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Pierangelo Isernia, Francesco Olmastroni, Rossella Borri and Carlotta Mingardi*

Abstract

This study offers an inventory of elite and public opinion surveys on EU foreign and security policy (EUFSP). It first provides an analytical overview of the most relevant literature and data on the topic while exploring the theme of foreign and security policy from the angle of political elites' attitudes and beliefs. In the second section, it focuses on the mass level, using public opinion data collected over the last two decades to explore European publics' support for EUFSP and their willingness to accept more integration in foreign and defence matters.

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Introduction

If there is an area on which scholars of international relations and EU studies agree that more research is needed, this is the study of domestic public opinion and political elites on European foreign and security policy. As Smith suggests, the role of public opinion in this policy is an "important area of opportunity for [European foreign policy] scholars".[1] Along similar lines, Krotz and Maher claim that "Taking domestic politics more systematically into account – whether viewed through historical institutionalist, constructivist, or rationalist lenses – could be one of the more significant contributions of this new field to the study of international relations".[2]

Any discussion on the attitudes of public opinion and elites towards EU Foreign and Security Policy (EUFSP) faces at least three challenges. The first challenge is conceptual. What are we talking about when we refer to European foreign and security policy? Hard to answer since both terms, "European" and "Foreign" (with the latter also including security and defence) policy are loaded and loose. As for the first term, this can have at least three meanings:[3] i) the national foreign policies of the European states; ii) the European coordination of national foreign policies, what is commonly referred to as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); iii) and, finally, the foreign policy of the EU institutions, as embodied in the European External Action Service. The second term – "foreign", "defence", "security" – is ambiguous as well. As Krotz and Maher contend, "no standard definition of foreign, security, or defense policy cooperation has emerged among the growing number of scholars who study it".[4]

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1 Michael E. Smith, "European Foreign Policy", in Robert A. Denemark and Renée Marlin-Bennett (eds), *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, Blackwell Reference Online, February 2016, p. 12.

2 Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, "International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and Security Policy", in *World Politics*, Vol. 63, No. 3 (July 2011), p. 572.

3 See Walter Carlsnaes, "Introduction", in Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen and Brian White (eds), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*, London, SAGE, 2004, p. 1.

4 Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, "International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and Security Policy", cit., p. 552. The array of acronyms both reflects these ambiguities and magnifies the confusion. We kept record of the followings acronyms: CSDP, coined in the Lisbon Treaty; Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); and, earlier on, European Political Cooperation (EPC). In their work, Cladi and Locatelli use CSDP as "a catch-all label, and [they] refer to CFSP, ESDP and EPC only as time-contingent experiences". See Lorenzo Cladi and Andrea Locatelli, "Introduction: On Theories, Paradigms and CSDP", in Lorenzo Cladi and Andrea Locatelli (eds), *International Relations Theory and European Security: We Thought*

The second challenge is empirical: where we really stand in terms of integration on foreign and security policy. Ojanen suggests that the way we assess the progress of integration in this area very much depends on our views and assumptions about integration and international relations. "The way we frame the research problems, why we pose the questions we pose depends on our views and assumptions about integration and international relations".[5] It might well be that because this area is so much under-theorised (see the next challenge), these views and assumptions are only loosely connected to theoretical statements and made explicit. Indeed, studies on this topic are only implicitly theoretical. On this point, ambivalent and contradictory statements are the rule. As an example, Oppermann and Höse define EUFSP as "one of the most dynamic and contested fields of European integration",[6] but the list of references (note 1, p. 149) they quote exudes uncertainty rather assertiveness, with titles like "built on rock or sand?", a "policy without substance", and "hanging together or hanging separately".[7]

Finally, a third challenge is theoretical. European foreign and security policy is, turning Conan Doyle on his head, a dog that should not bark; and there are several reasons for claiming this.[8] As Ojanen points out, European integration theories explain "the absence of security and defence policy integration in the EU instead

We Knew, London/New York, Routledge, 2016, p. 7. In his chapter, Duke remembers that "the policy area originally evolved with the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which was formally launched at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. A decade later, with the advent of the Lisbon Treaty, ESDP became CSDP (and for a brief, and confusing, period it was even CEDSP!)." See Simon Duke, "The Common Security and Defense Policy", in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 22 November 2016, p. 3.

5 Hanna Ojanen, "Explaining the ESDP: Theoretical Grips on Recent Developments", in Bo Huldt et al. (eds.), *European Security and Defence Policy. A European Challenge*, Stockholm, Swedish National Defense College, 2006, p. 4-5.

6 Kai Oppermann and Alexander Höse, "Public Opinion and the Development of the European Security and Defence Policy", in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2007), p. 149.

7 Trevor Salmon, "The European Security and Defence Policy: Built on Rocks or Sand?", in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2005), p. 359-379; Alistair Shepherd, "The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: A Policy without Substance?", in *European Security*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2003), p. 39-63; Jolyon Howorth, "European Defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately?", in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (November 2001), p. 765-789.

8 See Jakob C. Øhrgaard, "International Relations or European Integration: Is the CFSP sui generis?", in Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (eds), *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 26-44, https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526137647.00008.

of accounting for its presence".[9] This will not come as a surprise for realists, since for them security and foreign policy is at the core of national sovereignty and can by no means supranationalised. More surprising is that even one of the main proponents of neofunctionalism, Ernst Haas, did not expect much integration on military and defence issues because – irrespective of the spillover effect – "functional contexts are autonomous. Integrative forces which flow from one kind of activity do not necessarily infect other activities, even if carried out by the same organization".[10] However, other perspectives argue exactly the opposite. Using a rational institutionalist perspective, Mérand and Angers suggest that "When it comes to defence, the EU's collective action problem is so evident that it defies the mind to think that the existence of this problem has not had more of an impact".[11]

More puzzling is to understand why so much debate has been going on among scholars despite the absence of security and defence policy integration. In 2007, Howorth tartly noticed that, while the EUFSP staff in Brussels was of only 200 persons, "there were many thousands of academics and students all over the world who engaged in study of the subject".[12] The figure of EUFSP staff has evidently grown significantly since then, and especially after the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), but it is still noteworthy that scholars were debating European foreign policy in big numbers well before the EU had started to develop its own foreign policy institutions and personnel. Be that as it may, no matter how crowded the field is, according to some it remains theoretically underdeveloped and normatively overdeveloped. As observed by Bickerton et al., "the field is characterized, with some exceptions, by an orientation towards description and prescription".[13] This situation can help explain the "empirical" (i.e., descriptive and atheoretical) approach to the study of this policy area. Moreover, as

9 Hanna Ojanen, "Explaining the ESDP: Theoretical Grips on Recent Developments", cit., p. 2.

10 Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process", in *International Organization*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer 1961), p. 373.

11 Frédéric Mérand and Kathleen Angers, "Military Integration in Europe", in Philipp Genschel and Markus Jachtenfuchs (eds), *Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The European Integration of Core State Powers*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 58.

12 Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 2nd ed., Basingstoke/New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 14.

13 Chris J. Bickerton, Bastien Irondelle and Anand Menon, "Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy", in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (January 2011), p. 9.

Tonra and Christiansen argue,

> the field of study in EPC/CFSP has been dominated by empirical accounts of decision-making, policy-making and regional or issue-based case studies. Only infrequently are such accounts grounded in an explicit theoretical framework and, even then, such analyses are often dominated by realist/rationalist accounts of state behaviour (Bretherton and Vogler 1999 is an important exception from a social constructivist perspective).[14]

Keeping the conceptual, empirical and theoretical challenges highlighted in the literature on EUFSP, this study aims to shed light over European elites' and general publics' views of it. For this purpose, the deliverable is organised into two main sections. The first offers an analytical overview of the most relevant literature and data exploring foreign and security policy from the angle of political elites' attitudes and beliefs. The second section is centred on the mass level. Focusing on public opinion data collected over the last two decades, it explores European publics' support for EUFSP as well as their willingness to accept more integration in foreign and defence matters.

1. Elites and European foreign and security policy

1.1 Introduction

If, as highlighted, multiple challenges of a different nature (conceptual, empirical, and theoretical) characterise the debate on EUFSP, there is a further obstacle when it comes to the study of political and bureaucratic elites with regard to this matter. Since foreign and defence policies are a typical elites' business, one could expect that much is known about what political and bureaucratic elites think of European foreign and security policy. Nothing is farther from the truth, with scholarly research showing a lack of empirical attention to European elites' views

[14] Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen, "The Study of EU Foreign Policy: Between International Relations and European Studies", in Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (eds), *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 4, https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526137647.00006. See also Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London/New York, Routledge, 1999.

and attitudes towards the issue. While in the United States a "cottage industry" on elites in foreign policy has grown over time, there is nothing comparable in Europe. Only in the last two decades the interest in what European elites think of foreign policy has (slowly) grown; still, scholarly research is far from offering a systematic interpretation of elites' attitudes and proclivities.[15] And this neglect is, in itself, surprising for two reasons. One is that a lot of claims are made about what the elites think or do on European foreign and security policy. Second, and even more intriguing, this neglect is not because of a lack of data. Indeed, as the following review will show, there are data available in Europe that might contribute to fill this gap.

While we will return to the reasons for this neglect in the conclusion, this first part of the deliverable starts with a review of the existing literature on political elites and foreign and security policy. After introducing the data on which our own review is built, we then discuss the main picture emerging from these data.

1.2 The literature

The study of elites (and political elites in particular) covers different angles. Our focus is on the attitudinal studies of political elites, especially members of parliaments (MPs) and of the European Parliament (MEPs), mostly through survey instruments. These studies look at elite attitudes either in isolation or as compared to the general public. In this regard, three main lines of research can be found, all of them – explicitly or implicitly – bringing in a comparison with the public: the structure of beliefs, the content of their beliefs, and the linkage between the beliefs (and behaviours) of elites and those of the public.

1.2.1 Structure of beliefs

Putnam suggested three reasons why studying elites' beliefs make more sense than studying their opinions when interested in explaining elites' political

[15] Liesbet Hooghe, "Europe Divided? Elites vs Public Opinion on European Integration", in *European Union Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 2003), p. 281-304, https://hooghe.web.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11492/2017/02/europe.divided.eup_.2003.pdf.

behaviour. First, "elite preferences often do not accurately predict outcomes".[16] Second, "a leader's behavior is a function, not just of his personal opinions, but also of the objective situation in which he finds himself".[17] Third, what is often more interesting to study in political analysis is not what has happened but what might happen, and "unless we understand how specific opinions fit into a broader pattern of beliefs, we can neither predict nor understand elite behavior".[18] For this reason, Putnam argues in favour of studying the "fundamental orientations" of leaders. This is what he does in his book *The Beliefs of Politicians*.[19] Following the line of thought according to which general orientations, belief systems or what are also called "predispositions"[20] are important predictors of attitudes towards foreign policy issues, the debate has revolved around what structure these beliefs have.

While Putnam adopted a comprehensive approach in deciding what to include into the politicians' belief system (specifically, in *The Beliefs of Politicians* Putnam discusses four dimensions: the cognitive, normative, interpersonal, and stylistic orientation), the literature on the content of the structure of beliefs in foreign policy has focused on a different, and narrower, set of dimensions. In particular, the discussion about the most appropriate way of describing the different dimensions through which leaders (and possibly the public) structure their foreign policy beliefs has evolved in three stages.

A first stage was opened by Caspary, who, quite in isolation at his time, criticised both Almond's mood theory (1950) and Converse's "non-attitudes" hypothesis,[21] suggesting that the American public's foreign policy attitudes could be aligned along a fundamental isolationist–internationalist continuum.[22] According to

16 Robert D. Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1976, p. 80.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Robert D. Putnam, *The Beliefs of Politicians. Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973.

20 Ibid. See also Ole R. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, Revised ed., Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2004, p. 258-266.

21 Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics", in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent*, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, p. 206-261. Published also in Critical Review, Vol. 18, No. 1-3 (2006), p. 1-74, https://doi.org/10.1080/08913810608443650.

22 William R. Caspary, "The 'Mood Theory': A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy", in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (June 1970), p. 536-547.

Caspary, World War II and the subsequent Cold War had created "a remarkable stability of strong popular support for an active U.S. role in world affairs".[23] Internationalism, in turn, was "an excellent predictor" of a wide range of policy questions.[24] This gave American leaders a "strong and stable 'permissive mood' toward international involvements".[25] However, Caspary nowhere claimed that this was true of the elites as well. In fact, the (untested) assumption was that most elites were internationalist at that time.

A second stage of discussion came with the Vietnam War breaking up the one-dimensional consensus of the Cold War. The still overwhelmingly internationalist American elites (and public) fractured themselves into different groups, depending on what role they saw America should be playing in the world. Besides the isolationist–internationalist dimension, a second dimension, alternatively dubbed the liberal and conservative version of internationalism by Mandelbaum and Schneider,[26] the militant and cooperative internationalism by Wittkopf[27] and the Cold War and Post-Cold War internationalism by Holsti[28] and Holsti and Rosenau,[29] was added. This produced a three-headed structure of beliefs,[30] since the second dimension cut across the internationalists alone. This three-headed structure was found for both elites and the general public.

At the end of the Cold War, a third stage set in and a new dimension was added: the unilateral versus multilateral one.[31] Again, public opinion and leaders were

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23 Ibid., p. 536.

24 Ibid., p. 537.

25 Ibid., p. 546.

26 Michael Mandelbaum and William Schneider, "The New Internationalisms. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy", in Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild and Robert J. Lieber (eds), *Eagle Entangled. U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World*, New York, Longman, 1979, p. 34-88.

27 Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, Durham/London, Duke University Press, 1990.

28 Ole R. Holsti, "The Three-Headed Eagle: The United States and System Change", in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 1979), p. 339-359.

29 Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "America's Foreign Policy Agenda: The Post-Vietnam Beliefs of American Leaders", in Charles W. Kegley and Patrick J. McGowan (eds), *Challenges to America. United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s*, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1979, p. 231-268.

30 Ibid.

31 See Rondald H. Hinckley, *People, Polls and Policy-Makers. American Public Opinion and National Security*, New York, Lexington Books, 1992; William O. Chittick, Keith R. Billingsley and Rick Travis, "A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs", in *International Studies Quarterly*,

found to be very close in the way they structure their beliefs.

No discussion of comparable scope can be found in Europe. In the United States, the political issue underpinning this theoretical debate was whether a stable support for a liberal, internationalist foreign policy existed and how sturdy it was – an issue that, occasionally, pops up in American discussion.[32] In Europe, elites faced a different kind of problems. In the 1950s, the issue was whether European elites would have been able to overcome their narrow nationalistic values and perspectives and join forces under the American leadership against the Soviet bloc.

Karl W. Deutsch and his collaborators pioneered the field, looking for the appearance of a pluralistic security community between Western European countries (more specifically France and Germany) and the United States,[33] with other studies following along the same path.[34] The empirical results showed European public opinion and leaders to be quite close to the United States and willing to partner with it. Using a variety of data sources like elite interviews, mass opinion polls, surveys of arms control and disarmament proposals, content analysis of prestige newspapers and economic transaction data, Deutsch and his collaborators found a robust link between the major European countries and the US.[35]

Vol. 39, No. 3 (September 1995), p. 313-331; more recently, Ole R. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, cit.

32 See for example Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, "Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States", in *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007), p. 7-44, https://www.belfercenter.org/node/85256; and contra Stephen Chaudoin, Helen V. Milner and Dustin H. Tingley, "The Center Still Holds: Liberal Internationalism Survives", in *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Summer 2010), p. 75-94.

33 See Karl W. Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control in the European Environment: A Summary Report", in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (June 1966), p. 354-365; Karl W. Deutsch, *Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance. Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1967; Karl W. Deutsch et al., *France, Germany and the Western Alliance. A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967; Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.

34 Morton Gorden and Daniel Lerner, "The Setting for European Arms Controls: Political and Strategic Choices of European Elites", in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 1965), p. 419-433; Morton Gorden and Daniel Lerner, *Euratlantica. Changing Perspectives of the European Elites*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1969; see also Lloyd Free, *Six Allies and a Neutral. A Study of the International Outlooks of Political Leaders in the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan and India*, New York, The Free Press, 1959.

35 Karl W. Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control in the European Environment", cit.; Karl W. Deutsch, Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance, cit.

A few years later (1965), using interviews with a panel of elites in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, Gorden and Lerner confirmed the fundamental pro-Western orientation of political elites.[36] Their study also showed interesting cross-national differences: while British and German elites leaned towards the Atlantic cooperation, French elites preferred European cooperation over reliance on the United States. In line with the prevalent image of the French as a maverick ally and German and the United Kingdom as faithful partners, these divergences reflected the meaning that each country's elites attached to the European integration project. These differences notwithstanding, the prevalent view among scholars and practitioners was that in both the United States and Europe during the 1960s an overall stable and unproblematic "Cold War consensus" on foreign policy issues existed at both the mass and elite level.[37]

No systematic study of elites' structure of beliefs on foreign and security policy can be found in Europe for more than two decades after the 1960s. This issue apparently appealed little to European scholars. The few available studies adopt quite diverse approaches and ask different research questions. In what is probably the closest attempt to replicate the American literature, Ziegler contended that Europeans structure their attitudes on a common Atlantic cooperation along a two-dimensional space – military versus non-military cooperation – producing a fourfold typology: Atlanticists, Military Allies, Isolationists and Dovish partners.[38] However, he relied on public opinion data only and did not attempt to apply this typology to elites.[39]

Even less systematic is the study (in Europe or elsewhere) of what the European elites think of European integration. Only in the last decade, two programmes of research have started to till this uncharted territory. Schmitt and Thomassen

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36 Morton Gorden and Daniel Lerner, "The Setting for European Arms Controls", cit., p. 429.

37 Richard C. Eichenberg, *Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe. Consensus Lost*, London, MacMillan, 1989; Michael Mandelbaum and William Schneider, "The New Internationalisms", cit.; Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus", in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 1992), p. 439-466.

38 Andrew H. Ziegler, "The Structure of Western European Attitudes towards Atlantic Co-operation: Implications for the Western Alliance", in *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (October 1987), p. 457-477.

39 Ibid.

explored the relationships between political elites (MEPs and MPs) and the public in European parliamentary elections[40] (and this is also relevant for what we discuss in the following sections). Hooghe studied what the Commission and the Council officials thought.[41] For this purpose, Hooghe carried out three waves of surveys with top EU-level officials, with the EUCIQ (European Commission in Question) project as the most systematic attempt to study what the Commission thinks of itself and the others.[42]

1.2.2 The structure of beliefs: elite and mass comparisons

This discussion about the structure of beliefs bears upon another stream of research, the one that explores the relationship between elites and public opinion. Three positions can be detected in this connection.

A first one claims that what marks the difference between elites and the public is the presence of a structure of beliefs among the former and the lack of it for the latter. This is the position made famous by Converse, who suggested that most of the public entertains only "non-attitudes".[43] However, it is also implied by those like Stouffer and McClosky et al. who claim that elite opinions are substantively better than those of the public (i.e., more enlightened, more open and more tolerant).[44]

A second position argues that elites and public attitudes are both structured, but in different ways. This position was first suggested by Lane, who distinguished "morselising" from true ideology,[45] then more explicitly put forward by Stimson

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40 Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen (eds), *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.

41 Liesbet Hooghe, *The European Commission and the Integration of Europe. Images of Governance*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001; Liesbet Hooghe, "Europe Divided? Elites vs Public Opinion on European Integration", cit.

42 See Hussein Kassim et al., *The European Commission of the Twenty-First Century*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.

43 Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics", cit.

44 Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties: A Cross-Section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind*, New York, Doubleday, 1955, p. 279; Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffmann and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers", in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (June 1960), p. 406-427.

45 Robert E. Lane, *Political Life. Why People Get Involved in Politics*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1959; Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology. Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does*, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.

in his seminal article about the impact of different levels of political awareness on personal beliefs,[46] and eventually and forcefully argued by Sniderman et al., who transformed it in a genuine research programme.[47] It is worth mentioning that this position can come in different forms. What would make the elites different from the masses can be either the greater degree of role constraints in elites' beliefs or the different content of these beliefs.[48]

A third position suggests that both the public and the elites hold the same beliefs. This position has been argued more systematically in foreign policy, where Wittkopf, Holsti and Rosenau,[49] on the one hand, and Herrmann and Tetlock,[50] on the other hand, have shown that the structure of beliefs of both groups is substantially the same.

Besides this discussion, a certain amount of attention has been devoted to the degree of congruence between elite and public opinions. The most systematic attempts in this direction are the ones by Wittkopf and Page and Bouton, who explored differences between leaders' and the general public's attitudes on foreign policy.[51] What this kind of literature standardly concludes is that a gap does exist between the two actors on topical issues.

1.2.3 The elite-mass linkage

A third, important, debate revolves around the mutual connection (if any) between elites and the masses. Many things have happened since Miller and Stokes first

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46 James A. Stimson, "Belief Systems: Constraint, Complexity, and the 1972 Election", in American *Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1975), p. 393-417.

47 Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Phillip E. Tetlock, *Reasoning and Choice. Explorations in Political Psychology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

48 Ibid.

49 Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism*, cit.; Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "America's Foreign Policy Agenda", cit.

50 Richard K. Herrmann, Philip E. Tetlock and Matthew N. Diascro, "How Americans Think About Trade: Reconciling Conflicts Among Money, Power, and Principles", in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (June 2001), p. 191-218.

51 Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism*, cit.; Benjamin I. Page and Marshall M. Bouton, *The Foreign Policy Disconnect. What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don't Get*, Chicago/London, The University of Chicago Press, 2006.

published their paper on the linkage between voters and politicians.[52] The debate has also moved from a mono-causal trajectory to a more circular view of the relationship. The two classical views, which have authoritative supporters among democratic theorists, are, on the one hand, that elites' opinions feed into mass opinion providing cues that help the general public make sense of what to think about politics[53] and, on the other, that elites are accountable to mass opinion. And here the discussion has focused on whether the elites feel accountable to what the public thinks as the elites perceive it (as originally suggested by Miller and Stokes)[54] or, rather, to what people actually hold in their mind, with the accompanying problem of explaining whether and why elites sometimes tend to misperceive public attitudes.[55]

1.3 The data available

Somewhat paradoxically, the study of political elites' attitudes and policy preferences on foreign and security policy started in Europe, with Karl Deutsch and its ambitious project "Arms Control in the European Political Environment" (ICPSR study No. 7274) conducted in the late 1950s.[56] Riding on his own theory about "security communities", Deutsch and collaborators launched an ambitious project of mass, elite and media analysis on security issues. A streak of studies followed suit with Lloyd Free and Renzo Sereno (six European countries plus the US; data available at the Roper Center), Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden (the MIT TEEPS study conducted in the United Kingdom, France and Germany in 1955, 1956, 1959, 1961 and 1965; available at the Roper Center), and the 1981 USIA Elite Survey (available at the Roper Center). More recently, the 1996 EU Commission study (not

52 Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress", in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (March 1963), p. 45-56.

53 See, more recently in Europe, Matthew Gabel and Kenneth Scheve, "Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental Variables", in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (October 2007), p. 1013-1028; Matthew Gabel and Kenneth Scheve, "Mixed Messages: Party Dissent and Mass Opinion on European Integration", in *European Union Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 1, (March 2007), p. 37-59.

54 Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress", cit.

55 See Steven Kull and I. M. Destler, *Misreading the Public. The Myth of a New Isolationism*, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 1999.

56 Karl W. Deutsch et al., "Arms Control in the European Political Environment: French and German Elite Responses, 1964", in *ICPSR Studies*, No. 7274 (16 February 1992), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR07274.v1.

publicly available), InTune, the EES/TLS (2006–2008 and 2010) and the Transatlantic Elite Survey (TES, 2013) of the Transworld project have been carried out in different European countries. Similar projects – i.e., EU-only focused and not comparative as for the elite-mass dimension – are the EUCIG project by Simon Hix and the multi-year project (with three waves in 1995–97, 2002 and 2008–2009) by Liesbet Hooghe, both of them focused on the EU officials in the Commission and Council. Following the first European Parliamentary elections, another project that devoted some questions to the European common foreign and security policy has been the European Election Studies,[57] conducted since 1979 for all European parliamentary elections and including three elite studies (of candidates and middle-level political elites) out of seven waves (1979, 1994 and 2009).

In the 2000s, three European projects have contributed to shed further light on these issues.[58] The first, InTune, was financed under the EU's 6th Framework Programme, and the second, EUEngage, under the Horizon 2020 Programme. The third project was a joint effort by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, under the aegis of the Transatlantic Trends Survey, and it is called the European Elite Survey (EES), covering top level officials of the Commission and the Council as well as MEPs in all TTS countries. The EES was conducted in 2006, 2007 and 2008; then it was repeated in 2010, under the name Transatlantic Leadership Survey, and in 2013 it was upgraded into the Transatlantic Elite Survey of the Transworld Project (funded under the EU's 7th Framework Programme).[59]

Similar studies, surveying only American foreign policy leaders, sometimes multi-yearly, have been available since the early 1970s. Here, we can basically distinguish three set of programmes, beside a few ad hoc ones focusing on specific subgroups such as businessmen[60] and members of the US House of Representatives (United

57 For more information, see the European Election Studies (EES) website: http://eeshomepage.net.

58 See Appendix I to the current study.

59 See Transworld website: http://transworld.iai.it.

60 Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson, "Foreign Affairs Perspectives of United States Business and Military Elites, 1973", in *ICPSR Studies*, No. 7491 (18 January 2006), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR07491.v1.

States Congressional Survey, 1975 – ICPSR study No. 7377):[61]

- the FPLP (Foreign Policy Leadership Project – ICPSR study No. 2614),[62] by Holsti and Rosenau covering the 1976–1996 period, and followers, including the updated samples by Herrmann and Tetlock in 1996 (Public Decisions about going to War), and Feaver and Kohn at the Triangle Institute for Security Studies in 1998–1999 (Survey on the Military in the Post-Cold War Era, 1999 – data available at the ODUM Institute);[63]
- the CCFR 1975–2002 American Public Opinion and United States Foreign Policy Series by John Rielly and Benjamin Page (ICPSR studies Nos. 5808 (1975), 7786 (1979), 8130 (1982), 8712 (1986), 9564 (1990), 6561 (1994), 2747 (1998), 3673 (2002), 4137 (2004));[64]
- the Council on Foreign Relations quadrennial (2005–2009) survey of CFR members (Survey Foreign Policy Opinion Leaders, 2005 and 2009) (data not publicly available).

1.4 Some initial results

What picture emerges from these elites' surveys? Our report addresses three main questions. The first is whether political elites in European countries support a common European foreign and security policy and whether any discernible time trend can be found. The second, more specific issue is what relationship political elites see between a European common foreign and security policy and NATO. Connected to this, we can explore what role elites see for Europe in relationship with the United States. For each of these three topics, we will discuss available data, with a particular attention to the six EU countries that are examined in the JOINT project, namely France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, and Spain.

61 United Nations Association of the United States of America, "United States Congressional Survey, 1975", in *ICPSR Studies*, No. 7377 (16 February 1992), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR07377.v1.

62 Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy Leadership Project, 1976-1996", in *ICPSR Studies*, No. 2614 (2 March 1999), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR02614.v1.

63 Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (eds), *Soldiers and Civilians. The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2001.

64 John E. Rielly, *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Chicago, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1979.

1.4.1 A Common Foreign and Security Policy?

The first question we explore is how popular the idea of a common foreign and security policy is among European elites. The answer to this admittedly broad question is straightforward: quite a bit.

It might be useful to remember that at the beginning of the European integration process, foreign and security policies were not within the radar scope of the elites either. In his Yale project, Karl Deutsch remarked that "European integration is seen as primarily nonmilitary in purpose".[65] In the 1960s, only 19 per cent of the French and 10 per cent of the German elites saw strengthening the West against Communism as the purpose of European integration, while 45 per cent of the French and 67 per cent of the German emphasised economic or cultural purposes.[66]

Things have changed over the years, however, and a substantial support for a common EU foreign policy has clearly emerged. As displayed in Table 1, this was evident for a wide set of countries in 2007, and such a result is confirmed for a smaller subset of the same countries in 2014. In 2007, on average, 86 per cent of the elites in 20 European countries were in favour of "A single EU foreign policy toward outside countries". In the six countries we focus here in the context of the JOINT project (namely, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain) these numbers were even higher, with 98 per cent of the German elites and 96 per cent of the Italian elites supporting a common foreign policy in 2007. These numbers are also very stable over time, with the partial exceptions of Greece, where support for a common foreign policy drops to 75 per cent in 2014, and Poland, where support goes up from 77 per cent in 2007 to 86 per cent in 2009. The single odd man out is the pre-Brexit UK, where elites are divided on the issue, with 50 per cent of respondents in 2007 and 40 per cent in 2009 being against a single European foreign policy.

65 Karl W. Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control in the European Environment", cit., p. 361.

66 Ibid.

Table 1 | Support for a single European foreign policy, 2007–2014 (%)

	2007			2009			2014		
	Favour	In-between	Against	Favour	In-between	Against	Favour	In-between	Against
Austria	83	1	15	86	12	3			
Belgium	95	0	5	96	4	0			
Bulgaria	93	1	6	86	9	2	81	0	4
Croatia							87	0	10
Czech R.	75	0	25	76	15	8			
Denmark	83	0	17	84	2	14			
Estonia	88	2	5						
France	90	1	7	91	4	2			
Germany	87	0	13	98	1	1	94	1	22
Greece	95	2	2	92	3	5	75	3	32
Hungary	94	1	5	90	7	3	66	2	10
Italy	90	0	10	96	3	1	90	0	7
Lithuania	93	0	8	89	7	4	93	0	17
Poland	77	1	21	86	10	4			
Portugal	90	0	10	89	8	3	83	0	7
Serbia	79	2	16	73	13	13			
Slovakia	84	0	16	91	8	2			
Slovenia							85	4	14
Spain	93	1	7	95	2	3	91	1	13
UK	44	6	50	32	27	40			

Question: Thinking about the European Union over the next ten years or so, can you tell me whether you are in favour or against ...? A single EU foreign policy towards outside countries.
Source: INTUNE.

Confirming the sturdy support for a common foreign policy, the 2017 EuEngage elite survey (Table 2) reveals that substantial majorities of political elites, in all surveyed countries, think that the Europeanisation of foreign policy should go even further. In France, Greece, Italy and Spain more than two thirds of the interviewees think that "the EU integration should go further on foreign policy", with percentages respectively of 84, 85, 78 and 83 per cent. Quite interestingly, it is Germany that turns out to be less supportive, with 54 per cent of respondents preferring the "should go further" option and the rest of German elites split among those who think that the EU integration on foreign policy is gone too far (25 per cent) and those who locate themselves in-between (21 per cent). The Dutch and, again, the

British elites are definitely the least enthusiastic of further strengthening European integration in this area.

Table 2 | Foreign and defence policy too far or not far enough, 2017 (%)

	Foreign policy			Defence policy		
	Gone too far (0-3)	**In-between (4-6)**	**Should go further (7-10)**	**Gone too far (0-3)**	**In-between (4-6)**	**Should go further (7-10)**
Czech Rep.	21	38	41	17	21	62
France	3	13	84	6	10	84
Germany	25	21	54	31	21	48
Greece	8	8	85	3	5	92
Italy	8	14	78	11	17	72
Netherlands	29	57	14	29	43	29
Poland	15	27	58	8	23	69
Portugal	21	17	63	24	22	54
Spain	1	15	83	2	15	81
UK	22	50	28	25	56	19

Question: There has been a lot of discussion recently about the decision-making power of the EU. Some people say that the EU has gone too far in terms of integration on many issues; other say that the EU integration should go further on many issues. For each of the following areas, on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the EU integration has gone too far and 10 that the EU integration should go further, where would you place yourself? If your views are somewhere in between, you can choose any number that best describes your position.
Source: EUEngage.

A last piece of evidence that confirms this wide support for cooperation among European countries on foreign policy matters is coming from another question asked in the EuEngage elite surveys in 2016 and 2017 (Table 3).

Table 3 | How to respond to security threats (%)

	2016			2017		
	Decide on its own (0-3)	**In-between (4-6)**	**Decide jointly (7-10)**	**Decide on its own (0-3)**	**In-between (4-6)**	**Decide jointly (7-10)**
Czech Rep.	8	25	67	13	20	67
France	8	13	77	8	12	80
Germany	10	16	71	24	17	59
Greece	13	9	75	5	13	82
Italy	5	17	78	5	15	80
Netherlands	7	40	53	14	43	43
Poland	13	11	74	9	19	72
Portugal	3	26	68	6	24	70
Spain	7	6	85	3	11	86
UK	40	37	23			

Question: In recent years, the EU has been confronted with international security crises in the Ukraine and in Mediterranean countries (such as Libya and Syria). Different policies have been suggested and we would like to know your view. For each of the following policy alternatives, please position yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that you would fully support the policy at the left and 10 means that you fully support the policy at the right. If your views are somewhere in between, you can choose any number that best describes your position. To address these problems, each Member State should decide on its own when responding to major security threats OR EU Member States should have a common response to major security threats.
Source: EUEngage.

After an opening statement stating that "In recent years, the EU has been confronted with international security crises in Ukraine and in the Mediterranean (such as Libya and Syria)", respondents were asked whether "each Member State should decide on its own when responding to major security threats OR EU Member States should have a common response to major security threats". Again, solid majorities, ranging from 71 per cent in Germany to 85 per cent in Spain, were in support of a joint response both in 2016 and 2017.[67] Probably as an effect of the 2016 Brexit referendum, the British political elites appear unusually out of sync with the rest of European elites, including the Netherlands, where only 7 per cent of the interviewees subscribe to the idea of deciding on its own when it comes to face important challenges, as compared to 40 per cent of the British elites who adhere to this view.

[67] In Germany, however, data report a decline in support for a joint response to security threats in 2017.

This set of questions, however, solicits an answer "on the cheap" – to express support for a quite generic and valence issue – without exploring any trade-off or stressing any cost involved in supporting or opposing further integration in this policy area. To explore the stability of these attitudes, another set of questions probes elites' view when a common European foreign policy is set as an alternative to a national foreign policy. Also in this case, however, the supportive attitude towards a common European foreign policy is confirmed, although with less overpowering numbers. Table 4 reports elites' views in 1979, a period characterised by increasing East-West tensions after years of détente. In particular, a question asked politicians whether foreign policy ought to be handled at the national or European level, exploring different possible combinations: from a fully independent national foreign policy to handling it "entirely by the European Community institutions, through majority vote", with two "in-between" and less drastic alternatives, that is, either a consultation among European member states or a decision by European institutions but with the veto power of each single EU member state. Not surprisingly, responses are more nuanced, partly confirming and party correcting the picture previously described. Indeed, these data project an image of the EU member states divided in two main groups. On the one hand, the fully Europeanists – namely Italy and Germany – where a plurality, if not a majority, supports a fully Europeanised foreign policy. On the other hand, a group of countries more in tune with the idea of a strengthened European cooperation, but leaving national governments solidly in the driving seat –here France and the UK stand out.

Table 4 | How foreign and defence policy should be handled, 1979 (%)

Foreign policy									
	BE	**DK**	**DE**	**FR**	**IE**	**IT**	**LU**	**NL**	**UK**
By national governments acting independently	0	29	2	30	27	4	8	11	26
By national governments, through prior consultation with other European community governments	23	49	29	27	38	29	42	38	39
By European community institutions, with member governments retaining the right to veto	18	15	25	19	27	15	17	23	21
Entirely by European community institutions, through majority vote	53	0	43	7	8	52	25	21	11
NA, DK	8	7	2	18	0	0	8	6	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Defence policy									
	BE	**DK**	**DE**	**FR**	**IE**	**IT**	**LU**	**NL**	**UK**
By national governments acting independently	0	22	4	41	54	8	25	23	31
By national governments, through prior consultation with other European community governments	13	2	29	21	19	27	58	32	34
By European community institutions, with member governments retaining the right to veto	25	2	22	16	15	14	0	15	15
Entirely by European community institutions, through majority vote	50	0	44	5	4	51	17	15	9
(R volunteered): through NATO	10	73	0	2	4	0	0	11	10
NA, DK	3	0	1	14	4	1	0	4	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Question: The functions that I am about to describe can be performed in various ways. This card shows four alternative ways of handling them. (int: read card a) How should each of these functions be performed in the near future? Just tell me the number of the alternative you prefer (int: read the individual items and assign each a value): Q.13d. who should carry out foreign policy? Q13f. who should carry out Defence policy?
Source: European Election Study.

Table 5 | How foreign policy should be handled, 1994 (%)

Security and defence			
	By Nation state (1-3)	**In-between (4)**	**By European institutions (5-7)**
Austria	20	30	50
Belgium	4	16	80
Denmark	38	25	38
Finland	70	20	10
France	27	19	54
Germany	15	19	66
Greece	36	14	50
Ireland	50	23	27
Italy	18	14	68
Luxembourg	7	10	83
Netherlands	25	22	53
Portugal	21	21	58
Spain	15	15	71
Sweden	63	18	19
UK	42	15	42

Foreign policy towards countries outside the EU			
	By Nation state (1-3)	**In-between (4)**	**By European institutions (5-7)**
Austria	40	0	60
Belgium	9	23	68
Denmark	63	0	38
Finland	44	33	22
France	33	24	43
Germany	18	16	66
Greece	51	19	30
Ireland	42	22	37
Italy	19	16	65
Luxembourg	3	6	90
Netherlands	25	18	57
Portugal	42	17	41
Spain	15	15	70
Sweden	55	22	23
UK	35	19	46

Question: Which of the following policy areas should be decided by national governments and which should be decided jointly by the European Union?
Source: European Election Study.

Over the years, this picture seems to have changed in the direction of a greater desire for Europeanising foreign policy. Table 5 shows the distributions for the 1994 European election candidate study. With only some exceptions, either majorities or pluralities in all surveyed countries support the idea of foreign policy being handled at the European level. In particular, majorities in all JOINT countries, except for Greece, support the idea of the EU handling foreign policy. Greece has a majority in favour of retaining national control over this policy area, followed by one-third of the French elites. British politicians are divided, but with a plurality in favour of a more Europeanised foreign policy. Neutral countries, namely Ireland and Sweden, hold on to national control.

The picture reported in Table 6 is slightly different, in part because of different question wordings. As discussed above, the 1994 question asked to choose between an only national *vs* a jointly European handling of foreign policy. On the contrary, in 1996 the Eurobarometer more assertively asked to choose between an "exclusively national" foreign policy and one handled "exclusively at the European level". Taking

this difference into account, however, the ranking looks pretty much the same, with only a larger number locating themselves in the middle of the 10-point scale than in the previous survey. Again, Sweden (with Denmark this time) shows clear majorities in favour of a uniquely national control, as compared to the other countries. Unfortunately, since then, this question has never been asked again.

Table 6 | How foreign policy should be handled, 1996 (%)

	Defence			Foreign policy		
	National (1-3)	**In-between (4-7)**	**European (8-10)**	**National (1-3)**	**In-between (4-7)**	**European (8-10)**
Austria	10	30	60	38	52	11
Belgium	3	21	76	12	53	35
Denmark	37	37	26	64	32	4
Germany	6	26	68	24	54	23
Greece	47	27	26	24	46	30
Finland	63	34	3	55	39	6
France	14	36	51	13	56	31
Ireland	24	50	26	32	48	19
Italy	7	25	68	20	51	29
Luxembourg	3	16	81	24	60	16
Netherlands	7	39	55	24	64	12
Portugal	19	36	45	19	53	27
Spain	5	24	72	18	58	24
Sweden	49	36	15	51	46	3
UK	27	45	28	33	50	16

Question: To what extent should each of the following policy areas be decided at the national or regional level and to what extent at the European level? We have a scale from 1 to 10. "1" means "exclusively at the national or regional level" and "10" means "exclusively at the European level". The scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.
Source: Top Decision makers, Flash Eurobarometer No. 39 (February-March 1996).

Moving to attitudes towards a common defence, the results of available surveys reveal a high support for a common European defence policy as well. Interestingly, support for a common European defence policy is either at the same level (France and Germany), if not higher (Poland), than the one expressed for foreign policy. Among the JOINT countries, only Germany displays a lower level of support for defence policy as compared to foreign policy, with values similar to those observed in The United Kingdom, where the starting point, however, is much lower than in

any other country, with the exception of the Netherlands.

We also find a similar pattern to the one we have reported for foreign policy when the question asks for a choice between the national and the European way of handling the policy. In 1979 (Table 4), Germany and Italy are the two JOINT countries more supportive of an "entirely European" handling of defence policy, while France is the least supportive, with 40 per cent of the political elites suggesting that defence policy should exclusively be handled at the national level and only 5 per cent at the European level. This support for national prerogatives on defence matters is higher in France than in the United Kingdom, where only about one-third of the sample (31 per cent) supports an exclusive national competence on defence issues.

Again, as reported in Table 5, we observe a shift in support between 1979 and 1994, with majorities in all countries – France included (54 per cent) – supporting a joint defence effort. Similar results are reported in 1996 (Table 6) with the noteworthy exception of Greece, where only 26 per cent of the political elites want defence to be handled "exclusively" at the European level. By contrast, support is always above 50 per cent in France, Germany, Italy and Spain.

1.4.2 A common European Army?

An obvious implication of any integration process in the defence policy domain is having some sort of a common EU army. Not surprisingly, tapping what the elites think about a common army has been a persistent source of curiosity over the last decade. And a reference to the army provides a slightly more precise – or at least vivid – idea of what we refer to as "common defence policy" than a generic mention to defence policy itself. For this reason, results based on questions mentioning this aspect probably provide a much more realistic assessment of how far European elites are willing to go in the promotion of a EUFSP. Table 7 presents the results of what is probably the longest time series available on what the elites think about the appropriate authority under which an army in the EU should operate.

Between 2007 and 2019, this question was asked six times, inviting respondents to choose among two alternatives – a national or a European army – and the possibility of volunteering other responses. A first finding emerging from this table is that, with a few exceptions (the UK stands out, but it is not alone), in most

Table 7 | National vs European Army (%)

	2007				2009				2014				2016				2017				2019			
	National	EU	Both	Neither	National	EU	Both	Neither	National	EU	Both	Neither	National	EU	Both	Neither	National	EU	Both	Neither	National	EU	Both	Neither
Austria	33	43	20	3	38	33	26	3																
Belgium	2	66	27	5	12	81	6	0																
Bulgaria	24	19	56	1	19	21	52	1	48	12	40	0												
Croatia									30	14	50	6												
Czech Rep.	51	16	31	2	34	11	49	5					29	3	64	3	40	6	54	0				
Denmark	46	34	18	2	45	43	10	2																
Estonia	47	4	40	1																				
France	21	18	56	0	12	17	65	4					9	24	63	2	14	25	59	2				
Germany	27	48	22	3	19	33	43	5	19	42	29	10	17	28	45	11	29	14	55	2				
Greece	7	18	68	5	5	26	69	0	23	15	57	5	12	16	65	8	5	15	72	8				
Hungary	18	42	36	3	8	31	53	6	40	11	47	2												
Italy	6	40	50	3	14	60	24	1	9	72	14	5	15	46	36	3	11	54	31	5	10	34	37	6
Lithuania	41	15	43	0	31	17	50	0																
Netherlands													53	13	27	7	57	0	43	0				
Poland	38	6	51	4	26	6	63	4					33	2	63	0	17	3	78	2				
Portugal	31	33	33	0	23	14	58	2	31	10	58	1	30	17	42	10	24	10	56	10				
Serbia	23	18	53	3	30	11	53	4																
Slovakia	15	30	51	4	15	24	54	4																
Slovenia									48	15	35	2												
Spain	18	51	27	4	11	47	34	5	27	33	36	4	13	39	44	5	6	42	45	6				
UK	49	1	43	7	69	1	26	1					71	5	22	2	67		33					

Question (InTune 2007): Some say that we should have a single European Union Army. Others say every country should keep its own national army. What is your opinion?
Question (ENAC 2014): Some say that we should have a single European Union Army. Others say every country should keep its own national army. What is your opinion?
Question (EUEngage 2016–2017): Some say that we should have one single European Union Army. Others believe that every country should keep its own national army. Which of the following comes closest to your view? [Not asked in the UK].
Question (Italian Elite Survey 2019): Alcune persone sostengono che dovrebbe esserci un esercito unico dell'Unione Europea. Altri sostengono che ogni Paese debba mantenere il proprio esercito nazionale. Quale tra queste affermazioni è più vicina alla Sua opinione?
Source: InTune 2007; ENAC 2014; EUEngage 2016–2017; Italian Elite Survey (2019).

countries the two most popular alternatives are either having them both ways or having a single European army. In the European surveyed countries, substantial majorities of political and bureaucratic elites were clearly oriented towards a more Europeanised defence policy already in the early 2000s. Over time, the main issue, when it comes to a common European defence policy, has become not "whether" to do it, but rather "how much" Europeanised it should be. As an example, the number of German elites in favour of "a national army only" declines over time, and the same holds true for France. Still, Germany is also the country with an interesting evolution among the "Europeanisers": a steady decline in the number of those who are in favour of an EU-only army and the growth of those in favour of a combination of EU and national armies. Another important element to note is the East-West divide on these topics. In general, Eastern European countries, such as Hungary and Slovenia, prefer a national army, while in Western and Southern European ones, such as Greece and Portugal, a combination of national and European army is the preferred option.

1.4.3 What about NATO?

Any further development in the direction of a common European army raises not only the issue of how this is going to be coordinated with national defence policies, but also, at the multilateral level, what kind of relationship such a European defence structure might have with NATO. As a matter of fact, the issue of the relationship with the Atlantic Alliance has always been front and centre in the mind of policymakers, scholars and observers since the very beginning of the European integration process. It was Deutsch who first explored this issue, interviewing 147 French and 173 West German respondents in 1964. He found that

> majorities of French and German leaders [saw] their countries as linked by long-run political and military interests more strongly to the United States – and in the second place to Britain – than they [were] linked to one another. Any weakening of French ties to the United States thus [could] weaken the German-French relationship.[68]

[68] Karl W. Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control in the European Environment", cit., p. 360.

To support this conclusion, Deutsch reported the results of a question asking whether "[Germany/France] should rather endeavour to strengthen NATO, or European unity (EEC) or both?" (Table 8).

Table 8 | EU/EEC vs NATO, 1964 (%)

	France	Germany
EEC	40	15
NATO	4	11
Both	49	72
Negative answer	7	3
Total	100	100
(N)	(124)	(141)

Source: Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Arms Control in the European Political Environment: French and German Elite Responses, 1964*, cit.

Despite the reluctance of some to choose between the US and Europe, "it seems from many subtle indications that the latter [Europe] had come to command by 1964 much the larger share of elite imagination and emotional involvement".[69]

In 1979, the European Election Study explored the very same issue (Table 9). The results confirmed what we found discussing different attitudes towards a common foreign policy in France, Italy and Germany. French political candidates were the most supportive (52 per cent) of a more independent "European Defence posture" from NATO, with another 35 per cent of French candidates supporting a stronger NATO. In Italy, on the contrary, elites were almost equally divided between continuing "the current levels of support for NATO" and to "develop a European Defence posture more independent" from the Atlantic Alliance. In Germany, on the contrary, a substantial majority was in favour of continuing the current level of support for NATO. Interestingly, British political candidates were the ones, along with the Italians and the Irish, in which a substantial fourth of the entire sample supported the idea of reducing "the need for a strong Defence".

69 Ibid.

In the 2000s, the EPRG MEP survey asked different samples of political representatives whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement "The EU rather than NATO should be responsible for Europe's defence" (Table 10). Clearly, there were important differences across countries and over time. In 2000, substantial, if not overwhelming, majorities agreed with this statement in France, Greece, Italy and Spain. In Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal, no more than one third of the samples agreed that the EU should be responsible for Europe's defence rather than NATO. Sweden and the UK were the two countries with the least support for this idea. In Italy and Germany the pattern has not changed over time – majorities of Italian political elites and minorities of German political elites agree that Europe should have more to say as compared to NATO. In France, Spain and Greece, the support for a greater role for the EU than for NATO declined between 2006 and 2011; still majorities or pluralities (e.g., Spain in 2011) thought that the EU should be responsible for Europe's defence.

Table 9 | EU/EEC vs NATO, 1979 (%)

	BE	DK	DE	FR	IE	IT	LUX	NL	UK
Continue current levels of support for NATO	13	71	55	5	27	30	50	34	34
Develop a European defence posture more independent	58	0	22	52	12	34	17	9	24
Seek to reduce the need for a strong defence through	5	2	11	7	35	22	17	28	26
More support for NATO	25	27	1	35	0	0	0	28	1
European defence organisation within NATO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Responses 2 and 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Other response	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
NA, DK	0	0	10	1	27	15	17	2	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Question: In view of all the changes in the relations among the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union which have taken place in the past ten years, which of the following statements comes closest to your own view of how Western Europe should provide for its military security? (int: show card b).
Source: European Election Study.

These results seemed to be confirmed by the 2009 InTune survey (Table 11), which asked, "Which authority would be more appropriate to deal with European security?" mentioning NATO, the EU and the national level. In Italy, Greece, Spain and France,

substantial majorities answered that the EU level was the most appropriate. In Germany, only 30 per cent pointed to the EU (interestingly, almost half of the sample refused to answer to this question). In Poland, the sample was almost equally split between the EU and NATO. In general, Eastern European countries (and Denmark) were more favourable to leave things in the hands of NATO than of the EU.

Table 10 | EU vs NATO (% agree that the EU rather than NATO should be responsible for Europe's defence)

	2000	2006	2011
Austria	100	25	100
Belgium	50	43	80
Bulgaria			43
Cyprus		100	100
Czech Republic		38	40
Denmark	14	20	14
Estonia		67	50
Finland	57	80	60
France	90	94	64
Germany	38	25	44
Greece	75	100	67
Hungary			33
Ireland	75	67	67
Italy	71	71	72
Latvia		25	0
Lithuania		40	0
Luxembourg	20	100	
Malta		100	100
Netherlands	33	17	40
Poland		12	25
Portugal	27	71	0
Romania			45
Slovakia		50	40
Slovenia		0	67
Spain	86	40	43
Sweden	13	38	14
UK	12	30	18

Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about EU foreign and defence policies? The EU rather than NATO should be responsible for Europe's defence.

Source: Simon Hix et al., *EPRG MEP Survey Dataset: Combined Data 2016 Release*, https://mepsurvey.eu/data-objects/data.

Table 11 | EU vs NATO, 2009 (%)

	NATO	EU level	National level	Refused to choose only one	Don't know, NA	Total
Austria	13	71	14	0	3	100
Belgium	19	74	2	0	5	100
Bulgaria	35	50	6	0	8	100
Czech R.	40	51	7	0	2	100
Denmark	43	45	12	0	0	100
France	21	65	9	0	5	100
Germany	9	30	6	55	1	100
Greece	9	81	9	0	0	100
Hungary	32	59	6	0	4	100
Italy	19	73	5	0	4	100
Lithuania	63	30	3	0	3	100
Poland	47	44	6	0	3	100
Portugal	20	57	18	0	5	100
Serbia	6	63	28	0	4	100
Slovakia	39	50	3	0	9	100
Spain	17	74	5	0	3	100
UK	55	22	20	0	3	100

Question: Which authority would be more appropriate to deal with European security?
Source: InTune.

However, to the question asking whether "NATO is still essential to the country's security" substantial majorities in many European countries (including Italy) answered affirmatively over the 2006–2013 period (Table 12). Only in France, in 2008, just a third of the sample answered that NATO was still essential, but this number went up again to 51 per cent in 2013.

Table 12 | NATO still essential (%)

	2006	2007	2008	2013
Bulgaria			100	
Germany	88	81	70	61
Greece				53
France	50	45	33	51
Italy	59	58	61	52
Netherlands	77	70	67	
Poland	82	91	95	58
Portugal	64	67	67	
Romania			88	
Slovakia	100	100	100	
Spain	60	64	73	
UK	82	80	82	64

Question: Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?
Source: Transatlantic Trends Survey and European Elite Survey.

Table 13 | NATO or EU independent of NATO, 2016 (%)

	NATO (0-3)	In-between (4-6)	EU (7-10)
Czech Rep.	54	15	30
France	15	27	56
Germany	35	39	24
Greece	19	42	37
Italy	25	26	49
Netherlands	67	20	13
Poland	72	13	13
Portugal	40	38	16
Spain	36	24	37
UK	79	14	7

Question: To address these problems, it is better to strengthen military cooperation within NATO vs. To address these problems, it is better to create a European Union army independent of NATO.
Source: EUEngage.

That the possibility of facing a choice between NATO and the EU creates some ambivalence among European elites is confirmed by the 2016 EUEngage survey (Table 13). Asked whether in addressing the military challenges "it is better to

strengthen military cooperation within NATO" or "it is better to create a European Union army independent of NATO", elites in the ten countries surveyed answered differently. In the UK, the Netherlands, Poland, and the Czech Republic majorities supported the NATO option. In all other countries, elites were deeply divided. Only in France a majority (56 per cent) favoured an EU solution. In Germany, Italy, Greece and Spain, political elites were at least ambivalent, with pluralities (in Greece and Germany) locating themselves in-between the two extremes.

1.4.4 Europe as a superpower?

To deepen our understanding of this ambivalence, we can rely upon a set of questions that explored how European political elites view the relationship with the United States, the main player in NATO, and whether they think the EU should play a role in cooperation or act as a counterweight to the United States. This topic has been addressed by different questions over time and therefore it is not easy to assess possible trends.

Table 14 | Europe and superpowers, 1979

	BE	DK	DE	FR	IE	IT	LUX	NL	UK
More independence from both the super-powers	88	20	54	78	62	82	42	57	63
More coordination with the USA than hitherto	5	12	35	3	15	17	33	30	15
More coordination with the USSR than hitherto	5	0	3	2	0	1	17	0	3
Preserve the status quo (volunteered)	0	39	0	2	8	0	0	9	9
More coordination with both the USA and USSR (volunteered)	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
Other response	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
NA, DK	3	29	7	15	4	0	8	4	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Question: In the future, how should the European community develop its relationship to the super-powers? (int: read precode)
Source: European Election Study.

In 1979 – still in a fully bipolar era – the European election study asked (Table 14) "In the future, how should the European community develop its relationship to the

super-powers". Three main alternatives were offered: "more independence from both the super-powers", "more coordination with the USA than hitherto", and "more coordination with the USSR than hitherto". Quite interestingly, strong majorities in France, Italy and Belgium, and majorities in most other counties (including Germany and the UK) preferred more independence from both superpowers. No more than one third of the elites in Germany and the Netherlands would have preferred a closer relationship with the United States. In the 2000s, the situation is slightly more variegated when examining an admittedly less complex question. The percentage of those who agreed that "EU foreign policy should develop as a counterweight to the United States" varied significantly both across countries and over time. The two most interesting patterns are those of France and Germany. In the former, support for Europe as a counterweight has declined over time, while in Germany has increased. In Italy and Spain, attitudes appear to be divided.

Table 15 | Superpower EU, 2017

	The US should remain the only superpower	The EU should become a superpower, like the US	No country should be a superpower	Don't know	Total
Czech Republic	12	52	31	5	100
France	2	78	21	0	100
Germany	9	39	52	0	100
Greece	8	41	46	5	100
Italy	2	34	64	0	100
Netherlands	29	43	29	0	100
Poland	21	59	21	0	100
Portugal	3	43	51	3	100
Spain	2	58	38	1	100
UK	38	9	53	0	100

Question: In thinking about international affairs, which statement comes closer to your position about the United States and the European Union?
Source: EUEngage Project.

A slightly different way of exploring this issue is whether the EU "should become a superpower like the US" (Table 15). In 2017, European elites appear divided on this issue. Not surprisingly, 78 per cent of the French elites are in favour of the EU becoming another superpower, while only 39 per cent and 34 per cent of German

and Italian elites, respectively, think the same. Only in the Netherlands and Poland more than one-fifth of the elite samples agree that the EU should become a superpower. In all other countries, the most favoured option is that "no country should be a superpower".

2. Public opinion and European foreign and security policy[70]

2.1 Introduction

The development of a common defence policy has made some progress over the last years. In part as a way to re-launch the European project after the 2008–2013 financial and economic crisis, a Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy was released in 2016 with a set of proposals to reinforce the commitments in this policy field. While this flurry of activities is based, among other things, on the assumption that similar initiatives are a way to address a public demand for more Europe in defence and international affairs, a curious divide creeps in the discussion on public opinion and EUFSP.

On the one hand, there is wide consensus among both policy-makers and EU scholars that a common security policy is in high demand among the national electorates. According to David McAllister, chair of the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, "The EU has to deliver on the expectations of its citizens and to focus its actions on the 'three Cs': coordination of threat assessment, consolidation of the European project and cooperation within coalitions and institutions delivering security".[71] It should come as no surprise, therefore, that public opinion has become a useful leverage for further integration in this area. In the early 2000s, Ojanen claimed that the Working Group on Defence of the European Convention "used public opinion as a justification for further steps in the

[70] This section draws on Matthias Mader, Francesco Olmastroni and Pierangelo Isernia, "The Polls—Trends: Public Opinion Toward European Defense Policy and Nato: Still Wanting it Both Ways?", in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Summer 2020), p. 551-582.

[71] David McAllister, quoted in European Parliament, *MEPs Advocate Stronger EU Foreign and Defence Policy*, 13 December 2017, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20171207IPR89766.

field".[72] More recently, Howorth stated "the European public, in a very general sense, has no significant underlying problem with CSDP. [...] It is not European publics that are concerned about loss of sovereignty in CSDP, but EU governments."[73]

On the other hand, public opinion scholars are much more reluctant to concede on this. While they acknowledge that support for EUFSP is in general high, and usually higher than on other policy areas, they warn that this consensus is "permissive", i.e. shallow and fickle, "superficial but not substantial",[74] because it is either uniformed[75] and incoherent[76] or not sturdy enough to bear the potential (financial and human) costs.[77] A few years into the Post-Cold War era and well into the Iraq crisis, Eichenberg pointed out that "public opinion in Europe now strongly supports the position that the EU [...] should have the 'primary voice' in matters of European security".[78] This trend, however, might have changed since then. Furthermore, the emerging preference for European defence was not observed in all EU countries under observation.

It is for these reasons that we believe it is important to monitor the state of European public opinion on EUFSP and extend the analysis of trends in public opinion on European defence and foreign policy integration to all EU members, including old and new member states, NATO members as well as neutral countries. After all, the EU has almost doubled its size in the last twenty years, with 13 new countries

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72 Hanna Ojanen, "Explaining the ESDP: Theoretical Grips on Recent Developments", cit., p. 13.

73 Jolyon Howorth, "European Security Post-Libya and Post-Ukraine: In Search of Core Leadership", in Nathalie Tocci (ed.), *Imagining Europe: Towards a More United and Effective EU*, Rome, Nuova Cultura, 2014, p. 138. See also Frédéric Mérand and Kathleen Angers, "Military Integration in Europe", cit.

74 Klaus Brummer, "Superficial, not Substantial: The Ambiguity of Public Support for Europe's Security and Defence Policy", in *European Security*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2007), p. 183-201.

75 Richard Sinnott, "Knowledge and the Position of attitudes to a European Foreign Policy on the Real to Random Continuum", in *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2000), p. 113-137, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/12.2.113.

76 Clifford J. Carrubba and Anand Singh, "A Decision Theoretic Model of Public Opinion: Guns, Butter, and European Common Defense", in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (April 2004), p. 218-231.

77 Dirk Peters, "European Security Policy for the People? Public Opinion and the EU's Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy", in *European Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (September 2014), p. 388-408.

78 Richard C. Eichenberg, "Trends: Having It Both Ways: European Defense Integration and the Commitment to NATO", in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (February 2003), p. 627-659 at p. 638.

(mostly from Eastern Europe) gaining the EU membership since 2004, and the most sceptical country towards EUFSP[79] – the United Kingdom – has left the Union. Moreover, several recent developments, like the release of a Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy in 2016, the activation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation in 2017[80] and the adoption of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence in March 2022, make foreign and defence policy a topical issue and raise important questions. How sensitive to these developments is public opinion? What are the political implications for European defence following the exit of the most powerful opponent to EUFSP (the United Kingdom)? What do European publics think about the issue? Given higher (perceived) threat from Russia, do European citizens have a strong preference for a common EUFPS as the most credible insurance against Russian aggression? We will address these questions while looking at the European publics' support for the EUFSP over the last two decades.

2.2 Support for EUFSP

The major source of cross-national data on support for EUFSP comes from the Eurobarometer. Over the last two decades different questions have been asked in the attempt to understand how much support there is for foreign and defence issues. The rich variety of data available allow us to shed some light on how robust this support is, but it also raises questions on what meaning to give to the differences originating from a variety of differently worded questions. With some approximation, two different sets of questions have been systematically asked over the years, although in different formats and wordings. A first set of questions explores whether the respondent is for or against "A common foreign policy among the Member States of the EU towards other countries" and "A common defence and security policy among EU Member States". While these questions intend to tap a more general orientation towards a common effort – whatever common might suggest or imply in the respondent's mind – a second set of questions addresses more clearly the issue of a unified policy, inviting to consider whether

79 Ibid.

80 European Commission, *Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Defence and Security Conference Prague: In Defence of Europe*, Prague, 9 June 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-1581_en.htm.

the respondents prefer a national versus a European decision-making process as far as foreign and defence policies are concerned. For both foreign and defence policies, the questions frame the issue (in slightly different formats) as follows: "For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?" To further complicate the issue (and comparability over time), this latter question was asked separately for foreign policy and defence and security until 2005, and from then "defence and foreign affairs" were instead combined into the same question.

Before entering the discussion of the results emerging from these different questions, let us first capture what we see at a glance. We note two things. First, irrespective of the question wording, the format and the period, large majorities in most EU countries support both a common foreign and a common defence and security policy (Figure 1). Support in general was well above 70 per cent in the six founding member countries, Southern Europe and in the newly admitted Eastern European countries most of the time. The only exceptions are Portugal, Italy, and Hungary. Support was slightly below 70 per cent in Portugal, while it recently dropped slightly below the 70 per cent mark in the latter two countries. The United Kingdom and the neutral EU member states (Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and Austria) showed lower support throughout the period, with average levels hovering between 50 and 60 per cent. Since 2010, there has been a slight increase in these countries, however, with support now exceeding the 60 per cent mark.[81]

[81] Two other Eurobarometer items on general European defence show the same stable support across all European countries but Great Britain and the neutral countries, which exhibit (somewhat) lower support. One of these items is available from 2000–2011 and asks whether decisions should be made by the national government or jointly within the European Union, the other was fielded between 2003 and 2007, asking whether the EU plays a positive, negative, or neither positive nor negative role for issue of national defence.

Figure 1 | Favourability towards a "common defence and security policy" and a "common foreign policy", 2000–2020 (continue)



Question: "Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it". 1. A common defence and security policy among EU Member States; 2. A common foreign policy of the 28 Member States of the EU countries. Response options: "For"; "Against"; "Don't know" (DK).
Note: Reported are percentages of respondents who chose response option "For".
Source: Eurobarometer, various years.

Figure 1 | Favourability towards a "common defence and security policy" and a "common foreign policy", 2000–2020 (continued)



Question: "Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it". 1. A common defence and security policy among EU Member States; 2. A common foreign policy of the 28 Member States of the EU countries. Response options: "For"; "Against"; "Don't know" (DK).
Note: Reported are percentages of respondents who chose response option "For".
Source: Eurobarometer, various years.

We find similar results when we look at questions asking whether these policies should be jointly conducted (Figure 2). While increasing majorities thought that decisions concerning European defence policy had to be taken at the EU level in the six founding members, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and most countries that joined the EU between 2004 and 2013, respondents of neutral members such as Austria, Ireland, Sweden and, to less extent, Finland and Malta were equally split between those who favoured the EU level and those who considered the national government as the sole and legitimate authority for defence issues.

Second, we note a slight increase in familiarity with these issues. Taking the share of "don't know" (DK) responses as an indicator of familiarity with the issue of European defence, Figure 3 shows quite a lot of variation in these responses, both between countries and across time.

There is a rather stable divide between low DK response rates in the six founding members and Eastern Europe and higher rates in the southern countries, as well as in the United Kingdom and Ireland. The other neutral members fall somewhere in between. At the same time, there is a trend towards greater familiarity in almost all countries (exceptions are France and Poland). In 2000, for example, DK percentage was 25 per cent in the United Kingdom, dropping to 15 per cent in the late 2010s; in Germany it decreased from 10 to 2 per cent in the same period. In sum, there is evidence of increasing familiarity with the idea of organising defence at the European level with continuing differences between countries that are not readily interpretable. These patterns might be the result of different response styles but also of differences in ambivalence as respondents might also choose the DK category when they are torn between support and opposition.

Looking more carefully at the different questions, an interesting, and somehow puzzling, result emerges from a systematic analysis of both series of question formats. On the one hand, when asked about support for a *common* foreign or defence policy, the latter is systematically rated higher than the former. In all countries, except for two neutral countries – Austria and Ireland – support for common foreign policy is slightly lower than support for common defence policy. On the other hand, when asked whether foreign or defence policy should be conducted either nationally or jointly by all EU member states, a *joint* European foreign policy is slightly more supported than a common European defence policy.

Figure 2 | Preference for a joint defence and foreign policy, 2000–2011 (continue)



Question: "For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?" Defence; Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union; Defence and foreign affairs. Response options: (NATIONALITY) government; Jointly within European Union; DK.
Note: Reported are percentages of respondents who chose "Jointly within European Union".
Source: Eurobarometer, various years.

Figure 2 | Preference for a joint defence and foreign policy, 2000–2011 (continued)



Question: "For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?" Defence; Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union; Defence and foreign affairs. Response options: (NATIONALITY) government; Jointly within European Union; DK.
Note: Reported are percentages of respondents who chose "Jointly within European Union".
Source: Eurobarometer, various years.

Figure 3 | Support for a common defence and security policy, 2000–2020 (continue)



Question: "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A common defence and security policy among EU Member States".
Source: Eurobarometer, various years.

Figure 3 | Support for a common defence and security policy, 2000–2020



Question: "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A common defence and security policy among EU Member States".
Source: Eurobarometer, various years.

A difference in question wording was introduced by Eurobarometer in 2005, when the two questions about a joint defence or a joint foreign policy were combined together, asking whether "defence and foreign affairs" should be conducted jointly or separately by each member state. The survey confirmed the gap in support between foreign and defence policy. When asked about the two policies separately,

a joint foreign policy gains more support than defence policy (an average of 66 per cent versus 45 per cent). When they are asked together, combining "defence and foreign affairs", support for foreign affairs pulls support for defence uprapid. A possible interpretation of these somehow puzzling results might reside in the loose meaning of a "common" foreign policy as compared to the more precise meaning of what a "jointly decided" foreign and defence policy is. A multilateral approach to foreign and defence policy is supported by all Europeans, but a quite different matter is to leave to the EU alone the power to decide on the actual policies. Here, the public seems to prefer that foreign policy rather than defence is conducted jointly, suggesting that the latter is a more sensitive issue for many Europeans. This would be in line with what is usually assumed by those who claim a sort of permissive consensus in foreign and defence matters.

In sum, these data indicate stable and substantive public support for, and increasing familiarity with, the issue of a common defence and security policy throughout Europe, with the neutral countries and the United Kingdom showing somewhat attenuated support. Undoubtedly, Europeans' support for EUFSP grew markedly during the first decade of the 2000s, with transatlantic relations strained by the Bush administration's preference for unilateral action.[82] Still, large segments of the public were and remain elusive on whether a common European security should mean a transfer of sovereignty from the state to the EU level and a more pro-active approach by the EU in defence and foreign policy matters.

2.3 The test of a European single army

Moving from general orientation towards a common foreign and defence policy to more specific questions about European defence, it has to be noted that most of the data cover the period of the transatlantic fallout over the Iraq War (between 2003 and 2007), making long-term trends difficult to trace. The available data show that measures unrelated to the deployment of the military abroad receive high public support across all countries. Eurobarometer data, for example, indicate that in almost all countries the overwhelming majority of respondents concur that EU

82 Philip Everts, Pierangelo Isernia and Francesco Olmastroni, "International Security Across the Atlantic: A Longitudinal Comparison of Public Opinion in Europe and the United States", in *Transworld Working Papers*, No. 29 (May 2014), http://transworld.iai.it/?p=1502.

members should agree on a common position when an international crisis breaks out (Table 16, left side). In this case, the pattern of neutral countries being less supportive of integration measures towards European defence is less pronounced, with only two of them showing this reduced support. Similarly, high levels of support can be found for guaranteeing human rights around the world (Table 16, right side).

Table 16 | Support for common position in crisis and guaranteeing human rights around the world, 2003–2005 (%)

	1. Agree on a common EU position				2. Guarantee human rights	
	2003	**2004**	**2005**		**2003**	**2004**
Belgium	85	92	92		80	92
France	86	89	88		84	89
Germany	86	89	86		79	88
Italy	88	80	81		80	76
Luxembourg	93	89	91		89	87
Netherlands	83	84	83		84	93
Denmark	78	76	76		87	85
Ireland	74	73	73		77	78
UK	72	78	77		67	74
Greece	86	86	88		90	88
Portugal	76	71	74		73	78
Spain	79	78	74		76	81
Austria	74	79	79		75	84
Finland	76	78	81		86	94
Sweden	85	80	80		89	90
Cyprus		91	96			90
Czech Republic		87	92			76
Estonia		91	90			82
Hungary		83	82			85
Latvia		89	89			82
Lithuania		87	83			82
Malta		70	74			85
Poland		86	85			84
Slovakia		89	86			80
Slovenia		89	88			83
Bulgaria		80	82			78
Romania		85	78			78
Croatia		87	83			87

Question 1: "When an international crisis occurs, European Union member states should agree on a common position". Response options: "Tend to agree"; "Tend to disagree"; "DK".
Question 2: "The European Union should work to guarantee Human Rights around the world, even if this is contrary to the wishes of some other countries". Response options: "Tend to agree"; "Tend to disagree"; "DK".
Note: (a) Reported are % "Tend to agree".
Source: Eurobarometer.

Measures related to the military are less systematically popular and, at the same time, there is a larger variation across countries. By and large, European publics are somewhat less enthusiastic about the idea of setting up a rapid military reaction force, even if majorities support this idea in most countries (Table 17, left columns). According to the 2005 Transatlantic Trends Survey (TTS), most respondents in most countries considered were willing to go one step further, agreeing that EU countries should combine their national military forces into a single European army, despite possible disagreements with supranational decisions (Table 17, middle column). A clear exception here was the United Kingdom, where only 35 per cent agreed with that proposal.

While most Europeans were not opposed to the establishment of a single army, this does not mean that the use of this European military would be acceptable as well. When posed specific questions about the use of military force, public support is much lower. For instance, the 2006 and 2007 TTS data showed that, in most of the countries surveyed, majorities would reject a decision of the EU to use military force if their own government disagreed (Table 17, right column). Remarkably, in 2007 levels of agreement were as low as 33 per cent in Germany and France.

Table 17 | Support for a common EU army, 2003–2007 (%)

	Rapid military reaction force[a]			European army[b]	Abide by EU decision[b]	
	2003	2004	2005	2005	2006	2007
Belgium	76	83	82			
France	75	79	79	63	41	34
Germany	60	63	60	53	33	33
Italy	73	69	63	61	44	47
Luxembourg	72	69	68			
Netherlands	69	72	69	49	51	46
Denmark	54	62	60			
Ireland	61	60	58			
UK	71	71	71	38	39	43
Greece	77	69	73			
Portugal	69	67	71	65	46	51
Spain	69	71	62	61	48	44
Austria	57	64	58			
Finland	50	64	63			
Sweden	67	66	68			
Cyprus		84	88			
Czech Republic		72	72			
Estonia		77	77			
Hungary		75	67			
Latvia		82	80			
Lithuania		76	70			
Malta		54	48			
Poland		79	78	52	48	50
Slovakia		74	72	59	27	35
Slovenia		70	75			
Bulgaria		73	73			
Romania		72	70			
Croatia		78	70			

Question 1: "The European Union should have a rapid military reaction force that can be sent quickly to trouble spots when an international crisis occurs". Response options: "Tend to agree"; "Tend to disagree"; "DK".
Question 2: "The countries of the EU should combine their military forces into a single European army, even though [country] may not always agree with EU decisions". Response options: "Agree strongly"; "Agree somewhat"; "Disagree somewhat"; "Disagree strongly".
Question 3: "If the European Union should decide to use military force, [COUNTRY] should abide by that decision, even if [country] disagrees". Response options: "Agree strongly"; "Agree somewhat";

"Disagree somewhat"; "Disagree strongly".
Note: Reported are: a) % "Tend to agree"; b) % "Agree strongly" + "Agree somewhat".
Source: Eurobarometer (Question 1); Transatlantic Trends survey (Questions 2 and 3).

At the same time, there seems to be consensus across the TTS countries about the desirability of EU leadership in the world (Figure 4), with large majorities in the EU's founding members looking favourably on this idea. Relatively speaking, Britons, Greeks and Slovaks showed slightly lower levels of support throughout the survey period, with supporting percentages most often hovering between 60 and 70 per cent, as opposed to the 70–90 per cent range in the founding members.

Similarly, Europeans at the time would have liked the EU to be more independent from the United States (Table 18). Only Britons, Swedes and Eastern Europeans believed that the US-EU partnership in security and diplomatic affairs should remain the same or become even closer.[83] Interestingly, the desire for a more autonomous role of the EU decreased during the first Obama administration, but it turned up again in 2014, at the peak of the first Ukraine crisis in 2014 (Table 18). In that year – the last for which data are currently available – Eastern European, British and Swedish publics firmly endorsed the transatlantic partnership. Western Europeans preferred a stronger role for the EU in security and defence matters instead. Only the Dutch were evenly divided between a more independent EU and a (closer or unvaried) partnership with the United States.

However, support for EU leadership in world affairs and for a more independent approach from the United States did not coincide with the idea of prioritising the development of military capabilities at the EU level. Asked about the most helpful initiatives for the future of Europe, only minorities mentioned the creation of a common army (Table 19). From 2006 onward, this initiative ranked last out of six in most countries, far behind other goals such as having comparable living and education standards, well defined external borders, and a common language. Noteworthy exceptions are France, Netherlands, and Cyprus, where more than one-fifth of the national public considers a common army as a priority for the future of the Union.

83 Similarly, Eurobarometer polls conducted between March 2003 and November 2007 consistently show that in most EU countries more than 70 per cent of the interviewees agreed that "EU foreign policy should be independent of United States foreign policy".

Figure 4 | Desirability of a EU leadership in world affairs



Question: "How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very desirable, somewhat desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable?"
Note: "Desirable" combines options "very desirable" and "somewhat desirable"; "undesirable" combines options "somewhat undesirable" and "very undesirable".
Source: Worldviews (2002) and Transatlantic Trends Survey (2005–2014).

Table 18 | EU–US partnership in security and diplomatic affairs

	Date	Become closer	Remain about the same	Take a more independent approach	Don't know	N
Bulgaria	06/2006	24	19	42	14	1,026
	06/2008	37	20	35	8	1,000
	06/2009	27	32	33	8	516
	06/2010	38	25	30	7	1,016
	05/2011	32	31	33	4	1,012
	06/2012	27	34	33	6	1,007
France	06/2004	31	16	51	1	505
	05/2005	27	15	57	1	513
	06/2006	23	20	56	1	1,000
	06/2008	25	20	53	1	1,000
	06/2009	41	25	34	0	500
	06/2010	35	26	39	1	1,001
	05/2011	33	25	41	1	1,000
	06/2012	25	32	42	1	1,000
	06/2013	25	33	40	2	1,000
	06/2014	19	24	57	1	1,000
Germany	06/2004	31	16	51	1	505
	05/2005	27	15	57	1	513
	06/2006	23	20	56	1	1,000
	06/2008	25	20	53	1	1,000
	06/2009	41	25	34	0	500
	06/2010	35	26	39	1	1,001
	05/2011	33	25	41	1	1,000
	06/2012	25	32	42	1	1,000
	06/2013	25	33	40	2	1,000
	06/2014	19	24	57	1	1,000
Greece	06/2014	18	9	69	4	1,000
Italy	06/2004	30	10	59	1	470
	05/2005	29	6	65	1	522
	06/2006	35	7	57	1	1,002
	06/2008	37	9	52	1	1.000
	06/2009	51	10	37	2	502
	06/2010	53	8	38	1	1,001
	05/2011	50	10	36	3	1,002
	06/2012	43	9	46	3	1,000

	06/2013	36	12	49	4	1,000
	06/2014	32	8	58	2	1,000
Netherlands	06/2004	32	10	56	2	517
	05/2005	23	13	64	1	507
	06/2006	17	16	65	2	1,000
	06/2008	26	14	58	3	1,000
	06/2009	23	26	49	3	497
	06/2010	32	20	47	2	1,000
	05/2011	30	25	44	1	1,000
	06/2012	28	32	37	4	1,000
	06/2013	21	32	45	2	1,000
	06/2014	20	32	47	2	1,000
Poland	06/2004	44	12	38	6	501
	05/2005	49	10	34	7	516
	06/2006	41	18	33	8	999
	06/2008	45	21	25	8	1,000
	06/2009	46	25	20	10	494
	06/2010	45	20	30	5	1,000
	05/2011	40	26	27	8	1,000
	06/2012	35	29	26	10	1,000
	06/2013	32	34	26	8	1,000
	06/2014	37	36	22	5	1,000
Portugal	06/2004	24	17	48	11	493
	05/2005	25	23	49	4	472
	06/2006	19	15	58	8	1,000
	06/2008	22	17	56	5	1,000
	06/2009	30	28	37	5	498
	06/2010	33	22	45	1	1,000
	05/2011	29	25	44	2	1,000
	06/2012	21	25	51	4	1,000
	06/2013	20	22	54	4	1,000
	06/2014	19	20	55	6	1,000
Romania	06/2006	51	16	23	10	1,000
	06/2008	52	28	12	9	515
	06/2009	54	21	17	9	1,042
	06/2010	56	23	17	5	1,018
	05/2011	50	31	15	4	1,025
	06/2012	51	31	15	4	1,042
	06/2013	43	31	21	6	1,000

Slovakia	06/2004	25	15	54	6	491
	05/2005	35	20	36	8	508
	06/2006	17	25	51	7	1,002
	06/2008	25	25	41	9	1,016
	06/2009	34	28	30	7	523
	06/2010	31	32	33	4	1,006
	05/2011	28	34	32	6	1,004
	06/2012	19	41	33	7	1,005
	06/2013	21	43	32	5	1,000
Spain	06/2004	38	8	48	5	500
	05/2005	42	7	49	2	500
	06/2006	34	7	57	2	1,003
	06/2008	37	8	52	3	1,004
	06/2009	53	8	38	1	540
	06/2010	52	9	38	2	1,003
	05/2011	47	8	43	2	1,002
	06/2012	40	14	43	3	1,000
	06/2013	34	10	52	4	1,000
	06/2014	28	12	58	3	1,000
Sweden	05/2011	25	35	36	4	1,003
	06/2012	23	38	35	4	1,000
	06/2013	23	38	34	6	1,000
	06/2014	26	36	35	4	1,000
UK	06/2004	35	17	44	4	500
	05/2005	27	21	49	3	505
	06/2006	19	19	57	4	1,002
	06/2008	26	20	51	3	1,001
	06/2009	33	27	36	4	494
	06/2010	30	23	45	2	1,000
	05/2011	28	29	39	4	1,001
	06/2012	25	31	40	4	1,000
	06/2013	21	31	42	5	1,000
	06/2014	19	35	42	5	1,000

Question: "Do you think that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the European Union should become closer, should remain about the same, or should the European Union take a more independent approach from the United States?"
Source: Transatlantic Trends Survey.

Table 19 | A common army for the future of Europe (%)

	02/2006	09/2006	12/2011	11/2012	09/2016	09/2017	03/2018	11/2018
Austria	8	10	8	11	17	14	13	13
Belgium	12	19	11	11	18	18	19	17
Bulgaria	-	8	8	5	10	11	8	8
Croatia	-	12	-	16	13	9	8	11
Cyprus	26	23	13	12	18	17	26	26
Czech Rep.	10	12	9	9	19	12	14	15
Denmark	9	8	4	6	9	8	9	8
Estonia	9	11	11	10	12	12	14	12
Finland	4	7	4	5	7	8	9	8
France	19	18	11	12	21	23	19	19
Germany	5	6	3	5	8	9	8	10
Greece	10	12	6	6	10	8	14	10
Hungary	7	7	9	6	19	14	12	15
Ireland	6	6	5	7	6	7	6	6
Italy	9	15	12	8	12	16	19	15
Latvia	9	11	7	8	12	11	14	12
Lithuania	9	9	7	7	18	13	15	15
Luxembourg	13	15	7	9	12	14	11	16
Malta	1	7	4	4	7	6	5	5
Netherlands	22	21	12	17	21	31	26	22
Poland	8	6	6	7	18	14	15	18
Portugal	8	8	8	8	6	4	5	5
Romania	-	8	7	10	17	15	11	14
Slovakia	10	10	6	6	10	7	9	9
Slovenia	14	10	8	6	10	9	7	13
Spain	5	6	4	2	3	6	3	4
Sweden	10	11	5	7	7	8	11	7
UK	8	8	6	8	7	6	9	6

Question: "Which two of the following would you consider to be most helpful if anything, for the future of Europe?" (max. 2 answers).
Note: Reported are percentages of respondents who chose response option "A common army".
Source: Eurobarometer, various years.

All these different questions project a pretty coherent image of where we were in Europe on these issues up until recently. Overall, the United Kingdom and the neutral countries often lagged behind all other countries in terms of support for a

common foreign and defence policies, but these differences were moderate. Apart from a small trend towards increased familiarity with CSDP, the only notable shifts in opinion seem to be event-related and quite homogenous across Europe. The largest differences can be found in terms of attitude object. More specifically, while support for EUFSP in general is consistently high across Europe and over time, it is lower for more specific measures relating to the military and its deployment.

2.4 European defence and the Atlantic Alliance

We have shown that general support for EUFSP was high and quite stable over the 2000–2020 period across Europe, provided no reference to a transfer of sovereignty on military issues was made. But Europeans, especially in continental Western Europe, also believed the EU should exert a strong leadership in world affairs and take a more independent approach from the United States in security and diplomatic affairs. So, what do citizens say when pressed to choose between an independent European defence cooperation and the Atlantic Alliance?

Despite the general consensus on the need for EUFSP and more independence from American influence, Europeans express different views when asked what the most appropriate level of decision-making for defence issues is – the national government, NATO or the EU (Figure 5). Increasing majorities in the six founding members, Greece, Portugal, Spain and most East European countries think that decisions concerning European defence should be taken at the EU level. In the neutral member countries, in contrast, comparable shares of the population prefer the EU and the national government level, respectively, with NATO not surprisingly being the least favourite option. From 2000 to 2003, and more noticeably since 2005, the Danes tended to support NATO as the most appropriate institution to deal with European security, while Britons were evenly distributed across the three response options. It is worth noting that in a few countries significant but decreasing percentages of the public did not express any preference, with about one-fifth of the respondents opting for the "don't know" answer in Bulgaria, Ireland, Lithuania, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

Figure 5 | Appropriate level of decision-making for defence and security issues, 2000–2009 (%) (continue)



Question Eurobarometer: "In your opinion, should decisions concerning European defence policy be taken by national governments, by NATO or by the European Union? [one answer only]".
Question InTune: "Which authority would be more appropriate to deal with European security? [one answer only]"
Source: Eurobarometer, various years; InTune 2009.

Figure 5 | Appropriate level of decision-making for defence and security issues, 2000–2009 (%) (continued)



Question Eurobarometer: "In your opinion, should decisions concerning European defence policy be taken by national governments, by NATO or by the European Union? [one answer only]".
Question InTune: "Which authority would be more appropriate to deal with European security? [one answer only]"
Source: Eurobarometer, various years; InTune 2009.

Data from a survey conducted as part of the European InTune project[84] indicate that this ambivalence about the preferred level of decision-making for security issues was partially dispelled one year after Obama's inauguration in all the sixteen

[84] Maurizio Cotta, Pierangelo Isernia and Paolo Bellucci "IntUne Mass Survey Wave 2", in *ICPSR Studies*, No. 34272 (22 April 2013), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34272.v2.

EU surveyed countries but Poland and Estonia (see the last data point in Figure 5).

It resurfaced in July 2017, however, after President Trump had taken office. In a survey by the EuEngage project, respondents faced an "either-or" choice between strengthened military cooperation within NATO and a European Union army independent of the Atlantic Alliance to address international security crises (Table 20). Among the Czech, Poles, Britons, and the Dutch, NATO was clearly the preferred option. In the remaining six Western countries surveyed (i.e., France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), the public was divided about which of the two was the best solution. Similarly, majorities in all EU countries agreed that both foreign and defence policy could be equally handled at the national and the EU level at the end of 2018.

Table 20 | Military cooperation within NATO vs. EU army independent of NATO (%)

	0-3	4-6	7-10	Don't know	N
Czech Republic	48	34	18	0	1,416
France	19	45	36	0	1,181
Germany	30	49	21	0	1,230
Greece	14	53	33	0	1,074
Italy	15	50	35	0	1,278
Netherlands	46	40	14	0	1,211
Poland	57	27	16	0	1,128
Portugal	27	53	21	0	779
Spain	22	49	29	0	1,205
UK	61	29	9	0	1,137

Question: "In recent years, the EU has been confronted with international security crises in the Ukraine and in Mediterranean countries (such as Libya and Syria). Different policies have been suggested and we would like to know your view. For each of the following policy alternatives, please position yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that you would fully support the policy on the left and 10 means that you fully support the policy on the right. If your views are somewhere in between, you can choose any number that best describes your position".
Notes: 0: "To address these problems, it is better to strengthen military cooperation within NATO"; 10: "To address these problems, it is better to create a European Union army independent of NATO". Only in the UK: "To address these problems, it is better to create a European Union army independent of NATO, with the participation of the UK".
Source: EuEngage-Kantar Public, 2017.

Conclusion

A curious disconnect creeps in the discussion on the connection between public opinion, political elites and European foreign policy, the political discourse on what public opinion thinks of European foreign and security policy and the empirical data available.

First, public opinion data show that there is a vast support for further integration on defence and security issues and this is widely acknowledged by both experts and scholars.[85] The EU's defence policy is among the most supported public policies by public opinion. The analysis of available longitudinal data for the 2000–2020 period confirms a stable public support for, and increasing familiarity with, EUFSP throughout Europe, with the neutral countries and the United Kingdom showing somewhat attenuated enthusiasm. Undoubtedly, Europeans' support for EUFSP grew markedly during the first decade of the 2000s, with transatlantic relations strained by the Bush administration's preference for unilateral action.[86] Still, large segments of the public were and remain elusive on whether a common European security should mean a transfer of decision-making power from the state to the EU level and the end of the Atlantic alliance. The enlargement of the EU has brought more variety of opinions within the pack. Although the founding six are still the most supportive of EUFSP in general, public support in the other ones is substantial as well. The fact that the country housing one the most critical public towards European defence, the United Kingdom, has left the EU means that the remaining members' preferences have become more homogeneous, suggesting that a window of opportunity is available for increased security and defence integration.

Second, support for further EUFSP integration is widespread also among political, business and social elites. When it comes to a common European defence and foreign policy, the issue is not "whether" to do it, but rather "how much"

85 See for example Klaus Brummer, "Superficial, not Substantial", cit., p. 184; Jolyon Howorth, "European Security Post-Libya and Post-Ukraine", cit.; Frédéric Mérand and Kathleen Angers, "Military Integration in Europe", cit.

86 Philip Everts, Pierangelo Isernia and Francesco Olmastroni, "International Security Across the Atlantic, cit.

Europeanised these two policy areas should be. The topics on which divisions seem to emerge are about how far to go with a single European army and what kind of relationship the European army should have with NATO and its main partner, the United States. Here the main cleavage is the East-West divide. In general, Eastern European countries still prefer a national army, and cooperation via NATO, while the Western and Southern European ones are in favour of a combination of national and European army and a revised role for NATO.

Still, all this mass and elite support notwithstanding, foreign and defence are areas in which not much integration has been achieved. It is still an area under the full competence of the EU Council of Ministers and there are no tangible sings this can change. Why is this the case? Why, irrespective of how widespread and cross-sectional support for further integration on defence and foreign policy matters is, progress is so slow and incomplete? With no pretence to fully address this question, three possible explanations could be offered.

The first is that, as a matter of fact, the support that does exist at the mass level is shallow or ignorant or both and the elites perceive it. Support is shallow because, it is argued, Europeans do not want to pay for their defence (free riding), do not want to bear the human costs of the use of force (casualty aversion) or do not like the use of force (soft vs hard power). Ignorant because security and defence is a typical area of which people know little or nothing. The combination of shallowness and ignorance qualify support for an integrated EUFSP as a form of "permissive consensus".

If a "permissive consensus" on these topics does actually exist and it is shallow, this means that it can easily be shaken. And here a second possible explanation for the lack of integration arises. Politicians, no matter how enthusiastic they are, might be reluctant to scale up Europeanisation in these areas because they are afraid of parties and policy entrepreneurs ready to agitate and politicise the issue to transform this permissive consensus into a constraining dissensus. As soon as the issue gets politicised, grounds for disagreement among European publics will be more likely to emerge as symbolic favourability will be put to the test and disagreement might arise among continental Europeans. To what extent this is a real concern? In a recent paper, Angelucci and Isernia have found that although common defence is prone to be politicised and that right-wing, non-mainstream

parties are the best positioned to mobilise the electorate on this issue, right-wing voters are also the least likely to be mobilised.[87] Furthermore, the voters of mainstream, and generally Europhile, parties are hard to mobilise by right-wing issue entrepreneurs on EU defence issues. This suggests that, despite the efforts of issue entrepreneurs to politicise EU defence, the attempt may fail to find enough followers.

A last potential explanation has to do with organisational resistance. No matter how much political elites are found to be supportive of a more integrated common foreign and defence policy, there are powerful organisational constraints, from the military and diplomacy, that resist to such a project.

[87] Davide Angelucci and Pierangelo Isernia, "Politicization and Security Policy: Parties, Voters and the European Common Security and Defense Policy", in *European Union Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 2020), p. 64-86, https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116519851193.

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Appendix 1: List of elite studies

We here report a brief description of each of the studies used for the review on elites' beliefs.

1. *The Top Decision makers - Flash Eurobarometer No. 39*
Time span: February–March 1996
Principal investigators: Karlheinz Reif
Website: https://search.gesis.org/research_data/ZA2896
Sample: Sample of high-ranking decision-makers in politics (elected members of Parliament), administration, leadership personalities from business, the working world, the media as well as persons who play a leading role in academic, cultural and religious life in their country.

2. *The EPRG (European Parliament Research Group) MEP Survey Data*
Time span: 2000, 2006, 2010 and 2015

Principal investigators: Richard Whitaker, Simon Hix and Galina Zapryanova
Website: https://mepsurvey.eu/data-objects/data
Sample: Members of European Parliament

3. *European Election Study*
Time span: 1979, 1994 and 2009
Principal investigators: Hermann Schmidt et al.
Website: http://eeshomepage.net
Sample: Candidates to European Parliamentary Election

4. *European Elite Survey /Transatlantic Leadership Survey*
Time span: 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010
Principal investigators: Pierangelo Isernia
Website:
Sample: Members of European Parliament and top level officials of the EU Commission

5. *Transworld*
Time span: 2013
Principal investigators: Pierangelo Isernia
Website: http://transworld.iai.it
Sample: Members of European Parliament and top level officials of the EU Commission

6. *INTUNE Project (under the 6th FP)*
Time span: 2007 and 2009
Principal investigators: Maurizio Cotta and Pierangelo Isernia
Website:
Sample: National member of Parliament, business and trade union elites

7. *ENAC (CIRCaP, 2014)*
Time span: 2014
Principal investigators: Maurizio Cotta
Website:
Sample: National member of Parliament, business and trade union elites

8. *EUEngage Project*

Time span: 2016, 2017

Principal investigators: Maurizio Cotta and Pierangelo Isernia

Website: http://www.euengage.eu

Sample: National member of Parliament

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