POWER2YOUTH

Organizational Factors of Youth Exclusion/Inclusion and Youth Collective Agency in the South East Mediterranean

Concept Paper for Meso-level Analysis (WP3)

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Abstract

The meso-level analysis as identified by the project Power2Youth is "the level of organized groups (e.g., political parties, networks, trade unions, charities, social movements, etc.) and of their actions and interactions." The aim of Work Package (WP) 3 is to study: (1) the factors that favour or constrain youth participation in organizations (both formal and informal, including mainstream traditional organizations such as trade unions, political parties, business organizations and various kinds of youth organizations); (2) the different types of youth activism and forms of youth mobilization that are influenced by different social backgrounds; and (3) the transformative role of organized youth. WP3 meso-level research will proceed in three steps for each of the countries considered: (1) background analysis mainly based on secondary literature on the political context; (2) mapping of youth-led organizations (YLO) and youth-relevant organizations (YRO); and (3) empirical research through focus groups and semi-structured interviews with a selected sample of young activists.

INTRODUCTION

The meso-level analysis as identified by the project Power2Youth is "the level of organized groups (e.g., political parties, networks, trade unions, charities, social movements, etc.) and of their actions and interactions. The aim of Work Package 3 (WP3) is to understand the transformative role of organized youth in their respective societies, and how youth influence politics from below through conventional and unconventional means.

According to past research in the field, young women and men have been largely excluded from mainstream social, economic and political organizations in the SEM countries, leading to their marginalization and exclusion from the labour market and from civic and political participation (World Bank 2010). The authoritarian structure, in conjunction with its associated nepotism and crony capitalist system, has led to further social, economic and political alienation and exclusion of young women and men in the region. Youth in the SEM have also been largely excluded from the mainstream trade unions, teachers unions and business associations (El Mahdy 2010, Fawzy 2010). In some SEM countries, political parties have been venues where youth are a rare occurrence. For instance, in the case of Egypt pre-2011, only two of the then functioning 26 political parties had youth divisions, namely the ruling National Democratic Party and the Democratic Front Party (Sika 2012b). Only young women and men who accepted the authoritarian system were included in these small venues

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of formal participation in public life, whereas the rest were to some extent marginalized (Jamal 2007, Gengler et al. 2013), or resorted to informal means of collective action which helped bring about revolutionary movements in a number of SEM countries.

Indeed, some youth have resorted to different types of participation through developing youth movements, which have networked together in one way or another for political, economic, social and cultural change within their respective countries (Shehata 2012, Sika 2012a, Vairel 2013, Beinin and Vairel 2013). Recent developments in the region have shown that youth can have a major impact on the political, economic, social and cultural spheres through unconventional means, like social networking. However, even though these unconventional methods are important in raising the issue of youth participation and exclusion, one should not only perceive youth participation and activism from a progressive perspective. In fact, youth activism might also lead to a further institutionalization of authoritarianism (Jamal 2007, Gengler et al. 2013).

In order to establish a more in-depth understanding of these youth issues, WP3 will conduct deskwork and field research with different youth movements and organizations to understand:
• The factors that favour or constrain youth participation in organizations: attention will be devoted to understanding how gender, class, generation, "race"/ethnicity, urban/rural differences impact on constraining and enabling factors. Who participates? Who doesn't? Why? Whose voices are heard? Who speaks for whom? (Both formal and informal organizations are considered here, including mainstream traditional organizations such as trade unions, political parties, business organizations and various kinds of youth organization).
• The different types of youth activism and forms of youth mobilization that are influenced by their different social backgrounds. (Attention will be given to the different experiences of youth who live in urban versus rural environments, educated versus uneducated youth, young women versus young men. How are these different backgrounds related to the different experiences of young women and men?)
• The transformative role of organized youth, in different areas, such as their role in combating sexual violence and harassment and in influencing employment policies, for instance.

One of the main challenges – as perhaps in other WPs – is to stipulate two sometimes hardly compatible objectives: *contextualization* and *generalization*. This paper attempts to provide a framework to achieve both. We aim to establish analytical tools taking into consideration intersectionality, which will enable country experts to account for the empirical complexities and specifications of their respective empirical cases. At the same time, our aim is to facilitate a more systematic comparison among the cases studied in this project by providing a framework for structured categorization.

Organizational Factors of Youth Exclusion/Inclusion

1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

With reference to the tasks formulated in the Power2Youth general framework for the meso-level of analysis, research in WP3 will attempt to answer to the following questions considering as a time frame the period from 2000 onwards, and considering the intersectional analysis whereby the participation of young women and men be will be analysed on the basis of intersecting gender differences, class differences, race and ethnicity differences and rural versus urban backgrounds.

Structural Context

What is the structural context in which youth movements and organizations act? What are the factors favouring or constraining youth mobilization and youth participation in organizations?
- What is the role of class, gender, religious and sexual orientation in preventing or helping youth in social, economic and political participation? To what extent do nepotism and patrimonialism lead to the exclusion/inclusion of young men and women from/in mainstream organizations?
- How is youth activism portrayed in the general discourse of the countries concerned? Is it positive (e.g., the importance of youth dynamism) or negative (e.g., youth as extremists) or both, depending on the political circumstances? Do perceptions change depending on the gender of activists?
- Did government policies hinder or favour the dissemination of the discourse of youth organizations and movements to the rest of society? Do gender, religion, class and sexual orientation of certain organizations or movements influence these government policies?

Here we will rely heavily on secondary literature review for each of the countries concerned and also on the results provided by research through WP2.

Conceptualizing Youth Exclusion

How do youth organizations and movements conceptualize youth exclusion? How is exclusion defined in terms of gender, class and rural/urban backgrounds of young men and women?
- How do they perceive, frame and elaborate the status of being young and the "problem of youth" or "youth exclusion"?
- Are there differences among youth movements in the way they frame "youth exclusion"?
- How do youth frame their collective grievances?
- What is the difference in the discourse between youth who believe in themselves as agents for "revolutionary" change in youth informal movements versus the discourse of youth who perceive themselves as agents for "evolutionary" change in mainstream organizations?
- When is it that some organizations or movements become "oppositional"? How do class, gender and rural/urban location affect the possibility of a youth movement being or becoming more radical and oppositional?

Transformative Impact

What transformative impact do organized youth have in society?
- Are youth movements and organizations able to influence the mainstream political discourse?

- Is "youth exclusion" as perceived by youth movements and organizations framed in the same manner as in the government's discourse? Or do youth challenge these mainstream ideas and try to reinvent youth grievances? If so, which organized youth do so: youth movements, youth who are part of human rights NGOs or politicized youth in political parties?
- Are organized youth able to influence policy making?
- What is the extent to which different youth organizations have been able to use social networking sites as venues for various types of participation in the public and political spheres? Have they been able to disseminate their grievances beyond social networking?
- How far can youth penetrate the mainstream organizations that influence politics, like political parties, business associations, labour movements and NGOs? How far can youth go beyond these organizations and develop their own initiatives in the form of youth movements and student protest movements to actively change politics beyond the mainstream?
- How do youth-led organizations influence other adult-led organizations like trade unions and political parties in programmes, in mobilization strategies, etc. and vice-versa?
- How do international youth movements affect/influence youth movements in the SEM countries and vice-versa?
- All the previous questions need to incorporate basic ideas on intersectionality: How do class, gender, colour, sexual orientation and different axes of belonging or positioning concur in creating the conditions for oppression but also for mobilization? Each of these research questions should be opened to understand the role and intersection of the meaningful factors in each context (in some contexts it may be religion or sect along with class and gender, for example, while in others it may have more to do with rural/urban origin, gender, religious affiliations and class) in promoting youth organizations, their views, their politics , their concerns and their practices.

To better understand the influence of youth in their respective polities, we shall aim to link these questions with the four domains of public action selected by Power2Youth macro-level of analysis (WP2), i.e., employment, family, migration and spatial planning policies:

- How far has youth collective agency been able to influence "youth" employment policies in their respective countries, or the way in which the problem of youth unemployment has been formulated?
- To what degree has youth collective agency had an impact on family policies, both on the categories of public action and on issues pertaining to social protection, gender policies, pension schemes, inheritance and personal status laws? How far has youth collective agency challenged the prescribed roles in the family and society at large?
- To what degree has youth collective agency been able to influence migration policies? Is migration perceived a problem or a solution to youth unemployment?
- Have public policies concerning spatial planning been altered as a result of youth collective agency? Was there a re-appropriation of public sphere by youth movements?

Patterns of Variation

Is it possible to identify patterns of variation among youth groups and activities across countries and changes of such patterns over time in a singular country (e.g., pre- and post-2011 uprisings)?

- How big is the share of informal groups (e.g., social media networks) in comparison to formal organizations, and can we witness changes over time?
- Have political-actor groups increased with revolutionary activism in the countries in which there was a major uprising?
- Are most groups inclusive in that they cover various issue areas, or do most groups specialize in politics, economics or social activism?

2. YOUTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE

We shall proceed with the general definitions that were adopted in the Power2Youth overall concept paper. The main task of WP3 is to understand the role of youth collective agency in radical and/or incremental social change or, in other words, "what is the nature of youth as both an ideological symbol and political actor?" (Sukarieh and Tannock 2014:81) In this sense, this section will provide a brief literature review on the role of youth organizations and movements as agents for change in their respective societies.

In trying to influence and change their societies, youth resort to activism. Activism is a process in which people participate with different degrees of continuity in social movements, or protest activities. Many scholars, like M. Kent Jennings (1987), believe that activism is most present among youth. Youth are believed to have more radical beliefs and are more likely to engage in movements that challenge the existing status quo. Activists normally mobilize around social, economic and political grievances, often through joining a movement or a group, but also through non-conventional means like using cyber activism, or video activism, as did activists emerging in Syria in 2011 who posted videos on YouTube to call for attention to their cause (Khatib and Lust 2014).

Throughout the past decade, different movements have sprung up in the SEM region. Some of these have sought only political rights, others only economic, while still others have amalgamated both political and economic rights in their demands (Ottaway and Hamzawy 2011, Fawzy 2010). For instance, in 2007, Morocco witnessed 954 episodes of contention, where young people took to the streets to voice their discontent with unemployment, high standards of living and poor labour conditions (Ottaway and Hamzawy 2011:4). In Egypt, there have also been different episodes of contention, in which professionals have decided to strike beyond the formal structure of unions. Workers founded their own independent unions, such as the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (Beinin 2012). Another new form of protest has been established through social networking sites and blogging – a growing phenomenon in the SEM countries. "Blogging is related to some extent to the youth movement as bloggers tend to be young and youth movements use blogs as a form of communication. Bloggers are effective in disseminating information, spreading the word when protests are being planned and circulating audio-visual materials documenting the excess of governments and their security services" (Ottaway and Hamzawy 2011:12).

Talking about youth activism, Asef Bayat contends that: "When young persons develop a particular consciousness about themselves as youth and begin to defend or extend their youthfulness in a collective fashion, a youth movement can be said to have developed. […] The power of Muslim youth movements in the Middle East lays precisely in the ability of their

atomized agents to challenge the political and moral authorities by the persistence of their merely alternative presence. Even though youth movements are, by definition, concerned with the claims of youthfulness, nevertheless they can and do act as a harbinger of social change and democratic transformation under those doctrinal regimes with legitimizing ideologies that are too narrow to accommodate youthful claims." (Bayat 2010:31-2)

From Iran in 2009 to the Arab uprisings in 2010/2011, the youthfulness of the protests in the SEM was noticeable (Rivetti and Cavatorta 2014). Youth movements arise when the state prevents them from living and acting on their own youthfulness (Bayat 2010). Linda Herrera (2012) asserts that young people in the SEM have developed awareness along their common social and political grievances and have formed a youth consciousness through the help of mobile and digital communication tools. She points out that the concepts of "Facebook and Twitter Revolutions" were developed in the Western media through referring to Egypt in 2008, after two young people used Facebook as a mobilizational tool for demonstrations in solidarity with textile workers in al Mahala al Kubra, an industrial city in Egypt, which later developed into the controversial April 6 Movement.

Beyond the enthusiasm raised by the recent wave of protest, largely perceived to be youth-led, Sukarieh and Tannock (2014) contend that the idea of youth being a subject for change is not new. This age cohort has been the subject of analysis in the West for centuries. However, in-depth analyses on the role of youth and student movements in perpetuating social, economic and political change has only gained ground since the mid-twentieth century, especially with the rising tide of youth activism in the US during the mid-1960s. The role of youth organizations, especially youth movements, in altering state–society relations has been the core of much research in the past decade. Not only have researchers been interested in the role of youth as agents for social change, but policy makers have also been highly concerned with the role of youth as both a "problem" and as "positive agents" for change. However, to understand the importance of youth in their respective polities, and their influence on global society in general, it is important to analyse the context in which these youths live. "This is not just because of the wide range of social and political actors involved in shaping the meaning and salience of youth, but also because of the extended scope of referents the concept of youth implicates. Youth functions invariably as a relational concept, one that is defined and given meaning, through its contrastive relationships with the concepts of both childhood and adulthood" (Sukarieh and Tannock 2014:4).

Youth are therefore able to influence, but also to be influenced by, the general context in which they live. Informal institutions in SEM societies influence youth and youth organizations. These informal institutions range from bureaucratic and legislative norms to clientalism and patrimonialism (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). These informal institutions are important in shaping social and political behaviour and political outcomes. There is an array of informal institutions, from personal networks to clientalism, corruption and traditional culture.

In the SEM context, clientalism is an important concept, which identifies relationships between different economic, social and political actors. It is also largely associated with youth exclusion from the economic, social and political spheres. It is associated with the particularistic use of public resources and with the electoral arena in the political realm. It entails that votes and support for a political contestant are exchanged for jobs or other benefits. This can become

a useful strategy for winning elections and for building political support, through selectively releasing public funds for supporters. It is therefore a strategy of partial political mobilization that differs from more universal patterns, such as programmatic appeals or mobilization motivated by a certain political party's achievements (Roniger 2004). In the SEM context, formal rules are not applied arbitrarily. Rather, they are applied in a way that ensures and promotes the interests of the already existing social alliances, or of the political and private economic elites. According to Oliver Schlumberger (2008:634), these are precisely the social groups that organize and develop the legal and institutional frameworks of Arab countries. Moreover, the economic system in SEM countries is characterized by informality, the absence of generally applicable rule of law and strong political control over the economy through informal modes of interaction between the regimes and the business elites. A symbiotic relationship develops between political rulers and socially dominant businessmen through networks of patronage. In this system, business elites develop their own clientele networks by embedding the system of informality and weakening the rule of law (Schlumberger 2008, Luciani 2007). These practices precipitate an infringement on the economic and political inclusion of the middle class who do not have access to this cycle of informalities. As Robert Springborg (2011) asserts, these countries developed a crony capitalist system that was unable, and in which political decision-makers were unwilling, to include the quickly eroding middle class and the high number of socially and economically excluded youth.

Research in the field has shown the various aspects of clientalism and nepotism which inhibit young people's capability of participating in the different spheres of life (Henry and Springborg 2010, Schlumberger 2008, Soliman 2011, Jamal 2007, Diwan 2013). These informal barriers to inclusion have had a profound impact on the way in which young people have articulated their grievances during the past decade. Many protest movements have emerged as a consequence. Some of those were only concerned with economic issues and grievances, like many organizations representing the interests of workers and miners in Tunisia's Gafsa and elsewhere. The wave of labour protests that emerged in Egypt in 2008 in the industrial city of al-Mahalla al-Kobra is another example. On the other hand, some movements were more political in nature, like the Kifaya movement in Egypt, from which various youth movements emerged, like the Youth for Change Movement. Other movements have amalgamated both political and economic concerns together in their framing process, which ultimately led to the famous slogan "bread, freedom, social equity," during the first weeks of the Arab uprisings in December 2010 and January 2011. An important aspect for the research is to understand the extent to which patronage and clientalism prevent some youth more than others, depending on their gender, sexual orientation, rural/urban background and ethnicity.

Another important aspect to be considered by the research is that the types of youth activism and forms of youth mobilization are influenced by their different social backgrounds. For instance, urban and educated youth have different needs than those from rural, uneducated backgrounds. Youth belonging to confessional minorities might feel excluded by Islam-based forms of mobilization. Furthermore, activism by young women may encounter gender-specific constraints that limit their ability to influence political, economic and social change. At the same time, however, young women have increasingly learned to circumvent such gender constraints and are becoming more active in political and civic participation (Khoury and Shehata 2011, Paciello and Pepicelli 2012).

Organizational Factors of Youth Exclusion/Inclusion

According to Asef Bayat, activism in general and youth activism in particular does not necessarily need to be in opposition to the political regime, but may take different forms. For instance, it may take the form of community activism, where grassroots groups work together for collective action. "People are for the most part, facing the same challenges of day-to-day living: finding secure housing, being able to pay the rent, acquiring urban amenities, and having adequate schools, clinics, cultural centres and the like" (Bayat 2000:iii).

Youth may also be active in formal organizations, like political parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and religious movements. Therefore, the purpose of WP3 is *not only* to analyse movements which are political and "revolutionary" and often informal in character, but also those movements that seek to advance socio-economic reform and youth well-being from within the current political systems. Our conceptual point of departure here is that political participation may occur not only as a form of contentious politics toward authoritarian regimes, it may as well include collective action within the confines, and even in support, of those very regimes (Albrecht 2008). In early twentieth-century Europe, youth were also linked and affiliated with conservative organizations. Youth who belonged to different organizational structures like churches, political parties or school unions were also closely linked to the dominant political forces in their respective societies. These youths have had an important impact on persistent social and political problems associated with nationalism and imperialism within their respective countries (Sukarieh and Tannock 2014).

This part of the research might not necessarily look towards organizations created by youth themselves; the entities in question may well be formal organizational structures which contain youth branches. The importance of this lies in the fact that some youth prefer to advance "evolutionary" change rather than "revolutionary" change. This means that they prefer to advance their causes through the formal organizational structures within their respective polities. NGOs are important organizations for analysis, for the purposes of WP3. These are distinguishable from other forms of collective action and activism. Where collective actors or movements might rise and fall instantaneously, NGOS are more "formal" institutions, with permanent organizational structures, with members, offices and financial income (White 1933). Youth who are part of the main established NGOs are more welcomed in the political sphere and are a part of the minority "included" youth.

The problem with such youth, however, is that they form a backbone of the authoritarian structures in society, through becoming tied to the state. For them, being tied to the state with its corruption and authoritarian structure would advance their own social, economic and political gains (Jamal 2007, Gengler et al. 2013). For example, Gengler et al. (2013) found that youth in Qatar, who are part of civil society organizations and have high social capital, are directly linked to the Qatari ruling elite. On the other hand, youth who belong to the opposition do not participate in any form of open protest, either civically or politically. They only voice their opinions via social networking. It is therefore no surprise that Arab governments, especially those in the middle and lower ranked economies, like Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon, have "consistently promoted civil society organizations that promote social services to fill the gaps the government is not able to fill in terms of education, health care, and services. On the other hand, civil society organizations that promote human rights or entertain any political discourse have remained rather weak [...] because they face severe government interventions and grave hostility" (Sika 2013:54). Arab regimes have been

intervening in trade and labour unions to increase government domination in society. Funding sources for NGOs are highly restricted and must be first approved by their governments. Ministries of the interior have the right to investigate civil society organizations' staff; and in Gaza, civil society organizations have to submit the personal biographies of their founding members to the Ministry of the Interior (Hawthorne 2004).

3. YOUTH MOVEMENTS AND BEYOND

WP3 analysis will be based on three distinctive typologies of organizations: organizations that have government relations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and unconventional organizations. Even though these organizations are not purely "youth-led" organizations, we believe that they are worthy of analysis for the purposes of WP3. We are also intrigued by variation in the scope of youth organization, in that we aim to find out which of them are purely youth-led, and which others, that may well not consist of youth organizationally, are concerned with youth issues. For example, after the 2011 Egyptian uprising, more than 90 political parties have been established. For the purposes of this WP, we want to know how many of these political parties have been created *by* youth and *for* youth. And how many of these political parties contain youth branches? This will provide us with a general overview of the importance of youth in the political sphere. Are youth addressed only for "window dressing," or are they contributing to real transformative change on both social and institutional levels? The same idea applies to all other organizations.

Organizations with Government Relations and Political Parties

- These refer to organizations which are essentially established by the government, like youth clubs for example.
- A distinction between "ruling" political parties and opposition parties should be upheld in our analysis.

There are many benefits of political parties and their functions in the SEM. According to Jason Brownlee (2007), political parties represent an important legitimating process for regimes in general and for authoritarian regimes in particular. They form the backbone of political stability in most authoritarian countries. Accordingly parties function as the support for the authoritarian leader, while at the same time, they sideline opposition forces in different areas (Albrecht 2013). Within the realm of the ruling political party, dominant forces and elites in society cooperate to maintain their power and status quo. The ruling parties are able to regulate the differences in power struggles and competition between different elites. Successful loyal elites are able to become part of the cabinet, the military or the police. These parties assure elite contestants that they always have an opportunity in the future to advance their political ambitions (Brownlee 2007). The extent to which political parties are able to incorporate youth into their ranks is essential in bridging the gap between the public and the political spheres. In hybrid regimes like Turkey, the importance of political parties is clear. Political parties are important institutional guarantees for government accountability, since they threaten the government with potential loss of office. If the possibility of losing office is not taken seriously, then governments can get away with corruption. The problem in Turkey today lies in the fact that opposition parties are not posing any major threat to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Yildirim 2014).

Non-Governmental Organizations

a. Unions, student unions, business associations and labour unions. A distinction should be made between independent unions and regime-based unions.

b. Human rights organizations.

c. Developmental organizations (these should include NGOs which are concerned with the environment and with alleviating poverty).

d. Religious organizations and movements

- These include (but are not restricted to) the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafi movement in Egypt and Lebanon, the *al-'Adl wa-l-Ihssan* movement in Morocco, Hamas in the Palestinian Territories, the Gülen movement in Turkey and Hizbullah in Lebanon. Though the line between these movements and politics is very thin, we suggest distinguishing between their social and political outlook, i.e., organizational factors which help in the developmental processes and how these affect their political constituencies.

- The importance of these religious-based organizations is clear for the purposes of WP3. These organizations/movements have a high mobilizational capacity in society and are also adept at mobilizing youth to their ranks, which became empirically manifest in the first elections after the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings. In Turkey, Islamist movements have also been influential in introducing youth into their ranks (Tuğal 2009).

NGOs in general, and labour and trade unions in particular, are believed to be an important and integral part of civil society organizations, and their role as agents for democratization in Latin America and Eastern Europe has been widely studied (O'Donnell et al. 1986). Nevertheless, in the case of the SEM, the majority of unions have institutionalized and legitimated authoritarianism (Jamal 2007, Rahman 2002). During the 2000s decade some independent unions emerged, and after 2011 we have seen an upsurge in independent unions in some countries (Beinin 2012). Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon have been among those countries in which independent unions have emerged. In Lebanon, it is important to note that public sector workers have for the first time in decades participated in union protest (Massoud 2013). NGOs can be for the most part categorized as either pro-development organizations which are promoted by governments to assist them in their developmental processes; or human rights organizations which have caused much concern amongst government officials, for their regular stance against human rights atrocities (Carapico 2012, Kienle 2011).

Unconventional Organizations

- These include but are not restricted to: April 6 Movement, Youth for Change in Egypt; February 20 Movement in Morocco; Taksim Solidarity Movement in Turkey; Democratic Left Movement in Lebanon. Choir groups like Eskenderella, for instance, are also part of this organizational type. Individual activists like artists and graffiti artists also fall in this category.

- Distinction between movements that were established prior to 2011 and after 2011 should be emphasized.

As argued before, these movements emerged during the 2000s. They consist mainly of youth and have had an immense impact on mobilizing other youth to their ranks (Khatib and Lust 2014). They have also been instrumental in mobilizing people to the streets on the eve of the ousting of some long-standing Arab dictators, such as Egypt's Mubarak and Tunisia's

Bin Ali (Mason 2012). Nevertheless, we need to also have an overview of movements that emerged after 2011, in order to understand the effect of the Arab uprisings on developing opportunities and threats for movements. Moreover, the demands and aspirations of these new movements should be compared to those of the older movements to have a broader scope of the 2011-effect on youth movements.

4. METHODOLOGY

In an attempt to answer the main research questions outlined above, WP3 meso-level research will proceed in three steps:

1) Background analysis mainly based on secondary literature on the structural context in which youth movements and organizations act and on the factors that favour or constrain youth mobilization and youth participation in organizations for each of the country case studies.

2) Mapping exercise on *youth-led organizations* (YLO) and on organizations that have youth branches that we call *youth-relevant organizations* (YRO) (see below).
- The mapping process is for the online database. This is to be composed of two parts: the first part is a narrative about existing knowledge on the number of YLO and YRO in each concerned country. The second part is composed of a table including the three typologies on § 4, listing the organizations that each research team is going to conduct its fieldwork with. Thus, it will itemize each NGO, unconventional organization and government-related organization that each team will conduct the interviews and the focus groups with.
- The mapping exercise will also help identify patterns of variation among groups and activities across countries and over time within countries (e.g., pre- and post-2011).

3) Empirical research through focus groups and semi-structured interviews with young activists and young people who are part of a selection of the most relevant YLO and YRO for each country considered. Empirical research will be mainly focused on investigating: (a) how YLO and YRO frame and elaborate the status of being young and the "problem of youth" and (b) the transformative role of organized youth in society (see below). All of the questions for the focus groups and the interviews are based on the questions posed on § 2 in this Concept Paper.

Empirical Research through Focus Groups and Semi-structured Interviews

The fieldwork for WP3 is based on both focus groups and semi-structured interviews.

Interviews
- For intersectionality purposes, researchers will bear the following in mind. Doing qualitative interviews: Who interviews whom, when, where? Inasmuch as the production of knowledge is itself a power-laden exercise (i.e., who will read the analysis? For what purpose? Who will benefit/will be disadvantaged by this disclosure of information?), it is important to take into account power relations between researcher and interviewees:
- Who interviews whom? We need to take into account power relations between researcher and interviewees and give thought to possible impacts on interview dynamics. Should

a woman interview a woman? A man a man? What generational difference between researcher and interviewee will enable openness (i.e., on discussions on sexuality)? And what about class differences as manifested, for instance, in language?[2]

- A minimum of 30 interviews should be conducted in each country. We should include interview partners from both rank and file and directorial positions.

Focus groups

- For intersectionality, researchers should keep in mind the same issues as above. Moreover: need to consider power relations among participants themselves (e.g., are there kinship relations? Fear of gossiping? Racism? etc.). When would a mixed focus group be most suitable, when can't it be planned for? (issues of privacy, fear of gossiping, gender relations of power, etc.). Whose permission is needed to participate? Can young women and men have equal access? How to enable their participation in case they face difficulties in attending different workshops or focus groups?[3]

- A total of 35-45 individuals should be part of focus groups. Thus, we can either have 3-4 focus groups each with 10-15 participants, or more focus groups with 3-4 participants. This is dependent on the context and circumstances of each research team.

- If research teams have the capacity and the will to do participant observations, then these should be conducted as well.

Selection of Youth

We suggest seven criteria for the selection process of youth within their respective organizations that will help to generate a representative sample among the constituency in which we are interested.

1. **Age**: social and legal age.
2. **Civic engagement**: individuals who are actively engaged in cultural, social, economic or voluntary organizations (i.e., NGOs, choir groups, labour unions).
3. **Political engagement**: targets individuals who are politically engaged in political parties, or youth movements, protest movements or student movements.
4. **Educational background**: distinguishes between individuals who are part of an organizational structure and have i) no formal education, ii) primary education, iii) secondary education or iv) university education. Among university graduates, we suggest to distinguish further between degree holders from a national university or a foreign university.
5. **Social stratification**: distinguishes among interviewees according to their social and class background. The main criterion here is the professional occupation and monthly earnings of young adults or of the parents.
6. **Gender** should be "mainstreamed" into the other criteria to ensure for example that women are interviewed among members of organizations surveyed, etc., and not only "as women." Gender is not investigated solely by looking at women's movements. "Sex" is male and female bodies; "gender" is the social and cultural construction of what it means to be a man or a woman, as a social structure and organizing principle. An intersectional approach intersects male/female with other variables (e.g., class, religion, race and ethnicity, urban/rural, disability, sexuality, etc.).
7. **Role within the organization**.

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[2] Contribution of the SOAS research team in the Power2Youth project.
[3] Ibid.

Areas for Later Addition to the Database

Apart from categorization efforts, empirical research – both desk-based, focus groups and interviews – will uncover additional factual information about selected groups and organizations, which we can add to the online database after the empirical work is finished for WP3. We identify ten specific areas, which will later be added to the database (July 2015, after submission of the focus groups' minutes):

1. Size of movements and changes in size over time (SIZE). Here the number of members who disengage from the movements will also be taken into consideration
2. Social and sectarian composition of membership (SECT)
3. Female population among membership (GENDER)
4. Organizational structure and hierarchy; degree of clientalism; generational struggles within organizations; internal decision-making processes (ORG)
5. Programmes and ideological background (IDEA)
6. Funding and economic resources (FUND)
7. Activities and strategies (ACT)
8. Geographical outreach and spatial setting (urban vs. rural) (GEO)
9. Inter-group connectivity (cooperation with similar groups, individuals and movements) (CONNECT)
10. International cooperation (INTER)

5. OUTLINE FOR COUNTRY REPORTS

For more coherence between the research in the different country case studies, we suggest the following report outline:

1. Introduction/background
- Structural context in which youth organizations act
  We should also look at:
  - Status of gender discrimination/equality in state law (Constitution, Civil and Penal Codes, Family Laws, etc.);
  - The existence of sexual and reproductive health policies influencing women's sexuality (Ministry of Public Health? Ministry of Social Affairs? Ministry of Women's Affairs?);
  - The existence of gender-specific employment and entrepreneurial programs (Ministry of Economy and Infrastructure? Development agencies[4]).
- Societal/political factors favouring or constraining young women and young men's mobilization and youth participation in organizations.
- Government policies to advance and/or constrain young women and young men's mobilization/youth-organized collective agency.
- The main discourse on youth (e.g., are young women and young men being exposed as a problem or as agents for change?).
- What are the prospects for youth to advance change from below?

2. Critical discussion/analysis of quantitative and qualitative data on organizations available in each country (all organizations but with a special focus on YLO/YRO).

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[4] Contribution of the SOAS research team in the Power2Youth project.

Organizational Factors of Youth Exclusion/Inclusion

3. How do youth organizations and movements conceptualize young women and young men's exclusion?
- How do they perceive, frame and elaborate the status of being young?
- Are there differences among YLO and YRO in the way they frame "youth exclusion"?
- Identify the difference between youth who seek "revolutionary" change through protest movements, versus youth who seek "evolutionary" change through mainstream organizational channels.

4. The transformative impact of organized youth in society:
- Are young women and young men collectively contributing to the (re-)shaping of the public debate on youth? If yes, in what ways? Is "youth exclusion" as perceived by youth movements and organizations framed in the same manner as in the government's discourse? Or do youth challenge these mainstream ideas and try to reinvent youth grievances? If so, which organized youth do so: youth movements, youth who are parts of human rights NGOs or politicized youth in political parties?
- Are youth organizations able to influence/change the mainstream political discourse of the government institutions in various domains? How? Which domains?
- How far can young women and young men penetrate/influence adult-led organizations, like political parties, business associations, labour movements and NGOs?
- How far can young women and young men go beyond mainstream organizations and develop their own initiatives in the form of youth movements and student protest movements? To what effect?
- How do international youth movements affect/influence youth movements in the SEM countries and vice-versa?

More specific on the four domains of public action selected by the macro-level research (WP2):
- How far has youth collective agency been able to influence "youth" employment policies in their respective countries?
- To what degree has youth collective agency had an impact on family policies, both in the category of public action and on issues pertaining to social protection, gender policies, pension schemes inheritance and personal status laws?
- To what degree has youth collective agency been able to influence migration policies? Is migration perceived as a problem or a solution to youth unemployment?
- Have public policies concerning spatial planning been altered as a result of youth collective agency?

5. Patterns of variation over time within countries
- How did youth organizations and movements influence the public sphere in the SEM prior to 2011 and after 2011?
- Are youth organizations and movements more or less empowered?
- What are the different government policies directed at youth in the post-2011 uprisings?
- Critical discussion
- What lies ahead for organized youth and the prospects for youth-led change in society from below?

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POWER2YOUTH is a research project aimed at offering a critical understanding of youth in the South East Mediterranean (SEM) region through a comprehensive interdisciplinary, multi-level and gender sensitive approach. By combining the economic, political and socio-cultural spheres and a macro (policy/institutional), meso (organizational) and micro (individual) level analysis, POWER2YOUTH explores the root causes and complex dynamics of the processes of youth exclusion and inclusion in the labour market and civic/political life, while investigating the potentially transformative effect of youth collective and individual agency. The project has a cross-national comparative design with the case studies of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territories and Turkey. POWER2YOUTH's participants are 12 research and academic institutions based in the EU member states, Norway, Switzerland and South East Mediterranean (SEM) countries. The project is mainly funded under the European Union's 7th Framework Programme.