomes number one priority.
5. Third Party Intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Jarat Chopra

The invasion by Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) of Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank, so-called “Operation Defensive Shield” launched on Good Friday 2002, altered fundamentally the terms of debate about international intervention in the crisis. After eighteen months of widening and deepening conflict, it was a concrete turning point in which the routinely visible characteristics of the intifadah uprising were replaced by the physical manifestation of near full reoccupation. With some 1200 Palestinian and over 400 Israeli deaths by mid-April, and the shattering of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) security and governance capacities, proposals for third party action encompassed the full range of peace operations and state-building activities that have been deployed since the end of the Cold War, collectively and multilaterally through the United Nations (UN) or cooperatively and multinationally under a lead government. But what can and cannot work?

The minimum level of intervention required is elevated with each stage of deterioration in ground conditions. Both sides have converged somewhat on the idea of a third party. Governments and international organizations and agencies have so far pursued a minimalist form of incrementalism that has produced a complicated set of disparate structures with little functional capacity. By contrast, negotiations for a permanent settlement agreement had envisioned a much better comprehensive approach necessitating an integrated architecture for implementation in the long term. In the short term, however, a limited and symbolic international presence in the form of traditional observers, which had been tried in Hebron with unpopular results, could not have satisfied calls for protection. For a year, Israeli security concerns and Palestinian political interests under US mismanagement paralysed the development of monitoring mechanisms. Though critical as one part of an intervention, monitoring by itself is insufficient.

Amongst force options, static conventional peacekeepers can deliver little more in this environment than unarmed observers. The UN proposed a full-scale enforcement action by a coalition of the willing, and this may be ultimately needed to provide top cover for a comprehensive mission. However, between these extremes, military or gendarmerie units with a limited force capability performing constabulary functions can accomplish the bulk of activity.

The current debate about a multinational “trusteeship” over the area quickly overshadowed the broader range of third party options. It is an extreme proposition that contrasts with the preceding trench warfare over mild forms of monitoring and is fraught with difficulties that its proponents have not yet acknowledged. It can be done, but will require considerably

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1 The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, and do not represent a current official position of the PLO or of donor governments. The author is grateful to Yezid Sayigh and Sally Morphet for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay. A shorter version of this essay will be published as an article in The International Spectator, Vol. XXXVIII, n. 4, 2003.
more planning and preparation than earlier experiments in transitional administration if it is not to backfire here. International governance will fulfil the requirements of a comprehensive and integrated approach, but its attractiveness to some may dangerously replace tackling the hard political questions at the core of resolving the conflict. Indeed, any intervention to be effective will need to be deployed within the context of a geopolitical process leading to a permanent settlement between Israelis and Palestinians.

1. Elevated Intervention

Throughout the intifadah, a minimum level of intervention has been required if a third party was ever to stem the violence and foster a political outcome. As ground conditions progressively worsened, the necessary threshold of international action gradually rose. The single event of Operation Defensive Shield, however, catapulted this minimum threshold up to the higher end of the scale. It was Israel’s most massive military action in the territory since 1967. The amount of destruction had profound humanitarian consequences and effectively disemboweled the governing capacity of the Palestinian Authority. All manner of international pressure, including an explicit demand to withdraw in UN Security Council Resolution 1403 of 4 April, as well as by US President George W. Bush, proved ineffective. By the time the operation was over, the notion of “withdrawal” no longer made sense as a new order on the ground had been created. Armoured elements of the invading force remained deployed around cities, conducting security raids at will in urban areas thereafter. Fences began to be erected around major population centres, including Ramallah and Nablus. The post-invasion landscape continued until a suicide bombing in Jerusalem on 18 June 2002 led to a new Israeli policy of seizing PA land in response to each Palestinian attack. Within weeks, a full and complete reoccupation of Palestinian-controlled areas had taken place, with daily curfews imposed indefinitely on the inhabitants. The IDF had assessed that Israel could financially afford a military reoccupation, but it could not pay for the delivery of basic services to the population. Israel courted international agencies and organizations operating in the region, with the intention of having them provide assistance. This placed those bodies in the uncomfortable position of either inaction in the face of worsening humanitarian conditions, or stemming the crisis and facilitating the sustainability of Israeli occupation. The IDF was operating in what it considered “uncharted waters”, appreciating that its strategies may not create security, but also blinded with fury over the continuation of suicide bombings. In the absence of alternatives, inertia rooted in past policies and Israeli reliance on the military as a coping mechanism led to a plateau in terms of the facts on the ground that was distant from politically resolving the crisis. The IDF has since been drawn into assuming civil functions over Palestinians and, having largely exhausted its offensive options, is just maintaining the status quo.

A degree of urgency now characterizes the deteriorating situation on the ground. The two-state solution appears threatened by desperate economic, demographic and security conditions on both sides, as well as an erosion of mutual trust. The scale of settlement con-

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struction has fragmented the Palestinian territories and integrated the West Bank into Israel in an unprecedented manner. The Israeli security fence is becoming a fact on the ground, and will likely result in some 70-100,000 Palestinians living between the fence and the Green Line while the majority of settlers will be living east of the fortification. The cycle of violence has undermined reconstruction efforts, with $1 billion effectively frozen due to donor reluctance to rebuild infrastructure that is likely to be destroyed again. Even doubling the amount of aid will have a barely noticeable impact on socioeconomic conditions; the problem is a political one and the international community cannot spend its way out of the crisis. There is the specter of worse deterioration, a sense of hopelessness on both sides and no clear vehicle on the horizon for resolution of the conflict.\(^3\)

Under these prevailing conditions, there has been nevertheless a degree of convergence between Israelis and Palestinians about third party intervention, if only in terms of headlines and labels rather than agreement on details. While Palestinians have perpetually called for some form of international role, Israel has resisted “internationalisation” of the conflict, opposed any restrictions on IDF activity, feared a predisposed bias an intervention might have against it, and mistrusted countries other than the US that might contribute to a mission. However, the Israeli Government perceived a potential usefulness of a third party in an ad hoc, task-specific sense, with the resolution of two thorny difficulties in ending Operation Defensive Shield. Both the siege of Arafat’s compound and the standoff at the Church of the Nativity centred around an Israeli demand for arrest of certain Palestinians in each and a refusal on their part to surrender. Brokered with the participation of European Union (EU) representatives, an agreement was reached in which the named Palestinians were placed in the custody of a handful of international monitors, deployed with extraordinary speed, who supervised their expulsion or their incarceration in a Jericho jail. Furthermore, Israeli public opinion shifted on the whole question of a third party. One poll, conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University on 23-35 April, found that 44% of the Israeli Jewish (and 78% of the Arab) public favoured international intervention.\(^4\) Having entered public debate, the question of international intervention is likely to stay, despite reservations about it.\(^5\)

2. Minimalist Incrementalism

Despite the rising minimum threshold of intervention required, Quartet members – the US, the EU, the UN and Russia – and international agencies have pursued a minimalist and incrementalist approach to *de facto* intervention, already numbering over 1000 personnel in civilian and security areas. Multiple actors and narrow considerations of a third party role

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have resulted in a convoluted set of relations and distorted proposals that can neither respond to realities on the ground nor effectively underwrite the current “roadmap” for resolving the conflict.

In the wake of Operation Defensive Shield, the Bush Administration began informal consultations with the parties on a holistic strategy and unrealistic timetable for resolving the conflict in a matter of months, encompassing every successive step, including a ceasefire and political measures, such as a settlements freeze, and ending with the creation of a Palestinian state – all in anticipation of a major policy speech by the President. The Palestinian side developed a detailed vision for de-occupation and a sequential timetable with a political horizon for how this could be accomplished. There would be two separate and parallel tracks to be completed within a year, one for all aspects of a permanent status agreement and one for transitional elements until the conclusion of a final settlement. A third party presence was envisioned for each step in the short and long terms. For its part, Israel presented its claim to the President that Arafat had authorized a cash payment to the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, composed of Arafat’s Fatah activists and which had conducted suicide bombings. By further discrediting any Palestinian partner for peace, Sharon could inhibit such a comprehensive political and security-based strategy by the US.

On 24 June, Bush delivered his much awaited speech in the Rose Garden of the White House. He called for “a new and different Palestinian leadership”, while also envisioning a two-state solution. International efforts in subsequent months were preoccupied with reform of the gutted Palestinian Authority, focusing attention within the crisis instead of on it, while support was being built elsewhere for a war on Iraq. Although, reform was also something that Palestinians themselves were yearning for. An International Task Force for Palestinian Reform, which integrated international diplomats stationed in the area, representatives of international organizations and agencies and Palestinian officials, developed a “100 Days” workplan and timetable. Seven subcommittees were established for: civil society; financial accountability; local government; market economy; elections; judicial reform; and administrative reform. The subcommittees reported to a Quartet Committee on PA Reform, and thence to the Quartet Envoys and eventually the Quartet Principals. The process proceeded rapidly, though it proved unfeasible to replace Arafat, or have him appoint a Prime Minister with full powers that would render his role as President symbolic – something that Arafat only acted on in March 2003 on the brink of an Iraq war.

The Quartet chain of command for the reform process sat next to an unwieldy international architecture that had emerged on the ground in a piecemeal manner, uncomfortably combining the range of organizations, agencies and national representatives operating on the ground in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance and Palestinian reform. An Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) was the senior coordinating body and had existed since the Oslo process. Chaired by Norway, it met in Oslo every few months and was composed of senior representatives on the ground and heads of offices, including from the World Bank and the Office of the UN Special Co-ordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO). It addressed such issues as the rate of disbursement of pledges. A Joint Liaison Committee (JLC) established below it was composed of UNSCO, the World Bank, the EU, the International Monetary Fund, Japan and the US, and included some of the same individuals as the AHLC. The JLC served as the principal communication link between
the myriad actors. A JLC Committee on PA Reform was established pursuant to the reform process with the same composition as the JLC, and some of these individuals also participated in the Quartet reform committees.

A Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) also reported directly to the AHLC and was chaired by Norway, the World Bank and UNSCO. It was responsible for shepherding aid groups on a task-specific basis, and included embassy and agency representatives. Following Operation Defensive Shield, the LACC became the centre of gravity for the humanitarian effort and conducting damage assessments, and it established a Humanitarian Information Center and a Humanitarian Task Force.6

This complex structure has been in perpetual evolution. Donors shifted to bilateral assistance the more coordination fell apart with the gradual delegitimation of the PA over the preceding months. Humanitarian assistance, which has amounted to basic food delivery, got clumped with the reform effort and development assistance, which was with reconstruction somewhat on hold. Furthermore, preoccupation with Palestinian reforms, which was not accounting for issues that cut across multiple sectors, permitted the humanitarian emergency to worsen. A fully integrated international architecture has been needed and the existing structures could be transformed if relevant governments, organizations and institutions are willing. One of the critical issues then to consider will be how to integrate all of this with a robust third party intervention that might eventually be mandated.

Instead, more incrementalism has been the result. When the US introduced in autumn 2002 its “roadmap” for an end of conflict strategy, the issue of monitoring of its terms arose. The US acknowledged the need for it, but was reluctant to include the terms of monitoring in the language of the roadmap itself. The operating approach in consultations amongst Quartet members and with the parties was to use as much as possible of what exists on the ground as the basis of monitoring. The US accepted that the UN could begin doing this, but the danger is that the existing architecture, which is by no means ideal for humanitarian or development assistance, let alone implementing a political programme, may crystallize in its current or a similar form, thereafter ossify and undermine the prospects of a new third party role better suited to the minimum level of intervention required. A Palestinian monitoring proposal for the roadmap similarly relied as much as possible on what exists, but also integrated it in the form of a unitary monitoring structure. Ultimately, the mechanism design that gained currency amongst Quartet members was a committee that embodied the current status of the incrementalist architecture. It replicated conventional means of coordination, facilitating exchange of information amongst various international actors operating independently on the ground, with occasional confidential reporting up separate chains of command. Information may go into the mechanism, but it is not configured for any action to come out of it, and consequently it will fall short of the basic needs of monitoring.7

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6 These two bodies were variously composed of: UNSCO, the World Bank, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the UN Relief and Works Agency, the World Food Programme, the UN Development Programme, the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund, the World Health Organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Palestinian Red Crescent.

The US had been determined to deliver a finalized roadmap in December 2002, as it increasingly prepared for war in the Gulf, but the prospect of new Israeli elections in January 2003 delayed presentation of it, ultimately until after the conclusion of hostilities in Iraq. As violence continues now in the West Bank and Gaza Strip within the context of the roadmap, its monitoring mechanism is yet to be tested. Alternatively, the roadmap itself may become irrelevant and lead to yet another kind of effort in the future.

3. Comprehensive Requirements

The existing incrementalist approach fundamentally contradicts the ideals of a permanent status agreement, in which a considerably more comprehensive third party role had been envisioned. Regardless of failed talks at Camp David in July\(^8\) and Taba in December 2000, the likely contours of a permanent settlement are well known to both sides.\(^9\) Remarkably, it was only for the first time at Camp David that Palestinian and Israeli negotiators acknowledged the need for a third party to guarantee the terms they hoped to eventually reach. There was no explicit definition of what kind of intervention they were alluding to, its scope of activity or composition. The “Clinton Parameters” presented at Taba referred to an international force, which could only be withdrawn by mutual consent, which would be gradually introduced into the area as Israel withdrew over 36 months, and which would have authority over a small remaining IDF presence in fixed locations in the Jordan River Valley. The international mission would also monitor the implementation of an agreement, including the final arrangements for Jerusalem, guarantee border security and provide a deterrence capacity. A separate refugee commission was to address compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation short of a full “right of return”.

At Camp David, two negotiators had a fleeting but telling exchange. One Palestinian referred to the US-led Multinational Force and Observers separating Israeli and Egyptian armies in a series of demilitarised zones in the Sinai desert. With comparable brevity an Israeli dismissed this interposition model on the grounds that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were a different operational theatre, and something more pervasive, encompassing a social and political environment, would be required than a clearly defined buffer between military forces. The point was essentially correct, though whether it was made substantively or intended to avoid consideration of detail is not clear.

Nevertheless, this peripheral digression reflected a distinction between an international trigger mechanism that might be needed in the Jordan River Valley in the long-term, and the variety of tasks that would have to be conducted under the agreement beforehand in the remainder of a Palestinian state as Israel withdrew, on their common borders and in the complex relations that the two would have, strategically, socially and economically. In par-

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ticular, an international role was envisioned in the monitoring and verification of: compliance with the timetables for Israeli withdrawal; respect for each state’s territorial integrity; limitations of personnel and arms imposed on the Palestinian armed forces; adherence to regulations governing Israeli access to and use of any military locations the IDF was permitted to maintain in Palestinian territory, including early warning stations in the West Bank and an armed presence in the Jordan River Valley; and prevention of cross-border infiltration. In addition, assistance was needed to maintain order, resolve disputes and ensure respect for human rights as the IDF departed; as well as to help provide for Palestinian defence from, and deterrence to, external threats in lieu of a functioning Palestinian army, on which an agreement would likely place considerable constraints.

There were significantly different understandings between negotiators regarding the types and strengths of Israeli armed forces to be placed in the Jordan River Valley, the duration of their stay and their nature and purpose. Palestinians anticipated a few symbolic outposts, mixed with international personnel, for a relatively short period of a few years. Israelis had planned for large-scale mechanized units to remain for at least a decade. Their aim would be, in the event of a threat from the East, to control a possibly hostile Palestinian population for 48 hours – the time it would take for a main force to deploy from inside Israel.10 To both minimize or exclude altogether an Israeli force along the Jordanian border, and render unnecessary Israeli early warning stations in the West Bank, a security arrangement will be needed that delivers a convincing international deterrent. A limited number of international personnel, configured as traditional-style military observers, or exceptionally as peacekeeping battalions, may constitute a nominal thin line. But their effectiveness will rely on the particular composition of nations participating in the operation, and the direct link between their activities and a regional apparatus that is guaranteed by powerful governments. The functions of the mission cannot be limited to reporting of mounting threats; it will need to serve as a “trip-wire” for predetermined action to prevent breaches of the peace. Such a configuration could eventually be institutionalised as a formal regional security organization.

In the order of conceptual complexity, the one-dimensional design of an interposition presence in the Jordan River Valley is more straightforward than the multifunctional operation that would need to deploy amidst the pervasive geography of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Palestinian thinking about the possible architecture of a third party guarantor for a permanent status agreement began in autumn 2000. At the time, the governance and security capacities of the Palestinian Authority were at their peak. Consequently, PA officials directly conducted political, administrative, and economic state-building activities, with the assistance of donor governments and international organizations, and in the context of cooperation with Israel under the Oslo Interim Agreements. The planning assumptions for a third party role, therefore, were relatively restrictive.

An international monitoring and implementation mission would not discharge by itself in any way the terms of an agreement, but would independently guarantee in every way their fulfilment by the parties acting jointly or individually as necessary. It would do so through

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a detailed mechanism on the ground – with a Joint Monitoring Commission, sector-specific Joint Committees, and specialized, cross-cutting Task Committees – that embodied the political will behind the conclusion of an agreement in the regular interpretation and implementation of commitments made by the parties. By exercising a degree of political authority, the mission would translate a diplomatic settlement into practical terms and provide a means of bridging any lacunae in the conditions accepted, resolving disputes between the sides and addressing failures to fulfil obligations. In this manner, the usual gap between the mandating powers – including the consent of the parties by their respective leaders – and field activities could be narrowed, tightening mission organization and minimizing the opportunity for manipulation or navigation around necessary provisions. Indeed, it is the structural gaps, both vertically and horizontally, that endanger achievement of benchmarks in a timetable. Therefore, a genuine political centre of gravity would serve to integrate the parties in joint implementation and its authority would be capable of propelling the process forward.11 Given the specifics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this kind of a joint formula, to a lesser or greater extent depending upon the degree of intervention, is applicable across the range of preferred third party options.

4. Flawed Symbolism

In between the extremes of gradual incrementalism and the comprehensive requirements of a permanent status agreement, an essentially symbolic presence has been attempted in Hebron and called for in the form of international observers at the outbreak of the intifadah. The incompatibility between popular expectations of dynamic action and the inherent limitations of these static options indicate that the minimum level of intervention needed was much higher from the outset.

The degree of structural integration required in a comprehensive approach is distinguishable from the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). It was first established on 8 May 1994 to assist in promoting stability and restoring normal life, following the massacre on 25 February of 29 Palestinian worshipers at the al-Haram al-Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs during Friday dawn prayers by Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish settler from New York. Pursuant to the Agreement on Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron of 21 January 1997, the multinational civilian TIPH became fundamentally a situation and human rights reporting mechanism without any physical means to follow-up on action regarding the information it gathers – much like the current monitoring mechanism for the roadmap.

In principle, TIPH’s structure appears sound. The TIPH is represented at the local level in the Hebron District Coordination Office, through which Palestinian Police Forces and the IDF conducted their security cooperation. A Joint Hebron Committee comprises the Israe-

Third Party Intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Military Commander and the Palestinian Police Commander of the Hebron district, the Israeli and Palestinian heads of the Hebron District Civil Liaison Office, and the TIPH Head of Mission. It receives TIPH situation and specific incident reports and is supposed to address in its bi-weekly meetings any issue that the District Coordination Office has not been able to resolve. At the international level, a Monitoring and Steering Committee that meets every three months is the highest venue for discussing matters of policy.

However, the political centre of gravity of the TIPH is in the six national capitals of the individual nations participating in the mission, despite the coordinating role played by Norway. Weekly reports of the TIPH, that are not made public, are submitted to each of the foreign ministries which may or may not have responded to their contents as part of a much broader political process. By contrast, the joint monitoring model above by definition would relocate the political center of gravity on the ground and have at its disposal a capacity to respond immediately both independently and through the parties. It is also essential for the parties themselves to take advantage of the international mechanism. Although the TIPH reports are confidential, they are provided to the senior Israeli and Palestinian representatives in the Monitoring and Steering Committee, who could have publicized relevant information. On the Palestinian side, however, a critical mistake was to treat the deployment of TIPH as a political victory and an end-state, rather than a beginning point and something to be harnessed regardless of the limitations of its mandate. It would be a cardinal error to behave the same way with any future international presence.12

When violence broke out, though, the drive for “internationalisation” in part overshadowed what could and could not have worked. Mounting frustration amongst Palestinians about the slow pace of progress during the Oslo process exploded in the second “Al-Aqsa Intifadah”, sparked by Sharon’s provocative visit with over 1000 Israeli police officers to the mosque at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount on 28 September 2000.13 Shifting from a third-party architecture for a permanent status agreement, attention internationally and amongst Palestinians focused on options for immediate deployment in the short-term. A popular rallying-cry amongst Palestinians demanded a “protection force” of “observers”. This embodied two flawed assumptions. First, “protection” was understood to mean that international observers would permit the confrontational expression of the intifadah, including rock-throwing, but prevent a disproportionate Israeli military response. In reality, any international intervention would have removed the opportunity for confrontation – unless it meant non-violent freedom of assembly – and in effect pacify the intifadah, which Palestinians would not have welcomed, unless it was linked to a political horizon and a new order in negotiations.

Second, observers by any standard of definition might report on incidents, but they have no independent capacity to intervene on the ground in even minimal form, including halting an individual case of physical assault. An observer mission with a protection mandate was a profoundly dysfunctional formula, especially if its only purpose was to achieve a


13 See further the Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, April 30 2001, pp. 4-12.
political victory through its creation. Prejudices against the ineffectiveness of the TIPH were legion, and precisely not what was desired. Yet observers, even if they might have provided an impartial accounting of incidents, would have been nothing more, leading quickly to their dismissal in the streets with possibly counterproductive consequences. Israel for its part eschewed any form of international presence, determined to retain maximum freedom of action in pursuit of its security imperatives and deeply suspicious of external intentions. Although by February 2001, out-going Labour Foreign Minister, Shlomo Ben-Ami, was publicly calling for international intervention given the failure of bilateral negotiations.

On 31 October 2000, the Palestinian Observer representative at the UN, Nasser Al-Kidwa, circulated a working paper regarding a “Protection Force for Palestinian civilians” (UNPOF). Its mandate would be to contribute in providing safety and security for Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation, and in ensuring freedom of movement of Palestinian persons and goods, as well as freedom of worship. The mission would be composed of 2000 mobile military observers equipped with individual arms and means of communication. It would not only perform a monitoring function, but would also respond to locations of tension and instability where the occupying Power threatened the safety and security of Palestinian civilians. The proposal failed to receive the requisite votes at the Security Council on 18 December and was vetoed by the US on 27 March 2001. Had such an UNPOF been deployed, though, it would have suffered a worse fate than the TIPH, with high expectations in the midst of violence being met with impotence.

In the meantime, the UN Secretary-General had been considering such a deployment since mid-November. Although a formal mission concept was never tabled at the Security Council, the UN through its Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem developed a detailed contingency plan, dated 29 December 2000, for implementing an unarmed military observer mission in the West Bank and Gaza Strip called “Observer Group Territories” (OGT). Unlike the Palestinian conception, the OGT would be limited to observing, monitoring, investigating, verifying and reporting on violations of a cease-fire to be in place prior to deployment. Relying on the consent of both sides and on liaison with them, mobile units would have freedom of movement to patrol friction points, though there would be no defined lines of separation between Israelis and Palestinians. An opportunity did not arise ultimately for the UN to present the plan to the parties.

5. Paralysed Monitoring

For the year preceding Operation Defensive Shield, direct or indirect talks between the sides in initiatives brokered by the US focused exclusively on the limited activity of monitoring of any ceasefire deal to be concluded. The inability to reach a meaningful agreement as conditions progressively worsened – with Israel demanding security first and Palestinians requiring a political end-state – meant that monitoring by itself quickly became too little, too late and would always fall short of the minimum level of intervention required. However, monitoring activities would inevitably need to be a key part of a broader intervention deployed. For instance, a third party role in a freeze on or withdrawal of settle-
ments is fundamentally a monitoring activity, with the Israeli Government and military responsible for actual implementation.

### 5.1 Political and Security Monitoring

Following the conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on 17 October 2000, President Bill Clinton established and dispatched a Fact Finding Committee under the leadership of US Senator George J. Mitchell. The Committee was tasked with determining how and why the intifadah broke out and to make recommendations on ending the violence. It issued its final report on 30 April 2001, and in outlining a number of mutual obligations on the part of both sides, the Committee fundamentally linked Israeli security and Palestinian political interests.

The issue of an international intervention proved to be one of the most controversial issues addressed by the Committee, one that internally divided the technical team at the forefront of the fact-finding effort. The final report only referred to the controversy, noted that the Palestinians had been in favour while Israel was adamantly opposed, and stated that such a mission required the support of both. Inevitably, in order to fulfil the mutual obligations outlined in the Committee’s recommendations, a third party element was still needed to verify compliance.

A minimal form of multinational monitoring began to develop. In April, an Egyptian and Jordanian “Non-Paper” on ending the crisis called for a Political/Security Committee at the high officials’ level to monitor implementation of the parties’ actions. Palestinians articulated in May the outlines of a Monitoring Mechanism, composed of the participants of the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit (in addition to the parties, the Governments of Egypt, Jordan and the United States, the UN and the EU), the Russian Federation and the members of the Fact-Finding Committee (including Turkey and Norway). A two-tiered structure included a Steering Committee as the highest authority of the Mechanism on the ground, and three subordinate Subcommittees for security, settlements and economic and civil affairs.

### 5.2 Security-only Monitoring

Throughout the spring of 2001, violence between the two sides intensified and escalated, including Sharon’s introduction of F-16s in the area for the first time since the 1967 war. Then on 1 June, a suicide-bombing at the Dolphinarium nightclub in Tel Aviv claimed 21 lives, the worst since the start of the intifadah. Palestinians braced for a severe retaliation, but the US convinced Sharon to act with restraint and a reprisal was averted. Instead, CIA Director George J. Tenet was dispatched by a new Republican administration, which had vowed non-engagement in the crisis in the wake of what it interpreted as an embarrassing failure of the previous President. Both Sharon and Arafat were forced to publicly declare unilateral ceasefires, in name if nothing else. Tenet began hard-line negotiations with the

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two sides, in principle pursuant to the Mitchell report. However, his operating assumption was to disconnect the security from the political recommendations, marking the start of a US approach, in keeping with Sharon’s position, that attempted to address security issues first, separately from political concerns, delaying them seemingly indefinitely. Despite acknowledgement of the Mitchell report, efforts over the following year were increasingly distanced from its content. In effect, the demand was for a capitulation of the intifadah without a commensurate political horizon, something that resembled a Palestinian defeat and surrender. It was inevitable that a ceasefire constructed on such terms was doomed.

Nevertheless, pursuant to the Palestinian-Israeli Security Implementation Plan, or “Tenet Workplan”, of 11 June 2001, both sides accepted third party monitoring and supervision of implementation of their obligations. The Palestinian position was based on the Monitoring Mechanism developed for the Mitchell report, with a political steering committee and a security subcommittee initially, to which it was hoped would be added the settlements and economic and civil affairs subcommittees as the process moved into a subsequent “confidence-building” phase. The US instead was relying on a senior-level security committee chaired by the CIA and composed of the security chiefs from both sides. The issue of monitors began to be debated guardedly in the Israeli press. On 19 July 2001, a G-8 meeting of Foreign Ministers in Rome issued a statement on the Middle East, which ended with: “We believe that in these circumstances third-party monitoring accepted by both parties would serve their interests in implementing the Mitchell Report.” The G-8 leaders meeting in Genoa endorsed on 22 July the position of their foreign ministers. Israel rejected the idea of monitors on the grounds that they were not needed and because the Palestinians had not respected the ceasefire.

Still, US representatives began for the first time extensive negotiations with both sides for a monitoring mechanism, based on the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG) with which those representatives had been personally familiar. The ILMG had been established in April 1996, following Israel’s “Grapes of Wrath” operation in Lebanon. The US and France sponsored a ceasefire between Israel, Lebanon and Syria on the basis of an “Understanding”, which was neither a signed agreement nor a verbal exchange of assurances. The aim of the ILMG was the protection of civilians, something that the parties had already accepted, but it did not address the political roots of the conflict, as the Mitchell report had attempted. The ILMG was a single-tier forum to address violations, composed of the three sides and the US and France as rotating chairs. The US and French delegations were based in Cyprus and meetings were convened as required in Lebanon. The model was wholly unsuited to monitoring the Mitchell report, let alone the reality now surrounding the breakdown of the Tenet “ceasefire”. Though it corresponded to the US-favoured senior-level security committee as a center of gravity, with high-level Palestinian and Israeli teams.

Responsible to the ILMG-type forum would be a tiny group of 10-12 American technical experts drawn from the State Department (probably the Counter-Terrorism Unit), the Pen-

tagon and the CIA. The monitoring effort would be conducted through ad hoc visits to the area. Negotiations proceeded torturously on the conception and meaning of all parts of the monitoring model proposed. Despite Israel’s rejection of monitors altogether, a small, entirely US team was preferred to any other. The Palestinian security apparatus did not take the few experts very seriously, questioning the distinction between them and the CIA’s existing role in security cooperation between the two sides. Nevertheless, Palestinian negotiators worked with the model, attempting to at least make the composition more multinational, and arguing for some kind of international contact group to which the effort would be responsible (something which would later evolve into the Quartet).

This round of talks and the Tenet ceasefire had effectively ended by the third week of August. The US proposal had been a poor one; Israeli intransigence with regards to monitoring persisted; Palestinian negotiators became preoccupied with parts of East Jerusalem and Abu Dis that had been taken in IDF operations; and violence intensified in a pattern in which principally Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Israel were setting the agenda in mutual attacks, to the exclusion of the PA. A draft Security Council resolution was formulated that called – this time for observers with a protection mandate – for the establishment of a monitoring mechanism to help implement the Mitchell report. The US rejected the resolution.

5.3 Security Plus Monitoring

As the Bush Administration’s “war on terror” increasingly placed Iraq in the cross-hairs in 2002, and as a high-profile Saudi Arabian initiative promised full recognition of the State of Israel by all Middle East governments in exchange for ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the US needed some diplomatic movement on a round of violence that had reached new heights by March. US Special Envoy General Anthony C. Zinni was dispatched a third time, after two previously failed efforts. He arrived on 14 March with the objectives of first securing US national interests, and second to conclude a ceasefire, supervise a political process and remain engaged until the creation of a Palestinian state. Though privately articulated, he did not publicly announce the second of these, which would have been a critical confidence-builder.

UNSCO warned Zinni at the outset not to focus on security alone, with preoccupation on a ceasefire. It was a strategy that had failed for a year, obviously. Initially, Zinni concurred. Within days, his view seemed to have reversed. Reservedly, the Palestinian team demanded the Tenet Workplan in full, with a clear link to the Mitchell Report, and thereafter political questions to follow immediately on conclusion of a ceasefire – still something short of requiring an established political timetable first. The Israeli position reconfigured the Tenet Plan altogether, reducing their obligations or rendering them ambiguous while increasing Palestinian security commitments. The US put forward two bridging proposals in succession, which Palestinians interpreted to be mainly in line with the Israeli position. The dynamic was one in which Palestinian negotiators were fighting for the Tenet Plan, something that had not been in their interest in the first place, that had been accepted by Sharon and that had been a US initiative. As one Palestinian negotiator asked Zinni: Mitchell
came with a plan, Tenet came to implement Mitchell, then Zinni came to implement Tenet; which American official is going to come to implement Zinni?

There was already skepticism on the streets about the terms under which Palestinians might be forced to accept a ceasefire, with expectations of a short shelf-life for it. Before a Zinni plan could be concluded, on the night of 27 March the worst ever suicide bombing marked the start of Passover with 29 deaths at a hotel in Netanya. The next day talks effectively ended and the situation quickly deteriorated, while the Arab League Summit in Beirut adopted unanimously the Saudi initiative – on the eve of Operation Defensive Shield.

Despite the inability to reach agreement, the parameters of a potential monitoring mechanism had evolved. The Palestinian side devised a concept for an International Monitoring and Verification Mission to implement fully the “Tenet Workplan”, the Mitchell recommendations and any other interim measures accepted in the past or workplans that may be agreed in the future. An International Steering Group (composed of the Quartet and other interested states) would oversee a Senior Trilateral Political Committee (composed of senior representatives of the US and the two sides) and three joint subcommittees with monitoring teams for security, settlements and economic and civil affairs.

In contrast to the earlier US model, Zinni had been considering a two-tiered structure, with four technical teams responsible to a Trilateral Security Committee. A Security team would focus on Palestinian arrests, prisons and weapons collections. A Geographical team, concerned with redeployments, would have a mobile capacity to respond to information provided to the Committee. An Incitement team was not intended to be particularly operational, but would constitute a forum for complaints to be aired and for Zinni to address. A final, undefined “Other” team would be created for any of the remaining Mitchell recommendations agreed to, including a settlements freeze. However, this essentially political team would still report to a Trilateral Security Committee. The numbers of monitors would be greater than proposed in the past, and their composition could also have been more multinational. It was also believed that Israel by then might have accepted as many as 60 monitors.

While such design questions were overtaken by events, their details are no less germane to any reconsideration of a mechanism based on an equation combining security and political elements.

5.4 Force Options

If observation and monitoring fell short of minimum intervention requirements as the intifadah progressed, so would have static and defensively- armed military peacekeeping contingents. They would have been as dysfunctional as observers if given a protection mandate – as had been dramatically illustrated by the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia, whose inability to ‘protect’ was quickly resented locally and deplored internationally. At the opposite end of a spectrum of options to unarmed observers and lightly armed peacekeepers is a high-intensity military enforcement operation properly authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, acting against the will of the parties if necessary. Such a mission was not conceived as in any way possible before Operation Defensive Shield, but its dramatic effects placed enforcement on the table.
Prominent individuals had already made arguments for a full-scale intervention, including even NATO.\textsuperscript{17} Then in May 2002, the UN Secretary-General circulated to Security Council members an option for a large multinational force (MNF) of willing member states acting under Chapter VII. It was conceived as a “stabilization plus” force along the lines of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia. The military MNF would assist the parties in maintaining a declared ceasefire; restore Palestinian security capacity, including the police and the judicial sector (ensuring consistency with international human rights standards); and create secure conditions for the resumption of negotiations and the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance by the UN and other international civilian agencies. A single-lead nation would retain command and control, in a clear structure, over the entire operation. The UN considered a number of candidates, though a reluctant US would be the only one acceptable to Israel. The Secretary-General intended the proposal to at least stimulate more imaginative and expansive international thinking about third party intervention.

A middle ground between the extremes of peacekeeping and enforcement best characterized the security requirements of the intifadah. After the end of the Cold War, so-called “second generation” multinational forces had aimed to use limited force in the accomplishment of mandated objectives.\textsuperscript{18} By combining this doctrinal development with the experience of Multinational Specialized Units (MSU) established in the Balkans, something of a model could be discerned that was in fact proposed to the Mitchell Committee and which would still be relevant for any intervention now. The MSU were first established in Bosnia in 1998 to fill a “security gap” between the large-scale US-led military units of the Stabilization Force, which acted only when significant conflict broke out, and the regular civilian functions of investigation, search, seizure and arrest of UN and local police forces. Incidents of wider civil unrest in a deeply politicised environment, including riots and clashes, fell somewhere in-between. Consequently, the MSU were gendarmerie-type units with constabulary functions, or police contingents with military status, built around the Italian Carabinieri. The MSU were subsequently established in Kosovo and played a similar role with regards to the Kosovo Force and civilian police of the UN Interim Administration Mission.\textsuperscript{19}

Such mobile units deployed throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip could have defused incidents at a variety of friction points. They would not have been situated at fixed locations, reinforcing lines separating Palestinian and Israeli-controlled areas, but they would have been capable of rapidly responding to any threatening event throughout the operational area. Defusion of incidents would not necessarily mean relying on armed force; rather the MSU type of approach would rely on a mixture of a credible presence and dynamic engagement with the population, the parties and other factions through a robust


\textsuperscript{19} “MSU Techniques, Tactics and Procedures”, unpublished doctrine, 5 August 1999.
system of continuous liaison in advance of, during and following incidents to help deescalate or prevent them from turning violent. Such a mission could not alter the nature of the environment – that would be the result of agreement between the parties. However, it could have altered the experience of daily life of the local population while negotiations proceeded.

Achieving this necessitates strong overall political direction, in the context of a comprehensive approach to the conflict, and mature, experienced personnel capable of significant responsibility and exercising delegated powers. In addition to the Italian Carabinieri, the British Army is well acquainted with this kind of mission, and the Australian SAS and Federal Police, as well as their New Zealand counterparts have shown they have such a capability. Of Scandinavian units, the Norwegian military has managed to adapt from a traditional peacekeeping role to the complex requirements of internal conflicts. It is unlikely that the UN, which is still configured best to perform observation or peacekeeping tasks, could deliver the kind of mission required. A single nation-led coalition might be the likely alternative, though authorized by a Security Council resolution.20

5.5 Debated “Trusteeship”

The dislocating and fragmenting consequences of Operation Defensive Shield triggered an active debate about international “trusteeship” over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The idea gained more traction more quickly than any other intervention option in Israeli quarters,21 amongst some Palestinians and in certain European capitals. However, other than broad comparisons with the UN transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor, the concept has not been well-defined, the term “trusteeship” has been used out of its historical context and both sides have opposite interpretations of its objectives. For Israelis it must be a means of replacing the Palestinian Authority once and for all and defeating militant groups at all costs. For Palestinians it must rebuild the Palestinian Authority and restore its governing capacity. Neither side has acknowledged the degree of executive, legislative and judicial powers that such a mission would necessarily exercise. They also differ fundamentally on the geographic scope of deployment, whether only over Palestinian-controlled areas or the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip.

It is also not clear whether Israel would accept withdrawal first, or if an international “trusteeship” would be layered on top of an IDF occupation. Would it be a means of internationally legitimizing and implementing an Israeli unilateral separation, in which all aspects of Israeli and Palestinian life were severed in unconnected infrastructures? Or rather, is the notion to get a US-led effort to fight terrorism in the area as part of the global war on terror?22 The aim of any meaningful transitional administration must be to make itself obsolete as quickly as possible, by ensuring that a functioning local authority with full capacities for governance can assume full control. The experiments to date have not been suc-

21 See for instance David Newman and Joel Peters, “Kosovo as the West Bank, Macedonia as Israel”, Ha’aretz, 30 October 2002.
22 Martin Indyk, “A Trusteeship for Palestine?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 3, May/June 2003, pp. 51-
cessful in this regard. Too much power has been concentrated in the hands of the Transitional Administrator, who has the function of a colonial governor. Transitional separation of powers fostering democratic principles has not yet been achieved, and the ability to effectively involve the local population in such temporary rules and build the necessary capacity for self-government has been abysmal, leading in turn to renewed violence.

Yet, the destruction of the PA exposes Palestinians to external control. Without the necessary safeguards built into the doctrine of transitional administration, the prospect is a precarious one for Palestinians. In such an eventuality, the best-case scenario will be to ensure that the outside footprint is a light one. This has to be done by Palestinians themselves, as they reconstruct their own authority in their own image as difficult as this currently may be. If this can be accomplished, with bilateral and multilateral assistance, then it will offer the best chances for independence in a real sense, and reduce the possibility of another – international – occupation. The trajectory of events may not afford such a luxury to Palestinians. Therefore, in any scenario other than Israeli annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, international planners will have to come to terms, as an operating assumption, with the restoration of a Palestinian governing apparatus in a state-building exercise.

Conclusion

Some government officials perceive that Israelis and Palestinians are not ready for international intervention, and that they have to “bleed” more until a stalemate forces them to compromise. But it is likely that both sides have the capacity to out-“bleed” the tolerance of the international community and threaten its broader interests. It is not clear what the breaking point will be, whether a single catastrophic event or an eventual agenda imperative, unavoidably, of Washington. Some on each side believe that they need to be ready in the event of an opportunity for an effective degree of intervention, resulting now in considerably increased engagement on the issue.

The minimum level of intervention required by conditions on the ground is already at a high threshold. The degree of fragmentation on the Palestinian side, the military and civilian nature of the Israeli presence, and the breadth of economic, social, institutional, geographic and humanitarian concerns dictate the need for a comprehensive approach. International forces may be able to create a secure environment, but they will have to be subordinated to a political authority responsible for a Palestinian state-building effort in the context of permanent status negotiations conducted along a fixed timetable with a clear horizon. Monitoring the terms of a peace process will be one ingredient. Constabulary functions should ensure a positive difference in the daily lives of the population in the area of


deployment if the effort is to be accepted and supported. The package may be wrapped up as a “trusteeship”, but there are permutations of the concept to be articulated and selected. Altogether, international intervention cannot replace resolution of the conflict, but if judiciously introduced it may function as a corridor towards the prevailing vision of a two-state solution.
APPENDIX 1

Peace-, Institution- and Nation-building in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, a Conference Report, Rome, 4-5 July 2003

Cristina Paciello

The question of peace – institution - and nation-building in the Mediterranean and the Middle East was discussed in six sessions, including the closing round table. In the following, it is reported the discussion that took place on the five papers presented to the conference and published in previous pages.

1. Democracy in the Arab countries and the West

The discussion that followed the first presentation focused mainly on Western policies for promoting democracy in the area and the difficulties in bringing about change and political reform there. It began with considerations concerning Western motives for pursuing democratization in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, especially those of the US. In particular, one participant looked at the security dimension of Western motives. The point was made that, while the debate on the conventional security dimension that has to do with democratization and stability is still open, after September 11th other security aspects are clearly prominent on the US agenda. Such aspects have also been implicit in some European approaches to Mediterranean dialogue. A first security motive is that the security stake is not just a regional conventional one, but involves spillovers and what one might term homeland security. So, the same speaker continued, it is not just a theoretical security interest, but a highly tangible one. Another security motive, which is probably more obscure, is the US’ interest in shaping partners in the Middle East into actors that are predictable, understandable and not aggressive. On the democracy and security nexus, another participant observed that there is a contradiction between trying to get to a higher level of security on one hand and fostering democracy on the other hand. Indeed, democracy is the long-term goal, while security most often a very short-term goal. At the moment, the speaker said, we cannot afford to wait for democracy to come about to play its positive role of stabilization. Therefore, since the two goals do not go together, a way to deal with both of them at the same time has to be found.

On Western policies and democracy promotion in the MENA, in commenting the presentation, one participant remarked that more stress should be put on the role of the West in monitoring the lack of democracy. In particular, the speaker observed that the EU is not consistent in promoting democracy in the region because it does not apply human rights clauses strongly enough. The speaker pointed out that promoting democracy in the region means applying EU mechanisms that already exist, rather than improving them. Tunisia is a case in point. It would have been a success story if, over the last ten years, European leaders had decided to apply the right policy and pressure, but they have done just the opposite. Another speaker reinforced the point made in the presentation that the international and regional context is crucial when thin-
king about political change and democratization. In particular, there is a temptation on the US side to view it in bilateral terms and not as a regional process. The result is an unbalanced sort of approach as shown by the case of the Gulf. As the participant noted, the US is engaged in this extraordinary process of change in Iraq, while it is not involved in Iran where there are some more encouraging elements of political change.

A debate also took place on differences and similarities between EU and US approaches to democracy promotion in the region. One participant argued that, in terms of basic motives and approaches, the US and the European states are not so different. However, it was noted that a sort of peculiar historical juncture has been reached raising the question whether there is something revolutionary going on in the US approach. In particular, looking at the debate on US foreign policy at the moment, the participant distinguished between two groups: one has a kind of systemic interest in the promotion of democracy which is believed to be a sort of mission inherent in foreign policy; the other group has clearly a more strategic and tactical interest in the issue. The crucial difference, as pointed out by the same speaker, will be revealed by the degree of patience they have for situations that are going to require a long time to unfold. While, for the latter group, the question is to fix one foreign policy problem and then move on to the next, from a European perspective, policy in the area is conceived on a longer term. Lastly, the same speaker stressed that the issue of conditionality is now very central in both the EU and US approaches to the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Other participants tended to underline the differences between the US and the EU approaches to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It was argued by some participants that, although Europeans and Americans have agreed on regime change and democracy promotion in the region, they differ in the instruments to be used to reach that goal. While the EU would like to promote democracy through peaceful means, the US intends to change these regimes by imposing a model of democracy from outside and by force. Another participant noted, however, that while this is certainly right, in addition to the use of force, part of the difference is also about the capacity to use force. Moreover, some expressed concern about the US’ current national security strategy and what is going to happen after the November 2004 elections. Doubts were also raised that the current US national security policy can bring democracy to the region. According to one comment, if the US national security doctrine were to endure, cooperative security would be pushed underground and those countries that have no intention of democratizing will be further encouraged. According to another speaker, the EU has been more effective than the US in enlightening the debate on democracy in the region due to its different approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the EU has credit in the Arab world because it considers the Palestinian territories illegally occupied and does not admit free trade with Israeli colonies, the US is discredited because of its connection with Israel.

Participants also dealt with the “Islamist dilemma”. There was agreement among participants that, in order to be able to support a real democratic transformation, the West needs to accept the idea that Islamic movements will come to power and to tolerate a certain amount of risk. As a participant commented, since the Cold War both the Americans and the Europeans have been in favor of the status quo in the region. They have supported authoritarian regimes because those regimes are considered better than Islamist regimes. The speaker also observed that, while attitudes in the US and the EU seem to be changing, both Americans and Europeans are still not prepared to accept the “democratic paradox”, namely the idea that Islamic movements will co-
me to power. Thus, according to the speaker, to foster a real process of democratization, the EU should support those countries in the South that are prepared to accept the participation of Islamic movements in political life. It should also look very carefully at the experiences of Turkey, Jordan and Morocco, while being very critical of the attitudes of Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt which have suppressed all Islamic movements and all kinds of opposition. The participant concluded cautioning that we should also be very careful about how to fight terrorism because, by making it a global threat, the West has been supporting very repressive policies.

The debate returned to the question of the double standard inherent in Western policies pursued in the region. Generally, participants agreed on the point made in the presentation that the West should abstain from holding a double standard attitude towards the region if it wants its policy of democratization to be credible and effective. However, one participant observed that it is not so much a matter of a double standard as the very nature of democracy that is being played out. Looking at the US policy of the last ten years in the Middle East and specifically the Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq, one can see that domestic policy plays out externally and that there is no consistency in external policy if one cannot ensure domestic support for it. Thus, that participant highlighted, democracy itself may keep democracy from coming about in other regions. International law and international organizations however can help steer a more steady course in support of democracy in other parts of the world and provide some elements of continuity on which to rely. Yet, the problem at hand, according to another intervention, is the essence of democracy rather than the double standard. The participant argued that, as long as the so-called democratic societies in Europe and US consider the freedom fighters in the Arab countries terrorists and not legitimate fighters against colonial rule, the West has no credit to interfere in the process of democratization in the region. Lastly, a further comment brought the attention of the participants to the contradictions in the US policies regarding democracy that have been pursued in the Middle East. First, US policy is based on two completely different assessments of what the problems in the Middle East are. The first set of perceptions is that there is something inherently wrong with the Middle East and that there is no civil society in the Arab world, whereas the second set of perceptions is that these societies have been victims of repressive regimes that need to be removed in order to bring about democracy in the region. Second, three different sets of actors are involved in the formulation of policy in the Middle East: the Pentagon, which is the most influential actor and is not greatly interested in democratization in the Middle East; the Middle East Bureau, which does not take the same position as the Pentagon and argues that it is better to have authoritarian regimes than to have Islamist regimes; and the leadership of the Middle East Partnership Initiative, which is institutionally in charge of democracy promotion in the Middle East and suggests doing more of what the US has been doing all along. As a result of this constellation, the speaker concluded, it is very difficult to see how those double standards and contradictions are going to be eliminated.

A few comments were made on the issue of compatibility between Islam and democratic values. A participant emphasized that the problem with democracy at least in the Maghreb is the practice of democratic principles rather than trust in such principles. There is indeed a pledge for universal and democratic principles in the Middle Eastern constitutions, basic laws and rhetoric, but they are not respected and the debate on democracy is monopolized by the ruling parties. It was also reminded that the real transition from monopartitism to pluralism in some MENA countries was due to pressure from within the society and not from the West. Another speaker also stressed that the pressure for democratization in the Arab world is coming from within.
In particular, given the multiplication of non-state actors in the region, the same participant expressed optimism about the role of civil society in pressuring for democratization from within the Arab countries. The need to look at the extent to which both the US and Europe are willing to support non-state actors in the Arab world was also underscored. Another point made by the same speaker was that the focus should not be on the compatibility between Islam and democracy. Indeed Islam has different interpretations and many Islamist scholars have seen no problem in terms of compatibility between Islam and democracy. Thus, according to the participant, the major problem is the social/economic issue. Indeed, when people are struggling for their daily life, it is hard for any political party to express a program and provide incentives to move towards a more tolerant and democratic society. The same participant concluded by looking at the complex case of Algeria. While in order to understand the Algerian case one needs to look at its colonial history, the problem of identity and cultural issues, socio-economic conditions feed the Islamic movements. One of the failures in the Algerian case, according to the same speaker, is that the process of liberalization went too fast and there was no negotiated path between the state and the people.

Finally, specific remarks on Iraq were made by a few participants. Some questioned that the real objective of the military intervention in Iraq was democratization. One speaker also warned against the risk of building up institutions in Iraq that are based on elections but do not rely on population participation. Lastly, another participant underscored the importance of a debate on what the US is going to do in Iraq. At the moment, people in Washington are completely disconnected from the debate on the nature of democratization and are busy making very practical decisions.

2. Promoting Economic and Political Reconstruction in the Middle East: Room for EU-US Cooperation?

In debating the EU and US strategies for reconstruction and development in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern region, some participants tended to comment on the major differences between the two approaches and, with different emphasis, raised doubts about the possibility of reaching a complementarity between them. According to one participant, while in promoting cooperation, stability and development in the Middle East presumably both the US and Europe are pursuing self-interest, there are significant differences in their respective objectives. The EU aims to bring the region into its political and economic orbit, while US objectives, especially after September 11th, are multiple, namely fighting terrorism, settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, bringing the region closer to US political economic interests and taking control over Iraqi oil resources. The same participant also observed that imposing democracy from outside is a very questionable concept and that, unlike that of the US, the European approach seems to be closer to the view of promoting democracy through dialogue, understanding and cooperation. Moreover, participants agreed that cooperation between the US and the EU on the one hand and the Middle East on the other hand is basically cooperation between the strong and the weak, with all its economic and political consequences. At the same time, as one speaker noted, while the US approach in that regard is clear cut, the EU approach seems to be more subtle. Indeed, according to the US, the weaker party has to agree on what is proposed or it will face consequences. Whereas, the EU association agreements imply the notion of mutual benefits. In addition, the same participant noted that, while both approaches are based on eco-
nomic liberalism, the American approach is closer to what John Stiglitz calls “market fundamentalism”, which means no attention to institution-building and social equity. This neglect for proper social equity and sustainable growth is likely to have tremendous destabilizing influences in the region.

Another speaker pointed out that there is no connection in the US approach to the Middle East and the Mediterranean between funding and economic development or political reform, with a few countries getting most of US foreign aid and the rest of the region almost nothing. In contrast, the Euro-Med Partnership embodies a constructive approach and a real strategy to help development in connection with political reform and respect for people. The same participant, however, acknowledged that there now seems to be a new spirit behind the recent US initiatives regarding the Middle East, namely the Partnership declared by Colin Powell on December 12, 2002, the statement made by President Bush on May 2003 in Carolina and the MCA (Millenium Challenge Account). The ideas of a free trade area and partnership has indeed been enlarged to the whole region. Another intervention discussed the differences between the EU and US strategies in terms of competition between practices. According to that comment, the US and the EU think very differently and, in fact, have developed two sets of practices that are now competing. The US is sovereignty reinforcing, puts material power over legitimacy and has a traditional security-type thinking. Europe on the other hand is sovereignty transcending, places legitimacy over power and has a cooperative security set of practices in mind and a community-building perspective.

However, some participants emphasized the scope for convergence and cooperation between the US and the EU with regard to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. According to one participant, rather than talking about competition between models and practices, one should simply talk about different agendas. Another comment was that, although it is true that there is competition between the EU and the US, there are some interesting parallelisms in the methods that, in the long run, perhaps not with this administration, may lead to a triangular solution, in particular on economic aspects. It was noted that the US is proposing things that, under different names, were proposed earlier by the EU, such as the idea of a free trade area and a bilateral approach. Finally, while agreeing that there is now a lot of convergence in principles between the US and the EU, for example, on the attitude towards the role of private investment, a participant expressed surprise that there is almost no cooperation on democracy promotion in a transatlantic perspective. In the participant’s view, this is something on which some kind of agreement is possible.

The role of the EU in promoting development in the region and the Euro-Med Partnership were discussed by some participants in more detail. According to one contribution, the EU should take into account that a free trade area alone cannot lead to improved welfare in the region and that it has had negative effects in Morocco and Tunisia. Moreover, the same speaker recalled that Europeans are not taken seriously in the South because of the many contradictions in their behavior. Although the reciprocity rule applies in Euro-Med association agreements, Europe only allows free trade of certain goods and free movement of certain factors of production – excluding labor. This is why, according to the same speaker, the perception in the South with regard to the issue of democracy is that the North is not genuinely interested in promoting democracy. Finally, the speaker warned that what happens in Iraq is likely to have a deep effect on whether or not this suspicion is strengthened. Thus, if the South’s suspicion about the North
persists, there will be the paradox that the push for democracy will become a problem in itself and a major cause of the absence of democracy in the South.

Another remark was that, while there are a good number of potential benefits for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries in associating with the EU, the South is too fragmented to negotiate as a block vis-à-vis the North. According to a further intervention, the EU framework is good but has clear deficiencies. Thus, there is a need for the EU mechanisms to be substantially developed and improved. Lastly, contrary to the view that the EU does not allow the Middle East and North Africa to integrate, a speaker stressed that positive conditionality through inclusion has been a major factor in EU policy on the European continent. In the Barcelona process, positive conditionality has not worked because the incentives have not been strong enough to really promote democratization. According to the same speaker, the new concept of a wider Europe introduced by the EU may be an incentive for the southern Mediterranean countries to democratize: if they accept to go through a process of democratization, they are likely to become part of the European economic space with all the freedoms of the economic space, including the free movement of people. Thus, according to the participant, there is a real possibility for positive conditionality to work.

Finally, on the American strategy for reconstruction and development in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern region, a few comments tended to remark that it is still unclear and hardly defined. In particular, with regard to the MCA, one participant noted that it is hard to know how it is going to work in the area: it is very difficult to get any information about it and what little is known does not apply very well to the Arab world because it requires an income level that is too high for most countries. The same participant also observed that the Aid Relationship to the Middle East, which is developing at this point through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), is even least defined than the MCA. It has no guidelines, no positive conditionality, no strategy, no substance and no method. In this sense, referring to the presentation of this session, the same participant raised doubts on the extent to which one can rely on the MCA as an indication of how the US perceives its partnership and its aid relationship to the Middle East.

3. Nation-building in the Greater Middle East: The View from Washington

The debate began with comments on the US’ nation-building efforts in the Middle East. In drawing conclusion from the previous presentation, a participant commented that the US commitment to political change in the region has been too little and too late. The same speaker provided three suggestions to prepare the way for democracy and nation-building in the region. The first suggestion was that the credibility of external efforts in nation-building should be improved since trust is important for any attempt at initiating and supporting change from the outside. In this regard, starting the efforts for change with military interventions such as in Iraq and Afghanistan is a burden because after the war there is the danger of being perceived as occupying rather than liberating forces. According to the participant, this burden could be reduced through rule generation. The idea of the free trade area, for example, should be extended to other fields. The same speaker also brought to the attention of the participants the proposal of an arms control regime for the greater Middle East, including Iran as well as Europe and the US. It was noted that, while it is not a new proposal, it is time to build up trust between the lo-
cal and outside powers. The second suggestion pointed to the importance of instilling a sense of ownership of nation-building, which, according to the participant, would lead to a genuine democratization and would help to diminish the suspicion that the West hides other goals behind external democratization plans. As a third suggestion, the EU should commit itself more strongly to nation-building in the Middle East. While the EU has successfully used the instruments of positive conditionality and inclusiveness to bring about change inside Europe (namely enlargement to Greece, Spain and Portugal and Eastern Europe), the way in which the EU deals with the rest of the world and, in particular with neighboring regions (the Russian Federation, the Caucasus, the Caspian, the Middle East) is now on the agenda. Referring to a recent draft paper presented by Solana to the heads of state and government in an attempt to develop an EU security strategy, the participant noted that the EU approach toward neighboring countries seems to give priority to long-term structural change over the short-term, and civilian investment over military investment. The system is in the making and there is therefore the possibility of influencing it.

Participants also discussed the reasons for the West’s engagement in nation-building. One participant suggested that one should not take for granted that the objective of US and EU intervention is nation-building. Nation-building is a rhetorical term used to achieve certain agendas. The same participant noted that, judging from the presentation, there are no elements of nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was also observed that there has been a militarization of globalization in the last ten years since the fall of the Soviet Union and that military intervention has become a supplementary instrument to association agreements for achieving political objectives. Moreover, the same speaker continued, external intervention has become so globalized that a new theory of it is needed to explain the behaviors of the EU and the US globally and to identify the real reasons why these interventions are taking place. According to another comment, the US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan is not about nation-building and political change at all, but about dealing with a specific strategic problem. In particular, nation-building is seen as a post-intervention management device, an “exit strategy”. Another participant argued that the only reason for the US engagement in political change after September 11th is the perceived need to prevent the formation of more al Qaidas and more weapons of mass destruction from ending up in the hands of rogue regimes as well as to ensure that there are no hostile regimes in the region, the main assumption being that if a country becomes democratic it also becomes peaceful. This, according to the participant, explains a lot of American mistakes. Indeed, with regard to the US intervention in Iraq, the US planners based their plans on serious misperceptions since they did not understand that Iraq is the worst candidate in the region to engage in the exercise of nation-building. The results were thus totally predictable. Finally, another comment was that the US commitment to nation-building in Iraq was a political maneuver to justify an intervention that was done on the basis of political interests. Bush began to talk about nation-building and democratic transformation because he was trying to sell a policy that was not terribly popular among Americans and in the rest of the world.

The issue of what options the US now has in Iraq was also debated. One participant outlined five options, which were assumed to be on the table in some US think tanks and Pentagon-linked places: a) the current option, which however does not seem to be working; b) involving the international community, which would make it easier to engage in democratization in Iraq; c) getting out, which is the antithesis of nation-building; d) dividing Iraq into two or three semi-autonomous entities; and e) imposing an authoritarian ruler that will be presented as a demo-
Cristina Paciello

cratizer. The same participant, however, argued that none of them are good options in terms of both nation-building and broader US and Israeli interests. In this sense, there is no good solution. Another participant pointed out that, having made the commitment to nation-building for instrumental reasons, the US is now in a difficult position. Given that the first justification for going to Iraq – the weapons of mass destruction – is gone, the Bush administration cannot afford to lose the second justification, that is democratic transformation, altogether. Indeed, while the options are all bad and it would be easier for the US to just give up, there is a very big problem of international credibility.

Finally, participants generally agreed that the term ‘nation-building’ may be misleading and incorrect. A participant underscored the importance of clarifying the concept of nation-building and remarked that it should not be used for everything. As was noted, speaking of state-building instead of nation-building, for example, may make more sense in a post-colonial situation. Since the term state-building implies “destroying and then rebuilding a state”, it may be useful to describe the case of Afghanistan, where there was a loose state, and that of Iraq, where the state was destroyed. Nevertheless, the same participant explained that, where there is a state like in Egypt and Morocco and so on, the concept of nation-building or state-building does not make much sense. In that context, one should speak of democratic transition and political reform, which mean the transformation and reform of that state in a democratic sense. Lastly, while conceding that the term nation-building is an unfortunate one, a participant noted that if you take part in the policy debate you necessarily have to use the same term that everybody uses.

4. Palestinian Authority Reform: A Key Ingredient to Peace Diplomacy

The discussion addressed the subject of Palestinian reform and its major impediments, looking firstly at the security-democracy nexus and then at the interrelationship between political reform, external pressure and political objectives. One participant commented initially on the meaning of Palestinian reform. The speaker wondered if, instead of limiting the discussion to reform of the Palestinian Authority, it should be extended to reform of all Palestinian politics meaning substantive rather than administrative reform. It was noted that indeed the Palestinian Authority is essentially reforming to maintain the factional and institutional status quo and that no social pact exists between the leaders and the vast majority of public opinion. According to the participant, there are certain historical reasons that explain why reforming Palestinian politics is particularly difficult. The Palestinian national movement in exile was characterized by two things: a multiplicity of parties, which gave the PLO a certain amount of credibility, and the PLO’s use of violence as a way to legitimate the state. This became problematic once the PLO returned to the West Bank and Gaza and began to take on the characteristics of a state. In contrast to the earlier tradition, Al-Fatah has come to dominate the Palestinian Authority, which no longer necessarily represents the broad spectrum of Palestinian opinion. The same speaker also restated the point made in the previous presentation that the Palestinian question is an excellent case study for the security-democracy nexus and advised that top-down reforms that play to short-term security concerns are likely to fail in the long term.

To highlight the relation between Israeli and US political objectives on one hand and their pressure on the Palestinian Authority to reform on the other hand, another participant raised the following questions: if Arafat had signed the agreement with Barak in Washington in
2000, would the reform of the Palestinian Authority now be a priority in regional international politics? Is the appointment of Abu Mazen and Dahlan a symptom of reform or was the push for their appointment based on the presumption that they would be more likely to make concessions to Israel than Arafat? If the US and Israeli political objectives had been served, would we be speaking about reform to the extent we are now? Another participant recalled that, although at an earlier stage of the Oslo process Israel had been in a position to demand certain issues that today are described as reform, it did not pressure Arafat about any standards of human rights or judicial transparency. Indeed, the speaker continued, Israel thought that Arafat would be able to do a much better job at suppressing terrorist organizations than Israel itself as he didn’t have to worry about human rights pressure. In the view of that participant, the Israeli decision not to press for reform of the Palestinian Authority then appears to be a big mistake: if you allow a regime that is dictatorial and does not respect human rights to emerge, you cannot expect it to deliver on security for either the Israeli or the Palestinian people. A further intervention remarked that the US also played a role in triggering reform of the Palestinian Authority and this was part of keeping people preoccupied with reform of the Palestinian Authority while building support elsewhere for a war on Iraq. Nevertheless, one participant stressed that reform is an internal domestic issue and has to be carried out whether there is pressure from outside or not.

A debate also took place on the relation between peace and political reform and on what comes first. Questioning the view that Israel and the US bear all the responsibility for what is happening in Palestine, one participant stressed that Palestinians can have reform even if there is occupation. Israeli occupation should not stop Palestinians from resolving their own problems and improving their system. According to another speaker, while it is unlikely that there will be a peace agreement if Sharon remains prime minister even if reforms to take place, this is no argument to stop Palestinian reform. It was noted that, in the longer term, from the Palestinian standpoint, reform is a good investment with regard to the peace process. Indeed, if the Palestinian Authority is dealing effectively with terrorism, this will bring about international and internal pressure for a different Israeli government.

Other participants expressed a different view. One speaker found it difficult to discuss political reform of the Palestinian Authority and democratization without taking into consideration that there is a military occupation, systematic destruction of the PLO apparatus, extra judicial killings and so on. Thus, further discussion of the link between the possibility of real political reform and the Israeli military intervention is needed. It was also pointed out by another speaker that, in the long term, there cannot be any minimum reform without peace. A further comment was made that getting reform without getting a peace agreement is not sustainable and it is likely to cause another Intifada.

Finally, a few comments were made on the “Islamist dilemma”. It was argued that the dilemma is very present in the case of Palestine. If there should be free elections in Palestine, most people suspect that Hamas would win. It was added, however, that, according to a counterargument, since Hamas gains most of its support from being an opposition movement, it is likely to be second to al-Fatah if the problem with Israel were solved. Lastly, another speaker made the point that if one wants democratic elections to take place in Palestine, all outcomes have to be accepted.
5. Third Party Intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Much of the discussion focused on the range of third party options and on the possible role of third party intervention in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some participants expressed doubts about the idea of a trusteeship for Palestine. According to one participant, such a solution would have very negative connotations for Palestinians and could be considered another form of mandate. Another comment was that a trusteeship would by definition be a nation-building exercise, but that Palestinians do not need international forces to rebuild Palestine. A further intervention made the point that the problem is that the Indyk proposal is not about a trusteeship but about fighting terrorism in the area as part of the war on terror.

While specifically debating the role of third party intervention, a participant noted that what intervention is from the perspective of Palestine is exactly what Israel wants to prevent. Thus, the same speaker called for the need to conceptualize ‘what intervention is for’ in order to understand how it can bring about the end of the conflict. Responding to this, a participant pointed out that the role of international intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been changing over time and is now becoming more complicated. Other participants stressed the importance of third party intervention, in particular from a Palestinian perspective. One contribution suggested that what might work for the Palestinian side would be a force that intervenes using force to prevent both the Israelis from coming back to Palestinian territories and the Palestinians from attacking certain targets in Israel. According to another comment, the third party is indispensable to bridge and normalize the relationship between the two parties, at least as a witness and possibly as a deterrent. The more the two parties psychologically and strategically accept to internationalize, the more they will normalize their relationship. In addition, one view maintained that, because Israelis are very sensitive to how they are portrayed internationally, the presence of third parties on Palestinian territories as witnesses to what is happening at the checkpoints would make the Palestinians feel more secure and protected. It was furthermore observed that a peacekeeping force that separates Palestinians from Israeli would be a better option than a trusteeship.

Another speaker, however, questioned that an international force can be used to separate the Palestinians physically from the Israeli. There is no border area on which the international force can operate and the settlement policy has created a geographic integration between the two sides. According to the same participant, one can talk only about the intervention of an international force on a neutral border after a peace agreement has been reached. Concerning the border area, another comment specified that, while one can talk about a separation force on the border with regard to the Jordan valley and Egypt, the idea of drawing a line anywhere else is operationally absurd. Nevertheless, a participant remarked that, as a result of final status negotiations, Israeli settlements would be dismantled since they all are illegal.

A few contributions also commented on the Israeli perspective on third party intervention. It was recalled that the Israeli experience with UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, which kept Israel out, was overwhelmingly negative and extremely damaging to the bilateral relationships between Israel and the member countries of that force. Moreover, of all the international forces in which Israel has been involved, UNIFIL is probably the most comparable to a force that could be introduced into the Israeli-Palestinian context under the present circumstances. This, accor-
According to the participant, partly explains the extreme Israeli awareness, with regard to how an international force could work. The same speaker further noted that, as a result of three years of Intifada and of what is happening in Iraq, which is likely not to be a threat any longer when Israel gets back to final status negotiations, Israel is expected to be in favor of a stronger Israeli and international presence in the Jordan Valley and on the Gaza and Egyptian borders. Lastly, the point was made that, given the Israeli experience with multinational forces vis-à-vis Egypt and with other peacekeeping operations, one should not take the current Israeli position of refusing a multinational force as a definitive one.

There were also some more specific comments on the role of third party intervention after a two-state solution is reached. According to some participants, third party intervention could fulfill the following functions: supervising the implementation of the agreement; monitoring the demilitarization of the Palestinian state; assisting in state-building; providing external protection for the borders of the Palestinian state not so much against Israel as others actors – state or non-state; and promoting Jordan Valley regional security cooperation. Lastly, during the debate, pointing to the gulf that separates Israelis and Palestinians on third party intervention, a participant expressed doubts about the possibility of reaching a compromise on the issue between the two parties.

Some participants highlighted the importance of third party mediation. According to one contribution, mediation is more important than intervention. Since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is so deeply rooted and historically difficult, the parties by themselves are not able to find a solution. In particular, the same speaker underscored the need for a more muscular, determined and objective mediation. Muscular mediation means that it should be closer to a kind of peace enforcement through political and economic measures that are prior to intervention rather than through military means. Monitoring is not sufficient to push through implementation of the Road Map. As for objective mediation, it is one in which several international actors would be involved, not just the US, but also the EU and the UN. This, as the speaker remarked, is the only way to have a long-term solution to the conflict. Finally, there was agreement among some participants that at the moment the most qualified entity to continue to mediate is the Quartet.

Some comments pointed to the important role that Europe has played in bringing the international monitoring mechanism into the Road Map and in working on strengthening it. In particular, a participant reported that, starting in January 2003, the EU began to reflect on how to fill the empty framework of the monitoring mechanism with something substantial both in terms of human resources and mechanisms. However, because of the war in Iraq, the Israeli elections on January 2003 and the process of appointing a new minister for the Palestinian Authority, the times was not right for a strong formal international presence and the EU as such was not in a position to impose anything on the Quartet. The same speaker noted, however, that there have recently been some encouraging signs. Especially after the summits in Sharm el-Sheik and Aqaba, and thanks to the ceasefire, there is a possibility of strengthening the monitoring aspect of the Road Map. Moreover, it seems that from the US point of view there is a lot of interest in having the Europeans on board even in an initial phase of monitoring due to the knowledge and the experience on the ground that the Europeans have accumulated in the years with the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) and the European observers initiative. The question is: how robust can this mechanism be? Nonetheless, the same participant made the point that, even if the principles of a strong monitoring mechanism should not be in-
ternationally accepted, there are still positive differences between the TIPH and the present mechanism. The former is only made up of six countries that have no political weight. Whereas with the latter, there is a way for the Quartet members, which represent the strongest players in the international arena, to impose certain decisions upon Israelis and Palestinians.

Another comment pointed to the important role that Egypt has played and can play in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to its long experience with peacekeeping and multinational forces. The Egyptian government could try to convince Israel to accept a multinational force and, given its important role in making Palestinian factions accept a ceasefire, it can be expected to continue to dialogue with Palestinians. Two different points were also made about the presence of the US on a multinational force. According to one participant, an international force composed of US members would not be credible. However, another participant noted that, while it is true that the US is closely associated with Israel, the American presence in an international multinational force would be a deterrent for the Israelis from invading Palestinian territories. This, as someone remarked, is the dilemma of Palestinians: on one hand, they have no reason to trust the US and, on the other hand, the US could have a deterrent role for Israel.

Finally, one participant argued that in order for a Bosnia-type intervention to take place in the Palestinian territories a number of preconditions would have to be met: a UN mandate; the participation of NATO, the US and the EU; and the contribution of other countries such as Russia and moderate Arab countries. However, as someone else noted, the question of whether or not the US would be willing to participate in that type of intervention is not easy to answer. While the previous administration would probably have accepted such an arrangement, this is less probable with the current administration. It is tragic that the Indyk concept is gaining momentum in Washington. As to whether Israel would be willing to accept the idea, the same participant observed that Israel will only accept the US as a military force. The EU could thus deliver civilian officials, but this option is still lacking in the current international environment.

6. Closing Session: Round Table

The round table session was introduced by Jean Fournet, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy. Following the introductory address, five speakers discussed the theme of NATO Mediterranean Dialogue in the Euro-American Context.

Jean Fournet, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, firstly made an overview of the reforms undertaken within NATO during the last year. He explained the reform efforts undertaken by Lord Robertson to enable the International Secretariat to more efficiently respond to the evolution of the security environment NATO operates in. Secondly, he outlined how the NATO Prague Summit represented a key landmark event in the history of Atlantic Alliance and remarked that the organization is continuing to push its transformation many steps further. The most important development is undoubtedly the decision to continue the enlargement process to include seven countries that are now participating in the internal works nearly as full members. NATO has also expanded its missions, it has developed new military capabilities and it has enhanced its partnerships. Moreover, it obviously remains for all the nations constituting the Organization the main body in which the transatlantic link can be developed, improved and expanded. In addition, the Transatlantic Alliance is the unique source of political and military capabilities to successfully manage unpredictable crisis and to build new ownerships through a cooperative approach to security. Yet, the Alliance certainly continues to
provide for the defense and security of its member countries.

As the speaker noted, the significant developments that have taken place since the Prague Summit have been welcomed by NATO ministers in their different periodical meetings. He pointed out that one important recent development was the NATO decision to take the lead of the International Security Assistance Force in the Afghan capital of Kabul, in August. NATO has also agreed to provide planning and other supports to Polish forces in Iraq, to help the international community bring stability there. In particular, NATO is currently working with the Polish authorities to define their requirements and how it might help in meeting them. It is clear, as he remarked, that NATO has considerably expanded its missions and its geographical perimeter. The speaker furthermore observed that NATO is a living body and felt that, while NATO will clearly meet new problems and new challenges in the future, its structure is flexible and robust enough to overcome the consequent difficulties coming from its expanded new roles and it will prove able to respond to real threats to the security of its members.

As far as the NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue itself is concerned, the speaker pointed out that it is improving, strengthening and deepening. While it is a political dialogue, it has also practical dimensions. He explained the “soft security approach”, whose main objective is to promote a better mutual understanding and to dispel any misconception about NATO. To achieve these goals, the speaker underscored the need of more cooperation between the NATO Organization, the different governments of the NATO member nations and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. Clearly, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and Civil Emergency Planning will be at the forefront of the soft security cooperation. Mr Fournet stressed that, in addition to the work with governments, there is a need to engage opinion elites and most of all the civil society, and specifically those segments that are shaping public attitudes and opinions in Mediterranean Dialogue countries. Especially now that civil society was becoming more assertive in Mediterranean Dialogue countries and there would be more room to reach out to key target audiences such as: parliamentarians, think tanks, the media and the successor generation, also helping them building ties with their counterparts from NATO member countries. Particularly regarding the successor generation, he announced that next year the NATO Public Diplomacy Division will make a special effort to engage in Mediterranean Dialogue countries those that one day will shape the policy of their nations and will produce the leaders of tomorrow.

Finally, some specific comments were made on the issue of NATO and the Middle Eastern process. The speaker made clear that NATO is not part of the Middle Eastern process and this has never been an item on its agenda. Nonetheless, he reported that the issue was raised by a number of NATO Foreign Ministers during their last meeting in Madrid. Underlying the conditionality of his sentence, the speaker said that we could look into a possible role of NATO in Israeli-Palestinian context only in the event that a peace agreement is reached between the two parties and if the international community should decide for a role to be played by an international force in the implementation of such an agreement. In other words, to reach a consensus in the Northern Atlantic Council on a possible role of NATO in the implementation of the peace process, there would be need firstly of an agreement by both the parties in the peace deal involving NATO and, secondly, of a clear request by the international community to NATO. Thus, as Mr Fournet concluded, while there is not at present any prospect for NATO to be involved in the peace process, that is not out of the mind of the people who are thinking about the future of the Organization, as well as of the ambassadors, ministers and prime ministers who ultimately are those taking decisions in NATO.
Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Director of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies of Lisbon (IEEI), began the round table by highlighting the divergences and convergences between the US and the EU with regard to their positions on the issue of democracy. As far as similarities are concerned, he noted that the US and the EU tend to converge on the analysis of problems. The conclusion that there are neither democratic systems nor democratizing regimes in the Arab world today is now accepted everywhere. The UNDP in the Arab Human Development Report, the European Commission in its report to the Council on human rights and democracy in the region and US analysts have all reached the conclusion that lack of democracy is at the heart of the problems in the region and that the authoritarian nature of most of the regimes feeds radicalism. Moreover, both Europeans and Americans are dealing with the same paradox, namely the “democratic paradox”: they want to promote political transformation, but they do not accept that, at the end of the process, there will be a regime that they do not like. With regard to divergences, the panelist pointed out that the US and EU differ on the way to deal with the above-mentioned problem. While the US has a messianic approach that is based on pre-emptive action, the EU prefers a process of inclusion and long-term economic and social integration within a multilateral framework. The EU is also very much concerned that the American way of fighting terrorism could further radicalize the situation in the area and make the process of democratization and modernization more difficult. Being democratic and modernist in the Mediterranean and Middle East is indeed increasingly difficult because it means being on the side of external forces.

Can a real transatlantic convergence on policies be reached? According to the speaker, this question is not easy to answer. He also stressed that convergence needs to be triangular, involving the US, the EU and the partners of the South. Indeed, in order to promote a real democratic transformation, there is a need for strong national and international legitimacy. Moreover, according to the panelist, there seems to be a convergence on projects between the US and the EU. The US is proposing a number of initiatives that are quite similar to the European approach of economic integration and inclusion, namely proposals for a free trade area and economic incentives to political transformation. However, reaching a common approach will depend on whether or not the US is prepared to accept the wider project of inclusion of the Mediterranean that has been put forward by the EU.

The panelist pointed out that convergence may be more difficult on hard political questions. For example, with regard to the issue of the intervention of a monitoring and international force in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which was debated earlier, there is no real consensus on the level of international intervention, with most Europeans and the South calling for a peacekeeping or peace-enforcing force, while Israel is less convinced of the practicability of such a proposal. In this regard, the speaker suggested that, given its strong American and European engagement, NATO could play a role in making Israel accept international intervention and European involvement.

In his final notes, the speaker briefly addressed the question of the Algerian crisis and then discussed the framework for transatlantic dialogue. On the first issue, he expressed astonishment for the lack of European and American involvement in solving the Algerian crisis, despite more than one hundred twenty thousand people killed. With regard to the second issue, he noted that the European approach to NATO has changed. NATO is no longer seen as an essentially American initiative that could create problems for the European identity and autonomy. Similarly, for the Europeans protecting NATO now means protecting a multilateral institution in which Europe is together with the US. Nevertheless, the speaker added that NATO should not be considered the only framework for transatlantic dialogue. In addition to the NATO Medi-
APPENDIX 1

terranean Dialogue, there are a number of frameworks for specific issues on which a number of countries could converge. In conclusion, de Vasconcelos raised the question of whether it is possible to create a multilateral framework in the Mediterranean other than through NATO and stressed the importance of opening a debate on the right framework for a real triangular dialogue involving the EU, the US and the partners of the South.

Hisham Kassem, publisher of the Cairo Times, in his intervention, attempted to explain to the participants the reason why he has publicly argued in favor of a military intervention to force democratization in Iraq. As he specified, while he was not representative of the Arab region since most of the Arab people are against military intervention, he nonetheless represented a much wider sector than one would expect. First, he traced the basis of his argument to the collapse of the Soviet Union when Eastern Europe, East Asia, Africa and Latin America were just beginning to democratize. By contrast, as he noted, in the Arab region there was a general deterioration with regard to civil and political liberties, human rights organizations’ activities and freedom of the press. Second, he remarked that the general regression in human rights and civil liberties was in turn the major cause of lack of development in the Arab world, resulting in no chance to create enough jobs for a growing population. Lack of development has been compounded by another disturbing trend: 60 percent of the Arab population is around 25 years old. Third, with regard to the international community, he pointed out that both Europe and the US continued to support what they called “stable regimes”, namely the authoritarian regimes of the Arab world that secured them with a flow of oil. In addition, even though almost all countries in Europe demanded an end to Arab immigration, no serious attempt was made to address the situation described above. Unfortunately, as the speaker said, this continued until September 11th when all realized that the Arab region was producing nothing but oil, terrorism and illegal immigrants. Finally, he made the point that attempts at a political solution in the Arab world were practically impossible with all 22 members of the Arab League being authoritarian regimes.

The panelist also questioned the arguments provided by those who were against military intervention. In the Arab world, the only argument against military intervention – that one cannot bomb Iraq because it is an Arab country – is weak. According to him, the fear of the West in the man of the Arab street and among Islamic fundamentalists is unsubstantiated. There is no Arab street in the Arab world and recruitment for Islamic movements is so difficult that it is unlikely that more people are going to be recruited. Kassem concluded by saying that democracy in the Middle East is possible.

Ian O. Lesser, Vice-President, Director of Studies, Pacific Council of International Policy in Los Angeles, first dealt with the issue of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, noting that, since the mid-1990s, the context for thinking about it has changed radically. Over the last two years, in particular, the pace of change has accelerated tremendously, with a lot of implications. The most fundamental being that, with NATO involved in Afghanistan and Iraq, one is no longer talking about something on the periphery and that the NATO Mediterranean initiative should perhaps be reframed in terms of a Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Dialogue or something even wider. The NATO Dialogue in the Mediterranean, for example, could be extended to Iraq.

Secondly, with respect to the nature of the security dialogue between the North and the South in the Mediterranean, the panelist observed that until two years ago there was a clear asymmetry: in the South, security mainly meant internal security, while in the North it was partly
about internal security but also a lot about other more conventional things. There is now, he noted, this irony that the North is facing the same kind of internal security perceptions and challenges that the South has dealt with for years. So, the speaker argued, although political perspectives and solutions may be very different, the agendas of the US and the South are not so very different. This, according to Lesser, could be the basis for an extension of the Dialogue in the area.

Thirdly, the question of US and European perspectives on Mediterranean security, the NATO and the Mediterranean is more problematic. Differences in that regard have always been substantial. The US never has talked about the region in the same way as Europe and its interest in Mediterranean security has been more pragmatic and practical. That said, the panelist continued, the more the discussion on Mediterranean security touches core Middle Eastern issues, Israel and neighbors, Palestine, Israel and the Gulf, the more the US obviously gets interested. Moreover, he noted that over the last couple of years there have been enormous changes in US foreign policy. He distinguished two ways of thinking about how US policy may evolve. The first way, which is more traditional, goes back to emphasizing a sustained engagement defined in regional terms and with the traditional partners. That is, according to Lesser, the kind of world in which the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue has a lot of significance for the US. The alternative is something rather different: foreign security policy is no longer defined in regional terms. According to that view, there are specific functional problems to be solved, for example terrorism, proliferation, HIV and so on, requiring a kind of specific intervention, perhaps pre-emptive, perhaps crisis management, but not necessarily a sustained regional engagement. This, he concluded, is the kind of world we are in at the moment. However, whether or not it is an enduring phenomenon or a transitory one is an open question. Referring to a previous panelist, Lesser concluded by pointing out that initiatives like the free trade area are not going to be significant in terms of US relations in the region and the security dimension because the US does not have the same economic weight in the region as the EU.

Nicola de Santis, Information Officer for Mediterranean Dialogue and Partner Countries at NATO, spoke about NATO and the Mediterranean region, and of building transatlantic consensus in a fast changing security environment. Responding to points touched by other speakers, he firstly made a few points on the issue of NATO relevance. Looking from inside the organization, he reminded that NATO’s relevance had been periodically challenged through NATO’s history and this was, to a certain extent, even a healthy and useful debate for the organization, as it pushed it to continuously adapt itself to the fast changing security environment. Indeed, he said that NATO had undertaken during the last twelve years historical changes. Mr de Santis remarked that September 11th had been a defining moment for transatlantic relations: twelve years after the end of the Cold War NATO was again faced with existential threats represented by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and possibly the combination of both. With regard to the issue of NATO relevance he noted that there had been a lot of *deja vue*. In 1991, for example, some critics argued that NATO had no role to play in Central and Eastern Europe, while in 1994 the same was said for a possible role of NATO role in the Balkans, considered by some as “out of area”. He said this was a rhetorical debate since he could not understand even at the time how the Balkans, with their potential of spill over of conflict within the adjacent NATO countries, could be considered as out of NATO’s area of responsibility. However, as Mr de Santis stressed, so much has happened in the meanwhile and he believed that, within NATO, the debate over out of area is now defunct. NATO has acted under a UN mandate in Bosnia, pre-emptively during the air campaign in Kosovo, again under
a UN mandate to deploy KFOR on the ground in Kosovo and preventively in Macedonia, in concert with the EU. NATO’s forces are today deployed in Afghanistan, in the Mediterranean with Task Forces Endeavour and STROG, and in Iraq as well, supporting Polish forces there. NATO is the only international organisation able today to organise effectively the responses of the international community in the fields of crisis management, peace enforcement and peace building. It was thanking to the fact that NATO established a secure environment in which the political, social and economic reconstruction of the Balkans could happen, also with the help of other international institutions. This should be a model for the future. NATO is there, it should simply be used. To respond to some critics of the past, one could easily argue that “NATO is out of area and not out of business”. As well put by the Alliance Foreign Ministers at their Reykjavik meeting: NATO will respond to future threats against its members wherever they come from.

On the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, the panelist pointed out that ten year after its establishment, in addition to providing a better mutual understanding among NATO and MD participants and correcting misperceptions, new cooperative dimensions have been added to it. Not only in the soft security cooperation but also in hard military cooperation such as: military exercises and related training activities in fields such as search and rescue, maritime safety, medical evacuation, humanitarian relief, and peace support operations, extending the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T) to Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The participation of Mediterranean Dialogue partners in these activities could improve the ability of the armed forces of these countries to operate with those of the members of NATO and thus facilitate the integration into NATO Forces of MD countries willing to contribute to NATO-led non-Article 5 crisis response operations. Military-to-military contacts at CHOD, staff and expert level to exchange information and reciprocal experiences on MD military co-operation issues, including in the field of peace support operations and related activities such as logistic support for MD country forces involved in NATO-led non-Article 5 crisis response operations, in order to improve the ability of MD countries’ forces to operate with those of the members of NATO. A wide array of other activities take place under the Dialogue’s Military Cooperation Programme. Mr de Santis stressed that the Mediterranean Dialogue was gradually evolving from a Political Dialogue into a real Partnership. The multi-bilateral character of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue: 19+1, 19+7 and, from the Prague Summit, 19+n, offer a high degree of flexibility to tailor this Partnership to the realities of Mediterranean Dialogue countries. He furthermore argued that, while it is true that Europeans and North Americans often have different perceptions vis a vis the Greater Middle East, one should not underestimate the fact that the Dialogue is the first attempt ever by the transatlantic community to define a common policy for the region within NATO.

Asked to comment on a possible NATO role in an internationally brokered peace deal of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Mr de Santis said this was not on the NATO agenda. Speaking on a personal basis since this was an academic conference, Mr de Santis noted that the issue is not so much whether NATO would have a role in the possible implementation of an agreement in the Middle East once it is reached, rather if the transatlantic community will have such a role. With regard to the institutional framework, he questioned the view of a previous panelist that there is a plurality of institutions to organise such an international presence, if requested by the parties, in an eventual peace-deal between Israel and the Palestinians. NATO brings together Europe and the US and Canada. Therefore it is the only institution which would guarantee both parties, should they chose to have an international presence on the ground there, following a peace accord. Should one wish to speculate on a possible future role of NATO in a future Midd-
le East agreement Mr de Santis said, on a personal basis, that a number of preconditions should apply to reach a consensus within NATO for the Organization to be involved. Firstly, there would have to be a request by the two parties to NATO to lead an international military presence. Its aim would need to be limited to help provide a secure and stable environment, possibly drawing from the Bosnia experience, after the two parties have agreed a peace plan. NATO would only help implement such a peace plan. Secondly, there would need to be some sort of international mandate to NATO, maybe from the UN, to have all NATO members on board. NATO brings together Europe and the US, it would therefore seem quite logical that if an international military presence were requested by the two parties, they would feel more guaranteed by a NATO led operation, rather than by an operation led only by the EU or only by the US. Thirdly, NATO is also engaged in a number of cooperative partnerships with Russia, PfP and Arab states, through the NATO Russia Council at 20, the EAPC and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. NATO would therefore be able to include other non-NATO contributors in such a military international presence, if requested by the parties, to include countries such as Russia, PfP and even Arab countries parties to its Mediterranean Dialogue and even other countries. In Bosnia after all NATO organised under IFOR and SFOR the participation of 21 non-NATO states, together with the member countries of the Alliance. In concluding his remarks, Mr de Santis stressed that the prospects of all of the above conditions actually materialising appeared to be quite remote. However, he also underlined that NATO and the EU have today developed complementarity and new partnership relations. Indeed, through the exchange of letters Robertson-Solana on behalf of the two organisations they have reached agreements to make concrete the transfer of NATO’s assets and capabilities to the EU to run “Petersberg type” military operations, under the EU’s responsibility, using NATO’s assets and capabilities, avoiding duplications and without de-coupling transatlantic security. “Berlin Plus” is now being tested on the ground through Operation Concordia in Macedonia. NATO and the EU are developing a concerted approach for the Balkans and are undertaking consultations on the EU’s Security Strategy. So, for the future it could therefore very well be that this cooperative partnership between the two organizations, could even be extended to other regions of the world.

Stefano Silvestri, President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome, began his intervention by pointing out that there has only been one important change in the Middle East: due to the war on terror and the new perception of international security, the Americans have decided to intervene heavily in the Middle East, which in a larger sense goes from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf and possibly to North Africa, even if the latter seems to be a secondary priority for Americans. So, the panelist argued, the political problem today is not only to identify the possible roles for different organizations but also to try to understand how the political climate has changed and if it is conducive to a transatlantic bargain or at least to a new transatlantic agreement. Moreover, according to him, the problem is that neither the EU nor the US seems to have a well defined idea of what they want to do and, therefore, tend to oscillate between different policies. This in part has to do with the difficulties of the questions to be confronted, but also with a more general uncertainty about the future shape of the international system and the roles that the US and the EU could or want to play in this situation.

As a second point, the speaker dealt with the issue of the similarities and differences between the US and the EU. While there is a certain convergence on the analysis and even on the aims to be reached by the international community, the differences generally arise on the strategy to be followed, creating a permanent obstacle to a good link among the international organizations in the area. There have been many attempts to overcome these obstacles through empiri-
cal step-by-step approaches – the Quartet is an example – trying to smuggle through different priorities and strategies in a way that would allow at least a degree of acceptance of common aims by the parties. Nevertheless, the speaker argued that the empirical approach has gone a little too far. There are some more basic political problems between the US and Europe that have to be confronted and solved. In that regard, he repeated, the uncertainties in both Europe and the US are a great obstacle.

With regard to the uncertainty in the US, the panelist pointed out that, apart from the different approaches of the opposition and the government, there are also two rather different strategies inside the government that are called by the names of two leaders of the past, namely the Palmerston approach and the Bonaparte approach: the former approach tends to build up the security of its own country and to defend its own permanent or less permanent interests on the basis of a number of ad hoc and empirical operations. In other words, the US does not really worry about the Middle East except in terms of its own security. The second approach moves from the assumption that democracy will bring security and, thus, is intent on destroying undemocratic regimes and changing the political reality in the area. According to the speaker, the two approaches cannot work together, and if there is no decision on which strategy to adopt it is very difficult to decide what to do together. Moreover, he noted that the democracy-building approach was used to increase the international legitimacy of actions taken under the Palmerston approach. As far as the EU is concerned, it is uncertain because it is divided and there is no effective and clear institution to deal with such divisions. That makes the EU a very slow actor and not very useful for rapid management of crises.

It was furthermore argued that, in general terms, there cannot be a division of roles between the EU and US. Yet, even in the absence of a complete agreement, the speaker suggested, the US and the EU could try to bridge the gap in the meantime by creating a number of steps – de facto realities – that could help to overcome their differences. However, he cautioned that if we are not able to work out common strategies to fight new threats, there is the risk that NATO will lose its coherence and effectiveness. In particular, looking at the presence of NATO in Afghanistan, he argued that to be effective we have to build a credible state there. Something that has not been done yet. The tendency is indeed towards a kind of federation of warriors. While the success of NATO operations has been certified in the Balkans, for Iraq it’s still a question mark. As Silvestri suggested, NATO should address these problems and cooperation between the US and the EU on them will probably be very useful in maintaining long-term coherence and an image of effectiveness, which it was unable to maintain in the Balkans.

The Discussion. The discussion touched upon the following issues: international legality and security; the rationale for the military intervention in Iraq; multilateral cooperation and the NATO of the future.

As for international legality, a participant pointed out that respect for international law is the basic condition for maintaining peace and international security and that international actors should therefore act in compliance with international law. It was argued that one of the root causes of the perpetuation of violence in the region is the deliberate rejection of international legality. Yet, according to the same speaker, what makes an institution relevant is not a step-by-step process but the values and principles that guide international action. Another speaker expressed concern that, after the Iraqi war, no international institution has so far considered that war illegal. Thus, he suggested, a first step to prevent further US military intervention in the future is that the Iraqi war be declared illegal at the level of the international community. More specifically regarding NATO, a participant pointed out that international law is not only so-
mething that is set down in the NATO treaty. During the air campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo, each time NATO had to plan an operation, there were lengthy discussions on all the legal aspects involved.

In addressing one of the previous panelists, some participants questioned the US’ military intervention in Iraq on several grounds, re-emphasizing some points on democracy in the Middle East made in previous sessions. One speaker asked how one can be fighting for civil liberties and democratic values while at the same time advocating illegitimate means and the violation of international law to achieve a goal. It was also stressed that the West has helped to maintain the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and that there were ulterior motives other than establishing democracy behind the military intervention. Another participant added that justifying military intervention in Iraq with the argument that there is a dictatorship means that there should be a military intervention in every MENA country. The point was also made that there is nothing intrinsic in the Islamic culture to impede the process of democratization. The same participant reminded that the Cold War led to support for regimes that were essentially not democratic. If this had not happened, an intrinsic process of democratization from the inside would probably have taken place. In addition, someone else said, jumping quickly to salvation from outside with military means raises problems of legitimacy about the invader. It was also noted by the same participant that the war on Iraq has made the whole process of democratization and the inclusion of Islamist organizations in the political arena more difficult than it was before. In his response, the panelist clarified that he did not want to justify international violation of law and did not stress the West’s blame in supporting authoritarian regimes enough because the habit is always to blame the West rather than undertake self-criticism. Moreover, with regard to Western motives, he said that he does not expect the West to promote democracy in the South. Whether or not the West is going to advocate civil liberties and democracy in the Middle East is not a reason to change his position. Lastly, as for the possibility of a military intervention in every country, he did not think that this is going to be necessary since there are already positive signs coming from several regimes in the region.

Participants also looked at the issues of multilateral cooperation and of NATO’s role. One participant observed that the US should not be confused with the Bush administration. In other words, the discussion did not adequately distinguish between the constants in US-European relations and a very variable situation highly dependent on a particular administration. Moreover, on the multilateral cooperation between the US and Europe, in general participants felt that working out a common approach to security, especially with the current administration, is a difficult task. While agreeing on that view, a participant noted that one should not ignore the many positive things NATO is doing regardless of the administration. It was also pointed out that the current US administration has the political will not only to work with the Europeans but to have a number of proposals pushed within the organization so that the position of all the parties in NATO can be harmonized.

More specifically on NATO, two questions were brought to the attention of the participants: what is NATO becoming now? Can NATO reconcile the two different visions of security? And if so, how? A participant noted that it is not possible to answer to the questions at the moment. The fact is that, for the first time, the transatlantic community is trying to devise a Mediterranean policy institutionally. Whether or not this is going to work will have to be assessed. Another participant commented that, if one looks at the kind of challenges that can be found in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern region, NATO is very limited as to what it can do. Rebuilding regions or developing democracy is a wider task. In this sense, the EU, which now represents a force that can muster both military and civilian elements, seems to be much better
equipped to deal with such challenges. The point was also raised that the very fact that the EU is enlarging to the south and to the east, not only geographically but in terms of size, will in the medium and long term naturally lead to a much greater European commitment in the area. According to other participants, given the deep differences between the EU and the US, NATO may help to define a common agenda. A further intervention argued that NATO may play an interesting role in the Mediterranean if it is able to look at the process of integration of the South into Europe in the same way as it looked at the process of integration of Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall; NATO had an important role in the European process of integration of the Balkans. What it is essential now is the way in which NATO looks at the Mediterranean. In addition, the speaker underscored the need to change the status quo in the region as the best way to fight radical Islam. This means, he concluded, that the West needs to change its attitude, integrating democracy, justice and human rights in the fight against terrorism: it needs to believe that the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries can democratize, to support democratic transition and to accept the risk of inclusion of political Islam in the political process.
Appendix 2

Activities of the IAI project on Transatlantic Perspectives on Relations across the Mediterranean border

I. Seminar on “Setting up a nucleus of NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Academic Institutions”, Rome on July 7, 2001

Papers
Roberto Aliboni, Think Tanks As A Cooperative Factor In Nato’s Mediterranean Dialogue
Jean-François Daguzan, Le rôle des institutions académiques dans le renforcement de la coopération en matière de sécurité autour de la Méditerranée
Carlo Masala, Western-Mediterranean Security Relations: Issues And Challenges

Participants
From NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Countries:
Abdel Monem Said Aly, Director, ACPSS - Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Egypt
Shai Feldman, Director, JCSS - The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Israel
Mazen Gharaibe, Acting President JID - Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, Jordan
Khalid Alioua, Senior Researcher, GERM - Groupement d’Etudes et de Recherches sur la Méditerranée, Morocco
Khaled Kaddour, Directeur de veille stratégique, ITES - Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques, Tunisia

From NATO Countries:
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Stefano Silvestri, President, IAI - Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy
Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies, IAI - Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy
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Ian O. Lesser, Senior Researcher RAND, USA
Michael Intriligator, Professor of Political Science, UCLA ‘s Burkle Center for International Relations, USA

From NATO:
Nicola De Santis, Italy Liaison Officer for Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries, Belgium

Rapporteur Daniela Pioppi, Junior Researcher, IAI, Istituto Affari Internazionali
Observers Gabriele Tonne, Assistant Editor of The International Spectator, IAI-International Affairs Institute, Rome


Papers
Béchir Chourou, Islamism: Roots and Prospects
Michael D. Intriligator, Globalization of the World Economy: Potential Benefits and Costs and a Net Assessment

Participants
Roberto Aliboni, Vice President, IAI-International Affairs Institute, Rome
Giancarlo Aragona, Director General, Directorate of Political Affairs, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
John Berry, Dean, NATO Defense College, Rome
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Jean-François Daguzan, FRS-Fondation de la Recherche Stratégique, Paris
Amedeo de Franchis, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Italy, NATO, Brussels
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Giovanni Brauzzi, NATO Head Office, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Rome
Hassen Hamdani, Attaché, Embassy of Algeria, Rome
Vincenzo Nigro, Journalist, “La Repubblica”, Rome
Gabriele Tonne, Assistant Editor of The International Spectator, IAI-International Affairs Institute, Rome


Papers
Roberto Aliboni, After September 11th: Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East in a Transatlantic Perspective.
Mohammed Khair Eiedat, Aftermath of 11th of September: An Arab Perspective.
Mark A. Heller, After September 11th.
F. Stephen Larrabee, The Impact of September 11 on U.S. Policy in the Middle East and Transatlantic Relations

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Appendix 2

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Prof. Duygu Bazogğlu Sezer, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Bilkent University, Ankara

Observers
Dr. Francesca Nardi, Research-Fellow, IAI, Rome
Dr. Maria Cristina Paciello, Research-Fellow, IAI, Rome

4. Tasks for transatlantic cooperation: Peace-, institution-, and nation-building in the Mediterranean and the Middle East Rome, 4-5 July 2003

Papers
Roberto Aliboni & Laura Guazzone, Promoting Political Reform in the Middle East and the Mediterranean
Jarat Chopra, Third Party Intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Mohammed Dajani, The Palestinian Reform
Tim Niblock, Reconstruction and Economic Development in the Mediterranean and Middle East in a Transatlantic Perspective
Marina Ottaway, Nation-building in the Greater Middle East

Participants
Emanuel Adler, Department of international Relations, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Roberto Aliboni, Head, Middle East and Mediterranean Programme, IAI-Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Yossi Alpher, Co-editor, bitterlemons.org; Former Director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Jerusalem
Antonio Armellini, Italian Special Envoy in Irak and Representative to the Head of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Baghdad, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
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Laure Borgomano-Loup, Deputy Head Research Branch, Nato Defense College, Rome
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Mohammed Dajani, Director, American Studies, Al-Quds University, East Jerusalem
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Corinna Horst, Program Officer, The German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Center, Brussels
Hisham Kassem, Publisher, Cairo Times
Ian O. Lesser, Vice-President, Director of Studies, Pacific Council on International Policy, Los Angeles
Samir A. Makdisi, Professor of Economics, American University of Beirut
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Abderraouf Ounaïes, Retired Ambassador and Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, University of Tunis
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Reinhardt Rummel, Senior Research-Fellow, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP, Berlin
Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker, Chairman, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Cairo
Stefano Silvestri, President, Istituto Affari Internazionali-IAI, Rome
Yahia H. Zoubir, Professor of International Relations, Thunderbird Europe-American Graduate School of International Management, University Centre, Archamps

Rapporteur Maria Cristina Paciello, Phd candidate, University of Florence

5. Published in the IAI Paper Series:
“Security Across the Mediterranean. Challenges and Cooperative Approaches After September 11”

Content
F. Stephen Larrabee, The Impact of September 11 on U.S. Policy in the Middle East and Transatlantic Relations
Mohammed Khair Eiedat, Aftermath of 11th of September: An Arab Perspective
Ian O. Lesser, Coalition Dynamics In The War Against Terrorism
Carlo Masala, Western-Mediterranean Security Relations: Issues And Challenges
Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Ten points on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
Roberto Aliboni, Upgrading Political Responses in the Mediterranean

Annexes
2. Activities of the IAI project on Transatlantic Perspectives on Relations across the Mediterranean border
- Processi e politiche per l’internazionalizzazione del sistema Italia, a cura di Paolo Guerrieri, (n. 19, novembre 2003, pp. 130)
- Il terrorismo internazionale dopo l’11 settembre: l’azione dell’Italia, di Antonio Armellini e Paolo Trichilo (n. 18, luglio 2003, pp. 120)
- Il processo di integrazione del mercato e dell’industria della difesa in Europa, a cura di Michele Nones, Stefania Di Paola e Sandro Ruggeri (n. 17, maggio 2003, pp. 34)
- La dimensione spaziale della politica europea di sicurezza e difesa, a cura di Michele Nones, Jean Pierre Darnis, Giovanni Gasparini, Stefano Silvestri, (n. 15, marzo 2002, pp. 48)
- Il sistema di supporto logistico delle Forze Armate italiane: problemi e prospettive, a cura di Michele Nones, Maurizio Cremasco, Stefano Silvestri (n. 14, ottobre 2001, pp. 74)
- Il Wto e la quarta Conferenza internazionale: quali scenari?, a cura di Isabella Falautano e Paolo Guerrieri (n. 13, ottobre 2001, pp. 95)
- Il ruolo dell’elicottero nel nuovo modello di difesa, a cura di Michele Nones e Stefano Silvestri (n. 11, settembre 2000, pp. 81)
- Il Patto di stabilità e la cooperazione regionale nei Balcani, a cura di Ettore Greco (n. 10, marzo 2000, pp. 43)
- Politica di sicurezza e nuovo modello di difesa, di Giovanni Gasparini (n. 9, novembre 1999, pp. 75)
- Il Millenium Round, il WTO e l’Italia, a cura di Isabella Falautano e Paolo Guerrieri (n. 8, ottobre 1999, pp. 103)
- Trasparenza e concorrenza nelle commesse militari dei paesi europei, di Michele Nones e Alberto Traballesi, (n. 7, dicembre 1998, pp. 31)
- La proliferazione delle armi di distruzione di massa: un aggiornamento e una valutazione strategica, a cura di Maurizio Cremasco, (n. 6, maggio 1998, pp. 47)
- Il rapporto tra centro e periferia nella Federazione Russa, a cura di Ettore Greco (n. 5, novembre 1997, 50 p.)
- Politiche esportative nel campo della Difesa, a cura di Michele Nones e Stefano Silvestri (n. 4, ottobre 1997, pp. 37)
- Gli interessi italiani nell’attuazione di un modello di stabilità per l’Area mediterranea, a cura di Roberto Aliboni (n. 3, ottobre 1996, pp. 63)
- *Comando e controllo delle Forze di Pace Onu*, a cura di Ettore Greco e Natalino Ronzitti (n. 2, luglio 1996, pp. 65)
- *L’economia della Difesa e il nuovo Modello di Difesa*, a cura di Michele Nones (n. 1, giugno 1996, pp. 35)

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- *The Role of the Helicopter in the New Defence Model*, edited by Michele Nones and Stefano Silvestri (n. 1, November 2000, p. 76)