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# **Summary of Party Positions on EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy.**

## **Case Studies: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain**

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# Summary of Party Positions on EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy. Case Studies: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain

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## Abstract

This study explores political parties' salience and position on foreign policy issues in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain across time. By analysing the main parties' electoral manifestos from 2000 to 2020, the study points out how foreign policy and related area, such as internationalism and military issues, have been only marginally addressed in parties' discourse. EU foreign and security policy remains a low salient issue for all parties in the countries under examination. Still, our analyses highlight a situation of low political salience but high "permissive consensus" on EU foreign and security policy among the public and bipartisan support among the elites. On this point, the extent to which these conditions can be exploited to move further down the path to increased European integration in this policy area seems to depend on whether and how this issue might become politicised.

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## Executive summary

As compared with the aggregate level of salience measured between the 1970s and the 1980s, our analysis indicates a decrease in salience of foreign policy issues in all party systems under examination. The only exception is Greece, which shows a less linear trend and a high degree of salience (>10 per cent) both in the 1995–1999 and 2010–2020 periods. On the contrary, all the other countries are characterised by lower levels of salience in the period 2010–2020. France (3.6 per cent), Italy (2.7 per cent) and Spain (2.1 per cent) show the lowest degree of salience in the last period of our analysis (2015–2020). Looking at the aggregate level of salience by party families, no clear trend emerges. Still, from 2010 onwards the nationalist party family is the one that prioritises foreign policy issues at the highest degree (>10 per cent).

In *France* (2002–2017), FN/RN is the party with the highest level of salience of foreign policy issues, followed by PS and UMP/R. In terms of positioning, all the relevant political parties in France, but the radical left, are in favour of increasing military expenditures or make positive references to the military. Looking at the most recent party manifestos (2012–2017), we find that both UMP/R and FN/RN support the increase of military expenditures up to 2 per cent of the country's GDP. Regarding NATO, UMP/R and PS support its role in the European collective security; FN/RN urged France to quit NATO's integrated military command; while FdG/FI call for a withdrawal of France from the Atlantic Alliance. Finally, the PS, UMP/R and LREM discuss the introduction of a budget for the European defence in their manifestos.


In *Germany* (2002–2021), all relevant political parties dedicate a similar degree of salience to foreign policy issues (between 5 and 8 per cent). AfD showed a lower degree of salience in its first election in 2013 and by then uniformed its attention to the one displayed by the other German parties. In terms of parties' positions, we find two “pacifist” parties with a prevalence of negative mentions of the military (Grünen and SPD) and three parties supporting military and military expenditures (CDU/CSU, FdP and AfD). Still, both Grünen and SPD moved toward a more neutral stance on the military in 2021. As for parties' positions on internationalism, all the German relevant parties have a positive internationalist stance, the only exception

being AfD.

In *Greece* (2000–2015), the study finds a high degree of inter-party differences in foreign policy issue salience. Some parties assigned almost no attention to foreign policy issues in some elections (e.g., ND in 2007, 2009 and January 2015; SYRIZA in 2007; KKE in 2009; PASOK in 2012 and in September 2015), while others dedicated more than one-fifth of their manifestos discussing foreign policy issues (KKE in 2000 and in January 2015; XA in 2012 and January 2015; ANEL in 2012 and January 2015). Looking at the parties' positions, SYRIZA and KKE are in favour of the reduction of military expenditures and their manifestos are often characterised by negative mentions of the military. On the contrary, PASOK, ND and XA – when they emphasise the military – always support an increase in defence spending, devoting only positive quasi-sentences to the military.

In *Italy* (2001–2018), the parties' attention to foreign policy issues has been quite modest. At the party level, the salience of foreign policy has been often lower than 3 per cent. In terms of positioning on the military, relevant Italian parties are divided. DS & DL, FI, AN, LN/L and FdI show pro-military positions. The PD tends to support disarmament in the 2008 and 2018 manifestos, while no quasi-sentence has been dedicated to either a positive or negative reference to the military in 2013. The M5S did not discuss foreign policy issues in 2013, while it assumed a pro-disarmament position in 2018. Regarding internationalism, almost all the Italian parties support internationalism and multilateralism. The exceptions come from the centre-right side. Indeed, in the 2018 elections the League, FI and FdI emphasised the need to strengthen national sovereignty in the international arena. Our content analysis of the most recent Italian manifestos (2008–2018) reveals that only the PD explicitly mentioned the need to create a new budget for the European defence. Positive mentions of NATO have been made by the PdL (2013). Finally, regarding the relationships with Russia, in 2018 both M5S and the League declare that Russia should be considered a strategic partner, suggesting that the economic sanctions against the country should be lifted.

In *Poland* (2001–2019), the level of salience of foreign policy issues shows fluctuations across elections; however, the party system does not display a huge degree of inter-party variation. Looking at the systemic trends, the salience of foreign policy issues has been quite marginal in the first two elections of the 21st century (below



2 per cent). Afterwards, we witnessed an increase, with a peak in the 2011 elections (10.7 per cent), followed by a linear decrease (7.3 per cent in 2015 and 4.4 per cent in 2019). In terms of parties' positioning, all the Polish parties showed preferences for increasing and strengthening the military. On internationalism, SLD and PO showed a pro-internationalist stance across elections. A pro-internationalist position is also found in the PIS' manifestos in 2007 and 2011. While in 2005 PIS devoted more quasi-sentences emphasising negative mentions of internationalism, in 2015 and 2019 its position was blurred, with both negative and positive features of internationalism.

In *Spain* (2000–2019), the mainstream parties (PSOE and PP) are those keeping high the attention on foreign issues across elections. IU – before its strategic partnership with Podemos – exhibited a profile similar to the mainstream parties. As for the newcomers, Podemos and Ciudadanos show a lower degree of salience than mainstream parties. The radical right party VOX, instead, presented the highest level of foreign policy salience of the whole Spanish party system in the 2019 elections. In terms of positioning, the rightist parties (PP and, more recently, Ciudadanos and VOX) have been always in favour of increasing military expenditures. On the other hand, the radical left (IU and, more recently, PODEMOS) has devoted more space to negative mentions of the military. Spanish parties are generally associated with pro-internationalist stances. This trend, however, changed after VOX's success; indeed, the party politicised sovereigntist stances. Our content analysis of the most recent Spanish manifestos (2008–2019) reveals that PP, Ciudadanos and the PSOE supported the creation of a European army, enhancing – at the same time – the role of NATO for the European security. Conversely, Podemos and IU suggested that Spain should leave NATO or – at least – organise a referendum on NATO membership. Both IU and Podemos argued that the European defence should be entirely managed and organised within a European framework; however, they never mentioned either the European Common Security and Defence policy or the creation of a European army. Finally, regarding the relationships with Russia, all Spanish parties suggest that these should – somehow – improve. However, no one questioned that the (now defunct) Minsk agreements had to be respected.

# 1. Data and methods

The current study explores political parties' salience and position on foreign policy issues in Italy, France, Germany, Greece, Poland and Spain across time. The study employs an original coding of the parties' manifestos and the data of the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR).<sup>1</sup> The MARPOR codes political parties' manifestos issued at the national elections into 56 categories. Among these categories, the study in-depth analysed all the mentions related to foreign policy issues. Furthermore, employing the corpus of the manifestos publicly available on the MARPOR website, we performed a qualitative content analysis of those sections directly dealing with foreign policy issues, explaining in detail the political parties' position and salience.

This section discusses the methodology that we employed in the following analyses. First, we detail the rationale behind MARPOR coding, highlighting the features of the foreign policy issues that we analysed in the deliverable. Second, we present the methodology of the analyses performed at the individual party and party system levels. Additionally, we present the political parties analysed, clarifying the time frame of our analysis.

## 1.1 The MARPOR data and its foreign policy categories

MARPOR covers the issue preferences of thousands of parties from 1945 until today in over fifty countries on five continents. The richness of this dataset – across time and space – made the employment of MARPOR data almost a “standard” in contemporary comparative research on political parties. The MARPOR codes the political parties' manifestos issued at national elections into 56 categories. The coding procedure divides each manifesto into “quasi-sentences” that constitute the units of measurement of the MARPOR. A quasi-sentence can be equal to a natural sentence or shorter. In brief, when a natural sentence contains references to more than one issue, then it is split into a number of quasi-sentences that equal the number of issues mentioned by the natural sentence. After coding, the

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<sup>1</sup> Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2021a*, Berlin, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2021, <https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpds.2021a>.

MARPOR elaborates a score for each category that consists of a ratio between the number of quasi-sentences associated with that category over the total number of quasi-sentences contained in the manifesto. For example, if a political party shows a score equal to 3.5 on the category “Military: Positive” this means that 3.5 per cent of its manifesto is devoted to discussing issues coded within the “Military: Positive” category.

**Table 1** | MARPOR categories on foreign policy issues

| Code   | Item                                    | Description   |
|--------|---|---|
| per101 | Foreign special relationships: Positive | Favourable mentions of particular countries with which the manifesto country has a special relationship; the need for cooperation with and/or aid to such countries.  |
| per102 | Foreign special relationships: Negative | Negative mentions of particular countries with which the manifesto country has a special relationship.  |
| per103 | Anti-Imperialism                        | Negative references to imperial behaviour and/or negative references to one state exerting a strong influence (political, military or commercial) over other states.  |
| per104 | Military: Positive                      | The importance of external security and defence.  |
| per105 | Military: Negative                      | Negative references to the military or the use of military power to solve conflicts.  |
| per106 | Peace                                   | Any declaration of belief in peace and peaceful means of solving crises.  |
| per107 | Internationalism: Positive              | Need for international co-operation, including co-operation with specific countries other than those coded in 101.  |
| per109 | Internationalism: Negative              | Negative references to international co-operation. Favourable mentions of national independence and sovereignty concerning the manifesto country's foreign policy, isolation and/or unilateralism as opposed to internationalism. |

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., “Codebook”, in *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit., p. 10-12.

The MARPOR codebook presents eight categories related to foreign policy issues (see Table 1). These categories are: i) Foreign special relationships: Positive; ii) Foreign special relationships: Negative; iii) Anti-Imperialism; iv) Military: Positive; v) Military: Negative; vi) Peace; vii) Internationalism: Positive; and viii) Internationalism: Negative. *Special relationships* categories (Positive and Negative) code all the quasi-sentences that contain favourable or negative mentions of the international relationships that the manifesto's country has with other state entities. The *Anti-Imperialism* category includes all the negative references to the imperial behaviour of a country exerting a pervasive influence (political, military or commercial) over other countries. *Military* categories (Positive and Negative) group all the quasi-sentences referring to military issues and can include references to increasing/decreasing military expenditures, modernising the military, obeying military treaties, abolishing/introducing conscription, disarmament. The category *Peace* includes all the declarations indicating peace as a general goal or the desirability of ending specific ongoing wars. Finally, the *Internationalism* categories (Positive and Negatives) might include references to increasing international cooperation (e.g., aid to developing countries, world planning for scarce resources, the support for global governance, the support for international courts, the support for the UN or other international organisations), as well as negative references to international co-operation, favourable mentions of national sovereignty in the international context, isolation and unilateralism.<sup>2</sup>


## 1.2 Research strategy

This deliverable aims to provide an overview of the party politics trends on the foreign policy issue over time, with a special focus on the last two decades (2000–2020). In order to do so, we performed a four-step research strategy to provide pieces of evidence about: 1) the aggregate trends on foreign policy issue salience across time (1970–2020) by party families and countries; 2) the salience and the positioning of national political parties over the last twenty years; 3) a fine-grained reconstruction of the foreign policy goals stated by national political parties; and, finally, 4) the party system degree of polarisation and dispersion on foreign policy issues.

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<sup>2</sup> For more details, see Andrea Volkens et al., “Codebook”, in *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.





First, the aggregate trends on foreign policy issues are measured by combining all the eight foreign policy categories of the MARPOR (see above). In this respect, we provide an average measurement by countries and party families from 1970 to 2020. In order to ensure the comparability among the six countries under examination holding their national elections at distinct points in time, we aggregated the countries and the party families' saliences using a five-year time interval. The analysis at the country level is performed by weighting political parties' foreign policy salience by their electoral success in national elections.

Second, the analyses of the individual political parties have been conducted by looking at their emphasis on the eight foreign policy MARPOR categories in each election over the last twenty years. In this respect, the study measures both the party's aggregate salience of foreign policy issues and explores the party preferences across different foreign policy issues by disentangling the relative weight of each category. The latter allows us to understand which political parties, for example, prefer to pay special attention to military rather than peace issues. Furthermore, we also explored political parties' positions on the two issues characterised by the presence of negative and positive categories (namely, military and internationalism). In this respect, we created positional indexes locating parties on these sub-issues).<sup>3</sup> The party-level analyses based on MARPOR data have been conducted by selecting the relevant parties of each national party system (see Table 2).

Third, besides a quantitative analysis of the data provided by the MARPOR dataset, we performed a qualitative analysis with the purpose of identifying the foreign policy goals and targets as stated by political parties in their electoral manifestos. This qualitative analysis has been restricted to a subsample of our cases whose national languages we speak – namely, Italy, Spain and France – and refers only to the annotated manifestos provided by MARPOR.

Finally, in order to measure the degree of polarisation and dispersion on the foreign policy issue in each country, we created an index of polarisation and an

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<sup>3</sup> For the operationalisation, see Heemin Kim and Richard C. Fording, "Voter Ideology in Western Democracies: An Update", in *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 42, No. 1, (January 2003), p. 95-105.

index of dispersion looking at the different degrees of salience that each political party attributed to foreign policy issues. The index of polarisation is operationalised by subtracting the two most extreme positions among parliamentary parties on Internationalism and Military. The index of dispersion is calculated by employing the standard deviation of the aggregated salience of foreign policy issues among parliamentary parties. Both indexes have been constructed by including all the parties holding at least one seat in the lower chamber of the national parliament.

The remaining part of the deliverable is structured as follows: first, we provide a comparative overview of countries and party families trends across time (1970–2020); then we engage in country-specific sections, presenting the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses on individual parties as well as the aggregated analysis of party systems' polarisation and dispersion indexes. The appendix reports the tables and figures for all the political parties analysed, while the deliverable includes only those that are relevant for the understanding of the evolution of politicisation of foreign policy issues in our set of countries.

**Table 2** | Relevant parties in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain (2000–2020)

| Country | Abbrev. | Party English name   | Party name  |
|---------|---------|--|---|
| France  | UMP/R   | Union for a Popular Movement/<br>The Republicans                               | Union pour un mouvement<br>populaire/Les Républicains                                 |
|         | FN/RN   | National Front/National Rally  | Front national/Rassemblement<br>national  |
|         | FdG/FI  | Left Front&/France Unbowed   | Front de gauche/La France<br>Insoumise  |
|         | PS      | Socialist Party  | Parti socialiste)   |
|         | LREM    | Republic Forward   | La République En Marche!  |
| Germany | SPD     | Social Democratic Party of<br>Germany  | Sozialdemokratische Partei<br>Deutschlands  |
|         | CDU/CSU | Christian Democratic Union of<br>Germany/ Christian Social Union in<br>Bavaria | Christlich Demokratische Union<br>Deutschlands/ Christlich-Soziale<br>Union in Bayern |
|         | Grünen  | Alliance 90/The Greens   | Bündnis 90/Die Grünen   |
|         | FdP     | Free Democratic Party  | Freie Demokratische Partei  |
|         | AfD     | Alternative for Germany  | Alternative für Deutschland   |


|        |            |  |  |
|--------|------------|--|--|
| Greece | PASOK      | Panhellenic Socialist Movement                           | Panellínio Sosialistikó Kínima                             |
|        | ND         | New Democracy  |  |
|        | SYRIZA     | The Coalition of the Radical Left – Progressive Alliance | Sinaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás – Proodeftikí Simachía |
|        | KKE        | Communist Party of Greece                                | Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas                                |
|        | XA         | Popular Association – Golden Dawn                        | Laïkós Sýndesmos – Chrysí Avgí                             |
|        | ANEL       | Independent Greeks                                       | Anexartitoi Ellines  |
| Italy  | PD         | Democratic Party   | Partito Democratico  |
|        | M5S        | Five Star Movement                                       | Movimento 5 Stelle   |
|        | NA         | National Alliance  | Alleanza Nazionale   |
|        | FI/PdL     | Go Italy/People of Freedom                               | Forza Italia/Popolo della Libertà                          |
|        | LN/L       | Northern League/The League                               | Lega Nord/Lega   |
|        | DS         | Democrats of the Left                                    | Democratici di Sinistra                                    |
|        | DL         | The Daisy – Democracy is Freedom                         | La Margherita – Democrazia è libertà                       |
| Poland | PO         | Civic Platform   | Platforma Obywatelska                                      |
|        | PIS        | Law and Justice  | Prawo i Sprawiedliwość                                     |
|        | SLD        | Democratic Left Alliance                                 | Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej                               |
| Spain  | PSOE       | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party                         | Partido Socialista Obrero Español                          |
|        | PP         | People Party   | Partido Popular  |
|        | Ciudadanos | Citizens   | Ciudadanos   |
|        | Podemos    | We Can   | Podemos  |
|        | IU         | United Left  | Izquierda Unida  |
|        | VOX        | Voice  | Vox  |

## 2. Comparative trends on the foreign policy issue

Figure 1 shows the foreign policy salience among different party families across time (1970–2020) in the six countries analysed in this deliverable. No discernible trends emerge. Still, a few elements can be highlighted. Since their first appearance in our dataset, green parties assigned a quite high salience to foreign policy issues. In the 1980–1984 period, the German Green party, that is, the only green party in our sample, paid almost 25 per cent of its attention to foreign affairs issues. This score was based on the party's emphasis on peace and disarmament issues. Still, in the following years, we witnessed a normalisation of the Green parties that as of now are almost indistinguishable from the other party families.

A second interesting information refers to the high degree of foreign policy salience attributed by nationalist (mainly radical right) parties after 2009. Indeed, from 2010 onwards the nationalist party family shows a high emphasis (higher than 10 per cent) on foreign policy issues. This figure is driven by the Nationalist parties' references to the increase in military expenditures and isolationist policy proposals.

**Figure 1** | Foreign policy salience by party family (1970–2020)




Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

Figure 2 shows the salience of the foreign policy issue across time and space. Here we can highlight some interesting trends signalling important differences in our

sample of countries.


**Figure 2** | Foreign policy salience by country (1970–2020)



Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

First, on average, Italy displays the lowest level of salience among the six countries under examination. More precisely, the average – weighted – salience across Italian parties has been always equal to or lower than 3 per cent, excluding the 1980–1984 (7.1 per cent) and 1985–1994 (5.5 per cent) periods. France shows fluctuations in the degree of its systemic salience. Generally, the salience has been always above 5 per cent, with two peaks in the 1970–1974 (11.2 per cent) and 1975–1979 (9 per cent) periods. Still, in more recent years, France displays a decrease in the salience



attributed to foreign policy issues by political parties, falling to 4.9 per cent in the 2010–2014 period and to 3.6 per cent in the 2015–2020 period. Fluctuations are also registered in the German case, albeit with higher levels of salience when compared to France. In Germany, the period between 1975 and 1989 is characterised by a level of salience higher than 10 per cent, with a peak in the 1980–1984 period (17.1 per cent). Since then, political parties' attention to foreign policy issues decreased, albeit not in a linear fashion. The period 2010–2014 is marked by the lowest emphasis on the foreign policy issue (4.9 per cent), but already in 2015–2020, we saw an increase (7.7 per cent). In Spain, the attention to foreign policy issues has declined over time. Between 1975 and 1999, parties' salience has been always higher than 5 per cent, with a peak in the 1985–1989 period (7.3 per cent). Since then, the degree of salience has been constantly lower than 5 per cent, with a fall in the 2015–2020 period (3.1 per cent). Greece is characterised – in general – by a high degree of salience of the foreign policy issue, quite often higher than 5 per cent. In this respect, the only points in time with falls on this trend are in 1985–1989 (5.3 per cent), 1990–1994 (6.4 per cent) and in 2005–2009 (4.9 per cent). Then, in more recent years, Greece is characterised by the highest degree of salience among the six countries – i.e., 12.4 per cent in 2010–2014 and 11.7 per cent in 2015–2020. Finally, in Poland, the degree of salience of foreign issues shows fluctuations and no regular pattern. In the 1995–2004 period, the attention has been relatively low (2.6 per cent), growing a bit in the following periods and reaching its peak in 2010–2014 (7.7 per cent).


## 3. France

### 3.1 Individual party stances on foreign policy issues

Figure 3 shows the degree of aggregate salience attributed to foreign policy issues by the relevant French parties in the 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017 elections. Looking at the systemic emphasis on the foreign policy issue, the 2012 elections have been characterised by the highest degree of salience (8 per cent), boosted by the attention paid to the issue both by the PS (9.8 per cent) and the UMP (10.2 per cent). Still, the party showing the highest degree of emphasis on foreign policy issues across the different elections has been the FN in 2002 (14.7 per cent), then led by Jean-Marie Le Pen. At the systemic level, the elections with the lowest foreign policy salience took place in 2017, and such score has been mainly driven by the

remarkably low salience exhibited by the most successful party in this electoral competition: LREM (1.4 per cent).

**Figure 3** | Foreign policy salience in France by political parties (2002–2017)




Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

When we disaggregate the foreign policy salience by parties, some important distinctions emerge. The PS' emphasis on foreign policy has been mainly driven by positive mentions of Internationalism. Still, both in 2007 and 2012, respectively 2 and 3.3 per cent of PS' manifestos have been devoted to discussing increases in military expenditures. However, in the 2017 manifesto, no single quasi-sentence referred to foreign policy.

Figure 4 shows the disaggregated salience attributed to foreign policy by the UMP/R. Until 2012, the foreign policy salience has been mainly driven by the positive emphasis on Internationalism. Still, we report an inverse tendency in 2017, where 1.2 per cent of the manifesto has been devoted to negative references to Internationalism. Regarding the references to military expenditures, since 2007 they are quite constant in the UMP/R's manifestos (between 1.3 and 1.6 per cent).

**Figure 4** | UMP/R's foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2002–2017)



Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).


Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

Figure 5 displays the disaggregated foreign policy salience for the *Front National*. The overall high salience displayed by the party has been mainly driven by the positive emphasis on the military, which reached the highest peak in 2002 (5.4 per cent) and the lowest fall in 2012 (2.7 per cent). Furthermore, the party also showed negative views on internationalism. Among the main French parties, only the radical left (FdG/FI) used negative mentions of the military (0.7 per cent in 2012 and 0.5 per cent in 2017) in the manifestos. Moreover, FdG/FI's emphasis on foreign policy issues has been mainly driven by positive mentions of peace (0.4 per cent in 2012 and 2.2 per cent in 2017).

Finally, LREM is the one characterised by the lowest score on foreign policy issues. Still, it should be mentioned that in its 2017 manifesto the party did not emphasise any foreign policy subdimension, but positive mentions to military (1.4 per cent).



**Figure 5** | FN/RN's foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2002–2017)



Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

Looking at these MARPOR data, we can conclude that, in positional terms, almost all French relevant parties have been in favour of increasing military expenditures or have at least made positive references to the military in the 2002–2017 period. The only exception is represented by the radical left, which took a negative position on the military both in 2012 and 2017. As for their positions on Internationalism, French parties are in general associated with positive references to internationalism. Still, two exceptions should be mentioned. First, Les Républicains took a negative stance on this category in 2017, but this has been mainly due to the relative shortness of its manifesto. Indeed, the only two negative quasi-sentences on Internationalism referred to the need to reinforce France's sovereignty in the international arena and protecting the country from external threats. Second, the FN/RN displayed an ambivalent stance on Internationalism, by alternating positive and negative references across all elections taking place between 2002 and 2017.


### 3.2 Qualitative analysis of the French political parties' manifestos on foreign policy issues (2012–2017)

In 2012, the UMP affirmed to strengthen French participation within NATO and speed up the construction of a common European defence. Regarding the strategic perspective on global governance, the UMP stated that “the G20 should replace the functions currently played by the G8”. The Républicains 2017 manifesto did not devote special attention to foreign policy issues. Still, the manifesto states to “assign 2 per cent of the GDP to defence”. Furthermore, the Républicains assert to “preserve French Nuclear submarine and air nuclear weapons”. Looking at the EU-defence perspective, the Républicains affirm that they “want to create a common European defence budget”.

In 2012, the PS affirmed its willingness to build world governance around the G20, strengthening the links with the emerging powers (Brazil, China, India) by increasing the centrality of multilateralism in international relations. The PS urged for interrupting the military operations in Afghanistan immediately. Finally, in 2012 the PS stated that “NATO must find again its role: the collective security”. The PS 2017 manifesto did not devote any attention to foreign policy issues, while defence is discussed in just one quasi-sentence referring to the European defence. In this context, the PS declared: “Europe must be powerful, more democratic, and oriented to social affairs. Europe must consolidate the security agreements against terrorism and the policies for the European defence”.

The FN 2012 manifesto affirmed that France must leave the NATO integrated command. The FN stated the goal to invest up to 2 per cent of the GDP in the military expenditures. The RN 2017 manifesto re-affirmed to “leave the NATO integrated command”. There are, furthermore, a couple of quasi-sentences proposing to increase military expenditures up to 2 per cent of the GDP. Furthermore, the FN demanded to add a 2 per cent minimum threshold for military expenditures to the French constitution. These increases in the military budget will help “shape a new multipolar equilibrium based on the equality of the nations”.

The FdG 2012 manifesto asked for the withdrawal of French troops from Afghanistan and leaving NATO. The manifesto declares that “France should break with NATO



and the foreign policy based on military intervention and power”. The FI 2017 manifesto suggested replacing NATO with an alternative “coalition of the people”. The manifesto also argued that “NATO has been created by the US to fight the Soviet Union, [...] now it is a US tool to extend its leverage in Europe”. The only organisation that, according to FI, can be considered responsible for collective security is the UN. Furthermore, France must abstain to join any military operations, excluding those supported by the UN. In terms of strategic alliances, FI calls for “halting the hypocritical alliance with the oil-monarchies of the Gulf”. The manifesto suggested reaching 0.7 per cent of the GDP for development cooperation.

The LREM proposes to increase defence expenditures up to 2 per cent of the GDP. Furthermore, the manifesto discusses the common European defence in the following terms: “We should start together with Germany the project of Europe of defence, grouping those countries that want to join our project and creating a budget for the European defence that will finance our common military expenditures”.


### **3.3 An overview of polarisation and dispersion on foreign policy issues in the French party system**

Figure 6 shows the degree of polarisation and dispersion on foreign policy issues among parliamentary parties in France.

In terms of polarisation, the data show no sign of polarisation on the Military in 2002. Since then, polarisation is boosted by anti-militarist stances issued by radical left parties in 2007 and 2012. In 2017, polarisation on Military decreased as the radical left (FI) softened its anti-militarism by introducing a military-related proposal on the voluntary military training for French citizens.

Focusing on Internationalism, the French party system registered a low (absent in 2007) degree of polarisation among parliamentary parties until 2012. Then, hostile positions on Internationalism appeared and polarised the issue. In terms of dispersion, due to the different salience attributed to foreign policy issues by French parties, we observe a converging trend, meaning that the manifestos of the French parties have become less dissimilar than they were in the past on foreign policy.

**Figure 6** | Polarisation and dispersion on military, internationalism and foreign policy issues in France (2002–2017)



Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.


## 4. Germany

### 4.1 Individual party stances on foreign policy issues

The salience attributed to foreign policy issues by relevant German parties did not significantly vary across parties and elections. Figure 7 shows that the elections marked by the lowest degree of salience have been in 2005 (6 per cent) and 2013 (5.3 per cent), while in other elections the attention floated from 7.6 per cent in 2009 to 8.1 per cent in 2021. If we look at the systemic salience from a long-term perspective, we can highlight a decrease in attention when compared with the 1970s and the 1980s. Still, we do not find any decreasing trend in the last 20 years. In terms of parties' differences in the attention devoted to foreign policy issues, Grünen, SPD, FdP and CDU/CSU all showed a degree of salience comprised between 4.8 per cent (SPD in 2013) to 9 per cent (CDU/CSU in 2021). The only party showing a quite distinctive degree of – low – attention to the issue has been AfD

in 2013 (2.7 per cent). Yet, AfD “aligned” to the standard attention devoted by the other actors in the system in the following elections (precisely 8.4 per cent in 2017 and 7.1 per cent in 2021).

**Figure 7** | Foreign policy salience in Germany by political parties (2002–2017)




Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

As for the parties’ emphasis on the individual issue, we can notice interesting differences. The Grünen’s attention to foreign issues seems mainly driven by three sub-issues: negative mentions of the Military, references to Peace and positive mentions of Internationalism. Still, the “pacifist” stance of the party has been softened in the last elections, when the Green Party dedicated 0.6 per cent of its manifesto to positive mentions of the Military.

Intriguingly, the SPD reveals a supply – on foreign policy issues – quite similar to the Grünen. Also in this case, the three main categories are negative mentions of the Military, Peace, and positive mentions of Internationalism. Nonetheless, the SPD also expanded its attention to positive mentions of the Military in the last two elections (0.7 per cent in 2017 and 1 per cent in 2021).




The salience devoted to the Military by the FdP shows a higher degree of attention toward positive mentions. The salience of this category is above 1 per cent in all the elections, but in 2013 (0.5 per cent). Still, also for FdP, the most salient sub-issue is represented by positive mentions of Internationalism. Furthermore, negative mentions of Military and pacifist quasi-sentences are addressed by the FdP across all the elections.

Figure 8 shows how the attention toward increasing military expenditures has been mainly driven by CDU/CSU. Across the examined elections the party always dedicated at least 1.5 per cent of its manifestos to discuss positive mentions of the Military, reaching two peaks in 2002 (4.8 per cent) and 2021 (3.3 per cent), respectively.


Finally, the newcomer radical right party – AfD – showed an interesting evolution of his supply. In the 2013 elections, when it ran on a liberal Eurosceptic platform, the party exclusively emphasised internationalist issues with no references to other sub-issues related to foreign policy. In the following elections, however, the party – moving toward the radical right family – devoted a higher attention to positive mentions of the Military and negative mentions of Internationalism (see Figure 9).

In terms of parties' positions on the Military, we find two “pacifist” parties with a prevalence of negative mentions (Grünen and SPD) and three parties supporting Military and military expenditures (CDU/CSU, FdP and AfD). In 2021, both Grünen and SPD moved toward a more neutral stance, devoting about the same number of quasi-sentences to positive and negative mentions toward the Military in their manifestos. Looking at the parties' positions on Internationalism, all the relevant German parties have a pro-internationalist stance, with the noteworthy exception of AfD. In the latter case, we registered a blurred positioning. In 2013, the party only dedicated quasi-sentences to positive mentions of Internationalism, thus assuming a pro-internationalist stance. In 2017 and 2021, the party dedicated almost the same number of quasi-sentences to both negative and positive references to Internationalism, thus holding a more neutral position.

**Figure 8** | CDU/CSU's foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2002–2021)



**Figure 9** | AfD's foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2013–2021)



Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).


Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.



## 4.2 An overview of polarisation and dispersion on foreign policy issues in the German party system

Figure 10 shows the degree of polarisation and dispersion on foreign policy issues in Germany.

**Figure 10** | Polarisation and dispersion on military, internationalism and foreign policy issues in Germany (2002–2021)



Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

In terms of polarisation, the data display a high degree of polarisation on the Military issue among parliamentary parties. Until 2017, as already pointed out, all parties had a negative stance on military and military expenditures. Despite the following reduction, the degree of polarisation remains high in 2021, due to the anti-militarist position of the parliamentary radical left party Linke. Regarding the polarisation on Internationalism, it is almost absent until 2013. Then, it increases as the AfD enters the national parliament with its “demarcationist” stance. In terms of dispersion on foreign policy salience, we observe quite low inter-party differences until 2013. With the entrance of AfD, however, the German parties’ manifestos appear to be more dissimilar than they were in the past.




## 5. Greece

### 5.1 Individual party stances on foreign policy issues

Figure 11 displays the salience of the foreign policy issue across parties in Greece. First, our analysis shows a high degree of inter-party variability in salience. Indeed, in the Greek sub-sample, some parties dedicated almost no attention to foreign policy issues in some elections (e.g., ND in 2007, 2009 and January 2015; SYRIZA in 2007; KKE in 2009; PASOK in 2012 and September 2015), while others devoted more than one-fifth of their manifestos to foreign policy issues (KKE in 2000 and January 2015; XA in 2012 and January 2015; ANEL in 2012 and January 2015). In terms of systemic salience, Greece is regularly above 5 per cent, excluding two elections (2007 and 2009). The highest degree of systemic salience has been reached at the general elections held in May 2012, followed by a decrease in the 2015 elections.

**Figure 11** | Foreign policy salience in Greece by political parties (2000–2015)




Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

The foreign-policy profile of the two main radical left parties in Greece (SYRIZA and KKE) is marked by the employment of an anti-imperialist discourse. Figure 12

shows how these kinds of references are diffused across elections in the SYRIZA manifestos, reaching a peak in May 2012 (10.9 per cent). In this election, we also see a peak in the attention paid to foreign policy by SYRIZA (18.5 per cent). Since then, the party decreased its attention to the issue and – to a certain extent – normalised its manifestos by including references to other issues like Internationalism and Peace. The party also assigned some attention to the positive mentions of the Military in the June 2016 elections (1 per cent); still, the negative mentions of the Military – indicating the willingness to reduce the military budget – continue to be prevalent (1.4 per cent) in this election.

**Figure 12** | SYRIZA's foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2000–2015)



Notes: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships– (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).


The SYRIZA's 2007 manifesto did not devote any quasi-sentences to the foreign policy issue.

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

The KKE profile is even more focused on the anti-imperialist issue than SYRIZA. Until the 2007 elections, this issue was also integrated with references to Internationalism and Peace. However, since 2012 the party's salience is almost entirely skewed in discussing the anti-imperialist issue, with only minor references to reducing the military budget in June 2012 (1.2 per cent) and to Internationalism in September 2015 (0.9 per cent).

Figure 13 displays the PASOK's attention to foreign policy across different sub-issues. Until 2009, the party shows a pattern in line with a centre-left governing party, focusing on Military, Internationalism, and Peace. Starting from 2012, however, the party reveals a fuzzy stance on foreign policy. In May 2012, the PASOK's manifesto shows a remarkably low degree of attention to the issue (0.5 per cent); then – only one month later (June 2012) – the party drafted a manifesto with a high emphasis on foreign policy (12.2 per cent), albeit entirely devoted to anti-imperialism (4.1 per cent) and Internationalism (8.1 per cent). Since then, the party's salience of foreign policy decreased in the two 2015 elections (4.5 per cent in January and 0.2 per cent in September).

**Figure 13** | PASOK's foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2000–2015)




Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

The emphasis on foreign policy displayed in the ND's manifestos is associated with fuzzy evolutionary patterns (Figure 14). In the 2000 and 2004 elections, the ND's manifestos can be framed as a classic centre-right ruling party's platform, with a high emphasis placed on increasing military expenditures (i.e., 4.3 per cent in 2000 and 2.8 per cent in 2004). Still, in 2007 the party assigned a very low degree of attention to foreign policy, discussing only positive mentions of the Military in

a few sentences (0.2 per cent). In the 2009 elections, no emphasis was placed on foreign policy issues by the ND. Then in the 2012 elections, ND presented the same electoral manifesto and its only statement on foreign policy referred to the Aegean disputes with Turkey. In September 2015, moreover, the ND's manifesto was also assuming anti-imperialist traits entirely focusing on the Greek memorandum.

**Figure 14** | ND's foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2000–2015)



Notes: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

The ND's 2009 and 2015-01 manifestos did not devote any quasi-sentences to the foreign policy issue.

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

Finally, ANEL and XA (two radical right parties) are those showing the highest foreign policy salience. ANEL centred its foreign policy supply on criticising Turkey and the memorandum. By contrast, XA focused more on the increase of the military budget.


Political positions on Military and Internationalism are stable and do not change across elections. SYRIZA and KKE are in favour of the reduction of the military expenditures and their manifestos are often characterised by negative mentions of the Military. On the contrary, PASOK, ND and XA – when they emphasise the military – always support the increase of the expenditure devoting positive quasi-

sentences to the Military. Regarding Internationalism, XA is always assuming negative stances, while KKE negative position toward Internationalism has been registered only in 2000 and 2004. ND, PASOK and SYRIZA are always assuming positive stances.

## 5.2 An overview of polarisation and dispersion on foreign policy issues in the Greek party system

Figure 15 displays the degree of polarisation and dispersion on foreign policy issues in Greece.


**Figure 15** | Polarisation and dispersion on military, internationalism and foreign policy issues in Greece (2002–2021)



Notes: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

The index of polarisation is calculated as the difference between the two most extreme positions on each issue among parliamentary parties. The index of dispersion is the standard deviation of the variables EU and foreign policy.

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.



In terms of polarisation among parliamentary parties, the data show a high degree of polarisation on both the military and internationalist issues. As already observed, ND and PASOK supported both Military and Internationalism until 2009, while KKE opposed militarism with almost no emphasis on the internationalist issue. By contrast, SYRIZA combined both anti-military and pro-internationalist stances. In the 2012 elections, ANEL and XA contributed to strengthening the polarisation trends on these issues.

Finally, in 2015 the negative references to Internationalism disappeared from the manifestos of the Greek relevant parties, leading to the absence of polarisation. In the January 2015 elections, moreover, no party campaigned on the reduction of the military expenditures. In terms of dispersion, as anticipated, the Greek manifestos show the highest diversity among the countries under examination; the trend slightly decreased in the September 2015 elections but remains the highest among our set of countries.


## 6. Italy

### 6.1 Individual party stances on foreign policy issues

In Italy, the political parties' attention toward foreign policy issues showed fluctuations across parties and elections (Figure 16). Still, from a comparative perspective, the parties' attention to foreign policy issues is quite low. The elections with the highest degree of systemic attention were in 2001 (3.1 per cent), 2006 (3.1 per cent) and 2018 (3 per cent), while the 2008 (1.2 per cent) and 2013 elections (1.3 per cent) were marked by a very low degree of salience. At the party level, the attention paid to foreign policy is regularly lower than 3 per cent. Still, higher degrees of salience have been provided by the DS & DL in 2001 (5.9 per cent) and 2006 (5.1 per cent) elections, and by FI (6.3 per cent) and FdI (4.4 per cent) in 2018.



**Figure 16** | Foreign policy salience in Italy by political parties (2001–2018)




Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

In 2001 and 2006, the DS and the DL run in a common coalition, presenting – together with other parties – the same electoral manifesto. In 2001, their most salient sub-issues were positive mentions of the Military (1.9 per cent) and Internationalism (3.1 per cent). In 2006, the parties attributed a slightly higher salience to Internationalism (4.4 per cent), whereas the attention given to the Military decreased (0.6 per cent). Furthermore, few quasi-sentences were dedicated to Peace (0.5 per cent).

The PD was established in 2007 following the merge of DS, DL and other minor centre-left parties. In 2008 – the first election in which PD ran – the manifesto showed an interesting pattern on foreign policy, including the emphasis on multilateralism (0.5 per cent), Peace (0.5 per cent), disarmament (0.5 per cent) and Internationalism (0.5 per cent), also supporting the special relationships with US (1 per cent). In 2013, the party only emphasised Internationalism (1.5 per cent), while the following manifesto (2018) devoted a few quasi-sentences to the Military (0.3 per cent) and Peace (0.1 per cent).

**Figure 17** | PD's foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2008–2018)



Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.


From 2001 up to 2013, the centre-right parties in our sub-sample (FI/PdL, AN, PdL) presented coalition manifestos together with other centre-right allies. These manifestos are characterised by a very low degree of foreign policy salience in 2001 (1.1 per cent), 2006 (0.8 per cent), and 2013 (0.5 per cent). In 2008, no quasi-sentence was devoted to foreign policy issues.

In 2018, the League's attention toward foreign policy increased as compared with the previous period, still occupying a very modest scope in the manifesto (2.7 per cent, see Figure 18). The LN emphasis was driven by positive mentions of the Military (1 per cent) and Internationalism. Regarding Internationalism, in particular, we register almost an equal percentage of positive (0.8 per cent) and negative (0.7 per cent) references.

In 2018, FI increased its foreign policy salience more markedly than the League. Also in this case, however, the most salient sub-issues were positive mentions of the Military (2.1 per cent) and negative mentions of Internationalism (3.1 per cent).



**Figure 18** | LN/the League's foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2001–2018)




Notes: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

The LN's 2008 manifestos did not devote any quasi-sentences to the foreign policy issue.

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

In 2013, FdI did not devote any quasi-sentence to foreign policy issues. In 2018, its salience increased (4.4 per cent), driven by the party's emphasis on the Military (3.3 per cent). Similarly, also the M5S did not emphasise foreign policy issues in 2013, while it presented a supply focused on Internationalism (1 per cent), disarmament (1 per cent) and anti-imperialism (0.5 per cent) in 2018 (see Figure 19).

**Figure 19** | Foreign policy issue salience of M5S and FdI by sub-categories across elections (2013–2018)



Notes: Items included: Foreign special relationships+ (per101), Foreign special relationships– (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

The M5S and FdI's 2013 manifestos did not devote any quasi-sentences to the foreign policy issue. Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

In terms of parties' positioning on the Military, relevant Italian parties are divided on the issue. DS & DL (2001, 2006), FI, AN, LN/L and FdI show pro-military positions. Both in 2008 and 2018 the PD tended to support disarmament in its manifestos, while no quasi-sentence has been dedicated to either a positive or negative reference to the Military in 2013. The M5S did not discuss foreign policy issues in 2013, while it assumed a pro-disarmament position in 2018.

Finally, almost all Italian parties turn out to be supportive of Internationalism and multilateralism. However, exceptions can be found within the centre-right camp in 2018, when the League, FI and FdI explicitly claimed the need to restore national sovereignty in the international arena.


## 6.2 Qualitative analysis of the Italian political parties' manifestos on foreign policy issues (2008–2018)

The PD 2008 manifesto is quite concise on foreign policy, but it shows support for multilateralism and a preference toward disarmament: “Italy should choose multilateral strategies for international peace missions”; “Italy should be against the increase of military expenditures”; and “Europe and the US together make everything easier”. In the 2013 manifesto, the PD declares that the EU is the centre of its foreign policy, but there are no details on more specific issues. In the 2018 manifesto, the PD claims that the “European common defence and security policy represents a crucial step for the EU integration process”. The PD suggests that the EU should create “a new budget for the European defence that could be invested in creating a common border police and seacoast guard”. Then, “the EU should create a European intelligence service”. And finally, “the EU should create a common market for the defence”.

The PdL 2008 manifesto did not devote any quasi-sentence to foreign policy. In the 2013 manifesto, the PdL affirms that “Italy should be a central actor in Europe, within NATO, in the euro-Mediterranean dialogue and the relationships with the East”. The FI 2018 manifesto proposes “to increase military expenditures by reaching the average expenditures of the European partners”.

In 2008 and 2013, the LN’s manifestos are the same adopted by the PdL (see above). In its 2018 manifesto the LN supports the strengthening of the relationship with the “Trump administration”. Still, the League argues that “Russia is not a threat, but a partner for both NATO and the EU” and that “the relationship with Russia should be softened and not being perceived in antithesis with the country’s relationships with the US”.

The M5S 2013 manifesto did not devote any quasi-sentence to foreign policy issues. In the 2018 manifesto, the M5S proposes “to reduce military expenditures by dismissing the properties of the ministry of Defence”. Furthermore, the M5S aims to decrease the public’s support for the military industry, shifting it to other economic sectors. The M5S argues that the unipolar rule established by the US has failed. In this respect, the M5S supports a new global order based on the refusal



of colonialism and respect for self-determination principles. The M5S affirms that Italy should withdraw from all its agreements with NATO. In this respect, M5S claims that NATO diverged from the Italian interests since the end of the Cold War. The M5S also denounces the support that “our government provided to oil-monarchies and Turkey”. According to the M5S, the economic sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia are against the country’s interests. Italy should abolish the sanctions and should rebuild its relationship with Russia. The manifesto defines Russia as “a commercial, economic, cultural and historical partner for Italy and Europe. An essential country to solve the international crisis and a friendly partner to build a new multipolar equilibrium”.

The FdI 2013 manifesto did not devote any quasi-sentence to foreign policy, while that of 2018 recommends to increase military expenditures, reaching the average of other European countries.


### **6.3 An overview of polarisation and dispersion on foreign policy issues in the Italian party system**

Figure 20 shows the degree of polarisation and dispersion on foreign policy issues in Italy.

In terms of polarisation among parliamentary parties, the data display a high degree of polarisation on the Military in 2001, 2013 and 2018. As already pointed out, no political party devoted any quasi-sentence to the Military (neither positive nor negative) in the 2006 and 2008 elections.

Similarly, the polarisation on Internationalism is absent before the 2018 election, while it increased after the “sovereigntist” turn of the Italian centre-right forces. As for dispersion, the degree of dissimilarity among Italian parties is quite low. However, this is due to the fact that most of the parties are paying very limited attention to foreign policy issues.

**Figure 20** | Polarisation and dispersion on military, internationalism and foreign policy issues in Italy (2001–2018)



Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).


Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

## 7. Poland

### 7.1 Individual party stances on foreign policy issues

In the Polish party system, foreign policy salience shows relevant fluctuations across elections. However, relevant political parties do not display huge variations in terms of aggregated salience within each election. In this respect, the inter-party difference on salience is never higher than 4 per cent in each election. Looking at the systemic trends, the salience attributed to foreign policy issues has been quite marginal in the first two elections of the 21st century (below 2 per cent). Afterwards, we witness an increase, with a peak in the 2011 elections (10.7 per cent), followed by a linear decrease (7.3 per cent in 2015 and 4.4 per cent in 2019).

**Figure 21** | Foreign policy salience in Poland by political parties (2001–2019)




Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

Moving the analysis to individual relevant parties, Figure 22 displays PO's emphasis on foreign policy sub-issues. First, during the 2001 and 2005 elections, PO did not devote any quasi-sentence to foreign policy issues. Then, from 2007 onwards, its attention has been mainly driven by a positive emphasis on the Military. Furthermore, mentions of special relationships have also been made and they are associated with the US and Germany (positive) and Russia (negative). In terms of fluctuation across elections, PO follows the trends registered in the systemic salience (peak in 2011, then a decline in the two most recent elections).

**Figure 22** | PO's foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2000–2019)



Notes: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships– (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).


The PO's 2001 and 2005 manifestos did not devote any quasi-sentences to the foreign policy issue. Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

Figure 23 shows the foreign policy salience exhibited by PIS. Also in this case, the fluctuations are quite evident, following the party system average trend. Furthermore, the PIS' salience appears to be driven by the positive mentions of the Military; the mentions of special relationships are addressed to the US, Germany and Russia. Moreover, PIS also negatively emphasised Internationalism in the 2005, 2015 and 2019 elections.

In terms of parties' positioning, the relevant parties analysed showed preferences toward increasing and strengthening the military. On Internationalism, SLD and PO manifested a pro-internationalist stance across elections, and the same appears in PIS' manifestos in 2007 and 2011. Still, in 2005 PIS dedicated more quasi-sentences emphasising negative mention of Internationalism, while in 2015 and 2019 its position is blurred, emphasising both negative and positive features of Internationalism.



**Figure 23** | PiS' foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2000–2019)



Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).


Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

## 7.2 An overview of polarisation and dispersion on foreign policy issues in the Polish party system

Figure 24 shows the degree of polarisation and dispersion among parliamentary parties on Military and Internationalism in Poland. As for the military, the only parliamentary parties assigning negative mentions to this category in their manifestos are the Left and Democrats, PSL and especially Palikot Movement. The latter is the driver of polarisation both in 2011 and 2015. On Internationalism, the polarising tendencies are due to the negative – or blurred – stances shown by PiS in 2005, 2015, and 2019. Finally, the Polish manifestos show comparatively a low dispersion score that reaches its highest values in 2011, which is also the year of maximum systemic salience.



**Figure 24** | Polarisation and dispersion on military, internationalism and foreign policy issues in Poland (2001–2019)



Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.


## 8. Spain

### 8.1 Individual party stances on foreign policy issues

Figure 25 shows the salience of foreign policy issues across parties in Spain. The results show that the two Spanish mainstream parties, PSOE and PP, are those keeping the attention to foreign issues high across elections. Specifically, the PSOE's attention to foreign policy falls below 5 per cent only in the 2011 elections (4.5 per cent), while the PP's lowest scores are registered in the 2000 (4.8 per cent) and 2019 elections (4 per cent). IU – before its strategic partnership with Podemos – exhibited a degree of salience similar to the mainstream parties. As for the newcomers, Podemos is slightly above the 2 per cent threshold in 2015 and 2016, while it further declines its attention in the 2019 elections. Ciudadanos shows

higher attention than Podemos – albeit lower than PP and PSOE – in the 2015 (4.4 per cent) and 2016 (4.6 per cent) elections.

**Figure 25** | Foreign policy salience in Spain by political parties (2000–2019)



Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).


Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

Still, in the 2019 elections, the party's attention falls below 3 per cent, while the radical right party VOX presented the highest salience on foreign policy issues (i.e., slightly below 6 per cent). In terms of systemic trends, the Spanish party system experienced a linear increase until 2008 (7 per cent); since then, the party system's attention started declining and reached 4 per cent in the 2019 elections.

Figure 26 shows the emphasis on the foreign policy sub-issues of the PSOE. Its most emphasised category is Internationalism (positive). Until the 2008 elections, PSOE also devoted some salience to negative mentions of the military and in this respect – again until 2008 – these negative mentions are higher than the quasi-sentences supporting the military. However, this trend is reversed starting from

the 2011 elections.

**Figure 26** | PSOE's foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2000–2019)




Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

Figure 27 displays the salience devoted to foreign policy sub-issues by the PP. In this case, we can detach three main categories until 2011: Internationalism positive, Military positive and Special Relationship positive. The latter mainly refers to cooperation with Latin American countries. Starting from the 2015 elections, the attention is entirely devoted to positive mentions of both Internationalism and the Military. As for the latter, the PP is the party showing the highest salience in the 2015 elections, scoring an emphasis equal to 4.4 per cent.

**Figure 27** | PP's foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2000–2019)



Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.


The Ciudadanos' foreign policy salience is mainly driven by its emphasis on the Military (positive), which is relatively constant across elections (between 1.8 and 2.2 per cent). The other relevant category – albeit declining in the 2019 elections – is represented by positive mentions of Internationalism.

VOX's foreign policy salience is stable and coherent with its inclusion within the radical right family in the 2019 elections. Indeed, the most emphasised categories are represented by military positive (respectively 2.5 and 2.8 per cent), followed by negative mentions of internationalism (2 per cent in both elections).

Finally, the IU's supply is in line with its radical left profile. Indeed, the three most emphasised subcategories are negative mentions of Military, Peace, and positive mentions of Internationalism. As for Podemos (see Figure 28), its supply is similar to the IU profile in the 2015 and 2016 elections, with a clearer emphasis on Anti-

Imperialism. Still, the 2019 elections signal a change in the Podemos discourse. Indeed, the most salient category in these manifestos is represented by the military (0.9 per cent in April and 0.8 per cent in November).

**Figure 28** | Podemos' foreign policy salience by sub-categories across elections (2015–2019)




Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

## 8.2 Qualitative analysis of the Spanish political parties' manifestos on foreign policy issues (2008–2019)

The IU 2008 manifesto denounces the “US imperial interest” and argues that Spain should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. In 2008, IU affirms that “the common security and defence policy should be developed as a cornerstone of a European pacifist and antinuclear stance”. In the same year, the party also suggests that “the EU should acquire the capacity to deploy peacekeeping missions around the world”. “The US military bases in the Spanish territory should be converted into bases managed by the UN”. The 2008 manifesto says that “Spain must refuse the



US unipolar order based on globalisation and it should relaunch a new multipolar order based on peace and democracy”. Finally, the IU asks for a referendum on the Spanish belonging to NATO. The 2011 IU manifesto questions “the imperial politics carried out by the US and NATO”. In this respect, IU criticises the Zapatero government (2004–2012) for conceding the country’s military bases to NATO. The EU common security and defence policy, according to IU 2011, “failed with the war in Libya. The EU is not a real actor of peace. It is supporting the US’s request for an increase in military expenditures, and it is not supporting the democratisation within the UN”. In this respect, the IU says that it aims to change the EU common security and defence policy architecture in a radical way.

Taking the opposite stance, the PP 2008 manifesto declares that “Spain’s membership of NATO is the most important element for the security of the country and the Western collective defence” and that Spain “must support the European common security and defence policy”. The PP 2008 manifesto argues that “the Spanish participation in international missions sponsored by the UN, NATO and the EU have allowed Spanish troops to show their social prestige”. The manifesto also suggests strengthening the Spanish relationship with the US. In the 2008 manifesto, the PP affirms that “Europe needs its troops and that it should defend its values (rule of law, freedom, equality, pluralism, and democracy) outside its borders”. The PP asserts that Spain should also invest in its relationships with Russia. In the 2011 manifesto, the PP re-affirms that the US represents the most precious ally for Spain and that “Atlanticism is a fundamental value for Europe and the world”. In the same manifesto, it also claims that it will support the EU’s common security and defence policy. In its 2015 manifesto, the PP declares that it will respect all the decisions taken by NATO during the 2014 Newport (Galles) meeting, explicitly supporting the proposed increase of military expenditures. In addition, the party affirms that the EU external service should be strengthened and that it should be involved in all international debates. In the 2016 manifesto, the PP reasserts that Spain must respect all the decisions taken by NATO during the 2014 Newport (Galles) meeting. By including this reference, the party reiterates its stance on the need for Spain to increase its military expenditures. In the 2016 manifesto, the PP also supports the development of a common security and defence policy. Furthermore, it indicates that Spain must strengthen transatlantic relationships with the US. At the same time, the PP contends that Spain must preserve a dialogue with Russia, asking for the respect of the Minsk agreements.





In the following manifesto, issued in 2019, the PP argues that “NATO is the most important element of Spanish foreign policy”. In this respect, “Spain must strengthen the transatlantic relationships with the US to be a hub for the Atlantic, regarding economy, energy, security, culture and digitalisation”. The PP promotes the European common policy of defence and supports all the military operations sponsored by NATO and the US.

The PSOE 2008 manifesto claims that “the EU should be more engaged with the rest of the World, sponsoring peace, democracy, security, human rights, sustainable developments, and actions against climate change”. The PSOE supports the common security and defence policy and argues that the EU should participate with one voice in all international organisations. In addition, the PSOE supports the creation of a transatlantic agreement between the EU and the US. Furthermore, the party aims to strengthen the relationships between NATO and the EU. Regarding the cooperation with Russia, the PSOE 2008 manifesto says: “Russia is a crucial actor. We want to strengthen our cooperation with Russia both in bilateral terms and through the EU. A stable Russia – with democracy and human rights protection – is a crucial feature for world security”. The PSOE 2011 manifesto indicates that the EU must be active with only one voice within the international organisations. Furthermore, the PSOE supports the common security and defence policy to extend the defence and the promotion of European interests around the world. The PSOE supports the creation of a transatlantic agreement between the EU and the US. In its 2015 manifesto, the PSOE affirms that the industry of security and defence is important for the Spanish economy, and it should be supported and integrated with that of other European countries. The PSOE supports “the development of a common EU foreign policy”. For the PSOE 2015 manifesto, the relationships with the US are the central focus of both Spanish and EU foreign policy. The PSOE argues that the external EU service should be strengthened. The 2015 PSOE manifesto states that the “EU should create a military alliance that will react in case of threat or attack against one member state”. In 2015, the PSOE supports the creation of a European Army. The PSOE 2016 manifesto argues that the military industry in Spain should be supported and that it represents a crucial player in the process of re-industrialisation. In the 2016 manifesto, the PSOE suggests that the EU should lead a multilateral order based on the G20. The EU must strengthen its common security and defence policy. The US is the main actor both for Spain and the EU, the Atlantic relationships must be strengthened. According to the 2016



PSOE manifesto, strengthening European security means strengthening NATO. Spain should also support a dialogue with Russia to increase mutual security. In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, the agreement must be respected with no external interference. According to the 2016 PSOE manifesto, the EU should create a European Army. The EU should be integrated within the NATO Integrated Command. The PSOE 2016 manifesto suggests that military expenditures should be increased. In the program issued in 2019, the PSOE's references to foreign policy are quite general. There is a mention to the "strengthening of the agreements with the EU, NATO, the UN and G20", and one that expresses the party's endorsement for the creation of a European Army.

In its 2015 manifesto, Ciudadanos declares that NATO is a central feature of Spanish foreign policy, and that Spain must support NATO and the US in their fight against Islamic terrorism in the Middle East. Spain should contribute to developing the EU external action service in order to strengthen EU diplomacy. Regarding Russia, Europe must preserve a constructive dialogue. According to the 2015 manifesto, Spain must support a reform of the tools of the EU common security and defence policy. Ciudadanos also supports the creation of a common European Army. Furthermore, the party claims that the EU must take a unity position within international organisations. Ciudadanos also proposes to set the target for development cooperation at 0.7 per cent of the GDP. In the 2015 manifesto, Ciudadanos aims to increase the military expenditures, by reaching the average of the EU countries. The 2016 manifesto also underlines the need to strengthen the common security and defence policy. In this respect, according to the party, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy should be the only voice of the EU within the international organisations, and it should be responsible in front of the European Parliament. Moreover, in line with the previous manifesto of 2015, the 2016's one also stated that the EU should create a European Army. Ciudadanos also affirms that Spain must respect the agreements with NATO, and it has to develop more deep bilateral relationships with the US and France. Finally, the Ciudadanos manifesto issued in April 2019 promised to improve the conditions and the equipment of military personnel and the army. Moreover, the party indicates 0.7 per cent of the GDP as a target for development cooperation.

In the 2015 manifesto, Podemos demands the revision of the agreement with the US on the concession of the military bases on the Spanish territory. In this





respect, it states that “the participation of Spain in the US anti-missile defence represents a threat against Spanish security”. Podemos aims to increase Spanish autonomy within NATO. At the same time, the party aims to develop a common security policy within the EU. Podemos posits that NATO is a destabilising factor for European security; that the EU must be the leader of a new alliance of the European countries; and that Russia should be integrated into this Euro-centric security framework. According to Podemos, Spain should reach the 0.7 per cent target for development cooperation. In 2016, Podemos’ manifesto suggests the need for a new international multilateral agenda. In this respect, Podemos aims to rediscuss the agreement allowing the presence of US military bases on the Spanish territory. Furthermore, according to Podemos, Spain must be autonomous from NATO and should invest in a common security and defence policy to deal with foreign issues from a purely European perspective. Hence, Podemos proposes a new architecture for the European defence, built on the actual OSCE framework and aiming to replace the role of NATO. The 2016 manifesto argues that 0.7 per cent of the GDP should be invested in development cooperation. In the manifesto issued in April 2019 Podemos supports replacing NATO with the European defence. Moreover, Podemos supports the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

The VOX manifesto issued in April 2019 supports the increase of military expenditures. However, the manifesto mentioned neither specific issues nor EU common defence and security policy. The manifesto issued in November 2019 is again very elusive on foreign policy issues. Still, VOX affirms the willingness to increase military expenditures. Furthermore, the manifesto says that Spain should participate in all the military missions fighting terrorism around the world.


### **8.3 An overview of polarisation and dispersion on foreign policy issues in the Spanish party system**

Figure 29 displays the polarisation and dispersion trends of Military, Internationalism and Foreign Policy Issues in Spain (2000–2019). The high level of polarisation in the military reveals the positioning of the Spanish parties on this sub-issue. On the one hand, the rightist parties (PP and, more recently, Ciudadanos and VOX) have been always in favour of increasing military expenditures. On the other hand, the radical left (IU and, more recently, PODEMOS) has always dedicated more space to negative mentions of the military. Furthermore, the PSOE displayed a more anti-

militaristic stance until 2008.

With regard to internationalism, the parties positioning in Spain has been characterised by positive mentions of internationalism. This trend changed after VOX's success, which politicised sovereigntist stances. Finally, in terms of dispersion, we can observe a limited variance among relevant parties' foreign policy salience; moreover, this trend is further declining in the most recent elections.

**Figure 29** | Polarisation and dispersion on military, internationalism and foreign policy issues in Spain (2000–2019)




Note: Items included: Foreign special relationships + (per101), Foreign special relationships – (per102), Anti-Imperialism (per103), Military + (per104), Military – (per105), Peace (per106), Internationalism + (per107), Internationalism – (per109).

Source: Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection*, cit.

## Conclusions

This study provides a detailed overview of the party positions on foreign and security policy over the last two decades, covering the years from 2000 to 2020. The



main result is the confirmation that, in the countries under examination, foreign policy issues and especially EU foreign, security and defence policy have been only marginally addressed in the parties' electoral manifestos. It is interesting to note, however, that while there is no clear trend in salience at the aggregate level across party families, since 2010 it was in the nationalist party family that foreign policy issues are becoming more salient.

Of the six countries considered, France, Italy, and Spain are those that show the lowest degree of salience in the 2015–2020 period. Greece shows no linear trend, but foreign policy issues become more salient in the 1995–1999 and 2010–2020 periods. In France, all main parties, with the exception of the radical left, are in favour of an increase in military expenditures, and in the 2012 elections foreign policy issues became more topical. Different parties' stands are registered about the French role within NATO and on European security. Italy is the case in which foreign and security policy is the least salient. All main parties support internationalism and multilateralism, although some nationalist parties show increasingly sovereigntist tendencies from 2018 on. In Germany, all relevant parties but AfD have a pro-internationalist stance. In Spain, the party manifestos show support for the creation of a European army among the mainstream parties, which also endorse the enhancement of the role of NATO in European security affairs. Finally, in Poland, foreign policy issues are not salient, except for a peak in 2011. All Polish parties show a positive attitude towards the increase of military expenditures, while they are divided on internationalism.

Another take regards parties' views of their country's relations with Russia. Party manifestos analysts focused their attention on the topic predominantly in 2014, with the return of Russia's assertiveness in international affairs through the annexation of Crimea and the following conflict in Ukraine. Before the Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, for which there is yet no systemic data on party manifestos across the six countries considered here, only some Italian, Polish, and Spanish parties showed some stand on relations with Russia. Specifically, Italian parties focused on the issue of sanctions, with two nationalist parties endorsing a lifting of sanctions (before 2022) as they view Russia as a "strategic partner". In Poland, before 2022 only one party (though an important one) expressed negative stands on the topic of special relations with Russia. Finally, in Spain, the discussion appears to be less defined but shared by all main parties, which suggested that Spanish-Russian

relations should have – somehow – improved (again, before 2022).

EU foreign and security policy remains a low salient issue for all parties: references to its various dimensions remain scattered, and attention is irregular in all countries. Overall, our analyses highlight a situation of low political salience and high “permissive consensus” on EU foreign and security policy among the public and bipartisan support among the elites. On this point, the extent to which these conditions can be exploited to move further down the path to increased European integration in this policy area seems to depend on whether and how this issue might become politicised. To study the conditions that might make this politicisation likely to happen is the object of our following studies within the JOINT project (both focus groups and the online survey). For the moment, we can hypothesise that these conditions are a combination of policy entrepreneurs and political factors able to mobilise people against such a process of integration, thus allowing them to blame a common foreign and security policy for something citizens care about (e.g., exploiting the worries of war or fuelling isolationist attitudes).

**Table 3** | Summary of parties’ standing on internationalism, military expenditures, NATO

|         | Internationalism     |                       | Military expenditures  |                               | NATO                 |             |
|---------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|-------------|
|         | Positive             | Negative              | Positive               | Negative                      | Positive             | Negative    |
| France  | PS; UMP/R            | UMP/R after 2017      | LREM                   | -                             | UMP/R                | FN; Fdg     |
| Germany | All                  | AfD                   | CDU/CSU; Fdp; AfD      | Grünen; SPD; Linke            | -                    | -           |
| Greece  | INDIK; PASOK; SYRIZA | XA                    | PASOK; ND; XA          | SYRIZA; KKE                   | -                    | -           |
| Italy   | All (until 2018)     | Lega; M5S since 2018) | DS&DL; FI; AN; NL; FdL | PD                            | PdL                  | M5S         |
| Poland  | SLD; PO; PIS         | -                     | All                    | Left & Democrats; PSL; Plikot | -                    | -           |
| Spain   | All                  | VOX                   | PP; Ciudadanos         | IU; Podemos                   | PP; Ciudadanos; PSOE | IU; Podemos |



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