European security and the future of transatlantic relations

IAI RESEARCH PAPERS

Edited by Riccardo Alcaro and Erik Jones

An IAI-SAIS Bologna Center publication
funded by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung

Edizioni Nuova Cultura

IAI
Istituto Affari Internazionali

IAI Research Papers

European Security and the Future of Transatlantic Relations

Edited by Riccardo Alcaro and Erik Jones

An IAI-SAIS Bologna Center publication
funded by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung

Edizioni Nuova Cultura

Acknowledgements
This volume has been made possible by funding from the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung. Thanks also to the Compagnia di San Paolo for its generous contribution.

Series Editor
Natalino Ronzitti

First published April 2011 by Edizioni Nuova Cultura

For Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)
Via Angelo Brunetti 9 – I-00186 Roma
www.iai.it

Copyright © 2011Edizioni Nuova Cultura - Roma
ISBN: 9788861346475
Copertina: a cura dell'Autore.
Composizione grafica: a cura dell'Autore.
È vietata la riproduzione non autorizzata, anche parziale, realizzata con qualsiasi mezzo, compresa la fotocopia, anche ad uso interno o didattico.

Contents

List of Contributors 7

List of Abbreviations 9

Preface
Riccardo Alcaro, Erik Jones 11

1. Transatlantic Relations in a Multipolar Europe 15
   Riccardo Alcaro

2. NATO's role in European Security - and Beyond 41
   James Goldgeier

3. European Security in NATO's Strategy 55
   Ulrike Guérot

4. Beyond Europe - Transatlantic Relations in a Global World 61
   Dana Allin

5. Nuclear Arms and Missile Defense in Transatlantic Security 69
   Oliver Thränert

6. Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in Europe 87
   Steve Pifer

7. Russia in the European Security Architecture: Contributor or Contender? 97
   Arkady Moshes

8. Russia and European Security: a Change of Paradigm or Just Another Abstract Debate? 117
   Oksana Antonenko

9. Reset West-Russia Relations - But Use Common Sense
Arthur R. Rachwald 125

10. Much Ado about Nothing: EU Defense Policy after the Lisbon Treaty 133
Anand Menon

11. European Security, Transatlantic Relations, and the Challenge to US Global Leadership 149
Erik Jones

Appendix
Transatlantic Security Symposium 2010. Conference Report 169
Valeria Calderoni, Alina Oroschakoff

List of Contributors

RICCARDO ALCARO, Transatlantic Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Intenazionali, and European Foreign and Security Policy Studies Fellow

JAMES GOLDGEIER, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, and Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Academy, Washington DC

ULRIKE GUÉROT, Senior Policy Fellow and Head, European Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin Office

DANA ALLIN, Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy, International Institute for Security Studies, London, and Editor, *Survival*

OLIVER THRÄNERT, Senior Fellow, Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Missile Defense, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin

STEVEN PIFER, Director, Arms Control Initiative, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC

ARKADY MOSHES, Director, Russia in the Regional and Global Context Program, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki

OKSANA ANTONENKO, Senior Fellow and Program Director, Russia and Eurasia, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

ARTHUR RACHWALD, Professor of Political Science, US Naval Academy, Annapolis (MA) and Visiting Professor, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center

ANAND MENON, Professor of West European Politics, University of Birmingham

ERIK JONES, Professor of European Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center

VALERIA CALDERONI, MA Candidate, Johns Hopkins SAIS Bologna Center

KALINA OROSCHAKOFF, MA Candidate, Johns Hopkins SAIS Bologna Center

List of Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
CBO	Congressional Budget Office
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DCA	Dual-Capable Aircraft
DG	Directorate-General (EU Commission)
EAS	European External Action Service
EDA	European Defense Agency
EEC	European Economic Community
EMU	European Monetary Union
ERPSC	EU-Russia Committee on Security and Foreign Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EST	European Security Treaty
EU	European Union
EUCOM	European Command
EUFOR	EU Force
G-20	Group of Twenty
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GUAM	Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
HR	High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
IAI	Istituto Affari Internazionali
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund

INF	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JDEC	Joint Data Exchange Center
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
MAP	Membership Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
New START	New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
SAIS	School of Advanced International Studies (Bologna Center)
SAP	Stabilization and Association Process
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
TEC	Treaty establishing a European Community
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
USD	United States dollar
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War

Preface

Riccardo Alcaro, Erik Jones

Long the main pillar holding up the transatlantic relationship, the security of Europe seems to have turned into an accessory element in the transatlantic security agenda. This trend can be traced back to three main structural factors. First, with the dual enlargement of NATO and the European Union to most countries once under Soviet rule, the political stabilization of post-Cold War Europe has largely been achieved, with the result that the strategic relevance of the European theater has diminished. Second, over the last twenty years the threat environment has changed dramatically, with security challenges to the United States and European countries now emanating from distant places. Third, the economic shift towards once under-performing countries in Asia (most notably China and India) and other regions in the world underlies an emerging international relations system characterized by multiple centers of powers, with the obvious consequence that the United States, as the richest and most powerful amongst them, is increasingly eyeing the Pacific and other regions rather than Europe.

In this changed scenario, the United States and European countries have often been unable to find an enduring convergence on how to deal with issues related to Europe's security, such as NATO's role, relations with Russia and other former Soviet republics, and the European Union's autonomous military capabilities. However, the concern that such differences reflect a structural trend inexorably leading to the drifting apart of the transatlantic partners is exaggerated. Under the Obama administration, the United States and EU countries have found new common ground. If the US and its European allies are able to build upon their current convergences and coalesce around a shared vision of Europe's security, they will re-energize their decades-old special relation-

ship. Although not as central as it used to be, European security can therefore still be an important component of transatlantic relations.

These and other related issues were among the subjects debated at the 2011 edition of the *Transatlantic Security Symposium*, the annual Rome forum on transatlantic security. The conference, which took place on the eve of NATO's November 2010 summit that endorsed the alliance's new strategic concept, brought together experts and practitioners from the EU, the US, and other countries such as Russia. As usual, the debate was lively and intense, the exchange of views open and frank. The discussions revolved around four macro-themes: the role of NATO in Europe, the development of a NATO-wide missile defense capability and its relations to nuclear arms control; the challenge of finding a constructive relationship with Russia; and the potential – alas, mostly unexpressed – of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

This volumes collects a revised version of the papers presented at the conference, plus a number of briefs drawn from the speaking notes of some of the discussants. As the volume's editors, we have added an introductory chapter providing a background to the issues dealt with more in detail in the following chapters, as well as a final paper linking the US role in Europe to its role on the world stage. A report on the conference's proceedings is included in the appendix.

We asked our contributors to take account of the NATO summit's results, although it was obviously too early for an in-depth analysis of their long-term consequences. Only time will tell how successful the decisions taken at the summit will prove to be. Nevertheless, we are heartened by the ratification of the US-Russia nuclear arms pact 'New START'. This is a fundamental step in ensuring Europe's long-term security, even as lingering contrasts in Europe remind us that the European security space remains fractured.

The *Transatlantic Security Symposium 2011: European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship* was jointly organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). The conference was made possible by the generous financial support of the Compagnia di San Paolo, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Rome office), the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and NATO's

Public Diplomacy Division. A special thanks goes to the Thyssen Stiftung and the Compagnia di San Paolo for financing this publication.

We would also like to thank our respective administrative staffs for making sure that we all met at the same time and place, and our research assistants for helping us along they way. Special thanks go to Barbara Wiza for providing editorial support.

1.
Transatlantic Relations in a Multipolar Europe

Riccardo Alcaro

For decades European security was at the core of the transatlantic relationship. During the first half of the 20th Century the traditional reluctance of the United States to get involved in the highly competitive European security system gave way to the recognition that it was in the country's national interest to avoid the emergence of an hegemonic power in Europe. The US felt compelled to intervene with massive military, economic, and human resources in two epoch-making world wars resulting from the collapse of the precarious European balance of power.

At the end of the Second World War, the United States made the strategic calculation that the most effective way to prevent the Soviet Union from succeeding where Nazi Germany had failed was for the US to become a long-term European security actor.

During the Cold War the US turned that part of Europe not occupied by Soviet forces into the first line of defense from, as well as pressure on, the communist bloc. Together, the United States and its European partners established or contributed to establishing a multi-layered institutional complex to provide protection for the countries of the North Atlantic (NATO); to reinforce the political cohesion and economic prosperity of the anti-Soviet bloc's European pillar (the Marshall Plan arrangements; the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, OEEC; the European Economic Community, EEC); and to create a platform for dialogue and selective cooperation with the opposite bloc (the Council of Europe and, later, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, plus a number of bilateral US-Soviet deals in the arms control field).

This intimate connection between European security and the transatlantic relationship remained true also in the aftermath of the dissolution

of the Warsaw Pact. In the 1990s, facing a an international scenario lacking any rival worthy of the name, the US fell back, almost by default, on a conservative attitude informed by the desire to preserve its newly acquired status of sole superpower. It soon became clear that a secure and stable Europe, comprising a plurality of US allies linked one another by common values and a sense of reciprocal belonging, would provide the United States with greater legitimacy and a wider array of political and economic assets to defend its pre-eminent status. Furthermore, if the US were to take seriously the responsibility descending from its 'victory' against the Soviet bloc, taking care of the defeated camp was to be one of its primary concerns.

This is the ultimate reason why the United States could not neglect the Balkan wars of 1991-95 and 1998-99 as merely European stuff. Its intervention, both as military 'pacifier' (along with NATO) and as a political mediator, confirmed that It remained a key European security actor. US pressure to upgrade the institutional set-up of Europe by turning the CSCE into a full-fledged international organization (OSCE), continuing to negotiate with Russia and other former Soviet republics over arms control agreements, and supporting the transformation of the EEC into a political entity, the European Union, should also be understood as evidence that the United States remained committed to Europe. In strategic terms, the most significant step towards ensuring Europe's long-term stability was the dual enlargement of the EU and NATO to countries once under Soviet rule, which the United States supported more enthusiastically than most of its European partners.

In sum, while no longer the central front in an epochal struggle, Europe remained nonetheless high on the US agenda throughout the 1990s, its security and stability lending more credibility to the vision of benign US global leadership. Consequently, the transatlantic relationship maintained its special place in the United States' and European countries' foreign policies.

This situation started to change in the early years of the 21st Century. On the one hand, the United States embarked on a process of adjustment to an international scene characterized by a shift in the economic balance towards once under-performing regions, the rise of new powers, and the emergence of new threats (in particular terrorism and the

spread of weapons of mass destruction), as well as the multiplication of crisis areas that breed those threats. As the US increasingly fixed its eye on regions other than Europe, the transatlantic relationship underwent a process of transformation, in that it relied less on security within Europe and more on problems in the outside world. During George W. Bush Jr.'s presidency, in particular his first term between 2001-2005, the transatlantic relationship was actually downgraded to the willingness of European countries to subscribe to the US foreign policy agenda.

On the other hand, the enlargement of both the EU and NATO seemed to have brought the process of stabilizing Europe to an end, thus relegating Europe to the 'success story' or at least 'job done' list of items. However, since early 2007 the validity of this assessment was put into question by Russia's increasingly tangible dissatisfaction with Europe's post-Cold War political and security outline. During the last years of Vladimir Putin's tenure as president (2000-2008), Russia opposed ever more vehemently a number of US-led initiatives, in particular on European soil (just to mention a few: NATO's planned enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, Kosovo's independence, Bush's plan to install parts of the US ballistic missile defense system in Eastern Europe). This process culminated in the war waged by Russia against neighboring Georgia in 2008, which was intended as much to rebuild Russia's prestige domestically as to humiliate NATO and force it to re-appreciate Russia as one of Europe's great powers. As clashes with Russia exposed fissures both at the transatlantic and the EU level, it seemed that European security, far from being the glue between the transatlantic partners, had become a bone of contention.

Although the emerging gap between European security and transatlantic cooperation reflects structural changes in both the European and global contexts, there is no irrefutable evidence pointing toward an unstoppable widening of this gap. In fact, since the inauguration of the Barack Obama administration in early 2009, there has been an attempt by the United States and its European partners to rebuild consensus, in particular concerning relations with Russia. Today European security is in a state of flux, and it is still too early to predict how it is going to develop in the mid- to long-term. Nonetheless, it is certainly possible to identify the undercurrents capable of orienting the direction European

security could take. This introduction, and indeed this entire volume, aims at delving deep into such issues.

EUROPE'S FRACTURED SECURITY SPACE

Europe is a highly institutionalized security complex. No other region counts so many organizations and sub-regional arrangements performing security tasks: NATO; the EU; the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, the Russian-led group comprising other six former Soviet republics);[1] the OSCE; the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM, a four-strong body committed to promoting security and prosperity around the Black Sea basin);[2] the EU-led Balkans Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). In addition, a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements have been struck as a contribution to the continent's security, such as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and US-Russian arms control deals.

Apart from the sheer number of institutions, it is the nature of some of these organizations that makes Europe's security environment peculiar. NATO and CSTO are military alliances bound by a mutual defense clause (accordingly, an attack against one member must be considered an attack against all members)[3] that conduct regular joint military exercises and have set up a rapid reaction force. NATO has also long established an integrated military command. The EU, for its part, is the most integrated organization of the world, combining elements of intergovernmental and supranational governance (although not in the foreign and defense policy field). With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty

1. CSTO member states are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Founded in 2002, the CSTO is based on the 1992 Treaty of Tashkent.

2. GUAM member states are Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. GUAM was established in 2001.

3. In a way closely reminiscent of the Washington Treaty's Art. V, Art. 4 of the Tashkent Treaty binds all member states to provide assistance, including by military means, to the member state under attack.

a mutual assistance clause, not dissimilar in essence from NATO's Article V on mutual defense, is now valid also for all EU member states.[4]

Such complexity has contributed to reducing significantly, but not to eliminating altogether, the risk of conflict in Europe. And yet it also reflects a fractured security landscape that resembles an ill-conceived puzzle whose pieces do not fit perfectly. In particular where multilateral bodies are weak, or where territorial disputes have been frozen but not settled (as in Moldova and the Caucasus, and potentially in the Balkans and the Crimean peninsula), undercurrents of conflict and tensions remain. This hinges a great deal on the fact that Europe's multiple security actors have different security sensibilities, needs, and priorities. As a consequence, they often pursue diverging agendas.

Multiple actors in the western camp: NATO, the US, and the EU

NATO is still Europe's main security actor. Not only does the alliance comprise the majority of the continent's countries, but also the most advanced in economic and technological terms. More important, NATO also includes non-European members, one of which – the United States – happens to be the world's mightiest military power by far. Mostly with the urging of the United States, NATO has undergone a process of adjustment to the new threat environment in recent years which has led it to embark on military operations far away from the Euro-Atlantic area as well as on security tasks not related to territorial defense. Two examples are the stabilization and counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan and the antipiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden.

The alliance has not forgotten its European roots, though. As stated in its recently endorsed new strategic concept, territorial defense, to which regular contingency planning and military exercises contribute essentially, remains at its core. So does the commitment to the vision of a 'Europe whole and free,' significantly evoked in relation to the al-

4. Art. 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union as amended by the Lisbon Treaty.

liance's open-ended enlargement policy.[5] In other words, NATO apparently sees itself not only as the ultimate guarantor of its members' defense, but also, at least potentially, as the guarantor for peace in Europe as a whole. Clearly, other European countries, namely Russia, do not see exactly eye-to-eye with NATO on this.

One peculiarity of NATO is that, in spite of being a mainly European organization, its most influential member, the United States, is from a distant continent. Many, if not most, European NATO member states actually appreciate the alliance precisely because it keeps the US focused on Europe and, as a corollary, on their security. NATO provides a legitimate framework for US military presence in Europe. The alliance's most senior military officer is simultaneously the head of EUCOM, the US military command for Europe, one of the only two US armed forces headquarters located outside the US territory (more precisely in Stuttgart, Germany).[6] Thousands of US troops are stationed in a number of US bases and other minor facilities spread across Europe. Five European countries also host US nuclear warheads in the framework of special nuclear-sharing arrangements that constitute NATO's nuclear deterrent.

However, the United States' security role in Europe extends beyond NATO's courtyard, encompassing an entire complex of bilateral relationships that vary considerably in nature, purpose, and intensity. While US security cooperation with its largest NATO allies – Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey – focuses primarily on areas other than Europe, European security continues to occupy a slot in their list of activities. For instance, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the US are all members, along with Russia, of the Contact Group for the Balkans, an ad hoc grouping acting as guarantor of regional peace accords' implementation. The US has also developed bilateral military relations with smaller countries, in particular in central and eastern Europe. Although now ab-

5. Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, adopted by NATO Heads of State and Government on 19-20 November 2010 in Lisbon. See in particular the Preface and sections on 'Core Tasks and Principles,' 'Defence and Deterrence,' and 'Promoting International Security through Cooperation.'

6. The other one, AFRICOM, is also in Europe, and is also near Stuttgart.

orted, Bush's plans to place components of a US-built ballistic missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic attest to the significance of an autonomous – i.e., separate from NATO – US security role in Europe.

Even more telling in this regard is the US's bilateral relationship with Russia. European security seems to a certain extent to be a function of US-Russia relations. Progress, or lack thereof, on NATO-Russia cooperation agenda, for instance, generally follows periods of warmer or cooler relations between Washington and Moscow. In addition, American and Russian officials negotiate nuclear arms reductions – which affect directly Europe's security since Europe is well within the range of those weapons – on a bilateral basis or, as some European pundits bitterly put it, over the heads of the Europeans. More broadly speaking, the attitude towards Russia of some European countries – in particular the eastern ones – is often a by-product of the US's Russia policy. For countries such as Poland or the Baltic states, chastising Russia – as well as other European countries for being soft on Russia – is politically less expedient if the US is bound on a conciliatory course. Specific national concerns *vis-à-vis* Russia are consequently emphasized or de-emphasized according to the attitude prevailing in Washington at a given time.

All this however cannot conceal the simple truth that, presently, Europe no longer catches America's attention as in the 1990s. Today, Washington does not see Europe as a security problem and, to the extent that security problems do persist in the Old Continent, it would want the Europeans to be able to manage them autonomously or with the US playing a supporting role only.[7] This trend has led pundits and commentators to predict a future withdrawal of the United States from Europe and advance the case for a 'trialogue' comprising the three main actors that geopolitics links one another in this offshoot of the Eurasian continental mass: the EU, Russia, and Turkey.[8]

Nonetheless, the diminished importance of Europe for the US should not be made automatically equivalent to a diminished importance of the

7. See James Goldgeier's chapter in this volume.

8. See Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard (with Dimitar Bechev, Jana Kobzova, and Andrew Wilson), *The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe*' 'European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Report', October 2010.

US for Europe. While the two processes are inter-related, postulating their identity carries the risk of taking trends for facts, thereby producing unfounded conclusions. In fact, even a reduced US military presence in Europe would not make the United States less relevant to European security. It might be that US strategic planners are today more ready than ever to 'leave Europe to the Europeans,' but not to the extent of renouncing America's ability to influence developments in Europe according to its interest. NATO's relevance might be destined to fade away as time passes by, but as of now there is no evidence pointing to its actual demise, nor is there any reason to believe that US-Russia relations are set to become a secondary issue. If anything, the contrary seems the case. Thus, the United States is likely to be counted among one of Europe's security players still for many years to come.

The European Union is perhaps Europe's most intriguing security actor, and at the same time the most difficult to grasp. This hinges a great deal on the fact that while the EU does perform security tasks and is developing an autonomous military dimension, it contributes to the continent's security mostly through non-military means. Together with NATO, the EU is the most spectacular example in recent history of the ability of countries for centuries divided by rivalry and conflict to establish an area of peace and stability. Unlike NATO, however, the EU has done so by fostering integration in a number of policy areas as much as promotion of common values and norms. A sign of its success is not only that war among its member states has now come to seem unthinkable, but also that none of them, not even the largest members, think of their role in the European context if not as members of the EU.

The stabilizing impact of the European Union is felt also beyond its borders, most notably in countries with a realistic prospect of becoming members. The EU's eastern enlargement in the 2000s contributed decisively to consolidating the democratic stabilization of the candidate countries. Even more telling is the case of the Western Balkans, where tensions have certainly not remained latent since the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The US was crucial in putting an end to the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo, but it is the prospect of EU membership that constitutes the most powerful incentive to avoid conflict among countries or groups within countries torn by countless mutual recriminations. And even

where the prospect of accession is vague or non-existent, as is the case with Ukraine, Moldova, or Russia, the vicinity of the European Union and the advantages of being engaged with it both in political and economic terms do have a restraining, albeit limited, effect on destabilizing forces. Finally, the EU is perceived in less antagonistic terms than NATO by countries otherwise suspicious of western intentions and actions, notably Russia or (to a lesser extent) Serbia, and this facilitates detente processes (as it became clear during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, when Russia accepted the mediation of France, then holder of the EU presidency). Accordingly, the importance of the Union's political and economic role for Europe's security cannot be exaggerated.

Against this backdrop, the weakness of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the EU's civilian-military capacity, is a source of frustration and growing delusion for many observers.[9] Not only do standard defense tasks remain outside the CSDP framework, but even crisis management, ostensibly the CSDP's rationale, is mainly performed in post-conflict situations, i.e. when security conditions seem no longer to be as critical as to raise concerns about the possibility of large-scale outbreaks of violence. Even the EU's largest military mission ever, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (which counted 7,000 troops at its onset in December 2004), was basically a follow-up of a NATO force that had guaranteed against the risk of violence for almost nine years. Furthermore, Althea itself has relied on NATO's planning capacity, in keeping with the 2003 Berlin Plus agreement regulating EU-NATO military cooperation. To a lesser degree, the same process of supervised transfer of responsibility between the two organizations happened between 2001 and 2003 in Macedonia, where an EU military mission replaced a NATO force only once security conditions were judged sufficiently stable. That CSDP, in military terms, is just a supplementary crisis management tool is further attested to by the decision by US and European leaders to maintain NATO control over the security of Kosovo after the latter's declaration of independence from Serbia in early 2008.

9. Anand Menon's chapter in this volume draws a dark picture of CSDP.

The Lisbon Treaty contains a legal mechanism allowing for the greater military integration of like-minded EU member states, but so far 'permanent structured cooperation' (as this complex, if not cumbersome, legal device is called) has remained untested. Tellingly, when faced with the daunting prospect of ensuring the sustainability and effectiveness of their military capabilities in times of severe budget constraints, France and Britain, the EU's largest military powers, opted for a bilateral arrangement.

Striking a more positive tone, some point to the fact that CSDP at least fosters greater integration of European defense markets – which is clearly a sine qua non for a credible autonomous defense capacity – while others recall that CSDP has presided over the development of civilian crisis management assets on an unprecedented scale.[10] Such considerations certainly ought to qualify too a severe judgment of CSDP, but the fact remains that the EU's hard security role in Europe is ways below its potential.

The reason for this is manifold. Defense still retains a sacred aura of national sovereignty, and EU member states tend to safeguard their right to take decisions in this area jealously. Furthermore, apart from Britain and France, European countries have a poor military investment record, and consequently their capabilities are often not up to the task.

More broadly speaking, the European Union's hard security profile ultimately depends on the existence of NATO. The presence in Europe of an organization in which the mightiest military power on the planet is involved on the basis of a collective defense clause greatly reduces the appeal of turning the EU into a full-fledged defense actor. After all, to do so EU member states would have to devolve a considerably larger amount of money to develop military capabilities that in any case would hardly match the technological standards of US equivalents. In other words, the modesty of the European Union's hard security role is deeply intertwined with the United States being a prominent security player in Europe.

10. See, among others, Ettore Greco, Nicoletta Pirozzi and Stefano Silvestri eds., *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*, IAI Quaderni English Series 19, November 2010 (http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid=1&contentid=618).

Russia's multiple approach

Viewed from any of countries lying beyond the EU's and NATO's borders, Europe's security and problems related to it seem quite different from what they look like to western eyes. Nowhere is this more true than in Moscow. Russia's vision for Europe's security is distinct from the West's, in particular as far as NATO is concerned. The Kremlin's narrative on European security is imbued with resentment at NATO's subterranean 'grand vision' for Europe, according to which the dream of a Europe finally whole and free could become reality if the perimeter of the alliance were extended to the entire continent. In Russia's eyes, NATO is the bearer of strategic and security interests that contrast with its own, and Moscow retains that differences can only be manageable if its security interests are taken in due account.

Russia boasts its exceptionality with respect to the West also in terms of political values, and insists on its right to follow a distinct path of political development. In fact, Russia's power system, in which the maintenance of elements of western-like democracy seems to be functional to the consolidation of an authoritarian inner-core structure, raises the question of whether Russia's clashes with the West reflect domestic politics rather than geopolitical reality. Undoubtedly, the antagonism towards the West, and in particular the United States, has been brandished by Russian leaders as a useful consensus-gathering political tool. As mentioned previously, former President Putin was especially keen on antagonizing the United States. Nonetheless, describing Russia's position as merely antagonistic would be inaccurate. In the last twenty years, Russia's leaders have proved to be able to articulate their approach to Europe's security according to different patterns. Even though it is hard to trace such patterns back to a unitary, consistent strategic design, the fact that Russia has followed different lines of conduct confirms that its leadership is anything but fixed on an unsophisticated assessment of the problems of Europe's security. The last two years – that is, since Dmitry Medvedev became president (and Putin prime minister) – provide evidence of this.

Russia certainly pursues the revisionist goal of re-framing Europe's security architecture in a manner that more closely reflects its prefe-

rences. The Russian leadership feels that post-Cold War political and security arrangements in Europe have produced no or little benefit for Russia itself. Not everybody in Russia may actually buy the argument that western initiatives such as NATO's eastern enlargement were deliberately aimed at 'encircling' it, but certainly they have been a source of concern for Russia's security and military establishment. Such concerns have been translated into a number of specific political demands that fill Russia's packed *cahiers de doleance*: opposition to NATO's enlargement, to the stabilization of the Balkans in western terms, to the deployment of US military assets in central and eastern European countries, to the transformation of the OSCE into a sort of European human rights and democracy agency, and to the expansion of western influence in the former Soviet space, which Russia considers, in President Medvedev's own words, a sphere of 'privileged interest.'[11]

On the other hand, Russia's leadership realizes that its revisionist goals cannot be pursued only by antagonizing NATO and the US, and that in many respects a more cooperative approach can bear more fruits than inflammatory rhetoric or the use of coercive means. This kind of strategic calculus has surfaced time and again since the collapse of the USSR, including recently. In part, former President Putin's ever more assertive stance towards the West could be ascribed to his frustration at having gained little or no advantage for Russia from his outspoken support for the US following the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks. Today Russia can reasonably conclude that it has successfully resisted the US-led western initiative it feared the most, notably NATO's enlargement to Ukraine (by way of political influence on the Russia-leaning sections of Ukraine's establishment) and Georgia (by way of arms). The Georgia war, in particular, has demonstrated that Russia does have a comparative advantage with regard to the West, since neither the US nor the EU seem willing to put reversal of Russia's actions in the Caucasus ahead of the pursuit of other priorities to which Moscow's contribution is essential: curbing Iran's nuclear program, reducing nuc-

11. For a bleak assessment of the prospect for a genuine West-Russia rapprochement, see Arthur Rachwald's chapter in this volume.

lear arms, securing EU energy supplies (a good part of which originates from Russia), just to mention a few. Indeed Moscow's cooperation on these issues is tantamount to a powerful disincentive for the transatlantic partners to bring up again initiatives the Russians oppose.

More generally, one should count on the fact that Russia has its own, strong interest in stabilizing relations with both the EU and the US. Russia cannot afford alienating the EU, with which it engages on a number of fronts, ranging from energy to trade to visa regimes. Recently, Moscow has refrained from exacerbating intra-EU divisions, a tactic it repeatedly resorted to by putting a friendly face on its relations with continental Europe's largest members while treating countries once under Soviet rule with contempt. Similarly, Russia has much to gain from partnering with the United States, not least because Russia shares many of the issues of US concern – Afghanistan's pacification, Iran's opaque nuclear ambitions, Islamist-rooted terrorist networks, drug trafficking, organized crime.[12]

Russia's leaders might therefore have concluded that their revisionist agenda concerning Europe can become a matter of dialogue and negotiation, instead of contention, with the EU and the US. Whether this approach reflects a strategic shift from confrontation to cooperation, or whether Russia's leadership has only become more sophisticated in balancing assertiveness with cooperation, remains an open question. In fact, the latter option fits well in the picture of a Russian security establishment in which short-term opportunism and political pragmatism coexist with the legacy of deeply-rooted anti-western sentiments and a sense of Russian exceptionalism. After all, Russia likes to depict itself as one of the vertices of the world's emerging multipolar structure, and as such aims to both establish equal footing-based relations with other great powers or 'poles' and ensure the widest margin of autonomy to its international action.[13]

12. Oksana Antonenko's chapter in this volume provides an insightful analysis of Russia's recent 'conversion' to a more cooperative attitude.

13. Arkady Moshes' chapter in this volume generally follows this line of interpretation.

This sense of 'strategic solitude,' as it has been effectively defined,[14] helps explain Russia's oscillating approach towards the West, in particular as far as Europe's political-security system is concerned. Whereas cooperation, even with rivals, on major global issues may well fall into the expected behavior of one of the world's 'poles', Europe's security configuration is instrumental in securing Russia's great power status.

Since the US-championed 'reset' policy was launched two years ago, Moscow has agreed to more incisive action to curb Iran's nuclear program, allowed military supplies to transit its territory and airspace to reach the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, and struck the most significant nuclear arms control treaty with the United States in a generation, New START.

Progress on European issues however has been much more limited. While Russia has welcomed NATO's decision to resume formal relations (interrupted after the Georgia war) and has adopted a wait-and-see approach towards the new US plan for a missile shield in Europe, and while it has agreed to the EU's umpteenth flagship initiative towards Russia – the so-called 'modernization partnership' – it continues to see Europe's security through different lenses. Opposition to NATO enlargement is no weaker than in the past, Kosovo's independence has not been recognized, the OSCE's democracy monitoring role continues to be contested, and arms control arrangements, in particular the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, which Russia suspended in 2007, remain hostage to the Russia-Western rift over the future of former Soviet republics in East Europe and the Caucasus.

Multiple actors, multiple approaches: East Europe and the South Caucasus

The region extending from NATO/EU borders to Russia is usually described as a gray zone of multiple and complex countries characterized by latent instability. In spite of their huge differences, all states in this

14. By French international relations scholar Thomas Gomart, "Russia Alone Forever? The Kremlin's Strategic Solitude", *Politque étrangère* special issue, World Policy Conference, 2008, p. 23-33. Quoted in Moshes' chapter.

'land in-between' – in which South Caucasus countries are included by virtue of geopolitics rather than geography – present some common traits. In various forms, they all suffer from structural weaknesses, spanning political instability, frailty of the rule of law, economic volatility, divisions among domestic constituents (often along ethnic lines). Some of them also have unsolved disputes with separatist entities – Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan – that great powers or neighboring states tend to exploit to their advantage.

According to the conventional wisdom, this region is the theatre of a struggle for influence between Russia on the one hand and the EU and the US/NATO on the other hand. Undoubtedly, EU, US, and Russian interests seem difficult to reconcile here, to the extent that countries in this region are often classified according to their presumed political allegiance along a spectrum whose two ends are the staunchly pro-US Georgia and the Russia-leaning Belarus. Nevertheless, the real picture is much more complex.

To begin with, the struggle for influence is not limited to the EU, the US or Russia. Turkey is at least as important for the countries in the South Caucasus, and is also a regular interlocutor of Ukraine over Black Sea matters; Azerbaijan has established links with neighboring Iran; and in the last few years the governments of Belarus and Moldova have benefited from China's notoriously loose lending policy, attesting to the growing ability of Beijing to play on a global scale.

Furthermore, regional countries have been learning to adapt to their unfriendly environment. The ruling elites of these countries have come to appreciate the merits of an independent – i.e. de-linked from a standing allegiance to one single foreign power – political course, insofar as they see in this a way to preserve their privileges or power position. Depending on the country's domestic power structure and political and economic resources, the nature of such oscillations varies significantly. When it comes to authoritarian regimes, like the Belarusian or the Azeri, it often takes the form of unscrupulous free-riding, including forms of blackmails: an example is Belarus' threat to cut electricity to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad to get lower energy tariffs; another is Azerbaijan's recurrent threat to divert energy exports to Russia, which is a way

to both gain credit in Moscow and get more favorable terms in energy deals with the EU. In other cases, such as Moldova, the ability to perform political acrobatics is a matter of survival for any government in power. In still other instances, the elites have chosen instead to use their unconditional support for a foreign power to aggressively pursue their own goals, thereby gaining greater influence on their patron than the size and importance of their country would allow for. The way tiny Georgia was able to get US President Bush's ear on its request for NATO membership is a good case in point.

At any rate, the end result points in a similar direction: East European and South Caucasian countries cannot only be seen as the passive object of the policies of foreign powers. They are also able, within certain limits, to influence those powers and even to play them off against one another. Neither buffers between, nor standing partners of, the big players, the countries of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus oscillate between free-riders and balancers. They bear therefore no vision of Europe as a single security space.[15]

EUROPE'S MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE AND THE US ROLE IN IT

In part, the reason for the inefficacy of Europe's security system to bring peace and long-term stability to all of Europe lies in the system itself. Most of it is a legacy from a bipolar world. The transformation processes that bodies such as NATO or the OSCE have undergone since 1991 have not gone so far as to convince a number of countries on the losing side of the Cold War, most notably Russia, that they are beneficial to them too. The CSTO may not be represented as a new Warsaw Pact, and yet its main rationale is not a vision of a secure Europe (not least

15. Andrew Wilson, "The Rise of the 'New Titoism'", *Current History*, vol. 109, no. 729, October 2010, pp. 295-300 provides an insightful and provocative analysis of the 'independent' political courses followed by East European and South Caucasian countries, as well as of their role as 'balancers' rather than buffers.

because the CSTO is more Eurasian than European), but rather the attempt by Russia to secure its influence over much of the former Soviet space. In this sense, the creation of the CSTO reflects a 'bloc' logic that closely resembles the Cold War logic.

NATO's credibility is challenged also from within.[16] The alliance's attempts to re-frame its role according to the new threat environment attest to the never-ending, energy-consuming internal negotiation over what threat should be accorded priority – whether, for instance, Russia should be considered as an unfriendly power to provide against (including by enlarging NATO further east) or as a difficult but indispensable partner in tackling threats such as terrorism, WMD proliferation, or regional crises. Besides, several European countries feel uncomfortable with the level of influence on European affairs that NATO grants the United States. After all, NATO is the main reason why Europe's only truly post-Cold War institution, the European Union, under-performs in the security and defense field.

The OSCE is beset by a similar imbalance, in that its members strongly disagree as to what it should or should not do. This lack of internal credibility explains why, in spite of the commendable job the OSCE has done in monitoring democratic progress in Europe, it has been unable to replicate the success of its predecessor, the CSCE. Back in the 1970s, NATO and the Warsaw Pact used the CSCE as an instrument of reciprocal recognition and to advance cooperation on single dossiers, a task that today's OSCE performs only marginally. Currently, the OSCE's role seems to have become to monitor how well some central and eastern European countries align with/uphold western political standards. This role however implies a qualitative difference among its members that not all are ready to tolerate.

No-one in Europe is unaware that this institutional set-up needs a fresh coat of paint. The consensus, however, does not go much farther. Russia, in keeping with its revisionist party role, aims at a new European Security Treaty encompassing all states from the Atlantic to the Urals. The draft treaty posted on President Medvedev's website has however

16. See Ulrike Guérot's chapter in this volume.

met with little enthusiasm outside Russia. In particular, the fact that the text's wording is crafted so as to give treaty parties a sort of veto power over one another's decisions has raised suspicions about whether Russia's ultimate goal is to advance its claims rather than set shared, Europe-wide goals. While welcoming the proposal as a sign of openness on the part of the Kremlin, the West has de facto buried it by inserting it into the agenda of the OSCE Corfu process, a diplomatic venue where European security issues are discussed but not agreed upon.

At the end of the day, none of the abovementioned difficulties is serious enough to western eyes to warrant calls for a new legal foundation for European security. Europe's outdated institutional complex may be the source of persisting tensions, but it still provides a rock-solid insurance against the threat of major interstate conflict. As such, for most if not all NATO and EU member states it is still better than any other proposed alternatives (e.g. a new European Security Treaty, or a triangle between the EU, Russia, and Turkey).

The risks of a multipolar Europe

In mapping Europe's power constellation, the role of the United States emerges as the single most important variable. Indeed, it is striking to see to what extent the possibility of redrawing Europe's security institutions is made dependent on the US role being preserved, enhanced, or curbed. Revisionist Russia views it as quasi-hegemonic and wants it reined in. Most European NATO member states consider the US role as crucial to their security and consequently want Washington to remain committed to Europe. Countries in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus are often busy figuring out how to use US interests in their region to their benefit. Supporters of a more effective European Union admit that the United States, through NATO, hinders progress towards an enhanced EU security and defense capacity. Inferring from all this that the US presence in Europe is more a divisive than a stabilizing factor contrasts however with the reality of a stable NATO area and with a troubled, but not adversarial, West-Russia relationship.

To say that the United States is a divisive factor in Europe is therefore, at best, inaccurate. However, the US certainly *can* take decisions

resulting in inter-'polar' clashes. After all America is one of Europe's 'poles,' which implies by definition that its action impacts the European balance of power. So does, however, action by the other poles, Russia and the European Union. Hence, it is ultimately to the multipolar nature of Europe's international relations system that the persisting tensions in Europe should be ascribed. The antidote against the risk of such system drifting towards instability is not so much reducing the number of 'poles,' as harnessing its inherent destabilizing dynamics. However, the method that is commonly applied in such circumstances – the institutionalization of interstate relations – is hardly applicable in Europe's case, given the impasse between conservative and revisionist forces.

The differences within the EU and between the EU and the US pale in comparison to West-Russia divergences. Yet, they do matter inasmuch as they offer Russia or other actors from the 'land in-between' the chance to exploit transatlantic and intra-EU divisions to their advantage. Georgia's bid to join NATO or the Bush administration's plan to install parts of the US missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic are just two examples attesting to this fact. Russian and Georgian leaders' game was to use the support of one faction inside the western camp to ratchet up pressure on the other faction. For instance, a familiar charge against Germany, France, and the other European countries that opposed both the missile shield and NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia was that they were too prone to accommodate, or even appease, Russia. But the real bone of contention was that these countries and the group led by the United States held different views of European security. France, Germany and other countries in continental Europe were and still are unwilling to turn it into a theatre of confrontation, and are therefore resentful at whatever US initiative leads in that direction. This position contrasted with the Bush administration's willingness to pursue its objectives in Europe irrespective of the consequences they could have on relations with Russia.

These as well as other similar cases attest to the fact that the transatlantic relationship is affected by 'polar' dynamics, in that the US and EU member states (sometimes just a group of them, sometimes all) have distinct security needs and have accordingly developed an independent view of the problems besetting Europe's security. But diversity of priori-

ties does not necessarily imply an inability to agree on objectives. For instance, after the Obama administration re-formulated the missile shield plan in a way that is both more compatible with NATO's principle of indivisibility of security (in that it would ensure coverage of basically all allied territory) and less controversial for Russia (because it would be mostly ship-based), NATO members agreed to include missile defense in the alliance's core tasks.

Contrary to his predecessor, President Obama seems to have come to terms with the constraints that multipolarity puts on US foreign action. After all, as major challenges keep the United States busy in the Pacific, Afghanistan and the Middle East, there is no point in opening a new front in Europe. Avoiding quarrels with the European Union and defusing tensions with Russia is also the most obvious step to win their cooperation on issues of greater urgency like Iran or Afghanistan. This simple assumption is the red line linking a series of Obama administration's moves on Europe: the reformulation of the missile shield plan, the shelving of NATO's enlargement agenda, the US-Russian New START agreement on the reduction of nuclear warheads.

This course of action reflects the Obama administration's pragmatic conclusion that multipolarity is at work in Europe like in other parts of the world, and this implies restraint and prudence on the part of the US in larger scale than it was deemed necessary in the recent past, especially because the US faces far more pressing issues elsewhere. At any rate, Obama's strategic shift has brought the United States closer to the position of most EU large member states and had a calming effect on some of Europe's flashpoints. If convergence is an equally possible outcome of multipolar dynamics as divergence, Europe's long-term stability is a realistic objective.

Transatlantic cohesion as an antidote against a multipolar 'drift'

To break the impasse between revisionist forces (most notably Russia) and conservative forces (most NATO and EU member states) it is crucial to adopt a mid-term approach orienting the evolution of European security towards the long-term goal of a single European security space cen-

tered on the predictability of the behavior of all parties and where occasional tensions are managed through established mediation mechanisms.[17] This would reduce the distance between Europe's various 'poles' so that the conservative camp does not have to worry about change and revisionist forces feel that their interests are not neglected. If the United States and its European partners manage to turn the largely occasional convergence on European issues reached under the Obama administration into a structural one, they could ground European security onto more stable foundations. They should work within the existing European security arrangements, given the fact that the impasse between 'revisionists' and 'conservatives' makes the option of starting from scratch a non-starter.

The adoption of a mid-term approach implies work on NATO, West-Russia, and European Union levels. At the NATO level, it is of great importance to re-frame the US commitment to Europe so as to establish a structural link between US and European security. One way to do so is to make use of the political potential enshrined in a US-built but NATO-anchored ballistic missile defense capacity in Europe. Contrary to NATO's nuclear deterrent (made up of US sub-strategic nuclear warheads deployed in five NATO members), which has its roots in the past, missile defense is a response to a threat of the future: ballistic proliferation. Evidently, partnering to tackle a danger that might affect both the United States and EU member states in the near future is more likely to infuse a sense of relevance and reciprocal commitment than relying on a cooperation mechanism – NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements – designed to counter a threat that no longer exists.[18] The development of a NATO missile defense capacity could also facilitate the decision on reducing, and eventually relinquishing, NATO's nuclear arsenal, since mis-

17. For a more detailed analysis of the notion of a single European security space, see Riccardo Alcaro and Emiliano Alessandri, "Engaging Russia: Prospect for a Long-term European Security Compact", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 191-207.

18. Steve Pifer's chapter in this volume illustrates in detail the extent to which NATO's nuclear deterrent is now outdated and calls for a careful management of its eventual obsolescence.

sile defense components deployed in European countries would be an as powerful guarantee of the US commitment to Europe as sub-strategic nuclear warheads.[19]

In the recent past, missile defense has been a major source of tension with Russia. The plan to link it to Russian missile defense capabilities, which has a certain backing in the US and European security establishments (including NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen), could therefore turn an issue of contention into an aggregating factor – in theory at least. The feasibility of this project is highly debated, not least because Russia has not overcome its suspicions about the US missile shield. Opening the prospect of NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense, therefore, cannot but be a single piece of a broader West-Russia engagement strategy. This would also imply expanding to NATO the US-Russia dialogue on cyber security and the dialogue on Arctic issues between Russia and regional countries such as Norway. An exploratory NATO-CSTO dialogue on security challenges spanning across Eurasia and Europe could pave the way for the establishment of formal contacts between the two organizations.

Far more important is to re-activate substantial talks on arms control, both in the nuclear and conventional fields. Even minimal progress on reducing sub-strategic nuclear arms, like winning Russia's consent to a formal venue where to discuss the issue, would not be an irrelevant achievement, given that such weapons have never been the object of arms control agreements. Number and deployment of conventional forces in Europe are regulated by the now suspended 1991 CFE treaty. To end this situation, which is beneficial to no-one, implies however a painful compromise on the part of NATO countries. Their refusal to ratify the 1999 amended version of the treaty – which re-calibrates troops' ceilings and deployment limits on a national rather than a bloc basis – until Russia withdraws troops from Georgia and Moldova is as morally

19. Oliver Thranert's chapter in this volume offers a more subtle, and less optimistic, view of the possibility that ballistic missile defense could actually play the political role of NATO's nuclear deterrent. See also Riccardo Alcaro, *Combining Realism with Vision: Options for NATO's New Strategic Concept*, IAI Working Paper 1007 (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2010) (http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai1007.pdf).

understandable as practically untenable. Since they have no ability, or willingness, to reverse Russia's action in the Caucasus, ratification of the amended CFE would at least re-introduce control over Russia's conventional military assets. While ratification would represent a moral setback, its practical net result would be positive.

In the mid-term, the European Union's security role is not destined to change in nature. CSDP is bound to remain a complementary tool in the foreseeable future, and as such is likely to continue to nurture frustration of EU-friendly observers. However, CSDP should be put into perspective. Its importance may well lie in what is paving the way for than in what is going to deliver in the next few years. If future circumstances force the US to significantly reduce its presence in Europe[20], EU member states could only rely on CSDP to compensate the loss. More critical still is the EU's soft power, which remains a powerful instrument to stabilize relations with Russia and, crucially, with countries in the former Soviet space. By way of a more integrated energy policy (to be achieved through more intra-EU competition, sources diversification, and physical connection of EU member states' energy grids), for instance, the EU would reduce the leverage over its internal affairs of both producing (Russia) and transit countries (Ukraine, Belarus). If the US were to include support for greater EU cohesion in its Europe policy, a healthy balance between transatlantic cohesion and European integration would be re-established.

How to deal with East European and South Caucasian countries remains the most problematic issue, by far. The pause in NATO's enlargement is a short term palliative. The problem may remain latent in the case of Ukraine, which under the current government has adopted a course of political neutrality. But Georgia's NATO ambitions remain intact, and this may well turn out to be a sort of time bomb threatening whatever ongoing West-Russia rapprochement. The fact is that, as long as this area remains an area of competition, latent tensions will persist and the 'frozen' conflicts will most likely remain, at best, frozen. On the

20. Erik Jones' chapter in this volume puts the US role in Europe into the wider picture of the limits of US global leadership.

other hand, if the West-Russia rapprochement were to progress in a significant way, Europe's 'poles' would be less prone to be played off against one another, although this might imply western acceptance of limiting former Soviet republics' Euro-Atlantic integration.

Thus, inasmuch as this region is where western and Russian interests clash most resoundly, no clear-cut good option is available. But, again, if the US and EU member states coalesce around a vision of a single European security space, and on this basis manage to improve significantly their relations with Russia, one can bet on the reluctance of all parties, Moscow included, to jeopardize the benefits accrued from a more constructive relationship.

If this mid-term approach delivers the expected results, the odds of making Europe a single security space would look less unfavorable than is the case today. In this hypothetical scenario, today's conservative and revisionist forces could eventually find substantial common ground to re-design Europe's security institutions.

CONCLUSION

Historically, the intimate nexus between transatlantic relations and European security has been the main driving force behind the creation of Europe's multi-dimensional complex of institutions: NATO, the EEC/EU, the CSCE/OSCE, and other security arrangements, in particular in the arms control field.

Undoubtedly, the high level of institutionalization of European security is still a stabilizing factor insofar as it ensures peace within the large chunks of Europe that belong to either NATO or the EU. It also reduces the risk of interstate conflict, as it reflects a 'Europe of the few,' that is, a Europe where only a handful of actors are able to play power politics, and not a 'Europe of the many,' where a number of states more or less equivalent in terms of resources pursue an autonomous foreign policy course, thereby increasing the odds for confrontation.

Europe is emerging as a multipolar region where power is exercised, in different forms, by no more than three 'poles:' Russia, the EU, and the US; and since the EU and the US are able to manage their differences be-

low the threshold of confrontation, inter-'polar' clashes take place at the West-Russia level only. But even here, the lessons from the last twenty years are that neither the US nor the EU or Russia are willing to let tensions heat up to the breaking point. Nothing attests to this fact more eloquently than the *détente* course sought by all parties after the 2008 Russian-Georgian war.

Yet this highly institutionalized complex is unable to bring enduring peace and stability to all of Europe. Russia, the EU, and the US may be unwilling to break relations, but they certainly continue to have conflicting priorities, especially concerning the former Soviet space in East Europe and the South Caucasus. Here 'polar' relations have allowed for the 'freezing,' but not the settlement, of conflicts, and more in general are a brake to longer-term stabilization processes (not least because the regional elites tend to exploit inter-'polar' rivalries to their advantage).

There is a widespread perception that Europe's security complex is in dire need of an upgrade. However revisionist forces (notably Russia) and conservative forces (most NATO member states) have so far been unable to reconcile their divergences. This difficulty is augmented by differences within the western camp.

After a series of clashes during the Bush administration years exposed a transatlantic gap concerning Europe's security, under the Obama administration the US and the EU seem to have reached again a manageable degree of convergence. However, such convergence is more occasional than structural. To pave the way for Europe's long-term security, the United States and the European Union should agree upon a policy platform aimed at reinvigorating the US commitment to Europe's security, improving West-Russia relations, and fostering greater EU cohesion. Taming Europe's emerging multipolarity is possible upon the condition of a solid transatlantic relationship and a constructive West-Russia partnership. Even if not as central as it used to be, European security can still be a fundamental component of transatlantic relations.

2.
NATO's Role in European Security - and Beyond*

James Goldgeier

NATO is as busy as ever – but not primarily in Europe. Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation in the Mediterranean, and antipiracy off the coast of Africa, each of which involves partnerships with other institutions and non-NATO countries, mark the emergence of a global alliance. NATO's new strategic concept, unveiled at the November 2010 Lisbon summit, made clear how much the alliance has changed since the previous strategic concept was released in the midst of the Kosovo war – by the then-nineteen members of NATO – in April 1999.

Traditional security concerns in Europe have declined dramatically since 1990. Peace remains fragile in the Balkans, and the parts of Europe not included in NATO or the EU – in particular, the Caucasus – remain dangerously unstable. But the objective of a Europe whole, free and at peace has largely been achieved. This truly momentous accomplishment has led American national security attention to shift away from Europe as a primary theater of concern. The United States still needs to provide reassurance that Russia will not be allowed to intimidate alliance members in the East, and America is funding the effort to provide missile defense across the continent (a project that ideally will include Russia's participation), but otherwise, European security affairs will become Eu-

* Revised manuscript for publication, originally prepared for the Transatlantic Security Symposium 2010, 'European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship,' jointly organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, and held in Rome, Italy, on November 8, 2010.

rope's affair. To remain relevant to American national security considerations, NATO must continue to embrace its global future.

The United States has a strong interest in NATO's ability to continue its evolution into a major global actor. While the bonds across the Atlantic are frayed, they remain stronger than those tying the United States to other parts of the world. The allies share a common interest in preventing disruptions to the global economy, including attacks on freedom of navigation. As a community of democracies, the member states are threatened by Islamic extremism and the rise of authoritarian states. The United States gains legitimacy by working through NATO; Europe gains a vehicle for projecting hard power. While NATO alone cannot defend against the range of threats facing alliance members, it can serve as the hub for American and European leaders to develop the ties with other institutions and non-European countries necessary for the common defense.

It is remarkable how far the alliance has come since 1990, from enlargement to the East and the Balkans operations to the far-flung operations today. But as NATO has broadened its scope, some members have grown concerned that the alliance is shifting its attention too much away from Europe and seek to return NATO to its more traditional role defending against threats arising on the continent. This attitude has strengthened as an increasingly authoritarian and assertive Russian government has sought to reclaim a sphere of influence lost in the collapse of the Soviet Union. The new strategic concept successfully papered over continued differences in outlook, but those differences have not disappeared.

To remain relevant, as the 2010 strategic concept declared, NATO must continue to expand its traditional understanding of collective defense to confront the 21st Century threats of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) both to states and non-state actors, and cyber-warfare. By necessity, the United States has turned its attention away from Europe in order to counter these modern threats, which largely emanate from Africa, the broader Middle East, and Asia. But Europeans face these threats too, and publics should recognize that a more robust NATO offers Europe the chance to counter them. Given the varied nature and source of threats today, NATO can be successful only if the Europeans agree to stronger NATO-European Union coopera-

tion and to closer ties with major non-European democracies, particularly those in the Asia-Pacific region.

NATO still needs to provide assurance to its East European members that Russia will not be allowed to intimidate them. But the Lisbon summit laid the ground for a new opportunity to develop closer ties with Russia. Ultimately, improved relations with Russia will do more to address Eastern European fears than contingency planning and military exercises. A better relationship with Moscow is also necessary in a world of transnational threats. Although NATO is, and must remain, a values-based institution, collaboration among the world's democracies is not enough to combat threats like terrorism and WMD proliferation. The Cold War ended two decades ago; the US-Russia 'reset' must serve as the basis for a more productive long-term relationship between NATO and Russia.

The Lisbon summit provided assurance that the bedrock of NATO – Article V – remains sacrosanct and affirmed that the institution is prepared to respond to 'emerging security challenges.' A Europe that is largely at peace and secure within its borders is one of the most important results of the end of the Cold War and enables the United States and Europe to turn their attention to the threats arising elsewhere.

WHY NATO MUST GO GLOBAL

The core of the alliance has been, and always will be, Article V, which states, 'The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.'

In 1949, 'an armed attack' meant a Soviet land offensive in Europe, and the purpose of the treaty was to tie the American military machine

to Western Europe's defense. It was easy for the Western community to understand why solidarity was essential: a Soviet assault on West Germany would immediately imperil the citizens of the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Soviet domination of the continent would in turn directly affect North American vital interests. To argue that a Soviet armed attack against any member should be 'considered an attack against them all' was fairly straightforward.

To recreate that sense of solidarity today across the European continent is difficult, if not impossible. When Russian troops went to war in Georgia in 2008, states like Poland and Estonia grew immediately fearful. But citizens in France and Portugal are not lying awake at night worrying about a resurgent Red Army.

More threatening are the types of terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States in 2001, Istanbul in 2003, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005. In 2008, NATO members discussed the need to balance traditional Article V threats (the possibility of 'armed attack' in Europe) with the need for NATO to act as an 'expeditionary alliance' (a term introduced by President George W. Bush at the 2008 Bucharest summit) against threats arising from places like Afghanistan. But acting as an expeditionary alliance is not something to 'balance' with Article V operations; in certain cases today, it is the essence of Article V, and the new strategic concept successfully avoided drawing these unwarranted distinctions between threats arising from inside and outside of Europe and North America.

Furthermore, not all threats to states and society are military or even violent in nature. Russia does not have to send tanks into a neighboring country to devastate it. Cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007, originating from Russian territory, were the face of a new type of warfare, and periodic shutoffs of energy supplies have left populations in NATO countries such as Bulgaria and Romania vulnerable.

Should we think of cyber-attacks or energy cutoffs as Article V threats? After all, they are not by definition 'armed attacks.' But Article V was designed to create a sense of solidarity among countries in the face of significant threats to their way of life.

One can argue that Article IV is sufficient to manage these non-military contingencies: 'The Parties will consult together whenever, in

the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.' What's more important than trying to determine whether Article IV or Article V is the better vehicle for responding to a threat is to reaffirm that a threat to any member of the alliance will be met collectively. For NATO to be successful as a collective defense organization, any action initiated by an external state or nonstate actor that threatens the political and economic security or territorial integrity of a NATO member must engender a collective response.[1]

To be effective in responding to the array of threats facing its members, NATO has to further its global character. As US permanent representative to NATO Ivo H. Daalder has argued, 'The North Atlantic Area is no island. It is submerged in a globally integrated world. Today, the right lens for transatlantic relations is not so much American or European – it is global. And NATO, too, must increasingly view itself not only from a transatlantic perspective, but a global perspective.'[2]

Having a global perspective does not simply mean recognizing that threats can arise anywhere. It means enhancing ties with partners around the world. alliance relationships with other institutions and nonmember countries are not new. NATO worked with the United Nations to take over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2003, and established Operation Allied Provider to counter piracy after the UN requested escorts for its World Food Program vessels traveling near the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden. The alliance also created a Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to expand relationships with countries across the broader Middle East. The new strategic concept calls for strengthening these ties.

Most significantly, the alliance has been developing closer ties with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, in particular Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, which were the target of then-NATO secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's call for 'global partnerships' in

1. James M. Goldgeier, *The Future of NATO*, Council on Foreign Relations Special Report no. 51, February 2010, p. 7.

2. Ambassador Ivo H. Daalder, permanent representative of the United States to NATO, Transatlantic Forum, Berlin, July 1, 2009.

2006. It was unfortunate that the 2010 strategic concept failed to make explicit mention of the Asia-Pacific partners. NATO should work individually with these countries to develop a pace of coordination that fits their needs through the tailored cooperation packages, created in 2007. Australia has been a major contributor to the military mission in Afghanistan, and is an ideal partner to participate more closely in the alliance's efforts at military transformation and the development of a rapid response force. Japan began its structured dialogue with NATO in 1990, participated in the Balkans peacekeeping efforts in the 1990s and has provided support in Afghanistan; it could also play a major role in missile defense and in countering WMD proliferation. South Korea is a more recent NATO partner, but has provided personnel to the mission in Afghanistan and participated in the antipiracy efforts off the coast of Somalia.

If NATO's main purpose is to ensure security within Europe through the US commitment to the continent, as was the case during the Cold War, then these partnerships will remain peripheral. But if the alliance is serious about the need to deal with global challenges, then partners such as the Asia-Pacific democracies become much more central.

NATO CAPABILITIES TO MEET NEW THREATS

In response to the new threat environment, NATO has to prepare itself for a range of military contingencies, including responding to states and groups around the world that are planning attacks on European and North American targets. Unfortunately, Europe has little capability to transport troops across significant distances – more than 70 percent of European land forces cannot deploy. The minimal requirements the alliance set for itself to establish a NATO response force (25 thousand combined land, air, and naval forces) have gone unmet, as has the provision of important equipment such as helicopters.

In addition to fulfilling these requirements, NATO will need to develop greater maritime and missile defense capabilities. Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO ships are patrolling the Mediterranean to counter terrorism and interdict weapons of mass destruction. Operation

Ocean Shield, the current NATO antipiracy operation, involves the NATO standing maritime groups (and has cooperated with countries such as Japan and India to protect shipping off the coast of the Horn of Africa). As individual countries are unable to maintain or increase investments in maritime capabilities, as for example is the case in Britain, then greater collaboration among them, as is envisioned for Britain itself and France, will have to occur. In a budgetary era when smaller national navies are more likely, NATO's provision of interoperability will be important for coordinated action.

President Obama's decision to focus on short- and medium-range Iranian missile capabilities rather than on long-range missiles as in the previous administration, has centered attention on the threats to Europe emanating from the Middle East, thereby changing the missile defense discussion from how to protect the American homeland to how to defend NATO territory. At the Lisbon summit, the heads of state and government recognized that the creation of a missile defense system to protect territory and populations (not just forces) is a 'core element of [NATO's] collective defense.'

Given their military nature, maritime operations and missile defense capabilities are logically part of NATO's traditional scope. Non-military threats are less so. Although NATO has established the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability to respond to cyber-aggression, for example, the alliance has insufficient technological capabilities within the organization to respond to cyber-warfare. Similarly, while NATO officials have expressed the need to 'protect critical energy infrastructure,' energy security is largely a political challenge.

Developing non-military as well as military capacities to deal with future contingencies makes little sense for an organization that has trouble enough funding its military requirements. The strategic concept noted the need for partnerships but suggested NATO was going to develop a full spectrum of capabilities in response to new challenges. More preferable would be coordinating policy with institutions such as the European Union that have the resources and experience to complement NATO's military role. NATO should focus on the hard power necessary to deal with a range of threats, including missile and WMD proliferation, terrorism, and piracy, while working closely with other institutions,

non-governmental organizations, and private corporations to resolve the non-military threats facing alliance members.

NATO can take the lead role in military operations, as it did in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, even if, as in the case of the Balkans (and hopefully Afghanistan in the future) it eventually turns to organizations such as the EU to take over once a situation is stabilized. But on issues such as cyber and energy security, it should be the EU that takes the lead role, while NATO assists with logistical support and personnel as needed.

It is in their capacity as EU members that most NATO members can play a significant role in the future in managing security threats in Europe. In countering terrorism, for example, Europe has developed significant tools for both intelligence gathering and disrupting terrorist finances. The EU has established a Joint Situation Centre in Brussels, composed of national intelligence experts, that briefs EU policymakers on terrorist activities. It has linked national criminal databases, and it is able to monitor extremists and seize financial assets of suspected criminals. The EU maintains a 24 hour monitoring and information center for emergency civilian assistance in the event of a WMD attack.

Enhancing the EU's partnership with NATO by allowing for more joint action is the most important way for European members of the alliance to make a greater contribution to NATO. The EU's adoption of the Lisbon Treaty allows for more flexibility by a subset of EU members willing to engage in military and defense cooperation, and it also expands the scope of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) to 'joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks, peace-making and post-conflict stabilization; conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization missions.[3]

In spite of the Lisbon Treaty, NATO-EU collaboration remains stymied by the ongoing dispute between Turkey and Cyprus. Cyprus vetoed the EU commitment to end the trade blockade on Northern Cyprus; in return, Turkey reneged on its promise to open its ports to Cypriot shipping. Cyprus has blocked Turkey's participation in the EU defense

3. Daniel S. Hamilton, *The Lisbon Treaty: Implications for Future Relations Between the European Union and the United States*, Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, December 15, 2009.

agency, and Turkey will not let Cyprus work with NATO. Although working-level contacts between the two institutions are significant (e.g., there is an EU staff cell at SHAPE), high-level interaction is minimal, and therefore so is any serious collaboration in areas such as conflict prevention and crisis management.

The United States has long been concerned about Europe's limited military capacity, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been particularly critical of Europe's attitudes toward defense, for example, arguing, 'The demilitarization of Europe, where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it, has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st.'[4] But countries like Germany and Italy are not going to spend more on their military no matter how much the United States complains. Where they could devote their energies is creating more opportunities for serious NATO-EU cooperation. Turkey wants greater access to the European Defense Agency and the CSDP before it will support greater institutional collaboration. The major European powers should make finding a compromise a top priority.

Beyond the Turkey-Cyprus issue, the most serious problem is that the countries that are members of both the EU and NATO have two separate foreign policies when it comes to each institution. They do not coordinate their efforts or their missions. European diplomats who want to advance in their careers will increasingly choose to serve at the EU rather than at NATO, particularly now that the EU is building its own diplomatic service, which decreases NATO's effectiveness.

It makes more sense for NATO's hard power and Europe's soft power to complement one another than it does for each institution to expand its reach into the other's writ. For example, why create a NATO stabilization and reconstruction force, as some have proposed? The United States and Europe should develop these capacities through their civilian agencies (and the United States should get serious about supporting the

4. Robert Gates, remarks at the National Defense University at Fort McNair, February 23, 2010, quoted in http://www.rferl.org/content/Gates_NATO_In_Crisis_Allies_Must_Invest_In_Defense/1966632.html.

State Department's office of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction) and then work jointly with NATO military planners to prepare for future post-conflict situations.

The NATO-EU relationship will also be stronger if the United States and EU develop closer ties. The United States needs to beef up its mission to the EU and create closer ties between the staffs at its EU and NATO missions in Brussels. Currently, only one person at the US mission to the EU is assigned to defense cooperation. In addition to increasing the number of personnel to work on defense at the EU mission, the United States should install a deputy at both its NATO and EU missions who would be responsible for liaison with the other mission.

EUROPEAN SECURITY

Although NATO's attention must increasingly become global, insecurities persist within Europe. A core problem is that parts of the continent remain outside of NATO and the EU. In the Balkans, the integration of Serbia into the EU will be critical to stability in that region. Harder to solve is the problem of the former Soviet Union, which Moscow views as its privileged sphere of interests.

The Russia-Georgia war exposed a gap in European security and signified that the Helsinki Final Act's norm that borders be changed through peaceful means is only assured for NATO members. And the 2008 war reminded us that the West and Russia have two contrasting visions of European security.

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has sought a full voice in European security affairs, but NATO will not allow Russia to have a veto over alliance decisions. The West was so powerful after the collapse of the Soviet Union that it could pursue policies even if Moscow objected. Russia's resurgence has enabled it more recently to block further NATO enlargement into its neighborhood. But the issue is not just about a balance of power; it is about the vision each side has about Europe's future. NATO has used enlargement of the alliance to build security and stability across Eastern Europe. Russia, meanwhile, has sown discord and instability in places like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia in order to in-

crease its control over its neighbors and prevent further NATO encroachment.

The process of enlargement is essentially over. Montenegro and Bosnia can become NATO members in the coming decade, but Ukraine and Georgia will not. Ukraine under its new leadership is making its own choice not to do so; Georgia will not be able to do so because of Russian objections. At the Lisbon summit, NATO did – and should continue to – proclaim that the door is still open, but in reality, the process of enlargement has run its course, at least until Russia takes a different attitude toward NATO.

NATO should continue to promote practical cooperation with Russia that builds greater confidence on both sides. The NATO-Russia Council should expand the number of joint exercises and training operations to deal with issues such as terrorism and nuclear safety.

In the aftermath of the American 'reset' of relations with Russia and the forging of the New Start arms control agreement, the most significant potential area of cooperation between NATO and Russia is missile defense.

Efforts to work with Russia on missile defense have arisen periodically since the collapse of the USSR. In 1992, working groups were established in the United States and Russia to explore cooperation under the leadership of State Department official Dennis Ross and Russian Foreign Ministry official Georgy Mamedov. These groups discussed developing common threat assessments, early warning, regional threats, and space-based advances.

Similarly, in the late 1990s, US President Bill Clinton's top Russia hand, Strobe Talbott, had his own discussions with Mamedov on issues such as 'assistance [to Russia] in completing a missile-tracking radar station in Mishelevka near Irkutsk, access to early warning data, joint missile defense exercises, greater intelligence sharing on rogue threats, and the possibility of collaboration on satellite systems.[5]

The discussions in the early and late 1990s were bilateral, and they were held in conjunction with proposals on modifying the Anti-Ballistic

5. James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, *Power and Purpose: US Policy toward Russia after the Cold War*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2003, p. 297.

Missile (ABM) Treaty, which was a major stumbling block given Russian displeasure that the United States wanted to change the treaty. Once the George W. Bush administration scuttled the ABM Treaty, it eliminated the earlier problems that linkage produced, but that administration's missile defense conversations with the Russians did not progress either.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's attendance at the Lisbon summit created a new opportunity to collaborate on missile defense. The United States has long argued that Russia is threatened by the Iranian programs and should welcome the opportunity to participate in the system. The bilateral discussions between the two countries foundered in the past; perhaps a broader discussion among Americans, Europeans, and Russians will enhance the prospects for cooperation in this area, but the differences among the parties remain significant.

CONCLUSION

The central focus of American national security policy in the 20th Century was keeping Europe free from domination by any single power, first Germany and then the Soviet Union. That Euro-centric focus of American national security policy has changed dramatically. It has changed because of the great success of post-Cold War transatlantic policy. The 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty eliminated the possibility of a major surprise attack in Europe; the enlargement of NATO and then the EU has consolidated political and economic reform across the continent. NATO's intervention in the Balkans resulted in the eventual overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic and created the prospect that the Yugoslav successor states will become full members of Europe.

It is true that each of these issue areas remains problematic. The CFE Treaty needs to be adapted, and NATO and EU enlargement has stalled. Peace in Bosnia and Kosovo is tenuous.

One could therefore argue that NATO should focus on the problems of Europe rather than become a more global organization. But the problems of Europe are ones that Europeans should solve. In the aftermath of the Lisbon summit, NATO should embrace its global missions and its

global partnerships, explaining to its populations why the main threats arise far from the North Atlantic area.

There are those who fear that after Afghanistan, NATO member states will choose to turn inward. After all, that mission has become unsustainable, and those countries that have engaged in serious combat are heading for the exits. The Dutch recently ended their combat role in Afghanistan, the Canadians are scheduled to depart in 2011, and American and British troops will begin their withdrawals at that time. NATO is now determined to turn over security to the Afghan government by 2014.

It is certainly hard to imagine as American and European troops leave Afghanistan that any political leader would be able to generate troops for a similar mission that might arise elsewhere. But acting globally does not necessarily mean having tens of thousands of troops engaged in counter-insurgency.

As argued in this paper, NATO's primary global role will be two-fold. One will be providing maritime and missile defense capabilities to ensure freedom of navigation, stem proliferation, and protect against states like Iran. The other will be serving as a support organization, working with institutions like the EU, to deal with the range of non-military challenges that threaten the security of alliance members, for example, by disrupting terrorist financing and combating cyber-attacks.

NATO's ability to evolve depends on a number of factors. It must convince its publics that these efforts are essential to protecting the societies, economies and territories of the member states. That is the new strategic concept's most important role. Countries must be willing to invest where they can in either the military or non-military capabilities (or both) to deal with the range of threats, but the financial crisis made an already difficult challenge that much harder. And the alliance will have to make clear to both Russia and China that a robust global institution is a partner for them not a threat. Only if it does these things will NATO continue to serve as the central institution of common defense for the United States and Europe.

3.

European Security in NATO's Strategy*

Ulrike Guérot

Time has come to realize that European security is no longer the primary focus of NATO. NATO was built to secure Europe in a post-World War II order that was essentially made to "keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down", to quote the famous Lord Ismay. None of these three founding principles are still valid today. The US wants increasingly to move out of Europe, the Russians increasingly want to move into Europe and the Germans are increasingly outgrowing Europe. This means that the order of Yalta is finishing – and this is reflected in the new NATO strategy.

NATO'S INABILITY TO SOLVE EUROPEAN SECURITY PROBLEMS

NATO's new strategic concept is mostly about risks coming from the outside world and no longer from or within Europe. Traditional security concerns have declined dramatically since 1990. Therefore, the new strategic concept is all about counter-terrorism, Iran, missile defense and Afghanistan. Europe has ceased to be the main focus of American security interests. More importantly, NATO has proven not appropriate

* This chapter is an elaboration of comments made by the author to the paper James Goldgeier presented at the Transatlantic Security Symposium 2010, 'European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship,' jointly organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, and held in Rome, Italy, on November 8, 2010 (see chapter 2).

to deal with the remaining regional conflicts on the 'Eurasian' continent, as there are the many 'frozen conflicts' in South-Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria and others in the Caucasian region.

NATO is still perceived as a threat to Russia; therefore the engagement of NATO to solve these conflicts is not possible. This is dysfunctional especially for Europe. The European security architecture was build upon NATO, but does not provide an anchor for stability in the European near-abroad any longer. Russia has put up 'red-lines' with respect to NATO enlargement. This became already obvious, when the offer of membership action plans (MAPs) to Ukraine and Georgia was suspended at the NATO Council meeting in April 2008. Ever since, the relationship between NATO and Russia has been unclear. Whereas the Europeans lobbied for a stronger rapprochement between NATO and Russia, the US remained skeptical for quite some time. Or, to phrase it differently, Europe wanted and wants more from and with Russia than the Americans were able and willing to allow in the first place, still driven from 'Cold War' thinking than most Europeans.

When Russian President Dmitry Medvedev suggested a new European security treaty in the summer of 2008, the Europeans shied away from answering and shelved the proposal in the Corfu Process of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright-chaired group of experts, on the opposite, when preparing recommendations for NATO's new strategy, took a while to accommodate the European pressure for a redefined role of Russia within NATO. Indeed this was one of the major hurdles to agree on the new concept; and finally a reason to keep it pretty vague in wording. Sure, the United States itself has started a 'reset' policy towards Russia. But it seems clear that the US interest in Russia is only focused on global themes, such as 'global zero,' cyber-war, missile defense, Afghanistan or Iran. The US simply wants different things from Russia than Europe does. The US needs Russian cooperation for a global agenda and Russia still has a huge capacity to bring international relations into deadlock. It is precisely because the US has only a 'global' agenda with Russia that European security is neglected in the news strategic concept of NATO.

TURNING YALTA UPSIDE DOWN

It is fair to say that Europe needs Russia – and Russia needs Europe – more than ever. In a way, this is the inversion of the Yalta order and this is a tectonic shift in the European relationship with NATO. Europe is now heading for a modernization strategy with Russia, which will encompass trade relations, energy security and the democratization of Russia. More recently, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has even suggested a common trade zone from 'Lisbon to Vladivostok', whereas only a decade ago a transatlantic common marketplace was on the transatlantic agenda. It is still a European conviction that European security should have a transatlantic foundation, meaning that Russia should be moved towards both institutions, NATO and the EU. But the above mentioned inversion of the Yalta order will push Europe to move closer towards Russia regardless of whether NATO follows suit or not.

The Russians have clearly shifted towards a new *Westpolitik* and they are vigorously seeking ways to link up with Europe in any way they can. Russian elites today are convinced that the future of Russia is in Europe, because they feel threatened by China. In that respect, and as Europe feels pretty similar, there is something like a new geographic gravity at work in 'Eurasia' that contributes to the erosion of NATO, despite the rhetoric that still holds the former West together.

However, the very concept of the 'West' is fading away (and with it NATO), as it is no longer clear who belongs to the West. Europe wants now security *with* Russia, and no longer *against* Russia. The Medvedev proposal suggests a Russian-European security treaty, which could go as far as signing up for a concept of 'mutual security'. European authors have suggested opening the new solidarity clause of the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 42.7) to Russia. This is more than the NATO strategy implies for the moment and the question on how to deal and what to do with Russia will remain on the transatlantic agenda for a while.

In addition, the problem might well be that the US concept of a 'global' NATO does not work, because the common transatlantic glue is insufficient. When Europe will feel alone or actually will be left alone with its regional conflicts in 'Eurasia' on the one hand and the US will feel left alone and dropped by the Europeans with its global agenda – that is,

Afghanistan – further transatlantic estrangement might be the result. It is still the common engagement in Afghanistan that holds the alliance together, but the question is NATO will become once the alliance moves out of Afghanistan.

THE TOTTERING PILLARS OF TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS

In a way, all this is regrettable insofar as Europe has not yet drawn the consequences of the American farewell from Europe. Europe itself has been unwilling or unable to strengthen its own security and defense capacities in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy/Common Security and Defense Policy (CFSP/CSDP). This means that Europe is currently outgrowing NATO more by default than by dint of its own capacity and will. And relations between NATO and the EU are still both unclear and intertwined, but in essence dysfunctional to a large extent. All ideas of organizing a European 'caucus' within NATO have failed so far; but, on the other hand, Europe has shown itself to be lacking the ambition to move ahead vigorously with its own headquarter for military engagements in a 'European-only' setting. Europe has failed to build up own capacities, especially military capabilities. Conflicts such as that between Turkey and Cyprus still harm and hinder NATO-EU cooperation; and despite the Treaty of Lisbon, a new legal framework and more possibilities for CSDP through the permanent structured cooperation mechanism, the EU has proven unable so far to strengthen its political will to create a more independent security and defense policy or to increase its room for maneuver in the European Union's Eastern neighborhood and in the Caucasian region.

Beyond European defense capacities, the question is also how transatlantic relations can be organized and channeled more comprehensibly in the future, when NATO should reveal itself to be increasingly inappropriate to carry the transatlantic relationship alone. NATO is a single-issue institution and therefore is only responsible and competent for security defense affairs. Hence, many other topics become dominant and much more important for the transatlantic agenda. But NATO has prov-

en itself to be unable and inappropriate to integrate them into the list of NATO tasks, which again fuels the feeling of NATO's growing irrelevance for Europe that the new strategic concept, with its emphasis on global challenges, actually amplifies.

Topics such as climate change or financial regulations, in a way, matter more for transatlantic relations than classical security threats – or start to become security threats. NATO, indeed, tried to pick up topics such as the protection of energy resources and the like, but could not build a legacy on it. New polling data, such as *Transatlantic Trends 2010*, show rifts between the US and Europe with respect to threat perceptions and the readiness to use military force.[1] The risk is therefore high that the US and Europe will move further apart with NATO no longer holding the 'West' together, whereas no new institutions can bridge the transatlantic gap so that comprehensive transatlantic dialogue would be maintained.

CONCLUSION

The EU will need to fill on its own the security gap in 'Eurasia' that the NATO new strategic concept de facto creates. The more worrisome question is how the US and Europe can find more binding elements and new glue for the future to re-write the narrative for NATO. The new strategic concept is a valuable attempt to modernize NATO and to adapt it to the threats of the 21st Century. However, if the US and NATO differ not only in terms of threat perception, but as for the overall view on the world and what NATO, and if Europe as such is the missing element in NATO, then it might be difficult to hold the concept of NATO and the former 'West' against the current gravity of Europe being pulled closer to Russia. The US has historically engaged through NATO in Europe; but Europe shies away from engaging through NATO in the world now. This may lead to Europe being left alone… with Europe; and the US being left

1. German Marshall Fund of the United States and Compagnia di San Paolo, *Transatlantic Trends 2010. Key Findings*, http://www.gmfus.org/trends/doc/2010_English_Key.pdf.

alone… in the world! The new strategic concept gives a taste of this and, thus, of a world in which European security does not matter any longer in NATO's new strategy.

4.
Beyond Europe - Transatlantic Relations in a Global World*

Dana Allin

For two decades there have been expectations of strategic and economic power shifts from the Euro-Atlantic arena towards Asia-Pacific in general and China in particular. Some of this chatter is overexcited – glossing over the reality that China, if and when it surpasses the United States in GDP, will remain, per-capita, a poor country with huge political challenges and the demographic problem of an aging population of equal magnitude to Europe's and considerably worse than the United States.

The 2008-09 Great Recession and ongoing economic and financial crises in the United States and Europe have, nonetheless, thrown the question of respective geopolitical weights into sharper perspective. China and other Asia-Pacific nations weathered the crisis rather well. For the United States and Europe, by contrast, even if the recession is technically over, the ongoing economic crisis looks likely to continue to have deeply corrosive spill-over effects in the political sphere.

These include a crisis of strategic overstretch requiring reduced defense budgets and a rethinking of missions and commitments in Afghanistan and beyond; a frustration of hopes that the United States, even under a putatively committed liberal administration, would finally join its European partners in taking the actions necessary to price carbon and thereby assume leadership in efforts to create the mechanisms of global governance to avert catastrophic climate change; a crisis of moral

* This chapter is an elaboration of comments made by the author to the paper James Goldgeier presented at the Transatlantic Security Symposium 2010, 'European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship,' jointly organised by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, and held in Rome, Italy, on November 8, 2010 (see chapter 2).

self-confidence, in which the transatlantic partners' commitment to global promotion of human rights gives way to a more constricted realism and a challenge from an alternative "Beijing Consensus".

THE FALLEN ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

Before considering the consequences for NATO itself, it is important to understand this larger context of transatlantic relations. It is clear that the financial crisis and long economic struggle to get out from under the rubble will have profound implications for both the state of transatlantic relations and the place of the transatlantic allies in the larger world system. To begin with, the crisis has revealed underlying philosophical differences that are at least as important – and perhaps more important – than the other much-discussed differences over the role of military force, etc. In effect, the crisis has pitted a Keynesian America against a fiscally conservative continental Europe, with Britain after the Labour's electoral defeat lining up with Germany. Of course, this dichotomy is muddied by the fact that the Obama administration's Keynesian inclinations are greatly constrained by the blocking capacity of Republicans and Conservative Democrats. But the distinction still says something important about the diverging economic policy preferences on respective sides of the Atlantic. And transatlantic disagreements about how to cope with the economic crisis may be the most important transatlantic disagreements that there are.

A new era of chronically high unemployment in the United States, with a nominal rate over 9% which means an effective rate close to 20% un- or under-employed, would be incredibly corrosive to the American body politic and its ability to sustain US leadership and transatlantic partnership. On the other side of the Atlantic, Europe's more generous welfare states may help individual European societies to better weather the crisis, but they face other big challenges likely to be exacerbated by economic woes: first, a possibly greater challenge than the United States faces in integrating Muslim minorities (America's "Ground Zero Mosque" demagoguery notwithstanding); second, already well in train, a

blow to progress towards European unity, as demonstrated by the Greek debt crisis and the (initial) German response, as well as the Irish debt crisis. More broadly, if the initial critics of European Monetary Union have been vindicated – not a given, but certainly an arguable hypothesis – then the central mechanism of European Union will have been discredited. This could have important implications for the idea of a more balanced transatlantic partnership.

There are also geo-financial and geo-strategic implications for Euro-Atlantic – and particularly American – relations with the rising power of China. The basic mechanism of US and Chinese growth for almost a generation – Chinese saving and American spending – may no longer be viable. If so, it is not clear what replaces this mechanism. The shape of the "post-American world" depends on answers to this question. What Valery Giscard d'Estaing called the "exorbitant privilege" of the US dollar derived in large measure from the extraordinary burden that America assumed after 1945 in financing the world's – especially Europe's – post-war economic recovery, and in extending its military protection against Soviet threats. This was not pure altruism, of course, but the fact that economic recovery and strategic stability were manifestly in the American interest did not diminish the generosity of the US post-war project, as France's President Charles de Gaulle himself recognized.

Yet the financial underpinnings of this project, which were established at Bretton Woods but survived Bretton Woods' demise, carried at least two significant long-term problems for the international system. First, the seigniorage accorded to the United States through the dollar's reserve-currency role allowed Washington to ignore fundamental strategic choices and limits. The power to print the world's currency conveyed the ability to finance a global strategic role without commensurately taxing American citizens. Arguably, the ongoing economic crisis stems from this American habit of ignoring limits: the basic mechanism for US and Chinese growth for almost a generation – American over-consumption and Chinese over-saving – created the massive imbalances that helped cause the financial meltdown of 2008 and the consequent Great Recession.

Second, and with much earlier effect, the accumulation during the 1960s of large dollar balances in the reserves of West European coun-

tries constituted a kind of 'imperial tax', in David Calleo's memorable phrase; enjoying US military protection while their own defense budgets remained modest, thereby able to enjoy economic growth and to finance generous welfare states, these countries were reluctant to complain too loudly. Yet the dollar balances had inflationary consequences for countries, like France, where inflation was becoming an acute and endemic problem. For de Gaulle, taking tutelage from the economist Jacques Rueff, the whole system had become "abusive and dangerous."[1]

THE FALTERING SECURITY PILLAR OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

De Gaulle's criticisms were directed at a system that was falling apart anyway. Most remarkable, perhaps, is that the pre-eminence of the dollar, with attendant privileges for the power that prints it, has continued long after the Bretton Woods fixed exchange-rate system was abandoned. European countries who felt exposed to America's exports of inflation when the dollar rate was fixed felt comparable pain over subsequent gyrations of the dollar's value after it floated, which affected not only trade competitiveness with the United States but intra-European exchange rates. Yet however much they might grumble, there was during the Cold War an enduring reason for European (and Japanese) leaders to accept the situation, a reason that Calleo has been eloquent in describing:

> Throughout the Cold War, America's ability to create credit for itself in this fashion depended on two conditions: First, there was no real substitute for the dollar as a reserve currency. And second, the principal accumulators of exported dollars were Germany and Japan, US military protectorates who absorbed their dollars as a kind of imperial tax. All things considered, the costs of accumulat-

1. Christopher S. Chivvis, "Charles de Gaulle, Jacques Rueff and French International Monetary Policy under Bretton Woods", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 41, No. 4, October 2006.

> ing the exported dollars was a cheap price for America's protection, and awkward to refuse. The US was spending more on Europe's defense than the Europeans themselves.[2]

After the Cold War ended, however, Europe's leaders were freer to construct a system that afforded greater protection from the dollar. This benignly anti-American aspect of European monetary union was just one of several motivators for an audacious project at the heart of European Union. It has been hugely successful in many respects, but the flaw that economist critics identified from the outset – the mismatch between a single monetary policy and individual fiscal policies – has been painfully confirmed in the current financial and economic crisis. The future of the euro is, at the time of this writing, uncertain. If and when it recovers from the crisis, however, it – along with the more general problem of global imbalances epitomized by the US-China financial relationship – is likely to be a force affecting America's ability to finance endless deficits.

In security terms, the first obvious consequence will be on defense spending. This is perhaps not so dramatic when the American defense budget is larger than all the other spending in the world. But the crunch for Europe could be more dramatic, with serious constraints on Europe's strategic ambitions. (Conversely, requirements for rationalization could create an impulse for closer European defense cooperation.)

But these transatlantic defense budget debates will take place against a backdrop of deeper questions about the transatlantic alliance's military mission. Put simply, the Atlantic Alliance faces some inevitable tensions, ambiguities and contradictions inherent to the question of NATO's purpose twenty years after its founding purpose disappeared.

From the American side, it has often been argued that "[to] remain relevant to American national security considerations, NATO must embrace its global future."[3] This statement is correct in its implicit defini-

2. David P. Calleo, "Obama's Dilemma: Enraged Opponents or Disappointed Followers", http://bcjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/calleo-from-bcjia-mag_final-2.pdf, p. 7.

3. See James Goldgeier's chapter in this volume.

tion of the problem – that is to say, the biggest threat to NATO is American disinterest. It is not clear, however, that global NATO is the solution. This is not to deny that there are global threats and challenges that NATO will have to face. The problem, however, is that, if we look at NATO as a global actor, it is not an abstract discussion. The most concrete and challenging example of this is NATO's experience in Afghanistan; yet it is hard to imagine any NATO member capital, *including Washington,* where policymakers or politicians would enthusiastically point to the Afghanistan mission as a model for the future.

More broadly, is NATO's relevance an end in itself? To put it differently, if NATO did not exist, would we consider it necessary in 2010 to invent it? Intuitively, NATO does not seem like an institution that we should be careless about allowing to wither. We recognize its successes, and intuit its continuing value, even if it is not necessarily going to be the central organization for dealing with the range of geo-strategic challenges covered in this proposal. Analytically and rationally, however, the answer to the question is not obvious. The purpose of the question is not to suggest that NATO be abolished, but rather to set a rigorous test for what missions are strategically sensible and politically sustainable.

The argument for a global NATO is often expressed in terms of adequate European solidarity in support of American security concerns. But the measurement of this solidarity is an inherently flawed exercise. The problem emerged in stark terms on September 11th, 2001. European solidarity was expressed in the invocation of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty: one could confidently say that the transatlantic community – and indeed, much of the world – was united in the face of Al Qaeda's attack on civilization itself. But very soon, of course, the United States asked for European solidarity in service of an American concept of its security needs that many Europeans found eccentric, to put it mildly. The Iraq invasion was a kind of reduction *ad absurdum* of the idea that Europe now needed to repay the United States for its decades of protection against the Soviet threat. That test succeeded mainly in splitting Europe down the middle.

Nonetheless, there have been substantial European forces in Afghanistan in support of what is now a NATO mission. Are these European force there in service of their own articulated strategic concept around

European interests, or as a token of solidarity with *America's* mission? If it is the latter, it is difficult to see how the European commitment would be politically sustainable.

5.
Nuclear Arms and Missile Defense in Transatlantic Security*

Oliver Thränert

The debate about the future role of nuclear arms in Europe for transatlantic security has intensified. It can be expected to continue after NATO's Lisbon summit of November 2010, on which occasion the alliance adopted its new strategic concept. One important reason why the debate within NATO about nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament will go on is US President Barack Obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons. To make its contribution to this long-term goal, Germany wants all the remaining US nuclear forces on its territory to be removed, albeit not without consultation within the alliance. Some NATO partners that also host US nuclear forces, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, support Germany. Others, like Italy and Turkey, are less enthusiastic.

After Lisbon, two important topics remain on NATO's agenda for the coming years. As long as US nuclear forces are deployed in Europe, decisions will have to be taken about the modernization of the respective delivery systems. At the same time, the US and NATO will have to decide if and to what extent non-strategic weapons should become part of future arms control negotiations with Russia.

These discussions will be held against the background of developments in the Middle East. If Iran becomes a nuclear power, NATO's security landscape will be altered significantly. If Iran cannot be stopped from developing a nuclear weapons option, it will become a new focus of

* Revised manuscript for publication, originally prepared for the Transatlantic Security Symposium 2010, 'European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship,' jointly organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, and held in Rome, Italy, on November 8, 2010.

NATO's deterrence thinking. Missile defenses and 'deterrence by denial' strategies (i.e. the possibility to neutralize a first attack) will gain more importance for NATO, while at the same time nuclear weapons and 'deterrence by punishment' (e.g. the threat of a nuclear retaliation) will become less significant.

The NATO summit in Lisbon has been an important milestone on this way. In its new strategic concept NATO describes the capability to defend NATO populations and territories against ballistic missile attacks as a core element of its collective defense. At the same time, an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities remains a core element of NATO's strategy. In the coming years, the alliance will continue this adjustment to a new security environment. It will have to find common ground on the future nuclear weapons and missile defense relationship.

An important element of this adaptation process needs to be a new partnership with Russia. For if NATO wants to avoid its missile defense projects to stand in the way of improved relations with Russia and of further nuclear reductions, it has to find ways of discussing possible cooperation in this field with Moscow. The invitation extended to Russia for missile defense cooperation, appreciated by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Lisbon, is a first step into that direction.

US NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE: STILL RELEVANT?

Extended deterrence based on the threat of punishment has historically been the bedrock of NATO's nuclear policy. During the Cold War, the United States guaranteed its European non-nuclear partners as well as Canada that its nuclear forces would not only counter a potential Soviet attack on the US homeland, but also one on the territories of its allies. More specifically, a special arrangement called 'nuclear-sharing' was established, according to which European delivery systems and their crews were prepared and trained to use US nuclear weapons based in Europe.

Extended deterrence has never been an easy undertaking, mainly because the requirements of deterrence and assurance often are not

identical. What has become known as the 'Healy Theorem' illustrates this best: 'It takes only five per cent credibility of US retaliation to deter the Russians, but 95 percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.'[1]

More than twenty years after the end of the Cold War, extended deterrence is still relevant for NATO, as has been pointed out by NATO secretary-general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, when he has described the stationing of US nuclear forces in Europe as an essential part of a credible deterrent.[2] Likewise, the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review argues that the presence of US nuclear weapons combined with NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements contribute to alliance cohesion and provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats.[3] More recently, the NATO strategic concept reiterated that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The allies continue to participate in collective defense planning on nuclear roles and basing of nuclear forces.[4]

The US deployed nuclear forces in Europe for the first time in 1953-54. Their numbers peaked in 1971 at around 7,300 nuclear warheads of thirteen different types. Since the end of the Cold War, these figures have been drastically reduced. Today, only 150-200 non-strategic, air-launched gravity bombs remain. They are stored in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey, and would be deployed by aircraft that are on extremely low-level alert. The NATO strategic concepts of 1991 and 1999 defined the role of these weapons as political: deter potential adversaries and preserve peace. The NATO strategic concept of

1. David S. Yost, "US Extended Deterrence in NATO and North-East Asia", in Bruno Tertrais (ed.), *Perspectives on Extended Deterrence,* Recherches et Documents no. 3/2010, Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, pp. 15-36, p. 17.

2. Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, Tallin, Estonia, 22 April 2010.

3. US Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review Report*, Washington D.C., April 2010, p. xii.

4. *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, Strategic Concept For the Defense and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, adopted by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon (http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf).

2010 suggests that the circumstances in which use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.[5]

It is widely acknowledged that in today's strategic environment, NATO's non-strategic systems have little military operational relevance. The respective combat aircraft have limited flight-ranges. Although they would be escorted by other aircraft to penetrate the opponent's air-space, they cannot be expected to be very effective when attacking well defended targets. One important military option remains, though. In a crisis, those NATO partners that participate in nuclear-sharing could demonstrate their willingness to conduct a nuclear strike together. It is questionable, however, how valuable this option is under current circumstances. Moreover, there are even concerns regarding the safe and secure storage of nuclear weapons at US sites in Europe, making them potential targets of theft.[6]

While the argument above provides a rationale for the withdrawal of US nuclear forces from Europe, such a decision would contribute to already widespread sensitivities, particularly in new NATO countries. They might interpret such a move as evidence that their security needs are not taken care of. Central and East European NATO members would apprehend that such a nuclear withdrawal would only be the pretext of a complete American retreat from Europe, making them more vulnerable to Russian assertiveness and intimidation.[7]

This is not to say that old NATO members do not value the US nuclear presence in Europe; they do. In the view of new and old members alike, US nuclear forces in Europe are an essential link with the strategic US forces and help maintain allied cohesion and solidarity. Furthermore, those countries that host US nuclear bombs and participate in nuclear-

5. Op. cit.; see also Raymond Knops, *Non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe: A fundamental NATO debate*, 2010 Spring Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

6. Hugh Beach, "The End of Nuclear Sharing? US Nuclear Weapons in Europe", in *The RUSI Journal* vol. 154, no. 6, December 2009, pp. 48-53, p. 49. It is asserted that the training for nuclear security regimes is too short. Moreover, it is not possible to perform no-notice security checks due to host nation/NATO requirements.

7. Ronald Asmus, Stefan Czmur, Chris Donnelly, Aivis Ronis, Tomas Valasek and Klaus Wittmann, *NATO, new allies and reassurance*, Centre for European Reform, Policy Brief, London 2010.

sharing (the so-called DCA countries[8]) are aware that in doing so they have a special status within the alliance. Their impact on NATO's nuclear policy-making is more significant than that of other NATO members. True, apart from France, all NATO countries take part in the work of the Nuclear Planning Group. But this body would certainly lose its prominence if the US and Britain would remain as the only members directly related to nuclear affairs. The United States on its part welcomes the participation of allies in extended deterrence, including NATO's nuclear-sharing, because the latter is an instrument of burden-sharing in terms of financial costs as well as political risks and responsibilities.[9]

However, the group of DCA countries does not speak with one voice. While Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium are in favor of a US nuclear withdrawal, Italy and Turkey are opposed to it. In the case of Italy, the country's status within the alliance seems to be an important factor. In Turkey many fear to be confronted with a dilemma. If Iran becomes a nuclear power and at the same time the US removes all its nuclear weapons from Turkish territory, Ankara's security would be diminished. If, however, the United States removes its nuclear forces from other NATO countries but not from Turkey in a situation where it would remain unclear whether Iran would develop a nuclear option, then Ankara would have a hard time to explain to its non-NATO neighbors why it still hosts nuclear weapons while all other NATO countries are pulling them out.[10] This problem might become particularly delicate as the 2010 NPT Review Conference decided to convene a conference to discuss a WMD free-zone in the Middle East in 2012.

Finally, one should also not forget that the stationing of US nuclear forces in Europe has always had a non-proliferation dimension. One important reason why the concept of nuclear-sharing was developed in the

8. DCA is the acronym for 'Dual-Capable Aircraft'.

9. David S. Yost, 'US Extended Deterrence in NATO and North-East Asia,' op. cit.; see also David S. Yost, *The Future of NATO's Nuclear Deterrent: The New Strategic Concept and the 2010 NPT Review Conference – A Workshop Report*, NATO Research Division, Rome: NATO Defense College, 2010.

10. See Mustafa Kibaroglu, 'Reassessing the Role of US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey,' in *Arms Control Today* (June 2010) (www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu).

1950s and 1960s was to convince the Federal Republic of Germany to renounce nuclear weapons. Today, few believe that Germany would ever develop nuclear weapons of its own (in fact, Germany is legally bound by the two-plus-four treaty on German unification to renounce nuclear weapons). But other NATO members might change their mind in case nuclear proliferation at NATO's periphery were to take place. Again, this particularly applies to Turkey. While a nuclear weapons program would not be an easy undertaking for Ankara both politically and technically, some already fear that one of the reasons why Turkey is currently so eager to establish a civilian nuclear program is to keep the nuclear weapons option open.[11] The non-proliferation aspect of extended deterrence is particularly valuable from an American point of view. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review argues that the forward deployment of US nuclear forces reassures non-nuclear allies that their security interests can be protected without their own nuclear capabilities.[12]

THE MODERNIZATION VS. REDUCTION TRADE-OFF

Modernizing US nuclear forces in Europe

In case NATO does not give up on US nuclear forces in Europe, certain modernization decisions will be unavoidable. Otherwise, nuclear-sharing will wither away over time as ageing platforms become obsolete within the next five to ten years. But any modernization of nuclear-capable platforms would be hard to sell to the public in most European countries. Most importantly, such a decision would signal that the alliance is inclined to extend nuclear deterrence until 2050 and beyond – a proposition in stark contrast with current initiatives to renounce all nuclear weapons.

Today, there is only one type of US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, the B-61 free-fall bomb. This warhead, first produced in 1966, be-

11. Sebnem Udum, "Turkey's Nuclear Comeback, An Energy Renaissance in an Evolving Regional Security Context", *The Nonproliferation Review* vol. 17, no. 2, July 2010, pp. 365-377.

12. See *Nuclear Posture Review Report*, op. cit., p. 31.

longs to the oldest types of US nuclear weapons. However, it has been modernized several times. The Obama administration has made it clear that it will conduct a full scope B-61 Life Extension Program to enhance safety and security.[13] As far as platforms are concerned, the US plans to replace its F-16 based in Italy and Turkey for nuclear missions with dual-capable F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) beginning in 2016.

There seems to be much more uncertainty regarding the modernization of aircraft used by European forces. To begin with, it is publicly not known to what extent Greece (where no US nuclear weapons are stationed anymore) and the Turkish Air Force still participate in NATO's nuclear-sharing. Both countries continue to take part in exercises that are related to nuclear training, but reports indicate that their pilots are no longer certified for nuclear missions. Apparently, both air forces serve as a non-nuclear air defense escort.

Belgium and Germany are the most unlikely to replace their current platforms for nuclear use, the F-16 and the Tornado, respectively. Belgium is not participating in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, but rather concentrating on the Airbus 400M transport aircraft project. Brussels may in the future abandon all its fighter aircraft, leaving no room for future nuclear missions. Germany does not take part in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project either. In replacing the Tornado dual-capable aircraft, it is introducing the Eurofighter Typhoon into its air force for conventional operations. This new aircraft could be licensed by the US for nuclear missions, but this would make cost-expensive changes of the aircraft necessary. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the European consortium that is producing the Typhoon would be willing to disclose all technical details of the Eurofighter to the US – the Pentagon's precondition for issuing a nuclear license. Most importantly, the current conservative-liberal government in Berlin seeks the complete abandonment of US nuclear forces from German territory. This policy rests on a parliamentary consensus reaching across the entire party spectrum and resonating well with the German public. Any decision to modernize rather than forgo nuclear weapons would be opposed by the vast major-

13. Op. cit., p. 27-28.

ity of Germans. Against that background, such a decision seems extremely unlikely.

The Netherlands and Italy present a slightly different picture in that regard. Both countries participate in the F-35 JSF project, granting themselves the option for the introduction of such aircraft for nuclear missions. As of yet, both governments have not passed any decisions in that regard. The Hague gives Germany some political support in its efforts to make the European NATO allies nuclear-free. Italy so far keeps away from such initiatives.

In light of these political, financial, and technical uncertainties, a modernization of European platforms for nuclear use is doubtful in most cases. Whether individual countries would take such a decision if others choose not to do so, is an open question.[14] Still, the US could deem it necessary to continue basing nuclear weapons and related platforms in Europe and modernize the respective aircraft. But even if this were the case, nuclear-sharing would be ended as European NATO partners would not be involved any more. Taking into consideration that integrating NATO allies into the alliance's nuclear activities has been the main reason for the US to base non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, this possibility seems rather remote.

Negotiating reductions of non-strategic nuclear forces in Europe

Russia's non-strategic arsenal is estimated at between 2,000 and 6,000 warheads.[15] Uncertainty as to the exact numbers suggests the need for more transparency to be reached through arms control initiatives. But such negotiations would face a number of complicated issues.

14. Ian Anthony and Johnny Janssen, *The future of Nuclear Weapons in NATO*, Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, April 2010; Ian Anthony, "NATO's Nuclear Future: New Security Challenges and the Role of Deterrence", *International Politics and Society* no. 3/2010, pp. 145-158.

15. Amy F. Woolf, *Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington, D.C., 14 January 2010, p. 17. The lower number reflects the number of deployed weapons and the higher number includes weapons in central storage.

For starters, there is no commonly accepted definition of the term 'non-strategic' nuclear weapons. The best that one can say is that this category covers all those US and Russian nuclear systems that are not subject to the New START and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties. Such weapons range from gravity bombs to sea-launched systems such as torpedoes or cruises missiles based on submarines and surface vessels, as well as to nuclear warheads for air and missile defense systems still stored in Russia. These weapons serve different military purposes. For example, the Russian navy apparently perceives nuclear weapons on attack submarines as absolutely essential to confront the US navy in a conflict, but the Russian Air Force believes its remaining gravity bombs to be insignificant.[16] Whether such a great variety of weapons systems can be negotiated within the next round of arms control talks remains rather questionable.

Verification would be difficult, too. In recent agreements, verification mainly focused on the destruction of delivery systems. In the case of the remaining non-strategic nuclear forces, though, most of the delivery systems are of dual-use nature and are mainly operated in a conventional role. Therefore, verification would need to concentrate on the destruction of warheads. This would imply complicated issues of confidentiality. For the first time, accounting for individual warheads would become necessary, so that inspections would need to take place at nuclear warhead storage sites.[17]

Furthermore, it remains unclear to what extent Russia has any interest in negotiating its non-strategic forces. Mirroring NATO's Cold War attitudes, Russia is relying upon nuclear weapons as a counterweight to NATO's conventional advantages. More important, many in Moscow would see negotiations on strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons as an unwelcome political concession in case the imbalance between

16. Miles Pomper, William Potter and Nikolai Sokov, "Reducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe", *Survival* vol. 52, no. 1, February/March 2010, pp. 75-96, p. 77-78.

17. Miles A. Pomper, Nikolai Sokov and William C. Potter, "Breaking the US –Russian deadlock on non-strategic nuclear weapons", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 4 December 2009, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/breaking-the-us-russian-deadlock-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons.

NATO and Russia in terms of conventional weapons is not addressed in parallel.[18]

In addition, when negotiations begin, there would be a temptation for Russia to try to influence public opinion in the West and to divide NATO governments. Moscow's goal is to introduce the basic principle that nuclear weapons should only be based on the territories of the countries that own them. This implies the complete withdrawal of US nuclear forces from Europe – a long-standing demand of Russian and Soviet foreign policy. At the same time, Russia is unwilling to abandon its own non-strategic weapons. Such a Russian approach would be popular with many European publics and governments alike, but opposed by others. Maintaining alliance cohesion, therefore, would be a tough challenge.

Finally, Russia can be expected to argue, as it already did in the 1980s, that British and French nuclear forces should become part of a future agreement. Particularly Paris can be expected to oppose such a move on the grounds that it does see all its nuclear forces as strategic and it regards the maintenance of its *force de frappe* as an element of its independent foreign policy. London, too, is not enthusiastic about complicating its already difficult decision process on the future of its Trident nuclear forces with participation in arms control negotiations.

On top of all these difficulties, one should not forget that the next round of US-Russian arms control talks will be a complex matter. Specifically, further strategic reductions seem unfeasible so long as Washington and Moscow do not reach consensus on how to deal with the missile defense issue.

Against the backdrop of all these complexities, the new strategic concept of NATO argues that the alliance should seek agreement with Russia to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and the possible relocation of these weapons away from the territory of NATO members.[19] Indeed, such an approach seems to be promising at least as a first step.

18. 'Reducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe,' op. cit.., p. 78.

19. *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, op. cit.

REFOCUSING EXTENDED DETERRENCE

From Russia to the Middle East

Despite numerous efforts to improve NATO-Russia relations, including through the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council as well as Russian President Medvedev's participation in NATO's Lisbon summit, lingering suspicions on both sides remain. Russians perceive NATO's policy of enlargement as a challenge to Moscow's own goal of establishing a sphere of influence in what many call the 'near-abroad'. Against the background of their still vivid memories of Soviet occupation, new NATO members continue to perceive Russia as a threat. Russian oil cut-offs, trade embargos, cyber-attacks as well as the 2008 war against Georgia have all contributed to this threat perception. Indeed, it can hardly be expected that western and Russian interests will become identical in the near future. This is due to Russia's sheer size, making it both a European as well as an Asian player; its possession of a nuclear arsenal comparable only to the American one; as well as its domestic development, which combines both democratic and autocratic elements.

Still, Russia and the West share important interests. One of the latest examples has been the signing, after a relatively short period of negotiations, of the New START agreement to limit US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear forces. Another example is Moscow's acceptance of new and more forceful sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council that are meant to convince the Iranian leadership to change its current nuclear course. The NATO-Russian relationship can be characterized as a mix of cooperation and confrontation.

But NATO's extended deterrence is not only dependent on Russia and may continue to be even if NATO and Russia were to achieve substantial progress in their relationship. Only, its regional focus would shift from Russia to the Middle East. We do not know yet whether the E3 plus 3 – Britain, France, Germany plus Russia, China and the US – will be successful with their two-track approach of sanctions and incentives to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapons option. Nor do we know whether military action will be taken to end Iran's controversial nuclear program, or what the result of such a military operation would be. What

we know is that an Iranian nuclear capability – even if Tehran were not to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and openly test nuclear weapons – would definitely change NATO's security environment significantly (although it will never be comparable to the threat the Soviet Union imposed during the Cold War).

NATO partners at its southern flank would not be the only ones to feel less secure. In the event that Iran develops nuclear weapons and also ballistic missiles that could reach Berlin or Brussels within this decade, Central European NATO countries would also need to be reassured and protected. In addition, NATO could hardly be indifferent in case Israel or one of those Arab countries that participate in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue or the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative became the victim of Iranian military pressure. In sum, as a consequence of a possible nuclear dynamic in the Middle East, this region would gain importance for NATO.

The United States is already cooperating with Israel as well as a number of Arab countries in the field of missile defenses and deploys such systems in some of these countries. If these efforts already underway were to become part of an American containment policy *vis-a-vis* a nuclear Iran, NATO would be affected. This holds true even if NATO's own missile defenses were not directly linked to regional defense architectures in the Middle East.

From nuclear weapons to missile defense

The Obama administration aims to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons. Its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review values conventional power-projection capabilities as well as effective missile defenses for regional security architectures.[20] Particularly missile defenses can be expected to gain importance.

As the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO observed, NATO missile defenses could enhance transatlantic sharing of re-

20. *Nuclear Posture Review*, op. cit., p. v.

sponsibility and reinforce the principle that security is indivisible.[21] NATO's new strategic concept describes the development of capabilities to defend populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of its collective defense. In fact, an extended deterrence strategy focusing more on denial rather than punishment might be preferable, provided that effective defense systems become available. Because such a strategy stresses the importance of defenses, it might overcome credibility problems always involved in extended deterrence mainly based on nuclear threats. During the Cold War, Europeans have always questioned Washington's promise to escalate to the strategic nuclear level in case a conflict with the Soviet Union had occurred. If extended deterrence relied more upon defenses, such credibility problems might become negligible, as the US would not put its own existence at stake. [22]

President Obama's missile defense plans include a number of important advantages as compared to George W. Bush's approach. In contrast to Bush's, Obama's defense architecture is not American-centric. The US now intends its missile defense effort to be multinational and integrated with NATO members' defense capabilities – a fact that led NATO secretary-general Rasmussen to welcome Obama's decision. Besides, Washington now focuses on more immediate and realistic threats, i.e. medium-range missiles that could hit Europe rather than intercontinental missiles that could reach the US homeland. The envisioned stationing of the sea- and land-based versions of the navy's SM-3 interceptors is more capable of defending Europe, including its southern flank (which was neglected by Bush). At the same time it is more flexible.[23]

A NATO missile defense system would make sense particularly with a view to a potential nuclear dynamic in the Middle East. Nuclear newcomers of that region would most likely not be as irrational as to directly attack NATO, which is still the most powerful military alliance in the world. But they might behave assertively or even conduct aggression

21. *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, Analysis and Recommendations*, op. cit.

22. David S. Yost, op. cit., p. 16f.

23. Mark Fitzpatrick, 'A Prudent Decision on Missile Defence,' *Survival* vol. 51, no. 6, December 2009-January 2010, pp. 5-12.

against their neighbors. The alliance might want to respond to such action, because it feels responsible for maintaining international order. Moreover, NATO might be mandated by the UN Security Council for military operations in the Middle East. But if the aggressor possessed nuclear weapons, NATO might be deterred from intervention. To be sure, a first use of nuclear weapons against NATO would be without doubt responded to with a devastating counter-attack. But NATO could never be sure whether its deterrence would work.

This scenario suggests that a fundamental change is taking place in terms of the circumstances, under which deterrence needs to work. In the past, during the Cold War period, the main idea of deterrence was not to use military force in a relatively stable situation between East and West, at least in Europe. In the future, in a hypothetical world with more nuclear powers equipped with long-range ballistic missiles, those countries that feel responsible to protect international order will need to decide whether to use their forces in a contingency that might result in severe damage caused by the use of nuclear weapons by the aggressor. Deliberately accepting one's own vulnerability, as was the case during the Cold War, does not seem the appropriate strategic approach in such a context. Instead, effective damage limitation options would be a useful tool. Moreover, even limited missile defenses would have an impact on an aggressor's calculations.[24]

Missile defenses, moreover, will have an alliance dimension. Although NATO's strategic concept agreed upon in Lisbon avoids a link between the establishment of missile defenses and nuclear disarmament, a step-by-step build-up of defenses could replace in many ways the importance that nuclear-sharing has for NATO today. A NATO effort to establish missile defenses would keep the US committed to European defense. Allies could find new opportunities to actively participate in NATO force planning through arrangements similar to the Nuclear Planning Group. Finally, missile defenses would have a non-proliferation impact on allies.[25]

---

24. Anthony Seaboyer and Oliver Thränert, 'What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe,' *Survival*, vol. 48, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 85-96.

25. Oliver Thränert, 'NATO, Missile Defence and Extended Deterrence,' *Survival*, vol.

PROSPECTS FOR NATO-RUSSIA MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION

Deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial have never been an either-or. But in the years to come, NATO can be expected to increasingly shift from the former to the latter. This process will certainly take time. Elements of punishment will however not entirely go away because, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the alliance will maintain nuclear options. Moreover, more effective conventional strike options will gain prominence. But taking all this into consideration, missile defenses will become more important, while offensive capabilities will become less significant.

NATO's missile defense activities must be accompanied by efforts to cooperate in this field with Moscow. As has been rightly observed, without such an offer for dialogue and cooperation, missile defenses could severely damage NATO-Russian relations.[26] NATO's invitation to Russia to cooperate in missile defenses extended at the Lisbon summit and Russia's agreement to discuss the issue are the first steps in the right direction. Whether NATO-Russia cooperation would work in practice, though, remains to be seen.

At first glance, the prospects seem relatively positive. Both sides perceive current trends in missile proliferation as increasingly threatening their interests. For the Obama administration and NATO alike, missile defense cooperation with Russia is attractive for several reasons. For one, the US and NATO missile defense plans are not directed against Russia, as has been reiterated by the US Nuclear Posture Review of 2010. Second, missile defense cooperation would help to enhance NATO-Russia relations in general and align Moscow in an effort to confront proliferators, most notably Iran. Third, western governments are aware that without NATO-Russia cooperation, missile defenses would stand in the way of further nuclear reductions.

51, no. 6, December 2009/January 2010, pp. 63-76.

26. Sam Nunn, Igor Ivanov and Wolfgang Ischinger, "All Together Now: Missile Defense", *New York Times*, 21 July 2010.

From Moscow's perspective, the picture looks different. After the Bush administration's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002, Russia was suspicious that the Bush administration's missile defense plans aimed to undermine Russia's nuclear second strike capability. While such fears could be diminished with the Obama administration's new missile defense approach, they still persist, particularly within the Russian military. Some in Moscow might still hope that public resistance in European NATO countries as well as budgetary constraints will compel the alliance to reduce or even abandon its missile defense plans. Such an outcome might be preferred by Russian military planners, with Russian-NATO missile defense cooperation being only the second-best solution. In addition, Russians are aware that their own defense projects in many ways are not comparable with US efforts. Any US-Russian cooperation would thus uncomfortably reflect the imbalance between the two Cold War antagonists. Moreover, Moscow recognizes that any NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation might negatively impact its relations with China. In any event, Russia's main interest is to reduce the unpredictability of US and NATO missile defense efforts. To that end, Moscow aims at integrating early warning and defense systems. Exchange of data only would not be enough for Russia. This has been made clear by President Medvedev at the Lisbon summit of November 2010.

In practical terms, already in 1998 the United States and Russia signed a common statement on the establishment of a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) in Moscow, the purpose of which would be the prevention of accidental nuclear war through the exchange of information from each country's early warning system. The JDEC could also be used for the data exchange of missile launches by third countries. Regrettably, though, the planned JDEC has not been opened yet. Since President Obama took office, discussions about activating the JDEC have been revived. In June 2010, the US and Russia released a joint statement, renewing their commitment to exchanging data on ballistic missile launches with the ultimate goal of creating an international system to monitor, and exchange data on, the launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. On the NATO-Russia level, in 2002 a working group on theatre missile defense was established within the framework

of the NATO-Russia Council. This group conducted several simulation exercises aimed at enhanced NATO-Russian interoperation ability. After the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, these activities became the victim of the temporary suspension of the NATO-Russia Council meetings.

Many hurdles remain. Not only are technologies complex and cost-expensive, there are also difficult command-and-control issues. For instance, Russia would like to control the use of any asset it may make available to a common architecture, but NATO commanders have no intention to make the use of the missile defense system dependent on Russian authorization. The main problem, therefore, remains the lack of confidence between the parties. As long as more trust is not built, both sides would hesitate to reveal their vulnerabilities in the framework of enhanced missile defense cooperation. Moreover, as far as NATO is concerned, many still fear that information about western missile defense capabilities – and hence its deficiencies – could end up in Tehran or Beijing.[27]

As has been proposed by the Obama administration, a dialogue with Russia should be intensified to consider topics such as research or simulations and exercises with the aim of gradually developing elements of a joint missile defense architecture. In the longer term, consultations with China should also begin, since from Beijing's perspective, US-Russian missile defense cooperation would be a nightmare, given China's still limited offensive nuclear capabilities. But if it turns out that Russia is unwilling to cooperate with NATO in terms of missile defenses – a possibility that cannot be ruled out giving current Russian hesitations – NATO might conclude that it needs to meet new strategic requirements on its own.

CONCLUSION

Significant changes in NATO's nuclear posture as well as its missile defense policy will not occur over night. But slowly and steadily missile de-

27. Richard Weitz, "Illusive Visions and Practical Realities: Russia, NATO and Missile Defence", *Survival* vol. 52, no. 4, August-September 2010, pp. 99-120; Nikolai Sokov, "Missile Defence: Towards Practical Cooperation with Russia", *Survival* vol. 52, no. 4, August-September 2010, pp. 121-130.

fenses will become more important for the alliance defense posture, while at the same time the significance of US nuclear forces stationed in Europe will diminish. Still, NATO will remain to be a nuclear alliance, but deterrence by denial will gain importance over deterrence by punishment. This process can be expected to be accelerated in case Iran becomes a nuclear power and the alliance's extended deterrence focus shifts from Russia to the Middle East. In case NATO were not confronted with a nuclear Iran, missile defenses would be developed at slower pace, given defense budget constraints.

In any event, NATO would better talk to Russia both about the future of nuclear arms in Europe and the prospects of cooperation in the sphere of missile defenses. But if Moscow is uninterested in close cooperation with NATO, the alliance would need to meet its strategic requirements alone.

In the coming years NATO should develop a missile defense posture in coordination with the Obama administration's missile defense plans; further reduce the salience of nuclear weapons; establish a dialogue with Russia about transparency and confidence-building regarding nonstrategic nuclear weapons with a view to integrating this weapon category into the overall arms control agenda; and engage Russia in missile defense cooperation projects.

6.
Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in Europe*

Steven Pifer

When considering the growing discussion in Europe over NATO's nuclear posture, attitudes toward Russia, and increasing fiscal pressures on the defense budgets of all allies, three observations emerge. First, current trends raise the prospect that few, if any, US non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons will remain forward-deployed on European soil in a decade's time. Second, the nuclear issue will require careful management within NATO, where individual member states have very different views on NATO nuclear policy and posture. Third, bringing those nuclear weapons into a future round of US-Russian nuclear arms reduction negotiations might offer a way to square the different views within NATO. It might also provide a path for the alliance to get something in return – reductions in Russian tactical nuclear weapons – for the drawdown or complete removal of US tactical weapons from Europe.

US NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR WAY OUT OF EUROPE?

According to unclassified accounts, the United States currently deploys some 200 B-61 tactical nuclear gravity bombs at air bases in Belgium,

* This chapter is an elaboration of comments made by the author to the paper Oliver Thränert presented at the Transatlantic Security Symposium 2010, 'European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship,' jointly organized by the Instituto Affari Internazionali and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, and held in Rome, Italy, on November 8, 2010 (see chapter 5).

Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey.[1] These weapons are designated for use by US aircraft or allied aircraft which are wired for nuclear delivery and whose crews are appropriately trained. Current trends, however, raise the prospect that few, if any, of these weapons will remain in Europe in ten years time.

No one sees a compelling military rationale for maintaining these weapons in Europe any longer. When asked at an April 8th, 2010, Council on Foreign Relations meeting whether there was a military mission for US nuclear weapons in Europe that could not be handled by conventional forces or US strategic nuclear systems, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James E. Cartwright answered plainly 'no'.[2] In doing so, he confirmed what senior US military officers regularly say in private.

During the Cold War, US nuclear weapons in Europe underpinned NATO deterrence and defense in the face of large Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional force advantages. The Warsaw Pact dissolved twenty years ago, most of its former members have since joined NATO, and the Soviet Union collapsed shortly thereafter. The Russian army is a shadow of its Soviet predecessor. While it defeated the Georgian army in 2008, that victory revealed substantial shortcomings. Most NATO governments, and their publics, today do not see the Russian military as posing a significant security threat (though this is not a uniform view within the alliance).

There may be a political rationale for keeping US nuclear weapons in Europe, such as to underscore the transatlantic security link and/or maintain nuclear burden-sharing. But will these reasons prove persuasive with NATO governments, elites or publics? That is hard to see, particularly at a time when many in Europe regard Russia as a partner. Further, are European leaders prepared to lead in shaping opinion in favor of sustaining an American nuclear presence? There does not appear to

1. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: US Nuclear Forces, 2010", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May/June 2010, p. 67, http://www.thebulletin.org/files/066003008.pdf.

2. Federal News Service, Council on Foreign Relations meeting transcript, 'Nuclear Posture Review,' April 8, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/Council_on_Foreign_Relation.pdf.

be anyone of the stature of Helmut Kohl or Margaret Thatcher in Europe's present leadership ranks.

Several NATO member states – Germany, Belgium, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway – favor the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons. They seem comfortable with the idea that extended deterrence could be provided by US-based strategic nuclear forces, just as those forces provide a nuclear umbrella for Japan, South Korea and Australia, with no US nuclear arms forward-based in Asia.

There is, moreover, a practical driver that makes the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear arms more likely: the looming retirement of dual-capable aircraft, which can deliver both conventional and (US-provided) nuclear munitions, from European air forces. Germany maintains some Tornado aircraft for delivery of US B-61 bombs, among other missions. The German air force plans, however, to retire the Tornado sometime between 2015 and 2020 and replace it with the Eurofighter. At this point, the Germans have no plans to wire the Eurofighter for delivery of nuclear weapons; doing so would require choosing an option that would be expensive – the wiring would be unique to German Eurofighters – and would require a political decision, including approval by the Bundestag, Germany's lower house. Absent these decisions, the default mode for the German air force is to lose its capability to deliver B-61 bombs when the Tornados go out of service.[3]

The Belgian air force now flies nuclear-capable F-16s, which will approach the end of their service life over the next ten years. At this point, the Belgian government has made no decision to procure either Eurofighters or Joint Strike Fighters F35 (a 9-strong consortium-run multi-role aircraft project) to replace the F-16s, let alone a decision on wiring the successor aircraft for delivery of nuclear bombs. Given budget pressures, Belgium may procure no successor to the F-16.

3. A German military officer observed in a private November 2010 discussion that ending the dual-capable mission for the German air force would be a political decision, not a technical decision driven by the retirement of the Tornado. If directed, the German air force could keep some Tornados flying; it might not like that given the expense and difficulty of securing spare parts, but the air force would follow the political decision of the chancellery and cabinet.

If both Germany and Belgium give up dual-capable aircraft over the next ten years, it is impossible to see the Netherlands, which has made a preliminary decision to purchase Joint Strike Fighters to replace its aging F-16s, giving those aircraft a nuclear delivery capability. And, if Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands no longer maintain dual-capable aircraft, there is little logic to continuing to deploy B-61 bombs in those countries.

The withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands would, in turn, raise the question: are Italy and Turkey prepared politically to be the only NATO members hosting US nuclear weapons? One would expect, at least in Rome, significant political pressure to follow the lead of the three northern European states.

The alliance thus appears on a course toward a reduction in, if not complete withdrawal of, US European-based nuclear weapons. Were Iran to acquire a demonstrable nuclear weapons capability, that might create a new threat perception. But it is not clear that that would prove a game-changer sufficient to generate and sustain political support in Europe for maintaining dual-capable aircraft and a US nuclear presence on NATO soil.

THE NEED FOR CAREFUL MANAGEMENT

The deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe has been a central feature of NATO's deterrent and defense posture since the 1950s. Issues involving the US nuclear presence – such as the proposed multinational nuclear force in the early 1960s or the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in the early 1980s – generated considerable debate among alliance members, and sometimes among their publics. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been relatively little discussion of NATO nuclear policy as the number of US nuclear weapons in Europe has been quietly reduced.

As NATO now considers the issues of its nuclear policy and posture – including the question of US nuclear arms in Europe – careful management will be required. NATO member states hold diverse views. As noted, Belgium, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and

Norway favor reducing or withdrawing US nuclear weapons. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has been particularly vocal in calling for the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Germany.

Other allies disagree. The Baltic and Central European states – which joined NATO in 1999 and thereafter – largely support keeping the current policy and posture. They remain wary of Russia, attach great importance to NATO's Article V guarantee, and fear that a change in NATO's nuclear posture could signal a weakening of the US commitment to Europe's defense. Their attachment to NATO's current nuclear posture reflects in large part a broader lack of confidence in the Article V guarantee. Not all member states that have joined NATO in the past eleven years are confident that, in the unlikely event of a conflict with Russia, their allies would be there. Thus, the Poles have pressed hard to secure deployment of US missile interceptors and Patriot batteries on Polish soil. This does not appear to be motivated by the specific missile system itself; the Poles want US troops on their soil as an additional guarantee of Polish security.

NATO allies who wish to persuade the Baltic and Central European states to adopt a more flexible position on NATO nuclear policy and posture might consider whether there are other ways to reassure the new member states that, should the need arise, the alliance would be there to defend them. NATO has reportedly developed contingency plans for the defense of the newer member states. Another way would be for NATO to develop conventional force capabilities that could rapidly deploy to the territory of the alliance's eastern members. But the alliance has had little success in generating such capabilities, and it is difficult to see that happening in the future, when virtually all allies face a period of falling defense budgets.

France presents a special case. The French would prefer to see no change in NATO nuclear policy, at least not in declaratory policy. That stems from a French view that nuclear deterrence should be based on ambiguity as to the circumstances in which Paris might resort to nuclear weapons. This contrasts with the US policy, which, as a result of the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, has sought to make nuclear deterrence more transparent and predictable. For example, Washington has stated a negative security assurance under which it would not use, or

threaten to use, nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state party to – and in compliance with its obligations under – the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Obama administration has also stated that it seeks to create the conditions under which the 'sole purpose' of US nuclear weapons would be to deter a nuclear attack on the United States, its allies or partners.

There thus is a broad spectrum of views among NATO members over NATO nuclear policy and posture. Secretary of State Clinton in April 2010 in Tallinn articulated five principles regarding NATO nuclear weapons. First, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. Second, as a nuclear alliance, widely sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities is fundamental. Third, the broad aim is to continue to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons. Fourth, allies must broaden deterrence against 21st Century threats, including by pursuing territorial missile defense. And fifth, in any future negotiations, the aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members and include non-strategic nuclear weapons in the next round of US-Russian arms control discussions alongside strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons. [4]

Those principles appear capable of accommodating a broad range of outcomes. The most limiting principle seems to be the second, which calls for wide nuclear-sharing.

The strategic concept adopted by NATO leaders on November 19, 2010 reaffirms that "deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy." It adds that "as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance" and that "the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the alliance, particularly those of the United States." The document also states that "NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible levels of forces. Arms

4. Simon Lunn, *Reducing the Role of NATO's Nuclear Weapons: Where Do We Stand after Tallinn?*, RUSI Briefing Note, June 2010, p. 11.

control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability".[5]

The joint declaration adopted by alliance leaders on November 20 instructed the North Atlantic Council to "continue to review NATO's overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the alliance"' and added that the review would include the range of NATO capabilities, "including NATO's nuclear posture and missile defense and other means of strategic deterrence and defense".[6] Some NATO allies see this review as their best chance in the next decade to effect a significant change in NATO nuclear posture. Careful management of the review will be necessary if nuclear weapons are not to become a divisive issue within the alliance.

AN ARMS CONTROL SOLUTION?

Arms control may offer a way to manage the NATO nuclear weapons issue, though it could in the end require a tough decision on whether to remove or maintain US European-based nuclear weapons. Arms control might offer the alliance the opportunity to get something for the reduction in or withdrawal of those weapons, as opposed to the path of almost 'accidental' nuclear disarmament on which it now appears headed.

When signing the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START) in April 2010, US President Barack Obama stated that future negotiations should include non-strategic and non-deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the United States could agree to reduce its strategic arsenal much below New START's limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads without addressing in some way the large number of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons.

---

5. *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, 'Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,' adopted by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, November 19, 2010.

6. *Lisbon Summit Declaration*, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, November 20, 2010.

Negotiating reductions in and limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons will not be simple. The Russians maintain a significantly larger tactical nuclear arsenal than does the United States, and persuading the Russians to give up that numerical advantage will not be easy. The Russians, moreover, attach importance to those weapons. Stealing a page from NATO's books from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, Moscow regards tactical nuclear weapons as critical offsets to what the Russians perceive as conventional force disadvantages *vis-à-vis* NATO and China.

It may well be that Moscow has legitimate reasons for maintaining more tactical nuclear weapons than does the United States; Russia does not enjoy the protection afforded the United States by two oceans and two friendly bordering states. But the current Russian tactical nuclear inventory exceeds any reasonable requirement. For example, how many tens (or hundreds) of nuclear weapons would Russia really employ on its own territory against an invading Chinese army before the conflict escalated to a strategic nuclear exchange? Should there be a new round of US-Russian nuclear arms reduction negotiations, US negotiators should press hard to tackle the issue of reducing and limiting non-strategic weapons. European leaders, particularly those who have established close relations with President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, should use those contacts to reinforce the message of the need for Russia to dramatically reduce its tactical nuclear arsenal.

The United States may have some leverage to press the Russians on non-strategic weapons. First, the United States will reach its New START warhead limit largely by 'downloading' Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), that is, by removing warheads from the missiles so that they carry fewer warheads than their capacity. The removed warheads will be stored but could, if needed, be redeployed back to the ICBMs and SLBMs. The Russians are reducing missiles and appear to be keeping the remainder with full warhead loads. The United States thus will have an advantage in the number of strategic warheads that might be returned to strategic ballistic missiles. Washington should seek to trade limits on non-deployed strategic warheads for Russian agreement to limit non-strategic weapons.

A second area of possible leverage is the US forward-deployed nuclear arsenal in Europe. The Russians very much want to see those weapons removed and have stated that nuclear weapons should be based only on national territory. Moscow might make withdrawal of US nuclear weapons a requirement for any agreement that would cover tactical or non-strategic nuclear arms. The question would then arise: to what level *x* could US negotiators persuade the Russians to reduce their non-strategic nuclear weapons? Is there some number *x* that would secure the agreement of most, if not all, NATO allies for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe? That level *x* would vary from country to country: it would certainly be higher for Germany than for Estonia. But it would be worthwhile for the United States to explore in negotiations what level *x* would be.

An agreement on non-strategic nuclear weapons might offer other outcomes of interest to NATO. Some Russian analysts assert that most, if not all, Russian tactical nuclear weapons are not operationally deployed with their delivery systems but are consolidated at centralized storage depots (it is not clear that this is really the case). An agreement might make this a requirement, which would separate – or 'de-mate' – tactical nuclear weapons from their delivery systems, which should be of particular interest to those NATO allies close to Russia's borders.

Crafting a verification regime for limits on non-strategic weapons will not be simple. The United States (and NATO) might in a future arms control agreement have to accept a verification regime in which there would be high confidence in the ability to monitor limits on deployed strategic weapons but significantly lesser confidence in verifying limits on non-strategic (or non-deployed strategic) nuclear warheads. But having some limits on and some monitoring of Russian tactical nuclear weapons could be preferable to the current situation, in which those Russian weapons are completely unconstrained and under no monitoring whatsoever.

While achieving an agreement that reduced and limited non-strategic nuclear weapons along with reductions below New START's limits on deployed strategic forces would by no means be easy, the United States and NATO should consult on possible acceptable outcomes. An arms control solution offers a way for NATO to 'cash in' the nuclear weapons

the United States currently deploys in Europe that appear likely to be reduced or withdrawn in almost any case.

To explore such outcomes, the United States and NATO should consider a mechanism – such as the Special Consultative Group that met regularly during the 1980s to consult on the negotiation on intermediate-range nuclear forces – to discuss how the United States might address non-strategic nuclear weapons in a future US-Russian negotiation. Involving the allies early in a dedicated forum for discussion of US negotiating positions would give them confidence that their views were being heard and taken into account. Such a forum could prove a useful tool in avoiding intra-alliance splits over nuclear weapons issues, and could shape NATO support for the US arms control negotiating position with Russia.

7.
Russia in European Security Architecture: Contributor or Contender?*

Arkady Moshes

It has been frequently and correctly pointed out that in August 2008 the European security system demonstrated a fundamental deficiency. Multiple multilateral and bilateral structures created to guarantee peace, stability and cooperation on the continent proved to be unable to prevent a war between two countries, Russia and Georgia, which were both members of several of those structures, starting with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Since that moment serious attempts have been undertaken to address this deficiency on both conceptual and practical levels. The expert discussion has produced a solid body of recommendations on how to foster long-term and all-inclusive security in Europe.[1] In turn, the institutions

---

* Revised manuscript for publication, originally prepared for the Transatlantic Security Symposium 2010, 'European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship,' jointly organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, and held in Rome, Italy, on November 8, 2010.

1. To name just a few, one can see the following publications: East-West Institute, *Euro-Atlantic Security: One Vision, Three Paths*, 2009; *K novoi arkhitekture evropeiskoi bezopasnosti* (Towards a new European security architecture), "Russian experts' report for the Valdai Club conference, London, December 8th-9th, 2009; Margarete Klein, Russia's Plan for a New Pan-European Security Regime: A "Serious Proposal or an Attempt at Division?", *Russian Analytical Digest*, no. 55, February 18th, 2009, pp. 6-9; S. Dias Fernandez, *Time to reassess European security architecture? The NATO-EU-Russia Security Triangle*, European Policy Institute Network Working Paper no. 22, March 2009; Rolf Mützenich, "Security with or against Russia? On the Russian proposal for a 'European Security Treaty'", *International Politics and Society*, no. 2, 2010, electronic ed.; U. Kühn, "Medvedev's Proposals for a New European Security Order: A Starting point or the End

concerned have launched a series of consultations and debates, aimed at raising their effectiveness within the allocated spheres of competence.

The underlying problem, however, does not seem to have been solved. Indeed, it is in all fairness very difficult to approach in a comprehensive manner. This problem is the inherent dualism of Russia's role in European security, a deep internal antagonism which affects both what Russia does and even more so how it is perceived abroad.

On the one hand, it is a common sense to believe that Europe cannot hope to have a sustainable security regime without Russia's participation. Apparently, no one would be willing to contest the conclusion that if Russia for whatever reason chooses not to be a responsible stake-holder – let alone to undermine whatever emerging or existing arrangement – it will be difficult to make it work, especially if one deals with the territories of the so-called 'common neighborhood' between Russia and the enlarged European Union and NATO. Consequently, it becomes crucial to involve Russia into the construction of a cooperative regime, and this is why Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev's initiative to start negotiations on a new European Security Treaty, put forward in summer 2008, was received in the West as an invitation to a serious discussion.

On the other hand, it is equally self-evident that for a number of European countries Russia primarily represents a security concern – not one part of the problem, but the entire and only problem. Traditionally, observers attribute this view to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which have historical reasons of anxiety *vis-à-vis* Russia. In fact, the list is not fully exhausted by those countries, even though apprehensions elsewhere can be weaker and are not expressed too vocally.[2]

---

of the Story?", *Connections*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2010, pp. 1-16; Vladimir Baranovsky, "Russia's Approach to Security Building in the Euro-Atlantic Zone", *The International Spectator*, vol. 45, no. 2, June 2010, pp. 41-53; Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Sergey Oznobishchev, "Moskva-Briussel: voprosy ostayutsya. Otnosheniya Rossii i NATO: vozmozhno li realistichnoe partnerstvo?" (Moscow-Brussels: questions remain. Relations between Russia and NATO: is real partnership possible?) *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, July 2-8, 2010; Jordi Vaquer i Fanes. *Focusing again on European Security: The Medvedev proposal as an opportunity*, Documentos CIDOB, Seguridad y politica mundial 06, July 2010.

2. As an illustration, a leading Finnish columnist writes: "Whether Russia is a great power or not, it remains Finland's only security policy risk". Kari Huhta, "The voice of

The task of engaging Russia is thus automatically becoming bi-dimensional. As rightly emphasized by Russian scholar Vladimir Baranovsky, "among the challenges that Europe is facing in terms of organizing its own security space, the most serious one could be defined as alleviating concerns *in* and *about* Russia" (italics come from the original text).[3]

The dilemma is easily solved, on a theoretical level, if the objectives are – somewhat mechanically – united within a single political framework. A good example of this approach can be found in the recommendations of the high-level expert group on NATO's new strategic concept, which state that allies "should endorse a policy that combines reassurance for all alliance members and constructive re-engagement with Russia" and that the goal of cooperation must be pursued "while also guarding against the possibility that Russia could decide to move in a more adversarial direction".[4] The strategic concept adopted by NATO leaders in November 2010 in Lisbon echoes these lines, although it puts more emphasis on the opportunity of cooperation rather than the risk of confrontation.

But whether this can be achieved in practice remains an open question. It is totally possible that one only of the two components of the strategy will be given a priority. It is easy to declare that European security should be indivisible and address the concerns of all participating states. It is more difficult, when agreeing that today's European security regime cannot neglect the interests of Russia, not to imply that this would ignore the interests of Georgia – and vice versa – because their bilateral conflict leaves no hope to be solved soon.

This unique dualism of the Russian position will affect European security in the foreseeable future and determine the uncertainty concerning the future of Russian-Western re-engagement in the security field. It

---

Finland: audible, but still rather quiet", *Helsingin Sanomat – International Edition*, August 25th, 2010, http://www.hs.fi/english/article/NEWS+ANALYSIS+The+voice+of+Finland+audible+but+still+rather+quiet/1135259588056.

3. Vladimir Baranovsky, Op.cit., p. 42.

4. *NATO 2020: assured security; dynamic engagement. Analysis and recommendation of the group of experts on a new strategic concept for NATO*, 17 May 2010, pp. 27, 16.

would be wrong at the moment to predict the reversal of the current trend, but it would be equally wrong to forecast a smooth advancement towards sustainable partnership. It can only be hoped that pragmatic cooperation will be possible on specific issues and, if successful, that it will gradually dent mutual mistrust.

SEEING AN OPPORTUNITY

The positive momentum in Russian-Western security relationship is undeniable. Its key elements can be easily identified and assessed. A number of problems were solved or at least said to have been solved.

The main driver is, naturally, the reset between Russia and the United States, which has produced extremely important results such as a new START agreement, signed in April 2010 and entered into force in early 2011, the scrapping of the plan to deploy elements of a US-built ballistic missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia's confirmed commitment to support US and NATO effort in Afghanistan and, most recently, Russia's backing of new sanctions on Iran and the cancellation of the sale of S-300 air defense system to Iran's armed forces.[5] The atmosphere in the bilateral relations has changed for the better to the degree that even a spy scandal that broke out in July 2010 does not seem to have had any negative political impact. But most importantly, taking the role that the United States plays in defining the security discourse in the West at large into account, the Obama administration's readiness to view Russia primarily as a partner in enforcing the global non-proliferation regime and fighting terrorism and to seek compromises with Moscow on the basis of this understanding has triggered a similar wave of re-thinking in other countries. Voices of Russia-skeptics have not disappeared, but they have largely gone out of fashion.

Consequently, NATO-Russian contacts that had been frozen since the Russian-Georgian conflict have been normalized. The NATO-Russia

5. For details see R. Craig Nation, "Results of the 'Reset' in US-Russian relations", *IFRI Russie/Nei/Visions*, no. 53, July 2010.

Council has resumed its regular sessions. NATO's secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen has made an improvement of the alliance's relations with Moscow his priority and has even become a champion of a joint missile defense project that would include Russia. Suggestions to invite Russia to join NATO have been aired by various academic and public figures, and President Medvedev even got to Lisbon in November 2010 to attend the NATO summit. [6]

What is crucial, the current normalization is based on a solid underpinning, namely the implicit recognition on both sides that the plans of further eastern enlargement of NATO have been shelved *ad infinitum*, if not abandoned altogether. NATO's public position may still refer to the decisions of the 2008 Bucharest summit according to which Ukraine and Georgia one day would be members of NATO, but that does not look credible any longer. The reason is not only the fear of getting involved in a real military conflict with Russia in case of further enlargement nor the logic according to which "NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine is not commensurate with an agenda for resetting US-Russian relations"[7] – after all the alliance as a whole will probably never produce consensus around this view. There are two other, no less important reasons. One is the conclusion in several leading old member states that their security interests have been sufficiently guaranteed during previous rounds of enlargement and further extension would not add anything to their national security. The other one is the lack of internal support for the membership cause in the Ukrainian case and territorial disputes in the Georgian case, which undermine the legitimacy of the membership bids of both countries. In this way, the issue that for one and half decades has been the primary irritant for Russia as far as its relations with NATO were concerned, has been taken off the agenda.

In the meantime, the OSCE has been revitalized. The Corfu process, launched in June 2009 with the goal to raise the efficiency of the organi-

6. See for example, "It's Time to Invite Russia to Join NATO", open letter by Volker Ruhe, Klaus Naumann, Frank Elbe and Ulrich Weisser, *Spiegel Online*, March 8th, 2010, http://spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,682287,00.html; Charles Kupchan, "NATO's Final Frontier", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 89, Issue 3, May/June 2010, pp. 100-112.

7. R. Craig Nation, Op. cit., p. 14.

zation, can be called a success story. First, Russia, despite its generally cold attitude towards the organization (Russia has developed a sort of allergy to the OSCE's emphasis on the upholding of democratic standards, which it believes serves as an instrument to exert diplomatic pressure on it) nevertheless chose to take part in the process rather than derail it. Moscow continues to see the Corfu process as a not fully adequate format for the debate and is reluctant to channel the discussion on its proposed European Security Treaty through the OSCE, but it does not attempt to replace it with a different forum. Second, the Corfu process includes all three baskets of the Helsinki process (political-military, socio-economic, and human dimension) and does not reduce the debate to issues of hard security. On a separate note, but possibly having a linkage to Corfu, Russian attitude to the Council of Europe has changed for the better, which is revealed both in the official appraisal of the organization and the ratification of the 14th Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights.[8] Russia's refusal to do so earlier had blocked the reform of the European Court of Human Rights.

EU-Russian relations are lagging behind. The negotiations on a new comprehensive framework agreement progress very slowly if at all, reciprocal frustration accumulates in the field of energy relations, whereas the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative is viewed in Moscow as aimed to weaken Russia's influence in the common neighborhood. The Lisbon Treaty's entry info force does not seem to have made Moscow believe that the EU will become a prominent foreign policy actor or that the Union will finally gain the ability to speak with one voice on international and security matters. The mutual interest in launching the so-called Partnership for Modernization is manifested mainly at a level of political declarations and even action plans are yet to be prepared.

Several flourishing bilateral relationships between Russia and key EU member states have not grown into an all-encompassing partnership

8. See the article of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, "Euro-Atlantica: equal security for all", *Defence National*, May 2010; here Russian translations of the article is cited which is available at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/2fee282eb6df40e643256999005e6e8c/11767a9c3045022cc325772d00415746?OpenDocument.

with the Union. Noteworthy, however, in this situation the parties seem to believe that re-invigorating security cooperation may be a way out of the impasse. At least the Russian-German joint proposal, put forward in June 2010, to set up an EU-Russia Political and Security Committee is expected to be implemented without major difficulties.

There is a noticeable progress between Russia and some countries, whose relations with Moscow were complicated until recently. Above all, one should mention the Russian-Polish normalization that followed the tragic death of Polish president Lech Kaczynski in Smolensk in April 2010 (although the recent release of a Russian report that puts all the blame for the accident on the Polish crew has caused outrage in Poland). But the growing Russian-Danish cooperation, which was earlier impeded by Copenhagen's support of the NATO membership of the Baltic states and the non-opposition to the Chechen *émigré* activity, as well as the solution found by Russia and Norway to their old dispute concerning the borders of their respective economic zones in the Arctic Sea, should not be overlooked either. One can also sense a softening of Russia's approach towards the Baltic states.

The election of Viktor Yanukovich as president of Ukraine should have eased Russian concerns about a possible Euro-Atlantic drift of that country. In April 2010 Kiev agreed to extend the lease of the naval base in Sevastopol to the Russian Black Sea Fleet until 2042 and in July 2010 Ukraine's parliament adopted the legislation proclaiming the country's 'non-bloc' status, according to which Ukraine is barred from joining any military alliance. The medium-term future of Russian-Ukrainian relations is not clear. Obviously, the controversies resulting from Russia's interest in taking control of the Ukrainian gas transit system, assets in aircraft and chemical industry as well as railway and port infrastructure, will push President Yanukovich towards balancing Russia with the help of the West. Similarly, the deplorable state of the national economy will make him seek the support of international financial institutions, which will open the possibility for the West to approach Ukraine by means of a conditionality policy. Moscow would hardly view such developments with indifference. However, it would simply not be feasible to exert the same kind of pressure on Yanukovich (gas supply cuts, withdrawal of an ambassador, break in top-level contacts) as the previous, pro-West

Ukrainian administration had to withstand. The conflict potential is thus diminishing also here.

Finally, the very nature of the current debate should facilitate the engagement between Russia and the West. The renewed and narrowed focus on hard security should raise Russia's interest to continue it, because this is the only field where it can substantiate the claim to be considered equal to the West.

UNDERSTANDING THE COMPLEXITY

Welcoming the change for the better, it would be nevertheless simply wrong to underestimate the powerful factors that threaten the sustainability of the process. The context in which Russia and its Western partners try to re-define the role of the former in European security has not yet evolved to the extent that positive trends are irreversible.

First of all, the gap in rules and norms that regulate both internal and external behavior of Russia and the EU-NATO states respectively has not narrowed and apparently is not narrowing. 'Rules' here may be a more meaningful word than 'values' which can be illustrated by looking into less sensitive issues than security. For example, Russia's inability to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) after almost two decades of negotiations, which is difficult to interpret as hinging on something other than a lack of interest, reveals that Moscow is not ready to play by rules set by others. In turn, 'the others' do not want to change the rules that they have set up before and which, they believe, still work. Absence of common rules minimizes the window of opportunities by definition. *Ad hoc* cooperation on specific issues becomes the only available option as opposed to a comprehensive all-out engagement.

It is easy to come across the same feature when one returns to the security domain. Given the absence of normative convergence between Russia and Western countries, it does not come as a surprise that only Russia promotes the idea of a new European Security Treaty while other states are essentially happy with the existing NATO-based and OSCE-based continental security arrangement – symptomatically, the draft text of the treaty prepared by Russian officials places allegiance

to the treaty above the allegiance to all other existing alliance obligations.[9] Nor comes as a surprise that only Russia, of all member states of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, believes that its interests will be better guaranteed if it withdraws from the treaty than if it complies with it.

Second, when analysts say that today's opportunity is comparable with those that emerged after the Cold War and 9/11, their argument is not fully convincing.[10] In the two previous cases the fundamental changes in the global security situation were obvious. Today, one rather deals with a reassessment and new understanding of priorities than with a revolutionary transformation of the security landscape. For as long as the current political choices can be again revised, they can hardly serve as a firm background for re-engagement. What will happen if the next US administration for whichever reason decides to again focus on democracy promotion globally or in the former Soviet Union? What will happen if the oil prices return to the levels of 2008 diminishing – not the objective need but – the immediate urgency for the Russian government to seek economic interaction with the West? What will happen if personal foreign policy style of Russia's next leader will be closer to the assertive content of Vladimir Putin's 2007 Munich speech than to the more cooperative wording of Dmitry Medvedev? These questions are not rhetorical, but of direct practical relevance.

In reality, besides the European Security Treaty initiative – associated, noteworthy, with the name of President Medvedev rather than with the ruling Medvedev/Putin tandem as a whole – Russian diplomacy displays more continuity than change. It has not given up the post-imperial claim to have special rights in the post-Soviet space. It continues to see NATO's actions with extreme suspicion.[11] It is reluctant to

9. The 14-point draft was finally made public on the Kremlin's website in November 2009. Limited to the principle of indivisibility of security, it stipulates that security measures taken by one party shall be implemented with due regard to security interests of other parties. See also Oksana Antonenko's chapter in this volume.

10. Anatoly Lieven, "Spies aside Moscow has Come from the Cold", *Financial Times*, July 1st, 2010.

11. Russian Military Doctrine adopted in February 2010 identifies attempts to give

make even those insignificant but symbolically important gestures that would create a more open and more cooperative image of Russian leadership.[12] It is candid, provocative, self-confident and certain about the correctness of the *fait accompli*-type of policy when discussing the most divisive issue on the Russian-Western agenda – the outcome of 2008 war with Georgia.[13]

To summarize, Russia perceives itself as a pole in a multi-polar world and it does not seem that it would feel uncomfortable with being in a position defined by a French analyst as 'strategic solitude'.[14] To what extent this is a genuine self-assessment or diplomatic appearance may be worth a separate discussion, but it is clear that great power thinking and 'red-line' and 'zero-sum' attitudes remain rather strong.

Third, one cannot ignore a striking asymmetry of reciprocal interests. The interests that are not antagonist and could be harmonized in principle do not match with each other and, therefore, do not lead to an easy trade-off. To be more specific:

- Whereas the Western interest in partnership with Russia is very much security-driven, Russian interest is to a large extent determined by economic factors. However, in order to attract foreign investment and technologies a country does not necessarily have to develop security cooperation with the West, as proven by Asian states. It would suffice to open the economy, to accede to the system

NATO global missions and advancement of NATO states military infrastructure towards Russian border as the major external danger (http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/2a959a74cd7ed01f432569fb004872a3?OpenDocument).

12. NATO secretary-general Rasmussen, for instance, expressed his regrets that whereas NATO,while preparing its new strategic concept, had invited Russia to provide input, Moscow published the Military Doctrine without any consultations with NATO. Tracy McNicoll, "Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Reaching Out to Russia", *Newsweek*, vol. 155, Issue 8, Feb. 22, 2010.

13. Minister Lavrov said in an interview: "For us the question is settled finally and irreversibly. I would dare say that it is equally and irreversibly settled for other serious countries. It's just due to political correctness or other political reasons they cannot officially admit that". *Kommersant*, June 11th, 2010.

14. Thomas Gomart (see "Russia Alone Forever? The Kremlin's Strategic Solitude Politque étrangère", special issue *World Policy Conference*, 2008, p. 23-33.

of global rules and to fight crime, corruption and abuse at home. In short, the recipe as to how to create a favorable economic regime for foreign investment is well-known. Furthermore, a kind of trade-off in this particular sphere has already taken place in the middle of the past decade when the West chose to pursue the so-called 'pragmatic interests' in relations with Russia while agreeing to put the value gap on a backburner.

- Whereas the primary interest of the West is to secure Russian cooperation on global issues, the price that it might have to pay concerns issues of European security. Whether the commonality of global interests can be successfully decoupled from disagreements in the continental affairs is doubtful.
- Whereas the West urges Russia to proceed from the commonality of soft security risks, Russia would more likely gain the recognition of its status raising the hard security agenda where it is by definition a primary player. Within the soft security sphere (internal security, justice and home affairs) Russia has strongly voiced its interest in two objectives: more effective fight against Afghan drugs trafficking and introduction of the visa freedom for reciprocal travel of Russian and EU citizens. It is hard to predict whether, when and how Russian demands could be met. But it is obvious that if Russia and the EU do not trust each other (and each other's law enforcement system) to such an extent that they cannot agree to allow mutual short-term visa-free visits, the road to soft security cooperation will be very long.

Fourth, it remains to be seen whether the platform of security partnership between Russia and the West will be supported by public opinion. If not, the mutual rapprochement will be lacking democratic legitimacy. Admittedly, this is a relatively less important factor to be taken into account by foreign policy practitioners, but nevertheless it is not possible to restore the mutual confidence unless the process relies on a broad public support. Russian public opinion, due to the governmental control of the broadcast media, is more likely to follow the change in the official rhetoric, and this explains why in May 2010 33 percent of respondents of an opinion poll conducted by the Levada Center said that rapproche-

ment with NATO would be in Russia's interest compared with only 23 percent a year earlier. But at the same time 34 percent still thought it would be against Russia's interest (49 percent in 2009) and 33 percent found it difficult to answer (28 percent in 2009). Noteworthy, between 2004 and 2010 the share of opponents to this cooperation was always bigger than that of supporters.[15] In turn, in Europe, including the countries viewed to be Russia's close partners like Germany or France, Russia's image also worsened considerably throughout the last decade (even though further studies are needed), not least as a result of its conflict with Georgia.[16]

Fifth, banal as it seems, European security today is not bipolar. There is a group of countries – especially Ukraine, but Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan should be borne in mind as well – that are not members of the Euro-Atlantic zone of security and prosperity, but that also consistently refuse to take part in Russia-centered security projects, even though some of them do not have aspirations to join the EU or NATO. Unless they are integrated into a new regime, the system will not be stable.

INSTITUTIONS OVER-LOCKING AND OVER-BLOCKING: WHAT TO EXPECT?

One of the conceptual premises of the current round of the debate on how to re-engage Russia into security cooperation is the assumption about its isolation and exclusion by the West which is supposed to explain Russia's discomfort. For example, American scholar Charles Kupchan emphasizes that the West constructed "a post-Cold War order that effectively shuts Russia out", even though he admits that this outcome was in part a product of Russia's own making because the democratic transition stalled and certain foreign policy actions warranted

15. http://www.levada.ru/press/2010061502.html.

16. Steven Szabo. "Can Berlin and Washington Agree on Russia?", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 32. no. 4, October 2009, pp. 26-28.

NATO's role as a hedge against re-emergence of Russian expansionism.[17]

It is difficult to accept this conclusion in its entirety. As a holder of one of the five veto-wielding permanent seats in the UN Security Council and a member of a large number of continental as well as regional organizations in Europe, Russia can hardly be viewed as having no say in European security. What is true, however, is that more than once this say was not loud enough to be able to prevent the developments that Moscow would have liked to prevent. First of all, one should refer to several decisions adopted by the West in the Balkans. Russian opposition was ignored, and the West chose the same *fait accompli*-based approach for which it later criticized Russian actions in the South Caucasus. But most importantly, this concerns the inability of Russia to affect decisions taken inside NATO in any systemic way, if at all. If this is the main embodiment of isolation and marginalization and the source of Moscow's major discontent, then there is little reason to believe that the situation can dramatically evolve for the better.

To change the substance of NATO-Russian relations is extremely difficult because whereas Russia's membership in the alliance is neither sought nor can be seen as easily feasible, any status which is short of membership – and thus short of the full veto right – will hardly satisfy Moscow. The latter explains why the cooperative arrangements which have been tested first in the shape of the Permanent Joint Council established in 1997 and then the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) set up in 2002 have not lived up to expectations.

The Russian official position, according to which the country should not try to join NATO even if invited, reflects a near consensus that exists in the analysts' community. More conservative analysts arrive at this conclusion because they realize that accession to an alliance based on values would require fundamental and, from their point of view, not desirable internal transformation of the country. It would again imply the agreement to fulfill membership criteria set up by others and would make all the attempts to prevent membership of other countries – nota-

17. Charles Kupchan. Op. cit., p. 100.

bly Georgia and Ukraine – ahead of Russia logically unsustainable and practically futile. Both conservatives and liberals agree that by entering NATO Russia would lose its geostrategic identity and would have to accept US unquestionable leadership, which would not be in its interest. Separately, a warning against provoking China by joining NATO is sometimes made.[18]

Lack of membership aspirations as such is not necessarily an obstacle for cooperation. On the contrary, officially Moscow emphasizes the usefulness that it sees in the activity of the NATO-Russia Council,[19] and some experts have explored the opportunities of evolution towards a 'strategic partnership' and even the prospect of a union between Russia and NATO in the long term.[20] One of the lessons that seems to have been learned from the conflict between Russia and Georgia is that Russia-NATO security dialogue and consultations should continue in difficult situations and that the NRC should not be a 'good weather' platform. All this notwithstanding, it is clear that a body that brings together a group of states which can have prior consultations and an agreed position, and an outsider, has essential structural limits.

This dilemma was addressed by the Russian proposal on the new European Security Treaty. As recalled above, this initiative triggered a useful discussion. But now, after two and half years of debates, it can be firmly argued that the attempt to circumvent the problem of Russia's lack of partnership and even understanding with NATO by means of creating a new regime is not going to succeed. As one prominent Brussels-based commentator concluded: 'President Medvedev's draft European Security Treaty is not going to fly.'[21]

While agreeing to discuss the issues of European security, both Americans and Europeans from the outset remained skeptical towards

18. For details, and to compare, see Sergey Kortunov, "Edinye pravila dlia evroatlantiki" (Same rules for the Euro-Atlantic region) *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, no. 11, 2009; Dmitri Trenin, "Modernization of Russia's Foreign Policy", (Public Lecture) *Polit.Ru*, March 10th, 2010 (http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2010/03/25/trenin.html).

19. Sergei Lavrov in an interview to *Kommersant*, June 11th, 2010.

20. A. Arbatov, V. Dvorkin, S. Oznobishchev. Op. cit.

21. Michael Emerson, *Russia in Europe and the West*, CEPS Commentary, April 1st, 2010.

the specific proposal. It is hardly possible in this paper to go through all the reasons explaining this skepticism which are identified in the literature, but the three most important can be summarized as follows. First, the willingness to make NATO less relevant and to get a say in NATO's affairs was too easy to sense. The Russian initiative was perceived as "proposing a new tier to European security architecture that stands above all existing security arrangements".[22] Second, the initiative was viewed as intending to be a symbol of the final recognition of Russian political and military resurgence. Third, the proposal was not comprehensive enough and too vague to produce a legally binding document. It omitted important issues, arms control above all. Taken together, this analysis determined Western refusal to negotiate a new security regime for Europe.

It is not clear whether, facing such a reaction, Russia will lose interest in its own initiative. But in either case the situation urgently demands that Russia redefines its attitude towards the OSCE. Moscow can either accept its return to centrality in European security affairs and further contribute to its revitalization, or undermine the whole process, in which case the 2010 Astana OSCE summit might be followed by the reversal of recent positive trends and the organization's slide toward a status of a 'talk shop' at best. Both options are open. On the one hand, fears to indirectly promote a human rights and democratization agenda, which is inevitable if the OSCE gains in importance, will work for the latter option. But on the other hand, the OSCE may provide at least some balance *vis-à-vis* NATO, and so raising the effectiveness of this body may be viewed in Moscow as a lesser evil, since otherwise the centrality of NATO will be even more difficult to oppose.

Two new formats for security interaction between Russia and the West are worth exploring. If successful, they can increase confidence between the partners, although results could be limited at the beginning, materialize only gradually and mostly concern a niche capability of cooperation. One promising format is the above-mentioned EU-Russian

22. P. Nopens, 'A New Security Architecture for Europe? Russian Proposals and Western Reactions,' Part II. *Security Policy Brief* 10, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, April 2010, p. 5.

Political and Security Committee, the value of which is twofold: it would show whether EU and Russia together, not having the possibility to blame – or rely on – the United States, can actually take responsibility for solving security problems that are of concern for both; second, the field for cooperation seems to have been identified: conflict resolution in the common neighborhood, starting with Transnistria, the pro-Russian, de facto independent enclave in eastern Moldova.

Another format is a platform for cooperation between NATO and the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Some observers have suggested that NATO should drop its opposition to this cooperation.[23] Indeed, this would be a good test case to prove whether Western recognition of Russia's leadership within a group of post-Soviet states can actually increase its willingness to cooperate in practice. However, this idea needs to be developed much further before its real added value could be understood. The primary question is not whether individual CSTO member states can invest more in security cooperation with the West (which is already taking place within the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace Program and logistical support for NATO troops in Afghanistan), but whether the CSTO as a whole will develop a capacity to act as a security provider. So far, as attested to by its failure to intervene into the situation in Kyrgyzstan in spring 2010 despite the request from the authorities of this member state, the CSTO in this respect remains more a political organization and lacks either the military potential or the will to use it or both.

CONCLUSIONS: WHAT CAN BE DONE?

Trust in relations between Russia and the West as well as between Russia and its post-Soviet neighbors is an absolutely necessary precondition

23. Thomas Graham, "Transatlanticheskaya bezopasnost: nuzhna li reviziya" (Transatlantic Security: Is Revision Needed?) *Russia in Global Affairs*, July 1st, 2010. (http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/transatlanticheskaya-bezopasnost-nuzhna-li-reviziya-14877). The article is based on author's testimony at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives on March 17th, 2010.

for a stable and cooperative security order in Europe. There are two ways to achieve trust and partner spirit. One is to focus on the common interests and common goals. Another one is to resolve the divisive issues. The former approach, and this is what seems to be happening now according to the proponents of the Russian-Western 'reset', often looks and sometimes actually is more promising. The problem, however, is that unless the backlog of old problems is cleared away, they will come back and eventually make the 'agreement to disagree' just a figure of speech and disagreement an acute reality. Therefore, in order to proceed towards a real security partnership and strengthen European security the sides must be able to reach progress both on the new, common (global) agenda, which unites Russia and the West, and on the old (European) one, which has so far separated them. This may turn out to be mission impossible, but this is the only workable approach in the long term.

The following steps seem to be appropriate to this end.

First of all, discussion should continue. If the West wants to have Russia as a security partner it is worth conveying the message again and again. If Russia wants to secure the change it seeks, it may have to produce new, more convincing arguments why this would benefit everybody. The dialogue, however, will only be beneficial if two conditions are met. To begin with, the two sides should make an effort to avoid fuelling the feeling that one side is more interested in cooperation than the other. Just as the European Union and Russia have finally realized that their relationship is one of interdependence and not dependence, the security players should be aware that all will lose something if security cooperation does not work. The discussion should go into details. Initiatives can be bold and provocative, like the one to build a join missile defense system, or small and uncontroversial. There is no problem if some of them are rejected quickly as non-starters. But this is the best way to define the real potential for cooperation. The sooner the sides know how strong or weak it is, the better.

Since it is clear that there will be no revision of the institutional design of the European security system, it is crucial to raise the efficiency of the current organizations and existing dialogues, starting with the OSCE. The Corfu process should go on. But at the same time before thinking about taking new obligations it would be essential to guarantee

the implementation of the old commitments or at least provide an explicit and consensus-based explanation of why non-compliance with some of them can be tolerated or ignored – even though this is clearly suboptimal.

The OSCE seems to be an appropriate venue to raise the issue of conventional arms control. The CFE treaty may be beyond rescue, but the lack of transparency and verification in this sphere destabilizes the whole relationship between Russia and the West. Conditions for re-establishing some kind of a verification regime should be discussed. Sad and ironical as this may sound two decades after the declared end of the Cold War, it might be timely to return to the foundations of confidence-building and remember about non-provocative military exercises etc.[24] However, it would not be realistic to expect that contingency planning based on the scenario of an attack of one participant of the European security system by another would stop in the foreseeable future, even if this type of contingency planning is by itself a crucial component of the remaining mistrust.

The idea of providing joint – Russian and Western – security guarantees to the countries that may be willing to accept them can be seriously explored. Precedents of multilateral security assurances of this kind exist – for instance, they were given by US, Britain and Russia to Ukraine when in 1994 the latter finally decided to get rid of nuclear weapons inherited from the USSR – but the analysis of whether and how this regime actually worked for the recipient countries is not available. At the same time these joined guarantees should not be imposed upon the states which are willing to gradually integrate into the Euro-Atlantic community. Freedom to choose security arrangements must be honored.

Along with, and maybe even ahead of, the hard security partnership, Russia and the West should build up cooperation on soft security matters. The EU and Russia should take their agreement on the common space on justice and home affairs more seriously and step up the fight against drug- and human-trafficking. But most importantly, they should

24. For a detailed analysis and recommendations on this particular point see Ulrich Kühn, "DOVSE: vykhod iz tupika" (CFE: the way of the impasse) *Russia in Global Affairs*, July 1st, 2010 (http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/DOVSE-vykhod-iz-tupika-14883).

proceed from words to deeds on the issue of visa freedom. This is the most effective instrument of building trust between countries and demonstrating that security cooperation can bring tangible benefits to ordinary people.

Nevertheless, one should be fully realistic about the fact that even a combination of all conceivable forms of security cooperation will not be enough to remove the critical boundaries between membership and non-membership in NATO and the European Union. This implies that outsiders cannot be given the same influence on and access to decision-making in these institutions as insiders. Diplomatic efforts to blur these boundaries, divisive use of most advanced bilateral relationships and even public rhetoric about the need to give non-members a full say on the agenda of the EU and NATO will be a serious factor of disappointment and tension.

Finally, if NATO and the European Union are to remain value-based institutions – and there are no reasons to imagine otherwise – sooner or later they will have to think about how to bridge the value gap in relations with Russia. Without deep democratic changes inside Russia individual joint actions will be, of course, possible, but a comprehensive and lasting security partnership is not likely. This is a key lesson which needs to be learned following the evolution of the European security system since the end of Cold War.

8.

Russia and European Security: A Change of Paradigm or Just Another Abstract Debate?*

Oksana Antonenko

Over the past two decades, Russia and the West (defined here to include NATO and EU member states) have developed closer economic ties and in the post-9/11 world increasingly face common threats and challenges: climate change, Jihadist terrorism and maritime security are key examples. However, their security relationship today is based on less trust, less practical engagement and less transparency than it was during the first years after the Cold War ended. Moreover, the current set of tools available to Russia, NATO or the European Union includes no effective and operational mechanisms to jointly assess, prevent and address major security threats and challenges in the Euro-Atlantic region or globally. Cooperation between NATO and Russia or the EU and Russia takes place on the basis of *ad hoc* arrangements which limits the speed, breadth and strategic character of any cooperative action. Moreover, several EU and NATO members still view Russia as a potential threat rather than a genuine partner. The key inclusive organizations such as the UN and OSCE are in need of a comprehensive reform for which no international consensus exists at present.

* This chapter is an elaboration of comments made by the author to the paper Arkady Moshes presented at the Transatlantic Security Symposium 2010, 'European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship,' jointly organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, and held in Rome, Italy, on November 8, 2010 (see chapter 7).

MEDVEDEV'S PROPOSALS

In this regard the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's intention to stimulate regional discussion on the Euro-Atlantic security architecture is both timely and necessary. However, the Russian proposal for a new European Security Treaty (EST) is too narrow to address all challenges which the region faces, as well as too much focused on old legalistic formulas which do not adequately address the complexity of contemporary strategic environment in the wider Eurasia. Moreover, in the eyes of the absolute majority of the members of the Euro-Atlantic community, it lacks credibility due to the fact that Russia is seen as the source of many new sources of insecurity in Europe and has failed to normalize relations with many of its neighbors or to embrace cooperation with Euro-Atlantic community in the post-Soviet Eurasia. Finally, Europe already has a number of documents that have been signed and ratified: the Paris charter (established on the foundations of the Helsinki accords); the charter of European security signed in Istanbul in 1999 – these are two of the most pertinent examples. These arrangements have not provided a basis for overcoming the legacy of the Cold War perceptions, or for creating effective tools to address new threats. Hence, whilst the discussion on enhancing the Euro-Atlantic security system – with Russia as its part – should be welcomed, EST proposals have not generated support among Euro-Atlantic allies and therefore at present it does not have many chances to be concluded.

Curiously, the unveiling of Russia's proposals on the draft EST has already provoked a number of unintended consequences. One of them is the reinvigoration of the OSCE, something that Russia has not initially planned. Furthermore, Russia's draft EST highlighted the different security preoccupations of Russia and many other members of the Euro-Atlantic region: their perceptions and misperceptions of threats and security challenges. Finally, Russia's proposals and invitation to open the discussions have de facto opened Russia's own policies to more scrutiny and provided a platform for discussing issues which had been outside of the on-going dialogues in the existing formats including for example relations between CSTO and NATO-EU, a possible *modus vivendi* (or even cooperation) between Russia and the West in the post-Soviet Eurasia,

confidence-building measures in relations between Russia and its Western neighbors, the future of arms control, new initiatives on protracted conflicts (including both Russian and Western engagement) and NATO's future relations with Russia and other partners. All these unintended consequences of Russia's proposals demonstrate that in order to achieve its strategic objective, Russia should be prepared to demonstrate flexibility and readiness to embrace substantive contribution from other members of the Euro-Atlantic community to the discussion of its ideas and do it without prejudging the concrete outcome of these discussions. It is possible to imagine that significant progress could be achieved in strengthening the regional security system and enhancing Russia's role in it without Russia obtaining its proposed EST.

CHANGE OF PARADIGM?

NATO's summit in Lisbon in November 2010, which launched a new more ambitious agenda in relations between NATO and Russia including cooperation on missile defense systems for Europe; as well as preceding discussions on the creations of a joint EU-Russia Committee on Security and Foreign Policy (ERPSC) as proposed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Medvedev, mark the new approach towards Russia's role in the European and Euro-Atlantic security systems. On one hand, Russia started to demonstrate its readiness to engage with both NATO and the European Union in a much more pragmatic fashion to address common threats and challenges. On the other hand, NATO and the EU are making steps to integrate Russia more fully in policy-making on matter of common interest. This stage can be seen as integrating Russia with, not yet into, the established Euro-Atlantic institutional architecture. In itself, this is a huge step forward compared to the previous stage of affairs when Russia and the West (symbolized at that time by the Bush administration) have been sliding into a state of increasingly hostile zero-sum rivalry not only in the post-Soviet Eurasia, but beyond.

The key drivers of the new *détente* fall into three main categories. First, the 'reset' in the US-Russian and Russian-Polish relations have

presented an opportunity for developing a much stronger interest on the Western side towards a new engagement with Russia in the sphere of security. Some analysts have characterized the new chapter as the third turn in Western attitudes towards Russia: in the 1990s Russia was seen as weak and irrelevant; in the 2000s it was treated as part of the problem and even as a threat; and now the Obama administration is treating Russia as a 'normal' country with which the United States can both agree and disagree on some issues, but with which a pragmatic co-operation is not only possible, but also necessary.

On the Russia side, such attitudes have been matched by its own change of perceptions. On one hand, the global financial crisis and the war in Georgia have emphasized the limitations of Russia's assertive unilateralism. And on the other hand, President Medvedev's modernization policy, which remains so far largely rhetorical, but which has been used as a tool to begin mobilizing elites for another set of domestic reforms, requires at minimum a benign external environment for domestic transformation and at maximum closer cooperation with the West, which offers investment , technologies and governance models.

The second driving force is growing interdependence. In the post-financial crisis world, Russia, the US and European countries all experienced the limitations on their capacities and resources available for addressing security issues. Meanwhile, the slow pace of intervention during the crisis in Kyrgyzstan demonstrated that neither Russia nor the United States are ready to deal with crises on Russia's periphery. At the same time, however, Russia and NATO states today share more common interests than ever before in the post-Cold War era. If NATO fails in Afghanistan, Russia's security will be affected directly and immediately. Yet the withdrawal of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is increasingly dependent on the ability to leave behind a sustainable regional solution to assuring Afghanistan's stability and security. On Iran and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Russia and the West have to cooperate to achieve unity of purpose and resolve. Finally, new threats from climate change to energy security require cooperative approaches.

The third driving force is the changing world order in which both Russia and the West feel increasingly vulnerable and apprehensive in

the face of the shifting balance of power – both financial and increasingly military – *vis-à-vis* China and other rising powers. At the same time, these emerging power have not expressed readiness to share more burdens in respect to existing and anticipated threats be it regional conflicts or proliferation. In these circumstances greater cooperation between Russia, US and European countries (whether acting as EU or part of NATO or a coalition of the willing) will be welcomed.

OBJECTIVES OF ENHANCED WEST-RUSSIA COOPERATION

If the new paradigm is to take root, and if it is to survive the next big crisis better than previous systems have done during the wars in Kosovo or in Georgia, its motto should be flexibility and transparency. This new paradigm should include effective inter-connections between all institutional actors in the wider Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. It should also be focused on confidence-building and understanding rather than integration and change, as was the case during the first decade of NATO and EU enlargements. This will mean that cooperation with Russia should be possible even if Russia's domestic system remains different from that of Western democracies, as long as this cooperation is based on common rules and shared interests. Moreover, cooperation should be part of global partnerships which should not been seen as undermining the capacity of both Russia and other members of the Euro-Atlantic family to build relations with other actors – be it in Asia or in the Middle East.

The new paradigm should have the following objectives:

- Complete the task of assuring long-term European security. This means the effective ruling out of any regional conventional conflict in Europe; and it also means developing effective tools for preventing any local conflicts from reigniting.
- Inaugurate a cooperative approach towards security challenges in the neighboring regions – from the Caspian to the Black Sea and Mediterranean region.

- Achieve greater trust, develop interoperable capabilities and effective decision-making mechanisms – all of which are key prerequisites for creating a joint 'tool box' of instruments (political, military and economic) to project security further afield in Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
- Encourage further reforms that help re-launch the wave of transformation both in Russia and in post-Soviet Eurasia, which has stalled due to the absence of effective institutional support and external support needed to generate both incentives and the domestic pressure to sustain reform.
- Develop tools for dealing cooperatively with new security challenges such as climate change, cyber-security, the trafficking of narcotics etc. Here the possibility of greater cooperation between NATO and the CSTO would be in the interests of both parties. At the moment, the security agendas of these two organizations may overlap but nevertheless remain separate with a lack of cooperation in certain areas, e.g. antipiracy – the CSTO, for the last 2-3 years, has not been able to tackle problems associated with information wars due to the lack of such necessary tools as technological capacity or institutional manpower. This clearly could be a role for NATO assistance and intelligence sharing.
- Contribute to the development of a new system of global governance in which the United States, the European Union and Russia operate effectively and act collectively when addressing future crises (conflict-resolution being the key issue here). The EU, NATO and Russia have a special interest in, for example, resolving the protracted conflicts of the South Caucasus, most notably that of Nagorno-Karabakh – particularly since the institutional division of labor of organizations such as the OSCE, CSTO and NATO are ill-defined. This could risk further destabilization in the region and hence highlighting the ineffectiveness of decision-making processes in the various sub-regional and international organizations.

CONCLUSION

The new paradigm will be the end of the beginning of the post-Cold War era in the northern hemisphere. Much still needs to be accomplished in terms of building trust and confidence across Europe. In this regard, all instruments – from arms control and transparency (including for example the key provisions of the now suspended Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty) to pragmatic cooperation on solving protracted conflicts and devising tools to deal with new threats (like cyber attacks) – have to be applied and be made more effective.

Only after this phase is completed – perhaps five or ten years down the road – really big architectural questions – like Russia's membership in NATO-Russia or EU-Russia-US military cooperation – could be put on the table for a serious discussion. The answers will depend not only on the success of abovementioned political endeavors but also on which crises we will face in the near future, including the end game of ISAF presence in Afghanistan and the nuclear future of Iran. On both issues Russia's cooperation is not only desirable, it is vital.

9.
Reset West-Russia Relations - But Use Common Sense*

*Arthur R. Rachwald***

Security experts in the US and Europe, including contributors to this volume, have been busy examining conceptual and institutional complexities, opportunities, impediments, motives, and expectations in the current round of the ongoing attempt to enhance European security by improving relations with Russia. Arkady Moshes' approach is based on existing political and institutional realities within both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia, while Oksana Antonenko adopts a broader focus also encompassing Eurasian and global issues. The purpose of this chapter is to put their conclusions in the broader context of Russia's international and domestic politics in order to focus closer attention on the foundations of the current West-Russia 'reset' and to delineate the limits of and the prospects for this *détente*.

THE LIMITS OF THE WEST-RUSSIA *DÉTENTE*

There is no doubt that in the two years since the Russian invasion and partition of Georgia in the summer of 2008, Moscow has signaled its interest in a positive re-engagement with the United States and other

* This chapter is an elaboration of comments made by the author to the paper Arkady Moshes presented at the Transatlantic Security Symposium 2010, 'European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship,' jointly organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, and held in Rome, Italy, on November 8, 2010 (see chapter 7).

** The views expressed here are strictly those of the author and do not reflect the views of the US government or any other institutional affiliation.

members of NATO, and the change in attitude appears to go beyond political rhetoric. This positive re-engagement includes agreement with the United States on the New START treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms, as well as a measurable improvement in traditionally difficult Russian-Polish relations. Progress in Russian-Polish relations is important not only because of its direct impact on ties between Russia and the European Union, but also because a bilateral advance is not possible without parallel progress in the de-Stalinization of Russia. Specifically, the murder of some 22,000 Polish officers by the Soviets in 1940 (the Katyn massacre) and Moscow's subsequent refusal to acknowledge the crime are still supported by the Russian Communist Party, as well as by many influential members of the internal security apparatus who stubbornly oppose any transparency on this issue. One can only hope that the recent spat caused by the publication of a Russian report that puts all the blame on the Polish side for the airplane crash that in April 2010 killed Polish President Lech Kaczynski (along with around 90 people traveling with him) will not usher in a new phase of confrontation.

Many enthusiastic supporters of the new *détente* neglect other facets of the Russian reality: that a sovereign country was recently invaded and partitioned as was done under Russian expansionism in previous centuries and that Moscow's recent geostrategic gains include closer control over Ukraine and a permanent military presence in Crimea, thereby making Ukraine's membership in NATO impossible. There is also the matter of Russia's complete control over Belarus air space and other military assets. President Barack Obama's unilateral decision to alter plans on missile defense deployment in Poland has also increased Russian leverage in Europe without reciprocal concessions on the deployment of Russian short-range missiles in the Kaliningrad district.

These strategic successes, however superficial and temporary they might be, have fueled imperial nostalgia in Russia and are interpreted as evidence of its return to the status of a great power and its capacity to negotiate with the West from a position of strength. Moscow's renewed self-confidence is also confirmed by the decision to conduct large, provocative military exercises such as the October 2009 (Zapad-09) war games in Russia and western Belarus; these were designed to simulate

and repel an attempt by Polish and Lithuanian terrorists to take over Kaliningrad. It is impossible to miss the similarity between Zapad-09 and the invasion of Georgia in 2008; nor is it possible to overlook Russia's intimidation of the Baltic states, all of which are members of NATO.

This behavior is consistent with recently adopted Russian military doctrine, whereby NATO is singled out as the main threat to the country's national security. It is also consistent with Moscow's determination to establish and maintain a strategy fashioned on nineteenth-century quest for a sphere of influence in neighboring regions and possibly elsewhere.

These few examples of Russia's assertive, militaristic, and hegemonic political actions and aspirations provide a clear indication that the hardliners known as *siloviki* (a Russian word for politicians from the security or military services) continue to hold the upper hand not only in domestic politics, but in foreign politics and security as well. Examples of the underlying principles of former President and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's 'statism' are plentiful in Moscow's domestic and foreign policies. These include close ties between the state and private economic assets, suppression of democratic processes, censorship of the media, de facto one-party rule, and systemic corruption, as well as the neo-imperial dogma of Eurasianism, which implies the cultural and geostrategic necessity for the domination of the regions previously controlled by either the Russian tsarist empire or the Soviet state.

NO RESET POLICY WITHIN RUSSIA

Russia's recently proclaimed desire to improve relations with the West is not rooted in the liberalization and democratization of domestic politics. The call for another *détente* is not based on an antiauthoritarian transformation or reset at home, where instead Moscow continues to promote business as usual with no indications of a new *glasnost* on the political horizon.

President Dmitry Medvedev has publicly expressed concern on several occasions over his country's economic and social future, since Russia's economy and political stability appear to hinge on the interna-

tional price of oil and gas. According to Medvedev, the comprehensive development and diversification of the Russian economy away from one-commodity export is contingent on the liberalization and democratization of political structures engineered from the top: in other words, an evolution away from Putin's centralizing 'statism' and the pervasive corruption of the entire state-economy apparatus. So far, however, his appeals for political change to avoid Brezhnev-era socio-economic stagnation have not produced a single visible change in either politics or economics. It is legitimate to wonder whether Medvedev's intent to make Russian foreign policy less confrontational and adversarial would be more successful if it were accompanied by changes in domestic policy.

It is equally reasonable to wonder whether Russia is speaking with one voice or two and whether it is Putin's or Medvedev's followers that have more influence over the country's foreign policy. At the moment, President Medvedev seems to project the wisdom and foresight of Pyotr Stolypin, the Russian Prime Minister who was assassinated in 1911, while Prime Minister Putin expresses the views of 18th Century Tsar Peter the Great.[1] It is not clear who has the upper hand in Moscow these days, and the answer to this question may not be known until the results of the 2012 presidential elections are made public.

What is clear beyond any doubt, however, is the progressive deterioration of economic and social conditions in Russia. Moscow's global ambitions are to be financed by a weak and state-dominated economy that must sell oil for about $100 a barrel on the international market just to break even. Russia is lagging behind not only the West and Japan, but also China, India, and Brazil, and might in a few years face a direct economic challenge from the next tier of developing nations in Africa and Latin America.

Thus, modernization has become a top priority for Russia. Historically, however, this goal has presented Russian leaders, tsars, commis-

1. If this analogy seems extreme, we have only to examine Putin's February 10, 2007, speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy and his well-known remark that Ukraine ('Little Russia,' as he calls it) is not even a nation.

sars, and *siloviki* alike with the dilemma of how to modernize economic and social relations with the West without damaging the centralized power structure at home. Moscow's search for technology and business links with democratic countries is limited to economic benefits and assumes that it is possible to contain democratic institutions and notions of human rights while expanding business with the West. On numerous occasions, this objective has been communicated by officials who underline the strictly utilitarian nature of Russian motives behind improving relations.

A WISE USE OF RUSSIA'S AMBITION TO 'RESET'

In light of the above, the apparent Russian eagerness to re-engage with the West seems to be based on rather different motives and purposes than the security objectives of NATO, the European Union, and the United States.

While NATO explores the possibility of improving the security environment in Europe by fine-tuning existing structures, Moscow offers radical and grandiose blueprints for alternative security arrangements that would embrace the entire northern hemisphere and even include China. In a statement bordering on megalomania, Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's ambassador to NATO, explained that great powers such as Russia should not be expected to respect existing alliances but should instead make their own. And, in one sense, he is correct, since Moscow's call for a new treaty comes at a time when Russia is breaching many international obligations, including the Helsinki Accord and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

Facing the decline of its economic power base and international standing, and unwilling or unable to reform its domestic political system, Moscow is looking for ways to (1) secure its international standing through the growing dependence on nuclear weapons and (2) promote changes in international security arrangements to weaken existing structures and enhance its own ability to play a key role in global affairs. At the very top of Russia's priorities is weakening transatlantic ties and

helping to fragment NATO through a special and lucrative understanding – or perhaps even a partnership – with Germany.[2]

These remarks are not intended as an argument against active engagement with Russia in strategic and regional security matters or increased economic and social relations, but rather strike a cautionary note against idealized expectations and a preference for the unilateral dismantling of existing transatlantic security institutions, including NATO itself. Truly meaningful progress in relations between Russia and the West must be grounded in a realistic assessment of Russia's objectives and the limits on mutual cooperation imposed by Moscow's domestic imperatives and international designs. Although the current *détente* is not rooted in common values and similar political priorities, the West can nevertheless use improved relations to promote internal democratic evolution in Russia. After all, its domestic system is a work in progress, and the likelihood of another step toward democratization after Putin's rollback of proto-democracy under former President Boris Yeltsin should not be excluded.

The real breakthrough in Western security relations with Russia and the corresponding transformation of its domestic system will come as a result of the incremental accumulation of numerous grassroots confidence-building measures, a patient and persistent policy that would chip away at Moscow's hostile perception of the West. Russia must turn away from Putin's paranoia *vis-à-vis* democracy and human rights and his fascination with imperial nostalgia before the country can advance toward civil society and an acceptance of the principles of collective security.

CONCLUSION

Russia's need for modernization is a welcome opportunity for the West to facilitate processes of transformation within Russia itself and at the

2. It is revealing to recall that one discussant at the Transatlantic Security Symposium 2010 reduced the question of Russian credibility in matters of international security to Moscow's clean record in supplying energy to Germany.

same time to increase security for both sides. The chance to improve relations with Russia should not be used as an excuse to ignore the domestic dimension of Russian politics or to tear down existing transatlantic security structures on the basis of some pacifist notion that 'Europe has no enemies'. Russian foreign policy is driven by domestic imperatives. History is full of evidence that Russia relies on tensions along its borders to create domestic consensus and to legitimate authoritarian rule. It is important to remember that before Russia can become a good neighbor, an overhaul of its domestic politics in the direction of democracy is necessary.

10.
Much Ado About Nothing: EU Defense Policy after the Lisbon Treaty*

Anand Menon

If there is one thing that political science has taught us over the last decade, it is the importance of institutions, which both constrain the actors within them and can become powerful actors in their own right. Nowhere is the notion that 'institutions matter' more strongly subscribed to than in Europe. Here, it seems obvious not only that institutions have helped prevent war in a continent traditionally plagued by conflict, but also that they represent the most effective means of dealing with the vicissitudes of broader international politics.

Such thinking has much to commend it. The European Union played a crucial role in transforming relations between its members (albeit that NATO is too often overlooked in self-congratulatory European explanations for the continent's stability). Meanwhile, the power of attraction exerted by the EU has helped tame relations both with and between those of its neighbors that aspire to membership within it (albeit that its influence further afield has been far more limited).

Little wonder, then, that the latest revision to the EU's founding texts – the Lisbon Treaty – has generated so much breathless commentary; nor that the primary target of this excitement have been its provisions for foreign and security policy. After all, 25 of the 62 amendments it

* Revised manuscript for publication, originally prepared for the Transatlantic Security Symposium 2010, 'European Security and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship,' jointly organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, and held in Rome, Italy, on November 8, 2010.

ushers in apply to treaty provisions on foreign and security policies.[1] And the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) not only merits more space than the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) that preceded it, but has had its remit expanded to include joint disarmament operations, post-conflict stabilization and (as if these were not taxing enough of themselves) the 'fight against terrorism'.

As in all things connected with European integration, analyses of these changes range from the clinically depressed to the massively optimistic. A recent Financial Times article remarked on the absence of evidence that Lisbon has improved the Union's ability to act as a major international power.[2] Numerous others, in contrast, have been quick to voice their conviction that the new provisions will make the EU a more effective international security actor.

What follows largely adheres to the Financial Times line, with the main argument being that the Lisbon Treaty will not exert a noticeable impact upon the effectiveness of CSDP. While the treaty addresses some important problems that have long bedeviled EU security policies – though even here its success is far from guaranteed – it does little to address perhaps the fundamental challenge confronting CSDP: the reluctance of member states to take their responsibilities seriously. Given this, a narrow focus on institutions and institutional evolution at the EU level not only largely misses the point, but may also be actively counterproductive. By shifting attention from the national sources of the EU's lackluster performance as an international actor, it encourages member states to utilize European level initiatives as a means of avoiding, rather than meeting, their international responsibilities.

1. Unlike the Constitutional Treaty, which would have replaced all existing treaties with a single new one, the Lisbon Treaty remained faithful to the method adopted by previous Intergovernmental Conferences in merely amending existing treaties. It thus amends both the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), which it renames the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

2. David Gardner, 'EU Struggles to Project Itself as a world power,' *Financial Times* 19 September 2010.

LISBON AND CSDP

The key security policy ambitions of the Lisbon Treaty can be summarized in two words: 'coherence' and 'capabilities'. In this respect, policy makers have at least managed to identify the two crucial problems confronting CSDP.

CSDP (in)coherence

Issues of coherence have been a perennial problem for the EU's dealings with the outside world. Certainly, it benefits from its ability to deploy numerous different tools in its external relations, ranging from trade to aid to military force.[3] At the same time, however, the deployment of distinct policy instruments necessitates the mobilization of different policy actors using different decision-making procedures, which in turn can lead to friction and incoherence. It has become something of a truism in the literature to remark on the internecine rivalries that exist between different institutions with a role in shaping EU foreign policy and their deleterious effects.[4] Two senior officials intimately connected with CSDP have commented that the Union's reaction to a crisis can be driven "more by institutional rivalry than by a truly result-oriented approach".[5] By way of example, conflict and inconsistency have dogged the Union's ongoing civilian and police mission in Kosovo, not least because of the different policy instruments it has deployed.[6]

A central ambition of the Lisbon Treaty is to address such problems head on. In particular, it includes provisions intended to improve relations between the two key institutions involved in EU external policies –

3. J. Solana, 'Improving the coherence and effectiveness of European Union action in the Field of Conflict Prevention,' report presented to the Nice European Council by the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission (Brussels 2000).

4. T. Barber, 'The Appointments of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton,' *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* vol. 48 (2010) p. 58.

5. Bruno Angelet and Ioannis Vrailas, 'European Defense in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty,' *Egmont Papers*, no. 21 (2008) p. 6.

6. Steven Blockmans and R.A. Wessels, 'The European Union and Crisis Management,' *CLEER Working Paper* (The Hague, 2010) p. 19.

the Commission and the Council. Two innovations in particular are worthy of note in this regard – the creation of a new post of high representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (combining the old HR post with that of external relations commissioner and vice-president of the European Commission), and the setting up of a European External Action Service (EAS), intended to draw on expertise from within the Council, the Commission, and the member states.

Clearly, it is still too early to come to any definitive judgments regarding the new external relations machinery – indeed the External Action Service only became operational on December 1st, 2010. Yet early indications suggest that the institutional frictions that have hamstrung EU action in the past are not about to be consigned to the past.

Member states have hardly led from the front. From the first it was clear that political expediency rather than any real desire to foster effectiveness would shape their attitudes towards implementing the treaty provisions. The choice of a relatively unknown British 'Eurocrat', former trade commissioner Catherine Ashton, as first holder of the new high representative post was clearly – whatever her merits or indeed eventual success in the post – based on considerations of politics rather than on any real debate as to who was best qualified for what is undoubtedly a hugely challenging role.[7]

Moreover, the (unavoidable) ambiguity of a treaty that represented a fragile compromise between differing national preferences and priorities merely meant that conflicts avoided at the drafting stage could be fought out during implementation. Given that it is virtually impossible to divine from the text itself how responsibilities should be divided between institutions in the reformed system, little wonder these have mobilized to ensure the greatest possible influence in the new structures.[8]

The whole point of the External Action Service was to combine as much of EU foreign policy under one roof – and under the authority of

7. T. Barber, 'The Appointments of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton,' p. 56; Brendan Donnelly, 'Europe in the World: All Change or No Change in Foreign Policy after Lisbon?,' *The International Spectator*, vol. 45, no. 2 (2010) pp. 18-19.

8. T. Barber, 'The Appointments of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton,' p. 59.

the high representative – as possible. Yet the European Commission, quick to see in this a challenge to its authority, moved first. President José Manuel Durão Barroso transferred two sections of Directorate-General External Relations – dealing with climate change talks and energy issues – to new DGs for climate change and energy – so keeping them outside the purview of the EAS. Neighborhood policy was similarly entrusted to DG Enlargement, whilst a cumbersome fudge over development policy raises the prospect of continued incoherence when EU attempts to deploy the full range of its instruments. The jostling of member states to ensure the placement of their nationals within the new systems suggests that merit will prove about as central as it did in the choice of high representative. Meanwhile, the continued relevance of inter-institutional rivalries was revealed all too clearly by the public grumbling of some governments at the decision by HR Ashton to maintain her office within the Commission building.

CSPD (lack of) capabilities

Coherence has certainly been a serious problem afflicting EU security policies, yet it is far from being the most important one. This is widely acknowledged to be the problem of generating sufficient capabilities to allow the European Union to play the role to which it aspires. Anecdotal evidence of the problems caused by capabilities shortfalls are legion. To take but one example, it took months of squabbling between member states before EU forces were finally deployed to Chad in 2008, and this only once the Russians had agreed to provide four helicopters.

Such failings are not necessarily the result of under-investment (although the deep cuts foreseen by all national defense budgets may well make this an issue too). In 2006 member states together spent the equivalent of 60 percent of the total US defense budget – almost a quarter of global defense spending.

Rather, the problem is one of spending that fails to address the requirements of modern warfare. The latter is increasingly expeditionary and multinational in nature. Yet, although European Union member states have some half a million more men in arms than the United States, around 70 percent of their land forces cannot operate outside national

territory. According to figures from 2007, only two member states (Britain and Ireland) had met the NATO target of being able to sustain 8 percent of their ground forces on operations (Finland and Norway also had impressive records in terms of levels of deployment).[9]

Even those forces that exist and can be deployed cannot always work together effectively. Four European states use Chinook helicopters, but with different configurations, meaning that spare parts are not interchangeable. As for communications, one senior NATO commander was moved to comment that:

> I had to have nine different systems sitting on my desk just to communicate with all my units [in Afghanistan]. All these different national systems are useless and it's unacceptable that we don't have a common operational network.[10]

Lisbon marks a break from previous versions of the EU treaties by squarely addressing the question of capabilities. In particular, a new mechanism by the name of 'permanent structured cooperation' is intended to enable the Union to tackle capability deficits head on. A number of observers have emphasized its "considerable promise for dealing effectively with the problem of inadequate and irrational defense spending by member states",[11] in particular by allowing for the creation of 'pioneer groups' necessary for the creation of meaningful European defense capabilities absent the required political will on the part of all member states.[12]

Permanent structured cooperation is open to any member state that either enhances its defense capacities or possesses the capacity to supply combat forces. Uniquely amongst decisions with defense implications, it can be established by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), thereby

9. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations*, (London: IISS, 2008) p. 13.

10. Ibid., p. 22.

11. B. Angelet and I. Vrailas, 'European Defense in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty,' p. 4.

12. Nick Witney, *Re-Energising Europe's Security and Defense Policy* (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008).

preventing blockage by laggards. Perhaps most interestingly, any member of any such group that subsequently fails to live up to its commitments can be suspended on the basis of a decision by a qualified majority of other participants.

The European Defense Agency (EDA) is crucial here. Under the new treaty, it is meant to help in assessing member state contributions in the light of the criteria created for pioneer groups. It is based on these assessments that the Council can decide to suspend participants for failing to respect the criteria established. As if this were not enough, the EDA is also charged with "identifying, and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure [...] improving the effectiveness of military expenditure".

If it is too early to assess the effectiveness of measures designed to enhance coherence, it is all the more so for those aimed at improving capabilities – these have, to date, not been utilized. Yet there are grounds for legitimate doubts about the ability of the new provisions to achieve their stated objectives. For one thing, it is not at all clear what the benchmarks to be used for assessing performance actually are. Will member states qualify on the basis of their willingness to cooperate with partners, their progress in developing capabilities, or their readiness to deploy these capabilities on missions?[13] Clearly this choice will do much to determine how effective the Union is in practice at confronting security challenges.

More fundamentally, however, the single greatest flaw in the new treaty provisions concerning both capabilities and coherence is their failure to take into account the – in many cases debilitating – centrality of all twenty-seven member states to all major decisions relating to CSDP.

THE PERENNIAL PROBLEM: MEMBER STATES

Nowhere is the role of member states more pronounced than in defense policy. ESDP and CFSP were always characterized by strict intergovernmentalism, with a highly limited role for community institutions.

13. Ibid., p. 15.

For all the fact that the Lisbon Treaty formally removes the pillar structure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, that same system is in reality alive and well as far as the second pillar, and particularly defense, is concerned. Member states dominate decision-making and are responsible for taking all major decisions on the basis of unanimity. Provisions for foreign security and defense policies remain within the Treaty on European Union (TEU) rather than being grouped with all other EU policies in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

As if this were not enough, the prerogatives of member states are restated *ad nauseam*. Largely at the insistence of the British government (which declared itself satisfied with the defense provisions of the constitutional treaty and then insisted on further changes when negotiations on the successor document commenced) Article 11(1) TEU stipulates that the "common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures". On defense itself, Article 3a TEU states that the Union: "shall respect [member states'] essential State functions, including enshrining the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security". It goes on, for good measure, to recapitulate that in "particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State".

Perhaps most strikingly, the so called mutual assistance clause (Art. 42(7) TEU) effectively empties itself of all significance with the assertion that any obligation of assistance it entails "shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain member states", adding that any such obligations must also be "consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those states which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation". So, non-NATO members need not feel bound to provide assistance, whilst members should use the Atlantic alliance as the forum for any call for collective defense.

The Lisbon Treaty thus aims to enhance coherence and capabilities – but without in any way impinging upon the behavior of the member states. Yet it is precisely this behavior that has spawned the most severe problems in these areas.

It is because member states must reach unanimous accord on CSDP

operations that these have largely been – where they have taken place at all – small scale. Profound divisions between national capitals – over the need for intervention in certain geographical areas and over the primacy to be accorded to military as opposed to 'softer' forms of power – mean that consensus is often elusive and action, consequently, limited. Whether or not the capabilities exist to facilitate rapid and effective EU action, therefore, it is an open question as to whether member states would be able to agree on their deployment. Even states that do commit troops to missions often layer their contribution with restrictive caveats that severely limit their operational effectiveness.[14]

Above and beyond different attitudes towards the use of military force, member states are further divided by the thorny issue of the costs of such deployments. According to the principle of 'costs lie where they fall,' a system of perverse incentives, those member states willing to contribute forces for an EU mission also pick up the tab. The so-called EU-wide Athena mechanism makes provision for some 'common costs,' whereby all member states contribute towards around 10 percent of overall mission costs on the basis of a GDP scale. Yet not only does this leave contributors to pick up the bulk of the expenses, but it also renders certain member states still less anxious to see deployments occur. Germany in particular has become increasingly sensitive to the costs of missions in areas it does not consider to be a political priority.

Lisbon does little to change all this. All twenty-seven member states must approve CSDP operations – which do not fall under the purview of permanent structured cooperation. The treaty also maintains the prohibition on charging operations with military or defense implications to the EU budget (41(3) TEU). And whilst it includes a provision for a 'start-up fund' for initial expenditures on CSDP missions, the fact that this will be made up of member state contributions means that pre-existing problems are replicated rather than resolved. Until they are resolved, however, money will remain yet another obstacle in the way of timely and effective EU action.

Of course any decision to deploy military force depends on the exis-

14. Ibid., pp. 145-147.

tence of adequate military means to deploy. As we have seen, the Lisbon treaty addresses squarely the need to enhance European military capabilities. Yet the control exercised by member states again provides reasons to doubt the effectiveness of its provisions.

The idea of pioneer groups of states certainly makes sense. Huge disparities exist between member states in terms not only of spending on defense and capabilities (the UK and France between them account for over 40 percent of EU defense spending) but also of the differential willingness to invest in appropriate capabilities and deploy these. Yet the question then arises as to how these groups are constituted and who ensures they stick to their commitments.

Clearly, any pioneer group of states should be constituted on the basis of defense related criteria. Yet this is not always how member states see things. Perhaps most insidiously, those most anxious to press ahead with CSDP are not always those best equipped to do so. The so-called 'Chocolate summit' of April 2003, with its ambitious calls for a European Security Defense Union involved, alongside France, a member state at best hesitant about many ESDP interventions (Germany) and two of the lower spenders on defense as a proportion of GDP (Belgium 1.14 percent, Luxembourg 0.67 percent). When, in early 2008, Pierre Lellouche, French ruling UMP party deputy and spokesman on defense policy, published proposals for the creation of a defense 'G6' to take the lead in cooperation on defense matters,[15] these excluded not only two of most active member states when it comes to force deployments (the Netherlands and Sweden)[16] but several with a track record of deploying an above average number of troops (notably Austria, Finland and Ireland).[17]

There tends to be, in other words, something of a 'disconnect between public commitments to European military integration…and prac-

15. Pierre Lellouche, 'Huit Propositions Pour Donner À L'union Une Défense Commune,' *Le Figaro* (2008).

16. Nick Witney, *Re-Energising Europe's Security and Defense Policy* (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008).

17. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations*, pp. 13, 16.

tical deployments of forces'.[18] Yet ideological commitment to European integration is of little use when it comes to running operations, and says little or nothing about the willingness of a state to enhance its capabilities or deploy them. It is an open question as to whether the fact that Germany – with all its political and financial doubts about military deployments – was at one point scheduled to participate in eight different battle groups was a cause for celebration or unease.[19]

The fundamental reason why European military spending is often inefficient is because of the way national governments choose to spend the money they allocate to defense. The treaty addresses this, albeit in a tentative fashion, by providing the European Defense Agency with an important, if improbable, oversight function. It is expected, *inter alia*, to monitor national defense budgets and to assess whether participants in pioneer groups under permanent structured cooperation are meeting the criteria they have set themselves.

The daunting scale of these tasks has moved some to compare the process of capabilities improvement with that whereby member states achieved monetary Union, and the role of the EDA within it to that of the European Commission in the single market.[20] The Agency should thus serve as a 'conscience' or 'catalyst' for the development of military capabilities for ESDP.[21]

Such optimistic analogies, however, are flawed. For one thing, neither the European Monetary Union (EMU) nor the single market provide grounds for optimism concerning the ability of EU institutions to shape member state behavior. It was inadequate enforcement of the convergence criteria that allowed Greece to join the single currency on the ba-

18. B. Giegerich and W. Wallace, 'Not Such a Soft Power: The External Deployment,' *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 2 (2004) p. 164.

19. W. Jacoby and C. Jones, 'The EU Battle Groups in Sweden and the Czech Republic: What National Defense Reforms Tell Us About European Rapid Reaction Capabilities,' *European Security*, vol. 17, p. 322.

20. B. Angelet and I. Vrailas, 'European Defense in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty,' pp. 44-48.

21. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations*, p. 28.

sis of (at best) misleading fiscal data. And the successful flaunting by France and Germany in November 2003 of the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact bore eloquent testimony to the unwillingness of member states to punish those amongst their number who breach the rules of the game. As for the Commission, its role in policing the single market has itself come under sustained challenge from member states willing to flaunt the rules and unwilling to provide it with the resources necessary for it to fulfill this task.

Yet compared to the EDA the Commission is impressive indeed. College members are at least nominally independent, whilst the EDA steering board is made up of twenty-seven defense ministers (plus a nonvoting Commission representative). It in turn appoints the chief executive and two deputy chief executives. The Agency is thus prey to the whims of the national ministers that control it (and have notably, for several months, not managed to appoint a chief executive). It is thus hard to see it opting to suspend a participant in permanent structured cooperation, and harder still to see such a decision upheld by the Council.

As for effective monitoring of national defense spending, it is virtually inconceivable that member states will take the Agency's recommendations seriously. After all, even in apparently technical areas like the liberalization of the services sector, perceived intrusion by EU institutions has generated angry retaliation from national capitals. How much more angry would be the reaction of a state whose defense spending priorities are questioned? And this particularly in a time of recession, of savage cuts in defense spending across the Union, when 'rationalization' equates to redundancies. Already the siren voices are being raised, warning of desperate consequences if cuts are made.[22]

The odds, then, are not good for a weak institution, lacking both material resources and legitimacy, and operating in arguably the most sensitive area of public policy, to really shape and change member state policies.

22. Nick Butler and Jeffrey Sterling, 'Defense Cuts will hit Britain's Industrial Capacity,' *Financial Times*, 30 September 2010.

CONCLUSIONS: ACHIEVING LIMITED AMBITIONS

The Lisbon Treaty accurately identified two of the crucial problems that have hamstrung the EU's effectiveness as an international actor: coherence and capabilities. The solutions it proposes may conceivably focus the minds of the relevant actors on attempting to mitigate the most glaring problems of the past. Yet even this is far from certain. After all, the very process of implementing a treaty intended, in part, to overcome damaging inter-institutional rivalries has itself been profoundly shaped (it is as yet too early to say derailed) by those same rivalries.

And then there is the elephant in the room. Member states have to negotiate, agree, sign and ratify EU treaties. Little wonder, then, that these treaties tend to have little to say about the constraint that national capitals represent when it comes to enhancing the effectiveness of European integration.

At heart, the crucial constraint on CSDP is a need for political will: the will to spend enough on defense; the will to spend wisely, and the will to deploy the capabilities so acquired. Generating this will is not something that can be accomplished by a treaty. As the then *Financial Times* Brussels bureau chief put it, "The Lisbon Treaty, so EU leaders assure their publics, provides the instruments for […] projecting the EU's influence more effectively across the globe. What the treaty does not contain, however, is that vital ingredient for success – political willpower".[23]

The above has argued that, whatever the institutional fixes created by the new treaty, it is unreasonable to expect them to alter the preferences of national governments in a policy sector as sensitive as defense. Ambitious rhetoric by policy makers and observers alike serves merely to raise expectations excessively, paving the way for subsequent complaints that the Union has failed.

In reality, given the jealousy with which governments, whatever the limited potential of their national armed forces, protect their control over defense, significant progress in terms of a more coordinated European response to capabilities shortfalls is unlikely. Whilst some claim

23. T. Barber, 'The Appointments of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton,' p. 66.

that the current round of swinging defense cuts provides a perfect setting for greater collaboration on research, manufacturing and purchasing of defense equipment, it is just as likely to increase the sensitivity of governments when it comes to the inevitable job cuts that such rationalization would imply.

Better, then, to start with more modest, achievable objectives as a first step towards greater interstate collaboration. And an obvious place to start is with better information sharing. The former head of the EDA has pointed out that member states are at liberty not to provide data to that organization, to the point where no objective information exists on who has contributed what to operations.[24] More pressingly, it seems sensible that member states coordinate when deciding on the cuts to impose on their armed forces. It would be too much to ask for them to defer to an institution like the EDA, but a useful first step would be to ensure that defense ministries inform their partners about planned cuts, in order that these can be coordinated as far as possible. A German-Swedish paper circulated to a meeting of defense ministers in December 2010 marked a useful first step in this regard, calling on member states to conduct, in the first half of 2011, reviews of their military capabilities in order to identify areas of possible co-operation. We could in principle at least aspire to some kind of Open Method of Coordination type system for defense spending – non-binding, and based on bench marking – rather than aspiring to first pillar type decision making. Even here, however, it should be noted that the absence of an institution of the stature of the European Commission capable of agenda setting and compliance monitoring could undermine even such limited hopes.

Reasonable ambitions are the best starting point. It is unlikely in the extreme that the EU will ever become the kind of high profile and effective international security actor that some seem to think it should be. Yet it would be wrong to attribute the blame for this to the Union itself. Rather, it is up to member states to step up to the plate in order that, collectively, they manage to achieve those things that none amongst them can manage individually. Debating institutions is all well and good.

24. N. Witney, *Re-Energising Europe's Security and Defense Policy*, pp. 16, 23.

Yet this should not serve as an alibi for member states that are responsible for the major failings of EU security policies.

All this matters because the European Union provides an obvious mechanism by which European states can attempt to enhance their ability to deploy military force. Their failure to date to do so has led not only to the relatively underdeveloped nature of EU security policies, but also contributed to a failure to live up to broader security responsibilities. For all the popularity of, and heavy pressure from, US President Barack Obama, member states in 2009 came up with only some 5,000 troops (of which 3,000 only on a temporary basis) to supplement the 26,000 already deployed in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. The increasingly disinterested, not to say contemptuous, tone of commentary even from American Europhiles testifies to a growing disillusionment with the European Union.

Perhaps more worryingly still, there is evidence to suggest that leading member states are beginning to share this disillusionment. The November 2010 Anglo-French summit in London resulted in agreement on bilateral defense collaboration, but did not place this in the wider context of CSDP. There are thus certainly grounds to fear that the Union's leading military powers are increasingly coming to doubt the utility of an EU policy that was largely their own creation.

CSDP however, was launched for a reason, and that reason still holds. For all the shortcomings of the Lisbon Treaty, member states must do what they can to use its provisions to enhance their multilateral collaboration or the chronic problems identified so well in the Lisbon text will continue to undermine their ability to weigh significantly on international security affairs.

11.
European Security, Transatlantic Relations, and the Challenge to US Global Leadership

Erik Jones

The debate about European security and the transatlantic relationship gives a privileged position to the global role of the United States. Hence, when James Goldgeier writes about NATO's role 'beyond' European security, it is clear that his focus is on how NATO can help the United States pursue its interests across the globe. In part this is due to the reality that many security threats to Europe come from outside the continent; in part it is due to the fact that European security is weakened when US commitments draw down American military resources. Hence Goldgeier argues that the Europeans should solve problems within their own backyard and they should contribute to American efforts to address security concerns elsewhere. This is not a call to altruism on the European side; it is a matter of European self interest.[1]

In general terms, this notion of transatlantic partnership makes intuitive sense. Who offers better alliance opportunities for Europe than the United States? In more specific cases, however, it is easy to see how the security interests of Europe and the security interests of the United States might diverge, even if only in terms of perception and not reality. The missile defense debate is one example; the relationship with Russia is another. When the United States places missile defense installations in Europe it makes a visible commitment to transatlantic security partner-

1. See James Goldgeier, "NATO's Role in European Security – and Beyond" in this volume; for a contrasting view, see Charles A. Kupchan, "The Atlantic Order in Transition: The Nature of Change in US-European Relations" in Jeffrey Anderson, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse, eds. *The End of the West?: Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008) pp. 111-126.

ship. When the United States decides to relocate those installations to focus on Iran, it inadvertently creates problems as well as resolving them. This is because it creates the impression that US commitment to Europe is changing and it gives rise to concern that its perception of the best way to respond to a nuclear Iran is different from what many Europeans would be willing to accept. As a result, Europeans begin to question the fundamental structure of the alliance and the nuclear guarantee offered by the United States. Given that the time is fast approaching for US nuclear force modernization, there are looming practical implications to this debate.[2]

Relations with Russia show the other side of the coin. Whatever the motivations of President Barack Obama's administration for removing missile defense installations from Central Europe, it is clear that security concerns define the US-Russia relationship. For Europeans, that security lens is not so clearly predominant. On the contrary, some European countries – notably Germany – perceive Russia primarily in economic and energy-supply terms. This only stands to reason given the difference in geographic proximity to Russia and natural resource endowments between Europe and the United States. Nevertheless, the contrast between security and economic perspectives has a powerful influence on the structure of any partnership. It is small wonder, then, that many Europeans would question whether the United States should lead in defining relations with Russia, or whether it should follow.[3]

The problem with this notion of European leadership is isolating what constitutes Europe in the first place. The European Union does not encompass the whole of the continent and in any event is not a monolithic entity. There are important common institutions but it remains a collection of different member states. The addition of other, more encompassing organizations like the Council of Europe or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) only complicates any effort to locate Europe's 'actorness'. This is particularly true in the realm

2. See Oliver Thränert, "Nuclear Arms and Missile Defence in Transatlantic Security", in this volume.

3. See Arkady Moshes, "Russia in European Security Architecture: Contributor or Contender?" in this volume.

of security and defense. The different organizations play different roles and serve different sets of constituents. This helps to promote stability (and therefore also collective security) but it does not strengthen European power projection. The modest reforms introduced by the Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon Treaties do not seem to have answered the question of what Europe is either. They have facilitated the deployment of European missions into zones of past or potential conflict, but they have not substantially deepened European combat efficiency and neither have they muted the controlling influence of the member states. Hence, although the European Union now includes institutional arrangements that seem analogous to those of a nation state, it is in no way comparable to the United States. Europe is wealthy and it is well-armed, but it is neither unified nor coherent in defense and security terms.[4]

Europe is not a rival to the United States and yet it is not obviously a supportive influence either. Meanwhile, the United States has problems of its own. The Obama administration suffered a significant setback during the mid-term elections held in November 2010. The Republican Party won control over the House of Representatives and it was able to reduce the Democratic majority in Senate. As a consequence, the Obama administration has lost much of its room for maneuver in domestic policy and it faces an uphill battle getting Senate approval for key appointments and international treaties (it managed to have the US-Russia New START treaty on the reduction of nuclear warheads approved by the Senate in the final days of the lame-duck session, though). In turn, international perceptions of the strength of Obama as president have diminished, making it easier for some to ignore US entreaties or blandishments and for others to take advantage of perceived American weakness or preoccupation at home. Many question whether the prospects for American leadership have been fatally challenged and some even wonder whether they can ever be repaired.[5]

---

4. See Anand Menon, "Much Ado About Nothing: EU Defence Policy after the Lisbon Treaty", in this volume. Note that Europe's failure to come together on defence issues confounds the recommendations made by Kupchan (see note 1 above) and so tilts the prospects for transatlantic stability more toward Goldgeier's analysis.

5. Newspaper commentary after the November 2010 was full of this sort of doom

This is not an idle debate. On the contrary it taps into a wider *Zeitgeist* of the 21st Century, according to which power is drifting from the United States (and Europe) to China and elsewhere: it is the decline of the West and the rise of the rest.[6] The only difference is that it is happening in real time and at a pace that even the most enthusiastic (or pessimistic) of pundits would not have expected just a few years back.

FROM LEADERSHIP TO 'FOLLOWER-SHIP'

No matter how much it may be tempting to buy into the argument about the transfer of power from West to East (or North to South), it would also be wrong. To understand why, it is necessary to argue across the conventional wisdom and not against it. Specifically, this essay makes three points:

- the mismatch between US commitments and resources,
- the prospects for US-sponsored cooperation with other great powers, and
- the inevitable character of US global leadership.

The first point is one that proponents of the conventional wisdom about the decline of the West should find easy to accept: the impact of the global economic and financial crisis, coming alongside or on the heels of two expensive conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, has left the United States in a vulnerable situation. Now, more than ever since the end of

---

and despair. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to discount that analysis as a reflection of events of the moment. Serious commentators like David P. Calleo have long worried whether the US has finally overreached itself to the extent that it cannot pull back – particularly under the George W. Bush administration, but under the Obama administration as well. See David P. Calleo, *The Unipolar Folly* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

6. For a sample of such writing, see Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008); Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, "Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050", *Global Economics Paper,* no. 99 (New York: Goldman Sachs, 2003).

the Second World War, the United States needs cooperation from its friends and allies if it is to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

The second point is that whatever the need for cooperation, the United States is likely to encounter great difficulty mobilizing other countries to help it with the intensity and consistency required to meet the challenges we face today. Here the force of the argument is ironic if not tragic. The more the United States needs cooperation, the less likely others are to follow American leadership. Again, proponents of the conventional wisdom will find little to contest. On the contrary, there are many who think that US leadership lacks global legitimacy and so should not be the focal point for global cooperation in any case.

The third point is that the United States is likely to soldier on trying to provide global leadership in different guises nonetheless. This is partly due to hubris and frustration on the American side and partly due to indifference or distraction on the part of others. The basic point here is that neither Europe nor Japan is able to fill a global leadership role. Meanwhile, neither China nor any emerging power is particularly eager to shoulder the burdens that global (or even regional) leadership would entail. Even if that were not the case, emerging powers are even less likely to mobilize followers than the United States itself. Whatever the reason, the result will be further American foreign policy overcommitment leading to worsening and lasting damage to the United States. Both European security and the transatlantic relationship will suffer as a consequence.

That third point is not inevitable. While I have few doubts that the rest of the world will resist the mantle of global leadership, I have some reason to believe that a more equitable and sustainable sharing of burdens between the United States and the rest of the world can be restored. This will involve more than just a strengthening of the transatlantic relationship, although better cooperation between Europe and the United States will help. The transatlantic partnership must be the nucleus around which other countries will pool their efforts as well. The challenge, however, will be to bolster 'follower-ship' as well as leadership at the global level. This is as much a domestic issue as anything else: finding a solution will depend upon commitment in many national parliaments and not just the two Houses of Congress.

A LEADER WITHOUT RESOURCES

This analysis starts with the stark limits to the resources that the United States can bring to bear in confronting the many challenges it must face in the world – from terrorism to climate change and including all points in between. What matters in this context is not military hardware or personnel. Although there are clear signs of overstretch, the United States has both in abundance. Indeed, it has become almost a requirement at international security conferences for someone to point out that the United States spends more than the rest of the world put together.

What the United States lacks is the financial resources to balance defense expenditures – including procurement, operations, salaries, and veterans benefits – with everything else. This would have been true even without the global financial crisis. The US population is aging. In 2009, 18 percent of the US population was over the age of 60 – by 2050 that population share will be 27 percent.[7] Neither Medicare or Social Security – the largest welfare programs for the elderly run by the US government – was ever designed to handle such a load. Although we like to pretend that these are funded systems, the reality is that they are pay-as-you-go. By implication, future American workers will have to pay enormous taxes to fund the outstanding commitments. This will cut deeply into the money available for the rest of the budget.[8]

Consider the basic arithmetic.[9] Right now Social Security, the federal program providing retirement pensions to retirees, accounts for 20 percent of all federal outlays. With Medicare and Medicaid, the programs funding healthcare for the elderly and the poor, that share goes up to 41

7. This demographic data comes from the United Nations and is available upon request from the author.

8. See, for example, *The Long-Term Budget Outlook*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, June 2010 (revised August 2010).

9. This section about budget shares draws heavily on: *Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?*, Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 14 April 2010. The force of this argument is borrowed from Michael Mandelbaum, *The Frugal Superpower: America's Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era*, New York: Public Affairs, 2010.

percent. Even in a very low interest rate environment, the servicing of the federal debt adds another 6 percent on top of that. Then there is another 14 percent that goes to finance rather modest US social safety net – alleviating some of the worst effects of poverty. This means that just over 60 percent of the budget is tied up in interest payments and entitlements. And both categories – interest and entitlements – will only become more important as the US population gets older.

The economic crisis pushes matters to a whole new level of urgency. The fiscal constraints on the United States were bad before the start of the crisis. The Obama administration inherited a large deficit and a burgeoning public debt. Hence it was always going to have to face the need for a consolidation of the federal government's fiscal accounts. The stimulus package passed in the first months of the administration only delayed and did not deny this reality. And while the stimulus succeeded in stabilizing economic performance, the crisis has created long-term unemployed – exacerbating poverty. It has increased levels of stress, and worsened health overall. And it has run up both the deficits and the public debt, which will increase the burden of interest and amortization in the future. The fiscal situation was bad before, but now it is worse. In turn, this means that the prospects for further delay are more limited: the Obama administration has used up much of its room for maneuver.[10]

Then there are the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The human cost of these conflicts is enormous but the fiscal implications are more directly relevant to the argument. Taken together, Afghanistan and Iraq have a significant transitory effect on the defense budget – amounting to approximately USD 160-170 billion per annum. They also have a lasting impact on benefits to government employees, which include veterans. Together, defense expenditures and benefits payments account for another 27 percent of total outlays. Even as American involvement in both places begins to scale down, the absolute cost of having participated in both conflicts is likely to continue to grow.

10. See *The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, August 2010.

Once the numbers for entitlements and defense outlays are put together, they command an impressive share of the total: 41 percent for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security; 6 percent for debt service; 14 percent for the social safety net; and 27 percent for defense and for benefits owed to government employees, including veterans. That adds up to 87 percent of the federal budget. These are the things that the Obama administration cannot cut except with great difficulty.

The remaining 12 to 13 percent of the federal budget encompasses everything else – meaning education, research, infrastructure, and those non-security components of our international affairs (which amount to about 1 percent of the total). This is where the Obama administration will find it easier to cut outlays. It will be painful but it is inevitable.

Under its most optimistic assumptions, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) believes that the Obama administration will have to make a substantial adjustment at some point soon to ensure that the debt does not grow out of control.[11] Recent analysis from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concurs and argues that the United States is running out of its fiscal room for maneuver.[12] The Obama administration has not reached the limit yet – and there are still good arguments to be made that further stimulus is necessary to ensure that the economy does not go down yet again – but the administration knows that it will run out of space sooner rather than later.

More troubling, the IMF analysts assert, the Obama administration will have no way of recognizing that it has run out of room until it is already too late; financial actors will suddenly lose confidence in dollar denominated assets sending both bond and currency markets into a sharp correction.[13] This point went largely unnoticed when the IMF analysis was published. Instead commentators focused their attention on the fact that the Obama administration's room for fiscal maneuver has not yet disappeared. In doing so, they missed the principal thrust of

11. Ibid.

12. See Jonathan D. Ostry, et al. *Fiscal Space*, IMF Position Note (SPN/10/11), Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, September 1st, 2010.

13. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

the analysis – which is that fiscal crisis strikes without forewarning. To borrow from New York Times editorialist and Nobel Prize laureate in economics Paul Krugman, the Obama administration will find itself in a Wyle E. Coyote moment, having run off the cliff long before it had the chance to look down.[14] The fact that Krugman foresaw that possibility already three years ago does not change the nature of problem.

Under more pessimistic assumptions – called the 'alternative fiscal scenario' because it is characterized by a combination of legislative changes including an extension of the tax cuts enacted by the Bush administration – the CBO believes the Obama administration will have to cut net expenditures as soon as possible because the costs of delay in terms of future consolidation efforts will only continue to mount.[15] Despite the difficulties involved, both military and entitlement spending will no doubt feel the pinch.

It is hardly a surprise in this context that the Obama administration underscored the importance of economic issues in its 2010 National Security Strategy – 'at the center of our efforts is a commitment to renew our economy, which serves as the wellspring of American power.'[16] The Obama administration is also looking for friends and allies to help shoulder the burden. That is why it refers to the importance of maintaining strong alliances and it even goes so far as to insist that: 'Our relationship with our European allies remains the cornerstone for US engagement with the world, and a catalyst for international action.'[17] The implication is that other countries will have to continue to embrace American leadership, not just in Europe but elsewhere as well. US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg made the point about as elegantly as you can when he argued at the International Institute for Strategic Studies' Global Strategic Review last September that: 'The decision to reinvigorate global cooperation is not ours alone, but we can play a po-

14. Paul Krugman, "Will There Be a Dollar Crisis?", *Economic Policy*, July 2007, pp. 435-467.

15. *The Long Term Budget Outlook*, pp. 15-17.

16. *National Security Strategy: May 2010*, Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2010, p. 2.

17. Ibid., p. 41.

werful and important role in shaping that decision for other countries.' The possibility left open is that other countries may decide not to follow where the United States tries to lead.

A WORLD WITHOUT FOLLOWERS

Scholars of international relations tend to give much more attention to leaders than to followers. The reason is that leaders have prior causal significance. Greater powers have to threaten before lesser powers can react by balancing or band-wagoning. It is almost impossible to imagine a world where the influence of great powers does not come first. Speaking at the same IISS conference where Deputy Secretary Steinberg underscored the importance of global cooperation, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made an allusion to the fact that international politics regards a situation without leaders in the same way that nature abhors a vacuum. His point was that a leaderless world is unimaginable because a leader will always emerge in world affairs. If it is not the United States, then it may be China, India, Germany, or Japan. It is an intriguing prospect, and in some ways seems intuitive. But that does not resolve the problem of American leadership in decline. If push comes to shove, the world will find a leader. The more important question is whether that leader will be able to motivate any followers because without collective action there is very little that any country can accomplish acting alone.

Here it is useful to reflect on the European situation using a slightly different perspective from that deployed at the start of this analysis. The European Union does not claim to rely principally or heavily on its ability for power projection. Instead, the EU prides itself for being a model for prosperous and peaceful reconciliation. Europe 'leads' as an example for the rest of the world. There is a powerful logic behind this notion. The problem is that the influence of European leadership on other countries diminishes rapidly with any increase in geographic distance. Those countries that join the European Union feel the influence most strongly; those on its borders feel it considerably less; and those in other parts of the world hardly realize that such a thing as European leadership exists.

They may admire European prosperity but they feel little urge to follow its example (and no urge to do what Europe says).

The challenge of European leadership becomes even greater once we consider its unique constitutional features. Although the European Union has a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), these 'policies' – if that is indeed the correct noun – operate only with the agreement of the member states. Where such agreement is not forthcoming – which is true in areas like relations with China, Russia, the United States, or the Middle East – it is hard to speak about Europe in any coherent sense.[18]

Outside of Europe, the prospect for successful leadership is even worse. Who would follow China or India? Certainly these two countries are unlikely to follow each other, and neither is willing to follow Japan. That does not rule out the prospect that these countries can lead by example just as the European Union does and perhaps without the same diminishing influence across geographical distance. China, for example, is often held up as a model for developing countries because of the strong role of the state in guiding economic processes. But imitation of state capitalism as a model is not the same as coordination across state-capitalist systems and it is unclear that state capitalists have any interest in coordinating their actions (rather than simply being left alone).[19] For all the talk about soft power, it was the character of American values and not just the projection of American influence that fostered the development of a cohesive West at the end of the Second World War.[20] The Soviet Union managed to transmit its values as well, often to a willing population that was unimpressed with the advantages of democracy or market capitalism. Nevertheless, the character of those values fostered

18. Again, see Menon, "Much Ado About Nothing"; see also Erik Jones and Saskia van Genugten, "Introduction: The Future of European Foreign Policy",' in Erik Jones and Saskia van Genugten, (eds). *The Future of European Foreign Policy*, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 1-6.

19. Ian Bremmer, "State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?". *Foreign Affairs* 88:3, May/June 2009; Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, London: Atlantic Books, 2008.

20. See, e.g. Stephen S. Cohen and J. Bradford DeLong, *The End of Influence: What Happens When Other Countries Have the Money*, New York: Basic Books, 2010, pp. 35-64.

conflict rather than cooperation and the fractures this created in the Eastern block were felt almost immediately. Hence, the *Return to Diversity* in Central and Eastern Europe was not a sudden explosion in 1989; rather, as Joseph Rothschild makes clear in his book by that title, it was a process that was four decades in the making.[21]

Imitation of state capitalism inspired by China or Russia more closely resembles competition than collective action. Moreover, it is a mercantilist competition that does not benefit from a market based 'hidden hand'. Hence the weakening of US global leadership and the decline of the West is not a straightforward transfer of power from one group of countries to another; it is a dissipation (or bleeding out) of power as we move from an organized to a disorganized international system. The allusion here is to the second law of thermodynamics: complex systems tend to entropy or disorder.[22]

Consider the institutions of the Bretton Woods system, meaning not just the IMF and the World Bank group, but also the World Trade Organization (WTO). Neither China nor Russia (or another other emerging power) wants to assert western-style leadership over these institutions. In terms of Charles Kindleberger's theory of hegemonic stability, they do not want to act as lenders of last resort or as open markets for distressed goods.[23] We can make a similar point in terms of collective security. Both Russia and China are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and yet neither country appears eager to use that forum to take initiative. If anything, their ambitions are to limit membership in the group of five permanent members (P-5, which also includes Britain, France, and the US) and to make effective bargaining use of their own right of veto.

The institutions created to consolidate American global leadership are ill-equipped to serve any country but the United States. Yet if no

21. Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since World War II*, third edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

22. Erik Jones, "Closing Argument: Elusive Power, Essential Leadership", *Survival* 51:3, June/July 2009 pp. 243-251.

23. Charles Poor Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939: Revised and Enlarged Edition*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, pp. 288-305.

other country aspires to control these institutions, there are at least four reasons why the United States will have difficulty rallying others to support its continuing dominance. The first and most obvious is the ungenerous nature of the kind of leadership that the United States has to offer. It cannot make significant financial concessions to encourage cooperation through either foreign aid or market access. And it does not control who has privileged positions within this design of the global economic system as a whole. The first point follows directly from the arithmetic constraints on the US fiscal situation and from the periodic groundswell of US market protectionism. The second point is more complicated because it calls attention to the incentives that used to encourage countries to play a follower role.

The best way to explore this notion of structural privilege is to start with what we know about the US situation. There are a number of critiques of the Bretton Woods system, the United Nations, and NATO, that center on the problem of American exploitation of privilege. In the classic formulation, the US government uses its predominant position in the global economy to shunt some of the costs of its hegemony onto others.[24] This argument continues to have merit – not least because it acknowledges the high cost of accepting a global leadership role. Such costs are not borne out of altruism but self interest. As Brazil's foreign minister Celso Amorim has argued, a generous power is one that sees its interests in the long-term stability of the system. His example was the United States. That is what the US wanted at the end of the Second World War – and it did what was necessary to achieve that goal.

The point that is often overlooked in this analysis about the self-interested nature of America's commitment to the post-WWII world order is that other countries wanted the structure that the US had to offer as well – even if looked at only in straight economic terms. As export-led growth countries, Germany and Japan were eager to buy and hold dollar denominated assets and did not want their currencies to replace the dollar at the global level. They learned how to thrive in the shadow of

24. David P. Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland, *America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National Realities*, Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press, 1973.

America's exorbitant privilege. China is doing the same thing today. The problem is that the United States can no longer afford to offer these incentives. This is what the debate about global macroeconomic imbalances is all about – America's inability to underwrite the global economic system as consumer of last resort.[25] Hence, the Obama administration is asking countries like Germany, Japan, and China to change the export-led growth formulas that made it possible for them to thrive under American hegemony. That is a hard sell. It is made all the harder by the prospect that divided government in the US will prevent the Obama administration from making other concessions that could ease the pain.

The second reason that the Obama administration will have difficulty finding followers is that countries are less willing to identify with the system. This is a subtly different point because it has less to do with incentives, or how countries benefit from the system; instead the focus is on where the system does them harm. Germany is not part of the P-5; China has only as many votes in the IMF as Belgium and the Netherlands; and so on. Every country can see problems with the system of global institutions and each has its own view as to how the system should be reformed. The wrangle about IMF directorships and voting weights is a good illustration of the problem; but reform of the UN Security Council could fit as well. In that context, the Obama bounce in global public opinion polling does not offer much hope for improvement. Countries may like the United States and admire its leadership but that says very little about how they want to interact with one-another even if they believe that the US should continue to run the show.

The third reason that the Obama administration will have difficulty finding followers is that the problems it must face are so complicated and the consequences are so uncertain that it is hard to find consensus on what should be done. Here again it is useful to focus on the problem of macroeconomic imbalances. The Obama administration is trying to tell the Germans, the Japanese and (particularly) the Chinese, that the United States can no longer act as the consumer of last resort and that

25. Erik Jones, "Shifting the Focus: The New Political Economy of Global Macroeconomic Imbalances", *SAIS Review* 29:2, Summer/Fall 2009, pp. 61-73.

they will have to start investing in themselves and relying on domestic demand to stimulate output. And while it has made considerable headway in terms of changing the emphasis in the debate, none of the current account surplus countries is willing to concede the argument. On the contrary, they are telling the United States that it is America's obligation to reform. For all that the Obama administration has spoken optimistically about the G-20, that forum has clearly reached an impasse on this issue – both globally and within Europe itself. It is impossible to see how to avoid a repeat of the recent crisis if this problem of macroeconomic imbalances is not resolved.[26] If anything, the near collapse of Irish or Greek public finances threatens to make matters worse.

The fourth reason that the Obama administration will find it difficult to reassert control over multilateral institutions is that the other countries of the world are no less constrained than the United States itself. If anything, their situation may be even more problematic. This point is more complicated than can be expressed in this paper. Suffice it to offer a simple illustration. One of the most pressing constraints on US government finances lies in the fact that the American population over sixty will increase, as said, from 18 to 27 percent of the total during the next four decades. In China, the elderly share of the population will go from 12 to 31 percent, and China is not even the worst case. That distinction is reserved for South Korea, which will see it share of over 60s go from 15 to 41 percent of the total population. This peak is only slightly higher than we expect to see in Western Europe, although the starting point is much lower and so the change is correspondingly greater.[27] These emerging market and middle income countries have only a short window to exercise anything like global leadership before they have to face dramatic challenges at home. This means they are not only unlikely to lead; they are also unable as well as unwilling to follow. The conclusion to draw at this point is straightforward: the US needs cooperation now more than ever but it is unlikely to find a willing group of followers to help.

---

26. This is a recurrent theme in the writings of *Financial Times* columnist Martin Wolf. See, Martin Wolf, *Fixing Global Finance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

27. Again, this data is taken from the United Nations and is available upon request.

FRUSTRATION AND HUBRIS

There is no ready alternative to American leadership and there is no obvious support for American leadership either. Nevertheless, Kissinger is right to believe that the international system demands a leader. Some country must set the agenda and forge cooperation if all are to benefit from the power of collective action. 'Leadership' in this sense is roughly the same as the provision of public goods, including governance.[28] The most likely candidate is still the United States. The reason is that no-one else wants the job. Regional powers are working hard to stabilize their neighborhoods. This is what the recent history of the European Union has so amply demonstrated. EU member states are interested in other parts of the world but they are not 'present' in that sense of deep and inescapable entanglement. The former high representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, has been very explicit in stating that Europe's strength is to play a supportive – and not a guiding – role. Again, if there is European leadership, it operates more by example than by action. This is not to diminish the significance of the European Union. European integration has brought peace and prosperity to the Old Continent and that is a tremendous achievement. Most Europeans would be happy for others to follow that example.

The United States has much greater ambitions. This has a lot to do with the American political temperament and the underlying consensus in the United States on the indispensability of American power.[29] This was articulated most clearly during the 2004 US presidential elections. In the first of three presidential debates, the Democratic candidate, John Kerry, led off with the following conviction: 'I believe President Bush and I both love our country equally. But we just have a different set of convictions about how you make America safe. I believe America is safest and strongest when we are leading the world and we are leading strong alliances.' This conviction was uncontroversial in the debate. In-

28. This notion of leadership is developed in Mandelbaum, *The Frugal Superpower*.

29. Recent scholarship suggests this has always been the case, even during the period between the two World Wars. See Bear F. Braumoeller, 'The Myth of American Isolationism,' *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6:4, October 2010, pp. 349-371.

stead, the candidates sparred over who had the best formula for exercising such leadership. Kerry insisted that much hinged on American credibility and the president's ability to pass 'the global test where your countrymen, your people understand fully why you're doing what you're doing and you can prove to the world that you did it for legitimate reasons.' The Republican incumbent, George W. Bush, insisted that leadership emanates from the strength of American values and the constancy of American commitments because 'if America shows uncertainty or weakness in this decade, the world will drift toward tragedy.'[30]

This debate over the nature of American leadership became one of the defining moments of the 2004 campaign. Again, however, the assumption of American leadership was not at issue; what the candidates fought over was the style. The Bush campaign ridiculed Kerry for his suggestion of a 'global test' and cemented the importance of projecting American values and promoting American interests through a firm commitment to leadership abroad. Four years later, Democratic candidate and then President Barack Obama pulled the style of American leadership back in a more cooperative direction. Nevertheless, whether the administration is led by a Republican or a Democrat, the assumption that the United States should play a leading role in the world goes unchallenged.

Few if any other countries can field such a consensus. Certainly Europe would be difficult to cast in that role. It would not fit China too well either. The government in China wants to be treated as a great power in a world of great powers. It wants to be respected. But most of all, it wants to be left alone to wrestle with its many domestic economic and political challenges. What it clearly does not want, is to run the show. There are few if any indications that India, Russia, Brazil or Turkey want to assume that role either.

The implications of this lack of enthusiasm within other countries to strive to replace American global leadership are significant. When something truly terrible happens, the United States will consistently be among

30. The transcript of these debates is available online at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004a_p.html.

the first countries to respond. It may do so reluctantly and it will work very hard to bring others along with it. It will work with other regional actors who are more directly implicated in the matter. But it will always be there and it will become increasingly overstretched as a result.

This recurrent assumption that the United States should play a leading role in the world will continue despite the outcome of the 2010 midterm Congressional elections. The Republican victory in the House of Representatives, taken together with the gains it has made in the Senate, will lock up the machinery of government and make the Obama administration even more slower to react either to its own need for reform or to any problems arising abroad. But that is a matter of process and not principle, which remains largely unaffected by the alternation of legislative control. Although they rarely make clear foreign policy prescriptions, even members of the Tea Party movement believe in the essential indispensability of American global leadership. They may express frustration with the unwillingness of other countries to share the burdens of responding to global crises; they may deny the importance of common problems such as those related to climate change or trade and development; and they will certainly resist efforts to offer financial support for multilateral institutions. However, none of that contradicts the firm commitment that the United States has a special destiny to lead the world.

CONCLUSION

Should the United States continue to pursue its ambition to global leadership without the benefit of European support, there will be clear and negative implications both for European security and for the transatlantic relationship. An overstretched and under-resourced US administration is likely to withdraw prematurely from its overseas commitments – as it did in Lebanon in the early 1980s, in Somalia in the early 1990s, and as it may do both in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2010s. Given its close geographic proximity to these areas, Europe will undoubtedly experience the consequences. A frustrated American leadership will most likely pursue a piecemeal solution to the problem of global climate

change and it will continue to rely more heavily on bilateral trade deals in lieu of multilateral omnibus talks. Again, the consequences will be felt in Europe as well – with matching frustration on the European side of the Atlantic.

There is no easy solution to this conundrum. The Europeans are understandably reluctant to follow an American leadership with which they are in disagreement, and the United States is unwilling to underwrite public goods that are not to American benefit. Meanwhile, neither Europe nor the United States has any other partner who is willing or able to play a complementary role. The two sides of the Atlantic are co-dependent as well as inter-dependent. They must learn to work together if either is to achieve its goals.

Appendix
Transatlantic Security Symposium 2010. Conference Report

Valeria Calderoni, Kalina Oroschakoff

Due to the increasingly global and transnational nature of security challenges state actors are facing today, it is of acute importance now to assess the ongoing relevance of the current security framework in Europe or of the transatlantic community, the role of key institutions within this context, and the possibilities for cooperation among the existing institutions in order to face current and future threats and risks.

The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Bologna Center) organized the third edition of an established series of conferences hosted by IAI on the topic of transatlantic relations called Transatlantic Security Symposium, to foster dialogue and make the point on these relevant issues, threats and challenges.

The meeting was sponsored by Compagnia di San Paolo, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fritz Thyssen Stiftung in Köln, Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NATO Public Diplomacy Division and took place in Rome on November 7, 2010, on the eve of the NATO summit in Lisbon. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena kindly made the conference room available.

CONTENTS

The conference focused on European security and explored the topic in relation to four different perspectives: NATO's new strategy, nuclear arms and missile defense, the role of Russia, and the European plans for defense after Lisbon.

European security in NATO's new strategy

In the first session speakers and participants were invited to focus on the potential weaknesses of the Euro-Atlantic partnership within NATO and the opportunities for improvement in the alliance. This they did in particular with regard to exploring the roles and levels of commitment each side should be ready to devote. While the debate focused in particular on the role of NATO and its relevance to both Europe and the US, the potential role of the EU, also with regard to its relationship with Russia, was among the key issues discussed.

NATO has so far been the pillar of Western collective defense, a platform through which the US and Europe have addressed crucial issues like the war on terrorism, conflict in the Middle East or the spread of nuclear weapons in a joint effort. As they share 'the closest alignment of values, interests, capabilities and goals as well as the largest economic relationship in the world', it seems clear, as US President Obama pointed out parallel to the NATO summit in an op-ed for the International Herald Tribune, that 'neither Europe nor the United States can confront the challenges of our time without the other' – in spite of contradictory tendencies that might signal the contrary and doubts about the continuing US interest for the European theater. A crucial point would be to strengthen ties with organizations that complement NATO's strengths and capabilities like the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has so far been denied a primary role.

It appears necessary for the alliance to revisit the framework within which the various relationships among its members and partners are managed and take place. Traditional security concerns have declined dramatically in Europe since 1990. This raises the possibility for some members that NATO might redirect its attention too much away from Europe. In order to remain relevant, NATO needs to continue to upgrade its capacity to confront threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and cyber-warfare. Meanwhile, by necessity, the US has had to concentrate on threats which mostly originate in Africa, Middle East and Asia.

This is only one of several factors that may foster belief in the decline of US engagement in the transatlantic relationship. With regard to US at-

titudes, the most important symptom of this declining interest is the failure of the United States to seek the advice of the EU and to involve it in the consultation process on fundamental security issues. A key example illustrating this unequal relationship between the US and its European allies is the lack of European involvement and inclusion in the US-conceived Afghanistan strategic review in 2009. Europe remains useful for the United States: it was widely agreed that Europe continues to be the most important ally of the US for the moment, and that the US will not only have to keep courting it, but also be seeking its help, even though at times it will be reluctant to do so. Nevertheless, the EU seems to have been treated more as a force provider than a partner.

Any discussion of the unequal relationship between the two has to sides to it. Against the backdrop of the financial and economic crisis and a world economy in recession, the fact that most European countries are significantly cutting defense spending is not aiding their case for being treated as more credible and equal partners. Adding to that, it must be kept in mind that the playground in which current and future security challenges are evolving – and will need to be confronted – is predominantly outside the European region. US attention has shifted for non-military reasons as well; current political and economic developments point towards Asia and particularly China as becoming the new focus area.

The US is not, however, the only actor that might reassess its regional orientation. Europe could also be tempted to look eastwards and strengthen ties with Russia, believing NATO to be outdated and no longer helpful or appropriate to tackle European security concerns. Those who treat NATO as a product of the old Cold War order, and thus as obsolete, will consequently also be very skeptical of the eastward enlargement of NATO as an appropriate solution to Europe's long-term stabilization.

In fact, the currently insufficient level of European engagement in NATO's military efforts might be worsened and further hindered by the outcome of the war in Afghanistan: whereas the US might be willing to embark on similar missions in the future, it is debatable whether its European partners will be willing to be involved militarily to the same extent again.

There is widespread disagreement on whether Europe is doing enough in Afghanistan and in ISAF, on the role of the EU as an institution

within the wider security policy context, or on NATO enlargement being the successful answer to the threat of obsolescence, which has been leading to rifts between the US and Europe and within Europe itself. Yet, agreement exists with regard to a number of policy approaches that should be pursued. The opinion is shared by many that in case ongoing cooperation with NATO were to be pursued further on the European side, the focus of burden sharing should shift to the diversification of tasks through different forms of power: concerning the respective roles of the two major political institutions in the transatlantic context, the EU could concentrate and elaborate on its considerable soft power, leaving hard power to the US. This view stems from the consideration that, in regards to non-military capacities, it would not make sense for NATO to develop its own non-military institutions when it barely has funds enough to deal with military requirements. Instead, it should coordinate its policy with institutions such as the EU that have the resources to complement NATO's military role. While this might help with conceptualizing the first steps of a long process of defining roles and responsibilities, this characterization nevertheless does not help easing the psychological suspicion between the two institutions, widely different in their characteristics and views.

For example, while the EU has great legitimacy as an institution, it lacks a well-defined strategic culture, which is instead explicitly developed, formulated and promoted by the US within NATO. Adding to that, threat perceptions are also different between the EU and the US.

The difference in threat perceptions is particularly evident with regards to Russia. Some Central and Eastern European states like Poland and the Baltic countries see Russia as a potential threat and feel the need for reassurance of NATO intervention in case of aggression; while NATO should take the challenge of making sure these states feel safe, it should be clear that a high level of US engagement in Europe might be unsustainable. Hence, the EU should take over the issue of stabilizing relations with Russia – especially since the US through NATO tried but failed so far to solve this problem, although with the Obama administration some progress was made for the first time.

For the EU to pursue a more effective security policy and solve regional issues like that of Russia, it is necessary to reassert the impor-

tance of the OSCE, an often overlooked institution that was created precisely to establish an inclusive common security space, but was never given the chance to play a pivotal role so far.

Nuclear arms and missile defense in transatlantic security

The second session of the Symposium delved deep into highly sensitive issues such as the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe and the US plan to extend its anti-ballistic missile shield to Europe. Until recently the latter issue was a source of internal division, in particular because it had contributed to a sharp deterioration in NATO-Russia relations. Nonetheless, the decision of the Obama administration to reassess ballistic missile defense by replacing George W. Bush's plans to install large land infrastructure in Poland and the Czech Republic with a more flexible, mostly ship-based scheme has apparently changed the picture for the better.

While aiming at providing the infrastructure to ensure security in and for the transatlantic space, efforts at pushing forward this new missile defense system must take into account Russia's position towards and perceptions of it. Taking Russia into account could further promote constructive cooperation between the different actors involved or implicated: Russia has been repeatedly invited to participate in a common defense missile umbrella. The NATO-Russia meeting at the NATO Summit in Lisbon has laid the groundwork for a possible cooperation between Russia and NATO as both pledged their efforts to actively work at it.

Russia, however, is not the only international and regional player of relevance to transatlantic security that needs to be looked into and taken account of. The focus of NATO's extended deterrence might shift to the Middle East, in order to reassure not only its partners in the southern flank, but also Central Europe, in the event that Iran succeeds in developing ballistic missiles within this decade. NATO is already cooperating with Israel and several Arab countries in the field of missile defense, and some US systems are already deployed in these countries. In fact, according to some, a NATO missile defense system would make sense particularly with respect to potential nuclear newcomers in Middle East,

which could be tempted to act aggressively against their neighbors. Obama's new missile defense plan would contribute to a shift towards the primacy of deterrence by denial. Should Iran become a nuclear power in the near future, deterrence by denial would provide a more efficient and flexible framework for defense, although missile defense by itself might not be sufficient. Air defense would also be required along with other means for offensive capability. An efficient deterrence system must provide for the appropriate mix of denial and punishment.

Turkey as well needs to be taken into consideration. Turkey does not perceive Syria and Iran as threatening regional stability while Israel and its allies believe they do. Turkey is therefore reluctant to discuss security threats of this kind in the framework of NATO. This, however, makes it difficult to believe in missile defense as the joint project that will bring the members of the alliance to closer cooperate. According to some, the reason why Turkey is so difficult to relate with on this issue, is that it is operating on three different spheres: while entertaining a normative relationship with NATO, it is engaging in identity-based politics at home and in *Realpolitik* at the regional level.

According to some participants, the development of NATO-wide missile defense capabilities could facilitate a decision on the eventual withdrawal of US non-strategic nuclear forces deployed in Europe. Their main argument was that US nuclear forces in Europe are almost irrelevant in a purely military sense and that their political value as symbol of the US commitment to Europe could be reallocated to missile defense facilities. However, other participants disputed this conclusions. In addition, they stressed the importance of US nuclear weapons in Europe to provide even symbolic reassurance to those new Central and Eastern European NATO members feeling vulnerably exposed to Russian aggression.

Russia in the European security architecture

The third session of the Symposium delved deep into US and EU relations with Russia. The debate revolved around the following questions: how should the Euro-Atlantic countries look at Russia as a European security actor?

Participants agreed that the fact that NATO members have no single answer to this question hinges on different threat perceptions. For some European states Russia represents the principal security risk, while others are open to see it and engage with it as a partner. Participants admitted that the positive momentum achieved recently in the Russian-Western security relationship was undeniable, pointing to the US-Russia START agreement on strategic nuclear warheads reductions, Russia's commitment to assisting NATO in Afghanistan, and its support for a new, more incisive round of UN sanctions aimed at curbing Iran's nuclear plans.

Nevertheless, several experts noticed that, even though Russia and NATO are working towards concrete cooperation in a number of policy areas, Russia's interest in cooperation is mostly driven by economic considerations. By contrast, NATO is oriented towards security cooperation. Participants pointed out that Russia's new military doctrine described the eventuality of further eastward enlargement rounds of NATO as a major military danger, and that the Kremlin saw the war in Georgia as a success precisely because it prevented such further enlargement from happening. Therefore, they concluded, whereas it is possible to establish security cooperation, Russia is extremely unlikely to seek, or to be offered, NATO membership. Russia is equally unlikely to be satisfied with a loose partnership agreement.

From Russia's point of view, NATO deserves to be blamed for bilateral difficulties much more extensively than the alliance is ready to admit. Some participants noted that, in Russia's eyes, many NATO countries have undermined OSCE as the agreed central pillar of a European security architecture. Furthermore, NATO enlargement contributed to making Russia feel significantly more vulnerable and even 'encircled' – especially, since the unwritten clause of reassurance to Russia stipulating that no forces would be stationed in the new member countries was later forgotten. Russia has shown a capacity to adapt, and some progress has been achieved with the Obama administration. However, were the United States to reverse its course of action due, for instance, to the Republican victory in Congress elections, this would cause a backlash in the relationship with Russia that would be widely felt also in Europe.

In contrast to the rapid thaw in relations between Russia and NATO, participants contended that EU-Russian relations were proceeding at a very slow pace, and many initiatives that had been agreed had not yet been implemented. The so-called Partnership for Modernization was singled out as one example. Another is the EU-Russia Political and Security Committee, which is expected to start work soon and yet is also expected to face huge difficulties.

No participant denied that Russia's relationship with the EU is characterized by a difference in aims and values. While Europe is concerned with defending its 'way of life', Russia is concerned with defending its sovereignty and competitiveness. Russia is also eager to consolidate its influence over a number of states in the former Soviet space – its perceived sphere of 'privileged interest', as President Dmitry Medvedev has described it. For this reason, several participants argued, attempts by the EU to spread its values are unlikely to meet with success – or benevolence on part of Russia – nor is further EU enlargement any more likely, not only because there is no eagerness on the part of the EU to involve the most troublesome countries in the region, but also because this move would arouse and be met with Russian suspicion.

Some participants recalled that Russia seems to have no intention to change its increasingly authoritarian domestic power structure, and consolidate democratic principles and institutions. They predicted that Russia will have difficulties building better relations with the West without containing this authoritarian creep at home. According to some, within Russia's own borders the population is increasingly favorably inclined towards NATO, both with an eye to greater dialogue and looking toward the prospect of greater exchange with the West. While the challenges are immense, some scholars envision the possibility for improving relations through mutual public trust.

The EU's security and defense policy after Lisbon

The fourth session concluded the conference by addressing the changes and opportunities for a new EU security strategy in the light of the Lisbon Treaty, taking into account the different views of the participants

regarding the possibility that it might improve the ability of the EU to act as a major international power in security issues.

Most participants agreed that the European Union has played a crucial role in transforming relations between its members, while also helping to stabilize relations between the neighboring countries that wish to acquire membership within it. In light of this, the Lisbon Treaty has garnered much attention, although there is lack of consensus on whether it has actually improved the ability of the EU to act as a major international power in security issues, notwithstanding the fact that almost one half of its provisions regard security policies. The main reason for this modest achievement is, according to most participants, the widespread tendency of member states to avoid taking their security responsibilities seriously. This lack of reliability was said to be strictly interconnected with the constant lack of coherence in policy, due to the deployment of different instruments and procedures belonging to different members, which is a source of friction, confusion and even rivalry.

The Lisbon Treaty aimed at correcting these weaknesses, mainly through the creation of a new post, the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy. However, the unavoidable ambiguity resulting from his/her institutional mandate – due to the need of implementing an acceptable compromise between different positions – is clearly a hindrance when it comes to implementing the chosen policies.

Another crucial issue addressed by participants was the lack of military capabilities which are fundamental in order to back up any major security ambitions of the European Union. The entity of this problem is best illustrated by the inability of two thirds of European land forces to operate beyond national borders.

The Lisbon Treaty has created a special legal mechanism called 'permanent structured cooperation' through which a group of like-minded EU member states can proceed to further integrating their capabilities on the basis of pre-arranged criteria. To incentivize active (vs. ceremonial) participation in the new mechanism, the Lisbon Treaty allows for the possibility to penalize members of the permanent structured cooperation for failing to meet those criteria.

Participants acknowledged that it was too early to say whether this mechanism will succeed in overcoming the challenges posed by the dif-

ficulties of setting standards of evaluation for the single states' performance, as well as the problem of assessing criteria that would satisfy all member states. They identified the unanimity principle that dominates and thus hinders decision making as the main obstacle to a coherent and strong defense policy, noting that consensus tends to be often elusive, thus leading to nothing more than small-scale operations.

Some experts contended that the Lisbon Treaty does nothing to counteract this limitation, as it reconfirms the requirement of unanimity on decisions to deploy military force, which coupled with lack of political will, leaves little chance of widespread, significant military commitment.

Some suggested that the best way to deal with this flaw is to start with modest objectives and reasonable ambitions that are more likely to be fulfilled, as a first step towards greater collaboration. However, there was widespread skepticism that this would actually lead to the EU member states empowering the Union with more extensive competencies in the defense policy field.

CONCLUSION

In order to improve cooperation between the United States and its European partners within the framework of NATO, participants recommended either a diversification of tasks through different forms of power, an increase in defense spending on the part of Europe, or the pooling of European military resources at the EU level. In whatever form, European countries need to contribute more in military terms to Euro-Atlantic security and thus respond to US perceptions of insufficient European engagement in missions such as the one in Afghanistan, if they wish to be treated as partners on equal footing. However, this might not work in keeping US attention focused on Europe, as most of the current and future security challenges are located in other regions, key amongst them China, South Asia and the Middle East. The EU could provide its European member states collectively with greater leverage *vis-à-vis* the US if it developed the necessary tools and mechanisms to create the political will and exercise its soft power more effectively as a collective body.

In fact, while the EU enjoys great legitimacy as an institution, it lacks a well-defined strategic culture. NATO, in contrast to the EU, has monopolized strategic resources since its inception, as its purpose and role was to provide a common defense framework within the Cold War context and, tentatively, also in the post-Cold War context.

Some experts proposed that a shift towards deterrence by denial would be advisable in the wake of the envisaged missile defense system for the protection of the transatlantic area. While missile defense might provide a security insurance, it was argued that other means for offensive capability might still be necessary, especially with regard to potential threats emanating from nuclear proliferators.

Participants contended that in the prospect of a nuclear Iran the US and Europe should seek cooperation with players such as Russia and Turkey. Furthermore, considering differences amongst the individual European countries and the US with regards to how to approach Iran, a suitable mix of deterrence mechanisms and diplomacy has to be found and agreed on.

Accounting for differences in perceptions of threats among European states is a key element in any debate on how to approach and possibly build better relations with Russia. Furthermore it is of vital importance, particularly within the context of NATO enlargement and partnerships, to consider positions and sensitivities on the Russian side in order to avoid misunderstandings on the road towards a new relationship. Taking advantage of new impulses within Russia could help to build a momentum for closer alignment between NATO, as a security alliance and community of values, and Russia.

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 2010
CONFERENCE AGENDA

MONDAY, November 8

9:00-9:15 Welcome address and seminar introduction

Welcome address: **Stefano Silvestri**, President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Kenneth H. Keller, Director, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center

Introduction: **Riccardo Alcaro**, Researcher, Transatlantic Programme, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

9:15-9:45 OPENING SPEECHES

Sandro De Bernardin, Deputy Secretary General and Political Director, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
Vincenzo Camporini, Chief of Defence Staff, Italian Ministry of Defence, Rome

9:45-11:15 **FIRST SESSION**
European security in NATO's new strategy

Chair: **Alessandro Minuto Rizzo**, Senior Strategic Advisor, Enel Holding, Rome; former Deputy Secretary General, NATO

Paper-giver: **Jim Goldgeier**, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, and Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Academy, Washington DC

Discussants: **Ulrike Guérot**, Senior Policy Fellow, Head of Berlin Office, European Council on Foreign Relations
Dana Allin, Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Affairs, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

Giancarlo Aragona, Ambassador, former member of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO

OPEN DEBATE

11:15-11:30 COFFEE BREAK

11:30-13:00 **SECOND SESSION**
Nuclear arms and missile defence in transatlantic security

Chair: **Ettore Greco**, Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

Paper-giver: **Oliver Thränert**, Senior Fellow, Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Missile Defense, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin

Discussants: **David Yost**, Professor of International Relations, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA
Steven Pifer, Director of Arms Control Initiative, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC
Pieter Van Ham, Head, Global Governance Research, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague

OPEN DEBATE

13:00-14:15 LUNCH

14.15-15:45 **THIRD SESSION**
Russia in the European security architecture

Chair: **Nathalie Tocci**, Head of the EU and the Neighbourhood Department, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

Paper-giver: **Arkady Moshes**, Program Director on Russia in the Regional and Global Context, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki

Discussants: **Arthur Rachwald**, Professor of Political Science, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis (MA) and Visiting Professor, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center
Andrew Wilson, Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations, London
Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow, Program Director (Russia and Eurasia), International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

OPEN DEBATE

15:45-16:00 COFFEE BREAK

16:00-17:30 **FOURTH SESSION**
The EU's security and defence policy after Lisbon

Chair: **Antonio Missiroli**, Bureau of European Policy Advisers, European Commission, Brussels, and Adjunct Professor of European Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center

Paper-giver: **Anand Menon**, Professor of West European Politics, University of Birmingham

Discussants: **Sven Biscop**, Director of Europe in the World Program, Egmont - Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels
Kurt Volker, Senior Fellow and Managing Director of the Center on Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Washington, D.C.
Yves Boyer, Professor, Ecole polytechnique; Deputy Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

Open debate

Final remarks **Erik Jones**, Professor of European Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center

IAI Research Papers

The IAI Research Papers are brief monographs written by one or more authors (IAI or external experts) on current problems of international politics and international relations. The aim is to promote greater and more up-to-date knowledge of emerging issues and trends and help prompt public debate.

European Security and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, edited by Riccardo Alcaro and Erik Jones

Finito di stampare nel mese di aprile 2011
con tecnologia *print on demand*
presso il Centro Stampa "*Nuova Cultura*"
p.le Aldo Moro n. 5, 00185 Roma
www.nuovacultura.it

per ordini: ordini@nuovacultura.it

[Int_9788861346475_04]

Long the main pillar holding up the transatlantic relationship, the security of Europe seems to have turned into an accessory element in the transatlantic security agenda. In recent years, the United States and European countries have often been unable to find enduring convergence over how to deal with issues related to Europe's security, such as NATO's role, relations with Russia and other former Soviet republics, and the European Union's ambition to develop an autonomous military arm. Concerns, however, about trends inexorably leading to the drifting apart of the transatlantic partners seem exaggerated. In fact, under the Obama administration, the United States and its European partners have found some new common ground. An effort to transform occasional convergences into a shared vision of Europe's long-term security would contribute considerably to re-energizing the Euro-Atlantic bond. Though not on the same scale as in the past, Europe's security can still be a significant component of the transatlantic relationship.

www.nuovacultura.it

ISBN 978-88-6134-647-5

9 788861 346475

Cop_9788861346475_06EM

14.00 *EURO*