YOUTH AND AFRICA

edited by
Lorenzo Kamel

New-Med
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Edizioni Nuova Cultura

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IaI Istituto Affari
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Series Editor
Lorenzo Kamel

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List of Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CASP	Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRDIP	Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
FFC	Forces of Freedom and Change
GADEM	Groupe antiraciste d'accompagnement et de défense des étrangers et migrants
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross domestic product
GHG	Greenhouse gas
GoS	Government of Sudan
HCC	High Council of Communication

IDF	Israel Defense Forces
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JFC	Joint Field Committee
JPN	Juba Peace Negotiations
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MISCA	International Support Mission to the Central African Republic
MPFA	Migration Policy Framework for Africa
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors without Borders
NAP	National Action Plan
NCDC	Nigeria Centre for Disease Control
NCM	National Coordination Mechanism
NDDS	Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NiMet	Nigeria Meteorological Agency
NMP	National Migration Policy
NTS	non-traditional security
NYSC	National Youth Service Corps
PAAPS	Programme d'appui à l'amélioration de la protection sociale
RAMED	Régime d'assistance médicale aux économiquement démunis
RCP	Regional Consultative Process
REC	Regional Economic Community
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa and Bordering States
RMCC	Regional Migration Coordination Committee
RMCE	Regional Multidisciplinary Centre for Excellence
RMMS	Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat
RMPF	Regional Migration Policy Framework

SADC	South Africa Development Cooperation
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SC	Sovereign Council
SCP	Sudanese Communist Party
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIHMA	Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SRF	Sudanese Revolutionary Front
SuWEP	Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace
SWU	Sudanese Women's Union
TMC	Transitional Military Council
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

Introduction

Lorenzo Kamel

While many studies have focused on the present and the future of Africa and its interconnections with Europe, it is rare to hear how young people from African countries view and interpret the developments currently unfolding in their own countries, and how these are addressed in the international debate on the future of the continent. To fill the vacuum and meet the challenge, this edited volume gives voice to African youth, providing a platform for seven outstanding young scholars to present their ideas and contribute to the ongoing debates about conflict, security and radicalisation.

The chapters' authors have been selected following a highly competitive call launched in October 2019 within New-Med, a research network developed by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, the Compagnia di San Paolo and the German Marshall Fund (GMF) of the United States.

In the first chapter, Margaret Monyani, a doctoral researcher at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa, contends that borders in the Horn of Africa region are porous and vulnerable to various forms of organised crime, including terrorism, as evidenced by the existence of terror groups such as Al-Shabab in Somalia. Studies on regional migration governance suggest that regional bodies are critical in helping states to achieve a more balanced approach that enhances border security, which ultimately culminates in regional stability. Within this frame, Monyani examines the dynamics and complexities of regional migration governance

in the contemporary Horn of Africa, and identifies the various causes and trends of irregular migration flows and border insecurity in the region.

In Chapter 2, Aya Damir, a Research Officer at the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies at the American University in Cairo (AUC), turns the attention on Sudanese women. The latter have played a crucial role in contesting authoritarian regimes across Sudan's history, yet their engagement in peace processes has been minimal. Damir seeks to provide a framework to ensure women's political participation though analysing the literature, press releases and interviews with a wide variety of local players and local actors, including ten female refugees and asylum-seekers from Darfur and Khartoum. Her research shows that women's participation can be ensured through a framework which includes creating a gender-sensitive mediation process, confidence-building and accountability for war crimes, while also addressing the social factors that hinder women's activism.

Migration and the role of women are also discussed in Chapter 3, by Nabil Ferdaoussi, a graduate student of Cultural Studies at the University of Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah (Fes, Morocco), and a Research Fellow at the Moroccan Cultural Studies Centre. He contends that thousands of sub-Saharan migrants have been subject to violent practices by the Moroccan local authorities, and that key to gaining a deeper understanding of the overall migration crisis is to recognise the ill treatment of female migrants. The vulnerability of female sub-Saharan migrants to multiple forms of abuse and exploitation is addressed by humanitarian agencies and migration communities. Ferdaoussi shows that most of the initiatives carried out by these agencies operate myopically based on androcentric terminology, casting women as passive, agentless and vulnerable to human traffickers. In turn, to ward off international stigma and maintain its geostrategic interests, the Moroccan state regime justifies its abuse, summary deportations and unwarranted arrests as an effort to combat human traffickers and thus protect "vulnerable" and at-risk populations. This "blame game" amplifies female sub-Saharan migrants' vulnerability at all levels.

In Chapter 4, Victor O. Achem, a PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Ibadan (Nigeria), addresses the issue of climate change and shows that there are several manifestations of its effect in Nigeria, including increased drought and food shortages due to irregularities in rainfall

and flood. The consequences of this challenge range from conflicts over dwindling natural resources to mass migration into Europe. Over the past decade, cooperation between the European Union and Nigeria has continued to develop. The environment and climate change are also among the new fields of cooperation under the 11th European Development Fund, the EU development financial instrument for the 2014–20 period. Achem's chapter examines the ecological damage (rising temperatures, changes in seasonality and ecosystem productivity) and climate-induced conflict (land resource management and herders–farmers conflict). It also recommends a sustainable adaptation strategy in collaboration with the EU.

Chapter 5 also analyses the impact of climate change and environmental degradation. Hadjar Aounaf, a PhD candidate in Human Rights and Humanitarian Security at the University of Oran 2 Mohamed Ben Ahmed (Algeria), points out that Africa has shown a high level of vulnerability in relation to the effects of climate change, and that the ongoing environmental crisis is also having a severe impact on human security. He contends that the general level of awareness among many African communities regarding the roots and the impacts of climate change on environmental degradation is very low. Most individuals, in fact, are not sufficiently aware that their actions, daily consumption patterns and the poor management of natural resources are leading to both internal and external conflicts, and therefore also to human suffering. Overall, Aounaf highlights the linkage between climate change, human security and the importance of raising awareness in Africa on how to mitigate the impacts of climate change.

Muhammad Alaraby, a senior researcher at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina's Center for Strategic Studies (Egypt), focuses in Chapter 6 on illicit arms transfers, a major threat to stability, peace and development in Africa. The Horn of Africa, in particular, has become a critical crossroads for both legal and illegal arms transfer due to the growing strategic significance of the region in the global landscape. Domestic and external flows of arms threaten the national and human security of the region's states and populations; they push the region into a spiral of circular violence and conflict on several levels. To curb these flows, the author argues that more effective policy options should be implemented in the light of the current legal frameworks and the principles of human security.

Finally, in Chapter 7, Paul-Crescent Beninga, Director of the Central African Centre for Geopolitical Research and Analysis (Central African Republic), analyses the role of the media in armed conflicts, taking the Central African Republic as a case study. He claims that despite the complexity of the relationship between the media and politicians in conflict situations, the dynamics of the Central African media landscape have remained consistent; many radio stations and newspaper agencies have been established in the country during conflict and interwar periods. Beninga points out that the paradoxical proliferation of the media in times of armed conflict is the result of an effort to ease tensions and minimise the impact of conflict on the population, and the desire of many if not most citizens to weigh in on the conflicts by expressing their opinions.

1.
Regional Migration Regimes and Border Security in the Horn of Africa

Margaret Monyani

The emergence of regional migration regimes can be traced to the proliferation of various global governance initiatives that emerged after the Second World War.[1] Hein de Haas defined regional migration governance as

> the collection of national laws, policies, and practices complemented by relevant regional and international norms and an international framework for cooperation that states need in order to manage migration effectively. This involves, national migration schemes that address the entry, exit, stay, and return of non-nationals, operate in parallel to a number of bilateral, regional and intergovernmental arrangements.[2]

States' approach to migration governance has differed from their approach to trade. The majority of regional organisations involved in migration governance started off as Regional Economic Communities (RECs).[3]

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[1] T. Alexander Aleinikoff, "International Legal Norms on Migration: Substance without Architecture", in Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud and Euan MacDonald (eds), *International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges*, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, p. 467-479.

[2] Hein de Haas, *African Migration. Migration Governance*, draft report prepared for the Africa Regional Consultative Meeting on the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Addis Ababa, 26-27 October 2017, https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-documents/SocialDevelopement/Global-Compact-Migration-2017/governance-of-migration_english.pdf.

[3] Sandra Lavenex et al., "Regional Migration Governance", in Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas

RECs were established in order to promote trade, eradicate transport bottlenecks, ease customs issues that could affect movement of goods and money and eliminate trade barriers. This, however, cannot be said of migration. Over the years, states opted to address migration and border governance through non-binding but collaborative engagement facilitated through already existing RECs. Regional migration governance occurs in two forms: vertical governance, which refers to the sharing of responsibilities between various institutions; and horizontal governance, which refers to the sharing of responsibilities between various actors.[4] Generally, regional migration governance entails both formal and informal structures that thrive on the interplay between regionalism, trans-regionalism and various global/regional institutions.[5] This chapter is about the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)'s regional migration regime. The chapter will focus on the establishment of IGAD as a regional organisation as well as its migration governance structure and policies and what impact it has had on regional migration and border management.

1.1 Historical background of IGAD

IGAD is a regional organisation in the Horn of Africa that consists of eight member states: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda. IGAD was established in 1996 to succeed the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) that was formed in 1986. The main aim of IGADD was to help member states mitigate the effects of severe recurring droughts and other natural disasters that resulted in widespread famine, ecological degradation and economic hardship in the region. However, as other dynamic yet critical social, political and economic challenges arose across the region, the leaders of the member states made the decision to revitalise the regional body so as to allow members to deal with these emerging issues. The idea of a new IGAD

Risse (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 457-485.

[4] Giuliana Urso and Anna Hakami, "Regional Migration Governance in Africa: AU and RECs", in *JRC Technical Reports*, 2018, p. 46-47, https://doi.org/10.2760/338319.

[5] Sandra Lavenex et al., "Regional Migration Governance", cit.

was born out of the deliberations held at a meeting in Addis Ababa in April 1995. The new IGAD was launched the following year, at the fifth summit of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State in Djibouti in November.[6] IGAD's initial mandate did not explicitly encompass migration governance and the organisation was mainly concerned with the "sectors of agriculture, environmental degradation and climate change, and peace and security".[7]

Studies on migration trends in Africa show that international migration is largely intra-continental. A majority of migrants, who in many cases have been forcefully displaced, end up in neighbouring countries. The Horn of Africa, which is characterised by porous borders, produces and hosts a majority of Africa's refugee population: as of 2019, there were over 5 million displaced people in the Horn of Africa.[8] The majority of people crossing its borders are victims of forced displacement as a result of a variety of factors, such as civil strife, political instability, border conflicts resulting from long-standing enmity among IGAD member states, drought, poverty, the fragility of states or, in some cases, the absence of statehood, internal and cross-border conflicts, and natural disasters.[9] Just like other parts of Africa, the Horn experiences various other forms of migration as well, including labour migration. It is against this background that the African Union formulated the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA), which constitutes comprehensive policy guidelines and principles to guide African governments and regional organisations in formulating and implementing migration policies.[10]

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[6] IGAD, *IGAD-Migration Action Plan (MAP) to operationalize the IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework (IGAD-RMPF) 2015-2020*, 2014, https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ICP/RCP/2018/igad/igadmigrationactionplan2015-2020.pdf.

[7] Mehari Taddele Maru and Sahra El Fassi, "Can the Regional Economic Communities Support Implementation of the African Governance Architecture (AGA)? The Case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)", in *ECDPM Discussion Papers*, No. 181 (October 2015), p. 13, https://ecdpm.org/?p=19805; Mehari Taddele Maru, *Migration Priorities in Eastern and Southern Africa*, Djibouti, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 2012.

[8] IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, *A Region on the Move. 2019 Mobility Overview in the East and Horn of Africa and the Arab Peninsula*, April 2020, p. 9, https://migration.iom.int/node/8361.

[9] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), *2017 Global Report on Internal Displacement*, May 2017, p. 40-41, https://www.internal-displacement.org/node/313.

[10] IGAD, *Regional Migration Policy Framework*, adopted by the 45th Ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, 11 July 2012, https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/icp/igad-regional-migration-policy-framework1.pdf.

1.2 Migration drivers and trends in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa remains a major source of migrants in Africa and even globally. Interestingly, a majority of the migrants remain within the region, while a few migrate to other parts of Africa or to the North. As of 2019, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that there were more than 5 million migrants hosted by IGAD member states (Figure 1). According to the 2019 International Organization for Migration (IOM) report titled "A Region on the Move", over 8 million people were displaced within the Horn of Africa, 3.5 of whom were refugees.[11] The report further reiterates that the trends and causes of migration in the region remain numerous and dynamic. Notably, most migrants from the Horn travel in one of four major directions: via the Southern route (to Southern Africa via Kenya), the Eastern route (to Saudi Arabia via Yemen), the Horn of Africa route (to countries within the Horn of Africa), or the Northern route (to Europe via Sudan and Libya).[12] As of 2019, IOM reported that approximately 708,000 people from the Horn of Africa had crossed borders.[13] The majority of these migrants travelled via the Eastern route (Figure 2).

As outlined by the IOM, the main reasons for migration include economic or political instability; intractable conflict; intercommunal violence in countries such as Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia; environmental disasters such as drought in countries including Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti.[14] The study findings also show that 80 per cent of those crossing borders are adults, and 20 per cent are children.[15] In some cases children crossing the borders are unaccompanied. Women-headed households and children have also been recorded among the migrants in the region.[16]

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[11] IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, *A Region on the Move*, cit., p. 9.

[12] Ibid., p. 39.

[13] Ibid., p. 41.

[14] IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, *A Region on the Move*, cit.

[15] IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, *Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa and the Arab Peninsula (January-June 2018)*, November 2018, p. 7, https://migration.iom.int/node/4653.

[16] Eva Dick and Benjamin Schraven, "Regional Migration Governance in Africa and Beyond. A Framework of Analysis", in *DIE Discussion Papers*, No. 9/2018, p. 14, https://www.

Figure 1 – Estimated number of people of concern to UNHCR in the East and Horn of Africa in 2019

Source: UNHCR, *Subregion: East and Horn of Africa. 2019 Planning Summary*, 6 May 2019, http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/38?y=2019.

Figure 2 – Movement of migrants on the four routes in 2019 (%)

Source: IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, *A Region on the Move*, cit., p. 2.

die-gdi.de/en/discussion-paper/article/regional-migration-governance-in-africa-and-be-yond-a-framework-of-analysis; World Bank and UNHCR, *Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa*, Washington, World Bank, 25 June 2015, p. 15-16, http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22286.

Figure 3 – Reasons for migration by route

Source: IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, *A Region on the Move*, cit., p. 68.

IGAD member states are either migrant sending or receiving states. Research has shown that Somalia, for example, is a major migrant producing country, followed by Ethiopia and South Sudan.[17] Over the last few years the number of refugees returning home has also been on the rise. This is clearly the case in Somalia, where the concerted effort by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to uproot the terror group Al-Shabab has produced greater political and security stability. This has allowed many Somalis who had taken refuge in neighbouring countries such as Kenya to return home in hope of rebuilding their lives. In 2013, the Kenyan government signed a tripartite agreement with Somalia and UNHCR with a view to the voluntary return of Somali refugees. Meanwhile, research findings on migration flows in the region demonstrate that South Sudan is witnessing the "world's fastest-growing refugee

[17] Eva Dick and Benjamin Schraven, "Regional Cooperation on Migration and Mobility: Insights from Two African Regions", in *AnthroSource*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (June 2018), p. 103, https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2573-508X.2018.tb000011.x; Sergio Carciotto and Cristiano d'Orsi, *Access to Socio-Economic Rights for Refugees: A Comparison Across Six African Countries*, Cape Town, The Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA), March 2017, http://sihma.org.za/reports/Final_report.pdf.

crisis", with displacement driven by the increase in both drought and violent conflict.[18]

1.3 IGAD's migration regime structure

IGAD's migration regime has been in existence for over a decade. The regime is rooted in the Regional Migration Policy Framework (RMPF) that was derived from the African Union's migration framework. In 2012, IGAD became the first regional organisation on the continent to adopt a regional migration framework. Although the region was facing many economic and political challenges, donor pressure led the regional body to shift its focus to its migration regime.[19] The aim of the IGAD migration framework is "to foster a process aimed at an explicit migration policy for its Member States, ultimately for the latter to formulate national migration policies (NMPs) that streamline migration management regionally and nationally, respectively".[20]

The framework stipulates various institutions at the centre of migration governance in the region. These include the Ministerial Committee, the Regional Migration Coordination Committee, focal persons, and the IGAD Health and Social Services Desk.[21] Furthermore, in 2014, a Migration Action Plan that provides guidelines on implementation, monitoring and evaluation of migration programmes for the period 2015–20 was adopted. To improve regional and national coordination, IGAD has created platforms for exchange and information sharing. For instance, in 2008 it launched a Regional Consultative Process (RCP) on migration and set up the IGAD Regional Migration Coordination Committee (RMCC).[22] To sup-

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[18] Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS), *Monthly Summary: East Africa and Yemen, February 2017*, http://www.mixedmigration.org/?p=986; Eva Dick and Benjamin Schraven, "Regional Migration Governance in Africa and Beyond. A Framework of Analysis", cit., p. 6.

[19] Eva Dick and Benjamin Schraven, "Regional Cooperation on Migration and Mobility: Insights from Two African Regions", cit., p. 114.

[20] IGAD, *Regional Migration Policy Framework*, cit., p. 5.

[21] Ibid., p. 63-64.

[22] Caroline Njuki and Woldamlak Abera, "Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration Challenges in the IGAD Region", in *GREAT Insights Magazine*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter 2018), p. 11, https://ecdpm.org/?p=30308.

port member states dealing with protracted refugee hosting situations, the regional body has adopted a holistic approach to national coordination mechanisms. IGAD encourages its member states to work in collaboration with UNHCR in adopting a balanced approach that considers both the short- and long-term needs of the migrants within their territories. To this end, since 2014 several IGAD member states have adopted National Coordination Mechanisms (NCMs), a critical step in domesticating some of these regional migration policies and practices. Countries such as Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia have fully operational NCMs, while the rest are still in the process of formalising their own.[23] As of 2020, the regional body is yet to adopt a regime on the free movement of persons. A Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in the Horn of Africa is still under deliberation.[24] However, it is important to note that practically free movement of persons in the region is ongoing courtesy of bilateral agreements between some member states such as Kenya and Ethiopia. Once adopted, the protocol will be important in harmonising policies and procedures on free movement of persons and the regulation of trade and labour migration across the Horn of Africa.

As much as the regional body continues to build its migration and border regime, political instability and intractable conflicts coupled with environmental disasters still weigh on its efforts. The regional body is calling on its member states to embrace a comprehensive approach so as to cushion the impact on vulnerable and conflict-affected countries in the Horn of Africa. To this end, in 2017 two important programmes were adopted: the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions (NDDS) and the Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP).[25] The NDDS is a programme meant to coordinate the voluntary return of Somali refugees, who constitute the majority of refugees in the region. The objective of the DRDIP is "to improve access to basic social services, expand

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[23] Caroline Njuki, *The IGAD Migration Programme – An Overview*, presented at the Workshop on Best Practices in the IGAD Region, Djibouti, 28-29 March 2017, unpublished document.

[24] IGAD, *Protocol on Free Movement of Persons Endorsed at Ministerial Meeting*, 26 February 2020, https://igad.int/divisions/health-and-social-development/2016-05-24-03-16-37/2373.

[25] Caroline Njuki and Woldamlak Abera, "Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration Challenges in the IGAD Region", cit., p. 11.

economic opportunities, and enhance environmental management" for refugee hosting communities in IGAD member states. The project embeds

> the essential features of ensuring citizen participation and engagement in identifying and prioritizing developmental needs, including socio-economic infrastructure and livelihood opportunities to improve self-reliance of refugee hosting communities; improving social cohesion between refugees and refugee hosting communities; increasing citizen voice and role in development decision making; and eliciting greater demand for social accountability.[26]

To help realise these two programmes, in the same year IGAD tabled and adopted National Action Plans. The objective of the National Action Plans was to provide guidance to the member states in enacting and adopting national migration policies and guidelines.

Apart from the internal institutions that IGAD has adopted so far, the regional body also works with other regional organisations to streamline migration and border management in the larger East Africa region. In 2003, an Inter-Regional Coordination Committee was established to help coordinate migration governance between the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and IGAD RECs. In addition, with the support of the European Union, a Regional Political Integration and Human Security Programme involving IGAD, EAC and COMESA was launched. The main objective of the programme was to enhance cooperation among the three RECs on issues of human security, forced displacement and establishment of regional migration regimes.[27] In 2011, a Regional Multidisciplinary Centre for Excellence (RMCE) was established to offer training and to advise on how to develop regional migration policies. The centre serves four RECs: the South Africa Development Cooperation (SADC), IGAD, COMESA and EAC.[28]

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[26] World Bank, *Uganda - Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa Project*, Washington, World Bank Group, 2019, p. 8, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/347371555812093462.

[27] Giuliana Urso and Anna Hakami, "Regional Migration Governance in Africa: AU and RECs", cit., p. 49.

[28] Emmerentia Erasmus, *MME on the Move. A Stocktaking of Migration, Mobility, Employment and Higher Education in Six African Regional Economic Communities*, Brussels, International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), 2013, p. 23, https://www.icmpd.

While IGAD has made considerable progress in migration governance, the regional organisation continues to face some challenges. Forced displacement is a major driver of migration in the region. This is as a result of the political instability in the region as well as historical animosity among some member states, which has resulted in violent conflicts. Another challenge is the presence of terror groups and militias that continue to hinder efforts to attain stability in the region. Al-Shabab has taken control of Somalia, and the group has been responsible for many acts of terrorism in other countries such as Kenya and Uganda. This in turn hampers efforts at cooperation among member states. Moreover, the fact that all IGAD member states are members of more than one REC has posed a challenge to the regional body's efforts on the implementation of its policies and guidelines on regional migration. Member states find themselves being pulled in different directions as a result of numerous regimes, resulting in the duplication of resources as well as the challenge of dealing with competing priorities.

Conclusion

In conclusion, as much as IGAD has made some important steps towards migration governance, more needs to be done to strengthen the current migration and border regime. The analysis above reveals that IGAD maintains a liberal approach to migration governance. Member states are under no obligation to strictly adopt the stipulated migration policy and guidelines. While the lack of an overall enforcement body is balanced out by the many bilateral agreements among member states, the creation of a legal supra-national body is critical. According to the Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA), a well-equipped supra-national body would help with the adoption and domestication of regional migration policies at the national level. It is also important to work towards finding lasting and effective solutions to the major drivers of migration

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org/fileadmin/ICMPD-Website/ICMPD_General/Publications/MME_RECs_Report-Web_ en.pdf; Bruce Byiers, *The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)*, Maastricht, European Centre for Development Management (ECDPM), January 2016, https://ecdpm.org/?p=21721.

in the region, such as violent conflicts, political instability and poverty. Member states should work together to overcome the historical animosities that exist between such states as Ethiopia and Djibouti, and Kenya and Somalia. Additionally, the regional organisation should work on strengthening both horizontal and vertical coordination of various actors to pull together the resources required for an effective regional migration regime. Horizontal coordination would include both governmental and non-governmental actors, while vertical coordination would entail collaboration between continental, regional and national migration governance regimes.

External support is critical for regional organisations such as IGAD to be effective. The African Union and other global organisations such as United Nations and European Union should provide help in building the capacity of such regional entities. Last but not least, there is a need to invest in more research on the role of regional organisations in migration governance. Their efficiencies and weaknesses need to be understood by policy-makers and those in government, yet this cannot happen without proper analysis. IGAD's institutional structures and processes need to be strengthened to foster effective migration governance, which faces myriad challenges ranging from the occupation of one of its member states by a terror group, to the largely porous borders that allow for the flow of irregular migrants.

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2.

The Women of Sudan in Times of War and Peace

Aya Damir

After years of oppression, women were on the front line leading and forming the majority of Sudan's 2019 revolution. However, activism is not new among Sudanese women, who once resisted British colonial rule and protested in 1964 and 1985.[1] Moreover, today Sudan is in transition, with women forming 18.2 per cent of its sovereign council and 22.2 per cent of Sudan's cabinet.[2] Nevertheless, in 2017, under former President Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir's rule, women constituted 30.5 per cent and 11.4 per cent of the parliament and cabinet respectively, but were often sidelined from peace negotiations.[3] As a result, less than 40 per cent of Sudan's intrastate peace agreements included gender provisions.[4]

Since al-Bashir was ousted in April 2019, relations between the Government of Sudan (GoS), the Transitional Military Council (TMC), the Sovereign Council (SC), the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), other armed groups and protesters have

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[1] Nazik Kabalo, "In Sudan: Women Made Revolutions", in *Nazra for Feminist Studies*, 3 June 2012, https://nazra.org/en/node/127.

[2] AFP, "Sudan's New Cabinet Sworn in as Nation Transitions to Civilian Rule", in *France 24*, 8 September 2019, http://f24.my/5uZ.T.

[3] Monash Gender, Peace & Security (GPS), *Sudan: A Situational Analysis of Women's Participation in Peace Processes*, July 2018, http://mappingpeace.monashgps.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Sudan-Situational-Analysis_ART-1.pdf.

[4] Laura Stevens, Daphne Wang and Hashim Ismail, "Sudan: Freedom, Peace, and Justice", in *Failed and Fragile States Reports and Briefs*, 6 January 2020, p. 34, https://carleton.ca/cifp/?p=2026.

been unstable.[5] Moreover, the marginalisation of women's groups and in turn achieving social peace is at high-stake.

In the midst of this turbulence and paradox, this chapter explores the ever changing relationship between Sudanese women and their habitus, and provides recommendations to ensure women's effective participation in Sudan's present and future. The methodology is based on qualitative analysis of the literature; press releases; personal communication with three Sudanese women and men, including a prominent scholar and a community leader; and focus group discussions with ten female refugees and asylum-seekers from Khartoum and Darfur.

2.1 A brief history of Sudanese women's political engagement

The first organised women's political group was the Sudanese Women's Union (SWU), which was formed in 1951 and was part of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP)'s goal to further engage women. It was led by Fatima Ibrahim, who succeeded in securing multiple rights for women and led demonstrations against the Commander in Chief of the Military of Sudan, Ibrahim Abboud, in 1964.[6] The SWU was divided, however, as ties between the SWU and SCP members limited its autonomy.[7] Moreover, radical Islamist members contested its demand for women's political participation.[8]

In 1965, Fatima Ibrahim became the first woman to serve in Sudan's parliament, while the other female nominee, from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), lost due to lack of party support.[9] One might question how

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[5] UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Panel of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2455 (2019)*, 14 January 2020, https://undocs.org/S/2020/36.

[6] Liv Tønnessen and Hilde Granås Kjøstv, "The Politics of Women's Representation in Sudan: Debating Women's Rights in Islam from the Elites to the Grassroots", in *CMI Reports*, No. 2010:2 (2010), p. 3, https://www.cmi.no/publications/3643.

[7] Sondra Hale, "Testimonies in Exile: Sudanese Gender Politics", in *Northeast African Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2001), p. 85, 103-104.

[8] Liv Tønnessen, "An Increasing Number of Muslim Women in Politics: A Step Toward Complementarity, Not Equality", in *CMI Briefs*, No. 2018:3 (May 2018), https://www.cmi.no/publications/6534.

[9] Ibid., p. 4.

a woman from the MB could nominate herself, given that radical Islamist women had left the SWU due to its demand for women's political engagement. In fact, the 1970s saw a great deal of turbulence that transformed the habitus of Sudan.

Jaafar Nimeiri, President of Sudan from 1969 to 1985, sought to secure his authority by creating a single-party system.[10] Correspondingly, he suspended the SWU and formed his own Sudan Women's Union, which was dependent on him.[11] Furthermore, with the marketisation of Sudan's politics and the proliferation of the MB in the government and army, the path was paved for the MB to come to power, but they still needed to gain more support.[12] Therefore, one of the MB's most influential leaders, Hassan Al-Turabi, advocated for the importance of women's political participation to transfer women's voices and create a balance between soft and hard politics; women would focus on the former, which encompasses health care and maternity, while the hard politics of warfare, security and uprisings would be men's exclusive domain.[13]

When al-Bashir came to power, political groups were violently suppressed in order to decrease their political price and weaken the opposition in Sudan's political marketplace,[14] correspondingly gender-discriminatory laws were imposed to oppress women and obliterate their political influence. Thus, only the party's "constructed" woman was welcomed, and with the outbreak of civil wars, the role of "Spartan mothers" was recalled through the Sudanese Women General Union in 1991, in order to encourage men to fight in Sudan's civil war.[15]

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[10] Peter Woodward, "Sudan's Fragile State, 1956-1989", in John Ryle et al. (eds), *The Sudan Handbook*, Woodbridge, James Currey, 2011, p. 158, https://johnryle.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/JR-Publications-Sudan-Handbook-1.pdf.

[11] Zaynab El Sawi, *Women Building Peace: The Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace in Sudan*, Toronto, Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID), 2011, https://www.awid.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/changing_their_world_2_-_sudanese_women_empowerment_for_peace.pdf.

[12] Alex de Waal, "Sudan: A Political Marketplace Framework Analysis", in *WPF Occasional Papers*, No. 19 (August 2019), https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2019/07/Sudan-A-political-market-place-analysis-final-20190731.pdf; Peter Woodward, "Sudan's Fragile State, 1956-1989", cit., p. 162.

[13] Liv Tønnessen, "An Increasing Number of Muslim Women in Politics", cit.

[14] Alex de Waal, "Sudan: A Political Marketplace Framework Analysis", cit.

[15] Zaynab El Sawi, *Women Building Peace*, cit., p. 6.

2.1.1 Women in peace negotiations

As difficult as it was, Sudanese women believed they could bring peace. The Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace movement (SuWEP) connected Northern and Southern women across Sudan and Nairobi. With international support, it included almost 1,000 active members from diverse groups. However, it couldn't secure ten seats for women in the Machakos (2002) peace talks.[16] Moreover, in Naivasha (2005), women's position papers were accepted but were not included in the recommendations as the GoS rejected gender provisions on the basis that "they did not fight women". Additionally, Southern women who participated were not given sufficient time to prepare and were mocked while addressing gender issues.[17]

The Darfur Peace Agreement, on the other hand, included more than 70 gender sections as women's activism took a different path, creating a unified vision for women from diverse groups from all three states of Darfur. Moreover, a gender expert support team was created with international support, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) sent a gender expert to the mediation team and the African Union (AU)'s delegation included women. However, the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) did not ensure women's effective participation and was left utterly under government control. In order to advance the 25 per cent legislative gender quota, women unified their voices and created a voluntary gender experts team with international support.[18]

As for the Doha Peace Negotiations, women participated in the consultation forums. However, their representation in the official negotiations was limited due to lack of commitment by the negotiating parties and host government to gender issues, biased selection of civil society organisations (CSOs), women's isolation from the economy and lack of decision-making power, and absence of communication between women negotiators and activists. Additionally, women's participation in the final drafting of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) was not ensured.[19]

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[16] Ibid.

[17] GPS, *Sudan: A Situational Analysis of Women's Participation in Peace Processes*, cit.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Jasper Linke, *Women in Peace and Transition Processes. Sudan: Darfur (2009–2017)*,

In contrast, the international community's pressure to include women, trainings provided to women's groups on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325, workshops held by the mediation team with the conflict parties and CSOs, and coalition-building between women and CSOs to advance a unified agenda strengthened women's position.[20] However, there has been no progress on the DDPD since the fall of al-Bashir; thus, the future of Sudanese women's activism is unclear.

2.2 The role of women in overthrowing al-Bashir

Sudanese women from different factions of society played a crucial role in the revolution: women's groups engaged in drafting the Declaration of Freedom and Change, and they held leadership roles in the Sudanese Professional Association where they determined the location of the sit-ins, their security and logistics, distributed food, and so on. Even those who couldn't leave their homes hid the protesters, and women from the diaspora engaged in solidarity protests and funded the revolution.[21] Furthermore, the Kendakas of Darfur revolted, encouraged peaceful protests and distributed food.[22]

Unfortunately, some women suffered severe levels of violence: officers threatened women with flogging, and women were victims of sexual violence and war crimes. Some parents tried to prevent their daughters from protesting, and slogans such as "the president is a woman because he is weak" emerged but were stopped by the activism of women on social media.[23]

Moreover, after al-Bashir was overthrown, women knew they had to take part in Sudan's transition; however, when negotiations with the TMC took place, only one woman was allowed to participate. One of the justifi-

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Geneva, Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative (IPTI), September 2018, https://inclusive-peace.org/node/557.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Wilson Center, *African Women's Mobilization in Times of Unrest*, Symposium held in Washington on 5 June 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/african-womens-mobilization-times-unrest.

[22] Focus group discussion with Darfuri women, February 2020.

[23] Wilson Center, *African Women's Mobilization in Times of Unrest*, cit.; UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Panel of Experts…*, cit., p. 29; Urgent Action Fund Africa website: *How Torture and Intimidation Is Used to Tame Women's Rights Activists on the Frontline of Sudan Revolution*, https://www.uaf-africa.org/?p=11588.

cations of the coalitions of the FFC was the lack of women's experience in negotiating with the former regime.[24] However, women's groups were not the only ones to be sidelined, as the SRF had rejected the Constitutional Declaration.[25] Moreover, the FFC chose the list of the cabinet nominees and did not permit its amendment.[26]

2.2.1 Juba Peace Negotiations (JPN)

Women's groups from the periphery to the centre are demanding the right to participate in peace negotiations; they have presented a National Action Plan (NAP) and a memorandum on the JPN to the SC. Moreover, the SC has declared that women's leadership is important and that their issues are crucial to the peace discussions. Representatives of Darfuri women attended the JPN and presented their agenda.[27] As for the Joint Field Committee (JFC), Najat Suleiman is representing the SRF Darfur track. While consultative forums were held in Darfur, equal gender quotas were given to representatives of internally displaced persons (IDPs) but none for civil society representatives to the JPN.[28]

Taking a closer look at the demands of Sudanese women, they include participation in political life; implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325; accountability for war crimes; confidence-building; stopping arms exportation; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); securing women's agency; rebuilding the economy; creating social peace; eliminat-

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[24] Urgent Action Fund Africa website: *How Torture and Intimidation Is Used…*, cit.

[25] Katariina Mustasilta, "Three Scenarios for Sudan. From Non-Violent Revolution to Democratic Reform?", in *EU-ISS Briefs*, No. 10 (September 2019), https://www.iss.europa.eu/node/2361.

[26] "SFR Can Accept Sudan's Governors Provided Taking Part in the Nomination Process", in *Sudan Tribune*, 18 April 2020, https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article69231.

[27] "El Burhan: Sudanese Women Should Lead Peace Process", in *Radio Dabanga*, 18 November 2019, https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/el-burhan-sudanese-women-should-lead-peace-process; "Darfuri Women Demand Peace 'as Soon as Possible'", in *Radio Dabanga*, 9 March 2020, https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfuri-women-demand-peace-as-soon-as-possible; "Sudan Women Want Greater Role in Juba Negotiations", in *Radio Dabanga*, 26 February 2020, https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-women-want-greater-role-in-juba-negotiations.

[28] United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), *UNAMID Supports Consultative Conferences for IDPs and Darfur Civil Society for Sudan Peace Talks*, 3 February 2020, https://unamid.unmissions.org/node/100062355.

ing discriminatory laws; ending hunger, wars and the government's cycle of fear and silencing; and adopting gender quotas in the legislative and executive bodies and commissions.[29] Given these demands, it is necessary to assess whether the interim constitution provides a roadmap for the empowerment of Sudanese women.

2.2.2 Gender analysis of the Constitutional Declaration

The constitution addresses women as citizens, emphasising the importance of their participation in the public sphere, empowerment and the enjoyment of equal rights to men. Moreover, it seeks to eliminate discriminatory laws and practices and adopt positive discriminatory measures. It also includes provisions on entitlements to free health care for mothers, children and pregnant women. Furthermore, it acknowledges the importance of seeking justice for war crimes committed under al-Bashir's rule and the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1325 NAP.[30]

While the constitution includes the implementation of international and regional agreements that Sudan has ratified to advance women's rights, Sudan did not ratify the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Moreover, the constitution ensures equal civil, political and economic rights and the participation of women in the peace process based on UNSC Resolution 1325 and AU resolutions. Furthermore, it includes the formation of a Women and Gender Equality Commission but does not include any gender quotas in the independent commissions, including transitional justice, while the only quota (40 per cent) is included in the transitional legislative council.[31] However, in order to implement these provisions and ensure the substantive representation of women, a number of recommendations are necessary.

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[29] NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, *Statement by Ms. Alaa Salah at the UN Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security*, New York, 29 October 2019, https://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/resource/statement-unsc-wps-open-debate-october-2019; "Darfur Women Demand More Power", in *Radio Dabanga*, 23 March 2020, https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfur-women-demand-more-power; "Women's Rights Movement Is Growing in Sudan", in *Radio Dabanga*, 14 January 2020, https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/women-rights-movement-is-growing-in-sudan.

[30] Sudan, *Draft Constitutional Charter for the 2019 Transitional Period*, 4 August 2019, p. 4, 15, 18, http://constitutionnet.org/node/17011.

[31] Ibid., p. 10, 13, 14, 15, 18.

2.3 Conclusion and policy recommendations

A dichotomous and patriarchal relationship exists between Sudanese women and the ruling party, which considers them as a separate and dependent unit. Additionally, there is a spillover effect between the ruling party's strategy to secure its power and its relationship with women's groups. For instance, Nimeiri created a non-autonomous single party and follower SWU. Al-Bashir used violence against opposition groups and women to decrease their political influence. Finally, the SRF was excluded during the meetings in Addis Ababa and signature of constitutional declaration with the TMC,[32] consistently, only one woman was allowed to participate in these negotiations.

Peace negotiations have focused on wealth-sharing between the government and armed groups. Additionally, due to the masculinisation of hard politics in Track 1 negotiations, women believe that the current negotiations are focused on ceasefire and disarmament agreements and do not include state-building, and that their role will follow later.[33] Therefore, there is a disconnection between social peace and Track 1 peace negotiations. Another view is that men want to dominate politically and that women will continue to be sidelined at a later stage.[34] Given the divergence of women's opinions, it is necessary to attempt to understand their self-identification.

2.3.1 The identity of Sudanese women

While the majority of women from the focus group discussions arrived to Egypt in 2018 and 2019, they drew themselves and Sudan's habitus differently; women from Khartoum portrayed themselves as the flame of the revolution, sisters, mothers, educated and half of society. In contrast, women from Darfur drew weapons, burnt houses, tears and fleeing.[35]

Furthermore, women from Khartoum and Darfur mentioned their need for safety versus peace respectively. While safety includes walking in

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[32] Personal communication with Hamid Eltgani Ali, April 2020.
[33] Personal communication with a Sudanese woman, April 2020.
[34] Focus group discussion with women from Khartoum, February 2020.
[35] Darfuri women couldn't write, thus they only drew.

the street or staying at home without fear of becoming a victim of crime, peace for Darfuri women meant the end of war and disarmament. Moreover, women from Khartoum mentioned that they could not talk about incidents of rape with men and would prefer to talk with women, especially foreigners, due to social stigma.

There are also three identities and views of armed women in the periphery: those who had lost hope and their families, and picked up weapons in a suicidal yet brave act; wives of generals who had to protect internal areas when the men went to war, whose orders were obeyed; and women who were forced to turn to weapons to protect themselves and their children.[36]

It is clear that women in Sudan have different identities and roles; therefore, sidelining them from the JPN would not result in social peace.

Figure 1 – Khartoum women's drawings

Note: The comments on the drawings were written by the Sudanese women, only the comments between grey brackets were written by the researcher during the focus group discussions quoting what the women were saying to further understand their message.

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[36] Focus group discussion with Darfuri women and personal communication with a Sudanese woman.

Figure 2 – Darfuri women's drawings

2.3.2 Policy recommendations

Women's engagement in Sudan's present and future can be ensured through focusing on four main spheres: (1) mediation; (2) human capital; (3) transitional justice, reconciliation and implementing a Women Peace and Security (WPS) NAP; in addition to (4) addressing social factors.

1) Mediation. The stance of mediators affects the inclusion of women's groups; therefore, it is necessary to create a gender-sensitive mediation process through training mediators on gender-sensitive conflict analysis, allocating gender experts to mediation and negotiation parties, and collecting sex-disaggregated data on the participants and stakeholders, duration of their discussion, topics discussed and interaction. It is also important to ensure the participation of women as advisers on technical topics such as gender and land rights and to create parallel forums and working groups while accounting for women's family obligations.[37]

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[37] UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), *Guidance on Gender and Inclusive Media-*

Figure 3 – Women's engagement in Sudan's four main spheres

- Establishing a transparent gender-sensitive mediation process which transforms power strutures in the political economy and creates social peace

- Empowering women's groups to engage in the negotiations
- Raising awareness on social peace
- Technical and financial support from donor entities

Mediation

Human capital

Transitional justice, reconciliation & WPS NAP

Social factors

- Accountability for war crimes
- Establishing a tranparent WPS NAP structure

- Protecting female activists and victims of rape from harassment

In order to create social peace in Sudan and engage women, it is necessary to analyse the context of the political economy and power dynamics. The mediation process has to be inclusive and extend beyond the government, the SC, TMC and armed groups to include all stakeholders and opposing parties. Thus, it is important to engage youth, women and community grassroots organisations, as well as IDPs and refugees in marginalised areas, to ensure that the negotiations extend beyond the elites.[38] Moreover, the selection of

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tion Strategies, 2017, https://dppa.un.org/en/node/184561; Leena Avonius et al., *Inclusion of Women and Effective Peace Processes. A Toolkit*, Vienna, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, December 2019, https://www.osce.org/secretariat/440735; Miroslava Beham and Luisa Dietrich, *Enhancing Gender-Responsive Mediation A Guidance Note*, Vienna, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, October 2013, https://www.osce.org/secretariat/107533.

[38] Hamid Eltgani Ali, "How Sudan Transitions", in *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs*, No. 36 (Winter 2020), p. 101-111, https://www.thecairoreview.com/?p=10605; Laura Stevens, Daphne Wang and Hashim Ismail, "Sudan: Freedom, Peace, and Justice", cit.

representatives for Track 1.5 negotiations from the opposing parties should be based on transparent and gender-equitable measures. Additionally, with the disagreement between the FFC, SRF and GoS on the nomination process and selection criteria of civil state governors, it is necessary to ensure that the nominated candidates truly represent the community.[39]

Figure 4 – Social peace and empowerment agreement

The negotiation agenda should include empowerment issues such as a WPS NAP, and address political economy from a gender perspective, including the gains of women leaders in armed groups and the exclusive warfare economy in relation to women's political power. Additionally, the possibility of shifting from wealth-sharing towards impact indicators, such as the percentage of government expenditure on education in the states, should be studied, and a gender approach should be adopted by the Friends of Sudan fund. Moreover, ceasefire and security agreements must address rape as a weapon of war, not only as a crime.

Mediators should choose unbiased local actors and women's groups to participate, and determine milestones for consultation with them throughout the mediation process. Finally, mediators could deliver gender-sensitive training to the negotiating parties; facilitate meetings between women's groups, women in the negotiating parties, the mediation team and FemWise-Africa; and hold workshops between the government ministries, SC, armed groups, CSOs and women's groups.

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[39] "SFR Can Accept Sudan's Governors Provided Taking Part in the Nomination Process", cit.; "Sudan's State Governors Saga: Umma Party Calls to Review Selection Criteria", in *Sudan Tribune*, 21 April 2020, https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article69239; "SPLM-N Hilu Slams SRF Rejection of Governors' Appointment in Sudan", in *Sudan Tribune*, 19 April 2020, https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article69235.

2) Human capital. Women's groups need specific capacity-building training, logistical support and networking opportunities, such as training on security, governance, economics and DDR, to effectively participate in Track 1.5 negotiations. Additionally, awareness-raising on social peace and the importance of their inclusion from the beginning is crucial. Furthermore, links should be established between women's groups, female refugees and IDPs, and between women from the centre and the periphery, and these parties should be given greater roles to break the divides between them. Finally, it is important to advance their agenda as part of the civil society agenda through coalition-building.

Donor entities have a crucial role to play, including creating links between female mediators from donor entities, foreign female activists facing similar conditions and Sudanese women's groups. Moreover, they should provide financial and technical support to ensure women's participation in peacebuilding through training them on negotiations and drafting NAPs and earmarking projects for UNSC Resolution 1325 NAP.

3) Transitional justice, reconciliation, and implementing a Women, Peace and Security (WPS) NAP. Trusting former regime members and their supporters is a great concern for Sudanese women; therefore, it is necessary to hold perpetrators accountable for war crimes they have committed; provide safe spaces for female victims of rape to tell their stories; create gender quotas in transitional justice and truth finding committees; and integrate women in DDR programmes. Moreover, the possibility of creating a Sudanese Female Police Force and integrating female fighters from the periphery should be considered.

Finally, institutionalising a WPS NAP department formed by a con-

sortium of ministries, including justice, security and finance, and linking it with the women and gender equality commission is crucial. The NAP should include accountable entities, a budget, a timeline and reliable monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and should address specific topics.[40] Furthermore, women's groups from different tribes and ethnicities must participate in drafting and developing the agenda and its monitoring mechanism.

4) Social aspects. Female political leaders and victims of rape must be protected from harassment, violence, rumours and social stigma. Through collaboration with influential local leaders and youth, online and offline campaigns can be created and laws introduced that criminalise such violations, thus allowing women to speak up safely.

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[40] Henri Myrttinen, Laura J. Shepherd and Hannah Wrigh, *Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in the OSCE Region*, Vienna, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, January 2020, https://www.osce.org/secretariat/444577.

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3.

(Vulner)abilities of Sub-Saharan Women Migrants in Morocco

Nabil Ferdaoussi

A growing interest in studying the migratory experiences of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco was rekindled in the aftermath of a series of summary deportations that started in June 2018. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has forced us to delve ever more deeply into the study of migrants' vulnerability, as many transit and destination countries have failed to protect at-risk populations from contamination. Unprecedented actions taken by these countries – including travel bans on humanitarian agencies and bans on the landing of migrant rescue boats – are stress-testing their humanitarian policies to protect vulnerable people from the coronavirus pandemic.

What is particularly intriguing is that while Morocco has adopted a humanitarian policy aimed at the implementation of a national strategy to integrate migrants – claiming the position of the "regional leader" – sexual violence, impunity and discrimination are nevertheless widespread in the country. A recent report by Amnesty International records the persistent atrocities perpetrated against vulnerable migrants by security forces, who forcibly transferred 11,000 migrants to the southern region of the country and expelled 1,000 to their countries of origin, reportedly outside of a legal, humanitarian framework.[1] The authorities held dozens of vulnerable migrants in informal detention centre in Arekmane under

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[1] Amnesty International, *Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa. Review of 2019*, 18 February 2020, p. 48, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde01/1357/2020/en.

abject conditions.[2] The feminisation of sub-Saharan migration has witnessed several forms of violence and exploitation that have jeopardised the lives of many female migrants en route to Europe. The intertwined effects of gender, race, nationality and class generate various types of vulnerability among female migrants. The vast majority of sub-Saharan women in Morocco are from Nigeria (36.9 per cent), followed by Mali (8.9 per cent), Congo/DRC (7.9 per cent), Cameroon (6.9 per cent), and Sierra Leone (6.4 per cent).[3] The variability of their migratory experiences, and routes produces diverse forms of exploitation, aggression, dispossession, sexual violence and physical hazards, which makes it difficult to make sweeping generations about the vulnerabilities of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco.

Indeed, female arrivals in Morocco are highly vulnerable to human trafficking and sexual violence, and such vulnerability is all too often exacerbated by other mechanisms and actors. From their countries of origin all the way to their transit and destination countries, sub-Saharan female migrants are victimised by their male counterparts, security forces, traffickers, smugglers and border regimes. Such vulnerability forces these women into a state of passivity and gullibility, thereby divesting them of any modicum of agency to control their fates and bodies. Yet the word "vulnerability" implies both agency and the lack thereof. At times women utilise the way their bodies can be capitalised on to secure a safe journey to Europe,[4] which takes the form of engaging in the sex industry, deliberate pregnancies and forging intimate relationships with their male counterparts to gain their protection. At the same time, this vulnerability has been instrumental in justifying summary deportations, dispossession, unwarranted and illegal detentions, and other forms of physical and mental violence.

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[2] Ibid., p. 49.

[3] Driss El Ghazouani, "A Case Study of Sub-Saharan Female Immigration to Morocco", in Dina Fakoussa and Laura Lale Kabis-Kechrid (eds), *Socio-Economic Development and Violent Extremism in Morocco: Morocco's Regional Policy, Migration and (De-)Radicalization. Perspectives from the Region and Europe*, Berlin, DGAP, July 2019, p. 89, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/socio-economic-development-and-violent-extremism-morocco-moroccos-regional.

[4] Mehdi Lahlou, "Migration Dynamics in Play in Morocco: Trafficking and Political Relationships and Their Implications at the Regional Level", in *MENARA Working Papers*, No. 26 (November 2018), p. 10, http://www.menaraproject.eu/?p=1375.

3.1 Vulnerability reconsidered in the context of Sub-Saharan female migration in Morocco

During their journeys and upon their arrival in Morocco, sub-Saharan girls and women are subject to diverse forms of violence and abuse by different actors and institutions. While concerted efforts have been exerted to expose such vulnerability, a sizeable portion of the literature by humanitarian agencies and public authorities exploring the relationship between migration and gender frames such vulnerability, wittingly or unwittingly, within androcentric and racist paradigms. Far from reducible to a lack of agency, vulnerability carries overlapping implications of agency and the lack thereof.[5] As the world's most developed countries flounder in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic, continental solidarity and shared responsibility should be an immediate response to protect at-risk refugees and migrants.

In the context of mixed migration, sub-Saharan women migrants are more often than not framed in a position of vulnerability by human rights discourse and receiving governments, thereby denying any possibility of resistance and agency on the part of sub-Saharan female migrants in Morocco. Much of the research and analysis on gender and migration is predicated on sexist law.[6] Although this research may be valuable in unfolding the ways in which receiving or transit countries, such as Morocco, contravene international laws and conventions on human rights and mobility, it all the same fails to attend to the interlink of migration, gender, ethnicity and nationality beyond the parochial conceptions of vulnerability.[7] The failure of international law to address the issue of vulnerability beyond gendered and racist bureaucratic labels exacerbates the situation of sub-Saharan migrants.[8] In fact, despite being denied protection by an

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[5] Judith Butler, "Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance", in Judith Butler, Zeynep Gambetti and Leticia Sabsay (eds), *Vulnerability in Resistance*, Durham, Duke University Press, 2016, p. 25.

[6] Jane Freedman, *Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate*, 2nd ed., New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 14.

[7] The concept of vulnerability here refers to its traditional sense as used in legal frameworks, as opposed to the so-called "vulnerability turn", which is discussed by feminists, *inter alia* Judith Butler and Martha Fineman. As this paper will show, the second philosophical conception of vulnerability has two main implications.

[8] Giorgia Serughetti, "Smuggled or Trafficked? Refugee or Job Seeker? Deconstructing

array of actors and institutions, sub-Saharan female migrants in Morocco capitalise on their status of vulnerability to effectuate political mobilisation and to achieve their goals, as in the case of feigning subservience or trading their bodies for a safe border-crossing.

3.2 Sub-Saharan female migrants: Deconstructing (vulner)ability

According to a report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the vast majority of Nigerian female arrivals in Morocco have been trafficked for purposes of sexual exploitation – representing as many as 90 per cent of Nigerian female arrivals – and for Cameroonian female arrivals the estimate is 70 per cent.[9] Moreover, in a report by Doctors without Borders (MSF) on sexual violence and abuse in Morocco, the total share of women estimates 94 per cent of all patients, and almost 40 per cent of these women were victims of human traffickers.[10] Indeed, the migratory experiences of sub-Saharan women in Morocco are, to varying degrees, a veritable testimony of gendered and racialised vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the restrictive measures of Law 02-03, coupled with the coercive dominance of their male counterparts, have driven sub-Saharan women to count on their vulnerability to forge modes of resistance to gendered and racialised constructs.

Sub-Saharan women in Morocco reproduce gender roles and rely on their "corporeal capital" to enhance their chances of mobility.[11] Their bodies are commonly traded for social and economic mobility, as in the case of smugglers who prefer sex to money, to escape further sexual black-

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Rigid Classifications by Rethinking Women's Vulnerability", in *Anti-Trafficking Review*, No. 11 (October 2018), p. 16, https://doi.org/10.14197/atr.201218112.

[9] Arezo Malakooti, *Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots*, Altai Consulting for IOM MENA Regional Office, June 2015, p. 24, https://publications.iom.int/node/41.

[10] Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), *Violence, Vulnerability and Migration: Trapped at the Gates of Europe. A Report on the Situation of Sub-Saharan Migrants in an Irregular Situation in Morocco*, March 2013, p. 22, https://www.msf.org/node/45281.

[11] Nabil Ferdaoussi, "Making Sense of Female Sub-Saharan Migrants' 'Vulnerability' in Morocco", in *Morocco World News*, 6 March 2020, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2020/03/295491.

mail or rape by male migrants, soldiers or Moroccan civilians entering the camps.[12] In response to the pressure of their male counterparts, female sub-Saharans resort to pregnancy as a common strategy to increase their chances of mobility. At the same time, pregnancy may result in protracted journeys, as these women have to rear their babies until they are old enough to endure a border-crossing.

It warrants attention that the plurality of sub-Saharan women's experiences at the Moroccan–Spanish borders makes it difficult to produce a sweeping account of the otherwise intertwined effects of gender, race, ethnicity and border securitisation policies.[13] As such, just as the concept of vulnerability is itself slippery – implying both exposure to suffering and resistance to power by engaging in defiant practices – so too are the migratory experiences of migrant women. Thus, the heterogeneity of their experiences at the Moroccan–Spanish borders can be marshalled to deconstruct racist and gendered clichés about protection and ruthless migration policies.

3.3. Morocco's new migration policy fails: Instrumentalising human-trafficking discourse

A series of nationwide crackdowns have been unleashed against migrants since June 2018, resulting in massive police crackdowns, banishment to southern Morocco or the Algerian borders, and expulsion to countries of origin. While a flurry of reports revealed that such raids have been orchestrated, in joint coordination with the European Union and member states, to stymie the flow of migrants heading for Europe, the Moroccan government has proclaimed that they are aimed only at undocumented migrants and human traffickers.[14] A large number of migrants of various

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Some research findings reveal that in hostile environments such as transit and destination countries, migrants strive to forge socio-cultural solidarities to facilitate their bordercrossing. See: Sébastien Bachelet, "'Wasting mbeng': Adventure and Trust Amongst sub-Saharan Migrants in Morocco", in *Ethnos*, Vol. 84, No. 5 (2018), p. 849, https://doi.org/10.1080/00141844.2018.1537298.

[14] Aida Alami, "Morocco Unleashes a Harsh Crackdown on Sub-Saharan Migrants", in *The New York Times*, 22 October 2018, https://nyti.ms/2AmEhLY.

ages, nationalities and health conditions have been forcibly displaced and consequently dispossessed and separated from their social and familial networks. Likewise, journalistic reports have documented the unsightly deportations of sub-Saharan migrants by Moroccan police officials, referring to them as unwarranted deportations, discordant with "international human rights law and the Refugee Convention".[15] This is particularly due to the fact that, alongside the so-called illegal migrants and human traffickers, police officers have transported regular migrants with resident and works permits.[16]

Anti-Racist Defence and Support Group of Foreigners and Migrants GADEM, a staunch supporter of migrants' right to free mobility, is clearly apprehensive about Morocco's perilous and contradictory stances, being at once a repressive and hostile regime towards sub-Saharan migrants on its territory, a regional leader in migration management, and an international player who is trying to maintain strong diplomatic ties with EU and AU countries.[17] The Moroccan government justifies its arrests as targeting human traffickers, but it has not met the minimum standard of combatting human trafficking in several key areas, which renders trafficking victims vulnerable to re-trafficking and further arrests.[18] Justifying its summary deportations of at-risk migrants and refugees under the pretext of combatting human trafficking and drug dealing, Morocco will, in the long run, lose continental support for its territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara from certain African countries whose citizens are abused by the heavy-handedness of local authorities.

It is interesting to note that the trope of human trafficking, which places women migrants in a vulnerable position, is for the most part a brittle façade that Morocco and Spain maintain to manage the flow of "parasitical" migrants and legitimise their violent, repressive border pol-

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[15] Amnesty International, *Morocco: Relentless Crackdowns on Thousands of sub-Saharan Migrants and Refugees Is Unlawful*, 7 September 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/morocco-relentless-crackdown-on-thousands-of-sub-saharan-migrants-and-refugees-is-unlawful.

[16] Aida Alami, "Morocco Unleashes a Harsh Crackdown on Sub-Saharan Migrants", cit.

[17] Jouhari Bilal, "Expulsions gratuites", in *GADEM Briefing Notes*, 11 October 2018, http://lab4host.com/gadem/prod/?p=2024.

[18] US Department of State, "Morocco", in *2018 Trafficking in Persons Report*, June 2018, p. 311-314, https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-trafficking-in-persons-report/morocco.

icies. Within the context of combatting human trafficking, Morocco has long been deemed a watchdog – although it disavows, at least rhetorically, such a role – for supporting the EU's externalisation of border control, since it uses the migration question to bargain for bilateral relations with countries such as Spain.[19] More sharply in focus, however, is that we bear witness to a "discursive shift" from the fight against irregular migration to the fight against human traffickers who exploit children and women. While the issue of trafficking in women for sexual and labour exploitation is of cardinal significance, it has nevertheless been instrumental in justifying the atrocities and deportations committed by government and border regimes, under the pretext of putting paid to sexual violence and the abuse of female migrants. They capitalise on the "strategic duality" of female migrants as victims and male migrants as culprits as the premise for these sexist and racist discourses, arrogating to themselves the right to save and protect "black women from black men".

Unarguably, female arrivals in Morocco are not all as gullible and susceptible as the dominant discourse and local media frame them to be. Their migratory experiences may be exploitative ones – for example, they are frequently inveigled into prostitution with fake employment promises – but in recent years sub-Saharan migrant women have displayed a growing awareness about the inevitability of sex-work as an economic activity to achieve their goals, either in transit or destination countries.[20] Of paramount importance, at this juncture, is the analysis of the dual and rather Janus-faced nature of the concept of "vulnerability". On the one hand, it implies female migrants' resistance to gendered and racist forms of domination and subversion through capitalising on their vulnerability and thus reproducing female gender roles; on the other hand, it implies resistance to vulnerability through the deployment of strict border regimes by states that see themselves as "vulnerable" and threatened by sub-Saharan migrants.[21] Thus it can be argued that the rhetoric of human trafficking is nothing more than a structural form of resistance to vulnerability marshalled by state and border regimes against sub-Saharan mi-

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[19] Anna Jacobs, "Morocco's Migration Policy: Understanding the Contradiction between Policy and Reality", in *MIPA Articles*, 30 June 2019, https://mipa.institute/6872.

[20] Giorgia Serughetti, "Smuggled or Trafficked?", cit., p. 21.

[21] Nabil Ferdaoussi, "Making Sense of Female Sub-Saharan Migrants' 'Vulnerability' in Morocco", cit.

grants, a vulnerability that unfolds from the reverberations of the colonial legacy, as well as the failure of the nation-state and development projects in most African countries.

3.4 DISPROPORTIONATELY VULNERABLE: FEMALE SUB-SAHARAN MIGRANTS AMID THE OUTBREAK OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

On 20 March 2020, the Moroccan government declared a state of emergency to prevent a nationwide spread of COVID-19. Pre-emptive measures were taken by the state to control the movement of people, including massive shutdowns of schools, universities and mosques, national and international travel bans and workforce demobilisations. The collective efforts of the Moroccan King Mohamed VI and the existing government alike were touted internationally for their timely grappling with the lethal virus. However, the plight of migrants in the country amid the outbreak of the pandemic has yet to be addressed. Such measures flatten differences among people on Moroccan territory, as the rules of the lockdown and their enforcement are, for the most part, insensitive to migrants and foreigners in the country. While the pandemic is ravaging marginalised groups in every region of the world, female migrants are the least able to protect themselves amid stringent lockdowns.

Enforced lockdowns are mandatory and constitutionally legitimate for public health, but their strict measure are not in the interest of the entire population on the Moroccan territory, given the flagrant disparities between people on administrative and socio-economic levels. Sub-Saharan female migrants and children living in ghettos and detention centres are highly vulnerable to the spread of the virus. UN Secretary-General António Guterres declared that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and IOM are jointly working to forge a plan to improve conditions for migrants and refugees living in camps.[22] Amid this national turmoil, it's unclear whether the state will be willing to provide financial support, secure basic rights to health and sanitation, and develop ad hoc

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[22] United Nations, *Transcript of the Secretary-General's Virtual Press Encounter on the Appeal for Global Ceasefire*, 23 March 2020, https://www.un.org/sg/en/node/251369.

mechanisms for the protection of migrants and refugees against the morbid spread of coronavirus in camps and refugee settlements.

On 15 March, a Special Fund in the amount of 30 billion Moroccan dirham dedicated to the management of the COVID-19 pandemic was created under the aegis of King Mohamed VI. Moreover, on 27 March, a joint EU–Moroccan statement announced that the European Union had pledged 450 euro for an aid package to handle the socio-economic and health crises of COVID-19, with an immediate offer of 150 million euro to the Special Fund.[23] Unfortunately, the Moroccan state has not lived up to its position of regional leader in resolving migration issues in such trying times. A large number of migrants reported to me that they do not have travel certificates and are left with no money to buy foodstuff and medicines.

Moreover, with respect to female migrants working in the informal sector, there has been no rent moratorium or special treatment for pregnant women, who are most susceptible to this deadly virus. In the wake of an international border closure, any public health response from the Moroccan government should attend to the highly vulnerable – namely refugees, asylum seekers and migrants – as the provision of external help from volunteers and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is hampered by travel bans and fear of infection. Scant medical aid renders refugee camps far more vulnerable to coronavirus. Individuals with other health conditions unrelated to COVID-19, such as pneumonia, diabetes and pregnancy, are left with no assistance to withstand this lethal pandemic in camps and detention centres where sanitation and social distancing are unlikely to be applied. In Morocco, where adequate healthcare is limited even for nationals and where resettlement operations by IOM and UNHCR are closed off, the consequences of the pandemic for refugees and irregular migrants are likely to be disastrous. According to UN experts,

> Human rights must be at the centre of the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Inclusive measures aimed at protecting the rights and health of the whole population, including all migrants and traf-

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[23] Ahmed Eljechtimi, "EU Offers 450 mln Euros to Help Morocco Counter Coronavirus - Statement", in *Reuters*, 27 March 2020, https://reut.rs/2wKh87c.

ficked persons, regardless of their migration status, are urgent and necessary, and can contribute to the effectiveness of the general national measures against COVID-19.[24]

However, placing human rights at the centre of its response to the pandemic in the context of irregular migration is a challenging task for the Moroccan government.

Conclusion and policy recommendations

It should be made clear that the vulnerabilities of female arrivals in Morocco are constantly increasing, but the way in which these vulnerabilities have been mobilised by the state for ulterior motives should be confronted, addressed and contested. The following recommendations are for timely actions that the Moroccan government, in cooperation with international actors, should take in order to maintain its status as a "regional leader" of migration management in Africa and the MENA region.

• The state should overturn laws that impede migrant women's integration into the economic tapestry of Morocco.

Morocco should clarify its position on migration policies; while Article 02-03 is repressive, the new migration policies and development projects are discrepant. Article 416 of Law No. 65.99 should be revised to permit migrant women with professional qualifications to access managerial and leadership positions. This would make women migrants less vulnerable and susceptible to exploitation in the sex industry and in Moroccan households. In addition, Moroccan banks should simplify loan procedures for women migrants who are poised to start their own businesses.

• Women migrants should be integrated in the PAAPS and RAMED programmes to ensure they receive adequate medical coverage and to develop health-care services for them amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

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[24] UNHCR, *UN Experts Call on Governments to Adopt Urgent Measures to Protect Migrants and Trafficked Persons in their Response to COVID-19*, 3 April 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25774.

While the Social Protection Improvement Support Programme (PAAPS) aims at achieving 80 per cent of social security coverage in many eastern and southern regions of Morocco,[25] the scope of its beneficiaries should be expanded to encompass female migrants living in such regions. To reclaim its status as the leader of the AU, and in accordance with Morocco's commitments to human rights and international law, the state should facilitate the intricate and highly bureaucratic procedures of the Medical Assistance Scheme for the Economically Disadvantaged (RAMED) for female migrants.

• The Ministry of Communication and Culture should create training programmes for journalists on migration and human trafficking.

Moroccan civil society actors and journalists alike should be provided with training programmes to sensitise them to gender and race issues to overcome the problem of gendered and racist representations. Despite the enormous efforts they exert to ameliorate the socio-economic conditions of sub-Saharan women migrants, Moroccan civil society actors are not well trained to cope reflexively with the intersection of gender, race, ethnicity and class as determinant variables in the production and reproduction of vulnerability. Self-reflexivity remains problematic in Moroccan mainstream media vis-à-vis sub-Saharan migrants. The Ministry of Culture and Communication should adopt mechanisms to eliminate moralisation, demonisation and stigmatisation of sub-Saharan female migrants in mainstream media. A recent news article by Moroccan World News reported rumours by Moroccans claiming a sub-Saharan student contracted the coronavirus.[26] In such cases, rumours should not be the exclusive reason for detention; the issuance of a law that penalises moral panic and ostracism is viable in this respect to protect the moral and human integrity of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco.

• Training sessions should be provided for border officials on the risks of gender-based violence.

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[25] Hamza Guessous, "African Bank Loans Morocco $204 million for Social Protection Improvement", in *Morocco World News*, 21 February 2020, https://www.moroccoworld-news.com/2020/02/294282.

[26] Safaa Kasraoui, "Coronavirus: Ministry Denies Rumors of Infected Student in Eastern Morocco", in *Morocco World News*, 24 February 2020, https://www.moroccoworld-news.com/2020/02/294466.

The government should provide specific, gender-based training programmes to departments involved in combatting human trafficking (border police, justice, national security, gendarmerie, etc.). The political will of Morocco to prevent and eliminate violence against migrant women cannot sufficiently manifest itself solely in providing funds, training and sensitisation campaigns for police officers; more work should be done to combat abuse of power and impunity exercised by local authorities on vulnerable female migrants.

• The state should work to foster cultural and religious plurality, equality and tolerance in Morocco to ensure peaceful socio-cultural co-existence.

The religious discourse in Morocco is powerful and tremendously sacrosanct. While diversity, tolerance, peace and equality are the premises upon which such discourse is predicated, the Ministry of Religious Affairs should encourage sermons on the value of tolerance and co-existence to abolish violence and racism against female migrants.

• The state should actively address the issue of "human trafficking" to protect women against violence and exploitation.

The regime should adopt an affirmative action to redress disadvantages and vulnerabilities associated with migrant women in Morocco. It behoves the government to go beyond the "blame game" and scapegoating of human traffickers as the sole problem behind women's exposure to sexual violence and exploitation. The government should effectuate victim identification and referral procedures, since it does not proactively identify trafficking victims, especially among sub-Saharan female migrants. In doing so, vulnerable women should be shielded from detention, summary deportation or re-trafficking. Adequate protection services through financial or in-kind support to local and international NGOs specialising in human trafficking is, in large measure, ancillary to combat trafficking of sub-Saharan female migrants.

• The state must break through the wall of silence on migrants' plight during the time of the COVID-19 pandemic in order to maintain its humanitarian position as a "regional leader" on migration issues.

In such trying times, foreigners stranded or living in Moroccan territory should, irrespective of their administrative status, be updated on

governmental decisions with respect to sensitisation, financial support and public health. The issuance of displacement certificates authorising exit from their lodgings under specified conditions should be effectuated for migrants and refugees. The right to access information about protection protocols should absolutely be guaranteed as a fundamental human right. Furthermore, the state should ensure transparent management of the Coronavirus Pandemic Management Special Fund by allocating financial support to all migrants working in the informal sector. In view of facilitating access to health services for undocumented migrants in squalid camps and detention centres, the Moroccan government should take steps towards the regularisation of refugees and asylum seekers. In addition, an automatic extension for at least six months of all protection and assistance programmes for at-risk and trafficked migrants should be adopted by the Moroccan government to ensure the process of social inclusion.

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Giorgia Serughetti, "Smuggled or Trafficked? Refugee or Job Seeker? Deconstructing Rigid Classifications by Rethinking Women's Vulnera-

bility", in *Anti-Trafficking Review*, No. 11 (October 2018), p. 16-35, https://doi.org/10.14197/atr.201218112.

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4.

Nigerian Youths: A Euro-African Strategy for Climate Change Adaptation

Victor O. Achem

Climate change is among the greatest threats to our generation and those to come, as it impacts on public health, ecosystems and the economy. In line with this, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has affirmed that "climate change is projected to increase threats to human health".[1] Climate change affects human health directly through thermal stress, mortality or illnesses associated with flooding and storms, and indirectly through changes in disease vector range, such as waterborne diseases, water quality, air quality, and food sources and efficiency. It is evident that social effects will differ based on age, socio-economic class, job and gender and that the world's poorest people will be hardest hit.

The increase in temperature and sea level, and extreme weather events such as floods, cause waterlogging and contamination, which in turn exacerbates and alters the dynamics of diseases.[2] Other climate change impacts include desertification, global warming, damage to environmental infrastructures, conflicts between farmers and herders as a result of lack of grazing fields, conflicts related to land resource management and reclamation due to desertification and erosion. Nonetheless, it has been demonstrated that poor and vulnerable communities will be disproportionately affected, with poorer nations suffering the greatest impacts due

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[1] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), *Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report*, 2001, p. 9, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar3/syr.

[2] Jacob Kumaresan and Nalini Sathiakumar, "Climate Change and Its Potential Impact on Health: A Call for Integrated Action", in *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (March 2010), p. 163, https://doi.org/10.2471/BLT.10.076034.

to inadequate health systems,[3] as well as the ongoing output of emissions by multinational companies that have moved their production to the global south while claiming to be lowering their carbon footprint.[4]

4.1 ECOLOGICAL DAMAGE FROM CLIMATE CHANGE

The increasing volume of gases that absorb heat has directly resulted in the atmosphere storing more heat, resulting in higher surface temperatures. This increase in temperature is referred to as global warming. Future climate changes will largely depend on how quickly greenhouse gases (GHG) accumulate in the atmosphere. The concentration will be determined by how much is produced, and by how much is consumed by carbon "sinks" such as rivers and forests. However, the 2019 Emissions Gap Report suggests that by the year 2100 global temperatures are likely to rise by 3.2°C. If this occurs, the coral reefs will be reduced by 70–90 per cent. In fact, environmental manifestations are already evident, including heat waves, regular floods and droughts. The production of GHG has not declined despite multiple interventions including government promises, legislation and science alerts. The 2019 Emissions Gap Report further states that there has been a significant increase in GHG emissions (about 1.5 per cent) in the last decade, and increase in carbon dioxide levels has been extremely high.[5]

The Nigeria Meteorological Agency (NiMet) projected that 2019 would be another hot year in its forecast of seasonal rainfall.[6] Moreover, 2018 was reported to be hotter than the previous year. Average annual variance and rainfall in Nigeria over the last six decades are character-

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[3] J.O. Ayoade, *Climate Change. A Synopsis of its Nature, Causes, Effects and Management*, Ibadan, Vantage Publishers, 2003.

[4] António Guterres, "Africa has done the least to cause the climate crisis yet suffers some of its most devastating consequences", *Twitter post*, 9 February 2020, https://twitter.com/antonioguterres/status/1226626828833558532.

[5] John Christensen and Anne Olhoff, *Lessons from a Decade of Emissions Gap Assessments*, Nairobi, UN Environment Programme (UNEP), September 2019, https://www.unenvironment.org/node/26331; UNEP, *Emissions Gap Report 2019*, November 2019, https://www.unenvironment.org/node/26776.

[6] Nigeria Meteorological Agency (NiMet), *Seasonal Rainfall Prediction (SRP)*, 2019.

ised by many inter-annual variations that account for cold and hot seasons and extreme climatic events in many areas of the country, including droughts and floods. NiMet also projected the prevalence of malaria and certain diseases in some areas, with temperatures ranging between 18°C and 32°C and with humidity approaching 60 per cent as a consequence of these climate conditions.

4.1.1 Changes in seasonality and spread of diseases

Analysis by the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) for 2019 linked the rise of diseases such as meningitis, malaria and cholera to environmental and ecosystem components. In most parts of the country, the hot season during the year was warmer than normal.

Likewise, the NCDC situation report indicated that as of 5 June, a total of 914 suspicious cases of illness from 15 states had been recorded, of which 110 case reports were positive for bacterial meningitis, and the results showed that the high temperatures in the months of February, March and April were a precipitant for cerebral-spinal meningitis in Nigeria, which was exacerbated by low relative humidity and suspended dust in the atmosphere.[7]

Furthermore, the measles situation study as of 18 May revealed that high temperatures contributed to a measles outbreak in 660 Local Government Areas in 36 states, including the Federal Capital Territory.[8] Furthermore, intense rainstorms in certain areas of the country contributed to floods that polluted water sources, triggering the outbreak of cholera.

As of 31 October, a total of 1,583 suspected cases of cholera and 22 related deaths had been registered in seven states, comprising Adamawa, Bayelsa, Ebonyi, Delta, Kano, Katsina and Plateau.[9] The dry, dusty haze hanging over the population living in the far northern parts of the country,

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[7] Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), *An Update of Meningitis Outbreak in Nigeria for Week 23*, 5 June 2019, https://ncdc.gov.ng/themes/common/files/sitreps/079ef69035ed92a2a87efbf4bcdfdcaf.pdf.

[8] NCDC, *An Update of Measles Outbreak in Nigeria for Week 19*, 18 May 2019, https://ncdc.gov.ng/themes/common/files/sitreps/c29089119fed8675e9e8039a586a54f3.pdf.

[9] NCDC, *An Update of Cholera Outbreak in Nigeria for Week 44*, 1 November 2019, https://ncdc.gov.ng/themes/common/files/sitreps/75d8bc1e6e6a8bcfb7ac3376d-d5cdbd8.pdf.

which prevailed in January, February, March, November and December, was linked to the 2019 outbreak of respiratory ailments such as asthma, cough and catarrh. Observed weather patterns and their effects, such as high temperatures, heavy rainfall and dense swamp fields during the year, equally helped Anopheles mosquitoes to thrive, leading to high fevers in 2019. In November, the rate of malaria infection rose by 25 per cent in Nigeria, according to a retrospective report carried out by the NCDC.

Half of Lagos's population of 15 million live less than six feet above sea level, including the best neighbourhoods of Victoria Island and the Lekki Peninsula. Taking into account Nigeria's dense population, any relocation of this mass of people could be devastating, particularly since more than 50 per cent of the population live below the poverty line. Coastal flooding and deforestation, with its resulting population displacement, present serious environmental challenges in Nembe, Eket and other coastal towns in the Nigerian states of Bayelsa, Delta, Cross River, Rivers and Lagos.[10]

4.1.2 Changes in ecosystem productivity

The socio-cultural environment has undergone drastic changes in recent years, most of which are linked to climate change. Areas of the economy such as agriculture, especially in Africa and particularly in Nigeria, have undergone a number of changes. Land is rapidly becoming less productive due to low rainfall, resulting in drought and poor productivity. Government leaders have a particular interest in the susceptibility of Nigeria's agricultural industry to climate change, because agriculture is a central economic driver that employs between 60 and 70 per cent of the workforce and generates between 30 and 40 per cent of the nation's GDP.[11] This sector also supplies raw materials for various manufacturing industries and provides the country with reserves of foreign exchange revenue. The growing need for humans to secure shelter, as well as to

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[10] Peter Akpodiogaga-a Ovuyovwiroye Odjugo, "General Overview of Climate Change Impacts in Nigeria", in *Journal of Human Ecology*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January 2010), p. 50, http://www.krepublishers.com/02-Journals/JHE/JHE-29-0-000-10-Web/JHE-29-1-000-10-Abst-PDF/JHE-29-1-047-10-1993-Odjugo-P-A-O/JHE-29-1-047-10-1993-Odjugo-P-A-O-Tt.pdf.

[11] Joshua Ajetomobi, Abiodun Ajiboye and Hassan Rashid, "Impacts of Climate Change on Rice Agriculture in Nigeria", in *Tropical and Subtropical Agroecosystems*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2011), p. 614, http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/tsa/v14n2/v14n2a18.pdf.

meet the demand for wood, firewood and charcoal as a substitute for kerosene, has further threatened the forests. Deforestation has become a regular phenomenon, and intentional replacement has been neglected, causing the soil to lose the moisture provided by plants and leading to decreased humidity. Furthermore, deforestation also results in greater air pollution, as fewer trees are available to filter the air that flows across the environment. This air pollution can contribute to airborne illnesses, thus enabling vectors to travel long distances to promote and accelerate the diffusion of diseases.[12]

It is estimated that by 2100, Nigeria and other West African countries are likely to experience agricultural losses of up to 4 per cent of GDP due to climate change. Parts of the country that have experienced soil erosion and operate rain-fed agriculture could see declines in agricultural yield of up to 50 per cent from 2000–20 due to the increasing impact of climate change.[13]

Variations in rainfall patterns affect crop production in varying ways depending on location. Similarly, livestock production systems in Nigeria are already vulnerable to climate change with respect to anticipated decreases in rainfall around the Sudan–Sahelian zone and the consequent reduction in available grazing fields. Hence, further changes to rainfall and temperature will affect livestock production as well as availability of animal species.

Some areas with already high rates of hunger and poverty, notably parts of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, are expected to experience the largest declines in agricultural output.[14] Moreover, high levels of at-

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[12] Oli Brown, Anne Hammill and Robert Mcleman, "Climate Change as the 'New' Security Threat: Implications for Africa", in *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 6 (2007), p. 1141-1154, https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/climate_security_threat_africa.pdf.

[13] Clara C. Ifeanyi-obi, Unyime R. Etuk and Collins O. Uloh, "Cassava Farmers' Adaptation to Climate Change in Oron Agricultural Zone of Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria", in *Nigerian Journal of Rural Sociology*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (October 2013), p. 7-8, https://dx.doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.287162.

[14] Jemma Gornall et al. "Implications of Climate Change for Agricultural Productivity in the Early Twenty-First Century", in *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, Vol. 365, No. 1554 (27 September 2010), p. 2973-2989, https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0158; Gerald C. Nelson et al. "Climate Change: Impact on Agriculture and Costs of Adaptation", in *Food Policy Reports*, No. 21 (October 2009), https://dx.doi.org/10.2499/0896295354.

mospheric CO_2 are likely to reduce levels of crop nutrients such as zinc, iron and other essential nutrients.[15]

4.2 CONFLICTS RELATED TO LAND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Climate-induced conflicts are already worsening fragile security situations, with flashpoints located in the country's middle belt region and other susceptible communities within the eastern and western regions of Nigeria. Consequently, climate change poses a significant threat to Nigeria's ability to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and could also impede, perhaps even reverse, the progress already made. In general, the erosion and mismanagement of ecosystems can be an important contributor to an already vulnerable social system, so that climate change is best understood as an amplifier and threat multiplier.

4.2.1 Herders–farmers conflict

As a result of the Sahelian drought of the 1970s, as well as the intensification of climate change, the commencement of irrigated farming systems in the Savanna belt of Nigeria and the increased withering of pasture during the dry season, the amount of pasture available to cattle herders has shrunk.[16] Thus, it has become necessary for herds to move to wherever pasture is available to ensure their food security. Hence, pastures, woody vegetation, water resources and land are taken as a common property resource. This has further necessitated the movement and the attendant migration of a large number of pastoralists into the area of the humid forest zone of West Africa, thereby leading to a huge increase in conflicts between herders and farmers over grazing fields and water resources. Violent conflicts have occurred between the two groups for decades but have become especially prevalent in the north-central region of Nigeria.[17] This resource-based conflict has displaced

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[15] Samuel S. Myers et al., "Increasing CO_2 Threatens Human Nutrition", in *Nature*, No. 510 (2014), p. 139-142.

[16] Albert U. Ofuoku and Benjamin I. Isife, "Causes, Effects and Resolutions of Farmers-Nomadic Cattle Herders' Conflict in Delta State, Nigeria", in *International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 2009), p. 47-54.

[17] P.A. Adedeji, *Socio-Economic Effects of Farmers/Herders Conflict in Obi Local Govern-*

more than 400,000 people in north-central Nigeria within the last five years, and those displaced are struggling to rebuild their lives.[18]

Over the past few decades, there has been a huge influx into Europe of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.[19] The factors pushing people to leave sub-Saharan Africa include but are not limited to socio-structural problems, climate change and economic challenges, amongst other endogenous factors. Within the theoretical approaches to migration, this strategy is referred to as the "New economics of migration", in which migration decisions are considered to be focused on cost–benefit analysis by the individual, family or community to increase incomes and minimise risks resulting from crop failures, drought and conflict.[20]

In the case of Europe, the population of sub-Saharan migrants has been boosted by the influx of nearly 1 million asylum applicants between 2010 and 2017. Sub-Saharan Africans also moved to European Union countries as international students and resettled refugees, through family reunification and by other means.[21] Nigeria, being the most populous country in Africa, has strong socio-economic ties with Europe. Over the past decade, EU–Nigeria cooperation has continued to develop, with several socio-economic partnership and development projects under way across the region. The environment and climate change are also among the new fields of cooperation under the 11th European Development Fund (EDF), the EU development financial instrument for the 2014–20 period.[22]

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ment Area, Unpublished B.Sc Project, Submitted to the Department of Sociology, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, 2016; Oludayo Tade, "Policing the Poor and the Securitised Elite", in *Punch*, 22 February 2018, https://punchng.com/?p=353047.

[18] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), *Internal Displacement Mid-Year Figures (January-June 2018)*, 12 September 2019, https://www.internal-displacement.org/node/1247; International Crisis Group (ICG), "Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herders Violence", in *ICG Africa Reports*, No. 262 (26 July 2018), https://www.crisisgroup.org/node/6209.

[19] Phillip Connor, *At Least a Million Sub-Saharan Africans Moved to Europe Since 2010*, Pew Research Center, 22 March 2018, http://pewrsr.ch/2pw36zs.

[20] New economics of migration views migration as a rational family decision to minimise risks such as crop failure and maximise income through advanced means of production.

[21] Phillip Connor, *At Least a Million Sub-Saharan Africans Moved to Europe Since 2010*, cit., p. 3.

[22] EDF is the main source of EU development aid for the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the overseas territories. It is financed directly by the member states, outside the usual EU budgetary mechanisms.

Conclusion

In the effort to mitigate the effects of climate change, there is a need for human intervention to reduce sources, or enhance sinks, of GHG. This could include expanding forests and other sinks to remove greater amounts of CO_2 from the atmosphere. Adaptive efforts by the Nigerian government include its participation in the Great Green Wall, a joint forestation project with countries in Africa's Sahel region,[23] and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)-assisted Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme (CASP).[24]

As part of sustainable efforts in this trajectory, this chapter points to the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme as a tool for youth engagement in climate change adaptation. The NYSC was developed by the Nigerian government to engage Nigerian graduates in nation-building and the country's growth. Since 1973, university graduates and subsequent polytechnics have been required to participate for one year in the NYSC scheme, known as "the Service year".[25]

Nigeria comprises 36 states, including the Federal Capital, Abuja. NYSC members are sent to states other than their state of origin, where they are supposed to interact with people from different ethnic groups, social classes and communities, and study the indigenous culture of the place to which they are sent. The aim of this programme is to bring about unity in the country and to help the youth appreciate other ethnic groups. They are expected to work at their place of primary assignment as full-time employees, except for one working day that is dedicated to the operation of the community service development programme. After 11 months of community service, members of the corps are allowed a one-month vacation until their final meeting, where certificates of completion are award-

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[23] The Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI) was launched by African leaders in 2007 to promote the sustainable management of natural resources in arid zones of the continent. This EU-funded project (2011-13) helped build capacities of participating institutions and partner countries.

[24] International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) website: *Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme in the Savannah Belt*, https://www.ifad.org/en/web/operations/project/id/1100001692/country/nigeria.

[25] National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) website: *The National Youth Service Year: An Overview*, https://www.nysc.gov.ng/serviceyear.html.

ed. More so, graduates aged 30 and above are exempted from the compulsory one-year service in Nigeria.

The "One Corper One Tree" policy is a sustainable approach to climate change adaptation and ecological restoration in Nigeria that is targeted at youth involvement. It proposes that each corps member plants a tree in their community and nurtures it during their year of community service. In this way, educated youths become involved in the fight against climate change. As a part of monitoring, these trees would be inspected by the NYSC project supervisors, and they would be scored and recorded as part of a community development project by the corps members. It would then become the responsibility of the community to look after the trees after the expiration of the one year of service. The NYSC scheme turns out more than 6,000 corps members who are posted across all states in Nigeria on a yearly basis. If each of these "corpers" plants a tree before the end of their compulsory service and this strategy is maintained for the next five years, it will have a significant impact on the environment. Some other benefits include the economic opportunities available in tree crops nursery development as an enterprise, and the series of activities along the value chain, as well as a long-term reduction in climate-induced conflict in Nigeria. This approach is sustainable as graduates are enrolled in the scheme on a yearly basis. The European Union, under the 11th EDF, can drive this partnership through collaborative funding for the seedlings and by sponsoring the design of an implementation structure that can efficiently drive a sustainable, large-scale ecological recovery in Nigeria that is largely youth-driven.

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5.

Environmental Degradation and Climate Change in Africa: The Challenge of Raising Awareness

Hadjar Aounaf

5.1 Climate change: Causes and consequences

According to the Royal Society,

> Since the mid-1800s, scientists have known that CO_2 is one of the main greenhouse gases of importance to Earth's energy balance. Direct measurements of CO_2 in the atmosphere and in air trapped in ice show that atmospheric CO_2 increased by more than 40% from 1800 to 2019. Measurements of different forms of carbon [...] reveal that this increase is due to human activities. Other greenhouse gases (notably methane and nitrous oxide) are also increasing as a consequence of human activities. The observed global surface temperature rise since 1900 is consistent with detailed calculations of the impacts of the observed increase in atmospheric greenhouse gases (and other human-induced changes) on Earth's energy balance.[1]

This phenomenon has been the focus of extensive study, with some researchers attributing it to human actions, while others attribute it to natural causes.

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[1] Royal Society and US National Academy of Sciences, *Climate Change: Evidence & Causes 2020*, March 2020, p. 5, https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/projects/climate-change-evidence-causes.

Climate is naturally variable, as is evident in seasonal variations from one year to another. This variability is normal and is due to the interaction of many factors, including changes in ocean currents, volcanic activity and solar radiation. Major climate change, then, is significant and lasting change in the statistical distribution of weather patterns, including the frequency of extreme weather events such as floods, droughts and storms. This can happen over a period ranging from decades to millions of years.[2]

Changes in orbital patterns of the sun, called Milankovitch cycles, are the most significant driver of climate change over thousands to millions of years.[3] These have been the main driving force behind the last four cycles of ice ages and warm periods over the past 40,000 years. However, the Earth's climate has changed over the last 150 years, and we must understand what has caused the change over such a short period.[4]

Generally, we can identify the main causes of climate change as the following: greenhouse gases; industrialisation; deforestation; livestock production; use of aerosols; factory farming; consumerism; overuse of electricity; overfishing.

Every action has consequences, and they differ from one region to another. However, this issue affects the entire world, and especially developing countries, given that they lack the resources to confront the effects and mitigate their impacts. The effects of climate change include:

- high levels of ocean water due to the melting of glaciers;
- the collapse of ecosystems and the reduction of biodiversity;
- rainfall fluctuations and the movement of cultivated areas towards the poles;
- the intensification of natural disasters;
- increased conflicts over resources, migration and setbacks in the process of human development.

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[2] EKOenergy website: *Climate Change: Causes and Consequences*, https://www.ekoenergy.org/?p=2448.

[3] "The Milankovitch cycles describe how relatively slight changes in Earth's movement affect the planet's climate. The cycles are named for Milutin Milankovitch, a Serbian astrophysicist who began investigating the cause of Earth's ancient ice ages in the early 1900s." See Rachel Ross, "What Are the Milankovitch Cycles?", in *Live Science*, 20 February 2019, https://www.livescience.com/64813-milankovitch-cycles.html.

[4] EKOenergy website: *Climate Change: Causes and Consequences*, cit.

These causes and consequences may differ in severity from one region to another, according to the means and degree of awareness and other factors, but the truth is that it increases the gap between developed and developing countries.

5.2 Climate change in security studies debates

Climate change has been articulated as a threat to national, international and human security in scientific publications and political declarations. Therefore, theoretical perspectives shed light on how climate change and its consequences have been rendered governable as a security issue. Three schools of thought cover the full spectrum of positions on the issue: against securitisation, for securitisation and neutral.[5]

The Copenhagen School of security studies analyses the process by which an issue comes to be represented as an existential threat in terms of a process of securitisation.[6] This school, led by Barry Busan, is credited with extending the concept of security from the military to other sectors and maintaining the state as a reference unit for security in its analysis. The concept of securitisation is one of the most important theoretical contributions of the school. Securitisation as a process means transforming problems into security issues through their securitisation, it assumes that security can be understood as the result of a "Speech Act", and requires urgent special measures to legalise actions outside the usual political process. The most commonly recognised securitising actors are political leaders, bureaucracy, governments and lobbyists.

Scholars approaching the question from the human security perspective claim that

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[5] Angela Oels, "From 'Securitization' of Climate Change to 'Climatization' of the Security Field: Comparing Three Theoretical Perspectives", in Jürgen Scheffran et al., *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict. Challenges for Societal Stability*, Berlin/Heidelberg, Springer, 2012, p. 185, https://is.muni.cz/el/fss/podzim2019/ESS427/um/literatura/Oels_2012.pdf.

[6] Shirley V. Scott, "The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close have We Come and would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of Global Climate Change Policy?", in *Review of European Community & International Environmental Law*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (November 2012), p. 220.

the counterproductive effects of the securitization of climate change as spelled out by the Copenhagen School can be avoided once security is redefined in terms of human security. From this perspective, when climate change is constructed as a threat to human security, sustainable development emerges at the top of the policy agenda. Not only does sustainable development tackle pre-existing vulnerabilities, but it also enhances adaptive capacity to the impacts of climate change, actively reducing the likelihood of mass migration and violent conflict.[7]

The Paris School argues that "the failed securitization of climate change is better understood as the successful 'climatization' of the security field". According to this school of thought, the articulation of climate change as a security issue signifies that security professionals are casting climate change "as a legitimate threat in their everyday practices". The climatisation of the security field "means that existing security practices are applied to the issue of climate change and that new practices from the field of climate policy are introduced into the security field".[8]

Linking the environment to security concerns is extremely important to ensure the greatest possible safety and security is achieved and to track international efforts to protect the environment. At the academic level, it confirms the importance of the environment in state relations.

5.3 Impacts of and vulnerabilities to climate change in Africa

According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),

Africa is a continent under pressure from climate stresses and is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Many areas in Africa are recognised as having climates that are among the most variable in the world on seasonal and decadal timescales. Floods

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[7] Angela Oels, "From 'Securitization' of Climate Change to 'Climatization' of the Security Field…", cit., p. 185.

[8] Ibid.

and droughts can occur in the same area within months of each other. These events can lead to famine and widespread disruption of socio-economic well-being.[9]

5.3.1 Food and health security

Agriculture is the mainstay of most African economies, accounting for 40 per cent of total export earnings and occupying 60 to 90 per cent of the total workforce in sub-Saharan Africa. Agriculture provides more than 50 per cent of household food needs, and a similar share of revenue. Most agricultural systems in Africa depend on the climate, as most parts of sub-Saharan Africa depend mainly on rain-fed agriculture. Thus, environmental threats, the foremost of which is climate change, increase the threat to food security as productivity decreases and prices rise in countries that suffer from chronic food insecurity. About 150 million people in Africa are at risk of starvation and epidemics due to drought, including in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Zimbabwe, and the list is open, because the current conditions qualify a group of other African countries to meet the same fate in the upcoming years.

Environmental threats affect the most fundamental determinants of health safety, which are fresh air, fresh water, adequate food, adequate shelter and protection from disease.[10] Climate change impacts on the health of tens of thousands of people in Africa. Scientific research has shown that climate change and natural disasters have contributed to an increase in the prevalence of deadly microbial and infectious vector-borne diseases. Yellow fever is transmitted by mosquitoes to humans, especially in tropical Africa. The Ebola virus spreads more easily in tropical African regions. Dengue fever is also transmitted to humans by mosquitoes, as is malaria, one of the most dangerous infectious diseases. There is a relationship between increased temperature of the land and sea and increased spread of a group of infectious diseases to humans. For example, any increase in the

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[9] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), *Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries*, Bonn, UNFCCC Secretariat, 2007, p. 18, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/impacts.pdf.

[10] Nelson K. Sewankambo, "Climate Change and Health: An Issue with Great Potential for Exacerbating Health Inequities in Africa", in Hany Besada and Nelson K. Sewankambo (eds), *Climate Change in Africa: Adaptation, Mitigation and Governance Challenges*, Waterloo, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), 2009, p. 16-20, https://www.cigionline.org/node/2952.

temperature of the air, or an increase or decrease in precipitation, especially at unusual times, can lead to an increase in the activity and reproduction of insects that are affected by any slight change in the temperature of the air, and these insects help to speed the transmission of multiple types of viruses. Today, the world is witnessing the spread of a new virus and the resultant COVID-19 pandemic, which has killed many people around the world, particularly those who suffer from respiratory diseases. This pandemic greatly affects public health and the national economy as it causes disruption of economic activity in all sectors.

5.3.2 Economic and political security

Deteriorating environmental conditions have negatively affected the economic performance and the annual per capita income in Africa, as climate fluctuations reduce the ability of African farmers to deal with the climate situation, and this in turn affects agricultural crops that depend on rain water, which will decrease by 50 per cent during the year 2020. Increasing the sensitivity of the matter for these countries is that the majority of the population of the African continent suffers from poverty, which is one of the main causes of resource depletion. At the same time, the deteriorating environment and depleted resources further exacerbate the spread of poverty, which threatens economic growth at the present time and in the future.

It is a fact that environmental impacts are no longer limited to their social, economic and ecological dimensions, but have extended even to the political dimension. Among the contributing factors are rapid population growth, political tensions between countries over shared border resources, political instability, economic growth and urbanisation, combined with environmental challenges.

5.3.3 Civil conflicts and internal violence

As pointed out by Jürgen Scheffran et al., "Since the 1990s, there has been an extensive scientific debate on how the scarcity of natural resources affects violence and armed conflict." More recently, security studies have increasingly focused on

> the vulnerability of natural and social systems to climate impacts.
> [This] vulnerability can be broken down into three factors: (i) ex-

posure to climate change, (ii) sensitivity to climate change, and (iii) adaptive capacity. The last two can be affected by conflict. Many of the world's poorest people are exposed to various risks to life, health, and well-being. If climate change adds to these risks, it can increase humanitarian crises and existing conflicts without directly causing them.[11]

Climate change impacts resources, besides demographic, economic and political pressures weaken states' ability to meet citizens' needs and provide them with necessary resources such as food, water and energy. All of these factors will eventually lead to state fragility, internal conflicts and greater risk for the stability of states and the legitimacy of governments.[12]

The Horn of Africa suffers continually from problems that are exacerbated by climate change. Countries such as Somalia, Kenya and Eritrea record high indicators of violence. In 2012, Somalia suffered from droughts linked to climate change. In 2018, droughts in the Lake Chad basin boosted the efforts of extremist groups such as Boko Haram and al Qaeda in the Sahel region. In the same year, Mali witnessed an escalation of violence between farmers and herders, where the number of people in need of food reached 5.2 million as a result of violent acts and increased drought.

Political tensions and disputes between countries over water resources are among the most significant and most dangerous factors that have led and will lead to deepening conflicts over natural resources. The potential for such conflicts over this strategic resource is high, given that most of the 50 river basins in Africa cross national borders; one example is the conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt over the flow of the Nile River.

5.3.4 A nurturing environment for terrorism and organised crime

State fragility leads to a lack of social justice due to insufficient resources, conflicts, poverty and other aspects. In such contexts terrorist or-

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[11] Jürgen Scheffran et al., "Climate Change and Violent Conflict", in *Science*, Vol. 336, No. 6083 (18 May 2012), p. 870.

[12] Teller Report, *Climate Change Is Fueling Global Conflict Issues*, 11 October 2019, http://www.tellerreport.com/news/2019-10-11---climate-change-is-fueling-global-conflict-issues-.HyGel0OAuB.html.

ganisations proliferate and exert their influence in conflicts and crises. They try to bridge the gap left by the government by providing basic services to obtain legitimacy and to build confidence and support among the local population. Meanwhile, the population becomes more vulnerable not only to climate change but also to recruitment by terrorist organisations.

There is no direct connection between climate change, conflicts and violence related to terrorism and organised crime, but a wide range of climate change effects leads to such results.

5.3.5 Environmental refugees

Throughout human history, migration and climate have always been connected, and today climate determines the means of and reasons for migration. When political actors are unable to address the effects of environmental degradation, such as soil erosion, desertification and drought, the population responds by migrating. These environmental refugees often trigger conflicts between neighbouring countries, which further complicates climate change outcomes.

According to the World Bank, "the worsening impacts of climate change could cause more than 86 million people to migrate within Africa's borders by 2050. While climate change is one of many complex factors influencing migration flows within the continent, it is an increasingly important one from a policy perspective."[13]

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

As pointed out by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),

> Policymakers are faced with responding to the risks posed by anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases in the face of significant scientific uncertainties. It is appropriate to consider these uncer-

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[13] Africa Portal, *Call for Abstracts: Climate Change and Migration in Africa*, 6 December 2019, https://www.africaportal.org/features/call-abstracts-climate-change-and-migration-africa; Kanta Kumari Rigaud et al., *Groundswell. Preparing for Internal Climate Migration*, Washington, World Bank, 2018, http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29461.

tainties in the context of information indicating that climate-induced environmental changes cannot be reversed quickly, if at all, due to the long time-scales associated with the climate system.[14]

The process of climate change mitigation cannot be achieved by agreements only. It will require international cooperation to address many challenges, including multiple actors with diverse perceptions of the costs and benefits of collective action; emissions sources that are unevenly distributed; heterogeneous climate impacts that are uncertain and distant in space and time; and mitigation costs that vary from one state to another.[15]

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society and universities have an important role to play in mitigating climate change; non-governmental actors are critical for monitoring the implementation of international treaties, raising awareness about climate change impacts and in the negotiation of international agreements. Moreover, many UN agencies work closely with NGOs through environmental conventions and the evaluation and development of international environmental agreements.[16]

It is possible that climate change may open doors for scientific, cultural and economic cooperation. As a global issue, it requires unified action and policies. Harmonised international policies in a legal framework can advance the overall landscape of agreements and institutions relevant to climate change. Our recommendations are the following:

- Develop and disseminate methodologies and tools for assessing the impacts of and vulnerability to climate change, like climate prediction programmes.
- Raise awareness about the threat of climate change to the security and future of humanity, by incorporating the importance of environmental protection into academic curricula and symposia.

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[14] IPCC, *Climate Change 1995: Synthesis Report*, 1996, p. 28, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar2/syr.

[15] IPCC, *Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 1005, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3.

[16] Chiara Giorgetti, "The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Climate Change Negotiations", in *Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1998), p. 115, https://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications/891.

- Establish mandatory legal frameworks related to regulating the exploitation of natural resources.
- Encourage cooperation by the international community in the exchange of information and modern technologies that can be used to reduce the effects of climate change.
- Create a worldwide culture of sustainable development.
- Rationalise the consumption of natural resources, including water and energy.
- Integrate people, especially students, in the plan to combat climate change.
- Because poor countries are most affected by climate change, developed countries must share technologies and invest in alternative resources.
- Encourage youth to launch projects and start-ups related to climate change.
- Foster cooperation between universities and laboratories to exchange information and technologies.
- Adopt sustainable land management strategies, which could account for more than a third of emission reductions in the short term.
- Exploit household spaces such as surfaces to plant vegetables and fruits.
- Promote global education on family planning, sustainable refrigeration, improved farming methods and solar and wind power.

CONCLUSION

Climate change is an unavoidable fact, and one cannot deny the seriousness of its impacts or ignore its effects on human development. Just as it is not possible to deny the role of organisations, protocols and summits in finding solutions to mitigate climate change in a cooperative way, it still needs to be compulsory for all countries to become involved.

Combatting climate change requires the development of plans at the micro levels of every state, where civil society, researchers, academics and individuals play important roles, from raising awareness and changing behaviours, to inventing alternatives and finding solutions. The financial aid provided by developed countries to developing countries would

be more effective if it were in the form of scholarships, funds for laboratories, or even projects and investments that can alleviate the consequences of migration and disputes over resources.

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Kanta Kumari Rigaud et al., *Groundswell. Preparing for Internal Climate Migration*, Washington, World Bank, 2018, http://hdl.handle. net/10986/29461.

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Nelson K. Sewankambo, "Climate Change and Health: An Issue with Great Potential for Exacerbating Health Inequities in Africa", in Hany Besada and Nelson K. Sewankambo (eds), *Climate Change in Africa: Adaptation, Mitigation and Governance Challenges*, Waterloo, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), 2009, p. 16-20, https://www.cigionline.org/node/2952.

Teller Report, *Climate Change Is Fueling Global Conflict Issues*, 11 October 2019, http://www.tellerreport.com/news/2019-10-11---climate-change-is-fueling-global-conflict-issues-.HyGel0OAuB.html.

Maria Julia Trombetta, "Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the Discourse", in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2008), p. 582-602, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570802452920.

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6.

Illicit Arms Trade in the Horn of Africa: Fostering a More Effective Roadmap

Muhammad Alaraby

6.1 The Horn security architecture and external flows

After decades of fragmentation and security strife that kept the region in the backwater of the international system following the civil war in Somalia and the inter-state wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Horn of Africa recently has gained more attention with the "new scramble for Africa",[1] in which regional and international powers are vying for a more strategic position in the region, which interlinks the trade lines between Asia, the Middle East and Europe.[2] The region, to a large extent, is mirroring the regional and international shift in the global balance of power while becoming one of the most militarised regions in the world.[3] Arms trade dynamics are highly affected by these shifts. While illicit arms transfers in the 1990s and early 2000s were shaped by the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the disintegration of political regimes in Ethiopia and Somalia, with most of the illicit arms flows coming from Eastern Europe

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[1] Lee Wengraf, "The New Scramble for Africa", in *International Socialist Review*, No. 60 (July-August 2008), https://isreview.org/issue/60/new-scramble-africa; The Economist, "The New Scramble for Africa", in *The Economist*, 7 March 2019.

[2] Awol Allo, *The Gulf Scramble for the Horn of Africa*, London/New York, Zed Books, 2018.

[3] Neil Melvin, "The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region", in *SIPRI Backgrounds Papers*, April 2019, https://www.sipri.org/node/4796.

and the former Soviet republics,[4] the newcomers to the Horn of Africa are now the main sponsors of illicit transfers.

Before exploring the role of the newcomer powers in the region's arms transfers, it is worth noting that the majority of arms exports to Africa are still largely dominated by Western powers.[5] According to a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in the period 2014–18, Russia accounted for 28 per cent of the arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa, while Ukraine accounted for 8.3 per cent, the United States for 7.1 per cent and France for 6.1 per cent.[6] More importantly, as we shall see, a large proportion of the small arms and light weapons (SALW) imported by the Middle Eastern powers and sent into conflict zones are diverted to Africa via the Libyan and the Horn of Africa routes. The Western arms black market is playing a role in this diversion.[7]

6.1.1 China's illicit arms

Over the last two decades, China has become a major international exporter of weapons to Africa. According to the SIPRI report, China's arms exports to Africa account for 10 per cent of the continent's overall imports.[8] There is, however, a more controversial side to arms trafficking between China and Africa, manifested in secret arms deals made by China with parties involved in regional civil conflicts.[9] Needless to say, most of these conflicts have led international legislators to impose an interna-

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[4] Lynne Griffith Fulton, "Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Horn of Africa", in *The Ploughshares Monitor*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Summer 2002), https://ploughshares.ca/?p=3435.

[5] Lorenzo Kamel, "Torpedoing Africa, and Then Complaining About 'Migration'", in Al Jazeera, 18 August 2018, http://aje.io/d3a9l.

[6] Pieter D. Wezeman et al., "Trends on International Arms Transfers, 2018", in *SIPRI Fact Sheets*, March 2019, p. 8, https://www.sipri.org/node/4766.

[7] For example, the 1.2 billion euro arms pipeline since 2012 and 2016 that fed the demand of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Jordon by deals with Eastern and Central European states, where most of the purchased arms were diverted to the conflict zones ranging from Syria to Somalia. For more details, see Ivan Angelovski, Lawrence Marzouk and Miranda Patrucic, "Making a Killing: the 1.2 Billion Euro Pipeline to the Middle East", in *Balkan Insight*, 27 July 2016, https://balkaninsight.com/2016/07/27/making-a-killing-the-1-2-billion-euros-arms-pipeline-to-middle-east-07-26-2016.

[8] Pieter D. Wezeman et al., "Trends on International Arms Transfers, 2018", cit., p. 8.

[9] Ian Taylor and Zhengyu Wu, "China's Arms Transfers to Africa and Political Violence", in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (July 2013), p. 457-475.

tional ban on the sale of arms to these parties. A number of media reports in July 2018 revealed that China had "trafficked" arms through Djibouti. According to a report published by EXX Africa in August 2018, a website dedicated to risk analysis, most arms trafficking operations were run through the Chinese base in Djibouti and the trading port in Doraleh to conflict zones in the Horn of Africa, Sudan and South Sudan, as well as Yemen, where a civil war is being fought by Houthi rebels.[10]

Chinese arms mostly end up in the hands of government forces or rebel militias. Sudan stands as an example of this situation. As a result of the lifting of sanctions imposed by the USA on Sudan in October 2017, the scale of Chinese arms trafficking to Khartoum has been revealed. Beijing played a significant role in reducing the economic and military isolation imposed on al-Bashir's regime, which has been involved in a civil war in Darfur, to which the export of arms was banned under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1591.[11] In 2018, eyewitnesses reported that the Djibouti port received shipments of missile launchers, anti-tank missiles and batches of Chinese ammunition destined for Sudanese government forces in Darfur.[12]

Evidence has established that the rebels of Beja in Darfur have indirectly acquired a number of Chinese arms. While opposition groups in East Sudan acquired Chinese arms by stealing shipments from Port Sudan, the rebels of Beja acquired Chinese arms via primitive trafficking operations on the Sudanese border with Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo. Evidence has also demonstrated the involvement of Sudanese border guards and a number of officers of the peacekeeping forces formed by the United Nations and the African Union in trafficking operations. The same situation has occurred in South Sudan, where there is a civil war and a ban on arms imports. Consequently, the government of South Sudan started negotiations with Beijing to purchase batches of arms.[13] On another front, reports indicate that the Djiboutian government makes use of the secret arms trafficking deals taking place

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[10] EXX Africa, *The Secret Chinese Arms Trade in the Horn of Africa*, August 2018, http://bit.ly/2PvgfDy.

[11] UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005) of 29 March 2005, https://www.un-docs.org/S/RES/1591(2005).

[12] EXX Africa, *The Secret Chinese Arms Trade in the Horn of Africa*, cit.

[13] Ibid.

through the Djiboutian ports in order to pay its Chinese debt, while President Ismail Omar Guelleh directly benefits from these deals in contravention of domestic and international laws.[14]

6.1.2 Iran enters the theatre

In its strategy to outflank the USA and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) powers by reaching the Horn of Africa, Iran sought to gain access to the strategic entries of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, especially in Eritrea and Sudan, in order to provide logistical support for deploying its naval forces into the region.[15] After decades of being at odds with most of the region's regimes, Iran managed to use the vacuum in the regional power structure to foster pragmatic ties with the Eritrean regime, which agreed to grant it a naval station in *Assab*, adjacent to its rival Israel, in exchange for financial aid.[16] The Iranian presence in the region dramatically increased amid the on-going turmoil in the Arab countries, especially Yemen and Syria as of 2011, as Iran began to send its ships and vessels to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and even through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, for the first time since the 1979 revolution. This breakthrough raised many concerns, especially from the GCC and Israeli sides, about Iranian ambitions in the region.[17]

As the main regional power with strong allied non-state proxies, it was obvious that Iran would use its bases to smuggle arms and equipment to them, enhancing their position in open-ended conflicts in Syria and the Gaza Strip. Reportedly, Iran has smuggled weaponry to Hizbullah, Hamas and the Houthis over the last ten years. Moreover, the Somali rebels received considerable amounts of Iranian arms.[18] In 2014 the Israeli naval

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[14] Zeenat Hansrod, "Revealed: How Djibouti Filled in the Gap Left by Eritrea in Arms Trafficking", in *African Liberty*, 19 September 2018, https://www.africanliberty.org/?p=18750.

[15] Neil Melvin, "The New External Security Politics of the Horn of Africa Region", in *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security*, No. 2019/2 (April 2019), https://www.sipri.org/node/4797.

[16] Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, "Iran in the Horn of Africa: Outflanking U.S. Allies", in *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer 2012), p. 117-133, https://mepc.org/iran-horn-africa-outflanking-us-allies.

[17] Harriet Sherwood, "Iranian Warships Cross Suez Canal", in *The Guardian*, 22 February 2011, https://gu.com/p/2na66.

[18] Neil Melvin, "The New External Security Politics of the Horn of Africa Region", cit.

special forces intercepted and seized an Iranian arms vessel in the Red Sea, approximately 1,500 kilometres from the Israeli coast. According to statements by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), weapons of strategic significance were discovered on the Iranian vessel, including rockets capable of travelling various distances. The arms were destined for armed organisations in the Gaza Strip via Sudan.[19]

On the other hand, the GCC powers, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular, within the context of their desperate war in Yemen, have tended to put more pressure on the Iranian presence, primarily via economic incentives, to convince the Horn countries to limit their ties with Iran. These initiatives have paid off. For example, in exchange for 50 million dollars in aid provided by Saudi Arabia, the Mogadishu government cut its ties with Iran.[20] Furthermore, the US military helped this alliance to curb the flow of Iranian arms to Yemen. However, Iran sought to maintain its naval operation in the Gulf of Aden under the rubric of protecting its oil shipments and the counter-piracy operations.[21] In general, Iran is not a large supplier of arms to the region compared with its rivals, but it has used its position to funnel arms to its proxies across the region. It is likely that the competition between the two parties will increase the instability of the region and the flow of arms transfers, legal and illegal alike.

6.1.3 The UAE's and Saudi Arabia's destabilising arms

However, containing Iranian ambition is only one element of a greater strategy pursued by the UAE and Saudi Arabia in the Horn of Africa. Allegedly, the two most powerful GCC countries are seeking to dominate the region, its politics, maritime security and its human flows, through a mixture of financial pressures, the building of military and commercial bases

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[19] Israel Mission to the UN in Geneva, *Seizure of an Iranian Arms Ship in the Red Sea: Statements by PM Netanyahu, DM Yaalon, Pres Peres*, 5 March 2014, https://embassies. gov.il/UnGeneva/NewsAndEvents/Pages/Seizure-of-an-Iranian-arms-ship-in-the-Red-Sea-5-Mar-2014.aspx.

[20] Edmund Blair et al., "Somalia Received Saudi Aid the Day It Cuts with Iran: Document", in *Reuters*, 17 January 2016, http://reut.rs/1SVXeIj.

[21] Naveed Ahmad, "Iran's Quest for Foreign Naval Bases", in *The New Arab*, 24 January 2017, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/1/24/irans-quest-for-foreign-naval-bases.

and manipulation. Mirrored by their diplomatic conflict with Qatar since the eruption of the Arab uprisings in 2011, and more openly since the 2017 crisis, GCC political dynamics have contributed to the destabilisation of the region as these rival powers are investing legally and illegally in advancing their interests.[22]

Meanwhile, Qatar is playing a dual role in the region by enacting its familiar playbook of maintaining ties with both governments and rebel movements, including terrorist groups such as Al-Shabab, according to journalistic reports.[23] The UAE is the most active party in channelling illicit arms to the region through multiple methods. The 2019 Small Arms Survey points out that several Middle Eastern powers, such as Turkey and the UAE, contribute to the illegal arms trade on the continent, and in the Horn of Africa in particular, by ignoring end-user and end-use certification measures; thus, a lot of light equipment and arms are sold on the black market in northern Somalia and other regions.[24] Indirectly, the UAE has flooded Yemen with arms handed over to anti-Houthis groups, which have been diverted to the illicit Somali arms market. More directly, in September 2017, according to the UN team of experts, the Puntland state police seized a vessel laden with arms heading from Yemen to Somalia. The investigation discovered that the arms had been sold to the UAE by China and Serbia the previous year.[25]

Furthermore, the 2018 UN report indicated that the UAE was in the process of establishing a military base in Berbera overlooking the Gulf of Aden, 190 miles from the Yemeni coast. This scheme involved the transfer

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[22] For more on the impact of the GCC crisis on the Horn countries, check the International Crisis Group (ICG), "Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa's Horn: Lessening the Impact", in *ICG Middle East Reports*, No. 206 (19 September 2019), https://www.crisisgroup.org/node/11727.

[23] Ronald Sandee, "Qatar's Dangerous Game in Somalia", in *European Eye on Radicalization*, 5 September 2019, https://eeradicalization.com/?p=4453; Ronen Bergman and David Kirkpatrick, "With Guns, Cash and terrorism, Gulf States vie for Power in Somalia", in *The New York Times*, 22 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/world/africa/somalia-qatar-uae.html.

[24] Small Arms Survey and African Union, *Weapons Compass. Mapping illicit Arms Transfer Flows in Africa*, January 2019, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/2019/highlight-au-mapping.html.

[25] UN Security Council, *Somalia Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea submitted in accordance with Resolution 2385 (2017)*, 9 November 2018, p. 20-21, https://undocs.org/S/2018/1002.

of military materiel and ammunition to the territory and the government of Somaliland, which has been in a dispute with the federal government in Mogadishu since 1991, which would constitute a violation of the arms embargo on Somalia under UNSC Resolution 751 (1992).[26] Additionally, in March 2018, the UAE launched a programme to train the Somaliland forces.[27] Previously, the UAE and Saudi bases in Eritrea were also accused of channelling arms to rebel groups and the embargoed government via Asmara.[28]

6.2 Domestic arms flows

The diversion of arms is key to understanding the domestic flow of illicit arms transfers.[29] Weak state structures, common in Africa, have helped to facilitate such flows. The deterioration of the states in the Horn and other African sub-regions gave rise to the illegal possession or diversion of arms to non-state groups, tribes, clans and individuals. Somalia is an obvious case. With its long legacy of state collapse, internal illicit arms flows can be seen as an indicator of the end of the state's monopoly of the use of force. According to the Small Arms Survey, these flows are more common in the south-central parts of the state. They are the result of deliberate leakage and the sale of state-owned weapons to non-state actors, as well as black market trading and battlefield spoils, especially from Somali federal government and African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) forces.[30]

A 2014 UNSC report points to the blurring of the line between state

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[26] Ibid., p. 17-18.

[27] Alexander Cornwell, "UAE to Train the Somaliland Forces Under Military Base Deal: Somaliland President", in *Reuters*, 15 March 2018, https://reut.rs/2HBzOWx.

[28] "UN: Saudis, UAE Likely Violating Arms Embargo in Eritrea", in *VOA News*, 4 November 2016, https://www.voanews.com/africa/un-saudis-uae-likely-violating-arms-embargo-eritrea.

[29] Owen Greene and Elizabeth Kirkham, *Preventing Diversion of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Issues and Priorities for Strengthened Controls*, London, Saferworld and University of Bradford, February 2009, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/376.

[30] Khristopher Carlson, "Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia", in *Small Arms Survey Research Notes*, No. 61 (October 2016), http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/2016/highlight-rn61.html.

and non-state local actors as a major reason for the leakage of state-owned weaponry. For example, members of the Somali national army or police forces also serve in local militias in the southern and central parts of the country. Furthermore, desertion from the security services is another means by which state security supplies are diverted to local armed groups or for individual use. UN reports also note the large scale of the illicit arms black market in Mogadishu, where the deliberately leaked arms are traded. Many items have been purchased by the Al-Shabab group and used in their attacks on government and civilian targets.[31]

Local cultures and economies also support this illegal trade. For example, A 2016 report by PAX, an Amsterdam-based think tank, showed that in 2009 about 2.7 million small arms circulated in Sudan, including the south. Of these small arms, two-thirds were in the hands of non-state actors, civilians, armed opposition groups and tribal militias. The militias need to possess firearms in order to guard their herds of livestock as they cross the borders within and around the state.[32] Given that tribal and clan culture is a predominant factor throughout the region, and that tribes do not readily accept the central state's authority, the illegal transfer of arms can be seen as a normal feature of daily life. In return, the availability of SALW has contributed to the entrenchment of a "gun culture," where possessing arms is an indicator of social status and identity.[33]

6.3 Arms transfers as a threat to national and human security of the Horn of Africa

The proliferation of SALW and other arms fuels other non-traditional security threats that deepen the fractures within the region and across

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[31] UN Security Council, *Somalia Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea submitted in accordance with Resolution 2111 (2013)*, 15 October 2014, https://undocs.org/S/2014/726.

[32] Daniel Mack and Frank Slijper, *Armed and Insecure. An Overview of Arms Transfers and Armed Violence in the Horn of Africa (2010-2015)*, Utrecht, PAX, September 2016, p. 34, https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications/all-publications/armed-and-insecure.

[33] Matt Schroeder and Guy Lamb, "The Illicit Arms Trade in Africa: A Global Enterprise", in *African Analyst*, No. 1 (Third quarter 2006), p. 73, https://fas.org/asmp/library/articles/SchroederLamb.pdf.

borders. This creates "circular violence" as the eruption of local and national hostilities in turn attracts more illicit arms. Thus, the proliferation of small arms is responsible for the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and even more injuries in Africa.[34] Therefore, while the chances of direct confrontation between the region's powers and external powers decrease, due to the complexity of overlapping political and economic interests and the progress in the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea,[35] security threats posed by non-state actors and sub-national communities will be fuelled by illicit arms transfers.

Terrorism: By design, terrorist groups feed on illegal weaponry smuggled or stolen from the military and police stockpiles. The major terrorist organisation working in the region is Al-Shabab, which operates from central-south Somalia and beyond the borders in Kenya and Tanzania.[36] It is the most lethal militant group attacking civilians, AMISOM and government facilities, and foreign bases.[37]

Organised crime: The diffusion of arms encouraged Somali piracy following the collapse of the state and the dissolution of centralised power during the civil war.[38] A UN report points out that most of the non-state actors in the region are involved in transnational organised criminal violence. Groups such as Al-Shabab are using violence to tax the licit and illicit activities in the region under their control. Reportedly, the armed groups throughout the region are involved in five major organised criminal activities:

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[34] Adesoji Adeniyi, "The Human Cost of Uncontrolled Arms in Africa. Cross-National Research on Seven African Countries", in *Oxfam Research Reports*, March 2017, https://www.oxfam.org/en/node/8248.

[35] "Ethiopia 'Accepts Peace Deal' to End Eretria Border War", in *BBC News*, 5 June 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44376298.

[36] For an overview on the dynamics of terrorism in the region, see Eelco Kessels, Tracey Durner and Matthew Schwartz, *Violent Extremism and Instability in the Greater Horn of Africa. An Examination of Drivers and Responses*, New York, Global Center on Cooperative Security, April 2016, https://www.globalcenter.org/publications/violent-extremism-and-instability-in-the-greater-horn-of-africa.

[37] Council on Foreign Relations, "Al-Shabab in Somalia", in *Global Conflict Tracker*, last updated 22 April 2020, https://on.cfr.org/2UTTYly.

[38] Awet Weldemichael and Abdisalam Hassan, "Understanding Somali Piracy on Land and Sea", in *Fair Observer*, 29 July 2013, https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/understanding-somali-piracy-land-and-sea.

- migrant smuggling from Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea to Yemen and Saudi Arabia;
- drugs trafficking from South-west Asia to East Africa;
- ivory trafficking from East Africa to Asia;
- charcoal trafficking, especially from Somalia; and
- piracy off the Somali coast.[39]

Local strife: According to a 2017 Oxfam report on the human costs of the uncontrolled trade in arms in Africa,[40] the diffusion of arms endangers the social cohesion of the African states, exacerbating the deep-seated tensions between tribes, clans, ethnicities and cultures and tipping the scale toward the use of violence. The proliferation of SALW among local and tribal militias makes it easier to demonstrate power, which leads to mistrust and retaliatory measures to settle disputes. This situation is common across the region. Additionally, the same report highlights the impact of illicit arms on gender-based violence, where militants use the cheap arms to humiliate, intimidate, traumatise and displace individual and local communities. Women indeed are the most affected victims of this violence.[41]

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Mitigation of the threats posed by and resulting from the proliferation of SALW and illicit arms flows in the region should be focused on "human security" in addition to "national security" as a priority for both the region's states and the concerned African and international organisations. Human security as an approach entails widening the perception of security by ensuring basic socio-economic preconditions such as personal security and food security, an accessible labour market, and competent health and educational systems. This may serve to lessen violence and strife on the

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[39] UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Transnational Organized Crime in Eastern Africa: A Threat Assessment*, Vienna, UNODC, September 2013, p. 10, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_East_Africa_2013.pdf.

[40] Adesoji Adeniyi, "The Human Cost of Uncontrolled Arms in Africa", cit.

[41] Sherrill Whittington et al., *The Impact of Conflict on Women and Girls in West and Central Africa and the UNICEF Response*, New York, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), February 2005, https://www.unicef.org/publications/index_25262.html.

sub-national level, and to reduce the effects of local cultures and economic traditions that breed violence. However, these national policies should be coupled with continental and collaborative regional policies that principally target the dynamics of illegitimate arms transfers that transcend national borders.

Fortunately, the recommended policies do not lack a legal framework to guide them. This framework consists of several accords aimed at effective cooperation, enhancing the governance of non-traditional security (NTS) threats in general and the SALW trade in particular. The most important components of the legal framework are:

- *The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)*,[42] which is an international instrument endorsed by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013. It aims at promoting and regulating the international responsibility for international trade in conventional arms and seeks to prevent and eradicate illicit trade and diversion of conventional arms by establishing international standards governing arms transfers.
- *The Nairobi Protocol*,[43] which can work as a regional complement to the previous agreement, although it was drafted and signed ten years earlier (in 2004). All the greater Horn countries except Somalia have signed the Protocol. The Protocol is being monitored by the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA), based in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi. Established in 2005, RECSA's aim is to "build the capacity of the member states, coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol within the RECSA region."[44]
- *The African Union's "Silencing the Guns, Owning the Future" initiative*,[45] which is a wide-ranging policy initiative. Launched in 2013 on the 50th anniversary of the AU, it aims to achieve a conflict-free Africa, prevent genocide, make peace a reality for all and rid the continent of wars,

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[42] For more information on the treaty, ATT website: https://thearmstradetreaty.org.

[43] The text of the protocol can be found in RECSA website: *Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States*, https://recsasec.org/?p=4348.

[44] See RECSA website: *Who We Are*, https://recsasec.org/?p=4009.

[45] See African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), *Silencing the Guns, Owning the Future: Realising a Conflict-Free Africa*, Durban, Accord, https://www.africaportal.org/documents/13780/Silencing_the_guns_owning_the_future.pdf.

violent conflicts, human rights violations and humanitarian disasters. The leaders hoped to have all the guns silenced by 2020.[46] The initiative calls for a general amnesty month in September 2020, when those possessing illegally acquired guns can hand them into the authorities without penalty. It also builds on other regional treaties, such as the 2006 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the 2017 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention).[47]

Therefore, the year 2020 is supposed to witness the implementation of the initiative's goals. However, African politicians in the AU must be realistic in their aspirations, given the wide scope and geographic scale of the plan.[48] It would be more effective to test it in regional or sub-regional contexts such as the Horn of Africa. The following policy options can assist in the implementation:

Convince the ATT non-signatory states in the region to sign the treaty. Among the 15 RECSA countries, only six have signed the ATT. Those that have not yet signed include South Sudan, Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia. These governments and others should consider that signing the agreement will make available more economic, defence and technical assistance, which is crucial to their struggle for conflict-free countries.

Attract international aid for countering arms transfers and other NTS threats across the region, or raise funds for organisations, local initiatives and other grassroots movements to help local communities and national authorities in their efforts.

Build local and national databases mapping the flow of arms transfers. Through its early warning systems, the AU can build local and regional

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[46] Zipporah Musau, "Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020", in *Africa Renewal*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (December 2019-March 2020), p. 4-5, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/node/22764.

[47] Adewale Daniel Omojowo, "Conflict Free Africa: Silencing the Guns", in *Organization for World Peace Reports*, 21 February 2020, https://theowp.org/reports/conflict-free-africa-silencing-the-guns.

[48] Ineke Mules, "Stemming the Flow of Illicit Arms in Africa", in *Deutsche Welle*, 26 July 2019, https://p.dw.com/p/3MnFg.

databases that can accurately portray the situation of conflicts, the flows of arms and organised crime on the ground.

Deploy border control regimes to coordinate the inter-state efforts to seize illegally transferred arms and ammunition, and to mitigate the threats of human and drugs trafficking. These regimes should integrate local forces and improve their capabilities and resources. Technical assistance for these regimes can be provided by UN and AU agencies, such as peacekeeping forces.

Discuss the dangers of illicit arms transfers with non-African countries that are involved, such as Iran and China. For example, this issue should be included in the agenda of the next Forum on China–Africa Cooperation.[49]

Name and shame the international and regional parties involved in the illicit arms trade as a tool of pressure and to attract international community resources.

Integrate the political roadmap to reconcile conflicts between the region's states, building on the peace treaty concluded by Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2018. Most importantly, the UN and AU should support the state-building process in Somalia and help the federal government to counter the Al-Shabab terrorist group in cooperation with bordering countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Tanzania.

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[49] See the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) website: https://www.focac.org/eng.

Awol Allo, *The Gulf Scramble for the Horn of Africa*, London/New York, Zed Books, 2018.

Ivan Angelovski, Lawrence Marzouk and Miranda Patrucic, "Making a Killing: the 1.2 Billion Euro Pipeline to the Middle East", in *Balkan Insight*, 27 July 2016, https://balkaninsight.com/2016/07/27/making-a-killing-the-1-2-billion-euros-arms-pipeline-to-middle-east-07-26-2016.

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7.
The Role of the Media in Armed Conflicts: The Case of the Central African Republic

Paul-Crescent Beninga

Much of the academic literature on the role of the media in armed conflicts agrees that during conflicts the main role of media is to inform public opinion about military operations. It is from this perspective that Laurent Teisseire rightly states that "informing the public about the course of military operations is one of the tasks of the great popular press of the 19th century".[1] In the same vein, Alexandre Balguy-Gallois emphasises that the essential role of the media, and especially of journalists as eyewitnesses on the ground, is to inform the international community about the realities of war.[2]

In addition to this task, which corresponds to the classic model of communication (transmitter–messenger–receiver) taken from Harold Lasswell's famous question (who says what, to whom, through what channel, with what effect?), the media have played a catalytic role in political and social processes since the 1990s,[3] a role that includes participation in armed conflicts. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly relevant to study the role of the media in armed conflicts.

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[1] Laurent Teisseire, "Place et rôle des médias dans les conflits", in *Revue internationale et stratégique*, No. 78 (2010), p. 91, https://doi.org/10.3917/ris.078.0091.

[2] Alexandre Balguy-Gallois, "Le rôle des médias et l'accès des journalistes sur le terrain des hostilités: Une garantie supplémentaire du respect du droit international humanitaire?", in Jean-Marc Sorel and Isabelle Fouchard (eds), *Les tiers aux conflits armés et la protection des populations civiles*, Paris, Pedone, 2010, p. 84-104, https://rsf.org/fr/node/30149.

[3] See Anne-Marie Gingras, "Médias et conflits sociaux", in Études internationales, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1997), p. 615-622, https://doi.org/10.7202/703779ar.

This chapter stems from the paradox that media outlets in the Central African Republic (CAR) proliferate more in situations of armed conflict than in times of peace, albeit relative. Many radio stations and print news agencies have been founded amid conflicts and in interwar periods. This raises many questions regarding both the reasons for this proliferation and the nature of media actions. This chapter focuses on the socio-political analysis of different media actions in times of conflict in an effort to explain the reasons for the paradoxical proliferation of the media in the context of conflicts. In other words, what does media action consist of in times of armed conflict in the Central African Republic?

7.1 MEDIA COVERAGE OF ARMED CONFLICTS AND EMERGENCY ACTIONS IN CAR

Actions of first urgency are all media actions taken in situations of armed conflict that not only facilitate the population's access to information, but also influence (positively or negatively) the course of these conflicts. The media are considered here as vectors of influence that participate in the reconfiguration or transformation of the landscape of armed conflicts.[4] From this point of view, they are actors who are fully involved in the process of conflict transformation. Thus, the intent of this section is to study the actions of the so-called primary emergency media in conflict situations.

As Laurent Teisseire points out, the presence of the media in armed conflicts dates back to the 19th century and the first appearance of "war journalists or conflict reporters".[5] Later, the concept of conflict-sensitive journalism was developed to theorise the practices of journalists in conflict zones. It then became a tool for journalists in localities affected by armed conflict. Conflict-sensitive journalism enables media professionals in CAR to fully play a pioneering role in conflicts.

The analysis of the media's vanguard role is centred on its activity at two moments: the first takes place before, and the second during, armed

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[4] Nicolas Arpagian, "Internet et les réseaux sociaux: outils de contestation et vecteurs d'influence?", in *Revue internationale et stratégique*, No. 78 (2010), p. 97-102, https://doi.org/10.3917/ris.078.0097.

[5] Laurent Teisseire, "Place et rôle des médias dans les conflits", cit., p. 91.

conflicts. Although the focus of the analysis is more on the second moment, it is important to look at the first moment as well. Although it is difficult to contain, or better still to stifle, any hint of the emergence of armed conflict, the media have been constantly raising awareness in order to prevent and deter the occurrence of armed conflict. This awareness is achieved, for example, through media coverage, emergency actions and the organisation of conferences and debates. Before General Bozizé's *coup d'état* in 2003, the media in CAR, and more specifically the written press and private radio stations, both community and commercial, raised awareness and questioned national opinion and political leaders on the danger of a political crisis that could lead to armed clashes. In this regard, one editor rightly asserted:

> At the time of the late President Patassé, the press wrote and published a lot to challenge the conscience of politicians to favour dialogue at the expense of war. The crisis CAR is going through today is the result of the Bozizé rebellion. He showed the way, today everyone wants to take power by force of arms. The consequences are such that weapons are circulating all over the CAR.[6]

From this assertion, two main lessons emerge. On the one hand, the author shows how much journalists, through media coverage, play a pioneering role in raising awareness and informing the population in general and the political elite in particular on the need to avoid armed clashes. This is a proactive strategy to prevent possible conflicts – what some authors, such as Patrick de Favre Bintene, call proactive journalism.[7] Proactivity here consists of drawing the attention of the Central African people as well as the international community to the risks to which the country is exposed in the event of armed conflict.

On the other hand, such assertions reflect the fact that the ruling elite do not pay attention to alerts in the media. At this level of analysis, Central African journalists, especially those in the print media, believe that the strategy put in place has not led to the expected results. This is an almost

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[6] Our interview, Bangui, 24 December 2014.
[7] Patrick de Favre Bintene, *Rôle controversé des médias dans la résolution des conflits en RDC. Analyse critique de l'opérationnalité des médias dit pour la paix*, Éditions universitaires européennes, 2015.

programmed failure that is partly the result of the media's poor capacity to reach all social strata in the country.

With regard to the media's vanguard role during conflicts, we have noted that in the midst of conflicts, the media continue to act as a safeguard, either to contain the spillover of violence or to prevent disaster. As a journalist from Radio Notre Dame in Bangui points out:

> We managed to prevent a mutiny by the ex-Séléka on the eve of Christmas and New Year's Eve. We were told that they wanted to prevent Central Africans from celebrating the New Year for the third consecutive year. After a raid by our team in the field, we ventilated the information. This allowed the police to increase the number of patrols around their base in order to avoid any overflow. The same applies to the arrest of warlord Baba Ladé, it was thanks to the cross-checking of information we gave that this bandit was arrested by the multinational forces.[8]

Here, the action of the media is situated between two strategies: on the one hand, a proactive strategy, and on the other hand, a strategy that is part of the dynamics of conflict transformation.

The population's assessment of the effectiveness of these strategies is mixed. Many of those interviewed believe the media coverage has not only informed them about the conflict situation, but also enabled them to take the necessary preventive measures. At the same time, certain sections of the population do not appreciate the strategy of media coverage of the armed conflicts in CAR in the same way, believing the media are partisan and act as vectors of the increasing complexity of the conflicts.

7.2 Reactionary measures by the media: From denunciation to incitement to respect the rights of non-combatants

Prevention of conflict cannot be the sole motivation for the profusion of media outlets in conflict situations. Denunciation is understood as the pro-

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[8] Our interview, Bangui, 23 December 2014.

cess by which the media make public a fact that is unknown to the general public and that is met with indignation.[9] It must be distinguished from denunciation, which refers to the publication of false, shameful and slanderous facts about an individual, a group of people or a community. The purpose of denunciation, through media action, is to make stakeholders react directly in order to influence the course of the conflict on the one hand, and to ensure the protection of civilian populations on the other hand.

Common Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 provides, in the case of non-international conflicts, for the protection of persons who have not taken a direct part in the conflicts, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms.[10] Violations of this article often occur by states that are signatories to the Geneva Convention. The same is true in the case of armed conflicts in CAR, notably in the armed conflicts of 2002–3 and those of 2012–13. Indeed, many citizens have been victims of crimes committed by members of rebel movements, including killings, torture, kidnapping, corporal violence, looting and destruction of moveable and immoveable property. In December 2013, Amnesty International reported thousands killed, most of them civilians, in reprisals by the former Séléka rebels, but also in atrocities committed by anti-Balaka militias.[11]

Faced with this human rights crisis, the Central African media have implemented a communication strategy that consists of denouncing the abuses committed by rebel groups in order to appeal to international opinion on the one hand, and to encourage the belligerents to spare the non-combatant populations from these abuses on the other hand. By way of illustration, we have noticed some interactive programmes that serve as platforms for denouncing the abuses committed by the belligerents. These include the "Zia é tènè" programme on Radio Notre Dame,[12] the "A

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[9] See Pierres Lascoumes, "Des cris au silence médiatique: les limites de la scandalisation", in *Ethique et scandales publics*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2016), https://doi.org/10.4000/ethiquepublique.2799.

[10] Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/375-590006.

[11] Amnesty International, *"None of Us Are Safe": War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in the Central African Republic*, 19 December 2013, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr19/013/2013/en.

[12] *Zia é tènè*, in Sango language, literally means let us say, or let us denounce.

vous la parole" programme on Radio Ndeke Luka and the "Carrefour des auditeurs" programme on Radio Bangui FM.

7.3 Correcting misinterpretations that aggravate conflicts

The different theories of the media agree on the media's ability to influence opinion in both peace and armed conflict situations. The information provided by any media outlet generally has a variety of effects on public opinion. It often provokes reactions from other media sources interested in the same subject, especially when the logics underlying the media coverage are not unanimous, or even better, are subject to debate. It is clear that the media in situations of armed conflict are made up of two blocs: on the one hand, the media under Central African law, also known as the Central African media; and on the other hand, the media under foreign law, also known as the foreign or international media. As far as the international media are concerned, the main focus in the framework of this study are the Western media.

7.3.1 Inter-media quarrels over the nature of the conflict in CAR

The positions taken by the Western media in armed conflicts in CAR, particularly in the 2012 conflicts, do not for the most part reflect reality, because there is a clear desire to reproduce political discourse without any effort to gain distance from it. On this subject, Andrea Ceriana Mayneri, in analysing the question of media coverage in the Western press, rightly states that

> the multiplication of stories and the wide distribution of images have favoured simplifications and misunderstandings [...], by relaying without much critical distance expressions or speeches that are frequent in the Central African population or in the world of international diplomacy, but which are poorly adapted to this crisis and its analysis.[13]

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[13] Andrea Ceriana Mayneri, "La Centrafrique, de la rébellion Séléka aux groupes an-

This lack of distancing has caused shock among Central African journalists, who are trying to produce counter-discourses that are not all as productive as one might expect.

Indeed, following the failed coup attempt of 5 December 2013, the anti-Balaka self-defence movements were presented by the Western media as Christian militias that are opposed to the Séléka coalition, which is composed mainly of Muslims.[14] This description has led international observers to conclude that the Central African conflict is an interfaith conflict between Christians and Muslims. Faced with this drift, the national media have produced counter-discourses to explain to both national and international audiences that the conflict is not interfaith, but rather a crisis whose causes are deep and plural.

Certainly, the Western media define an editorial line on the media coverage of armed conflicts in CAR that does not take into account the reality in which these conflicts occur. In January 2014, the Western media, particularly BBC News Africa,[15] labelled a Central African citizen as a cannibal. A man had, in fact, picked up and brought to his mouth the remains of the body of a Muslim who had been lynched as he got off a minibus in Bangui. This "cannibal", however, is not in fact a cannibal. His gesture was an act of revenge following the assassination of his pregnant wife, his sister-in-law and her son by uncontrolled elements of the Séléka coalition. As Andrea Ceriana Mayneri rightly points out, this man was driven by a desire for revenge.[16] He was also someone who wanted to overcome fear and show his enemies how unimpaired he was by the loss of his family members. It would have been useful for the Central African media to arrange an interview with the young "cannibal" so that he could explain the motives behind his gesture, which is, in fact, a sign of distrust towards the executioners of his family.

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ti-balaka (2012-2014): Usages de la violence, schème persécutif et traitement médiatique du conflit", in *Politique africaine*, No. 134 (2014), p. 181, https://doi.org/10.3917/po-laf.134.0179.

[14] See Olivier Rogez, "Qui sont les anti-balaka?", in *RFI*, 5 May 2014, http://www.rfi.fr/fr/emission/20140505-rca-anti-balaka-milices.

[15] Paul Wood, "CAR Cannibal: Why I Ate Man's Leg", in *BBC News*, 13 January 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25708024.

[16] Andrea Ceriana Mayneri, "La Centrafrique, de la rébellion Séléka aux groupes anti-balaka", cit., p. 187.

7.3.2 The Central African media versus the Chadian media

Media quarrels are not only pitting Central African media against Western media, but also African presses against each other. The latter were divided over the abuses allegedly committed by Chadian forces participating in the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) in December 2013 in Bangui. Indeed, in December 2013, following the failed *coup d'état* of 5 December 2013 by anti-Balaka forces, the Chadian armed forces were accused by the Central African media of having committed acts of repression against non-Muslim Central Africans.[17] The Chadian press was accused of having stirred up national opinion in the CAR against the Chadian forces.[18] On 28 December 2013, a joint press conference between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chad and the African Union (AU) Commissioner was organised at the end of a meeting of the members of the international contact group on CAR. Moussa Faki Mahamat, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chad, stated that "what is said in the press is manipulation. Chad has been in CAR for 20 years. Chad does not have an agenda on CAR: we regret to note this shameless campaign against Chad."[19] Despite the formal denials by the Chadian press and its government, CAR national opinion has drawn the conclusion that the Chadian armed forces are defending the interests of the Séléka coalition. Here, one can read through this media quarrel that the media are each stealing from their state, from the ruling elite of their country. They have become, in fact, "instruments of public diplomacy".[20] This is in contrast to classical diplomacy, which only involves state actors, a diplomacy conduct-

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[17] Almost all the Central African media accused the Chadian army of the killings. You can read the following titles: "Des militaires tchadiens de la MISCA accusés d'avoir tué 3 personnes à Bangui", in *Radio Ndeke Luka*, 6 March 2014, https://www.radiondekeluka.org/actualites/securite/18888; AFP, "Centrafrique: des soldats tchadiens de la Misca tirent vers des manifestants", in *RFI*, 23 December 2013, http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20131223-centrafrique-soldats-tchadiens-misca-ouvrent-le-feu-manifestants.

[18] See the Chadian press review on the missions of the Chadian armed forces in the Central African Republic: "Revue de presse tchadienne", in *Actutchad*, December 2013.

[19] AFP, "Centrafrique: l'UA 'salue les actions' de l'armée tchadienne", in *L'Express*, 28 December 2013, https://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/monde/centrafrique-l-ua-salue-les-actions-de-l-armee-tchadienne_1310480.html.

[20] Cyril Blet, "Les médias, un instrument de diplomatie publique?", in *Revue internationale et stratégique*, No. 78 (2010), p. 119-126, https://doi.org/10.3917/ris.078.0119.

ed between different governments. However, as Cyril Blet rightly points out, "the international media" cannot be treated as mere tools of foreign policy".[21] Moreover, the media are international actors in their own right, despite the role they play in shaping foreign opinion.

7.3.3 Talk shows: An arena for interaction between the different parties of the conflict

CAR, like a number of other African countries, has experienced a high rate of mediation in the process of resolving armed conflicts. During President Bozizé's administration, an institution was created to mediate between the Central African protagonists.[22] The Constitution of 30 March 2016 provided for and created the National Mediation Council.[23] At the regional level, in 1996, a group of African heads of state was appointed to mediate between the mutineers and the government authorities. In 2013, in Libreville, Congolese President Sassou Nguesso Dénis was designated by his peers (President of central African region) as the mediator in the CAR conflict. Very often, these mediations are institutional and do not take into account the concerns of all social strata in the process of transforming armed conflicts.

7.3.4 Programmes that contribute to understanding the stakes of the conflict: Patara programmes and causal analysis of conflicts in CAR

At the height of the conflicts, we counted three talk shows, called "Patara",[24] one each on Radio Notre Dame, Radio Ndeke Luka and Radio Centrafrique. Traditionally, Radio Ndeke Luka organises a patara talk show every Saturday from 5 to 7 p.m. whose main objective is to bring together around a table the sons and daughters of the country to discuss political,

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[21] Ibid., p. 119.

[22] In 2010, Paulin Pomodimo, former Archbishop of Bangui, was appointed National Mediator. Its missions have earned him continental recognition. See "Monseigneur Paulin Pomodimo sacré Homme de la paix 2011", in *Radio Ndeke Luka*, 14 June 2012, https://www.radiondekeluka.org/actualites/societe/9483.

[23] See Title 11 and Art. 133, 134 and 135 of the Constitution of 30 March 2016, http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC183136.

[24] *Patara* in Sango language literally means dialogue, exchange or debate.

social, economic and cultural issues. However, we have observed that in conflict situations, the programme has been strongly oriented towards the search for causes, to the point that the debates have long been fundamentally political in nature. In reality, the broadcasts are a function of the socio-political context, of the prevailing political climate. Meanwhile, Radio Notre Dame and Radio Centrafrique have introduced special programmes called patara in conflict situations.

The fact that we have three programmes entitled "Patara" on three different radio stations is no coincidence. Rather, it shows the need to organise debates around the different causes of conflicts. The choice of the patara concept reflects the importance that the media gives to initiatives that contribute to the understanding of the causal elements of armed conflicts. It is a sign of both the symbolic and the strategic dimensions of media actions. It should be noted that the patara broadcasts have included multiple cases of talks within the various armed groups fighting in CAR. As a journalist from Radio Ndeke Luka states,

> The Patara programme, as a platform for dialogue and debate, has enabled us to reconcile many Central Africans. It brings men and women together around a table to discuss, to exchange without language on the causes of the difficulties that the CAR is going through. Patara is one of the programmes most watched by Central Africans.[25]

For this journalist, "Patara" is not simply a debate programme, but also a meeting place, a site of reconciliation where different societal and political actors can rub shoulders and forge bonds of friendship and sympathy. However, it is difficult to directly assess the impact of this programme on conflict dynamics.

7.3.5 Other programmes that contribute to analysis of the causes of armed conflicts in CAR

Other talk shows that contribute to the understanding and search for solutions to the conflicts facing the country include "Le Grand Rendez-

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[25] Our interview, Bangui, 26 December 2014.

Vous" on Radio Centrafrique and "E lé Songo" on Radio Ndeke Luka. Created in January 2017,[26] "Grand Rendez-Vous" is a talk show that presents the points of view of actors from different backgrounds: politics, academia, civil society and others. The intent of this innovation is to contribute, through contradictory exchanges, to the search for solutions to armed conflicts. According to our field surveys, Radio Centrafrique's "Le Grand Rendez-Vous" and Radio Ndeke Luka's "Patara" are the two programmes with the largest audiences. Their popularity can be explained by two factors: firstly, the relevance of the chosen themes, and secondly, the professionalism of the debate hosts. The themes focus on the causal analysis of conflicts and the search for solutions. They enable the population to decipher the discourse of the protagonists, the ruling elite and opinion leaders. The themes addressed also derive from current political events, which are themselves strongly linked to conflicts. On this subject, we interviewed a journalist who moderates the debates, who stated the following:

> It is true that the choice of topics is strongly oriented towards politics […]. This is because the news is dominated by the armed conflicts that the country has been facing for more than five years now. We can't stop talking about the conflicts, about the politics of the time when weapons are still crackling in the hinterland […]. In short, the choice of themes is determined by the political situation in the country.[27]

From this statement, it is clear that topics are chosen based on the socio-political context at the time.

7.3.6 Interactive programmes: A crossroads for exchange between panellists and listeners

Radio Notre Dame is one of the most active radio stations in situations of armed conflict. Numerous talk shows ("Patara", "Zia é tènè", "Espace Francophonie", etc.) have been initiated during sensitive periods in the conflicts (between 2013 and 2015). Following the example of the "Patara"

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[26] Our interviews with officials of Radio Centrafrique, Bangui, April 2017.

[27] Our interview, Bangui, April 2017.

programme on Radio Ndeke Luka, the main objective of "Zia é tènè" is to bring together the sons and daughters of the country around a table to debate, without taboos, current political issues. "Zia é tènè" is an interactive programme that allows the population to participate in the debate, and to denounce the abuses committed by armed groups in conflict. Its specificity is that it gives listeners the opportunity to question the panellists live, to contribute to the debate and even to make comments. "Zia é tènè", as its name indicates (let us say), is a real space for constructive criticism and self-criticism of society.

"Zia é tènè" is an arena for denunciation, a site that reveals the evils that undermine Central African society. It should also be noted that the subjects addressed at the height of the crisis have been political in nature, strongly oriented towards the causal analysis of armed conflicts. The acts of denunciation have led Radio Notre Dame to be questioned by the High Council of Communication (HCC).[28] In October 2015, a print media source and three radio stations, including Radio Notre Dame, were summoned by the HCC. The HCC criticised Radio Notre Dame for not respecting its terms of reference by broadcasting "programmes whose content does not correspond to their titles".

7.3.7 "Press Club" in the face of criticism from political figures

Set up in January 2017, the "Press Club" is an interactive talk show that brings media professionals together around a table to debate among themselves and at the same time exchange views with listeners who interact by telephone. The debate is often organised around current political, economic and socio-cultural topics. In fact, the choice of topics is largely based on political news related to the crisis. Although this programme is helping to raise popular awareness, it is nevertheless increasingly the subject of criticism. Indeed, the "Press Club" is gradually becoming a forum for trials of the international community, political opponents and opinion leaders. It is in this capacity that a leader of the opposition po-

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[28] Radio Notre Dame was twice arrested and put on notice by the High Council for Communication. The first inquiry dates from 2015 by the Transition High Council for Communication.

litical parties expressed his fear that the programme would turn Radio Centrafrique into Radio des Mille Collines.[29] The example chosen is caricatural and may be exaggerated, but it reflects the leader's fear.

The programme "Carrefour des auditeurs" (Bangui FM) is a forum for interaction between journalists-hosts and listeners. The latter are invited every working day (Monday to Friday), for one hour, to discuss current political, economic, social and cultural topics by telephone. Launched in 2017, the "Listeners' Corner" has a large audience, which can be explained by two factors: the relevance of the choice of subjects to be debated and the absence of censorship.

Conclusion

This chapter focused on the decisive actions of the media in times of armed conflict in CAR. The investigations and the analysis of the data collected allowed us to distinguish between emergency and post-emergency actions. The so-called emergency actions are essentially made up of the media coverage in crisis situations. Denunciations and pleas for the respect of human rights are, in fact, the main activities of media coverage in conflict situations.

Post-emergency actions are largely made up of talk shows, which are real places of interaction between the different actors in conflicts, and between the latter and the population through the media. However, although the intention behind the setting up of many programmes is noble, the fact remains that the outcome is often subject to debate. Some radio stations are criticised for organising programmes that do not contribute to the search for peace, but rather are likely to stir up tensions. These criticisms depend on the point of view of the critics and the organisations to which they belong.

All in all, in the light of all of the above, the media's decisive actions are aimed at influencing the course of conflicts and participating in the reconfiguration of the conflict landscape.

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[29] Our interview with an official of an opposition political party, Bangui, November 2018.

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According to UN projections, Africa's population is set to double to 2.4 billion by 2050, and it is expected to hit 4.3 billion by the end of the century. By then, about one-third of all of humanity will live on the continent. While many studies have focused on the present and the future of Africa and its interconnections with Europe, it is rare to hear how young people from Africa view and interpret current developments unfolding in their countries. To fill this gap, *Youth and Africa* brings together seven outstanding young professionals from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. They shed light on challenges and opportunities, and remind us that "Africa is a voice to be heard, not a problem to be solved".

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