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A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE OF LIBYA

Ronald Bruce St John

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Istituto Affari Internazionali

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The German Marshall Fund of the United States
1744 R Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
T 1 202 683 2650
F 1 202 265 1662
E info@gmfus.org

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Cover photo: Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and first lady Michelle Obama present the 2012 International Women of Courage Award to Hana El Hebshi of Libya, on the 101st Anniversary of International Women's Day, Thursday, March 8, 2012, at the State Department in Washington. El Hebshi, an architect, documented the violence of the Libyan revolution.

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Ronald Bruce St John¹

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¹ Dr. Ronald Bruce St John is the author of several books on Libya, including *Libya: Continuity and Change* (2011) and *Libya: From Colony to Revolution* (2012).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The February 17 Revolution in Libya has revealed policy continuities, contradictions, and constraints that present neighboring states and the transatlantic partners with challenges and opportunities. Elections for a General National Congress, which will name a new interim government, are scheduled for June 2012. The new government will rule until a constitution is approved and general elections are held in mid-2013. In the interim, the current government faces a number of challenges, including a lack of transparency, dialogue, and legitimacy. Its failure to address key issues, like integrating armed militias into a unified police and military force and articulating a framework for national reconciliation, has eroded public confidence. The rights of women and ethnic minorities are at risk, and the failure to establish a credible justice system raises questions about the government's commitment to human rights and the rule of law.

With Libya unable to secure its borders anytime soon, concerns with border security explain in part policies toward Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Algeria, and Tunisia. Mediterranean states worry about Libya's ability to secure its coastal waters, which are potential gateways to Europe for arms traffickers, terrorists, and illegal migrants. Unrest in the Sahel is fuelled by the return of heavily armed veterans of Gaddafi's army, racist attacks against black Africans in Libya, and a refugee crisis. In northern Mali, a Tuareg independence movement has surfaced, and with thousands of refugees crossing into neighboring Niger, there is concern that the insurrection in Mali could spread to the Tuareg community in Niger. Algeria is also concerned with Mali's inability to secure its northern territories, which provide bases for Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In sub-Saharan Africa, the disruption of regional alliances and the weakening of governments long supported by the Gaddafi regime are harbingers of a policy shift away from a

region in which Gaddafi lavished business projects and other forms of largess to buy influence. Early signs are that the new Libya will turn toward North Africa and the Middle East as well as to Europe to the detriment of sub-Saharan Africa.

Issue areas of transatlantic complementarity and cooperation expected to continue in post-Gaddafi Libya include energy supply, illegal migration, investment and trade, and security concerns, including terrorism. Europe will remain the principal market for Libyan hydrocarbons and is well placed to take advantage of commercial opportunities in Libya. U.S. companies will remain significant upstream players in the hydrocarbon industry, but the main concern of the United States downstream will be to avoid delivery disruptions to Europe that would have an impact on U.S. supplies elsewhere. Libya will review investments made outside the country during Gaddafi's rule; however, absent evidence of malfeasance, it can be expected to retain those in transatlantic states that make good business sense. Immigration is a likely area of policy change that will be welcomed in Europe, as post-Gaddafi Libya will be more cooperative in restraining illegal migration. Increased instability in the Sahel is an area of concern that wider transatlantic cooperation could best address, building on U.S. initiatives in Africa to develop a joint strategy aimed at state consolidation, and suppression of illegal trafficking and terrorism. Libya also presents the transatlantic partners with an opportunity to modify a long-held strategy that generally favored stability over democracy and human rights in the Arab world. Libya is a promising candidate for democratization, but like its neighbors, it will almost certainly elect a moderate Islamic government, offering the transatlantic partners a fresh opportunity to promote democracy and human rights if they can throw off old paradigms and embrace change.

FOREWORD

The February 17 Revolution in Libya has revealed an intriguing mix of policy continuities, contradictions, and constraints that present neighboring states and the transatlantic partners with new challenges and fresh opportunities. The Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage, released on August 3, 2011, outlines a workable process leading to elections for a General National Congress (GNC) in June 2012. In the meantime, the interim government faces a number of divisive issues, including a lack of transparency, dialogue, legitimacy, and public confidence. Border security is a major problem,

with the return of heavily armed veterans of the Libyan army, racial bias against black Africans in Libya, and a refugee crisis fuelling unrest in the Sahara and Sahel. Areas of transatlantic complementarity and cooperation that will continue in post-Gaddafi Libya include energy supply, illegal migration, investment and trade, and security concerns, including terrorism. Increased instability in the Sahel is an area of immediate concern, offering an opportunity for wider transatlantic cooperation. Libya also presents the transatlantic partners with a new arena to promote democracy and human rights in the region.

1 ARAB AWAKENING

In mid-January 2011, Libyan demonstrators clashed with police in al-Bayda, east of Benghazi, demanding a more dignified way of life, including decent housing. During the first week of February, Jamal al-Hajji, a prominent Libyan political activist, was detained by the authorities in connection with human rights activities. Around the same time, WikiLeaks posted diplomatic cables from the U.S. embassy in Tripoli documenting the rivalry, greed, and corruption that had long been suspected of the Gaddafi family. Following the arrest of Fethi Tarbel, a convener of a group seeking to address outstanding issues including the government slaughter in June 1996 of several hundred prisoners at Abu Salim prison, new riots broke out in Benghazi. As the thrust of the protests shifted from complaints about a lack of housing, social services, and jobs to a call for regime change, the demonstrators proclaimed February 17, the fifth anniversary of anti-regime riots in Benghazi sparked by cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, a day of rage.¹ The government responded to the February 17, 2011 protests with force, killing as many as 50 demonstrators in Benghazi alone. Over the next few weeks, the Gaddafi regime resorted to the harshest forms of repression, including repeated attacks on innocent civilians, to maintain its power. In response, the UN Security Council imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians from regime forces.²

When the February 17 Revolution is compared to the popular uprisings that have taken place recently in other Arab states, notably Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, there are many similarities

in the daily challenges facing the citizens of all of these countries. For years, all of them have suffered from high unemployment and even higher underemployment, poor and limited housing, mounting food prices, and large-scale graft and corruption. At the same time, their citizens gained increased access through the internet to new forms of internal and external communication, attaining proficiency in social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter.

There are similarities between Libya and the other states constituting what began as the Arab Spring and was gradually transformed into a wider Arab Awakening, but there are also differences. Libya has enormous hydrocarbon reserves, the largest known oil reserves and the second largest gas reserves in Africa, and thus is a relatively wealthy state compared to Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. In contrast to states like Egypt where political parties, trade unions, and other civil bodies existed throughout most of the Mubarak era, Libya at the outset of the revolution was a state with no operative civil society because the Gaddafi regime systematically destroyed civil organizations. Lacking these organizations and institutions, Libya stands alone in this regard as all democratic processes, procedures, and bodies must be created from scratch. Libya enjoys a homogenous Muslim society with almost 100 percent of the population Sunni Muslim in contrast to the religious divisions found in Egypt (Coptic Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Muslim minorities) and Syria (Alawite, Shiite, and Sunni Muslims). In part due to this homogeneity, fundamental Islamist movements and radical organizations like Al-Qaeda have found limited support in Libya, unlike Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists), Tunisia (Ennahda, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), and Yemen (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). The Libyan people are religious in nature and outlook and will very likely support an Islamic state; however, the vast majority of them have never shown any real

¹ On February 17, 2006, ten people were killed and several more injured after a crowd of some 1,000 demonstrators gathered outside the Italian consulate in Benghazi to display their anger at a minister in the Italian government who had worn a t-shirt displaying cartoon drawings of the Prophet.

² Ronald Bruce St John, *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*, Oxford, Oneworld, 2012, pp. 282-85.

interest in radical Islam. Tribal identities in Libya remain strong as in Yemen but unlike Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia. Tribal rivalries were often evident during the fighting that led to the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, and they have contributed to the instability and conflict that has characterized the post-Gaddafi era. Finally, the protesters in Libya, once government forces began killing them, called for regime change as opposed to a liberalization of the existing political system as was more generally the case in Egypt and Tunisia although some protesters in these two countries also called for the overthrow of the regime.³

It is tempting to consider the Arab Awakening that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and quickly spread to other Arab states as a single movement; however, the ambitions, demographics, and patterns of protest differed widely from state to

³ Ronald Bruce St John, "Libyan Myths and Realities," Royal Danish Defence College, August 2011, available at <http://forsvaret.dk/fak/eng/publications>.

state. In order to understand events in individual states and to comprehend the movement as a whole, it is important to recognize the variations among the different countries. The Arab revolts shared related economic grievances and a common call for personal dignity and responsive government, but their underlying social dynamics were the product of varied encounters with the outside world as well as decades of oppression under unique political regimes. Consequently, they faced widely different challenges moving forward. The transatlantic partners and other states engaged with Libya must study and understand these distinctions and distance themselves from the thought that the revolts in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen constituted a cohesive Arab revolt.⁴

⁴ George Joffé, "The Arab Spring in North Africa: origins and prospects," *Journal of North African Studies*, vol. 16, no. 4 (December 2011), pp. 507-32; Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011), pp. 2-7.

2 DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

To give the February 17 Revolution a political face, the rebel movement in late February 2011 announced the formation of a National Transitional Council (NTC), a body that derived its legitimacy from the local councils formed by the rebels. On March 29, 2011, the NTC issued its vision for a “modern, free, and united Libya” and called for the drafting of a new constitution to replace the constitutional proclamation issued in December 1969 by Gaddafi and the other members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage, released four months later, outlined a 13-month process leading to general elections and the formation of a new government.⁵ When the draft election law was released on February 8, 2012, the process outlined in the Draft Constitutional Charter was four months behind schedule, and given the political challenges ahead, the time line could slip further, meaning general elections likely will be held no sooner than June 2013. While some Libyan politicians have called for this process to be shortened, immature civil organizations and nascent political parties will benefit from the additional time to master the rudiments of political organization, campaigning, and advocacy. The transatlantic partners have an important role to play here, working through the UN and NGOs to provide the information and training needed to develop the parliamentary, legal, media, and related skills Libyans will need to run a democratic government.

The February 2012 draft election law calls for the election in June 2012 of a 200-member General National Congress to draft a new constitution. The allocation of seats for the GNC, announced on February 13, 2012, are Tripoli and the Nafusa

Mountains, 102 seats; Benghazi and the east, 60; the south, 29; and central Libya, including Sirte, 9. One month later, the election process was thrown into uncertainty when the 60-seat allocation to Benghazi and the east was rejected by a meeting of eastern tribal leaders, militia heads, and politicians who argued any allocation of seats based on population would perpetuate the discrimination of eastern Libya by the more populous western part of the country. The March 2012 conference of Cyrenaican leaders in Benghazi also called for the adoption of a federal system similar to what was in place in Libya from independence in 1951 to 1963, a call immediately rejected by Mustafa Mohamed Abdul Jalil, chairman of the NTC.⁶ If GNC elections are held in June 2012, the NTC will be dissolved during the first session of the GNC and the latter will appoint a prime minister who will form a new interim government to rule until a new constitution is approved and general elections are held in mid-2013.

Immediate Concerns

In the meantime, the NTC and the interim government, headed by Abdurrahim el-Keib, face a number of related challenges, including a lack of transparency, dialogue, confidence, and legitimacy. Meetings are held behind closed doors, no minutes are released, and new laws are not published on the NTC website. Moreover, both the NTC and interim government lack a framework for working with recognized experts and dialoguing with civil society organizations. The lack of confidence stems from their failure to address effectively key issues such as establishing security and articulating a framework for national reconciliation. Demobilizing the militias and incorporating their members into a national army, police force, or security force

⁵ National Transitional Council, *Founding Statement of the Interim Transitional National Council* (TNC), Benghazi, Libya, March 5, 2011, available at <http://www.ntclibya.org>; National Transitional Council, *Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage*, August 3, 2011, available at <http://unhrc.org/refworld/docid/4e80475b2.html>.

⁶ Larbi Sadiki, “Libya’s new ‘feds’: The call of Cyrenaica,” *Al Jazeera*, March 7, 2012, available at <http://aljazeera.com>; “Libyans Vehemently Reject Calls for Federalism, Consider It Conspiracy against Nation,” *Tripoli Post*, February 22, 2012, available at <http://www.tripolipost.com>.

remains a high priority; unfortunately, the NTC has been unable or unwilling to use all of the political and economic tools at its disposal to disband the militias. Paradoxically, it maintains that more forceful policies cannot be implemented until security is achieved, but its failure to exercise its authority against the militias perpetuates the insecurity and lawlessness that inhibits bold initiatives. The competing revolutionary narratives of the militias, many of whom profess exaggerated roles in the revolution and offer contrasting versions of legitimacy, are central to the current dilemma. Groups from Benghazi to Misurata to Zintan express widely different views as to how the revolution was carried out, how different groups contributed, and how their contributions should or should not be translated into future power-sharing arrangements. Their subjective views of the past translate into unrealistic expectations for the future, and inflated expectations can quickly turn into failed expectations, leading to apathy or radicalization. Steps the NTC could take to increase its legitimacy include demarcating the boundaries of its power by redefining its role as a legislative body with executive power in the hands of the interim government, expanding its membership to include democracy experts, and holding local council elections with each council then sending two representatives to a reconstituted NTC.⁷ The NTC and the interim government also need to do more to recognize and accommodate the demands of women, youth, and ethnic minorities. All three groups need to be made more aware of their rights, enjoy equal opportunities to influence governance, and have access to justice to redress violations of

⁷ Jason Pack and Barak Barfi, "In War's Wake: The Struggle for Post-Qadhafi Libya," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 118 (February 2012), pp. 3-9, available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org>; Susanne Tarkowski Tempelhof and Manal Omar, "Stakeholders of Libya's February 17 Revolution," United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 300 (January 2012), available at <http://www.usip.org>. The National Transitional Council held its first ever public session in Tripoli on April 22, 2012.

their rights. The youth movement, which played a central role in the revolution, is a key political constituency in a country in which one-third of the population is under 15 years of age. In the case of women, the establishment of a rule of law and the promotion of women's rights are joined as women make up more than 50 percent of the lawyers in Libya, and more than 65 percent of students in colleges of law are women. The Gaddafi regime, in its promotion of Arab nationalism, systematically discriminated against ethnic minorities, such as the Amazigh (Berber) and Tebu communities. An early recruit to the revolution, the Amazigh community has demanded from the outset official recognition in the new constitution of its culture and language. In February 2012, members of the Tebu ethnic group⁸ clashed with local gunman from the Zwai tribe in Al Kufra in southeastern Libya, highlighting the uncertain status of ethnic minorities and the porous nature of Libya's borders. In early April 2012, militias from Zwara, a mostly Amazigh town, clashed with militias from neighboring Jmail and Rigaldeen, Arab towns suspected of supporting the Gaddafi regime, again highlighting ethnic and tribal divides in Libya.⁹

Democracy and the Rule of Law

Libya also faces a formidable task in the creation of a modern legal system with the current structure, including law schools, the bar, and the judiciary requiring massive overhaul. For example, the criminal justice system suffers pervasive due process issues in part because Libya's criminal law has not been amended since 1953. Part of the problem is that the Libyan public as a whole

⁸ The Tebu are a dark-skinned Saharan race of uncertain origins, also found in Chad, Darfur, and Niger, who also suffered discrimination under the Gaddafi regime.

⁹ David D. Kirkpatrick, "Libyan Militias Turn to Politics, A Volatile Mix," *New York Times*, April 3, 2012; Glen Johnson, "In post-Kadafi Libya, Berber minority faces identity crisis," *Los Angeles Times*, March 22, 2012, available at <http://www.latimes.com>; "Mangoush: Kufra is Quiet, under Control," *Tripoli Post*, February 24, 2012, available at <http://www.tripolipost.com>.

does not understand basic due process rights, a situation not surprising after 42 years of Gaddafi rule. The failure to establish a credible justice system increases the importance of high profile cases like those of Gaddafi's second son, Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, held by revolutionaries in Zintan, and the former prime minister, Ali Baghdadi al-Mahmudi, detained in Tunisia, as does the failure to investigate the death of Gaddafi himself. If the NTC carries through with its threats to try Saif in a Libyan court, as opposed to the International Criminal Court (ICC), the resulting trial could well highlight the weaknesses of the Libyan judicial system. In addition, some 7,000 prisoners of war are still being held around the country, often in rudimentary facilities controlled by the militias. The January 2012 NTC decision to host the president of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, wanted by the ICC on genocide charges, raised additional concerns about the new Libya's commitment to human rights and the rule of law. Again, the transatlantic partners, working through the UN and NGOs have an important role to play in fostering the rule of law in Libya and supporting the rights of women, youth, and ethnic minorities in the process.

In the run up to the General National Congress elections and the drafting of a new constitution, one issue that merits additional thought and discussion is the movement in favor of a decentralized government. The United Kingdom of Libya emerged as a federal state in 1951, and for the next 12 years, four governments sitting in two national and three provincial capitals ruled Libya. Liaison between the federal and provincial governments and between the three provincial governments was poor, often resulting in conflicting policies and a duplication of services. With the deficiencies of a federal system increasingly obvious, it was abandoned in 1963 in favor of a unitary state. By that time, the number of people employed by the federal and provincial governments had

mushroomed to 12 percent of the labor force, the highest level in the world at the time.¹⁰

In the short term, a decentralized government, with the Economy and Oil Ministries in Benghazi, the Culture Ministry in Zintan, the Finance Ministry in Darna, and so forth, would be popular with powerful regional constituencies (and their militias); however, in the long run, it would likely result in bloated bureaucracies and dysfunctional governance. Under Gaddafi, advancement in Libya was too often based on who you knew as opposed to what you knew, and a decentralized government would tend to perpetuate this system with tribes and other interest groups heavily influencing, if not controlling, employment in the ministry located in their area. The related talk of creating 50 local councils and administrative offices, each with its own budget, would add to the confusion and waste. Instead of returning to past practice, Libya must seize the opportunity to chart a new path through the diversification of the economy within a centralized government. Granted, this will not be easy, especially in the short term; however, longer term, a centralized government appears to offer Libya the optimum scenario to develop both a robust democracy and a more diversified economy.

On a related issue, reports of corruption in the oil industry highlight a nationwide problem across all economic sectors. Although Gaddafi and his family are gone, the abuse and corruption they engendered remains, threatening Libya's political stability and economic growth. The interim finance minister, Hassan Ziglam, recently admitted that millions of dollars of Gaddafi family assets returned to Libya by European countries soon exited the country, stolen by corrupt officials. Ironically, the militias, acting in the name of the revolution, have become probably the single largest source of corruption in Libya. An estimated 25,000 fighters took part in

¹⁰ St John, *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*, op. cit., pp. 111-115.

the revolution; nevertheless, the NTC announced recently it had already made US\$1.5 billion in payments to some 250,000 men, most of whom falsely claimed to be fighters. In a related sphere, the government estimates that no more than 10-15 percent of the Libyans treated overseas as part of an \$800 million program for war wounded were actually eligible for treatment with many local authorities exploiting the program on behalf of family and friends.¹¹

Role of Islam

Libya has been, is, and will be an Islamic state. The 1951 constitution stated that Islam was the “religion of the state” although a subsequent article did call on the state to “respect all religions and faiths.” A 1953 statute establishing the Supreme Court specified that at least two well-qualified experts in Islamic law must be appointed judges to the Supreme Court. Both civil and *sharia* courts functioned in Libya throughout the monarchical period (1951–1969). In 1969, Gaddafi replaced the 1951 constitution with a constitutional proclamation. It protected religious freedom “in accordance with established customs” but also declared Islam to be the “religion of the state.” The Gaddafi regime proclaimed *sharia* to be the principal source of all legislation and established a High Commission to examine existing legislation to ensure it was consistent with Islamic principles. A 1972 law sought to rationalize women’s rights in marriage and divorce with *sharia*, and another law in 1973 merged civil and *sharia* courts. Thereafter, Gaddafi’s interpretation of the basic tenets of Islam was increasingly controversial, and when members of the orthodox religious establishment challenged him, he moved to undermine their power base,

¹¹ Ali Shuaib and Hadeel Al-Shalchi, “Libya halts cash for ex-fighters over corruption,” *Reuters*, April 9, 2012, available at <http://www.reuters.com>; “Update 1 — Libya probes oil contracts under Gaddafi,” *Reuters*, April 9, 2012, available at <http://www.reuters.com>; Borzou Daragahi, “Back to the bad old ways,” *Financial Times*, February 17, 2012.

purging the religious leaders most critical of him.¹²

Libya is a homogenous Islamic society with almost 100 percent of the population Sunni Muslim. Conservative in outlook and deeply religious in nature, the Libyan people have never displayed any appetite for the radical Islam advocated by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, or its North African affiliate, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Moreover, the general public in Libya, over the last year, has shown little interest in an Islamist alternative to the non-ideological February 17 Revolution. The Gaddafi regime suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood and more militant Islamist groups, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), but it was unable to prevent the growing religiosity among Libyans that has taken hold throughout the Arab world. In the final years of the Gaddafi regime, an increasing number of Libyans sympathized with a Muslim Brotherhood-type of ideology and aspired to the type of Islamic alternative promoted by the Brotherhood in a form of passive resistance to the regime. Even though there is no law governing the formation of political parties in Libya, the Muslim Brotherhood in early March 2012 announced the creation of the Justice and Development Party (also found as Justice and Construction Party), and other political associations and coalitions are being formed at a frenetic pace. Moderate Islamic movements, like the Muslim Brotherhood, can be expected to do well in upcoming elections in Libya as they have done in recent polls in Tunisia and Egypt.¹³

¹² Ronald Bruce St John, “Libya Is an Islamic State,” *Knox Reads*, February 13, 2012, available at <http://knoxreads.knox.edu/?p=79>; St John, *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*, op. cit., pp. 158-159.

¹³ “Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood sets up political party to contest June polls,” *Reuters*, March 4, 2012, available at <http://www.reuters.com>; Zahi Mogherbi, “Social change, regime performance and the radicalization of politics: The case of Libya,” in George Joffé (ed.), *Islamist Radicalisation in North Africa: Politics and process*, London and New York, Routledge, 2012, p. 41; Ali Brahimi, “Libya’s Revolution,” *Journal of North African Studies*, vol. 16, no. 4 (December 2011), pp. 616-617.

Conversely, it is unlikely that the general public in Libya will embrace the message of fundamental Islamist groups or jihadists or welcome the current of Salafism that has gained prominence elsewhere in the region. Salafism defines Islam in terms of conservative social and legal attitudes and prescribes external indicators of internal faith, like beards and the *burqa*. Where Islamists are concerned with seizing the state, Salafists focus on the individual and society. Gaddafi's fall emboldened Salafists in Libya who were persecuted and imprisoned by him, and they have increased their public presence, clamping down on the sale

of alcohol, demolishing the tombs of saints, and attacking the beliefs of Sufi Muslims and others as heretical. Their violent actions have generated Western media coverage out of all proportion to their numbers and influence, and while they will to continue to play a role in Libyan society, they will likely remain bit players in the upcoming elections.¹⁴

¹⁴ Youseff Mohammad Sawani, "Post-Qadhafi Libya: interactive dynamics and the political future," *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2012), pp. 2-3, 5-7, 17-18; Tempelhof and Omar, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8; Alia Brahimi, "Islam in Libya," in George Joffé (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

3 REGIONAL ISSUES

With informed estimates suggesting it will take up to five years to build a national army capable of policing the frontier, Libya will be unlikely to secure its borders anytime soon. Concern with border security explains in part initiatives toward peripheral states, Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Algeria, and Tunisia, all of which see the current situation in Libya in part as a regional security issue. Libya is in discussions with Egypt to secure the extradition of 40 Libyans accused of collaborating with Gaddafi before and during the revolution. When the Sudanese president visited Tripoli in early January 2012, he pledged to work with Libya to secure the border between the two countries, in part to prevent the smuggling of weapons to rebel groups in Sudan, which he claimed Gaddafi had facilitated. Another manifestation of the issue of border security is the arrival of French warships in late January 2012 to train the Libyan navy and help demine ports. Mediterranean states worry about Libya's capacity to secure its coastline which could be used as a gateway to Europe for arms traffickers, Al-Qaeda insurgents, and illegal migrants.¹⁵

Unrest in the Sahel, notably in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, is fuelled by the return of heavily armed veterans of the Libyan army, racist attacks in Libya against black Africans, refugees and related displacement issues, the volatile situation along the unsecured border, and the Tuareg loss of a key sponsor in Gaddafi. Adding to the mounting instability in the region, some 10,000 Niger nationals, mostly migrant workers, have returned home from Nigeria, fearing attacks from the Boko Haram Islamic sect. The presence of Gaddafi's third son, Saadi, in Niger, where he is under house arrest, and Gaddafi's wife, Safiya, his only living daughter, Aisha, and his first and fifth sons, Mohammed and

Hannibal respectively, in Algeria have complicated diplomatic efforts to maintain political stability in the region. Aisha has sought to intervene as a "friend of the court" in the legal proceedings at the International Criminal Court against her brother, Saif, who is charged with crimes against humanity. As the first anniversary of the revolution approached, Saadi put Libya and the region on edge when he called on Libyans to prepare for a general uprising of pro-Gaddafi forces.¹⁶

The alarming developments on the Libyan periphery prompted a two-day meeting of the foreign ministers and intelligence chiefs of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in late January 2012 to discuss what they described as the rising "terrorist threat" in the Sahara and Sahel. Concerned the fighting could spread across borders, the 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in mid-February 2012 called for an end to hostilities. In northern Mali, a new Tuareg independence movement, the Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad or MNLA), was formed with the intent to create a new state, Azawad, from the Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu regions of northern Mali. It consists of a mixture of veteran rebels, defectors from the Malian Army, and recently returned Tuareg veterans of the Libyan army who arrived in northern Mali in several heavily armed convoys. There is also a new Tuareg-based Islamist movement, Harakat Ansar al-Din (Movement of Religious Supporters), operating in

¹⁵ "Libya asks Egypt to hand over 40 wanted Gadhafi backers," *Washington Post*, February 29, 2012; "Libya and France boost military cooperation," Reuters, February 25, 2012, available at <http://www.reuters.com>.

¹⁶ Abdoulaye Massalaatchi, "Lethal 'cocktail' threatens Africa's Sahel," *Reuters*, March 16, 2012, available at <http://www.reuters.com>; Taha Zargoun, "Algeria promises Libya it will rein in Gaddafi family," *Reuters*, March 5, 2012, available at <http://www.reuters.com>; "Libya Seeks Saadi Gaddafi's Extradition from Niger," *Tripoli Post*, February 11, 2012, available at <http://www.tripolipost.com>.

the area, and rumors persist that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is also active in the region.¹⁷

During the last two weeks in March 2012, military and political events in Mali sharply deteriorated, sparking new concerns throughout the region. Unable to cope with the Tuareg rebellion in the north, junior army officers overthrew the government of President Amadou Toumani Toure, arguing his administration had failed to support their efforts to defeat the insurgents. Taking advantage of the power vacuum, the Tuareg rebels advanced south, occupying Timbuktu at the beginning of April. Having secured the borders of what they consider to be the Tuareg homeland, the rebels then halted their advance and declared themselves willing to negotiate either with the government or ECOWAS. During the first week of April, the ruling military junta agreed to step down in return for an end to diplomatic and trade sanctions, and President Toure resigned, clearing the way for the appointment of an interim government. In northern Mali, the situation remained uncertain and fluid, offering real potential for ongoing instability in and around Mali. In the south, the interim government was in a weakened position to deal with an insurrection that had declared an independent state of Azawad but was itself deeply divided in organization, capability, and aims between the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad and the Movement of Religious Supporters. At the same time, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and possibly other Islamist elements sought to take advantage of the instability in the area to further their own objectives. During the first week of April 2012, witnesses in northern Mali and refugees from the area who fled to neighboring Niger reported seeing jihadists

¹⁷ Xan Rice, "Mali battles to contain rebellion," *Financial Times*, February 20, 2012; Adam Nossiter, "Gaddafi's Weapons, Taken by Old Allies, Reinvalidate an Insurgent Army in Mali," *New York Times*, February 6, 2012.

from Algeria, Mauritania, and Nigeria in Tuareg-controlled areas in northern Mali.¹⁸

With tens of thousands of Arab and Tuareg refugees crossing into neighboring Niger, there is concern in the Niger capital, Niamey, that the rebellion in Mali could spread to the Tuareg community in northern Niger, which also includes well-armed, disaffected Tuareg veterans of the fighting in Libya. The Algerian government has long been concerned with Mali's failure to secure its northern territories, which provide bases for the Saharan and Sahelian branches of AQIM. Algerian relations with the new Libya have been strained because Algeria did not back the February 17 Revolution, was slow to recognize the NTC, and gave refuge on humanitarian grounds to Gaddafi's wife, daughter, and two sons. A series of incidents, including the discovery of two caches of weapons in southern Algeria in February 2012, which were thought to have originated in Libya, led to the opening of bilateral talks between Algeria and Libya aimed at combating arms trafficking and Islamist insurgents in the Sahara Desert. Further afield, there is also concern in and out of the region that the availability of looted Libyan weapons could allow new armed groups, like Jamaat Tawhid wa'l-Jihad fi Garbi Afriqqiya (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa or MOJWA), an Al-Qaeda splinter group dedicated to the spread of jihad throughout the region, to form in West Africa.¹⁹

¹⁸ Xan Rice, "Mali's Tuareg rebels declare self-rule," *Financial Times*, April 7-8, 2012; Michelle Faul, "Mali attracts Islamist fighters in void after coup," *Associated Press*, April 6, 2012, accessed at <http://hosted.ap.org>.

¹⁹ "Top U.S. officials visit Algeria to discuss the fight against terrorism in Africa," *Washington Post*, April 4, 2012; "At End of Algerian Minister's Visit Libya, Algeria Sign Bilateral Cooperation Agreement," *Tripoli Post*, March 7, 2012, available at <http://www.tripolipost.com>; Dario Cristiani and Riccardo Fabiani, *Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Implications for Algeria's Regional and International Relations*, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Working Papers, vol. 11, no. 7 (April 2011), available at <http://www.iai.it>.

Policy Shifts Elsewhere

Long active in Africa south of the Sahara, the Gaddafi regime launched a series of new initiatives in the region immediately after the United Nations suspended its sanctions package in April 1999. In the ensuing years, Gaddafi repeatedly called for greater African unity in the form of a United States of Africa with himself as its self-appointed head. The role the new Libya will play in sub-Saharan Africa is not completely clear; however, the disruption of regional alliances and the weakening of regimes supported by Gaddafi would appear to be the beginning of a policy reorientation away from a region in which Gaddafi lavished business projects and other forms of largess in an effort to buy power and influence. Early signs are that Libya will turn toward North Africa and the Middle East as well as Europe to the detriment of sub-Saharan Africa. At the recent African Union summit in Addis Ababa, Ashour Bin Khayal, the interim foreign minister, emphasized that Libya would reorient its role toward its African neighbors, stressing the need to strengthen Libya's southern borders to stem the flow of contraband, drugs, and migrants. He also vowed to end the nefarious activities of the Gaddafi regime in a variety of African states, noting that the former regime had used its diplomatic missions in at least 11 countries to store and smuggle explosives and weapons. The interim government's intent to review all Gaddafi-era investments in general and its aggressive pursuit of investments made in African states in particular are indications of a more business-like approach on the part of Libya toward Africa. In Zambia, it has made clear its intent to protect its 75 percent stake in Zamtel, a fixed-line telecoms firm, and in

Uganda, it has moved to protect its 69 percent stake in Uganda Telecom.²⁰

Relations with North African neighbors, like Tunisia, and the conservative Arab states in the Gulf, like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, are strengthening. Tunisia's new president, Moncef Marzouki, recently called for a revival of the Arab Maghreb Union, an economic grouping of North African states created in 1989 but largely dormant since 1994, mainly due to the conflict between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara. Libya has also restored diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. Elsewhere, looted weapons from Libya, including surface-to-air missiles, have reportedly been found as far afield as Sinai and Somalia. Depending on whose hands they fall into, purloined weapons could add to regional instability from Egypt to Iraq to Syria. In Somalia, where surface-to-air missiles from Libya have reportedly been delivered to the Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabab movement, it is feared they could be used against African Union (AU) troops in action against Al-Shabab in southern Somalia.²¹

In early February 2012, the NTC gave Syrian diplomats 72 hours to leave the country just days after it handed over the Syrian embassy in Tripoli to the opposition Syrian National Council. With Libya taking the hardest line in the Arab world against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, Libyan revolutionaries, many if not most of whom come from the conservative eastern part of the country, are joining the Syrian uprising much like they

²⁰ Ronald Bruce St John, *Libya: Continuity and Change*, London and New York, Routledge, 2011, pp. 130-33, 148; Julius Barigaba and Isaac Khisa, "Libya: Gaddafi Ghost Still Haunts Investments in East Africa," *All Africa*, February 18, 2012, available at <http://allafrica.com>; "Libya NTC says to review investments worldwide," Reuters, January 1, 2012, available at <http://www.reuters.com>.

²¹ "Officials: Weapons smuggling from post-civil war Libya to Egypt on the increase," *Washington Post*, March 5, 2012; "Somali rebels receive Libyan arms," *Sky News*, February 24, 2012, available at <http://www.skynews.com.au>.

once travelled to Afghanistan to oppose the Soviet occupation. Early in the same week in which Libya expelled Syrian diplomats, former Libyan rebel fighters from the city of Misurata announced the death in combat of three Libyan comrades fighting in Syria against the Assad regime. While many Libyans speak approvingly of former rebels heading to Syria, the political agenda and loyalty of these fighters are unknown, and they could prove a destabilizing force, not just in Syria, but in other Arab states opposed to the Arab Awakening. With Libya taking a lead role in supporting the Syrian

National Council, including a donation of \$100 million in humanitarian aid at the end of February 2012, some observers are questioning whether or not the new Libya will be a force for peace in the region.²²

²² Abigail Fielding-Smith and Roula Khalaf, "Jihadists put anti-Assad movement on defensive," *Financial Times*, April 10, 2012; Michelle Nichols, "Russia accuses Libya of training Syrian rebels," *Reuters*, March 7, 2012, available at <http://www.reuters.com>; "Libya to give Syrian opposition \$100 million in aid," *Reuters*, February 29, 2012, available at <http://www.reuters.com>.

4

TRANSATLANTIC CONCERNS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Through its establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) played a key role in the success of the February 17 Revolution; however, it is not playing a significant role in post-war Libya. Moreover, the Libyan experience reduced, at least for a time, NATO's appetite for humanitarian interventions elsewhere, notably in Syria. NATO involvement in Libya mirrored earlier interventions in Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, and Iraq in 2003 in that a handful of Western governments used a UN Security Council resolution that lacked full backing to justify actions on behalf of the international community. The more often this strategy has been repeated in recent years, the more a few countries, notably China and Russia, have been reluctant to give Western nations a blank check to intervene with force in the internal affairs of other states. With multiple commitments elsewhere and resource challenges of its own, the United States sought a limited, support role in Libya, which left NATO to operate in new ways, from the integration of 14 member states and 4 partners into improvised command and control structures to the adaptation of different surveillance and weapons systems. The Libyan intervention also exposed issues of political unity and cohesiveness as well as the limited military capacity of some NATO states who found their operational capabilities strained by cuts in defense spending.²³

Although the NATO intervention was widely supported by the transition authorities and the general public in Libya, it resurrected old debates in Africa and the Arab world about the motives and intentions of Western powers in a region of global strategic interest due to its location and natural resources. Not surprisingly, the issue of Western

engagement now hangs over dialogue inside and outside Libya, as well as in Egypt and Tunisia, about the future course of political transformation. In this context, Libya presents the transatlantic partners with an opportunity to modify a long-held strategy which generally favored stability over democracy and human rights in the Arab world. While it lacks the traditional building blocks for a liberal democracy, Libya in some ways is a relatively promising candidate for democratization. It has no entrenched institutions, like the Egyptian military, with which to contend, and with the exception of a comparatively underdeveloped Muslim Brotherhood, no organized Islamist groups, like the Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia. With a largely Sunni Muslim population, it lacks the contentious religious divisions found in Egypt and Syria, and with ample hydrocarbon reserves, it has sufficient economic resources available to satisfy the basic needs of its small population. Like its neighbors, Libya will almost certainly elect a moderate Islamic government, offering the transatlantic partners a fresh opportunity to promote democracy and human rights if they can throw off old paradigms and embrace change in the Arab world.

As for China and Russia, the transatlantic partners must recognize that both states have legitimate interests in Libya, which do not necessarily challenge Western concerns and which should not be viewed as a zero sum game. China's interest in Libya reflects both its wider interest in Africa as a whole and its strategic interest in the Maghreb where it enjoys good commercial relations with Algeria and Morocco. Beijing's policies from the Mediterranean to the Cape of Good Hope are driven largely by its thirst for energy and raw materials. At the end of the Soviet era, Russia returned to the region with its primary interest, similar to that of China, being increased cooperation in the field of energy. Both China and Russia have billions of dollars invested in Libya, and

²³ Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, "NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 91, no. 2 (March/April 2012), pp. 2-7; "Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libya Operation," An Interim RUSI [Royal United Services Institute] Campaign Report (September 2011), no. 4, available at <http://www.rusi.org>.

both states expect to play a continuing role in the country.²⁴

Issues of transatlantic complementarity and cooperation expected to continue in post-Gaddafi Libya include the development of energy supplies, border security and the related issues of arms trafficking and illegal immigration, terrorist-related threats and concerns in the Saharan and Sahelian states, market and investment opportunities in areas like infrastructure, reconstruction, and defense, and the promotion of democracy and human rights. An immediate priority of the NTC is the return of the remaining assets frozen abroad, the bulk of which are located in transatlantic member states. Libya has also announced a review of all Libyan investments outside the country. Absent evidence of malfeasance, Libya can be expected to retain all investments in the transatlantic states that make good business sense.²⁵

The National Oil Corporation (NOC) continues to issue highly optimistic projections about oil and gas production, estimates that often include condensate and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and that generally refer to maximum achieved output as opposed to sustained capacity. Libya should be able to approach sustained pre-revolution production levels by end-2012; however, the challenges that hampered the Gaddafi regime's attempts to increase oil production beyond 1.7–1.8 million barrels a day will remain critical issues beyond 2013. These challenges include the need for large-scale investment in upstream and downstream activities, including considerable foreign investment, policy

²⁴ "China-Africa Relations Make New Progress, China Top Official Says," *Tripoli Post*, January 31, 2012, available at <http://www.tripolipost.com>; George Joffé, "Introduction," *Journal of North African Studies*, vol. 16, no. 4 (December 2011), pp. 505-506; Cristiani and Fabiani, op. cit., p. 8.

²⁵ George Joffé and Emanuela Paoletti, *Libya's Foreign Policy: Drivers and Objectives*, German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Mediterranean Paper Series (October 2010), pp. 27-32, available at <http://www.iai.it>.

clarity and continuity, and a substantial increase in the OPEC quota.²⁶ Whatever production levels are achieved, Europe will remain the principal market for Libyan oil and gas. U.S. companies will remain significant upstream players in the hydrocarbon industry; however, the main concern of the U.S. government downstream will be to avoid delivery disruptions to Europe that would compromise U.S. supply sources elsewhere.

As for related investment opportunities in Libya, historical patterns of regime change in countries like Iran and Iraq suggest that looming demands for massive infrastructure and welfare spending will slow Libyan investment in hydrocarbon exploration and development, enhanced oil recovery (EOR), and spare capacity, providing ongoing opportunities for the transatlantic partners to invest. Libya will also need outside investment to rebuild other sectors of the economy, and all of this spells multiple investment opportunities for the transatlantic partners. As to whether or not members of the NATO coalition will receive special treatment in the awarding of contracts in Libya, this will happen on a symbolic level; however, Libyans have a well-deserved reputation for being tough negotiators and hard-headed businessmen and these traits will soon trump goodwill. In the short term, political strife, combined with uncertain investment laws and the unclear fate of business deals with the former regime, will dampen business prospects, probably until an elected government is installed. Longer term, post-Gaddafi economic policy is expected to be a mix of a strong government role in reconstruction and market-oriented reforms elsewhere.

²⁶ Keily Miller, "The Challenge of Sustainable Capacity in Libya's Oil Sector," *Libya Wire*, Issue 4, February 10, 2012, subscription only publication available at <http://www.libyawire.com>; St John, *Libya: Continuity and Change*, op. cit., pp. 103-104.

5 TRANSATLANTIC ASSISTANCE

As indicated earlier, Libya is unlikely to have the capability to secure its borders anytime soon, perhaps for several years. Consequently, border security and the related issues of arms trafficking and illegal migration will remain concerns for the Libyan government as well as for the transatlantic partners who would hope for better control of illicit activities. The transatlantic partners can assist Libya in this regard by encouraging and facilitating the development of joint border security strategies with neighboring states, together with the training, equipment, and technology necessary for Libyan forces to begin to secure their frontiers. On the related issue of illegal migration, the Gaddafi regime in recent years was increasingly cooperative with the EU, and particularly Italy, in stemming the flow of irregular migration after earlier exploiting the issue for political purposes. The new Libyan government is unlikely to use immigration policy as a tool to achieve other political goals as the Gaddafi regime did for years. On the contrary, Libya can be expected to cooperate with the EU to stem the flow of irregular migration, and as Libya gains better control of its borders, it should be able to reduce the number of irregular immigrants, most of whom come from sub-Saharan Africa.²⁷

Directly related to the question of border security, the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime has increased instability in neighboring countries, notably in Mali and Niger. Terrorist-related concerns in the Saharan and Sahelian states are an issue area that can best be addressed through increased transatlantic cooperation, building on U.S. initiatives in the region like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism

Partnership and the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). France and Spain in particular have important roles to play in the integration of Saharan and Sahelian policy dimensions into a broader policy for the Maghreb and West Africa. Both countries are in a position to build on their relationships with the states in the region to assist the transatlantic partners in developing a joint strategy aimed at capacity building, state consolidation, economic development, illegal trafficking, and terrorism suppression. To cite a recent example, France, which led the NATO intervention in Libya, is taking an active role in resolving the current political crisis in Mali, suggesting that autonomy as opposed to separation might be a compromise for the northern half of the country. Paradoxically, the only way to maintain close counterterrorism and other support in Libya and neighboring states is to encourage, support, and interface with moderate Islamic governments and groups.²⁸

Favoring stability over democracy and human rights protection, the transatlantic partners have long supported secular regimes in power in the Arab world, viewing them as the most reliable bulwarks against religious (Islamist) extremism and terrorism. Democracy and human rights were common talking points, but the status quo most often trumped any concerted emphasis on them. The speed and intensity of the Arab Awakening not only caught the transatlantic partners by surprise but also embarrassed them as the movement

²⁷ Valérie Vicky Miranda, *Striking a Balance Between Norms and Interests in Italian Foreign Policy: The Balkans and Libya*, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Working Papers, vol. 11, no. 11 (May 2011), pp. 11-15, available at <http://www.iai.it>; Emanuela Paoletti and Ferruccio Pastore, *Sharing the dirty job on the southern front? Italian-Libyan relations on migration and their impact on the European Union*, University of Oxford, International Migration Institute, Working Paper 29 (December 2010); Joffé and Paoletti, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

²⁸ St John, *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*, *op. cit.*, p. 277; Jean-François Daguzan, "France, the United States, and the Mediterranean: From Competition to Cooperation from a Transatlantic Perspective," in Roberto Aliboni et al. (ed.), *Southern Europe and the Mediterranean: National Approaches and Transatlantic Perspectives*, German Marshall Fund of the United States and Istituto Affari Internazionali, Mediterranean Paper Series (September 2011), pp. 8-20, especially pp. 19-20, available at <http://www.iai.it>; Jordi Vaquer i Fanés and Eduard Soler i Lecha, "Spain and the Mediterranean from Transatlantic Perspective," in Roberto Aliboni et al. (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 64-79, especially pp. 71-79; available at <http://www.iai.it>; Pack and Barfi, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

highlighted the bankruptcy of their short-sighted policies in the region. Even though the post-revolutionary situation in Libya remains tenuous, it offers the transatlantic partners an excellent opportunity to reverse course and actively promote democracy and human rights, consolidating a democratic platform in Libya and using that experience to promote the democratization of the Arab world.²⁹ A democratic Libya governed by the rule of law will promote stability throughout the Arab world and Africa and serve as an example to states in the region. Moreover, active participation by the transatlantic partners in the democratization of Libya will be an excellent learning experience for them as they seek to develop new strategies to cope with the Arab world in the wake of the Arab Awakening. Working through the UN and NGOs to avoid any hint of direct intervention in the internal politics of Libya, the transatlantic partners are in the best position to provide the information and training required for Libyans to develop the organizational, legal, media, and other

²⁹ Valter Coralluzzo, "Italy's Mediterranean Policy from a Transatlantic Perspective," in Roberto Aliboni et al. (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 38-61, especially pp. 51-53; available at <http://www.iai.it>; Roberto Aliboni, "Southern Europe and the Mediterranean: From Cold War to the Arab Spring," in Roberto Aliboni et al. (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 82-100, especially pp. 96-98; available at <http://www.iai.it>; Vaquer i Fanés and Soler i Lecha, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-71 and 78.

skills required to create and operate a democratic government. As the June 2012 parliamentary elections approach, the transatlantic partners should support the development of civil society organizations, encourage the pairing of civil society organizations with local councils, Islamic groups, and nascent political parties, help train and equip election monitoring organizations, and prod the NTC and the interim government toward greater transparency.

The future scope and objectives of Libyan foreign policy are unclear and will remain so until an elected government is in place in mid-2013. Recognizing their caretaker role, the NTC and the interim governments have refused to take all but the most pressing policy decisions on the assumption that strategies and policy decisions with long-term consequences are the purview of elected officials. That said, early signs suggest the new Libya will look more to the Arab world and less to Africa south of the Sahara than was true with the Gaddafi regime. Improved cooperation with neighboring states will have a real priority as will expanded relations with the other members of the Arab Maghreb Union. Like the Gaddafi regime, the new Libya will also look to the transatlantic partners, as well as China, Russia, Turkey, and other states, for investment, trade, and technology.

6

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The February 17 Revolution is a work in progress and will remain so for years to come. When compared to the other states constituting the recent Arab Awakening, Libya stands apart in terms of the enormous amount of work to be done to create a workable and working democracy. Civic organizations must be created, political parties must be formed, laws must be written, and elections must be held. And all of this must be accomplished by an immature body politic laboring in a volatile political climate, characterized by instability, distrust, and insecurity. It is a massive job that will take time; however, there are a number of steps the transatlantic partners can take to accelerate the process and to help bring it to a successful conclusion.

1. The transatlantic partners should dampen expectations of the February 17 Revolution inside and outside the confines of the partnership. Libya will need a long time to deal with the widespread consequences of Gaddafi's rule and the negative impact of his policies.
2. The transatlantic partners must coordinate their efforts to provide experts and outside assistance to interface with the interim government, civil organizations, and political parties. The NTC has inherited a country with no background or experience with civil organizations and largely without state institutions. The rights of youth, women, and ethnic minorities in particular are at risk.
3. To the fullest extent possible, the assistance and expertise provided by the transatlantic partners must be funneled through the United Nations or NGOs to avoid any suspicion of overt Western intervention in the internal affairs of Libya. The NATO intervention reawakened latent fears of colonialism and neo-colonialism, which must be put to rest. In short, local ownership of the political process must be maintained.
4. The transatlantic partners must encourage the NTC to use all economic and political means at their disposal to accelerate the integration of rebel militias into the national army, police, and security forces. The longer the militias operate independently, the more they will develop separate economic and political cultures, making demobilization increasingly difficult.
5. Libya offers a real opportunity to promote democracy and human rights in the Arab world, and the transatlantic partners must cast off old inhibitions and stereotypes and encourage democratization at all levels of Libyan society. In part, this involves encouraging grassroots democracy throughout the country by supporting local NGOs, civil society organizations, and local political organizations, and in part, it involves working directly and closely with moderate Islamist groups that the transatlantic partners have too often ignored in the past. To be successful in promoting democracy and human rights, the transatlantic partners must embrace all democratic movements and messages, including those with an overt Islamic resonance. Remember, Libya is and will be an Islamic state.
6. The transatlantic partners should encourage and facilitate the return of assets seized abroad and encourage and support a review of all international investments made by the Gaddafi regime. The return of seized assets will provide the interim government with breathing room as hydrocarbon production increases. A review of international investments will confirm those that make good business sense and the

liquidation of the remainder will provide the interim government with needed cash.

7. The transatlantic partners must support to the full extent possible Libyan efforts to establish border security, curtail arms trafficking, and limit illegal migration through coordinated strategies with neighboring states, training, and equipment. Given the current state of the national army, police, and security forces, Libya will be unable to secure its borders for some time, but the process can be accelerated with Western expertise and technology.

8. The transatlantic partners must develop a joint strategy to address effectively new terrorist-related concerns in the Sahara and Sahel that draws on U.S., French, and Spanish contacts and experience, in particular, to provide a more comprehensive and coordinated approach. The overthrow of the Gaddafi regime and the resulting instability on Libya's borders have created a climate of uncertainty and unrest in neighboring states conducive to increased terrorist activity.

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