

ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

PAPERS

**THE  
MEDITERRANEAN:  
POLITICS  
ECONOMICS  
STRATEGY**

**VOLUME ONE:  
THE SCENARIO AND  
THE CRISES**

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### PREFACE

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For the elaboration of the tables numerous sources, generally cited in the text, were utilized, the principal ones being: *The Oil and Gas Journal*, 1975; *ENI, Energia e Idrocarburi, Sommario Statistico*, 1955,1974; AMMI, *Metalli non ferrosi e ferroleghie, statistiche 1974*; UN, *Statistical Yearbook*; IISS, *Military Balance, Statistical Yearbook 1974*; Commodity Research Bureau Inc., *1974 Commodity Yearbook*; IISS, *Military Balance*; SIPRI, *Arms Trade Registers*; SIPRI, *Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmaments*; UN, *Demographic Yearbook*; Ministero degli Affari Esteri, " *Problemi del lavoro italiano all'estero*", World Bank, *Year Report*; *Recent Economic Development*; International Monetary Fund, *Recent Economic Development*; World Bank, *Atlas*; The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review*; International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*; UN, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*; OCDE, *Etudes Economiques*; Europa publications, *Europa Yearbook*; *Survey of Current Business*.

The term Mediterranean in this work is complex. Countries considered strictly Mediterranean are those with a coastline on the Sea, that is: Albania, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey. For political reasons the term is often extended to include two other countries: Jordan and Portugal. In order to analyze certain themes the definition was amplified to include several neighboring zones, essentially three: a) the Balkans, i.e., Rumania and Bulgaria, besides the coastal Balkan countries already mentioned; b) the Gulf and the Middle and Near East: Irak, Iran, Kuwait; Oman, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, South Yemen, Bahrein Qatar, Union of Arab Emirates, in addition to Jordan and the other coastal countries already indicated; c) the European Economic Community.

PART I

THE MEDITERRANEAN SCENARIO

## I. HYDROCARBONS AND OTHER RESOURCES

### HYDROCARBONS

#### OIL: PRODUCTION AND RESERVES

According to the first figures available for 1975 (see tables I.1,2) 63.4% of total estimated world petroleum reserves (c. 56.4 billion tons) and 44.2% of world production (c. 1.2 billion tons) are situated within the Mediterranean area. Given that Eastern and North African production is virtually entirely for export it may be said that the region has a monopoly position on the international petroleum market.

The Gulf area has a particularly high concentration of reserves and production (56.3% and 37% of the world total). Saudi Arabia, with at least 23.4% of world reserves, is in a preeminent position, being able, unilaterally, to control conditions on the international export market.

After rapid growth during 1973, petroleum production in 1974 and 1975 grew only very slowly, this being due to a reduction in world demand as a consequence of the price increases of autumn 1973. The more valuable grades, e.g. Libyan and Algerian, were particularly affected. Saudi production, on the other hand, grew rapidly, whilst Iran's approached in 1974 its projected maximum level of 430 billion tons/ annum by 1992. But in 1975 OPEC production fell by more than 12%. It should be noted that the reduction of Libyan production and Kuwait production is also influenced by a "policy of conservation", adopted since 1971, that is to say, of imposing restrictions on production until new discoveries are made.

Exports from Iraq, which had similarly been reduced on account of problems in marketing, facing the Iraq National Oil Co. (INOC) following the complicated and controversial nationalizations carried out during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war rose to unprecedented

levels in 1975, due probably to a very competitive commercial policy. INOC is nonetheless carrying out an investment programme which in four years should double its productive capacity. Algeria may on the other hand be turning, in line with the revenue requirements of its intensive development programme, towards a relatively "conservationist" policy. The Iranian authorities have, on occasion, expressed similar intentions although these contrast with the need to maximize mineral revenue in order to finance the country's ambitious plans for development.

The main markets for Middle-Eastern and North African exports are in Europe and Japan, although there was in 1974 and 1975 a significant increase in American imports, a tendency which may be expected to continue for the next four to five years. One can however detect at the same time an increase in the importance of non-Mediterranean exporters on the American market. The substitution of Libyan oil by crude oil of a similar grade from Nigeria is characteristic of this trend.

#### NATURAL GAS: RESERVES AND PRODUCTION

Reserves of natural gas within the Mediterranean area, estimated at 22.360 billion cubic metres, represent 28.9% of the world total (see table I.1). Potential gas production could furthermore be greatly increased if gas liberated during drilling for oil was not burned as is at present the practice in several countries in the region. The estimated extent of reserves of this relative new-comer to the international energy market is constantly rising.

Compared to reserve potential, production is still today relatively low (see table I.3). Algeria, Libya and Iran have been the only countries to adopt an export policy. With two exceptions, viz. the projects for a pipeline between Algeria and Italy (a notoriously difficult technical enterprise) and that for a pipeline between Iran and the USSR perhaps to be inserted at a later date in a triangular network linking Iran, the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, the Mediterranean exporting countries are mainly concerned with developing transport by sea.

Algeria exports to France, to Great Britain and to the United States and has signed nu-

Table I/1 Reserve of Hydrocarbons, 1975

	Oil (thousand tons)	%	Natural Gas (million mc)	%
Mediterranean area	56,430	63.4	22,360	28.9
<i>Gulf</i>	50,845	56.3	15,955	20.5
Abu Dhabi	4,000		650	
Saudi Arabia	20,800	(23.4)	3,500	(4.5)
Bahrein	45		190	
Dubai	200		50	
Iran	8,800		9,400	(12.8)
Iraq	4,700		780	
Kuwait	9,800		1,050	
Oman	800		60	
Qatar	800		230	
Sharjah	200		45	
<i>Other Middle East</i>	330		40	
Jordan	—		—	
Israel	20		—	
Lebanon	—		—	
Syria	310		40	
<i>North Africa</i>	5,400	6.1	5,375	9.6
Algeria	1,100		4,300	(5.5)
Egypt	540		130	
Libya	3,600		900	
Morocco	—		—	
Tunisia	160		45	
<i>Southern Europe</i>	555		1,000	
France	20		165	
Greece	5		260	
Italy	120		310	
Yugoslavia	55		50	
Rumania	300		290	
Spain	40		—	
Turkey	15		—	
OPEC	62,600	70.3	27,445	35.4
World	89,000	100.0	77,350	100.0

Source: *The Oil and Gas Journal*, 29 December 1975

Table I/2 Oil Production, 1974-1975

	1974 (thousand tons)	%	1975 (thousand tons)	%
Mediterranean area	1,245.1	43.7	1,170.2	44.2
<i>Gulf</i>	1,073.0	37.1	999.5	37.5
Abu Dhabi	68.0		75.0	
Saudi Arabia	426.3	(15.0)	351.5	(13.1)
Bahrein	3.4		3.0	
Dubai	11.6		13.0	
Iran	301.0		280.0	
Iraq	95.0		120.0	
Kuwait	126.3		107.5	
Oman	14.2		17.0	
Qatar	24.7		20.5	
Sharjah	2.5		2.5	
<i>Other Middle East</i>	11.0		12.9	
Jordan	—		—	
Israel	5.0		4.2	
Lebanon	—		—	
Syria	6.0		8.7	
<i>North Africa</i>	136.2		132.8	
Algeria	49.0		46.7	
Egypt	6.0		11.3	
Libya	77.0		70.0	
Morocco	—		—	
Tunisia	4.2		4.8	
<i>Southern Europe</i>	24.9		25.0	
France	1.0		1.0	
Greece	—		—	
Italy	0.9		1.0	
Yugoslavia	3.5		3.5	
Romania	14.5		14.5	
Spain	2.0		2.0	
Turkey	3.2		3.0	
OPEC	1,519.7	52.9	1,387.5	52.0
World	2,875.0	100.0	2,692.5	100.0

Source: *The Oil Gas Journal*, 28 December 1974 and 29 December 1975.

Table I/3 Exportation contracts for liquefied natural gas: situation at the end of 1974

Origin	Destination	Quantity transported (millions stn/year)
<b>Operating</b>		
Alaska (Kenai)	Japan (Yokohama)	
Algeria (Arzew)	United Kingdom	1.0
Algeria (Arzew)	France (Le Havre)	0.5
Algeria (Skikda)	France (Fos-sur-Mer)	3.4
Algeria (Arzew)	USA (Boston)	0.3
Algeria (Skikda)	Spain (Barcellona)	1.5
Brunei (Lumut)	Japan (Osaka)	
Libya (Marsa El Brega)	Italy (La Spezia)	3.0
Libya (Marsa El Brega)	Spain (Barcellona)	1.2
	Total	14.0
<b>Under project</b>		
Abu Dhabi	Japan (Tokyo)	
Alaska (Valdez)	USA (Pacific)	0.4
Alaska (Kenai)	USA (Pacific)	12.0
Algeria (Skikda)	USA (Boston)	1.8
Algeria (Skikda)	USA (Providence)	6.5
Algeria (Arzew)	USA (Cove Point)	10.0
Algeria (Arzew)	USA (Savannah)	10.0
Algeria (Skikda)	USA (Lake Charles)	4.2
Algeria (Arzew)	European Union (Fos-sur-Mer)	9.5
Algeria (Arzew)	European Union (Monfalcone)	6.0
Algeria (Arzew)	Spain (Valencia)	4.5
Algeria (Arzew)	West Germany (Emden)	6.0
Brunei (Lumut)	Japan (Tokyo)	2.2
Indonesia (Arun)	USA (Los Angeles)	5.5
Indonesia (Arun)	Japan (Osaka)	12.5
Nigeria (Bonny)	USA (Atlantic)	6.5
Sarawak	Japan (Osaka)	10.0
Trinidad	USA (Atlantic)	4.0
USSR (Petsamo)	USA (Philadelphia)	20.0
USSR (Olga)	USA (Los Angeles)	10.0
USSR (Olga)	Japan (Tokyo)	10.0
Venezuela	USA (Atlantic)	6.0
	Total	(160.6)

*Being Studied*

Australia	Japan	6.0
Australia	USA	5.0
Ecuador	USA	3.0
Iran	Japan	5.0
Kuwait	Japan-USA	13.0
Iran	Western Europe-USA	20.0-30.0
Qatar	Japan	1.0
Algeria	West Germany	6.0
	Total	59.0-69.0

Source: ENI, *Energia e Idrocarburi, Sommario Statistico, 1955-74*, Rome, 1975.

merous additional agreements for sales to Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria and Spain. Libya, in line with its policy on oil, has adopted a "conservationist" line (gas associated with petroleum is re-injected rather than burnt). Gas is exported through Esso Libya. The liquifaction plant at Marsa El Brega has an annual capacity of four billion cubic metres of which three billion are sold to SNAM (part of the Italian ENI group) and one billion to Gas Natural and Catalana de Gas. In 1970 Iran began to export gas to the Soviet Union where it is purchased by the Soviet Union in exchange for technical cooperation. Moscow would welcome a doubling of these supplies. Teheran would like to increase sales but at the same time would prefer to establish links with Western countries. After the virtual failure of protracted negotiations with Japanese companies, talks between the National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC) and Ruhrgas aimed at reaching an agreement on the sale to the Federal Republic via the Soviet Union, of ten billion cubic metres per annum plus an additional three billion cubic metres, to be retained by the USSR as payment for transit operations, were concluded in 1975. Negotiations at present underway between NIOC, the American corporation El Paso and the Belgian companies Sorex and Distrigaz could lead to agreement on the sale of a further 20-30 billion cubic metres per annum. A European group composed of SNAM, Ruhrgas, and Gaz de France and less important Swiss and Austrian companies has shown interest in importing up to 35 or 40 billion cubic metres per annum from Iran.

Other middle Eastern countries, in particular Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia are now be-

gining gas exports of their own. The race led by American companies to capture available gas reserves showed nonetheless in 1974 a tendency to slacken in intensity, this being due to a reduction in American research and production owing to a shortage of investment capita. At the same time the increase in oil prices led producer countries to reexamine the terms of their contracts with the companies. This too was a contributing factor in the fall-off of demand.

## STATE PARTICIPATION

The most characteristic feature of the oil and gas industry in the Mediterranean area has in recent years been a gradual tendency towards state ownership of reserves and plant. This is a recent trend (nationalization in the USSR after the October revolution, in Mexico in 1938, and in Iran in 1951 may be seen as isolated phenomena). It is part of a general beginning in the late 1960's towards state "participation" in enterprises engaged in drilling on national territory.

Such "participation" may come about either through agreement with the concessionary companies or by decrees. The first example of participation by agreement (the official OPEC line after June 1968) occurred as early as 1957 when AGIP signed a contract with NIOC whereby the latter would become the owner of the agreed concession in the event that exploration should prove successful.

The imposition of participation by decree i.e. nationalization, dates from the Iranian example of 1951 (reserved for all practical purpose in 1954 following the agreement with the "Consortium" after the coup d'Etat against Mossadeq) and that of Iraq, in 1961 which led to a twelve-year dispute with the International Petroleum Co. (IPC). Baghdad claimed that IPC and its associates (Barrak Petroleum Co. and the Mosul Petroleum Co.) had failed to actively pursue exploration on its 16 thousand mile concession. 99.5% of the concession was therefore expropriated, the remaining 0.5% representing the area within which the companies were effectively producing petroleum.

Whether state participation is agreed upon or whether it is imposed by decree, the government share in the enterprise may reach 100% at which point one may no longer talk of participation. In practice however links

with the companies are maintained. They receive from the state the same quantity of oil as they previously produced under long-term contract.

The tendency towards increasing levels of state participation grew stronger during the sixties. At one political extreme such an increase was seen as a penal measure against the companies or against imperialism, at the other as simply a new form of preferential relationship between companies and states, as the best possible guarantee of supplies to the Western economic system of which OPEC members were regarded as constituting an integral part. At a practical level the Algerian government in August 1967 inaugurated the era of a new kind of participation, when Esso, Mobil and Getty were nationalised as a reprisal against American support for Israel.

In June 1968 the OPEC conference drew up a declaration on oil policy favouring participation. In December 1971 a tougher attitude was adopted and the companies were asked to open negotiations immediately. This decision concerned principally states in North Africa and on the Gulf. Algeria had, for its part, already taken the initiative in 1970 nationalising Shell, AMIF (part of the Montecatini group) and the German companies Elwerath and Sofrapel. This initiative was followed on the 24th of February 1971, after the failure of lengthy negotiations with Paris for the renewal of the 1965 Franco-Algerian agreement, by the nationalisation of the remaining two (French-owned) companies enjoying concessions in Algeria, namely CFP and ERAP. Algeria took a 51% share in the companies, limiting in this way the cost of compensation and forcing the minority shareholders to choose between continuing investment without any corresponding say in decision-making and the withdrawal of their capital, together with a depreciation in share values. Iran, Lybia and Iraq took their independent paths towards state participation, as will be seen. The negotiations decided upon on the 7th of December 1971 concerned therefore Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar. The Saudi-Arabian minister for oil, Zaki Yamani was mandated to negotiate on behalf of these countries.

The General Participation Agreement concluded on the 5th of October 1972 provided for an immediate producer-state stake in the companies and their concessionary consortia of 25%, to be increased after 1978 in

annual stages of 5% with a final jump of 6% in 1982 bringing the state participation to 51%.

The agreement was officially signed by Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Qatar on the 20th of December 1972, and in January 1973 by the government of Kuwait. In this latter case however the agreement was subsequently rejected by the National Assembly which demanded immediate majority participation. The agreement was in any case rapidly superseded by Iranian and Lybian initiatives.

Iraq, for its part, had, on the 1st of June 1972, after the failure of protracted negotiations with IPC (which sought to reduce production from its Kirkuk field) completely nationalized the company. The dispute which followed (originating as far back as 1961) was finally settled on the 20th of February 1973. In the South of Iraq those companies which had been part of IPC continued their operations as the Basrah Petroleum C. - BPC. On the 7th of October 1973 however the American companies in BPC (Exxon and Mobil), which between them held a 23.75% stake in the consortium, were nationalised. 60% of Shell's quota within the same consortium was also taken over (60% of Shell is Dutch owned). These measures were decided upon as a reprisal for American and Dutch support for Israel during the October war.

In Iran all new research and production activities have, since the agreement with AGIP in 1957, been regulated by participation agreements which give to NIOC (which has a legal title to all concessions on Iranian territory) a 50% stake in the operation. With the "Iranian Sales and Purchases Agreement", concluded in 1972 and ratified on the 23rd of July of that year, the Tehran government, which continued to uphold the formal validity of the 1951 nationalisations, obliged the Consortium to hand over (in return for compensation) both its property rights in and its power of decision over production on Iranian territory. The Consortium (officially known as the "Iranian Operating Companies" is composed of the "Iranian Exploration and Production Co." and the "Iranian Oil Refining Co." It is owned by British Petroleum (40%), Shell (14%), Gulf, Mobil, Standard California, Standard New Jersey and Texaco (7% each) and the "Compagnie Francaise des Petroles" (6%), the remaining 5% being in the hands of the American companies: American Independen-

dent, Atlantic Richfield, Charter Oil, Continental, Getty, Standard and Ohio. Its dual role is, now, on the one hand, to operate the oil field on behalf of (i.e. on contract from) NIOC and on the other, to act as a preferred outlet for sales. The agreement fixed up to 1993 NIOC and the consortium's respective shares of oil production, the latter to receive 29.3 billion out of a projected total production of 42.5 billion barrels.

The history of participation in Lybia is a complex one. Decisions and evaluations have been influenced by factors of many different orders. On the 7th of December 1971 the BP share of the BP-Bunker Hunt joint operation was nationalised as a reprisal for alleged British consent to the Iranian occupation of Abu Musa and Tunbs: two islands in the Strait of Hormuz on the entry to the Gulf.

The Tripoli government has generally adopted the tactic of negotiating with companies individually, even where they formed part of consortia, and of relying on the weak resistance of so-called "independents" which were often dependent on Lybia for a large proportion of their supplies. On the 30th of September 1972 AGIP was able to begin production in the Bu-Attifel field, having signed a contract giving the Lybian National Co. a 50% stake in its concessions. Following the conclusion of this agreement the Lybian government increased pressure on the remaining companies. On the 11th of June 1973, Bunker Hunt, BP's ex-partner, was taken over. It had been resisting Tripoli's demands for participation on the strength of a secret agreement with the other companies whereby the latter were to have given it compensation for nationalisation in oil. This agreement, however, according to allegations made later by Bunker Hunt, failed to operate. On the 11th of August 1973 Tripoli took by decree a 51% stake in the American company, Occidental. On the 16th of August three American companies which together with Atlantic Richfield and Shell formed the Oasis consortium, namely Continental, Marathon and Amerada Hess, accepted 51% participation agreements. In September Tripoli announced its intention to nationalise all the remaining companies. The German corporation Gelsenberg accepted an agreement; the others resisted. As a consequence of this, the following February Atlantic Richfield and Shell (of the Oasis consortium) and Texaco and Socal (in the Amoseas association) were expropriated.

In March 1974 Mobil, and hence Exxon, accepted 51% participation agreements. The Libyan government has granted compensation for all its nationalisations, including the reprisal against BP.

Meanwhile on the basis of the decisions of the National Assembly the Kuwait government had been conducting lengthy negotiations with Gulf and BP (partners in the Kuwait Oil Co.) with the aim of taking a majority state holding in the consortium. Qatar had in February 1974 reached an agreement giving it a 60% stake in the Qatar Petroleum Co., a subsidiary of the ex IPC. An analogous agreement was reached in the Kuwaiti negotiations and ratified by the National Assembly on the 14th of April 1974.

The same level of participation was extended to Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, both countries having repudiated the General Agreement of the 20th of December 1972. In all these cases the taking of a 60% state holding in the companies was made retroactive to the 1st of January 1974. All those agreements were only of provisional status. The ultimate objective of the governments concerned is complete ownership. A 200% national ownership of Kuwait Oil Co. (KOC) was then agreed upon for the end of 1975 between the Kuwait government and BP/Gulf. At the same time Iraq bought the share of Basrah Petroleum Co. (BPC) still owned by BP, Shell, and CFP. On February 22nd, 1976, a preliminary agreement was announced (retroactive to January 1st) between the Saudi government and the four American shareholders of Aramco for the complete takeover of the Company.

Terms of compensation vary greatly from case to case. In discussion two reference bases are often referred to, namely "net accounting value" — which it is in the interests of states to use as a basis for calculation — and "current accounting value" — which some companies have succeeded in obtaining where the outcome of negotiations has, from their point of view, been favourable. When the first criterion is used, the value of those assets being nationalized is worked out on the basis of the original cost of investments. When the second criterion is used, investments are revalued at current price, as if, therefore, they had been made at the time of negotiation. This represents a compromise between the first criterion and the claims of the companies for compensation on the basis of foregone profits. It has been accepted by the General Agreement,

the Iranian Sales and Purchases Agreement and by Libya in its agreement with AGIP. Algeria, Iraq and Libya in its other participation agreements have used a corrected version of the first criterion.

There is, however, no firm evidence as to exact methods of calculation. Neither of the parties in these negotiations has ever been known to officially announce the exact amount of money which has changed hands.

## PRICES

In Autumn 1973 OPEC, on the initiative of the Middle-Eastern and North African exporters, tripled oil prices and announced that price levels would henceforward be fixed unilaterally by the producers. A year and a half previously decisions taken on the 14th of February 1971 in Tehran reversed a tendency towards falling prices which had by then lasted for more than ten years. There is no unitary price for oil. The price which applies to the company quotas is called the "posted" price. It is a nominal value on the basis of which fiscal revenue is calculated, the formula being

$$Ry + 85\% [P - (C + Ry)]$$

when  $Ry$  corresponds to royalties (today fixed at 20% of the posted price)  $P$  — the posted price and  $C$  the technical cost of production per barrel (calculated today for Saudi Arabia as \$0.12 US). 85% represents the rata of the so-called "tax on revenue" We see therefore that the real elements in the selling price, i.e. the real costs to the companies, consist of royalties, the tax on revenue imposed by the exporting country and the costs of extraction. We do not know the exact value of this latter element, not least because it is technically impossible (in practical terms) to define average unit costs. Available estimates are nonetheless very significant, showing average costs of between 10 and 60 cents per barrel in North Africa and the Middle East whereas costs elsewhere in the OPEC area are usually higher than 1 dollar per barrel and outside much higher still.

For over a decade before 1971 oil prices showed a tendency to fall, this being due to the policy of the companies, which on account of their strength in the producer countries operated with a view to maximizing

overall profits rather than those in the "upstream" extractive sector. This trend was however reversed by the decision which on the 14th of February 1971 emerged from the Tehran talks. At the end of negotiations, which the American administration and the companies had wished to make as broad as possible (only two or three companies having failed to take part and only ENI having given reason for its non-participation) OPEC succeeded in reversing the trend of prices on the international market (see table I.4).

Table I/4 Oil prices Arabian Light, 1971-1975  
(US dollars per barrel)

Year	Reference price	Government revenue
1971		
before February 15th	1.80	0.98
February 15th	2.18	1.26
1972		
January 20th	2.47	1.44
1973		
January 1st	2.59	1.51
June 1st	2.89	1.70
October 16th	5.11	3.04
1974		
January 1st	11.65	7.00
November 1st	11.25	9.80
1975		
October 1st	12.37	10.99

The price of "participation oil" was a separate question. According to the general agreement of the 24th of December 1972 this was lower than the price charged by the companies for the oil they directly owned. However, the shortage of oil in the second half of 1973 favoured direct sales by state. Oil auctioned by Iran reached a maximum price of 17 dollars per barrel. This sale, together with the favourable conditions created by the boycott on oil exports and production restrictions decided by the Arab States on the 17th of October 1973 and during the days which followed, encouraged

further, abnormal price increases decreed in Tehran on the 23rd of December. In 1974 auctions of oil proved less successful. The price of participation oil was nonetheless fixed at a higher level than prices deduced from the posted price, that is to say, at 93% and even 94.5% of the latter. The aim here is to keep the price at a high level until Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have achieved participation levels of 100% at which point the posted price mechanism will cease to have any meaning. Prices will, thenceforward, be determined by direct negotiation between the concerned parties.

The exporting countries' strategy is to fix their mineral or oil revenues at the high levels set by the present participation price. Towards this end they are proposing a linkage between oil prices, and an index of the international cost of living, that is to say, an index of the international prices of other raw materials and/or essential industrial goods.

The two main categories of pricing discussed above do not represent in reality the exact cost of oil, this being known only to the parties to any sale or purchase. There are several reasons for which the posted and the participation price may deviate from the real price. According to evidence given by the Libyan Minister for Oil to a French parliamentary commission of enquiry, Libya, on account of marketing problems, sold its oil, during 1974, at more than two dollars below the official price. It is extremely probable that discrepancies will appear in official figures where, as in the cases of the Consortium in Iran, IPC in Irak or, in the near future, ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia, large groupings which operated concessions before nationalization, sign long-term purchase agreements. So long as Middle-Eastern and North-African countries remain structurally unable to sell directly on the consumer market or in times of low demand, on any other market, long-term purchase agreements will continue to be rewarded with price concessions.

A further complication is added by the fact that not all the oil exporting countries apply OPEC decisions to the same extent, in the same way or at the same time. Venezuelan taxing of oil has for some time been heavier than that of the other OPEC members. According to evidence already cited above, Lybia at least among the Mediterranean oil exporters had, by the end of 1974, not yet applied decisions taken by OPEC at

Quito on the 17th of June of that year and in successive conferences.

From the beginning of 1971 onwards events moved rapidly (see table 1.4). The oil price, that is to say, the price paid in one way or another to the exporting states, rose from less than 1 dollar to more than 9 dollars per barrel.

The prices shown in table 1.4 served as a reference base for the OPEC negotiations. Price divergencies for oil produced in other Gulf states were due both to higher or (as in the case of Kuwait) lower costs of extraction and to the differing densities of the oil produced. In the case of Libyan and Algerian crude higher prices could be charged on account of the quality of the oil and of these countries proximity to major markets, reducing freightage charter costs.

At the same time the prices shown in the table do not take into account participation oil, which constitutes, theoretically, virtually the whole of Iraqi and Iranian production, 60% of that of the other Gulf states (with the exception of Oman) and 51% of Libyan and Algerian production. The calculation of the hypothetical average oil price is based upon the 60:40 ration of participation to directly owned oil current in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. In the specific case of "Arabian Light" the hypothetical average price in the fiscal conditions current at the beginning of 1975 could be calculated as

$[0.4 \times 9.92] + [0.6 (93\% \text{ of } 11.251) - 0.12]$   
i.e.  $3.968 + 6.158 = \$10.126$  U.S.

In view of the prospect of the abolition of posted prices following the agreement between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates on the one hand and the companies on the other for immediate 100% participation, it became, towards the end of 1974, important to define a unitary price for oil. The Iranians proposed a single price of 9.85 dollars/barrel to substitute the current complicated pricing system. This price, according to Tehran, was 1 dollar lower than that obtained on the free market (this having fluctuated during 1974 around 10.85 dollars). In the view of the Iranian government the reduction would have benefitted both the consumer countries and the companies, the gains being distributed equally between them.

Following the Iranian proposal Saudi Arabia called a conference of the Gulf states to meet at Abu Dhabi on the 14th and 11th of November to examine a Saudi counter-

proposal. This was accepted by Abu Dhabi and Qatar in the absence of Iran, Iraq and Kuwait, and on the 12th of December was adopted by OPEC at Vienna as the official policy of the organisation. The Saudi proposal was for a 40 cent reduction in the posted price (from 11.651 to 11.251 dollars), a 20% increase in royalties and an 85% increase in taxes, the aim being to force a reduction in "upstream" company margins. Company profit opportunities would be reduced by the tightening of the price differential between company-produced and participation oil. The former would be fixed at a floor price of 10.12 dollars/barrel, plus US \$4.12 for the technical cost of production; the latter (i.e. the price, theoretically, at which the exporting states should sell their oil on the free market) at a ceiling of \$10.46.

Despite this contrast of views between Saudi Arabia and Iran OPEC members are agreed on the need to prevent any fall in the present high minimum price of oil. The taking, by the producer countries, of direct control over their own resources has opened the theoretical possibility of a split in OPEC unity, the break-up of the organization and a return to free competition on the open market. In view of this possibility demands have been growing for the fixing of a minimum level of mineral revenue anchored to an international price index. The construction of such an index (in itself a technical impossibility owing to the distortion of international prices by transfer pricing within multinational corporations and by regional customs agreements) has appeared however to be a purely political demand, linked to general problems concerning the exporting countries of the area, and the reform of world monetary and economic institutions.

## OTHER RESOURCES

### BAUXITE

The Mediterranean area is not particularly rich in mineral resources. There are nonetheless in several countries of the zone significant reserves of bauxite, chromite and, above all, mercury and phosphates. France, Greece and Yugoslavia are among the ten largest international producers of bauxite (the ore from which aluminium is manufactured). In 1974 France produced 2,923,

Tab. I/5 Bauxite world production  
(Thousand metric tons)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Total world	59,587.2	66,041.4	69,174.6	72,998.9	81,221.3
France	3,050.7	3,183.6	3,257.9	3,299.0	2,923.0
Greece	2,292.2	3,087.0	2,700.0	2,739.0	2,813.0
Yugoslavia	2,099.0	1,959.0	2,197.0	2,167.0	2,370.0
Total Mediterranean area	7,671.6	8,425.8	8,257.5	8,263.2	8,146.8
Australia	9,256.3	12,732.7	14,437.0	17,596.0	20,065.3
Guinea	2,500.0	2,630.0	2,600.0	3,660.0	7,605.3
Guyana	4,417.2	4,233.6	3,668.4	3,621.4	3,048.4
Hungary	2,022.0	2,090.0	2,357.6	2,600.0	2,751.0
Jamaica	12,106.0	12,543.4	12,988.8	13,489.5	15,328.4
Surinam	6,022.0	6,718.0	7,777.0	6,686.0	6,853.0
USSR	5,400.0	5,800.0	5,800.0	5,800.0	6,000.0

Source: AMMI, *Metalli non ferrosi e ferroleghie, statistiche 1974*, Rome, 1975.

Greece 2,813 and Yugoslavia 2,370 thousand metric tons. France is the only one of these countries to refine most of its own ore (with 3.8% of total world aluminium production she is the seventh largest producer of the metal). Greece and Yugoslavia export most of their production. In March 1974, seven countries (Australia, Jamaica, Guyana, Guinea, Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone and Surinam) responsible for 2/3 of world bauxite production formed, with the aim

of encouraging production and insuring reasonable profits for producer countries, the International Bauxite Association.

#### CHROMITE

Both Turkey and Albania produce significant quantities of chromite. In 1974 Al-

Table I/6 Chromite world production  
(Thousand metric tons)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Total world	6,054.1	6,311.5	6,285.0	6,693.0	7,092.4
Albania	454.0	535.0	650.0	720.0	720.0
Turkey	518.9	603.2	680.2	568.5	682.7
Total Mediterranean area	1,472.2	1,644.2	1,405.6	1,353.5	1,476.7
South Africa	1,073.7	1,238.0	1,483.2	1,649.6	1,770.0
USSR	1,750.0	1,800.0	1,850.0	1,900.0	1,900.0

Source: see table I/5

bania was the third largest world producer with 720 and Turkey the fourth with 683 thousand metric tons, respectively 10.2% and 9.6% of total world production.

## MERCURY

Mercury is produced in large quantities by Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Algeria and Turkey, respectively, in 1974 the second, fourth, sixth, seventh and ninth largest world producers, controlling in toto 41.5% of total world production.

In 1974 the world's seven largest export-

tober 1974 the May agreement has not been put into practice. It should be noted that a market price of \$270 per flask makes the sale of Italian mercury (the production costs of which are much higher than this) extremely difficult. During 1975 the price went down even further to around \$ 150 US/flask.

## PHOSPHATES

The Mediterranean area with about one fifth of total world production is an important source of natural phosphates. The most important Mediterranean producers

Table I/7 Mercury world production  
(metric tons)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Total world	10,109	10,356	9,414	9,661	8,981
Spain	1,570	1,700	1,420	2,087	1,500
Italy	1,533	1,469	1,441	1,127	896
Yugoslavia	533	571	566	538	546
Algeria	—	245	462	455	483
Turkey	324	357	275	304	299
Total Mediterranean area	3,963	4,354	4,172	4,515	3,727
Total Americas	2,954	2,552	1,665	1,603	1,592
China	900	900	1,000	1,000	1,100
USSR	1,650	1,800	1,900	1,900	2,000

Source: see table I/5

ing countries (with 95% of world exports) decided at Algiers to set up a World Mercury Group with the five largest producers of the Mediterranean area (see Table 1.7), Mexico and Canada (with observer status) as members. The first decision of the group was to increase prices to \$350 US/flask (1 flask = 34.5 kg) thus eliminating the price-fixing role of the London and New York commodity markets. Subsequently, however, the producer countries have returned (with the exception of Italy) to selling their exports at the old price of \$250-300 US per flask. Despite a failed Italian attempt to convene a new meeting at Smirne for Oc-

are Morocco and Tunisia. With a total production for 1972 of 15,105 million metric tons, Morocco was the third largest world producer after the United States and the Soviet Union. The five year plan for 1973-77 forecasts an annual 7.8% increase in production, which should reach by 1977 about 24,000 million metric tons. Moroccan reserves are, furthermore, equivalent to about half of the world total (see the appendix to chapter on Spain and Morocco).

Exports of phosphates (managed by a state enterprise, the "Office Chérifien des phosphates" represents 25% of Morocco's total exports. With exports of 13,500 million

metric tons Morocco was in 1972 the world's largest exporter. Approximately 45% of all exports are purchased by EEC countries.

As a consequence of price increases in petroleum-derived fertilizers phosphate prices have also increased rapidly. From the beginning of 1974 onwards they rose from \$14 to \$42 per ton, and in July reached \$63.

Tunisia is the world's fourth largest producer of phosphates producing in 1972 3,474 million metric tons. Phosphates represent around 10% of Tunisian exports. 60% of sales are in Western, in particular, French,

extremely small proportion of Italian production is exported.

There is in fact a general tendency for important producer countries to be heavy consumers. Several producers, for example the North African countries, reserve their highest quality production for export and import less valuable oil (Table I.9).

Among the countries above, Spain (the world's largest exporter) exports a significant proportion of total production, (33% in 1973). Turkey and Tunisia export even higher proportions.

Table I/8 Natural phosphates world production  
(million metric tons)

	1970	1971	1972	1973
Total world	82,000	84,500	92,400	98,500
Algeria	493	489	506	608
Egypt	716	713	563	550
Israel	1,162	764	937	780
Jordan	913	651	714	1,081
Morocco	11,424	12,030	15,105	17,077
Tunisia	3,021	3,162	3,387	3,474
Total Mediterranean area	17,755	17,835	21,342	23,755
USA	35,143	35,277	38,465	38,226
USSR	17,780	19,000	19,730	21,230

Source: UN, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1974.

markets. As in the case of Morocco, Tunisian phosphates are managed by a state enterprise, Sfax-Gafsa and Co.

#### OLIVE OIL

World olive oil production is concentrated in the Mediterranean area. Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey and Tunisia are the five largest producers, with 90% of 1973-74 world total production.

The international market for olive oil is to a large extent conditioned by Italian consumption. In 1973 Italy was both the largest producer and the largest importer (187,000 metric tons) in the world. Only an

#### TOBACCO

Tobacco growing is fairly common in the Mediterranean area, even if only three countries (Turkey, Greece and Italy) may be considered as large-scale producers. After Bulgaria, Greece and Italy are two largest European producers, whereas Turkey is one of the principal Asian producers (Table I,10). Between 1970 and 1973 there was a slight increase in world tobacco production (4.1%). Exports expanded significantly (26%). Within this trend we may note the success of Turkish exports which rose from 7.8% to 9.1% of the world total.

Table I/9 Olive oil world production  
(Thousand metric tons)

	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74
Total world	1,555	1,467	1,549
Italy	616	340	520
Spain	341	440	500
Greece	183	249	192
Tunisia	167	70	130
Turkey	51	154	55

Source: Commodity Research Bureau Inc., 1975  
*Commodity Yearbook*, New York, 1975.

Table I/10 Tobacco world production  
(Thousand metric tons)

	1971	1972	1973	1973
Total world	4,632	4,521	4,861	4,822
Greece	95	88	85	83
Italy	78	79	84	96
Turkey	150	174	180	130

Source: UN, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1974

Table I/11 Cotton world production  
(Thousand metric tons)

	1970	1971	1972	1973
Total world	11,744	12,175	13,051	12,923
Egypt	509	510	514	490
Turkey	400	522	544	513

Source: UN, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1974

## COTTON

During 1972-73 world cotton production was stagnant following steady expansion in the preceding years. This stagnation was essentially caused by a move of farmers away from the crop, due to low prices as a result of competition from artificial fibres. Unusual weather conditions were however also a factor. Despite all this world exports which, during 1970-71-72 had stabilized at around 4 million metric tons per annum rose in 1973 to 4.6 million.

Cotton is produced by many Mediterranean and tropical countries although the former have an advantage in that the crop may be damaged by excessive sun and rainfall.

In 1973, Egypt and Turkey were the seventh and the eighth world's largest producers of cotton both exporting a significant proportion of production. They contribute, in fact, a greater proportion of world exports than of world production.

## II. LABOUR AND MIGRATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

As has always been the case in the past, ethnic and labour migration in the Mediterranean region is today impressive.

We aim in this chapter to give a quantitative outline of this phenomenon which may serve to synthesize basic trends in the Mediterranean basin in migratory movements and labour allocation between European countries and in particular those of the EEC.

The countries of the Mediterranean basin constitute, albeit in different ways and for different extents, natural reservoirs for the feeding of migratory flows within Europe, flows which may be regarded as concentric in the sense that they converge on the most economically developed countries of the Continent.

These countries are characterized to a greater or lesser extent both by a relatively high rate of population growth and an equal or often higher rate of emigration. This may easily be seen by comparing, as

we have done in table I.12, natural population growth rates and emigration for those countries of the Mediterranean basin where emigration is most common.

The fact for example that 2.3% of the Italian population emigrates in search of employment (annual average population growth rate 4.8%) shows that emigration may more than compensate for natural expansion in the population. The same phenomenon may be found in Portugal (4.2% emigration, 0.8%

France (despite the low level of emigration from the latter), in an EEC Mediterranean, Spain and Portugal in an Iberian, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey in a Balkan, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in a North African and finally Egypt and Lybia (the only two countries for which sufficient data is available) in a Middle-Eastern grouping.

It may be seen from table I.13 that Italian and French emigration (the latter being of negligible importance) now concerns more

Table I/12 Incidence of emigration in Europe on the demographic situation of the countries of origin

Mediterranean countries of emigration	Total population (thousands)	Percentage of emigrants in Europe (%)	Average rate of natural population growth 1963/1971 (%)
Italy	54,302	2.3	0.8
Spain	32,950	1.8	1.1
Portugal	9,500	4.2	0.8
Greece	8,800	1.7	0.8 <sup>1</sup>
Turkey	34,375	3.3 <sup>2</sup>	2.5
Algeria	13,349	2.6	3.5
Morocco	15,050	0.9	3.5
Tunisia	4,660	1.3	3.5
Yugoslavia	20,350	3.4	1.0

1. Relating to 1970

2. Including persons expatriated for political reasons.

Sources: Calculations made from EEC data (1972) and UN, *Demographic Year book* (1971)

average annual population growth), Greece (3.3% as against 0.8% and Yugoslavia (with 3.4% as against 1.1%).

Let us now examine the distribution of migrant settlement within Europe, particularly in the countries of the European Community, during successive waves of migration, with especial regard to classification by country of origin. For convenience we have grouped the countries of origin into geographical subregions, including Italy and

than two and a half million people (the majority settling in Germany — 24.5% — and Switzerland — 25.8% — these two countries now absorbing more than half of all migration from these countries).

The next most significant migratory flows are those originating on the Iberian peninsula and in North Africa (slightly over 1 million migrants in each case). In the former case a very large proportion (95.5% of migrants have again settled in Germany and

Table I/13. Mediterranean originating collectivity present in the main European countries of immigration.

Mediterranean area of origin	Total emigrants	European countries of appropriation					
		Benelux	Germany	France	England	Austria	Switzerland
		%	%	%	%	%	%
EEC	2.604.080	16.0	24.5	22.3	10.6	0.05	25.8
The Balkans	492.600	9.3	—	13.5	30.4	34.4	12.1
Iberia	1.000.528	9.2	69.4	—	0.8	—	12.1
North Africa	1.105,180	3.8	—	95.5	0.6	—	—
Middle East	22.255	0.7	—	—	96.6	2.4	0.1

Source: Calculations of data from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Problemi del lavoro italiano all'estero*, Rome, various years.

Switzerland). Interestingly however 95.5% of North African migrants settle, for historical reasons, in France.

So far we have dealt in terms of total migration, that is to say, we have considered not only active workers but also members of the non-active population (e.g., migrants who on reaching retirement age remain in their countries of adoption, relatives and spouses of working migrants, still in search of employment etc.). It is therefore necessary to consider the number of migrants who may in practice be considered as part of the

labour force (table I.14).

Comparing data for global migration (table I.13) with that for economically active immigrants, it is possible to calculate the level of effective economic activity of foreign migrants in host countries. In other words, one may discover the percentage of active workers in immigrant families in the more developed European economies.

Table I.15 shows the results of this calculation. Despite the lack of data for many countries and the non-comparability of data due to different data-making techniques,

Table I/14. Presence of foreign workers in the main European countries of immigration.

Mediterranean area of origin	Total emigrants	European countries of appropriation					
		Benelux	Germany	France	England	Austria	Switzerland
		%	%	%	%	%	%
EEC	1,143,133	—	37.2	22.3	0.1	—	29.5
The Balkans	1,089,808	—	68.3	4.8	7.0	15.3	3.8
Iberia	954,442	—	26.2	58.8	6.0	—	9.3
North Africa	504,988	—	5.1	94.2	0.5	—	—
Middle East	10,813	—	—	99.8	—	—	—

Source: see table I.13

it is easy to see that about 50% of migrants from Mediterranean countries form part of the economically active population of their host country.

In particular it may be seen that among migrants of different nationalities Spanish and Portuguese workers have the highest levels of economic activity whereas among host countries Germany and Switzerland have the highest levels, and thus offer most employment opportunities to foreign labour.

Let us now proceed to the examination of migratory flows from the countries of the Mediterranean to continental Europe during the early 1970's (table I.16).

79.1% of Balkan, 35.5% of EEC Mediterranean and 23.4% of Iberian migrants.

Having completed our structural outline of migration we may now examine briefly certain related economic phenomena. Table I.17 shows interesting data concerning the distribution of foreign workers between different branches of industry in host countries 21% of all migrants work in the commercial sector, lesser numbers in various branches of industry with the lowest proportion of migrants being found in the transport sector. Agricultural work is of negligible importance. On account of its close links with industry Mediterranean migra-

Table I/15. Active work participation of European countries.

Mediterranean area of origin	Total	main European countries of immigration					
		Benelux	Germany	France	England	Austria	Switzerland
		%	%	%	%	%	%
EEC	40.5	(1)	66.8	43.9	42.5	24.5	50.2
Iberia	95.3	—	36.0	—	64.4	82.7	73.4
The Balkans	(2)	—	—	(2)	51.3	98.7	71.7
North Africa	45.6	—	—	45.0	42.6	—	—
Middle East	48.5	—	—	—	50.2	—	—

1. Data related to groups of actual workers is missing.
2. Due to different methods of survey, data is not comparable.

Source: see table I.13

It should first of all be noted that the most important contribution of the total flow of more than 4 million migrants was made by the EEC Mediterranean countries (above all Italy with 1.3 million migrants) and the Balkan grouping (about 1.5 million). The nine obviously received the majority of these migrants but Switzerland also played an important, traditional role, especially in so far as regards Italian migration, as did Austria as a host for Balkan (especially Yugoslav) workers.

If one examines the distribution of migration among host countries it will be seen that Germany is in first place, receiving

tion within Europe depends upon the business cycle and constitutes the sector of the labour force most immediately affected by change in economic conditions.

Given that emigration is expected to continue at high levels in the coming years, this poses important social and economic problems. Table I.18 shows projected numbers of foreign workers in European countries for the next years. As can be seen about 6 million workers will be needed.

Such a level of migration could absorb a large proportion of overall population growth in the less developed Mediterranean regions. The resulting tensions might how-

Table I/16. Mediterranean migratory movements in Europe.

Main countries of origin	Main countries of destination							Tot. EEC Flux	Switzerland (1)	Austria	Tot. Eur. Flux
	Benelux	Germany	France	Italy	England	Denmark	Ireland				
France	22,242	51,500	—	3,555	3,550	100	200	81,147	—	—	81,147
Italy	105,506	426,400	235,000	—	100,000	600	400	867,906	337,996	3,306	1,209,208
<b>Tot. EEC</b>	<b>127,743</b>	<b>477,900</b>	<b>235,000</b>	<b>3,555</b>	<b>103,550</b>	<b>700</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>949,053</b>	<b>337,996</b>	<b>3,306</b>	<b>1,290,355</b>
Spain	46,524	184,203	256,000	1,747	22,000	700	100	511,274	85,804	263	597,341
Portugal	11,823	66,008	190,000	395	8,000	200	—	277,016	3,185	—	277,016
<b>Tot. Iberia</b>	<b>58,337</b>	<b>150,211</b>	<b>446,000</b>	<b>2,142</b>	<b>30,000</b>	<b>900</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>788,290</b>	<b>88,989</b>	<b>263</b>	<b>877,542</b>
Yugoslavia	20,210	474,934	33,000	3,531	2,000	4,400	—	538,075	24,953	146,000	709,023
Greece (2)	8,145	270,114	4,000	758	4,000	500	—	287,517	5,994	—	293,511
Turkey	31,883	511,104	4,000	155	14,000	5,800	—	566,942	9,037	—	575,989
<b>Tot. Balkans</b>	<b>60,438</b>	<b>1,256,152</b>	<b>41,000</b>	<b>4,444</b>	<b>20,000</b>	<b>10,700</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>1,392,534</b>	<b>40,984</b>	<b>146,000</b>	<b>1,579,438</b>
Algeria	3,000	2,000	245,000	—	—	—	—	250,000	1,000	—	251,000
Tunisia	2,000	11,041	30,000	—	—	—	—	43,041	700	—	43,741
Morocco	30,205	15,008	60,000	—	2,000	—	—	107,213	—	—	107,213
<b>Tot. North Africa</b>	<b>35,205</b>	<b>28,049</b>	<b>335,000</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>2,000</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>400,254</b>	<b>1,700</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>491,954</b>
Total emigrants 4,238,984											

1. Permission to stay for work purposes.

2. Including political refugees.

Source: data EEC (1972-74)

Table I/17. Incidence of foreign work on the main economic sectors of European immigration countries (1969)

Economic Sectors	Rate of incidence
Commercial activity (1)	21
Metalwork industry	17
Plastic industry	16
Mining industry	13
Building	16
Textile industry	11
Machinery and transport	10

1. Subordinate work only.

Source: S. Castles and G. Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press, London, 1973.

Table I/18. Prospects for European need for labour (1970-80)

a - Active population	93,300,000
b - Incidence of foreign work on the active population	7.5% (7,026,194)
c - Growth rate of the active population	10.2% (9,530,000)
d - Growth rate of the national active population	3.8% (3,550,000)
e - Rate of net necessary immigration	6.4% (6,000,000)

Source: *Regard Prospectif sur le Bassin Méditerranéen*, La Documentation Française, Travaux et Recherches de Prospective, Paris, 1973.

ever prove to be intolerable both for the countries of origin and for host countries. There is clearly a need for large scale cooperation in the field of investment policy. This is however outside the scope of this chapter.

As a conclusion to this brief outline of migration as it concerns the Mediterranean countries, some reference should be made to state policy on migration within Europe and to the international agreements which exist in this field.

The immigration policy of EEC countries has been in the past and to some extent continues to be characterized by selective recruitment. Selection is sometimes carried out within the mechanisms provided by bilateral treaties, in other cases by recruitment agencies set up by large enterprises in countries with heavy emigration (Ford, for instance has an agency in Turkey to recruit workers for its German factories).

The desired degree of selection is often directly fixed by the bilateral agreements on migration which most EEC countries have concluded with those Mediterranean states with high levels of emigration. We could cite here the case of the German-Morocco Convention of 1963 on the temporary employment of Moroccan labourers which limited the latter to employment in the extractive sector. (In 1967 they were allowed access to other branches of industry). The agreements between Belgium and Spain (1956) and Greece (1957) contain similar clauses.

Bilateral agreements reached between France and various Mediterranean countries (Spain, Portugal, Morocco, Tunisia) specify that immigrants may be employed only in the extractive, agricultural and certain other sectors.

Generalizing one may conclude that the access of immigrants to employment in particular branches of industry is usually determined by economic conditions within the host country, although demographic considerations (for example population structure in the host country) may in certain cases, perhaps in the French case, also influence government immigration policy.

Thus a policy aimed at the building up of a temporary foreign labour force tends to be liberal in so far as regards entry controls on foreigners yet restrictive in so far as regards their access to employment in

specific branches of industry. Conversely, a policy which aims at changing the overall demographic structure of a population via immigration tends to be restrictive from the start.

The condition for the long-term use of foreign workers, as specified in these bilateral treaties, make it possible for governments to systematically regulate migratory flows, relating these to local levels of employment. In Germany, work permits are renewed annually, in Belgium twice a year for the first two years. In France too policy on renewal is decided with regard to conditions on the national labour market.

A further series of provisions in the various bilateral agreements on the use of migrant labour regulate so-called "family immigration". France and Belgium have adopted a liberal approach to the admission of relatives and spouses of foreign workers. In Germany family immigration has not been encouraged, although in three of the six agreements reached with Mediterranean countries (i.e. those with Spain, Portugal and Greece) special provision is made to facilitate the admission of immigrants' dependants.

The agreements between the Netherlands and various Mediterranean states make no provision to deal with this problem. On the contrary measures have been taken to facilitate the repatriation of immigrants.

These, therefore, are, in brief, the terms of bilateral agreements on migration. The diplomatic trend today is however, despite the failure so far to reach concrete agreements, away from the bilateral approach, towards the management of the immigration problem in an organic, international context.

Quite apart from the EEC's role in guaranteeing the free movements of labour between member states one should mention here the work of the Labour and Social Affairs Committee of the OECD, supported by 23 countries. Among the tasks of the committee are the examination of labour policy in the industrialized countries, the study of cultural integration and professional training for immigrants and the better organisation of migration.

The ICEM (Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration) has also been involved in aid to immigrants, in particular insofar as regards political refugees and European migrants.

### III. REGIONAL COOPERATION WITHIN THE MEDITERRANEAN

#### THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK

Regional cooperation wherever it may be found within the Mediterranean area is either a reflection of the tendency towards Arab unity or alternatively of military alliances.

The one example of cooperation within a military alliance (i.e. Regional Cooperation for Development — RCD) is at present in decline in parallel with the decline of the alliance itself — CENTO. Owing to the great and unexpected wealth accumulated from oil exports since the end of 1973, Iran has begun to act independently, both in the military and in the economic spheres and has even loosened traditionally close ties with Pakistan, building still closer economic links with India. Compared with the dimensions now taken by independent Iranian economic initiatives joint commercial and industrial initiative with the other members of RCD are today of little significance. No projects comparable in scale to those at present being carried out in Iran have been or are being planned.

Inter-Arab cooperation has on the other hand been transformed — it has both been strengthened and to some extent institutionalised; the instability which plague it in the past seems to have been avoided. The most obvious change is in the decreased emphasis on politico-cultural similarities and the increased weight given to economic interest as factor favouring integration.

From the time of the foundation of the Arab League until the early 1970's inter-Arab cooperation was above all political in content. Declarations of unity (based on a common Arab culture) were constantly made. Short-term political goals were constantly in mind. The aim of unity was an ambitious one and was continually being damaged by inevitable differences of opinion

and by the speed with which it was thought that it would be achieved. (No well-made plan for unity was ever drafted). The wealth generated in the Arab world by the increase in international oil price has however allowed a start to be made on the building of solidarity -on -economic -foundations. Pre-existing cooperative machinery within the Arab League and OAPEC (The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) have been reinforced. Extremely important new machinery has been set in motion.

This movement towards united action is not however without its own weaknesses and instability. The proportion of oil wealth which is at present being dedicated to inter-Arab cooperation is according to some observers, derisory and certainly represents only a minimal proportion of available funds. The administration of expanded economic cooperation has, what is more, suffered, as is normal, from political differences and from struggles for influence.

Despite these failings it cannot however be denied that inter-Arab cooperation has been dynamized by the new wealth. New institutions have been created and existing ones strengthened. Despite their limited, sectorial nature these are now likely to hold together.

The process of integration in the Maghreb represents the exception to the rule whereby the emphasis of economic cooperation over political unification has been helpful. Proceeding relatively successfully for as long as political factors predominated, integration has stagnated since the attention of the Arab world turned towards economics. Algeria, the only major oil exporter of the Maghreb, has no intention of pursuing economic integration. The idea of unification has thus remained a dead letter.

The renewed interest in coordinated development shown by the Arab states after the increase in oil prices has been paralleled by that shown in larger-scale coordination under the auspices of the United Nations. In 1974 the United Nations Economic and Social Office Beirut (UNESOB) became the Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA). Given its composition it would have been more exact to term it the Arab Economic Commission for the Middle-East.

It must be pointed out that in none of its forms does cooperation verge on integration. It continues to consist of mainly bilateral (or occasionally multilateral) arrange-

ments between states, lacking in those features characteristic of the building of an integrated Community.

#### INTER-ARAB COOPERATION

After following a tortuous political path during the 1960's characterized by rapid reversals of policy, and following a pause after 1967 owing to the weakening of Nasserism, towards the end of 1973 inter-Arab cooperation took on new vigour. Its essentially economic goals were more modest than those it had set itself in the past. Coordination was sought less in the sphere of abstract principle than in that of practicalities.

Despite numerous initiatives within the framework of the Council for Arab Economic Unity, attempts at institutionalized economic cooperation during the 1960's had failed to produce any significant results. On the 6th of June 1962 the Arab League had agreed on the setting up of an Agreement for Arab Economic Unity. Upon this basis it was decided in August 1964 to proceed to the creation of an Arab Common Market to consist of Egypt, Jordan, Irak, Kuwait and Syria. By the terms of the second additional protocol to the agreement, which stated that two or more of the parties to this agreement may, if they so desire, agree to curtail the introductory or any other period and proceed directly to economic unity and in accordance with the decision of the Council (meeting for the first time in Cairo from the 3rd to the 6th of June 1964) to accelerate the creation of an economic community, it should have been possible for the Arab Common Market to come into being on the 1st of January 1965. In July 1965, however, the Kuwaiti National Assembly refused to ratify the agreement. No progress on the project had been made in the meantime, neither, as it turned out, was any to be made in the future. A new agreement for an Arab Market was signed in 1970 by Egypt, Iraq and Syria and was due to have come into force on the 1st of January 1971. Again however no measures were taken to implement it.

The one united political initiative of significance in contemporary Arab history, namely the decision to boycott oil exports to certain countries (the United States, the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia) and to reduce overall oil produc-

tion as a means of exerting pressure against Israel was made possible by the relative cohesion demonstrated by an essentially economic institution — OAPEC — which includes as members all the Arab oil producers. Other fairly large scale, multilateral initiatives, founded on economic institutions, have also been undertaken. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) has been re-dynamized. Its working capital, fixed in 1971 at 100 million Kuwait Dinars (around 285 billion lire) has finally been provided by the participatory states. During 1974 it concerned many long-term, low-interest loans to Lebanon (for a road from Beirut to the Syrian frontier and for the expansion of Beirut airport) to Sudan (for a road from Khartoum to the sea) to Egypt (for a fertilizer plan at Talkha) to Algeria (for the building of oil and gas terminals) to Tunisia, to Syria and to the North Yemen. AFESD is also in the process of evaluating the potential of a Pan-Arab Shipping Company. The Arab Mineral Wealth Conference, held in Gedda, at the beginning of November 1974, has called for an increase in the working capital of the fund with the opening of a special division for the financing of mineral exploration. In this field the Council for Arab Economic Unity has decided (during a session at Cairo between the 8th and the 10th of June 1974) to found an Arab mining company with a capital of 100 million Kuwait dinars. At the same session it was also decided to found an Arab Meat Company with a capital of 50 million dinars. In a later session, held in Cairo from the 6th to the 8th of June 1975 the Council decided that the Arab Society of Mines would be based in Amman.

In the industrial field there exists a plan for an Arab Industrial Development Bank. The main points raised by the recommendations of the third conference on the Industrial Development of the Arab States, held in Tripoli during April 1974 included the institution of this bank, the reduction of customs barriers between Arab countries and support for common enterprises. Among the latter were numerated "regional" iron, steel, petrochemical and fertilizer plants.

During its January 1975 session the Council for Arab Economic Unity discussed the need (as the General Secretary of the Arab League — Mahmud Riad put it) for "an overall strategy for the social and economic development of the Arab world" and for Arab aid to the developing countries.

This confirms our supposition that the wealth accumulated via increased oil prices is responsible for the new dynamism of inter-Arab cooperation.

The epicentre of the change appears to be OAPEC. As late as the end of 1973 the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries had been responsible (and then with great difficulty) for only minor, sectorial initiatives. In practice its only achievement had been the dry dock complex in Bahrein, the building of which began at the end of 1974 after long disputes caused by the opposition to the project (owing to the competition it would offer them) of the Union of Arab Emirates. During 1974 however OAPEC intensified its sectorial activities and at the same time expanded them to include the whole of the Arab world on the one hand and the developing countries and the EEC on the other.

In a conference held in Bahrein from the 30th of November to the 1st of December, to mark the beginning of work on the dry-dock complex, OAPEC reached agreement in principle on the institution of an Arab Petroleum Services Company and an Arab Petroleum Investment Company, the goals of both being to give technical or financial assistance to national petroleum companies. It was decided that the Investment Company would be provided with a capital of 1,200 million Saudi rials to be contributed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Union of Arab Emirates (17% each), Lybia (15%), Iraq and Qatar (10% each), Algeria (5%), Egypt, Syria and Bahrein (3% each). During the same conference the first meeting was held of the company set up to administer the Bahrein dry-dock complex, namely the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard Company.

Insofar as investments are concerned, a grouping of several Arab countries was responsible for the decision taken on the 16th of July 1974 to set up a fairly large-scale pool of funds managed by an Arab Investment Company. The initial capital of 200 million dollars was provided by a group of OAPEC members (Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Egypt, Kuwait and Qatar) and by Sudan. Despite the shareholders' being states the investment criteria of the company are purely commercial.

OAPEC has also been responsible, with its decision to give financial aid to Arab countries suffering from the effects of the oil crisis, for the initiation of a process which

could lead to the institution of a large-scale Common Monetary Agency. On the 2nd of June 1974, meeting in Cairo, the Organization decided to aid those countries suffering from increased oil prices. To this end "soft" loans were provided and a special fund, managed by OAPEC's Secretary-General and by AFESD was instituted. During 1974 the fund provided loans to six countries: namely Mauritania (4.7 million dollars), Morocco (\$6m), Sudan (\$7.3m), Somalia (\$7.3m), North Yemen (\$11m) and South Yemen (\$11.3m).

This process of interArab financial integration has already been expanded to a point where it is possible to conceive an "Arab Monetary Agency" or "Arab Monetary Fund". The new organization would have the function of providing long and medium term finance to the poorest members of the Arab League, working on principle akin to those of the International Monetary Fund. Plan for its creation have several times been discussed, both at ministerial level and within the Council for Arab Economic Unity. At a conference of the governors of the Arab central banks, held in Baghdad between the 22nd and the 24th of February 1975 the setting up of the fund was agreed to in principle once detailed technical studies had been completed. The initial funding of the institution would consist of 750 million units worth of "Special Drawing Rights".

#### A SPECIAL CASE: COOPERATION IN THE MAGHREB

"The Conference of Tangiers... in the knowledge that it expresses the unanimous desire of the people of the Maghreb to unite their destinies in line with their common interests, convinced that the moment has come to give concrete form to this desire in the shape of common institutions, in order to give to the latter the means to play the role which is due to them in the concert of nations; is of the belief that a federal solution is that which best corresponds to the reality of the participatory states".

This objective, which emerged at the end of the "Unity Conference" held in Tangiers from the 27th to the 30th of April 1958 between Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) the Istqlal and the Neo-Destour, has today been abandoned. The difficulties

it presented became clear immediately after Algerian independence in 1962 with the opening of a border dispute with Morocco which in the following year degenerated into open warfare. Relations between Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are today peaceful. The question of the Spanish Sahara could however give rise to new hostilities.

In 1964 Libya supported the Maghreb Community (this was the year in which Nasser travelled to liberated Algeria and in which the Maghreb having paid its debt of honour to Cairo began to pose as a pole of anti-Nasserism in North Africa). It has now taken a more distant stance. Mauritania, while observing developments in the North with interest, prefers for the moment to maintain observer status within Maghreb Community institutions.

The Council of Ministers has not met since July 1970 on which date it returned to the Permanent Consultative Committee for the Maghreb the latter's draft proposals for a "global transitory solution to prepare the way, in the best possible conditions for the transition to Maghreb integration", asking for a pause for reflection and for a new draft. At the previous conference (the fifth, held from the 22nd to the 25th of November 1967 at Tunis) the committee had presented to the Council of Ministers, not only proposals for sectorial initiatives but also a plan for the expansion of cooperation. This was based on three options. If the most ambitious of these had been chosen, then all quantitative and qualitative restrictions on intraregional trade with the exception of those protecting new industries would have been lifted. If the second option had been chosen preferential tariff reductions of between thirty and fifty per cent would have been given to goods produced by member states. A joint initiative would have been undertaken to achieve association with the EEC. The least ambitious plan, without defining precise objective made provision for the renunciation of preferential trade agreements with third parties and for the gradual liberalization of intra-regional exchange. The Conference had chosen the second option, referring to the goal of "economic union" to be achieved after a five year transitional period.

Meanwhile the process of unification remained a purely rhetorical notion. Trade between the countries of the Maghreb continued at very low levels, sometimes even showing a tendency to fall. The economic

policies of the three countries continued to follow totally contrasting lines. Relations with third countries were maintained on a purely bilateral basis.

The only achievement of the last few years has been the setting up of a Maghreb committee for citrus and early fruits which acts as an administrative liaison body, linking national organizations in the sector. The only one of the common agencies and specialized commissions (see Appendix to this chapter) to be functioning actively is the Commission for transport which regulates intra-Maghreb road and rail communications and which is pursuing plans for joint ventures in the fields of air and sea transport.

#### REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT (RCD)

The declaration of the 23rd of July 1964 which formally constituted Regional Cooperation for Development lists many sectors within the framework of regional economic cooperation where intervention might be possible — air, sea, road and rail transport, trade, oil and petrochemicals, tourism, banks and insurance, cultural development. Cooperation is organized on a sectorial basis. Until 1972 or thereabouts the organization was very active.

In the industrial field more than fifty projects were considered. Of these about thirty, in various branches of industry, have been or are now being brought to completion. Private capital will in the future also participate in such enterprises. Recent projects in the petroleum sector, have however for all practical purposes, failed: whilst the planned construction of a Turco-Iranian refinery at Izmir is in doubt, the project to build a pipeline through Turkish territory to carry Iranian natural gas to the Mediterranean port of Iskenderdun will probably never be realized.

In the services sector many common bodies (see Appendix) have been set up to deal with research and standardization problems. There have also been commercial ventures in the field of insurance. Two recent projects for the setting up of a Commercial Bank and a Development Bank have however failed to get beyond the planning stage. The same may be said of plans to reduce customs barriers (tariffs and quotas) and to

set up a preferential regional trading agreement.

The regional transport system has been greatly improved by the completion of the Ankara-Tehran railway. The construction of a key road between Ankara, Tehran and Karachi is now nearly finished. Frontier communications between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan have also been greatly improved. A regional programme of technical aid, which reached the apogee of its importance between 1966 and 1971 has provided the means to train about 170 students and 200 experts in such varied fields as development planning, business management, birth-control techniques, the control of infectious diseases, Islamic architecture, etc.

#### APPENDIX

##### THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA (ECWA)

Set up in 1974 by resolution of the United Nations Economic and Social Council to replace the United Nations Economic and Social Office Beirut (UNESOB) as an economic commission for the Middle-Eastern Arab Countries. Israel is not a member.

*Full members:* Saudi-Arabia, Bahrein, Irak, Jordan, Kuwait, the Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Syria, the Union of Arab Emirates, North Yemen, South Yemen.

*Consultative members:* Austria, Canada, Egypt, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Pakistan, Rumania, Spain, the USSR, the USA.

*Headquarters:* Beirut.

*Organization:* There is a Secretariat and a Commission. The current secretary is Mohamed Said El Attar (South Yemen). The President of the Commission is Fuad Nafam (Lebanon).

During its first year's activities the Agency's attention has been directed principally towards the new oil wealth which has accumulated in Arab hands. At the end of 1974 and the beginning of 1975 it expressed its desire for a meeting with representatives of the Arab Fund for Economic and

Social Development (AFESD) — a subsidiary organization within the Arab League — and of the separate Funds for Economic Development set up by Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Irak and Saudi Arabia. ECWA now has officials attached to these organizations.

## THE ARAB LEAGUE

Founded on the 22nd of March 1945 with the aims of "strengthening cooperation between member states, coordinatig their policies in order to build up cooperation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and managing the affairs and interests of the Arab State". The requirements for membership are a request to the permanent Genral Secretary and the assent of the Council.

*Members:* Algeria, Bahrein, Egypt, Irak, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lybia, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the Union of Arab Emirates, North Yemen, South Yemen.

*Headquarters:* Cairo

The *Organization structure* includes a Council, a Secretariat, and several standing committees. To these should be added other bodies, set up by decision of, or otherwise linked to, the League. — the Economic Council, the Council for Arab Economic Unity, various specialized agencies and offices.

The *Council* is the supreme decision-making body. Its membership is made up of representatives from the twenty member-states, each of which has one vote, and a representative for Palestine. Two sessions are held each year, in March and in September. The Council is structured around ten standing committees dealing respectively with Arab political, economic, social military, cultural and legal affairs, health, information, communications, and human rights. The *Secretariat* consists of the Secretary-General's Office and those of six assistant Secretary-Generals, an assistant military secretary and a assistant economic secretary. The current Secretary-General is the Egyptian ex-foreign minister, Mahmud Riad. The secretariat has thirteen departments dealing, respectively, with economics, politics, law, culture, labour, social affairs, health, communications, oil, finance, Palestine, information and protocol. The other organs of the league may be classified as follows:

### 1. *Economic*

—The Economic Council, set up in 1950. Began its activities in 1953. The delegates to the Council are the Ministers for Economic Affairs of the member-states of the League.

—The Council for Economic Unity (see below).

—The Arab Labour Organization. Founded in 1965 in order to promote cooperation in labour affairs. 15 member states.

—The Union of Arab Banks. Founded in 1964 with the aim of promoting interArab cooperation in banking. Now covers 15 League members.

### 2. *Military*

The Unified Defence Council. Founded in 1950. Composed of the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of the member states. In 1974 subcommittees were set up to study the possibility of establishing an Arab armaments industry.

—The permanent military commission, composed of representatives from the general staff of the member states. This body has the task of drawing up defence plans to be submitted to the Unified Defence Council.

—The Unified Arab Military Command, founded in 1964 in order to coordinate military policy towards Israel. In theory the command of forces on the "Eastern front" (Syria and Jordan) is reserved for the Egyptian Chief of Staff. In practice however this front suffers from fluctuations in relations between Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The joint command is thus periodically disbanded and reconstituted.

### 3. *Development and Cooperation Agencies*

The most important of these are:

—The Arab Financial Institute for Economic Development.

—The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESO). Founded in 1968. Headquarters in Kuwait.

In 1974, following the Arab summit meeting at Algiers (December -973) the following agencies were set up:

—The Arab Fund for Aid to Africa.

—The Arab Bank for Social and Economic Development in Africa.

—The Arab Food Organisation.

### 4. *Cultural*

—The Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Science. First proposed in 1964

the Organization began its activities in 1970. It maintains a permanent Arab League delegation at UNESCO which is empowered to act on behalf of those members of the League which are not directly represented.

#### 5. *Others*

- The Federation of Arab Information Agencies
- The Arab Postal Union
- The Arab Telecommunications Union.
- The Arab Organization for Standardization and Metrology
- The Council of Arab States for Civil Aviation
- The Arab Organization for the Administrative Sciences
- The Arab League Administrative Tribunal

#### 6. *Special Offices*

- The Israel boycott office
- The Panarab Social Defence Organization

During 1972-73 the League budget was approximately 4.5 million dollars. Member states contributed as follows: Egypt and Kuwait 14% each; Saudi Arabia 11.5%; Lybia 11%; Irak 10%; Morocco 6.4% Algeria and Union of Arab Emirates 6% each; Qatar 4%; Sudan 3.8%; The Lebanon and Syria 2.5%; Jordan 1.3%; Barhein; the Oman; South Yemen and North Yemen 1% each.

#### THE COUNCIL FOR ARAB ECONOMIC UNITY

Instituted by the agreement for Arab Economic Unity signed in Cairo on the 6th of June 1962, the Council for Arab Economic Unity is part of the League organization. On the 30th of April 1964 it began its activities following the ratification of the agreement by five signatory states. The agreement provided for the free movement of persons, goods and capital between the signatory states (article 1) and set its goals as the creation of a customs union, the adoption of a common policy and common regulations concerning trade with third countries, the standardization of internal transit and transport systems and the coordination of internal agricultural, industrial, commercial, social and labour policies (article 2).

The present *members* of the agreement are its original signatories: Egypt, Jordan,

Kuwait, Morocco and Syria, and Iraq, Sudan and North Yemen which have signed subsequently. Morocco has yet to ratify the agreement.

*Headquarters:* Cairo

*Organization.* There is a secretariat and a Council. The present Secretary General is Abdul Aal El Sakbani. The Council is composed of the representatives of member states. Each member state has the right to one vote. Decisions must be approved by a two-thirds majority. The Council has the power to formulate regulation and laws for the creation of a unified Arab customs zone and the coordination of foreign trade; to make commercial and monetary agreements; to coordinate development and agricultural, industrial and foreign trading policies; to regulate transport; to unify laws and regulations in labour and social affairs and to take measures to harmonize monetary and financial policy.

The Council has three standing committees and seven subcommittees which refer to it. The Customs Committee.

The Finance and Monetary Committee

The Subcommittee for Finance and Taxation

The Subcommittee for Monetary Affairs  
The Economic Committee

The Subcommittee for Agricultural Development

The Subcommittee for Industrial coordination and for the Development of monetary resources

The Subcommittee for the Planning and Coordination of Commercial Policy

The Subcommittee for the Planning and coordination of Transport and Communications

The Subcommittee for Social Affairs.

#### THE COMITE' PERMANENT CONSULTATIF DU MAGHREB (CPCM)

Founded on the 1st of October 1964 with the aim of studying and preparing for economic cooperation between the countries of the Maghreb: i.e. the drafting of plans for development, industrial, energy and mining policy, trade, employment and training.

*Members:* Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia; Lybia was a member until March 1970. At the last conferences of economic ministers, held

in July 1970 at Rabat, Mauritania was also present, with observer status.

*Headquarters:* Tunis

*Organization.* The supreme organ is the Conference of Economic Ministers to which the CPCMC must refer for all decisions. The Consultative Committee was originally composed of a president (who had to be of ministerial rank) and eight other members of which four have full representative status and four deputy status, two for each member state. Today, the Committee has only six members. The presidency is rotated annually among the member states. By its statute the committee must meet at least once every three months.

A Secretariat, with one delegate from each of the member states is responsible for the organization of the Council of Economic Ministers and the Consultative Committee. It also controls several sectorial committees. The Secretary is Mustafa El Kasri. The secretariat includes committees for Industrial studies, tourism, posts and telecommunications, transport and employment, insurance, standardization, pharmaceutical products, electric energy and youth and sport.

#### THE ORGANIZATION OF ARAB PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES

Formed in September 1968 by Kuwait, Lybia and Saudi Arabia to defend the interests of member states and to encourage cooperation in the petroleum sector.

*Members:* Lybia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Algeria (1970), Bahrain (1970), Qatar (1970), the Union of Arab Emirates (1970), Egypt (1971), Syria (1971), Irak (1971). With the exceptions of Bahrain, Egypt and Syria, all members of OAPEC are also members of OPEC.

*Headquarters:* Kuwait

*Organization.* The Council, composed of the oil ministers of the member states, is the decision-making body. Meetings are held twice a year. The presidency is rotated annually between the member states. The Secretariat consists of the Secretary-General's Office and five departments covering administration and finance, technical, matters law, economics and information. The present Secretary-General is Ali Attiga. The Deputy Secretary General is Abdelaziz El Turki.

Within the framework of OAPEC the following joint enterprises have been set up.

The Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Company  
The Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Company

The Arab Petroleum Investments Company  
The Arab Petroleum Services Company

#### REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT (RCD)

Formed in Ankara on the 23rd of July 1964 with the aim of promoting economic, technical and cultural cooperation between Middle-Eastern members of CENTO, outside the formal framework of the alliance particularly in the agricultural, industrial, communications, mineral resources, educational, health and integrated development sectors.

*Members:* Irak, Pakistan, Turkey

*Headquarters:* Tehran

*Organization.* A Ministerial Council, composed of the Foreign Ministers of the member states is the decision-making organ of the organization. In principle the Ministerial Council should meet every four months.

The Council for Regional Planning, composed of the representatives of national planning bodies, makes recommendations to the Ministerial Council concerning decisions to be taken. The Council for Regional Planning includes specialized commissions dealing with planning coordination, industry, oil and petrochemicals, trade, transport and communications, public administration and social affairs.

The Secretariat consists of a Secretary-General, three Deputy Secretary-Generals and six Directors. The present Secretary-General is Ahmed Minai.

## IV. MILITARY ALLIANCES AND DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

### MILITARY ALLIANCES WITH EXTERNAL POWERS

The general framework within which alliances are made and forces deployed within

the Mediterranean area is defined by the alliances of local with external powers. The latter may, like NATO, have a direct presence within the region or alternatively, like the Warsaw Pact, maintain a certain distance. In the following pages we will begin by outlining the Mediterranean role of these two alliance systems. We will then continue by showing that of United Nations forces stationed for various reasons, in the same area.

#### THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being as a result of the Treaty of Washington, signed on the 4th of April 1948, and commonly known as The Atlantic Pact. NATO is primarily a political and military defence organization. It includes, however, among its goals the promotion of economic, social, and cultural cooperation between member states.

The signatories of the Treaty are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, The Federal German Republic, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the USA. The Treaty is valid for 50 years. It has, however, been possible, since 1969 for any member state to withdraw from the organization on a year's notice.

The supreme organ of the Alliance is the North Atlantic Council, with headquarters in Brussels. The Council consists of ministers from the fifteen member states who normally meet twice annually and of ambassadors, delegated by each member government who sit in permanent session.

In 1966 France left the integrated military organization. Subsequently the fourteen remaining NATO members set up the Defence Planning Committee (DPC). France takes no part in its work, although she is informed of proceedings.

In 1966 two permanent nuclear planning bodies were set up. The first of these, the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee (NDAC) is open to all NATO members (although France, Iceland and Luxembourg do not in fact participate). The second, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) is a sub-group of NDAC, dependent on the latter. There are four permanent members (Germany, Italy, the

UK and the USA) and three or four temporary members. Temporary membership is rotated between NATO members every eighteen months.

The Eurogroup, consisting of all the European members on NATO with the exceptions of France, Portugal and Iceland, was formed in 1968. It is an informal body within which consultations are held on the coordination and improvement of the West European military contribution to Atlantic defence. Among the most important initiatives taken by the Eurogroup have been the approval in 1970 of the European Defence Improvements Programme and that in 1972 of the Principles for Cooperation in Armaments.

The supreme military organ of the Alliance is the International Military Committee (IMC) which advises the Atlantic Council on military questions and which may give political and military directives to NATO commands. The Committee is composed of the Chiefs of General Staff of NATO member states. France, (which maintains a liaison mission) and Iceland (which has no armed forces) are not represented. When it is in permanent session (meetings are held in the Atlantic Council building in Brussels) each country is represented by a military representative.

The most important NATO commands are Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), the former being based in Belgium, the latter in Virginia. There is also a third command, Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN). The ACE headquarters (SHAPE) are at Casteau in Belgium.

The two posts of Supreme Commander, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANTA) have always been trusted to American officers. There is no joint command for strategic nuclear forces in Europe. However the European and Atlantic Command (ACE and ACLANT) participate in the Joint Planning System which operates from Omaha, Nebraska, with the task of planning for the use and deployment of American missile and airborne nuclear forces and for the British strike aircrafts.

A small number of US ballistic-missile submarines and the entire British force are commanded from SACEUR. All remaining US submarines are controlled by SACLANT.

The Allied Command Atlantic is based at Norfolk, Virginia. The Supreme Allied Com-

mand (SACLANT) is shared by British and Americans. In the event of war it has the role of

- a) Participating in decisions concerning the use of nuclear weapons
- b) Protecting sea communications from attack. It has under its command British, Canadian, Danish, Dutch, Portuguese and American forces.

SACLANT is responsible for the area of the Atlantic to the North of the Tropic of Cancer, including the North Sea. The nucleus of its naval forces is provided by the American Second Fleet (including four attack carriers). Its nuclear deterrent role is complemented by ballistic-missile submarines.

Allied Command Channel is based at Northwood in Middlesex. Its role is to control the Channel and the southern part of the North Sea. It has at its disposal a large proportion of Belgian, British and Dutch naval forces and the Royal Naval Air Force. Since 1973 the Command has also disposed of a small permanent minesweeper force (Stanavforchan). The Commander in Chief of ACCHAN is a British admiral who is also second in command at SACLANT. Both the Atlantic and the Channel commands have cooperation agreements with French naval forces.

Allied Command Europe (ACE) is responsible for all NATO territory in Europe and Turkey, with the exception of Britain, France and Portugal. It has however general responsibilities for British air defence. The defence of Portugal is the responsibility of SACLANT. The ACE area includes the coastal waters of Denmark and Norway.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is also the Commander in Chief of US forces on the continent. His deputy is a British officer. There are also deputy commanders for nuclear affairs (at present an Italian) and for NATO air forces (at present an American). Within the ACE area are deployed approximately 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons and approximately 2,200 delivery vectors (aircraft, missiles, artillery). The command of nuclear weapons is exclusively in American hands. The average yield of bombs used by NATO tactical aircraft is approximately 100 kilotons, that of missile warheads about 20 kilotons.

SHAPE has at its disposal about 66 division equivalents (ground forces) and 2,800 tactical aircraft, deployed at 150 NATO air-

fields linked by a unified supply and communication network.

France continues to participate in the NADGE air defence and radar warning system. The second French army corps (two divisions) is stationed in Germany in accordance with a bilateral agreement between Paris and Bonn. Cooperation agreements with NATO forces are made directly between commanders on both sides.

The ACE mobile force (AMF) with its headquarters at Ceckenheim, in Germany, includes units from seven countries. It consists of seven infantry battalions, one armoured reconnaissance squadron, 6 artillery batteries and a certain number of helicopter units and ground-support fighter squadrons. It is an intervention force which could be used in certain circumstances as an emergency rapid action force, particularly on the northern and south eastern flanks.

The subordinate commands AFCENT, AFNORTH and AFSOUTH are subordinate to ACE and SHAPE.

(a) AFCENT — Allied Forces Central Europe — headquarters at Brunssum in the Netherlands. The Commander of these forces is a German general. He has at his command in Germany 25 divisions of six nationalities. Tactical air forces consist of 1600 aircraft including USAF F4s and F111Es. The German and American forces are equipped with Sergeant and Pershing missiles. For nuclear Strike Lance missiles are now replacing the old Honest Johns.

(b) AFNORTH — Allied Forces Northern Europe. Headquarters at Kolsass in Norway; responsible for the defence of Norway, Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein and the entry to the Baltic. The commander is a British General. He has at his command a large proportion of Danish and Norwegian forces; Germany has assigned one division, two combat air-wings and her fleet.

(c) AFSOUTH — Allied Forces Southern Europe. Responsible for the defence of Italy, Greece and Mediterranean and for the Turkish section of the Black Sea coast. Since the 1974 Cyprus crisis Greece has suspended participation until the situation has been clarified. AFSOUTH includes 19 Turkish, 11 Italian (and 9 Greek) divisions and the tactical airforces of these countries.

NATO forces in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean are commanded by CINCSOUTH (Commander in Chief Forces South-

ern Europe). CINCSOUTH has his headquarters in Naples.

Coming under CINCISOUTH's command are:

1. Command Allied Ground Forces Southern Europe (LANDSOUTH) based in Verona. Italian and US ground forces. The command has at its disposal the air support of the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF).

2. Command Allied Ground Forces South-East Europe, based at Smirne. Greek and Turkish ground forces. The command has at its disposal the air support of the 6th ATAF.

3. Command Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (NAVSOUTH) which is responsible for:

— The US sixth fleet. This comes under NATO command only in time of war. It consists of approximately fifty ships. The core of the fleet consists of two operational squadrons each containing an aircraft carrier and several support ships. In toto the fleet has 14 cruisers, destroyers and frigates. It can, in an emergency, be reinforced with a third aircraft-carrier. The fleet also includes a landing unit with a battalion of 1800 marines and five landing vessels. The USA also keeps a small number of atomic submarines within the Mediterranean. These use the base of Rota, in Spain and receive logistic support from the Isola Maddalena in Sardinia.

— Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED). British, Italian, (Greek) and Turkish naval forces. AFMED's role is to protect sea communications in the Mediterranean. Its airforces are divided into several air commands.

— Allied Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED). Consists of at least three destroyers supplied by Italy, Britain and the USA and three smaller ships provided by other countries, for use in particular operation zones. It is constantly on call for emergency action.

4. Command Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH), which controls one Italian, (one Greek) and two Turkish tactical air forces. (Each of these are at the same time part of the national airforces of their respective countries). AIRSOUTH's role is to defend AFSOUTH territorial air space.

5. AFSOUTH directly controls a Mediterranean special air reconnaissance unit, the Maritime Air Force (MARIARFORCE) which uses Italian, British and American reconnaissance aircraft based in Italy, Greece and Turkey in an anti-submarine role. French aircraft also participate in these activities.

Since 1973 NATO has passed through a series of crises which have to some extent weakened its political and military structure.

— The Arab-Israeli war in October 1973 showed up the problems caused by the need for adequate consultation between the USA and its European allies and by the divergence of interest and position which exist over the Middle-East, the energy crisis and relation with Arab countries.

— The Cyprus crisis in the summer of 1974 and subsequently, the Turkish occupation, have seriously weakened the Alliance's South-eastern flank. Greece has declared that she intends to withdraw from NATO's integrated military organization while remaining within the Alliance. Negotiations to clarify the position are proceeding. Military aid to Turkey is waiting final approval by Congress. However Turkey seems willing to retain the Alliance, or at least reopen the American bases on her territory, only if the Congress will clear the subsidies.

— The military coup d'etat in Portugal and the subsequent move leftwards by the Portuguese military during 1974 and 1975 have opened a further limited crisis on the South-western flanks. Portugal has withdrawn from the Nuclear Planning Group and several other NATO committees. The future extent of Portuguese participation in NATO political and military commitments is still under discussion.

— In Spring 1975 Britain decided its military commitments in the Mediterranean, withdrawing both men and ships. France has on the other hand strengthened its naval presence in the Mediterranean transferring several ships from the Atlantic. The "New Atlantic Charter", signed in 1974, which contains a declaration of the principles in future to govern relations within the Atlantic Alliance, aims to solve the problem of Atlantic solidarity and of US-EEC consultations. It does not however resolve the fundamental problems faced by NATO.

## THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

After failure in 1952 of the treaty setting up a European Defence Community, owing to the refusal of the French National Assembly to ratify it, on the 23rd of October 1954 a new treaty was signed in Paris, instituting the WEU.

The function of the Union is to coordinate the defence policy of member states promoting gradual military integration and collaboration in the social and economic field. The principle organs of the WEU are: The Council (headquarters in London). This consists of the foreign ministers of the member states or their ambassadors. The Council holds executive responsibility for the policy of the Union. The Assembly (which meets in Paris) consists of parliamentarians of member states who are already members of the Council of Europe consultative Assembly. There are also an Arms Control Agency, various standing committees and a Secretary-General (based in London). Among the member states France, Britain and Italy play important roles in the Mediterranean.

The WEU has not proved to be a very influential body. In 1974 however France showed signs that she wishes to reopen discussions on European Defence through the WEU. Little was achieved by this initiative, this being largely due to German unwillingness to discuss the problem within the framework of an organization the statute of which contains articles restricting and controlling the level of German armaments. The WEU thus plays a marginal role in European defence. It is unlikely that it will, in the future, be able to overcome its structural and political limitations.

## THE WARSAW PACT

The Warsaw Pact came into being on the 14th of May 1955 with the signature in Warsaw of a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Albania (which in 1962 ceased de facto to be a member, this becoming official in September 1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the USSR and by the decision to create a unified command for the armed forces of the signatory states.

The political Consultative Committee, the supreme organ of the Pact, consists, when it meets in plenary session, of the first secretaries of the Communist parties, the heads of government, the foreign and the defence ministers of the member states. The committee is served by a joint secretariat headed by a soviet official, with one representative from each member country and a Standing Commission, the task of which is to make recommendations on general questions of foreign policy to Pact members. Both bodies are based in Moscow.

Following reorganization in 1969 the non-soviet defence ministers are no longer directly subordinate to the commander in chief of the Pact. Instead, they together with the Soviet Defence Minister, form a Defence Ministers Council which is the highest military organ of the Pact. The second most important decision-making body, the Joint High Command must, by the terms of the Treaty "reinforce the defensive capacity of the Warsaw Pact, prepare contingency military plans and decide on troop deployment" The Command consists of a Commander in Chief and a Military Council.

In the event of war, the forces of non-Soviet Pact members are to be operationally subordinate to the Soviet High Command. The command of the air defence system which covers the whole of Warsaw Pact territorial air space is in the hands of the Commander in Chief of Soviet air defence forces, based in Moscow. Soviet forces in the Warsaw Pact have headquarters at Legnica in Poland (Northern Armed Forces Group), Budapest (Southern Armed Forces Group), Zossen-Wünsdorf, near Berlin (Soviet Armed Forces in Germany group), Milovic, to the north of Prague (Central Armed Forces Group). Soviet tactical air forces are stationed in Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet Union has installed short-range surface to surface missile (SSM) launcher in Eastern Europe. Most East Europeans have similar missile launchers at their disposal. It is not known however whether nuclear warheads have been supplied. Longer ranged Soviet missiles are all deployed within the Soviet Union.

With the exception of the Soviet fleet itself and to some extent the Polish fleet which is responsible together with the German Democratic Republic for security in the Baltic and the North Sea, the Warsaw Pact coun-

tries do not possess large naval forces, Since 1964 however, the year in which the first Soviet warships appeared in the Mediterranean in connection with the Cyprus crisis, the Soviet Union has followed a policy of steadily expanding its naval presence in distant waters including the Atlantic and oceans. The principal objectives of Soviet naval policy are:

(a) To develop and deploy a nuclear submarine fleet as part of the Soviet deterrent against the USA.

(b) To build a countervailing force to western strategic naval forces, in particular American aircraft carriers.

(c) To protect the rapid growth of the Soviet merchant navy and fishing fleet in such a way as to gather the maximum political and economic advantage.

The Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean may now be seen as permanent although it cannot yet be, said that the availability of bases in allied Arab countries is guaranteed. Rather the squadron has open to it a number of "friendly" ports in Algeria, and Syria at which supplies may be taken on and minor repairs carried out. "Friendly" ports also exist in Somalia, the South Yemen, Tanzania and Mauritius. Soviet ships are however obliged in practice to rely on a self-supporting logistic support system based on a series of anchorages in international waters.

#### THE CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION (CENTO)

The aims of CENTO are to provide for the mutual security and defence of member states and to favour, by the sharing of burdens, the economic development of the region. CENTO replaced the Baghdad Treaty Organization after Iraq had repudiated the Treaty in 1959. Britain, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey are full members of the organization. The USA has associate status in the military organization and is represented on the Military Council and in the Economic and Anti-Submersion Committees. The United States has also signed bilateral military agreements with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey (at Ankara in March 1959). Turkey is a member of NATO and Pakistan is in SEATO (The South-East Asia Treaty Organization).

CENTO has no genuine unified international command structure comparable to that of NATO. The organization has a council which meets either at ministerial (prime or foreign ministers) or a representative level. The Council is served by the following committees:

- The Permanent Group of Military Representatives
- The Anti-Submersion Committee
- The Liaison Committee
- The Economic Committee
- The Council for Scientific Education and Research.

There is also a Mixed Military Planning Group.

CENTO has a nuclear capacity provided by British Canberra bombers based on Cyprus, by the US sixth fleet and by Pentagon-controlled Polaris submarines stationed in the Mediterranean. In recent years, especially since 1973, developments in the Middle-East, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean have led to the emergence of political differences between CENTO members on such important questions as the Arab-Israeli conflict and Cyprus. This has particularly affected US-Iranian and US-Turkish relations. British influence too, has, since the decision to withdraw forces stationed "east of Suez" and the more recent reduction in political and military commitments in the Mediterranean been constantly falling, although London continues to supply arms to CENTO members. The obvious consequence of these developments has been a reduction in the importance of CENTO as an institution although the organization continues to function in certain areas of common interest.

From a local point of view the importance of the Economic Committee has been steadily growing. It has now become a more or less autonomous body within the CENTO framework and has renamed itself Regional Cooperation for Development (see the last chapter).

From a more general political standpoint the Antisubmersion Committee, in liaison with NATO, has continued to carry out its functions, in particular that of controlling Soviet and Chinese penetration within the CENTO area, a problem felt keenly by member governments.

## UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

UN forces are present in various areas of conflict within the region. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNIFFICYP) has the role of maintaining peace between the two communities on the island. This force, set up in March 1964 and whose mandate has been renewed by a series of UN resolutions (numbered in May 1973 3044 men (soldiers, police and a small number of doctors). At the end of 1973 it was slightly reduced. At the beginning of the 1974 hostilities it was down to about 2300 men.

UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) was set up in October 1973 to supervise the ceasefire along the Suez Canal and the return of rival forces to positions held on the 22nd of October of that year. UNEF's mandate must be renewed every six months and is still in force. UNEF now totals 6700 men of eleven nationalities.

UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observation Force), formed in June 1974, is stationed on the Golan Heights along the front. It now numbers 1250 men.

## NAVAL FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

### THE SOVIET FLEET

The Soviet fleet of fighting and support ships in the Mediterranean usually consists of about 60 vessels. It is linked to the Black Sea fleet which includes about 70 large warships. Soviet ships are usually modern and have a long-range offensive capability. Among the most modern are the Krivak class cruisers (which appeared in 1971) armed primarily with surface to surface (SS-N-10) missiles with a range of around 50 Km (for some up to 150 Km) and anti-aircraft missiles. These are now being joined by Kara class cruisers (one so far) equipped for helicopter operations and with an armoury of twice as many missiles as well as powerful anti-submarine weapons. These extremely modern ships are joining a fleet which already in 1968 was able to deploy Kresta class cruisers, also armed with missiles and helicopters. Among the major shortcomings of the new mission ships it seems necessary to list: a) very modest accommodation for the crew,

allowing for poor living conditions, and becoming unbearable if the time of permanence afloat is prolonged: b) modest stock of ammunition (due to the limited space), allowing for a limited time of sustained fire.

Already it becomes apparent that the major innovation introduced by the Soviet fleet is the preference accorded to missiles over conventional gunnery. This is understandable when it is considered that these ships usually operate without air cover in waters under the strategic control of potential enemies. They must therefore have the maximum possible strike power in the short period of fighting before the inferiority of their strategic position results in their neutralization.

This lack of air cover, away from Soviet bases will be only partially remedied when two new Kiril class aircraft carriers, each carrying about fifty short and vertical take-off aircraft, (STOBs and UTOLs) become operational. Indications that the Soviets intend to deploy them singly and not necessarily (like American aircraft carriers) as part of a tactical group of other ships responsible for their protection. These are however theoretical suppositions. In practice, given their role and size, the Soviets could well be disappointed by the low manoeuvrability of the ships of that size. Doubts have been expressed, what is more, as to whether they possess aircraft capable of operating from the decks of the new vessels.

The two aircraft carriers at present under construction will, eventually, go to join the two Moskva class helicopter-carriers which are already operational. The latter were originally designed for anti-submarine warfare. They can however also be used for reconnaissance mission, commando operations etc.

So far at least one of these helicopter-carriers has been operating in the Mediterranean. The Convention of Montreux on rights of passage through the Bosphorus contains provisions which could impose limitations on the freedom of navigation of the two new aircraft carriers. In peacetime however it is at the discretion of the Turkish government whether or not these will be invoked. It is unlikely that in practice the ships will be confined to the Black Sea. (It is possibly, however, because of this problem that the Soviets have officially classified the ships as anti-submarine cruisers. This type of ship has, during peacetime, the right of free passage).

At the moment the Soviet Union can, from bases on Warsaw Pact territory, ensure a certain degree of air cover to its ships when the latter are operating in the North-eastern sector of the Mediterranean, close to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. This might prove effective as far as Egyptian waters. The efficacy of this cover is however limited on the one hand by distance from base and on the other by the existence of the NADGE radar network; in other words by possible opposition from Atlantic Pact countries, the airspace of which Soviet aircraft would have to cross.

It does not appear, to date, as if there exist Soviet air bases in the Mediterranean. Rumours of a base at Marsa Matruh, in Egypt have yet to receive confirmation. And seems in contrast with the new political initiatives of the Sadat government. Even if planes (from the Balkans or Hungary) were permitted to land in Egypt, Syria or Algeria this would not allow full cover of the Mediterranean. In many cases, furthermore, such bases would be lacking in adequate defences.

#### THE AMERICAN FLEET

Owing to budget restrictions and the obsolescence of several ships the American fleet has in recent years suffered a major cut-back (from 1000 warships in 1968 to around 520 in 1974-5). In recompense, however, a large-scale construction programme has now been begun which should, over the next 6-8 years, without increasing the size of the American fleet, lead to its substantial modernization. Efforts are being made to build new surface to surface missiles capable of matching the weapons now carried by Soviet ships (Harpoon). It is possible that over the coming years the number of aircraft carriers will be reduced. At present the US fleet possesses the following carriers:

- 3 Nuclear propelled Nimitz class vessels (a further carrier is under construction), carrying about 100 aircraft.
- 4 Kitty Hawk class carriers (with 85-95 aircraft).
- 1 nuclear propelled carrier, the Enterprise (with about 95 aircraft).
- 4 Forrestal class vessels (with about 85 aircraft).

- 3 Midway class vessels (with 75 aircraft).

#### *Reserves:*

- 3 Hancock class vessels (with 40-80 aircraft).
- 2 Essex class vessels (with 30 aircraft and 15 helicopters).

#### *Training Ship:*

- 1 Hancock class vessel.

There is a replacement programme for obsolete aircraft carriers planned for the 1980's. This will be based on nuclear propelled vessels either of the Nimitz class or slightly smaller.

In the meantime, however, between 1975 and 1980 the number of American aircraft carriers will be reduced (probably by about twelve ships) although later it will be increased again. During this period the American capability for amphibious warfare will be reduced. The number of vessels available has already fallen from about 165 during the Vietnam war to about 60. These include, however, 5 Tarawa class vessels drawing about 40,000 tons each, (equal in size to the new Soviet aircraft carriers although only half that of an American aircraft carrier). The new ships can carry 30 helicopters each; they are equipped for use as troop transports, for UTOLs and STOLs, and carry 4 large landing craft. The 6 oldest amphibious assault vessels of the Iwo Jima type (18,000 tons) also carry 3 helicopters of various sizes. The Americans have at their disposal 2 Blue Ridge class naval assault ships (19,000 ton commando vessels) and 4 Mount McKinley class ships (12,500 tons).

This represents an enormous capability for rapid intervention in a crisis. 30,000 marines can be rapidly deployed in any part of the world with a high degree of flexibility.

Within the Mediterranean the US fleet usually consists of at least two aircraft-carriers, 17 large warships, support vessels, and two amphibious assault groups (each consisting of 3-5 amphibious assault ships). This fleet (the VI fleet) is the most powerful military naval force in the Mediterranean.

The rest of the American fleet consist of:

- the II fleet (the Atlantic): 4 aircraft carriers, 63 large warships, 1 amphibious assault group.
- the III fleet (the Eastern Pacific): 6 aircraft carriers, 52 large warships, 4 amphibious assault groups.

— the VII fleet (the Western Pacific): 3 aircraft carriers, 29 large warships, 2 amphibious assault groups.

A naval group is also stationed in the Persian Gulf where it is on occasions reinforced by an aircraft carrier. (The numbers of amphibious assault groups given here are approximate. These groups are in practice set up to meet specific requirements. In 1975 there were only 3 permanent groups, 1 in the Mediterranean and 2 in the Pacific).

The VI fleet can provide its own air cover. Support may also be received from the 16th air group in Spain and from aircraft stationed in Sicily (Sigonella), Greece and Turkey. American forces also benefit from cooperation with their allies. A special Mediterranean marine reconnaissance command, (MA-RAIRMER) has been set up, using Italian, British and American aircraft based in Greece, Turkey, and Italy. France takes an active role in these operations.

#### EUROPEAN FLEETS

European fleets in the Mediterranean are quite important. Recently the French government decided to move most of its surface fleet to Toulon and has announced a major new construction programme (to include a nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier, destined however in principle for ocean use).

The two Clemanceau class French aircraft carriers (32,700 tons) can carry about 40 aircraft each. New missile-launching cruisers and a helicopter-carrier will reinforce a fleet which already includes 49 large warships. Landing forces can count on the training cruiser and commando carrier, the Jeanne d'Arc (12,000 tons, 8 helicopters), on two landing ships, the Ouragon and the Orage (8,500 tons each) and other smaller vessels.

The British naval force in the area consists of a small number of ships which patrol the Mediterranean in turn. The British navy consists of 74 large warships, including 1 aircraft carrier (50,000 tons, 30 aircraft and 6 helicopters), which will remain in service for the rest of the 1970's and the assault ship Hermes (28,700 tons, 20 helicopters) which is soon to be converted for anti-submarine warfare. The amphibious assault vessel Bulwark (27,700 tons, 20 helicopters) is to be laid up and one of the two assault transports,

Fearless and Intrepid (12,000 tons with a helicopter landing pad) is to be placed on reserve. Although the emphasis is now being switched to anti-submarine warfare, the British will retain a significant capability for intervention. This will be the role of the new through deck cruiser Invincible (the first of a series of 4) drawing 20,000 tons with 9 helicopters and VHOLs. It appears that the British navy (which has had to give up plans for the building of two amphibious warfare vessels) is reducing its capability for action in distant waters in order to increase its protection of British sea-routes, of the North Sea, etc. The British government statement that from 1977 it will no longer maintain a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean<sup>51</sup>, (although British ships will continue to take part in manoeuvres, to participate in NAVOCFORMED etc.) should be seen in the context of this general orientation in policy. Despite the naval withdrawal the following British forces will remain in the area: the Near East Air Forces based on Cyprus, operates within the CENTO defence framework consists of two squadrons of Vulcan bombers (capable of carrying nuclear weapons), one squadron of Lightning fighter-bombers, one Hercules transport squadron, one squadron of transport helicopters and the long-range radar station on Mount Olympus. The bombers are to be withdrawn in 1979. Infantry and armoured cavalry units are also stationed in Cyprus.

— One helicopter-borne commando group based on Malta (41 Group Royal Marines). This is due to be disbanded in 1979. Two squadrons of Nimrod and Canberra reconnaissance aircraft will continue to be stationed on Malta until 1979. It is possible that these will not be totally withdrawn.

— One infantry battalion, one unit of marines, one Hunter fighter squadron, one radar station and some naval forces on Gibraltar. No reductions are planned here.

Troops at present assisting the Sultanate in Oman and on the Masirah air base (a small island in the Persian Gulf, belonging to the Oman which the Americans now seek to use).

Other fleets belonging to coastal states are also present in the Mediterranean. Of these the Italian is probably the most modern and is at present being strengthened. It consists, for the moment of one missile-launching cruiser

ser (with 9 helicopters), the Vittorio Veneto, 2 Andrea Doria class cruisers (with 4 helicopters each) and a series of other warships including boats equipped with missiles and new 76 mm Otomelara anti-aircraft guns is being increased. The only landing craft are two ex-American 7,000 ton County class vessels. Doubts have been expressed as to the operational status of the "Quarto" (800 tons) and the troop transport "Bafile" (14,000 tons). Among new ships planned are an through-decked 53 cruiser designed for use by helicopters and VTOLs, 12 frigates, 1 amphibious assault vessel, a large fleet of hydrofoils, etc.

The Greek fleet includes a number of not very modern destroyers and frigates. The Turkish fleet is more powerful and slightly more modern and has, as was shown during the intervention in Cyprus, an important landing capability (about 90 vessels for amphibious warfare). It seems likely that the Spanish fleet will be reinforced and modernized in the near future. For the moment it includes one helicopter-carrier (16,400 tons, 20 helicopters, 1 cruiser, 20 destroyers, 5 frigates (with another 3 on order) etc.

The size of submarine fleets is less easy to determine than that of surface fleets. Italy deploys 10 submarines and has plans for 4 more; Spain 8 (with orders placed for 2 a-259 class vessels), Greece 7 and Turkey 16. The French and British conventional fleets amount to 19 and 22 vessels respectively whilst Britain has 8 nuclear powered attack submarines and 4 ballistic missile submarines and France 3 ballistic missile submarines (a fourth is to be launched shortly). It is unknown what proportion of these fleets is stationed in the Mediterranean. The size of the Soviet and the American presence is also unknown. It is however clear that a certain number of submarines armed with strategic nuclear weapons are stationed in the Mediterranean. This can be stated safely on the grounds not only that there exist bases equipped for use by such submarines at Rota in Spain and on the island of la Maddalena in Sardinia, but also that the missiles carried by French submarines have a fairly short range and that it is only from the Mediterranean that those at present used by the Americans can reach certain targets in Central and Asiatic Russia. However the existence of underwater sandbanks and intense surveillance render the Mediterranean anything other than safe for submarines.

## BASES AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

The NATO countries possess a wide-reaching network of military bases. In some cases (for example that of the naval base at Pireo) these are set up as a result of bilateral agreements between the USA and individual members of the Atlantic Alliance. In other cases bases on which multilateral forces or commands are stationed (such as Sigonella in Sicily, Souda Bay in Crete, etc) are fully integrated into NATO structures.

One NATO command is based on Malta although the country has never been a member of NATO. There is also a British base on the island. There are other British bases, outside the NATO network though linked or linkable to it, on Cyprus and Gibraltar. National bases are sometimes "loaned" to the Germans for a given period for purposes of training and weapon testing (e.g. the Perdasdefogu polygon, the land around Oristano in Sardinia). The Germans also have permanent installations (e.g. in Portugal).

Some bases have "sovereign" status (e.g. the British bases on Cyprus, and a number of American bases). In other cases the use of a base is conceded by the host country but sovereignty retained. There are also some bases which are relics of the colonial past.

The situation is therefore extremely complicated. It is very difficult to treat exhaustively the various kinds of agreement in existence. The list below should be seen as an approximate one and may be in need of addition or corrections. In some cases secret agreements or limitations imposed on the free circulation of information may prevent us from acquiring secure and complete knowledge on bases, their importance, their strategic role and their legal status.

In Portugal the Lajes air base in the Azores (used for the American air-lift to Israel in autumn 1973, was set up by a bilateral agreement in 1951. It is however fully integrated into NATO. France has since 1964 maintained a ballistic missile testing station on the Azores. Since 1968 Federal Germany has extended its interpretation of an old 1964 agreement on stores etc to allow it to make use of the Beja air base which is probably to be closed in the near future). Portugal possess a considerable number of NATO bases and commandos (including I-BERLAND headquarters).

In 1970 Spain signed a military cooperation treaty with France. An Iberian pact between Spain and Portugal has existed since

1943. Its most important pact however is a mutual defence agreement with the USA dating from 1954. This agreement (which until 1975 was an executive agreement between the US and Spanish governments and charged to treaty status in 1976 commits the American executive to aiding the Spanish defence effort. After the renewal of the original agreement in 1970 Spain received 120 million dollars' worth of credit for American military aircraft and 63 million for army equipment. The pact renegotiated in 1975, reducing the air bases and providing for the denuclearization of American presence in Spain by 1979 (when the new US trident SLEM will be operational.

American bases in Spain are situated at Rota (near Cadiz) where there is a naval base, at Maron, Saragossa and Torrejon (this last base being due to be down graded soon being no longer central for SAC operations.) and at Elizondo in the Balearics where there is a missile base. American aircraft also use a number of less important airfields.

There are no foreign military bases on French territory. Since 1966 France has no longer been a member of NATO although she has remained within the Atlantic Alliance. France's bilateral agreements (often made within the NATO framework when she was still a member) have remained in force. As well as the agreements with Spain and Portugal already cited, she signed in 1959, an agreement with Canada (1955) regulating logistic problems faced by Canadian troops in Germany (stationed almost on the boundary of the French zone) and a further one on the exchange of scientific and technical information; agreements with Germany on logistics and troop training facilities (1960) and a bilateral agreement on political, economic, defence, cultural and scientific co-operation (1963). Bilateral agreements with the USA have remained in force. The largest military base on French territory is the Toulon naval base.

There are a large number of foreign military bases in Italy. We have already mentioned the existence of national bases which may, in case of need, be used by Italian allies. Italy has various bilateral agreements with the USA within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Of particular significance is the 1959 agreement allowing the provision to the Italian armed forces of medium-range missiles armed with nuclear warhead. These are under American control. American and

Italian (indeed in this case Atlantic) approval must be given before they are used.

NATO commands and forces are stationed at Vicenza-Verona, Livorno (Leghorn), Naples, at Vicenza-Verona, Livorno (Leghorn), Naples, Aviano-Udine and Sigonella. On the island of la Maddalena there is an American support base for nuclear submarines. This should be considered as being under direct American control rather than that of the Atlantic Alliance. These submarines, although under the orders of the Commander of the VI Fleet which in certain circumstances is at the disposal of NATO, are at all times under direct US control.

American nuclear forces are present in Italy and may operate from Italian territory. It is known neither whether there exists an agreement defining under what circumstances all these American nuclear weapons may be used nor, if such an agreement does exist, what its terms are. The Allied Atlantic Submarine Warfare Command has a research and testing station at La Spezia.

Greece has an agreement with Canada (1962) on the exchange of scientific and technical information. Still within the NATO framework, she also has numerous agreements with the USA. The most important of these, dating from 1956, covers arms supplies. These were suspended between 1967 and 1970, and then resumed at a rate of 56 million dollars worth of military aid every two years. At a bilateral level Greece signed, in 1949, an agreement allowing the use by the VI Fleet of a number of Greek islands for exercises. The re-establishment of democratic government in Greece together with the Cyprus crisis has led to problems for NATO and the USA. Greek participation in certain integrated commands (in particular those commands in which the Turks play a role) has been officially suspended. The idea of closing American bases has been in the air. Greek installation and air space are closed to NATO and may only be used after due notice has been received and permission given by the Greek government. This creates certain practical problems. The bases however, such as the naval base and the station for the families of sailors in the VI Fleet at Pireo, the NATO and American naval base and missile testing station at Nea Makri (Marathon) and the air base at Athens are all still open as are the important naval bases (at Salonika) and radar stations belonging to the integrated NATO air defence system NADGE. A new US-Greece agreement allow-

ing for the continuing availability of these bases was signed in 1976.

The USA has access to about 20 to 25 Turkish air and naval bases and also maintains six of its own bases all along the Turkish peninsula (at Ankara, Incirlik, Karamursel, Diyarbakir etc.). In 1950 Turkey signed a nuclear agreement with the USA similar to the US-Italian agreement and a whole series of other agreements within the framework of NATO. A new agreement in 1969 clarified the issue of Turkey's sovereignty over American and allied bases. Turkish personnel cannot be excluded from the bases. Within the NATO decision-making structure Turkey enjoys a clear right of co-decision with the USA as regards the size, the type and the use of American forces deployed on her territory. Following the Cyprus crisis the US Congress suspended military aid to Turkey. This led to a strong reaction from the Turkish government which threatened to close American bases and stop all American military activity within the country. A new agreement allowing the continuation of US presence was signed in 1976, but it is not yet operational, awaiting the approval of the US Congress.

American military forces in the Mediterranean have access, as well as to the bases already cited, to the air and naval station at Kenitra in Morocco and to naval installations in Bahrein on the Persian Gulf. It appears that they no longer have access to the naval and strategic communications base at Asmara in Eritrea. US military cooperation with Iran dates from 1950. Recently the USA have sold to Iran huge quantities of sophisticated military equipment. There are around 200 qualified American military technicians in Oran. Military cooperation with Israel dates from 1952. The Americans are responsible for supplying Israel with arms. Since 1953 the USA has had a military assistance agreement with Saudi Arabia, renewed in a general agreement in 1974. A similar agreement with Lebanon has been in force since 1957. In 1974 the USA and Jordan agreed on the setting up of a joint commission to examine areas in which collaboration was possible. Agreements have been reached with Egypt which although not directly military in nature have evident political and strategic significance. It is possible that through these agreements the USA will provide Egypt with technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The largest supplies of arms have been to Iran and to Is-

rael. However supplies have also gone to Turkey, Morocco and several of the Gulf states.

British air and naval forces are stationed on Gibraltar on the basis of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) which ended the War of the Spanish Succession. By the treaty, Britain obtained "full and complete sovereignty over the city and castle of Gibraltar, over port fortifications and over forts connected with the latter". Britain may neither "give, sell or in any way cede" its property without giving first preference to Spain. In 1854 and in 1908 Spain claimed that the boundaries of the territory had been shifted without due cause and now she claims that rights and political institutions granted by Britain to the citizens of the Rock were incompatible with the letter of the Treaty of Utrecht.

A treaty concluded in 1373 between Edward III of England and King Ferdinand and Queen Eleanor of Portugal pledges England and Portugal to "perpetual amity" and to "mutual assistance on the land and on the sea against any enemy". Between 1386 and 1815 this Treaty was on various occasions strengthened and its terms restated. It was renewed by the Portuguese during World War II and in 1943 used to provide a legal basis for the building of British military installations on the Azores.

The British military presence in Malta is based on two agreements reached in 1964 and 1972 (the latter due to remain in force until March 1979). By the terms of these agreements Malta guarantees that her bases may be used "for the defensive military purposes of Great Britain and NATO" and engages herself to allow "neither the stationing of the forces of any member of the Warsaw Pact on Malta nor the utilization by such forces of existing military installations". Britain has promised to give aid to Malta, to be paid in an initial installment of £ 16,000,000 followed by annual payments of £ 14,000,000. Some of this money is reimbursed to Britain by the allies.

The British presence in Cyprus and particular British responsibilities towards that country are regulated by the Zurich agreements of 1959 and by the British-Cypriot Treaty of 1960. By the terms of the former Britain recognizes the independence of the Island and is granted joint responsibility with Turkey and Greece for the maintenance "of the independence, the territorial integrity and the security of the island". The latter agreement establishes British sovereignty

over the territories of Akriptiri and Ahekalia and gives Britain the right to use 31 military installations and buildings and 10 training areas in other parts of the island.

Other British agreements: in 1972 a new treaty replaced agreements with Bahrein dating from 1882 and 1892. The new American role in the area and the growing independence of the island were given practical recognition.

Similarly, in 1971, a new agreement with Qatar replaced an agreement dating from 1916 which had made Great Britain responsible for the country's security and foreign relations. An analogous treaty replaced in 1971 50 year-old treaties with the Union of Arab Emirates.

An agreement with the Sultan of Oman allows the presence of British troops in his territory where they are helping in the struggle against guerrillas in the Dhofar. Britain also maintains an airbase on the small island of Masirah.

France's most important military agreement in the Mediterranean (apart from those already cited) is the Evian agreement with Algeria, signed in 1962, giving France the right to dispose for fifteen years of the naval base at Mers el Kébir and the air base at Bon Sfer. The two bases were evacuated in 1968 and 1970 respectively. (The French government maintains however that they cannot be ceded to third parties). A convention signed in 1967 includes provisions for continued military cooperation between France and Algeria.

The French overseas territory of the Afar and the Issa, on the Red Sea (ex-French Somalia), is also of interest in the Mediterranean context. Troops and coastal artillery units are stationed in the territory which also has a number of air and naval bases. The permanent garrison consists of 2000 infantry, 1 naval group of three frigates and two squadrons of aircraft.

Spain, as well as the bilateral agreements already cited, has two "Plaza de Soberania" at Ceta and Melilla on the Moroccan Mediterranean coast, where 8000 and 9000 men respectively including two Foreign Legion regiments, are stationed.

Since 1860 China has signed a series of friendship and economic cooperation agreements with Albania. In 1964 she made a treaty with Yemen and probably has political links with South Yemen.

Soviet relations with Iran are regulated by

a Treaty dating from 1921 as amended in 1927. By the terms of Article 5:

"The two High Contracting Parties undertake

(1) To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories, of any organisations or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the Allies of Russia.

They will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or armies within their respective territories with the afore-mentioned object.

(2) Not to allow a third Party or any organisation, whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other Contracting Party, to import or to convey in transit across their countries material which can be used against the other Party.

(3) To prevent by all means in their power the presence within their territories or within the territories of their Allies of all armies or forces of a third Party in cases in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers, interests or safety of the other Contracting Party".

Article six reads:

"If a third Party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a Foreign Power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its Allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territories as soon as the danger has been removed".

In 1927 it was specified that "articles five and six may only be applied where preparations have been made for the launching of a large scale military attack against Russia or the allied Soviet republics, either by the supporters of the overthrown regime" (i.e. the Tsarist regime) "or by its supporters among those foreign powers capable of aiding the enemies of the workers and peasants' republics and at the same time of sei-

zing, by force or subversion, part of the territory of Iran".

In 1959 Iran asked to be released from the obligations imposed by these two articles. This request was rejected by the Soviet government.

The USSR has also signed (in 1971) a friendship and cooperation agreement with Egypt. In 1972, however, around 20,000 Soviet military advisers, stationed in Egypt in accordance with the terms of treaty, were withdrawn on the request of the Egyptian government.

There are rumours of a Soviet military presence at the Marsa Matruh base. Egypt unilaterally abrogated these provisions in 1976.

In 1972 the USSR signed a fifteen year treaty of friendship and cooperation with Iraq similar to the Egyptian one. (The explicit objective of the treaty is to further the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and zionism). A request to join COMECON has not however been followed by any concrete decisions. There are rumours of secret Iraqi-Soviet agreements permitting, among other things, the establishment of a Soviet naval base at el Qasr, on the Persian Gulf. These rumours have not been confirmed. The agreement reached between Iraq and Iran (in 1975), explicitly aiming, as it does, to reduce the military presence of outside powers in the Gulf, seems to have reduced the probability of the setting up of such a base.

Iraq has received from the Soviet Union aircraft missiles and motor patrol boats. With the exception of an agreement signed in 1974 there are no treaties linking the USSR and Syria. Nonetheless Syria does receive massive arms supplies from the Soviet Union, these including for the year 1973-74, nearly 400 aircraft, motor patrol boats missiles and an unknown number of tanks (perhaps around 1000). Syria allows the Soviet fleet free access to its port facilities.

It is reported that contacts between the Soviet Union and South Yemen are on the increase, in particular that the Soviets have been granted access to the military port at Aden and to other military facilities, and have been authorized to use the island of Socotra, on the entrance to the Red Sea, for military purposes. This is however uncertain. It is also reported that the Yemen has granted access to the port of Hodeida.

In 1975 the Soviet Union concluded an agreement with Libya, the exact content of

which is not known. According to informed Egyptian sources the agreement covers massive Soviet military supplies (to a value of around 1 billion dollars) to be delivered over an indefinite period, the supply of technology for the peaceful use of atomic energy etc. It is not known whether there are also agreements allowing the establishment of Soviet air and naval bases and other military installations on Lybian territory. All reports as to the content of the treaty have yet to be confirmed.

The USSR plays a role in the training of the Algerian armed forces, particularly the air force. She is also responsible for providing Algeria with a proportion of her needs in military equipment. She enjoys certain facilities for use of bases in Algeria.

Yugoslavian sources have reported Soviet pressure for the concession of a base at Split. It is said however that Soviet requests have been rejected. There are numerous Soviet anchorage in the Mediterranean in international waters.

There exist numerous bilateral agreements between Mediterranean countries. Here we will only note a few of these.

1973-74 saw closer relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Among other signs of this tendency was the purchase by Saudi Arabia, on behalf of Egypt, of a number of French aircraft. In 1975 an agreement (to which we have already referred) was reached between Iran and Iraq. It included provisions helping towards a resolution of the Kurdish problems in Iraq. The agreement between Iran and the Oman, by the terms of which Iranian troops have gone to the Oman to help in the fight against the guerrillas in the Dhfar ahs been renewed. Jordanian troops have also recently arrived on the basis of an agreement reached in 1975.

## MILITARY FORCES

There follow a series of tables (tables 1.19, 1.20, 1.24, 1.22, 1.23, 1.24) outlining the strength of military forces present in the Mediterranean. This data must naturally be seen in the context of the information we have already presented on certain political considerations, on foreign alliances, bases and forces present in the Mediterranean and on the naval presence of external powers.

The comparison we make here between East-West forces in the Mediterranean is li-

Table I/19. Military forces. Greece, Turkey and Cyprus (1975).

	Greece	Turkey	Cyprus
Population	9,020,000	39,910,000	660,000
GNP (dollars m.)	18,600 (1974)	31,900 (1974)	700 (1972)
Defence budget	1,035 (1975)	2,175 (1975-76)	8 (1970)
Army	121,000 (1) (85,000 conscripts) reserves: 230,000 para-military forces: 100,000	365,000 (2) (200,000 conscripts) reserves: 750,000 para-military forces: 750,000	8,000 (3) reserves: 4,000
Airforce	22,700 (16,000 conscripts) reserves: 25,000	48,000 (25,000 conscripts)	—
Navy	17,500 (11,000 conscripts) reserves: 20,000	40,000 (32,000 conscripts) reserves: 25,000	—
Heavy and/or medium tanks	850	1,500	32
Light tanks	yes	yes	no
Heavy artillery	yes	yes	no
Combat aircraft	250	290	—
Transport aircraft	50	60	—
Helicopters	40	100	—
Submarines	7	16	—
Warships (more than 600 tons)	15	15	—
Missile patrol boats	4	—	—
Surface to surface missiles	yes	yes	no
Ship to ship missiles	yes	yes	no
Air to air missiles	yes	yes	no
Air to surface missiles	no	no	no
Anti-aircraft missiles	yes	yes	no
Anti-tank missiles	yes	yes	no

1. 1 battalion of 950 men was stationed in Cyprus (before the crisis of summer 1974).
2. 1 battalion of 750 men was stationed in Cyprus (before the crisis of summer 1974).
3. The National Guard, commanded by 650 Greek officers. Before the crisis of summer 1974 the Cypriot armed forces also included 500 men in the presidential guard and 5,000 men in police reserves. The sum of the forces which could be mobilized by the Greek and Turkish communities amounted to 30,000 men 15,000 in each case). Foreign armed forces, present on the island, consisted, apart from the Greek and Turkish battalion already cited in notes 1 and 2) of 8,000 men in a British contingent (1 battalion of infantry, 1 aerial reconnaissance, 1 fighter and 2 bomber squadrons and 2,200 men in the United Nations peace-keeping force.

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance 1975-76*; SIPRI, *Yearbooks, World Armaments and Disarmament, 1973, 1974, 1975*; SIPRI, *Arms Trade Registers*; IISS *Strategic Surveys, 1973, 1974, 1975*.

Table I/20. Military forces, front line countries in the Arab-Israeli conflict (1975).

	Israel	Egypt	Syria	Jordan	Lebanon
Population	3,360,000	37,520,000	7,370,000	2,730,000	3,230,000
GNP (dollars m.)	11,700 (1974)	17,900 (1974)	2,900 (1974)	1,000 (1974)	3,700 (1974)
Defence budget	3,500 (1975-76)	6,100 (1975-76)	670 (1975)	155 (1975)	144 (1975)
Army	135,000 (120,000 c.) R.: 240,000 P.: 9,000	275,000 R.: 500,000 P.: 120,000	150,000 R.: 100,000 P.: 9,500	75,000(1) P.: 10,000	14,000 P.: 5,000
Airforce	16,000 (1,000 c.) R.: 4,000	30,000 R.: 20,000	25,000	5,000	1,000
Navy	4,500 (1,000 c.) R.: 1,000	17,500 R.: 15,000	2,500 R.: 2,500	250	300
Heavy and/or medium tanks	2,500	1,950	2,100	450	60
Light tanks	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
Heavy artillery	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Combat aircraft	480	600	400	40	20
Transport aircraft	60	70	10	10	—
Helicopters	100	140	60	15	15
Submarines	2	12	—	—	—
Warships (more than 600 tons)	—	5	—	—	—
Missile patrol boats	18	13	6	—	—
Surface to surface missiles	yes	yes	yes	no	no
Ship to ship missiles	yes	yes	yes	no	no
Air to air missiles	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Air to surface missiles	yes	yes	no	no	no
Anti-aircraft missiles	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
Anti-tank missiles	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

c. = conscripts

r. = reserves

p. = para-military forces

1. 1 Special forces battalion is stationed in Oman.

Sources: see Table I/19

Table I/21. Military forces, Arab african countries in the Mediterranean (1975).

	Libya	Tunisia	Algeria	Morocco
Population	2,320,000	5,750,000	16,930,000	17,320,000
GNP (dollars m.)	5,900 (1974)	3,600 (1974)	8,800 (1974)	6,000 (1974)
Defence budget	200 (1975)	56 (1975-76)	280 (1975)	190 (1974)
Army	25,000	20,000 (13,500 c.)	55,000	55,000
			R.: 50,000	
		P.: 9,000	P.: 10,000	P.: 30,000
Airforce	5,000	2,000 (500 c.)	4,500	4,000
Navy	2,000	2,000 (500 c.)	3,500	2,000
Heavy and/or medium tanks	350	—	400	120
Light tanks	no	yes	yes	yes
Heavy artillery	yes	yes	yes	no
Combat aircraft	90	12	160	50
Transport aircraft	15	3	10	25
Helicopters	35	8	60	30
Submarines	—	—	—	—
Warships (more than 600 tons)	1	2	—	1
Missile patrol boats	3	3	9	2
Surface to surface missiles	no	no	yes	no
Ship to ship missiles	yes	yes	yes	yes
Air to air missiles	yes	no	yes	no
Air to surface missiles	no	no	no	no
Anti-aircraft missiles	yes	no	yes	no
Anti-tank missiles	yes	no	yes	yes

c. = conscripts

r. = reserves

p. = para-military forces

Sources: see table I/19

Table I/22. Military forces: The Gulf (1975).

	Saudi Arabia	Iran (1)	Iraq	North Yemen	South Yemen	Kuwait	Oman (2)	Abu Dhabi and other emirates	Qatar
Population	8,910,000	33,180,000	11,090,000	6,520,000	1,660,000	1,210,000	760,000	170,000	90,000
GNP (dollars m.)	12,000 (1974)	35,600 (1974)	5,600 (1974)	n.d.	500 (1972)	5,400 ('74)	n.d.	n.d.	280 (1971)
Defence budget	6,350 ('75-'76)	10,400 ('75-'76)	800 ('74-'75)	58 ('74-'75)	26 (1972)	162 (1974)	360 (1975)	n.d.	n.d.
Army	40,000 (3)	175,000	120,000	30,000	15,000	8,000	13,000		1,600
		R.: 300,000	R.: 250,000						
	P.: 23,000	P.: 70,000	P.: 19,000				P.: 2,000		
Airforce	5,500	60,000	12,000	1,700	2,500	2,000	1,000	15,000	400
			R.: 18,000						
Navy	1,500	15,000	3,000	300	300	200	200		200
Heavy and/or medium tanks	170	1,500	1,300	30	50	100	—	—	—
Light tanks	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	yes	no
Heavy artillery	yes	yes	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	no
Combat aircraft	100	250	250	25	30	20	30	25	13
Transport aircraft	20	90	30	5	4	5	30	9	—
Helicopters	50	230	100	5	8	7	25	20	2
Submarines	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Warships (more than 600 tons)	—	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Missile patrol boats	—	— (4)	5	—	—	—	—	—	—
Surface to surface missiles	no	no	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no
Ship to ship missiles	no	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no
Air to air missiles	yes	yes	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	no
Air to surface missiles	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
Anti-aircraft missiles	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Anti-tank missiles	yes	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes	yes	no

r. = reserves

p. = para-military forces

- 1,500 men are stationed in Oman including 1 battalion of parachutists and 1 helicopter squadron.
- The Oman government, engaged until the end of 1975 in guerrilla fighting in the Dhofar, receives military assistance from Great Britain and from Iran.
- 4,000 soldiers are stationed in Jordan and 1500 in Syria.
- The Iranian navy includes 14 hovercrafts.

Sources: see table I/19

Table I/23. Military forces. Othes (1975).

	Italy	France	Spain	Yugoslavia	Albania
Population	55,500,000	52,470,000	35,610,000	21,400,000	2,490,000
GNP (dollars m.)	150,000 (1974)	270,800 (1974)	64,700 (1974)	25,300 (1974)	1,100 (1974)
Defence budget	3,900 (1975)	10,800 (1975)	1,370 (1974)	1,700 (1975)	130 (1975)
Army	305,000 R.: 550,000 P.: 80,000	330,000 (1) R.: 400,000 P.: 73,000	220,000 (2) P.: 65,000	190,000 R.: 500,000 P.: 1,000,000	30,000 R.: 100,000 P.: 13,000
Airforce	70,000 R.: 30,000	100,000	35,000	20,000	5,000
Navy	45,000 R.: 65,000	70,000 R.: 50,000	45,000	20,000	3,000
Heavy and/or medium tanks	1,300	950	400	2,150	85
Ligth tanks	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Heavy artillery	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Combat aircraft	280	600 (3)	180	270	95
Transport aircraft	45	170	30	50	6
Helicopters	500	800	150	80	20
Submarines	10	19	8	5	—
Warships (more than 600 tons)	30	47 (4)	29 (5)	1	—
Missile patrol boats	2	1	—	10	—
Surface to surface missiles	yes	yes	no	no	no
Ship to ship missiles	yes	yes	no	yes	no
Air to air missiles	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
Air to surface missiles	no	yes	no	no	no
Anti-aircraft missiles	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Anti-tank missiles	yes	yes	yes	yes	no

r. = reserves

p. = para-military forces

1. Troops stationed abroad: 2000 in the territory of the Afars and Issas, 2000 in the Reunion; 4000 elsewhere in Africa 2 battalions in the Pacific Territories, and 1 battalion in the Caribbean.
2. 41,000 soldiers are stationed outside the Iberian peninsula: 6,000 in the Balearic Islands, 8000 in the Canary islands, 8000 at Ceuta, 9000 at Melilla and 10,000 in the Spanish Sahara.
3. This includes strategic aircraft and combat aircraft belonging to the Navy.
4. This included one aircraft carrier.
5. This included one helicopter-carrier.

Sources: see Table I/19

Table I/24. Military forces: a comparison between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Southern Europe (1)

	CATEGORY	NATO	USSR	WARSAW PACT (including USSR)
Available land forces in time of peace (in division equivalents) (2)	armoured	6	3	7
	infantry, mechanized and airborne	33	5	24
Available combat and direct support troops (thousands)		575	115	345
Number of tanks in operational service in time of peace (3)		3,500	2,250	7,250
Tactical aircraft in operational service	light bombers	8	30	30
	Fighter/ ground-attack aircraft	450	50	200
	Interceptor	275	200	625
	Reconnaissance aircraft	125	30	75

1. Nato forces here include Italian, Greek and Turkish ground forces (including troops stationed in Asiatic Turkey) and those British and American forces available for deployment in the Mediterranean. Warsaw Pact forces include Bulgarian, Hungarian and Rumanian ground forces and those Soviet units normally stationed in Hungary and in the Southern USSR available for deployment in the Mediterranean area.
2. Divisions, brigades and other units. A brigade is here taken as being the equivalent of one third of a division.
3. These are tanks attached to specific units. Reserve forces are excluded.

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance 1975-76*

mitted to consideration of NATO and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces (naval forces are examined elsewhere). This comparison is obviously to some extent artificial. In the event of the outbreak of armed conflict it would be necessary to take into consideration a whole series of other elements (e.g. the military strength of the superpowers in other regions, the overall balance of forces in Europe, the degree of involvement of local states etc). Although the other tables also suffer from comparable limitation we feel that they nonetheless represent descriptive outline of the situation which can form a useful basis for an evaluation of the real balance of forces within the area. The figures given refer to mid-1975. Only weapons systems already in service at that time are included in the list. Systems under order or which have since been supplied are not included.

### 1967 AND 1973: A COMPARISON OF AND TECHNOLOGY

We concluded this chapter with a comparison between military expenditure and technology in 1967 and 1973.

Table 1.25 excludes France, Italy, Portugal, Warsaw Pact Countries with interests in the Mediterranean and the forces of external powers. From a qualitative point of view the armed forces of these countries are still the most advanced in the area on account of their nuclear capability, their higher degree of integration and their logistic organization and links with developed industrial infrastructures. Nonetheless there is no longer the enormous qualitative and quantitative gap of the 1950's. Although one cannot talk of a "revolution" in the military balance the ending of the colonial area and the establishment of direct links between Mediterranean states and the superpowers.

It is interesting to note how the high cost of new weapons systems which in the past has proved an obstacle to their adoption by European states and even by the USA has in no way proved an obstacle to rapid rearmament within the region. This makes the Mediterranean an exception to the world trend.

The increase in military expenditure by countries in strategic position in the region is clearly of massive proportions. Between

Table I/25. Military expenditure in Mediterranean area countries: 1967 and 1973 (1) (millions of dollars)

	1967	1973	% growth 1967-74
World	196,883	211,745	7.5
Morocco	73.7	133.5	81.1
Algeria (2)	99	110	11.1
Tunisia	17.3	25.4	46.8
Libya	136.5	(400)	(193)
Egypt	718	2,327	224.1
Israel	562	2,415	329.7
Syria	102	289	183.3
Jordan	115	95	-17.4
Lebanon	39	67	71.8
Iraq	265	404	52.5
Iran	560	1,800	221.4
Saudi Arabia	(372)	(1,020)	(174)
Kuwait (2)	54	100	85.2
North Yemen (2)	5	(27)	(440)
South Yemen	—	26 (3)	—
Oman (2)	—	(80)	—
Cyprus	8	(7)	(-12)
Turkey	521	738	41.7
Greece	331	533	61.0
Albania (4)	69	148	114.5
Yugoslavia	540	634	17.4
Spain	550	722	31.3
France	6,133	6,067	-1.1
Italy	2,381	3,126	31.3

1. Constant 1970 prices and exchange rates. The figures in brackets are rough SIPRI estimates.
2. At current prices and 1970 exchange rates.
3. 1972. *Military Balance 1975-76* data at current prices and 1972 exchange rates.
4. Current prices. Benoit Lubell exchange rates.

Source: SIPRI, *Yearbook 1975*

1967 and 1973 military expenditure at constant prices by the first-line countries in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Israel, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon) measured at constant prices more than tripled (the increase was of 228.1%). The increase in expenditure in the Gulf (around 170%) was only slightly lower. The world increase in the same period was 7.5%.

This trend is confirmed by the increase in defence budgets between 1973 and 1975 (or between 1973-74 and 1975-76). Here a few examples suffice. In Israel the defence budget increased in two years by 256%, in Egypt, by 271.4%, in Syria by 212.5%, in Iraq by 131.4%, in Iran by 408.3%, in Saudi Arabia by 456.4%. These increases are measured in local currencies at current prices; even when inflation and loss-replacement after the Yom Kippur war are taken into account, the upward trend is even faster than that between 1967 and 1973.

In recent years there has also been a significant increase in military expenditure by other Mediterranean countries. Turkey for example, in two years (1973-4 to 1975-6) increased expenditure by 195.8%. Similarly Algeria, whose defence budget had been steady for a decade has over the last two years doubled her military expenditure (which rose from 545 million dinars in 1973 to 1.030 million dinars in 1975 (about \$ 285 million).

The increase in military expenditure in the Mediterranean area (in particular in the Middle-East and the Gulf, has been reflected in both quantitative and qualitative changes in local weaponry.

Thus on the quantitative plane the number of combat aircraft owned by Gulf and Middle-Eastern states rose from 1,200 in 1967 to nearly 2,300 in 1975. In the same period the number of tanks rose from 3,500 to 10,200.

Qualitative improvements in armaments have been even more significant. Iran and Israel both now possess or are about to come into possession of some of the most modern weapons systems in the world. Iran for instance has recently purchased 80 F-14 fighters, 10 C-5A long-range transport planes, 500 Bell helicopters, 800 Chieftain tanks, various types of very modern missiles including "Two" anti-tank, "Phoenix" air to air "Maverick" air to surface and "Harpoon" ship to ship, 7 "Spruance" class destroyers, 12 missile patrol boats and an entire hovercraft fleet. The first F-14s and the "Spruance" class destroyers have only recently been supplied to American forces. According to SIPRI Yearbook 1975, "by 1976, when current

orders have been fulfilled, Iran will possess approximately 500 highly advanced combat aircraft, close to 800 military helicopters, and 1,700 tanks".

The pattern for Israel's forces differ to some extent from the Iranian one. American supplies have played a slightly lesser role. The Israeli technological capability is however rather advanced. The new "Barak" fighter (a Mirage air-frame equipped with American jet-engines), the "Reshef" class missile patrol boats, the ship to ship "Gabriel" missile and the air to air "Fafael Shafrir" missile are all sophisticated weapons.

The qualitative improvement between 1967 and 1973 in Arab (in particular Egyptian and Syrian) weaponry was demonstrated during the October War. Anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles proved themselves to be particularly effective. Egyptian and Syrian rearmament is continuing on the qualitative as well as the quantitative plane (MIG-23 fighters, surface to surface "Scud" missiles). As for Egypt we must note that it is now buying new weapon's systems on the Western market.

Saudi Arabia and Lybia are also engaged in rapid armament. Although both countries, before 1967, possessed only small numbers of supersonic and transonic fighters, they will now have air forces of about 150-200 modern combat aircraft. Purchases are being made of all kinds of equipment (armoured vehicles missile patrol boats, various types of missile). The most serious problems faced by these countries are perhaps those of training, ground specialists and infrastructures.

Apart from Lybia, which receives its supplies principally from France and the Soviet Union, the other three countries we have mentioned here are mainly supplied by the United States. In 1974 total foreign sales by the American armaments industry amounted to about 8 billion dollars of which 47% went to Iran, 26% to Israel, 7% to Saudi Arabia, etc.

It is not only these countries however which are involved in the purchase of modern armaments. Since 1967 the Lebanon, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi have all bought supersonic Mirage fighters. Jordan and Qatar have purchased anti-aircraft missile defence systems. All the Gulf states have renewed their armaments though not on this scale.

For the moment rearmament in the Me-

diterranean depends principally on purchase abroad. There are however signs that the trend is changing. Israel already produces 30% of its arms requirements and has the technological capability to support a considerable growth in internal production. The

Arab states too wish to adopt a policy of self-sufficiency. In April 1975, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Arab Emirates set up an "Arab armaments enterprise", Its working capital has been set at more than 1 billion dollars.

## PART II

### CRISES WITHIN THE MEDITERRANEAN

## I. PALESTINE AND THE PALESTINIANS

### PALESTINE AND THE PALESTINIANS

Palestine is neither geographically nor politically welldefined. Various states have, over the course of history, dominated the territory which has been variously subdivided by the empires to which it has belonged. In some periods it has been restricted to Judah or to a coastal strip south of Beirut; in others it has embraced sometimes a large, sometimes a smaller part of present-day Jordan and Syria. Thus, for example, under the Arab dominium which began in 636 AD Syria and Palestine were included in the same province. Later the Kingdom of Jerusalem, founded during the period of the crusades (1100-1200) ruled over an ill-defined territory which stretched from Beirut to Gaza in the South-West and to Akaba in the South-East. The Ottoman empire divided the region into a number of administrative units, the most important of which was the Sanjak of Jerusalem. The rest of the territory was included in the region of Beirut and Damascus. In 1920 the British Palestine mandate covered both present-day Jordan and Israel; as early as 1922 however the Emirate of Transjordan was founded on the East-bank of the Jordan with separate status from Palestine on the west bank. The UN plan for partition, approved on the 29th of November 1947 made provision for the division of the mandated Palestinian territories into 6 zones controlled by the Arabs and Israelis and a seventh, Jerusalem, as an international zone. After the 1948-49 war, of the territory previously destined to the Arab-Palestinian state, 78% was under Israeli, 20.50% under Jordani and 1.50% (the Gaza strip) under Egyptian control. Until the eve of the 1967 war these boundaries remained unchanged.

Traditionally several contradictory definitions of Palestine have been offered. One of these, presented in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference by the World Zionist Organization identifies Palestine with "Greater Israel".

"Palestine must include in Southern Lebanon the cities of Tyre and Sidon and the Jordan springs on Mount Hermon, the Golan Heights in Syria including the city of Kuneitra, the Southern section of the River Litani, the river Yarmuk and the hot springs at Al-Himmeh, the entire Jordan valley, the Dead Sea and the eastern hills up to the boundaries of the Amman region; in the South the boundaries of Palestine must run along the Hedjaz railway as far as the Gulf of Akaba; in Egypt from El Arish on the Mediterranean coast to Sharm el Sheik on the Gulf of Akaba". For the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1968 Palestine was "an indivisible territorial entity defined by the frontiers of the old British mandate".

To define the Palestinians presents even greater problems. The composition of the population has differed over different periods. Jewish immigration, beginning in the early 1900's, resulted in profound religious and social changes. This process was greatly accelerated with the foundation of the State of Israel. In 1948 the region included about 1,300,000 Palestinian Arabs and 452,158 Jews. However in the first six years of Israel's existence a further 600,000 new immigrants arrived. Jewish immigration began to decline during the 1960's (in 1964 there were 55,000 immigrants, in 1967 — 15,000). In the 1970's however there was an upsurge, this being mainly due to immigration from Europe and the United States, (1971, 45,000 immigrants; 1973, 55,000). In 1973 the Israeli population stood at 3,302,000 of whom 2,750,000 were of Jewish origin whilst the rest were mainly Arabs (plus some Greeks and Armenians). The occupation of additional territories in 1967 and 1973 has added a further million persons (nearly exclusively Arab) to the population under Israeli administration.

### PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

In 1947, following the plan for the partition of Palestine, 30,000 Palestinian Arabs left the Jewish zones. The Palestinian refugee problem was born. The flow accelerated rapidly with the 1948-49 war which marked an irreparable break in any dialogue which might have existed between the two communities: about 250,000 Arabs left the territory occupied by the new Israeli state. Indiscriminate massacres, such as the

Table II/1. Evaluation of Palestinian refugees

Appropriation area	In camps		Refugees not in camps (Unrwa)	Total (Unrwa)
	Unrwa Data	Israeli estimate		
Jordan	155,280	159,000	444,291	599,571 <sup>1</sup>
Cisjordan	72,529	49,000	215,492	288,021
Gaza	195,216	165,000	130,873	326,089
Lebanon	97,111	27,500	94,587	191,698
Syria	50,179	89,500	128,088	178,267 <sup>2</sup>
<b>Total</b>	<b>570,315</b>	<b>490,000</b>	<b>1,013,331</b>	<b>1,583,646</b>

1. Including 260,445 refugees organised in 1967.

2. Including 20,492 refugees organised in 1967.

Sources: Unrwa and Israel's Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

one which occurred at the village of Deir Yassin, increased the terror of the Arab population, encouraging a massive exodus. By the end of the war about 700,000 Palestinian Arabs had left Israel. In 1950 UNRWA (The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near-East) was set up. In 1974 the number of refugees registered with UNRWA was as shown in table II.1. To these should be added a number of persons, not classified as refugees by UNRWA yet whose condition may, in practice, be assimilated to that of the refugees proper. In 1973, according to UN estimates, the refugees were distributed as follows: Transjordan - 230,865; Syria - 125,000; Egypt - 25,750.

UNRWA defines as refugees "those persons who resided in Palestine for at least two years before the 1948 war and who have lost their homes and means of subsistence". To be classified as a refugee it is also necessary that the person in question be resident in one of the four zones of operation of the Agency, namely Jordan, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and Syria.

Arab sources claim that this definition excludes from assistance 48% of all refugees

in Jordan, the children of refugees born after 1951, the inhabitants of frontier villages, Bedouin who have lost their land and those refugees absorbed within the Israeli economy (about 30,000).

According to Israeli estimates the Arab Palestinians are distributed as follows: the West Bank - 670,000 (a different Israeli estimate gives a figure of 716,000 for the West Bank and Jerusalem), Gaza - 380,000, Jordan - 643,000, Kuwait - 147,000, Saudi Arabia - 60,000, the Lebanon - 144,000 (240,006 according to Arab estimates), Syria - 138,000, other Arab countries - 20,000 (50,000 according to Arab estimates); other countries - 50,000. This amounts to a total of 2,252,000 persons to whom should be added the 400,000 Palestinians living in Israel. Of these two and a half million, 1,593,000 are, according to the Israelis Jordanian citizens whereas 490,000 are Palestinian refugees, that is to say resident in the camps and subdivided as shown in table 2.1.

According to the Palestine National Charter (see appendix), approved by the 1968 Congress "the Palestinian identity is an authentic, intrinsic and indissoluble quality that is transmitted from father to son.

Neither the Zionist occupation nor the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people as a result of the afflictions they have suffered can efface this Palestinian identity. (Article 4). Palestinians are Arab citizens who were normally resident in Palestine until 1947. This includes both those who were forced to leave or who stayed in Palestine. Anyone born to a Palestinian father after that date, whether inside or outside Palestine, is a Palestinian (Article 5). Jews who were normally resident in Palestine up to beginning of the Zionist invasion are Palestinians. (Article 6). Palestinian identity, and material, spiritual and historical links with Palestine are immutable realities. (Article 7).

#### THE POLITICAL PROBLEM

The opposition between Arab and Jewish communities, which at the beginning of Jewish immigration into the region took on only a vague form, grew sharper with the passing of time. At the beginning of the century Palestinian nationalism could to a large extent be identified with those Arab nationalist movements engaged in the struggle, first against the Ottoman empire and later against Anglo-French colonialism. The leaders of the movement generally came from the families of the great Sheiks (like the Husseini and the Nasciascibi) and their feudal vassals (the effendi) and tended towards conservatism and xenophobia. These families were commonly engaged in struggles among themselves, this being due, in part, to the uncertainty which existed as to the goals of Palestinian nationalism. There was continual doubt as to whether the aim should be a sovereign Palestine or rather, alternatively, an autonomous Palestine incorporated within Syria.

This ruling class, while often making agreements with the Zionist movement, nonetheless encouraged opposition to the Jews in order to ensure its own complete domination over a predominantly anti-British nationalist movement. The programme put forward by the movement during 1920-21 consisted of the following points: the annulment of the 1917 Balfour Declaration by the terms of which the British government had declared itself favourably disposed towards "the establishment in Palestine of

a national home for the Jewish people", the ending of the British mandate, the ending of Jewish immigration, a ban on the sale of land to Jews, the proclamation of Palestine as a Palestinian Arab state. Jewish immigration, the Balfour Declaration and the creation of the National Jewish Fund for the purchase of land in Palestine (Keren Kayemet le Israel) gave the Palestinian nationalist movement certain characteristics not to be found in nationalist movements elsewhere. Zionist ideology and the peculiar characteristics of Jewish immigration with its slogan of "Jewish labour" created serious social problems. Local workers were not given employment. Rather continued immigration of Jewish workers was encouraged so as to lead to the creation of an almost exclusively Jewish labour market.

The first dramatic consequence for the Arab population was the expulsion of peasants (the fellah) from their lands (sold by the effendi to the Jewish Fund) from jobs in Jewish industry and from their homes. The only openings for these people were to be found in administration and public services.

Arab opposition to Jewish immigration often took the form of violence. Jewish convoys, property and settlements were attacked. The height of pre-second World War tension was reached during the 1936-39 revolt when the Arab parties proclaimed a six-month general strike to force Britain to accept their requests. Although the role of certain anti-feudal forces, later to lose their significance after the death of some of their military leaders, should not be underestimated, the leadership of the revolt ended up in the hands of the effendi and the Syrian, Egyptian and Iraqi nationalist parties. It was more an anti-British than an anti-Jewish rebellion and identified itself with the pro-German independence movement at that time sweeping the Arab world. This situation led to ambiguities in the post-war period when the Zionist movement, which had supported Britain during the war, began an anti-British struggle in favour of massive immigration and the Arab leaders, weakened by their choice of sides between 1938 and 1940 proved unable to mount any effective opposition to the formation of the new state of Israel, being forced to accept the United Nations resolution of the 29th of November 1946, partitioning Palestine between Israel and Jordan.

After Britain's final withdrawal from Pa-

lestinian following her renunciation of the mandate the 1948-49 war became a simple Arab-Israeli conflict.

#### THE BIRTH OF ARAB-PALESTINIAN POLICY

The new Israeli state immediately sought to consolidate its social base, by so doing posing the "Palestinian Question" in its present form. Although for a year Arab refugees were formally accorded the "right of return", in practice only 100,000 Arabs went back to Israel. At the end of the 1948-49 war Israeli leaders made the return of the remaining refugees conditional on the recognition by the Arab states of Israel's new frontiers and the conclusion of a peace treaty. Special laws passed on the 30th of June 1948 defined the legal status of "abandoned land" and allowed Arab land and houses to be immediately occupied by immigrants, to the benefit of the Israelis. (This process took from 1948 to 1953). 350 new Jewish colonies were set up on Arab land; Arab plantations of citrus fruit were integrated into the Israeli economy.

We have already given the numbers of refugees who, since 1948, have been obliged to leave Israel and seek refuge in neighbouring Arab countries. Of these refugees only some 30% have succeeded in integrating themselves within the economics of the countries which have received them, in cities and in villages; the remaining 70% have had to rely on UNRWA aid and live in the refugee camps. The camps provide only the minimum conditions for human survival; housing is in shacks with walls made of mortar, mud and straw or in cement shelters with corrugated iron roofs. Seven to nine people live in each house. They have no water or electricity. UNRWA's budget is very small. In 1947 it had 85 million dollars to spend, i.e. 55 dollars per capita — 15 cents a day. On this budget it was able to provide food (flour, rice, dried vegetables, sugar, oil and dates), lighting (5 to 7 litres of oil/year) and clothing (1 blanket for every three refugees).

In the areas occupied during the 1967 war the situation was extremely serious. To the problems already mentioned have been added those resulting from military occupation: searches, trials, imprisonment, the blowing up of houses, curfews. These measures

have had some of their worst effects in Gaza where the majority of the population are refugees. Many have, as a result, fled to the East bank.

It was from these refugee camps that there emerged the embryo of a political organization aiming at the liberation of the Israeli occupied territories. Palestinian national feeling was originally used by the neighbouring Arab states as a tool in their bargaining with Israel. Up to 1956, many of the Palestinians expected the UN to resolve their problems for them. (As early as 1949 in paragraph II of resolution 194 the UN had encouraged the refugees to return to former Palestine). Others were active in the political parties of the other Arab states (the Ba'ath, the Arab Nationalist Movement, the Muslim Brotherhood and the various Communist Parties, all of which had extensions among the Palestinians. As a result Palestinian society for all practical purposes lacked a political organization of its own.

As early as 1954 fighting units of Al Fatah were organized within the Egyptian army and trained at Gaza whence they mounted occasional incursions into Israeli territory. Other small groups also operated from Saudi Arabia, the Lebanon and Syria. The aspirations of the Palestinian people continued nonetheless to be used by the various Arab regimes for the ends of "Pan-Arabism" — a policy pushed mainly by Nasser who had come to power with Neguib, in 1952. Nasser's policy which had had its first success with the setting up of the United Arab Republic and Egyptian-Syrian unity left no space for an autonomous Palestinian movement although it used the aspirations of the Palestinians to reinforce the united Arab front in the struggle against the Israeli enemy.

During this period the Arab ruling classes went so far as to accuse Al Fatah of working for foreign agents. Residence regulations and violent repression forced the movement into clandestinity whence it emerged only in 1967. In the early 1960's there was however no clear trend towards Arab unity. In 1961 the union between Syria and Egypt collapsed; in 1962 on the other hand, Algeria proclaimed her independence and in 1964 two summit meetings were held by the Arab countries with the aim of agreeing on a common strategy against Israel, which was planning at that time the diversion of Jordan head-waters.

In the first of these summits the Arab governments were forced to seek a solution to the Palestinian problem, including that of the organization of the Palestinian movement: a solution which, while maintaining strict control over the latter, would enable it to help in the common struggle against Israel. Thus was founded the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The leadership of the organization was entrusted to Ahmed Choukeiri, a diplomat; an executive committee of 14 members was set up and a fund created by the Arab League placed at its disposal. The PLO's military wing, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was integrated into the Arab armies, contingents being stationed primarily in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. These were not allowed to engage in operations without the permission of the country on whose soil they were stationed.

The second half of 1966 saw the beginnings of a leadership crisis within the PLO. Choukeiri's lack of independence from Nasser led to claims for a greater share in decision-making by officials stationed in Beirut and Damascus. This internal dissent, which lasted until December 1967, paralleled the contradictions inherent within the Arab unity movement. In the short term it led to the dissolution of the executive committee by Choukeiri and its replacement with a Revolutionary Council, the objective of which was to be the preparation of the Palestinian people for a war of liberation. In December 1967, however, Choukeiri was expelled from the PLO and his place taken (up to 1968) by Hammouda. With the Palestinian Congress in February 1969 the leadership passed to Yasser Arafat. At the same time 7 members of Al Fatah joined the PLO executive committee.

## PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS

Al Fatah was the first real Palestinian movement to be formed after the 1948-49 war. The first cells were organized in Kuwait and Qatar. In 1958 its first publication "Filastinuna" (Our Palestine) came out in Beirut, helped by the Moslem "Ibbad el-Rahman" movement. These early groups generally came from student circles or from the lower middle class. Their efforts were directed towards the creation of an em-

bryonic political organization within the Palestinian intelligentsia, with the aim of giving greater emphasis to the national problem.

From 1962 onwards however Al Fatah concentrated its energy on the building up of a military organization, Al Assifa (the tempest). In that year Yasser Arafat won permission from newly-independent Algeria for the opening of a Palestinian Office there. At the same time officers of the Iraqi Palestinian Army joined Al Fatah. Contacts were made with Palestinians living in West Germany. In 1964, whilst the Arab governments were setting up the PLO, Al Fatah decided to begin armed struggle independently from the Arab regimes. Early commando actions met, however, with serious problems; the clandestine nature of the movement and the Israeli policy of reprisals against Arab States limited its freedom of action and its contacts with the Palestinian population.

During the six day war the Palestinian organizations fought alongside the Arab armies. On the 30th of June 1967 Al Fatah, in a secret meeting, decided to continue resistance. Al Assifa began to train volunteers, whose numbers, in the coming months, grew considerably. The armed struggle, resumed in September, rekindled in the Palestinian population the feeling of nationhood. Al Fatah operations were directed against cities on the West Bank: Nablus, Ramalla, and Jerusalem. Israeli repression succeeded however in dismantling the embryonic resistance movement; the houses of Palestinians who had helped the commandos were blown up. Nonetheless although this repression succeeded in shaking the movement for a time, it increased Palestinians' hatred of the Israeli occupier. In order to reduce losses Al Fatah decided that in future commandos would operate from outside Israel, i.e. from Jordan, obliging the enemy to be perpetually on his guard.

The 21st of March 1968 marked a turning point for the commandos. At the Battle of Karami they resisted for over twelve hours inflicting heavy losses on the Israelis. This was armed propaganda directed both at the Arab states and the Palestinian masses. From that date onwards Al Fatah strengthened its military bases and forced both Israel and the Arab world to recognize its existence. It set up an embryonic medical

and administrative organization. Medical centres set up in the refugee camps were, given the disastrous living conditions and the total lack of medical care in the camps, of considerable political significance. The influence of the resistance began to surpass that of the Ba'ath and of Nasserism.

Other organizations, destined to play a leading role in the future, grew up by the side of Al Fatah. In 1955 Naif Hawatmeh formed a group called "Vengeance Youth", in 1966 the organization "The Heroes of the Return" was born. Saika (The Thunderbolt), led by Zuheir Muhsin and Sami Atari was founded in Damascus in 1968. It is basically a Ba'athist organization, allied to the Syrian regime. Its objectives are the liberation of the whole of Palestine and Arab unity under Ba'athist ideology. It controls well-trained commandos operating on the Jordan frontier and from southern Lebanon.

In April 1969 the Arab Liberation Front was founded. It was led by Abd el-Wahab e Khiali and controlled by the Iraqi Ba'aith party. In July 1967 the Popular Struggle Front, led by Samir Ausha was set up. In 1971 it joined Al Fatah.

In November 1971 there came into being "Black September" led by Ali Hassan Salameh. The organization has won notoriety for its attacks within Israel and abroad (assaults on Kibbutz, aircraft high-jacking).

The largest Palestinian Organization after Al Fatah is however the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), founded in 1967 by George Habash. It resulted from the merger of five movements: the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) formed in Syria in 1959-60 on an inter-Arab basis like the Ba'ath, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) led by Ahmed Gibrel, the "Heroes of the Return", the "Vengeance Youth" and finally the "Free Officers Movement" which had grown up in Jordan. Around the end of 1968 and the beginning of 1969 the organization split into:

— the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command. Founded in September 1968 by Ahmed Gibrel with financial support from Iraq, Syria and Lybia. The movement is outside the PLO. In 1969 it suffered a further split with the formation of the Organization for an Arab Palestine (OAP) led by Ahmed Zaarou and linked mainly to Egypt.

— The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habbash, Wadi Hadad and Ahmed e Yamani, supported by Iraq and the South Yemen.

— The Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), set up in February 1969 by Naif Hawatmeh and Yasser Abd Rabu, supported mainly by Iraq, Syria and the South Yemen. In February 1970, the Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (POLP) was formed as a breakaway movement from the PDFLP.

It is useful to examine the organizational structure and the political goals of the three largest movements, i.e. Al Fatah, the PFLP and the DPFLP. All three of these organizations have deep roots in the refugee camps, in places of work and in the schools.

In every region where refugees are settled Al Fatah has set up a regional committee. Each region is an autonomous entity with its own organization: a political office, an information office and a military office. At grass-roots level, there are cells organized in the fields, the universities and the factories. The regional committees are linked to the centre via three further committees: a refugees committee, responsible for the camps within a given zone, a students committee responsible for all Palestinian students within a given country and a workers committee, responsible for the workers in a region. The regional committees all take part in the work of the central committee.

The political office has executive functions. How many members it has is not known. The military wing of Al Fatah — Al Assifa — has representatives both at the political office and on the central committee. Cadres of the organization receive political and military training at the school for cadres and later exercise both political and military functions. Al Fatah is a national movement with militants drawn from all social classes. Its ideological principles are those it set itself when it was founded in 1956: the only road to the liberation of the homeland is that of revolutionary violence; this violence must be exercised by the masses; its aim must be the liquidation of Zionism in occupied Palestine, whether in its political, its economic or its military form; revolutionary action must not be controlled by parties or states; the struggle will be a long one; it will begin as a Palestinian revolution but will become an Arab

revolution during the course of its development.

Over the years Al Fatah has won recognition for itself as the most important Palestinian organization in Jordan, in Lebanon and internationally. The main difference with other organizations is over relations with Arab governments. Al Fatah will not interfere in the internal affairs of Arab states so long as the latter do not interfere with the armed struggle against Israel for the liberation of the homeland. The organization's medium-term objectives are to avoid a confrontation with the Jordanian regime, to improve its position in southern Lebanon; to bring about conditions in which it is possible to form a National Front with the other resistance organizations against Israel and to prevent the sacrifice of the Palestine resistance by the Arab regimes in a negotiated settlement. Al Fatah has accused other organizations of adventurism and has concentrated exclusively on the defence of the national rights of the Palestinian masses. In no way threatening the existence of the Arab regimes, it has been the only organization to receive substantial financial aid from nearly all of them: from Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

The PFLP shares the daily life of the refugees. One of its schools for cadres is situated in a refugee camp a few miles from Amman. There are approximately 25 Fedayeen for every six or seven thousand refugees. They try to improve material conditions in the camp while at the same time organizing and training the young people to become cadres, capable of controlling the rank and file, of forming and running clandestine cells and of organizing urban and rural guerrilla warfare. Great importance is given, not only to daily physical training, and to the study of various types of arms, but also to the political preparation of cadres. Beginners follow courses on the Palestinian problem: on its history, the present situation and prospects for the future. They study a number of Marxist texts on violence and armed struggle. Later in a second course of studies which like the first one lasts six weeks, attention is given to the problems facing the revolution: the political phase, imperialism and national liberation movements in various countries.

The Front finds support not only in the camps but also amongst the workers and

peasants. The social origin of militants is mixed: workers, poor peasants, intellectuals, students, craftsmen and small tradesmen. About three-quarters are Palestinian. The remainder are Iraqi, Syrian and Lebanese by nationality. First contact with the population is nearly always achieved through the Front's medical services. Some months later groups of Fedayeen are sent to organize a popular militia which as well as strengthening links with the local population also helps in the recruitment of new guerrillas. Strikes and struggles for higher wages have been organized both in factories and on farms although the Front has not succeeded in creating a trade-union movement, a form of political organization which it regards as being very advanced.

The Front's struggle is organized on three fronts. It is directed against imperialism to the extent that this acts as a brake on the development of Arab societies; against Zionism and Israel and against Arab reaction, which, with its links to imperialism is incapable of resolving the fundamental problems of Arab society. The Front is not rich. It is financed mainly by Iraq.

The DPFLP, formed after the split with the PFLP has begun to lay down the basis for its organizational work, for the training of cadres and for mass propaganda. The Front's leaders are mostly students and intellectuals; lower-grade cadres are of modest social origin; grass-roots support comes mainly from the camps. In Front bases (of which there are many in camps in northern Jordan) much care is taken with the political training of militants. Theoretical discussion is always accompanied by analysis of the practical situation. Militants in the Front maintain close links with the population; they help the peasants in the cultivation of the land and teach them to read and write. Although their political programme contains nationalist elements, the main emphasis is on the need for a revolutionary process, moving towards the liberation of the Palestinian people and of all the exploited peoples of the region. This requires a radical change in social and political relations within the Arab world, to be brought about by the workers and peasants rather than by the petty bourgeoisie. (This last aspect of the Front's analysis is one of the main reasons behind its differences with Habash and his Front). Precisely because of this ideology, the DPFLP has been, to some extent, isolated

within the Arab world and has had particular difficulties in finding finance.

#### TOWARDS PALESTINIAN UNITY

From the early months of 1968 onwards, Al Fatah pushed constantly for the formation of a united front including all Palestinian organizations. There were many difficulties, however, these being largely due to differences within individual organizations. There were differences between the PLO and the PLA, the latter continually questioning the political authority of the former. These led to a revolt at the PLO Congress held in July 1968. The most serious divisions were however within the PFLP where those tendencies which were later to lead to splits in the organization were already latent. The first step towards unification was taken with the Palestinian Congress held in February 1969, which, however, the PLA and the PFLP refused to attend on account of the low number of their delegates. The Congress marked a clear victory for Al Fatah with the election of Yasser Arafat to the presidency and of an eleven-man executive committee including 7 Al Fatah representatives, 3 from Saika and one member of the old PLO executive.

This executive committee controlled the following seven departments, one of its members being assigned to each: military affairs, public education and culture, political and international relations, the National Palestinian Fund, social questions, occupied territories, popular organizations (trade unions, students, women, etc.). The PLO has offices and representatives in all Arab countries except Saudi Arabia as well as in the USA, China, Yugoslavia, Switzerland and Great Britain (among others). 103 countries have recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

In April 1969 Palestinian commandos joined together outside the PLO framework in the PASC (Palestinian Armed Struggle Command). The function of the organization was to take on policing duties in southern Lebanon and in Jordan. All the Palestinian organizations participated with the exception of the PFLP. It was only after bloody clashes with the Jordanian army which led in September 1970 to the Battle of Amman that a unified command was established including the PFLP.

Unity between the various Palestinian resistance organizations was made necessary by the extremely tense relations which from 1970 onwards existed between these and the Arab states. Whilst some countries, such as Egypt, took a moderate line both towards the Palestinians and towards Israel, others, such as Jordan, persisted in seeking armed confrontation. Still others, such as Syria and Lebanon, whilst supporting general Palestinian strategy were committed to preventing the launching of military operations against Israel from their territory (southern Lebanon has, in recent years been continuously subject to Israeli bombing of "terrorist bases". Up to October 1973 the relative calm brought about by American moves towards a peaceful solution to the Middle-Eastern conflict was broken periodically by Palestinian organizations such as Black September which sought to prevent any negotiated settlement between Israel and the Arab States which did not take account of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.

#### THE OCTOBER WAR 1973

The October War, despite its brief duration, transformed the balance of power both within the region and between the region and the rest of the world. The most immediate consequences have been felt by Israel, above all in so far as concerns the military balance. Her initial losses and the retreat in Sinai emphasized her military vulnerability; her need for continual supplies of arms from outside showed how far she was dependent on the United States. The USA began a reassessment of the strategic role previously attributed to Israel in the region; links with the Arab world were strengthened and attempts were made to take on an impartial mediatory role.

Within the Arab world the war strengthened existing regimes more than it weakened them. At an international level Arabs won new position for themselves coming out of the war with greater economic and political power than ever. Within the Arab world the war led to a new line-up of forces which differed from that which had existed during Nasser's time. The new axis of power in the Arab world is centred on a grouping of moderate conservative states, in particular Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The "radical" states, which no longer include

Egypt among their number, have been forced since the war either to join the new grouping or else to remain totally outside it, as Iraq and Lybia have done. The principle of Arab unity and revolution, dominant during the Nasser era has been replaced by that of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between states.

This new coalition, reflected in agreements between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Algeria, has attempted to find a political solution to the Middle-Eastern conflict, perhaps being willing to go so far as to give recognition to Israel. The position of high prestige won by the Egyptians and Syrians as a consequence of their direct involvement in the war has led to the isolation of radical forces within the Arab world. The Palestine resistance movement has suffered the worst from this transformation in the regional balance of power, being suddenly faced with the acceptance by the Arab states of those conditions which both the resistance and the Nasserists had, for more than a quarter of a century, rejected. The movement has thus been forced to choose between acceptance of the Arab states' commitment to a political solution based on the recognition of Israel, and the rejection of all attempts at mediation, risking opposition from Arab States and the closing of the door to any negotiated settlement.

#### A NEW DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

Soon after the end of the October War a major debate was opened within the Palestinian resistance organizations. Gradually two distinct positions emerged: one group, led by Al Fatah and the Democratic Popular Front emphasized medium-term objectives, with reference to the Geneva Peace Conference and the creation of a Palestinian state on those territories which might be evacuated by Israel; the other, the so-called "rejection front", led by the PFLP, emphasized the strategic objective of the liberation of all Palestine and was unwilling to pay the price, implicit in the first position, of the recognition of Israel.

In so far as concerns the first position, Hawatmeh, the leader of the DPFLP has declared, "Today the resistance has to choose between two roads: either it can stand aside in a position of passive opposition, by so doing facilitating the American plan to resolve the Middle-Eastern crisis

or, alternatively, it can do all in its powers to oppose the success of the American plan and to prevent the liquidation of the Palestinian problem. On this second hypothesis its objective must be to impose the PLO as the only representative of the Palestinian people and to prevent the fall of the West Bank and Gaza under the control of the Hashemite monarchy. It must insist on the independent existence of our people on whatever territory Israel may evacuate. This independent existence will allow us to continue our struggle against Zionism for the establishment of a democratic state which covers the whole of Palestine".

Habbash, the leader of the PFLP and of the "rejection front" (which also includes the PFLP-General Command and the Arab Liberation Front), has stated: "We are not struggling to win a little piece of land. The PLO cannot take the responsibility of sacrificing the 1948 refugees in order to liberate the inhabitants of territories occupied in 1967".

At the National Palestinian Council, held in Cairo from the 1st to the 9th of June 1974, all the resistance organizations were agreed in adopting a compromise solution. In the 10-point document they approved the "no" to any recognition of, peace with, or laying down of arms against Israel and to any renunciation of the goal of a secular, democratic state was made extremely emphatic. In point 1 "the rejection of Security Council Resolution 242 which ignores the patriotic and national aspirations of the Palestinian People and considers their cause as a refugee problem" was made a condition for PLO participation in peace talks. Point 2 declared that whilst the strategic goal remained the establishment of a democratic state covering the whole of Palestine, the PLO would struggle for the building of an "independent national fighting authority" in any territory evacuated by the Israelis. Point 5 repeated the commitment towards the organization of liberation fronts for those Arab people who recognized the Palestinian programme, beginning with a Jordani-Palestinian Front.

The decision to define a series of intermediate stages before the final liberation of Palestine was mainly the result of the need to prevent the isolation of the Palestinians from negotiations for a peaceful settlement, which were, at that time making considerable progress. Plans for a settlement all lay within the framework of the

American "step by step" approach which aimed to prevent a new conflict by means of separate agreements with the two key states in the Arab world, namely, Egypt and Syria, thus isolating the Palestinians and strengthening the US relative to the Soviet position in the area. The disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt, signed on the 18th of January 1974 and between Israel and Syria, on the 31st of May 1974, followed as they were by Nixon's trip to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel and Jordan, represented an undoubted success for American strategy.

In return for a few territorial concessions and for substantial economic and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, military aid, these countries have proved willing to push the solution of the Palestinian problem into the background. (The problem is not even mentioned in the Israeli-Egyptian agreement). Jordan, directly affected by proposals for a Palestinian "mini-state" tried for her part to reach a disengagement agreement with Israel and to maintain her negotiating position on the West Bank. If the PLO were to be entitled to negotiate the Israeli withdrawal here she would automatically be cut out of the negotiations. In this context American policy achieved a further success with the joint communiqué issued on the 16th of July 1974, after King Hussein's visit to Egypt. Here it was stated that the PLO had the right to represent Palestinians on the West Bank, in Gaza and throughout the Arab world but not those living in Jordan. This went against the resolution of the November 1973 Arab summit at Algiers which deemed the PLO the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

Nonetheless, the June Palestinian Council, by defending the medium-term goals of the Palestinian movement allowed the opening of a dialogue with political forces in the Arab world. Israel, having resumed large-scale bombing over southern Lebanon, proclaimed through Prime Minister Rabin "There will be no withdrawals from occupied territory: Israel will never return to her frontiers of the 4th June 1967 and will never negotiate with the Palestinians except as part of the Jordani delegation. We already have a Jewish state and a Palestinian Jordan; a third state would be a time-bomb". Meanwhile the URSS promised all-round aid to the Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria; Lybia and Syria sided with the Palestinian resistance and proposed the

calling of an Arab summit to foil Jordani-Egyptian manoeuvres. Since this time the political and diplomatic victories of the Palestinian movement have followed each other in rapid succession.

A PLO delegation, led by Yasser Arafat, visited the Soviet Union, won permission for the opening of an office there and support for a seat for the organization at Geneva with the same rights as the other participants. On the 23rd of September, a tripartite conference between Egypt, Syria and the PLO, reaffirmed, despite the Jordani-Egyptian communiqué, that the PLO was the sole representative of the Palestinian people and that as such it had the right, on account of its interest in the West Bank, to take part in the Geneva peace conference. This led to Jordani decision not to attend, taken on the grounds that Jordan was no longer an interested party in the question of the occupied territories. At the same time it caused a split in the PLO. Habbash's FPLP, Gibrel's PFLP-General Command and the Iraq-influenced Arab Liberation Front left the executive committee, refusing all peace negotiation with Israel.

On the 29th of October 1974, the seventh Arab Summit was held at Rabat. The five-point final resolution reaffirmed the right of the Palestinian people to return to their home-land, their right to self-determination and the right of the PLO, in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to institute an independent national authority for all liberated territories. The Arab states accepted an obligation to support this authority, once it had been constituted, in all spheres and at all levels. This was a great diplomatic victory for the Palestinians. On the 14th of October 1974 the UN General Assembly agreed, with 105 votes in favour, 4 against and 20 abstentions, to a Syrian request that the PLO should be invited to the debate on the Middle-East as the representative of the Palestinian people. This was the first time a similar right had been accorded to a national liberation movement. On the 13th of November 1974, Yasser Arafat spoke at the UN, reaffirming the well-known goals of the Palestinian movement without making any significant concession to the US policy of compromise.

Finally, on the 22nd of November 1974, the UN General Assembly passed two resolutions. The first, without mentioning Israel's right to exist, declared the Pa-

lestians' right to return to their homes and lands, from which they had been expelled. Having reaffirmed the fundamental importance of a solution to the Palestinian problem in any settlement of the Middle-Eastern crisis the Assembly appealed to all states and international organizations to help the Palestinian people in its struggle for its rights. The second resolution gave UN observer status to a PLO delegation.

## CONCLUSIONS

Despite the political and diplomatic success of the Palestinian resistance, at the beginning of 1976 there is no clear future prospect.

The American policy of "step by step", which looked as if it had failed in 1975, concluded with the Sinai agreement, between Egypt and Israel, signed on September 1975. This agreement, based largely on separate peace between Egypt and Israel, brought the Middle East situation to an "impasse".

Following this event in the Arab world the division between the two parties was even more profound: on the one side what was considered the "moderate" party (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) and on the other that which became called "rejection front" (Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and a few Palestinian organizations).

The former party favoured any American initiative in the area, while the latter completely opposed any solution which did not consider the rights of the Palestinian people.

The Western Sahara question, marshalling on one side Libya and Algeria and on the other Morocco, provoking serious deterioration in the relationships between Morocco and Algeria, again worsened the division. In this situation, keeping in mind also the fact that the cold war between Egypt and Syria had been aggravated, any collaboration or communal intention results impossible.

The most dangerous consequence of the Sinai agreement is, however, the outbreak of the war still being fought in Lebanon. All contradictions existing in the Arab world have been centred in that one small country. This conflict, which marshalled on one side the right wing Lebanese forces and on the other the left wing forces of the Pale-

stinian resistance, is of a social and political nature. Here the PLO has been forced, yet once more, to defend itself and the thousands of Palestinians present in Lebanon.

Furthermore, the conflict is not limited to the Lebanese reality (dealing with the abolition of the privileges of few families in favour of the majority) but has become a conflict among the moderate Arab forces (wanting to make the Arab world open to Western interests), progressive forces and the Palestinian Resistance (wanting both a laic democratic Lebanon as well as an anti-imperialist Arab world).

The Palestinians living in the occupied territory, seeing in this situation a possible worsening of their own situation, defended their position with strikes and demonstrations during April of 1976, while Israel follows a colonisation policy. The demonstrations of the Palestinian people, lasting for five months, and the repression of the Israelian government (10 killed, hundreds wounded and arrested), indicated the active political presence of the PLO inside the occupied territory. This was confirmed by the great success of the candidates from the PLO in the local elections, held in the occupied territory in April 1976.

In conclusion, the Palestinians appear isolated in the inter-Arab context, while the same contradictions that American and Egyptian policy eluded themselves to have eliminated with separate peace, have come up today in Lebanon. Everything depends on the final outcome of the conflict since, if the Palestinian resistance is able to keep off the offensive, it will be able to give a factual consistency to the legitimacy of its representation of the Palestinian people, and furthermore, confirm yet another time that the Palestinian question is the crux of the Middle East question.

## APPENDIX

### THE PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER

The Palestine National Charter is the constitution of the Palestinians and their most important political document. The first version was compiled on May 1st 1964 (1st Palestinian Congress, Jerusalem); the

version presented here was amended at the Cairo Congress of July 17th, 1968.

1. This Charter shall be known as "the Palestine National Charter".

#### Articles of the Charter:

Article 1. Palestine, the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people, is an inseparable part of the greater Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are a part of the Arab Nation.

Article 2. Palestine, within the frontiers that existed under the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

Article 3. The Palestinian Arab people alone have legitimate rights to their homeland, and shall exercise the right of self-determination after the liberation of their homeland, in keeping with their wishes and entirely of their own accord.

Article 4. The Palestinian identity is an authentic, intrinsic and indissoluble quality that is transmitted from father to son. Neither the Zionist occupation nor the Palestinian Arab people as a result of the afflictions they have suffered can efface this Palestinian identity.

Article 5. Palestinians are Arab citizens who were normally resident in Palestine until 1947. This includes both those who were forced to leave or who stayed in Palestine. Anyone born to a Palestinian father after that date, whether inside or outside Palestine, is a Palestinian.

Article 6. Jews who were normally resident in Palestine up to the beginning of the Zionist invasion are Palestinians.

Article 7. Palestinian identity, and material, spiritual and historical links with Palestine are immutable realities. It is a national obligation to provide every Palestinian with a revolutionary Arab upbringing, and to instill in him a profound spiritual and material familiarity with his homeland and a readiness both for armed struggle and for the sacrifice of his material possessions and his life, for the recovery of his homeland. All available educational means and means of guidance must be enlisted to that end, until liberation is achieved.

Article 8. The Palestinian people is at the stage of national struggle for the liberation of its homeland. For that reason, differences between Palestinian national forces must give way to the fundamental difference that exists between Zionism and

imperialism on the one hand and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On that basis, the Palestinian masses, both as organisations and as individuals, whether in the homeland or in such places as they now live as refugees, constitute a single national front working for the recovery and liberation of Palestine through armed struggle.

Article 9. Armed struggle is the only way of liberating Palestine, and is thus strategic, not tactical. The Palestinian Arab people hereby affirm their unwavering determination to carry on the armed struggle and to press on towards popular revolution for the liberation of and return to their homeland. They also affirm their right to a normal life in their homeland, to the exercise of their right of self-determination therein and to sovereignty over it.

Article 10. Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular war of liberation. This requires that commando action should be escalated, expanded and protected and that all the resources of the Palestinian masses and all scientific potentials available to them should be mobilised and organised to play their part in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires solidarity in national struggle among the different groups within the Palestinian people and between that people and the Arab masses, to ensure the continuity of the escalation and victory of the revolution.

Article 11. Palestinians shall have three slogans: national unity, national mobilisation and liberation.

Article 12. The Palestinian Arab people believe in Arab unity. To fulfill their role in the achievement of that objective, they must, at the present stage in their national struggle, retain their Palestinian identity and all that it involves, work for increased awareness of it and oppose all measures liable to weaken or dissolve it.

Article 13. Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are complementary objectives; each leads to the achievement of the other. Arab unity will lead to the liberation of Palestine, and the liberation of Palestine will lead to Arab unity. To work for one is to work for both.

Article 14. The destiny of the Arab nation, indeed the continued existence of the Arabs, depends on the fate of the Palestinian cause. This interrelationship is the point

of departure of the Arab endeavour to liberate Palestine. The Palestinian people are the vanguard of the movement to achieve this sacred national objective.

Article 15. The liberation of Palestine is a national obligation for the Arabs. It is their duty to repel the Zionist and imperialist invasion of the greater Arab homeland and to liquidate the Zionist presence in Palestine. The full responsibility for this belongs to the peoples and governments of the Arab nation and to the Palestinian people first and foremost.

For this reason, the task of the Arab nation is to enlist all the military, human, moral and material resources at its command to play an effective part, along with the Palestinian people, in the liberation of Palestine. Moreover, it is the task of the Arab nation, particularly at the present stage of the Palestinian armed revolution, to offer the Palestinian people all possible material aid and manpower support, and to place at their disposal all the means and opportunities that will enable them to continue to perform their role as the vanguard of their armed revolution until the liberation of their homeland is achieved.

Article 16. On the spiritual plane, the liberation of Palestine will establish in the Holy Land an atmosphere of peace and tranquility in which all religious institutions will be safeguarded and freedom of worship and the right of visit guaranteed to all without discrimination or distinction of race, colour, language or creed. For this reason, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the world for support.

Article 17. On the human plane, the liberation of Palestine will restore to the Palestinians their dignity, integrity and freedom. For this reason, the Palestinian Arab people look to all those who believe in the dignity and freedom of man for support.

Article 18. On the international plane, the liberation of Palestine is a defensive measure dictated by the requirements of self-defence. This is why the Palestinian people, who seek to win the friendship of all peoples, look for the support of all freedom, justice and peace-loving countries in restoring the legitimate state of affairs in Palestine, establishing security and peace in it and enabling its people to exercise national sovereignty and freedom.

Article 19. The partition of Palestine,

which took place in 1947, and the establishment of Israel, are fundamentally invalid, however long they last, for they contravene the will of the people of Palestine and their natural right to their homeland and contradict the principles of the United Nations Charter, foremost among which is the right of self-determination.

Article 20. The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate Instrument, and all their consequences, are hereby declared null and void. The claim of historical or spiritual links between the Jews and Palestine is neither in conformity with historical fact nor does it satisfy the requirements for statehood. Judaism is a revealed religion; it is not a separate nationality, nor are the Jews a single people with a separate identity; they are citizens of their respective countries.

Article 21. The Palestinian Arab people, expressing themselves through the Palestinian armed revolution, reject all alternatives to the total liberation of Palestine. They also reject all proposals for the liquidation or internationalisation of the Palestine problem.

Article 22. Zionism is a political movement that is organically linked with world imperialism and is opposed to all liberation movement or movements for progress in the world. The Zionist movement is essentially fanatical and racist; its objectives involve aggression, expansion and the establishment of colonial settlements, and its methods are those of the Fascists and the Nazis. Israel acts as cat's paw for the Zionist movement, a geographic and manpower base for world imperialism and a springboard for its thrust into the Arab homeland to frustrate the aspirations of the Arab nation to liberation, unity and progress. Israel is a constant threat to peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Inasmuch as the liberation of Palestine will eliminate the Zionist and imperialist presence in that country and bring peace to the Middle East, the Palestinian people look for support to all liberals and to all forces of good, peace and progress in the world, and call on them, whatever their political convictions, for all possible aid and support in their just and legitimate struggle to liberate their homeland.

Article 23. The demands of peace and security and the exigencies of right and justice require that all nations should regard Zionism as an illegal movement and outlaw it and its activities, out of conside-

ration for the ties of friendship between people and for the loyalty of citizens to their homelands.

Article 24. The Palestinian Arab people believe in justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity and the right of peoples to enjoy them.

Article 25. In pursuance of the objectives set out in this charter, the Palestine Liberation Organisation shall perform its proper role in the liberation of Palestine to the full.

Article 26. The Palestine Liberation Organisation, as the representative of the forces of the Palestinian revolution, is responsible for the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people to regain, liberate and return to their homeland and to exercise the right of self-determination in that homeland, in the military, political and financial fields, and for all else that the Palestinian cause may demand, both at Arab and international levels.

Article 27. The Palestine Liberation Organisation shall cooperate with all Arab countries, each according to its means, maintaining a neutral attitude *vis-à-vis* these countries in accordance with the requirements of the battle of liberation, and on the basis of that factor. The Organisation shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab country.

Article 28. The Palestinian Arab people hereby affirm the authenticity and independence of their national revolution and reject all forms of interference, tutelage or dependency.

Article 29. The Palestinian Arab people have the legitimate and prior right to liberate and recover their homeland, and shall define their attitude to all countries and forces in accordance with the attitude adopted by such countries and forces to the cause of the Palestinian people and with the extent of their support for that people in their revolution to achieve their objective.

Article 30. Those who fight or bear arms in the battle of liberation form the nucleus of the popular army which will shield the achievements of the Palestinian Arab people.

Article 31. The organisation shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance and an anthem, to be decided in accordance with appropriate regulations.

Article 32. Regulations, to be known as

Basic Regulations for the Palestine Liberation Organisation, shall be appended to this Charter. These regulations shall define the structure of the Organisation, its bodies and institutions, and the powers, duties and obligations of each of them, in accordance with this Charter.

Article 33. This Charter may only be amended with a majority of two thirds of the total number of members of the National Assembly of the Palestine Liberation Organisation at a special meeting called for that purpose.

## II. INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

### PAN-ARABISM AND THE ARAB LEAGUE

Solidarity between the Arab countries has profound roots at an ideological level. As a movement of thought Pan-Arabism has developed in parallel with the re-awakening of nationalism. Many theorists of the Arab renaissance, as well as currents of political opinion and political parties (e.g. the Ba'ath) believe that the idea of common nationhood should be applied less to individual states within the Arab world, formed as a consequence of historical accident, in particular as a result of colonialism, as to the Arab nation in its entirety, to those peoples of Arab culture, between the Atlantic and the Gulf, who, at the time of their greatest splendour were united, not only by Islam and by a common language but also by a common political and legal system.

In more recent times the principle of unity between the Arab countries has been realized in the Arab League. Signed in Cairo on the 22nd of March 1945, the pact establishing the organization resembles more a classical alliance between sovereign states than an agreement designed to set up some kind of supranational authority. In the beginning seven states joined the League, namely Egypt, Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon, Transjordan (now Jordan) Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. The choice of Cairo for the headquarters of the organization, the fact that the Secretary-General is always an Egyptian, Egypt's dominant position in the financing of the League and in its decision-making has meant that too frequently the latter has appeared as an instrument of Egyptian policy.

If one considers the inability of the League, during the 1940's and 1950's, not only to define a common line on problems, crucial to the Arab states (the Israeli wars, relations with the great powers, the choice between alliance with the West and non-alignment etc.) but even to avoid occasionally armed conflicts between its members, doubts may be nurtured as to its efficacy. States, in particular Egypt and Iraq, have acted as competing poles of interest. When, after Nasser's revolution, Egypt began to follow policies, judged by the Western powers as contrary to their interests, Britain and the United States attempted to build an alliance around Iraq to oppose that same Egyptian hegemony, which until 1945 they had implicitly supported. This led to the splitting of the League into two opposed blocs. Formally speaking however its strength continued to grow as Arab states which had recently won independence during decolonization joined, even though their adherence was subsequent to their attaining independence: Libya (1953), Sudan (1956), Algeria (1962), South Yemen (1968), Bahrain, Oman and Qatar (1971), the Union of Arab Emirates (1972), bringing the number of member states to eighteen. Palestine also has a guaranteed place. The Charter lays down that until full independence is won the Council of the League will be responsible for deciding on Palestinian representation. Two further countries, Mauritania and Somalia, which despite the Islam religion and ethno-historical links to the Arab world, have always been considered as belonging to Africa south of the Sahara have recently been admitted to the League (in 1973 and 1974 respectively).

Within the League and in line with its general policy, there have been many attempts to rebuild at least partially the unity of the Arab nation. The largest-scale experiment took place between 1958 and 1961 with the institution of the United Arab Republic (UAR): a merger of Syria and Egypt into a single country with a common government, administration and capital. The Syrian-Egyptian union had had illustrious precedents in Islamic history and that of the Arab empire. Nonetheless, it proved in practice to be ill-adapted to the divergencies which existed between the two societies and to the fact that the Egyptian ruling class was totally foreign to Syria (even though it seems to have been the Syrian government which convinced Nasser to take this step, it was Egypt which absorbed

Syria as an Egyptian province). In the same year of 1958, (on the 8th of March) the Yemen joined the UAR, leading to the creation of the Union of Arab States, dissolved in December 1961, and before it had become a practical reality after the Syrian secession.

Alternatively the unity of the Arab Nation could be built around "Greater Syria" or the Fertile Crescent. Several versions exist of this ideal, beloved of the Hashimite dynasty (the dynasty founded by Hussein, ex-sheriff of Mecca, who in 1916, on the outbreak of the anti-Turkish revolt, became the self-proclaimed "king of the Arabs" and whose power in Jordan and Iraq was consolidated with British help after World War I. Its substance is the complimentarity which exists between Jordan, Syria, the Lebanon and possibly, in the future, Palestine and Iraq. The Federation of Arab States, founded on the 14th of February 1958 by Jordan and Iraq and dissolved "*de facto*" in July of the same year following the military *coup d'état* which overthrew the Iraq monarchy represented a variation on this theme, clearly designed to compete with the UAR.

Quite apart from institutional agreements such as the above, it is necessary to consider more self-evidently political alliances. In the absence of better defined goals these have usually centred on a common commitment against colonialism and neo-colonialism. Egypt, especially, has attempted to divide, even conceptually, progressive, non-aligned countries from conservative regimes linked to the Western powers. This has been at the cost of damage to Arab solidarity, indeed of confrontations between states and interference in the internal affairs of regimes in the opposite camp to her own. The line of division between the two camps has never been clear and has been defined in accordance with considerations of expediency. In general however Egypt has favoured Algeria, Syria and Iraq and also on occasion the Yemen, South Yemen, Sudan and Lybia. The definition of a compact group of so-called "liberated" countries (by which Nasser implied that other countries remained to some extent dependent on those historically responsible for colonialism) was not illogical. Nonetheless divergences and contrasts of view were to emerge even within this group. After the military *coup d'état* against the Imam in the Yemen (in September 1962) the opposition between "left-wing" republics and

"feudal" monarchies degenerated into open warfare between the leaders of the two sides, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, waged both directly and by proxy. Fearing an infectious spread of "revolution" over the Arabian peninsula, Saudi Arabia decided to resist, encouraging the royalists to engage in drawn-out guerrilla warfare. Determined to defend a regime of Nasserist officers, Egypt sent an expeditionary force which reached sixty thousand men.

This policy, which gave greater importance to the revolution than to Arab unity, was abandoned when Nasser inaugurated the calling of inter-Arab summits. Inter-Arab is a more accurate term than pan-Arab. The declared aim of these conferences was to permit a policy of coexistence between the Arab states based on their individuality and sovereignty. This implied nothing in terms of the ultimate unification of the Arab world. Despite the civil war in the Yemen this "horizontal" inter-Arab unity prevailed over the idea of a politically based union. Given the interests of her ruling classes, Egypt was forced to consider a connection and possibly an agreement with the monarchic forces in the Arab world.

## THE ARAB SUMMITS

The first summit of the series was held in Cairo from the 13th to the 16th of January 1964. All thirteen of the member states of the Arab League took part; all, with the exception of Lybia and the Lebanon, were represented by their respective heads of state. Nasser had proposed the summit in response to pressure from those who accused Egypt of seeking to avoid her responsibilities as the most important of the "front-line" Arab states facing Israel. The conference was to settle internal differences among the Arabs and to prepare a "political" response to Israel. The immediate problem which had led to its being called was that of the Jordan headwaters. It reviewed the principal problems faced by the Arab world and reached compromise agreements on policy. These were to a large extent dictated by Egypt, especially in matters concerning relations with Israel. Here she sought to avoid a war which, in the situation at the time, she knew the Arab world could only lose. The Confe-

rence thus limited itself to the preparation of its own plan for the Jordan, to be used as a bargaining counter against the Israelis. Between the Arabs the general atmosphere was conciliatory. Nonetheless, although many old disputes between Jordan and the UAR, Morocco and the UAR, Morocco and Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, were resolved, these first moves did not succeed in solving the problem of the Yemen.

In the friendly atmosphere which followed the January 1964 summit the Arab governments succeeded in agreeing on the setting up of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, overcoming opposition from Jordan which was bound to see a threat to her territorial integrity in the concept (and still more in the establishment) of a Palestinian Arab State.

The second summit was held in the same year, from the 5th of September to the 11th. All thirteen countries were represented. Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia and the Lebanon however sent lower level delegations. Attention was concentrated on the Israeli question: on how to support the newly constituted Palestine Liberation Organization and on the response to Israeli plans to divert the Jordan headwaters. Proposals were on the table to give concrete form to the Arab army, which already existed on paper, under command of the Egyptian Marshall, Ali Amer. No government was however prepared to accept "foreign" troops on its territory, the inevitable consequence of the establishment of a genuinely integrated army. Continuing deep differences between Arab governments were at the root of the deadlock. There was the suspicion that a single Arab command could support subversive action against regimes to which it was opposed. Those governments which took up the most intransigent positions against a collective defence system were also those most threatened: namely Jordan and the Lebanon. Syria, however, was also hostile to the idea. Fears (by Lebanon and Syria) that the beginning of work on the Jordan headwaters could provoke an Israeli attack led the Arab states to postpone the execution of their counter-plan. In the same way as at the Cairo summit in January, the Egyptian government worked to encourage a return to realism among the other Arab states. Its intention of putting aside "advanced" programmes, both in so far as concerned the revolution and the liberation of Palestine, to concentrate on the econo-

mic, political and military strengthening of the Arab world, was confirmed.

One result of the new atmosphere among the Arab states was the signature (on the 26th of May 1964) of a preparatory agreement for union between the UAR and Iraq. This ephemeral return to a policy of unification (the last manifestation of which had occurred in 1963 with a plan for a tripartite union between the UAR, Syria and Iraq) was, like the attempt with Lybia ten years later, to be void of practical consequence.

The 1965 summit (held at Casablanca from the 13th to the 17th of September) was dominated by violently differing reactions to Bourghiba's plan to attempt a "peaceful" settlement of the historic rivalry with Israel. Nasser rejected the Tunisian president's plan. (The latter sought to negotiate on the basis of the UN plan for the partition of Palestine, adopted in distant 1947). The Pan-Arab conference also declared against it. Tunisia (threatened with expulsion from the League) was absent from Casablanca and was thus unable to repeat or elaborate on the proposal; which, more than any in the past, had broken Arab unity on the Israeli question. The final communiqué was, in the part concerning Israel, rather vague, in line, to some extent, with the policy of the golden mean (between conciliation and extremism) supported by the Egyptian President, Nasser.

Again during the Casablanca conference, the concern to build a more solid basis for Arab unity led (on the 15th of September) to the signing of the so-called "Arab solidarity" pact. To give a greater solemnity to the agreement, the Arab governments agreed to make it an additional protocol to the Charter of the Arab League. The Pact commits its signatories to respect the governments of other Arab countries, to avoid any, even indirect, interference in the internal affairs of another Arab country and to cease any form of propaganda against other Arab countries. Such an agreement might seem redundant. It represented however the abandonment by those governments, of which Nasser's was the first, which had always declared themselves to have a mission to the Arab nation, of their revolutionary pan-Arab ideals. It represented a recognition of the status quo, respect for "diversity", the rejection of attempts to accelerate the course of history.

These were the principles which lay behind the bilateral agreement signed by Nasser and the new Saudi sovereign, King Feisal, at Gedda on the 24th of August of the same year. It was of little importance that the agreement was, in practice, never applied. The mere fact of its existence was significant. Egypt accepted a pact with the sovereign of the leading state in the opposing bloc; she accepted a procedure for pacification which, in the guise of the "right of self-determination" of the Yemeni people, might halt the progress of the revolution — a further proof of the new priorities assigner respectively to Arab unity and revolution.

The truce was however only apparent. The "reactionary" monarchies continued in their aim of isolating "the revolution", at the same time the "progressive" regimes were bound to continue to see the former on account of their international posture, as their enemies. When, at the end of 1965, King Feisal agreed to an Islamic pact, headed by Hassan II of Morocco and including the Shah of Iran it could be seen that the days of "peaceful coexistence" between Arab countries with different regimes were numbered. The traditional regimes lifted the banner of Pan-Islamicism against that of militant Pan-Arabism. In July 1966 Nasser, under "provocation" because of the radical policy adopted by Syria since the taking of power by the left-wing of the Ba'ath and disappointed by the poor response received by his policy in Tunisia and Saudi Arabia announced that on account of the impossibility of working with "reactionary Arab forces", Egypt would take no part in the Pan-Arab conference, due to be held at Algiers. She would carry on the struggle for the liberation of Palestine by "revolutionary, non-traditional methods". The Algiers conference, which should have met in September, was postponed sine die. Without stating this explicitly, Nasser was returning to his original analysis. The battle against imperialism within the Arab world became once again the basis of policy. Without this precondition the slow work of rebuilding the political, diplomatic, economic and military strength of the Arab world for the final confrontation with Israel would prove to have been illusiory.

Nasser's policy was a long-term one. However a series of events between the end of 1966 and spring 1967 (the UAR-Sy-

rian defence agreement, Palestine commando operations in Israel, Israeli reprisals in Jordan, tension between Syria and Israel) dragged him towards what was to go down in history as the "Six-day War".

#### AFTER THE SIX-DAY WAR

The June 1967 war changed the whole face of the Middle-East. Inter-Arab relations were completely transformed, this being at least partially due to the influence of Palestinian nationalism which before the war despite occasional protection from individual Arab governments had rarely been able to come into the open. The war itself seems to have broken out as a result of improved solidarity within the Arab bloc, (this appears to be especially true if the course of events preceding the fighting are examined from an Israeli point of view). The improvement, on Egyptian initiative, in relations between Jordan, Syria and Egypt (the countries which in the past had been most involved in the military confrontation with Israel) seems to have been especially important. After the war, the tendency was towards a closer grouping of the Arab states, including those not directly involved in the Israeli conflict. However the opening of an essential Palestinian dimension to the Middle-Eastern question increased the possibility of new splits occurring. Palestinian territory was occupied not only by Israel but also by Arab states. Significantly the nadir in inter-Arab solidarity was reached in 1970 during the military operation mounted by King Hussein's army against cadres of the Palestinian resistance.

In the immediate period following the June war there was a reel of summit meetings between Arab leaders. Cairo was the main centre. On the 15th of June, Atassi, the Syrian president, visited Egypt proceeding the next day to Algeria. On the 10th of July, Nasser, Boumedienne and Hussein met in Cairo. On the 11th, the Iraqi president, Aref, arrived first meeting Nasser alone and then on the 13th, Boumedienne and Atassi, both of whom had just returned from a meeting in Damascus. The president of Sudan arrived at the end of these consultations and thence forward attempted to play a more important role in the Arab-Israeli struggle. Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Iraq and Algeria were agreed on the necessity of taking all necessary "mea-

asures to annul the consequences of Israeli aggression" and formed the main front against Israel, a front which appeared as a reconstituted version of the old grouping of "liberated" Arab states and was thus, to some extent decisive.

Nonetheless, there was still room for united action. A meeting of Arab League foreign ministers, held in Kuwait on the 18th of June, was immediately adjourned to await decisions by the United Nations General Assembly. The agenda included a proposal to boycott oil supplies to Britain and the United States, accused of having aided Israel during the War. On the 4th of June, the eve of hostilities, a meeting of Arab oil-producing states at Baghdad had resolved to cut off sales of oil to any state which committed acts of aggression against an Arab state or which aided Israel. "Aggression" was defined as "any direct or indirect attack on an Arab state or the offer to aid Israel in any way".

The Arab foreign ministers met again in Khartoum on the 1st of August. The conference lasted until the 6th. The final communique was evasive. It is known however that the Arab states rejected any idea of peace with Israel. The United States was attacked from all sides. Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Libya tried to act as a moderating influence against pressure from Iraq and Syria. The conference also served as an opportunity for Egypt to propose an agreement with Saudi Arabia to settle the Yemen conflict. This was to follow the lines of the 1965 Gedda agreement which had never been applied.

Khartoum was again the site for a further summit conference (held from the 29th of August to the 3rd of September 1967) which defined the Arab states' position towards Israeli. The summit gave "three no's": no to the recognition of Israel, no to direct negotiations with Israel, no to peace with Israel. (Some of those present nonetheless interpreted the Arab used here as being in some way conciliatory, leaving the way open in practice to an end to the conflict and to the cessation of hostilities). Of the 13 members of the Arab League, eight were represented at the highest possible level (Egypt by Nasser, Jordan by King Hussein, Saudi Arabia by King Feisal, Iraq by Aref, Yemen by Sallal, the Lebanon by H elou, Kuwait by sheik as-Sabak and Sudan by President Azhari). The politically motivated absence of President Boumedienne of

Algeria and President Atassi of Syria showed the two resident's disapproval of the course taken by Arab strategy. Syria claimed that she was taking no part in the conference (although a Syrian minister was in fact present). King Hassan of Morocco, King Idris of Lybia and President Bourghiba of Tunisia (all of whom travelled only rarely in this period) were also absent. Apart from the definition of policy towards Israel the most important decision on inter-Arab relations taken by the conference was the institution of a system whereby the oil-producing states gave aid to the countries which had suffered most in the war. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Lybia contributed £50m, £55m and £30m respectively, £95m going to Egypt and £40m to Jordan.

The institution of this system had obvious political overtones. With the exception of Iraq and Algeria, the two countries most concerned with oil wealth to accelerate development, not here among the donors, the oil producers could all be counted at least among the conservative, if not among the reactionary states of the Arab world. Their donations must inevitably be seen as mortgaging the chances of the general liberation struggle. Although their influence was never explicit it was nonetheless of considerable importance. The radical states had succeeded in bringing oil into Arab strategy. Nonetheless the balance of power with the west remained unchanged; meanwhile the oil producers (in particular the oil producers of the Arabian peninsula) had won for themselves a voice in Palestinian affairs.

After Khartoum two years passed before the next Arab summit, again dominated by the question of Israel. The summit had been prepared at a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo (from the 8th to the 10th of November 1969) at which all the member states of the Arab League were present with the exception of Tunisia. There had also been a meeting between Nasser and King Feisal. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, once hostile, were now moving towards agreement. This was the prelude to the formation of a coalition which several years later, was to change the balance of power in the Arab world completely.

The summit was held in Rabat from the 21st to the 22nd of December 1969. All Arab League members, including Tunisia, were present. Yasser Arafat, who as head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, was rapidly winning acceptance as the main Pa-

lestinian nationalist leader, was also there. Among Arab heads of state only Aref (Iraq), Bourguiba (Tunisia) and Atassi (Syria) were absent.

From the moment the conference began there were polemics between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen. When Nasser left the conference hall in protest against the hesitations of other states in committing themselves militarily and financially to the final battle against Israel, it seemed as if the summit would end in disaster. Even though the Egyptian president was persuaded to return, the conference failed to reach any agreement. Nasser's protest was no mere gesture. It was a sign that he was beginning to doubt the utility of directing his policy towards the Arab world in general and that he sought to establish better defined relationships. This had become a credible alternative for the first time since 1967 when a few months previously (on the 1st of September) a revolution had established a Nasser's regime in Lybia (an important oil-producer). Could Egypt now escape the influence which Kuwait and Saudi Arabia exercised with their wealth over her policy?

In 1970, continuing her tactics of "separate" alliances, Egypt, which had established a preferential agreement with Lybia and Sudan, called a meeting in Cairo of those countries involved in the "confrontation with Israel": Egypt herself, Jordan, Syrian, Iraq (invited despite her lack of a common frontier with Israel, on account of her troops in Jordan) and Sudan (which was integrated into the Egyptian defence system and had troops stationed on the canal). There was however no way out of the contradiction between the two separate approaches: reliance on those which used to be termed the "liberated countries" (i.e. a political definition of allies) or alternatively, on solidarity between the countries with a military commitment against Israel. This however would mean alliance with Jordan which would both upset the political balance within the coalition and, more seriously, as could be seen after the Battle of Amman in September 1970, exclude the Palestinian movements.

The offensive launched by Hussein and his Arab Legion represented a sad chapter in the history of Arab solidarity, and a severe test. The Palestine Liberation Organisation and, to an even greater extent, Al Fatah, tended to act in Jordan as a state within a state with its own army, police

and loyalties. The Israelis threatened intervention if Hussein refused to "clean up" the Palestinians himself. Nonetheless, however justified the Amman court might have been, there remained the fact that an Arab army had waged open war on the Palestinians, that is to say on those considered more and more as the vanguard of the "Arab revolution". Hussein was defending Jordan's territorial integrity and indirectly his own power. He was at the same time, however, defending Israeli interests. The Jewish state had everything to fear from the presence of a compact guerrilla organization across the Jordan. His action went too obviously against the general line of Arab strategy not to arouse bitter opposition. This however was not the only reaction. Jordan was part of, and the Arab states were not yet ready to question, the status quo. This simple fact was ultimately to work in Hussein's favour.

The great powers, at one in treating the Middle-Eastern problem as a "controlled crisis", acted so as not to favour the Palestinians, the US by the discreet threat of military intervention, the USSR by dissuading Syria from a military demonstration on the Jordani frontier. Nasser finally exhausted himself in the work of mediation between Hussein and Yasser Arafat (dying on the 28th of September 1970 a few days after having convinced the two leaders to agree to a truce). More importantly he exhausted any hopes which might have remained of organizing the battle for the liberation of Palestine with a minimum of ideological coherency, at least towards the Arab states.

Jordan did not abandon her aim of "liquidating" the Palestinian resistance. There were further attacks by Hussein's armed forces in 1971. The other Arab governments simply made official protests (Egypt), closed their frontiers with the Hashemite regime (Syria and Iraq), or broke off diplomatic relations with Amman (Lybia, Algeria and later Syria). On the 30th of July 1971, Lybia called a conference at which Jordan was to be accused of following a policy "in contradiction with the supreme interests of the Arab nation". The invitation was accepted by Syria, Egypt and the two Yemens. Even here however proposals to break off all relations with Hussein, to expel Jordan from the Arab League and others which did not exclude a joint Arab

intervention in Jordan, failed to win approval. Egypt and Saudi Arabia returned to the task of mediation between Jordan, Syria and the Palestian resistance, showing in this way those Arab and international political interests which lay behind the evolution of the situation.

#### THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1973 WAR

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the fourth since the founding of the Jewish state in 1948, began and ended very differently from the previous three. If we exclude the 1948-49 war, which in any case ended with a gradual, ineluctable Arab collapse, it was the first time the Arabs had opened hostilities. The advantage of surprise enabled the Egyptian and Syrian armies to win important early successes on the battle-field which they were able to exploit despite an Israeli counter-offensive beyond the 1967 ceasefire line and the loss of some territory. Here we are more concerned with the political background to the conflict than with its immediate military results. The Arabs were able to make their surprise attack only because of a change in the pattern of Inter-Arab relations, which had in turn, between 1971 and 1973, been reflected in the Middle-Eastern policies of the superpowers, i.e. in the international environment.

This was largely due to changes within Egypt, the main pole of influence in the Arab world. Less than a year after the death of Nasser, the regime there went through its first internal crisis with the ousting in May 1971 of a group summarily defined as the "Nasserist left". The USSR felt that by forcing Egypt to sign a bilateral friendship and cooperation treaty Soviet interests would be safeguarded. A year later, however, in July 1972, relations between Moscow and Cairo deteriorated further when President Sadat requested the withdrawal of Soviet military advisors stationed in Egypt.

This was no isolated incident. The whole Arab world was changing. Sometimes openly, sometimes less openly, the reputedly "socialist" or "progressive" Arab governments had drawn closer to the United States. This reversal of a previously unquestioned anti-American line, dating back to 1955 or 1956 was clearly determined by internal political considerations. It was as

if those classes responsible either directly or through the military for the "revolutionary" options of the 1950's and 1960's now considered their objectives (a fuller recognition of national independence, the removal of foreign bases, the nationalization of the most important foreign financial and industrial interests, etc.) to have been achieved and were thus ready to follow a policy of stabilization rather than one of reform. The Sadat government in Egypt, the Assad government in Syria and others like them included the Israeli factor in these political calculations. Despite the widespread view that it was the USSR which had gained most from the stalemate in the Middle-East following the 1967 war the Arab governments realized that from that quarter they could hope for neither political nor military help in breaking out of the "no peace, no war" situation. The new line could be justified finally by the need to avoid being dragged by the actions and above all by the programme of the Palestine Liberation Organization (which aimed at a break down in relations between states, peoples and classes not only in Israel but also in the Arab world) into a policy, the consequences of which could not be foreseen.

With hindsight, one can see that Gheddafi's Libya, although its role appeared at the time to be marginal, was, or could have been, the key to the whole situation. The Libyan president assumed the role of Nasser's heir and successor, the champion of Pan-Arabism, the guardian of a particular concept of the Arab revolution. Lybia was lacking in Egypt's economic and military strength and had a much smaller population. This, however, could prove to be an advantage, for nothing prevented her from throwing her massive petrol wealth into the battle. Gheddafi's offer to Sadat for "organic union" with Egypt was a proposal to do just this, to give new strength to Nasserism, with all that ideology had meant in the past, in the service of the Palestinian and the broader Arab cause. Sadat however could not accept the offer. The class for which consciously or unconsciously he was speaking did not believe in Gheddafi's ideals.

From 1969 onwards Libya left no stone unturned in her attempts to persuade the other Arab states to resume progress towards Arab unity. On the 27th of Decem-

ber 1969, Gheddafi, Nasser and Nimeiri signed the Tripoli Charter intended as a first step towards the unification of Lybia, Egypt and Sudan. In November 1970, after Nasser's death, the Libyan president met Sadat and Nimeiri in order to reconfirm this commitment. In the same month he persuaded Syria to sign the Charter. The new United Arab Republic was to have four members. In April 1971 the news came from Benghazi that there were only to be three — Sudan had decided to take her time in order not to complicate relations with black Africa when a solution to her Southern problem was in sight. The Confederation of Arab Republics was founded in Damascus on the 20th of August 1971. However, despite a referendum on the 1st of September, which gave massive majorities in its favour, the tripartite union remained a paper creation. On the 2nd of August, Gheddafi persuaded Sadat to accept the principle of total union between Libya and Egypt, to be achieved before the 1st of September 1973. It was in order to remind the Egyptian government of its commitment that in May of that year he organized the famous "March for Unity" Sadat's alliance policy was now however turned in other directions. Although he said he was sure that "union between Egypt and Libya is inevitable, even at the price of a civil war", Gheddafi was obliged to admit his failure. The idea of turning to Tunisia and the signature in January 1974 of an agreement for complete union between the two countries was a pointless delayed reprisal against Egypt. It could no longer affect the balance of power.

The timing was not a coincidence. Whilst Gheddafi was calling on Egypt to respect the deadlines fixed for Arab unity, Sadat was preparing for war against Israel. In his planning however did not cooperate with the Libya president who more than any other leader preached the use of force to restore the Palestinians to their national heritage, but with Feisal, who like Sadat thought less about the Palestinians and more about the recovery of territory lost in 1967. For the sake of completeness, Sadat's plan required the cooperation of King Hussein. It was however a pre-condition for any "recovery" of territory on the Jordan that agreement be first reached on the Palestinian Arab state which was to occupy it. For this reason Jordan stayed out of the war. Nevertheless, a few weeks before the out-

break of fighting Hussein took part in a meeting with Assad and Sadat and was certainly aware of the preparations which were going on. A period of tension in relations between Jordan, Syria and Egypt had been closed.

Inter-Arab relations in 1973 took exactly the opposite course to the one they had taken between 1965 and 1966. At that time a series of summit meetings failed to prevent a growing split between the conservative-monarchical and the progressive-republican blocs. Now Saudi Arabia and Egypt were attempting to agree directly between themselves, without the mediation of third parties. The Lybian revolution would have led to the victory of the "Nasserites". Instead Sadat rejected Gheddafi (and all that a Lybian alliance could have meant) in favour of Feisal. A new chapter had been opened in Arab history. The state which had once been the most vigorous proponent of the nationalist revolution in the Arab world and which had been responsible for the anti-imperialist interpretation of Pan-Arabism was reconciled with the standard-bearer of legitimism, with a state which between the two wings of Arab nationalism preferred the Islamic fundamentalist approach. The building of this alliance as essential if the war against Israel was to be waged and won (or, as a minimum, if a repetition of the disastrous defeats of 1956 and 1967 was to be avoided). This time the United States was unable to prevent the Arabs from striking first. The advantage it derived was a real one.

Saudi Arabia's joining the coalition of Arab states directly committed against Israel enabled Egypt to re-establish communications with the United States. (Vice versa, it enabled the Americans, who continued to supply Israel with all the arms she needed, to control developments in the Arab camp). It also meant that the "oil weapon" could be used to full effect for the furtherance of Arab goals. It should be mentioned in passing that these changes had implications far outside the sphere of Inter-Arab relations. The Saudi-Egyptian axis was probably strengthened by tacit support from Algeria, which in September 1973 had won approval at the conference of non-aligned states for its policy of joint Arab-African action based on the use of the oil weapon against Israel and the West in the event of a war of "reparation".

The Yom Kippur war, unlike the Six-day War, strengthened the Arab states with respect to the Palestinian guerrilla movement. Only well organized, efficient states could claim to compete with Israel in the waging of modern warfare, fought with ever more sophisticated weaponry. Nonetheless, the Palestinian resistance was now, more than ever, a political reality which none could ignore. Even the enemies of the resistance could not avoid taking it into consideration as a factor in any political solution.

After 1973 inter-Arab discussions were centred on the line to be followed in view of a political settlement. In December 1973 Arabs and Israelis sat at the same table at the Geneva Peace Conference. This in itself was unprecedented. The aim of the talks was to find a solution which in one way or another would imply the acceptance by the Arab countries of the existence of a Jewish state in the heart of the Arab nation. This meant the renunciation of the whole theory of "Arab rejection" of Israel. To be carried out between the Arabs on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis. (It would be impossible to record all the meetings between Arab leaders in 1973 and 1974). In November 1973 at Algiers and about a year later in Rabat the members of the Arab League gave their interpretation of what was really involved in a "political solution". They laid down the conditions in which this would be possible. In particular they attempted to reconcile the existence of Israel with the national rights of the Palestinian people.

All the Arab countries with the exception of Iraq and Libya "which disapproved of Egypt and Syria's policy) were represented at the Algiers conference (which took place from the 26th to the 28th of November 1973). The choice of Algiers for the meeting which had, at least to modify the "three no's" of the 1967 Khartoum conference, was, given the city's credentials as the revolutionary centre of the Third World, a clever one. In practice the Arabs accepted the peace programme which, theoretically under joint Soviet-American guidance — in fact under that of the United States — had emerged after the Six-day War. Egypt and Syria were authorized to sign a military disengagement treaty with Israel. The only condition was that they should ascertain the compatibility of any such treaty with the ultimate objec-

tives of the Arab cause. For the Arabs the two "supreme and unnegotiable" conditions for a just peace in the Middle-East were the withdrawal of the Israelis from all territory occupied in 1967 including Jerusalem and the re-establishment of the national rights of the Palestinian people (represented by the PLO).

The delays entailed by Kissinger's step-by-step approach prevented the implementation of the Algiers programme. After the first disengagement agreement in Sinai and the Israeli-Syrian agreement over the Golan Heights, work at the Geneva Conference, the natural forum for a search for a "global solution" to the problem, ground to a halt. Egypt was at pains to show she had no desire for a separate peace. On the West Bank, there was no prospect of a military disengagement agreement, still less of any recognition by Israel of Palestinian national rights. At the end of 1974, after the meeting had already been postponed on a number of occasions, the Arab States finally met at Rabat (from the 26th to the 29th of October) to consider the situation.

The main change in the old Algiers policy concerned the Palestinians. The Arab League recognized the status of the PLO as the sole official representative of Palestine and the Palestinians and proclaimed the organization's right to establish an independent national entity covering all liberated territory. Jordan was thus deprived of her potential sovereignty over any West Bank territory which might be returned by Israel. This may appear to have been a defeat for King Hussein (and it is in this way that it has been interpreted in speeches by Israeli leaders, who deny the feasibility of a third state in the area historically covered by Palestine). However, given the gradual acceptance by the Palestinians of the idea of a state limited to Gaza and the West Bank, it may be possible to offer an alternative interpretation. The Rabat conference could perhaps be seen as the last step in the gradual transformation of the Palestinian problem into one that may be handled by purely diplomatic means. The Arab governments are agreed on the need for a Palestinian state on condition that that state should, far from subverting the Middle-Eastern status quo, as the Palestinians had originally intended, reinforce it. The new state could only emerge in a non-revolutionary situation. Its potential as a trouble-maker would be

strongly limited by de facto Israeli-Jordanian joint trusteeship. These at least are the premises upon which Egyptian and Saudi Arabian policy is founded. It is no coincidence that whilst the Arab League has now finally recognized the march towards a Palestinian national state, Libya and Iraq, the two strongest supporters of the revolutionary role of such a state, have remained outside the mainstream of Arab politics, even with respect to the struggle over oil.

To simplify one might say that in the immediate post-Kippur period inter-Arab relations have been dominated by two key factors — Egypt's political *entente* with Saudi Arabia and her military relationship with Syria. Egypt cannot break her ties with Syria because to do so might drive Damascus into fighting alone, thus destroying any remaining chance for peace in the Middle-East. Meanwhile she also needs to maintain contacts with Saudi Arabia, which provide guarantees to the United States on the line of Egyptian policy. In the same way Syria has no interest in breaking with Egypt. A one-front war with Israel is unthinkable, especially in the face of Soviet opposition. As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, her present relations with Egypt enable her to avoid too early a break between her traditional conservative Arabism, still strongly pro-Western, despite willingness to risk escalation in the oil conflict, and a state which is the incarnation of the radical anti-imperialist version of modern Arab nationalism. US policy has taken advantage of this situation to the obvious discomfiture of the Soviet Union. The least predictable variable within this model is the Palestinian factor. The majority of the PLO has accepted the role assigned to the organization. However an opposition group does exist in the form of the so-called "rejection front", which, with support from Iraq is continuing the struggle, not so much against the concept of a political settlement or against the formation of an Arab-Palestinian mini-state but rather against the tendency to subject Palestinian nationalism to the constraints imposed by a Pan-Arab policy itself dominated by the United States, or, at best, by more general great power strategy.

The second Sinai pact between Egypt and Israel (September 1975) modified the picture to some extent in dividing Egypt from Syria. Not even American pressures were able in fact to convince Israel to make a

contextual grant in Syria's favour with regard to Golan. The prospect of Syrian leadership as an alternative to traditional Egyptian leadership at this point becomes feasible: while Egypt, her basic requirements having been satisfied, tends to leave "the battle field", Syria can still be considered in first line. Unlike in the past, when she tried to form an alliance with one or both of the strongest Arab States, Egypt or Iraq, at the expense of passing immediately to a subordinate position, Syria under Assad strengthens her position by forming an alliance with the weaker countries (Lebanon and Jordan). These last are also the "sanctuaries" of Palestinian resistance, and closer at this point to Syrian influence. It is not without meaning that the Lebanese crisis of 1975-76 and the African-Moroccan controversy over the former Spanish Sahara regard Egypt in fact as marginal. This leads one to think of the decline of the nation which from 1945 on, through various vicissitudes, always represented the dominating force in the Arab world. It is difficult to believe in a definitive decline, because the hegemonic role of Egypt in the Arab world, outside the function assigned to her by Britain when the Arab league was founded and outside the pan-arab vocation rediscovered by Nassar, is assured by her demographic consistence, her economic and military potential and by the extreme preparation of her ruling class.

### III. CRISIS IN LEBANON

#### A YEAR OF WAR

The increasingly violent civil war in Lebanon has now been going on for more than a year. The Lebanese social system has been threatened with partition along ethno-religious lines. On several occasions, especially in spring 1976 it has seemed as if Lebanon might become the centre of an international crisis.

Who make up the two opposing sides? On the one hand there are the Kataeb or Falanges. These are para-military Catholic and Maronite organizations, set up by Piere Gemayel and his family, with the support of other Christian groups, including those led by ex-president Frangie and his son Tony. These are linked to right-wing poli-

tical groups, including Camille Chamoun's Liberal National Front, the Maronite League and the Front of the Defenders of the Cedar. Opposed to them are para-military Moslem forces linked to Moslem and Christian political groups of the centre, led by influential politicians such as Rashid Karamé, Saeb Salam, Rashid Sohl, to left wing Ba'ath, "Nasserite" and Communist groups, to the Shitite group "The disinherited ones", to Kamal Jumblatt's Socialist Progressive Party (Jumblatt is a hereditary leader of the Druzes) and to the Palestinian resistance movement. The Palestinian movement, represented by the President of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yassar Arafat, has however tried to mediate between the Falange and the Lebanese left, grouped around Kamal Jumblatt. Arafat has worked together with a number of centrist Moslem forces, represented by Rashid Karame, with Christian groups from Raymond Edde's National Bloc and with external Arab and non-Arab mediators.

The conventional date given for the beginning of the war is the 13th April 1975, the day on which the two sides began to use heavy arms, missiles and mortars against each other and barricaded the areas under their control. A meeting of the Lebanese Security Council failed to lead to any concrete results. A decision was taken against intervention by the army on the grounds that it was a predominantly Christian force. On the 16th of April mediation by the Arab League led to a cease-fire agreement, which remained without practical effect. The fighting continued until the 21st of April and spread to Tripoli, Lebanon's second largest, predominantly *Moslem* city.

The political confrontation continued. The Falange and the Liberal National Party (or Front) accused the Prime Minister, Rashid Sohl, who had been in office since October 1974, of failing to order the army to intervene. As a result half the ministers in the cabinet resigned, leading on the 15th of May to the fall of the government. In his resignation speech the Prime Minister blamed the crisis on the Falange and stated that the only possible solutions were either to recognise that the growth of the Moslem population had entitled it to a majority role in government or alternatively to set up a representative system wherein the division of powers no longer ran along religious lines.

Fresh fighting broke out between the Falange and the Palestinians. The President

attempted army intervention. Instead of nominating as Prime Minister Rashid Karame, as on the 23rd of May he had been unanimously advised to do, he appointed an old general Nureddin Rifai, a Sunnite Moslem, to head a military government. Despite this move the fighting continued. Left wing and Moslem pressure combined with support from Damascus and from moderate Christian groups forced the president and the right to retreat. Nareddin Refai resigned on the 26th of May. On the 28th Rashed Karame took up his post.

There followed a long political crisis. Attacks by Israel (with the death of seven soldiers in the South and, so it is said, the murder of eight Palestinian guerrillas in Beirut) were, at least, partly responsible for a new trial of strength. A French attempt at mediation, conducted by ex-Prime Minister Louve de Marville failed when it was judged by the Left as being over-partial to the Falange. The third wave of fighting reached the centre of Beirut and spread throughout the country. Karame was able to accelerate moves towards a settlement of the political crisis. On the 30th of June he formed a "government of National Salvation", made up of historical leaders of the centre-right, including ex-president Camille Chaneur, formerly the prime minister's bitter enemy, as Minister for internal affairs. The Falange and the Left were excluded from office. In agreement with Syria and, it is claimed, with the guerrilla leadership, certainly, at any rate, with Yassar Arafat, Karame made a pact with the PLO. His aim was to assure himself of the organization's cooperation in the maintenance of order and to safeguard the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. By making the agreement he blunted claims by the Falange that civil war was necessary in order to defend the state from "expropriation" by the Palestinians.

Fighting nevertheless continued throughout the summer, both in the capital and sporadically, elsewhere in the country, this despite any number of cease-fire agreements.

In September "total" war broke out. No area of Beirut or of the country at large was spared. The fourth round of fighting began on the 1st of September, in Tripoli. There was heavy damage to the city. As a reprisal large forces of Moslem militia-men left Tripoli to attack the neighbouring, predominantly Christian city of Zghorta, amongst whose five "great fami-

lies" was the family of President Frangie.

The government was bitterly divided. One group, supported by Frangie and represented by the Minister for Internal Affairs, Chamun, wanted the army to intervene. The Prime Minister, Karame, made this conditional upon a reorganisation of the army leadership. On the 10th September, a compromise was reached. General Iskandar Ghanem, unpopular amongst the Moslems, was put "on leave". The army command was given to Hanna Said. His task was to take up position between Tripoli and Zghorta and to separate the two sides.

Three days later violent fighting started up again. Once again Beirut was affected. For about three weeks the country was at a standstill. During this new crisis the divisions within the government deepened. Frangie, Chamun and Gemayel all wanted army intervention. Karame sought to delay this. Meanwhile well-known Moslem politicians and the Left began to demand the reform of the agreements which up to that time had defined the constitution of the country in religious terms. In August they reached agreement on a "Programme for the democratic reform of the Lebanese political system".

During these weeks of violence non-Lebanese Arab forces began to intervene more and more openly. The American government accused Lybia of having passed "tens of millions of dollars" to left-wing Moslem groups (*New York Times*, 15th of September 1975) and cited irrefutable evidence to this effect. It was claimed that Iraq had intervened on the same side, through a group of her own. This group however played a very marginal role. Large quantities of arms of dubious (according to some claims Egyptian or Israeli) origin were supplied to the Falange through the Port of Jumejeh, to the North of Beirut, controlled by Gemael's forces. Syria and the Palestinians, on the other hand, took on the role of "guarantors". In September the government was obliged to use the PLO as a police force to maintain order in Beirut. The government and the president sought increasingly open Syrian mediation. Several times during September the Syrian foreign minister, Abdel Halim Khaddam attempted to bind the two sides to a lasting cease-fire. On the 24th of September he succeeded in forming a "Committee for National Dialogue", with 20 members co-

vering the whole Lebanese political spectrum, from the Falange to the communist left. The setting up of the Committee was followed by intense political activity both within and between the two sides, leading to a clarification of their respective positions. Iman Sadr, the leader of the Shitite "Disinherited Ones" and Hassen Khaleh, the great mufti of the Republic and the Sunnite community called a Moslem summit which met at Dar el Fatua on the 4th of October and condemned "any attempt at a geographical or psychological partition of Lebanon". On the 7th of October a Christian summit was held at Bkerke, the patriarchal seat, attended by Pierre Gemeyel, Camille Chamoun, Raymond Edde and the Maronite patriarch Antoine Khorreie. The meeting did not rule out an agreement and favoured an inter-confessional solution to the crisis. Even within the Falange the hard-liners, led by Pierre Gemayel's son, Béchir, were opposed by a group open to a political solution under Joseph Chader. Those who favoured partition, that is to say, in practice the creation of a Christian Lebanon limited to Mount Lebanon and Beirut, found themselves in isolation. The only movements to take up this position were the group headed by Charbel Kassis, a Father Superior in the Order of Maonite Monks with few followers, the Maronite League and the Front of the Defenders of the Cedar. The prevailing attitude, favourable to the Left, was to maintain Lebanese territorial unity and to create a new institutional balance, capable of overcoming religious differences. At the same time it began to be felt that President Frangie represented an obstacle in the way of achieving this goal. On the 2nd of October Saeb Salan, who for three years had acted as Frangie's Prime Minister, made a violent attack on the head of state.

The PLO played a crucial role in this process of political clarification. Following a request for intervention by the Palestinian police force (CLAP) the organisation and above all its leader, Yassar Arafat worked actively for a new truce. This lasted a few hours from the 11th to the 12th of October. In a memorandum, presented on the 11th to the Committee for Dialogue, the PLO made clear its concern for the maintenance of the security, stability, independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and for the unity of her people and territory, with all that implies in terms of the states' right to exercise its authority in all Lebanese regions. Integration within another Arab

state was unacceptable. "The Palestinian people reject any substitute for their homeland to which they will never abandon their struggle to return".

Meanwhile however, whilst a political dialogue seemed to be beginning, the fighting intensified, especially in Beirut, where there was a backlash from the Falanges, determined to win back militarily the political ground they had lost. On the 15th of October the Falanges in the capital broke Arafat's truce and attempted to overthrow the military balance between the two sides, crossing the neutral zone and penetrating the west of the city along the sea front, an area of large hotels, offices and luxury shops. Fighting in the zone continued throughout November leading to large scale destruction. In December an alliance of ten Moslem groups brought together by Koleclat, the leader of the "Nasserites" succeeded in driving the Falanges from three of the largest hostels. There was enormous damage.

In mid-October, a special meeting of Arab League foreign ministers was held in Cairo. The proposal for the conference came from Kuwait and was supported by Frangie as well as by the Egyptian and Iraqi governments. Baghdad favoured total "Arabization" of Lebanon; Cairo, an immediate agreement between Moslems and Christians, necessary if Egyptian policy on peace with Israel was to succeed. For similarly contradictory motives Syria and the PLO were absent from the meeting. Because of her poor relations with Egypt, Libya also stayed away. The conference had no practical consequences apart from that of weakening the Falanges' threat to internationalize the conflict. Neither Egypt nor Iraq succeeded in forcing the Arab League to intervene. Attempts at mediation, by the papal envoy, Mons. Bertole and by UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, followed the same line, the aim being to avoid non-Lebanese involvement in the conflict.

January saw the worst fighting yet. On the 5th the Falangists launched yet another offensive against the Palestinians. In reprisal the Left, the Palestinians and the Moslems attacked Beirut's Christian areas. At this point the Falangists used aircraft and artillery to bombard the Moslem areas in southern Beirut and the crowded, poverty-stricken Moslem zone around the port. The other side retaliated by laying siege to the predominantly Christian coastal village

of Damur, the "feudal domain" of Lebanon's minister of Internal Affairs, Chamun. Elsewhere in the country there was also fighting. Summary execution became increasingly common.

After the break-down of the twenty-second cease-fire since the beginning of the conflict, on the 18th of January Prime Minister Karame resigned. This followed the failure of his attempt, supported by Syrian, Saudi-Arabian and French mediators, to resolve the crisis through a revision of the religious agreements regulating public life and the country's constitution. Worse still, the day before his resignation the airforce had intervened against left-wing "self-defence groups" without informing either the Prime Minister or the Minister for Defence.

Syrian intervention re-established the truce and brought Karame back into the government. Using military pressure on the Christians from the pro-Syrian Palestinian militia and political pressure on the progressives, foreign Minister Khaddam, supported by the Syrians, succeeded on the 22nd of January, in imposing a four point political compromise. This — according to Raymond Edde, a moderate leader — "placed Lebanon under a Syrian mandate". The truce was observed more or less for about two months. During that time however the country lived as if it were divided in two. Large scale migration gave geographical form to Lebanon's political divisions.

During these two months the movement against Frangie gathered momentum. Serious splits appeared within the army. At Shtura, in the Behaa, Ahmed El Kratib, a thirty-three year old Moslem who, on account of his religion had never been promoted above the rank of sub-lieutenant, founded the Arab Lebanese army. He received strong support, especially from units stationed in the South. The official army leaders were undecided as to whether to condemn those belonging to the ALA as deserters. Given the size of the movement the vast majority favoured an amnesty. The army question was however closely connected with that of the presidency.

Khatib called for Frangie's resignation. The Syrians on the other hand were now prepared to defend him. The demand was not met. In order to pacify the army, leaders had to turn against the president. On the 11th of March General Azis Ahdab formed the Movement for National Recovery and called on television for Frangie's re-

signation. This demand received quick support from all political groups, including the extreme right, which had now been defeated. Kamal Jamblatt, who had earlier criticized the general's action was now obliged by his Druze electoral base to reconsider his assessment. On the 13th the National Assembly approved a motion calling upon the president to resign. With Damascus' support Frangie refused. On the 15th Khatib and Ahdab joined forces for a march on the presidential palace. Once again the Syrians intervened to block their way, using pro-Syrian forces from Saika and the Yarmak brigade of the Palestine Liberation Army.

Fresh fighting broke out amongst the population at large. Once again there were massacres. The destruction was worsened by the use of artillery and armour from the army, which was rapidly disintegrating. The war was at its most intense in Beirut, in the hotel zone and around the port. Engagements were also fought in the mountains. Accusation of atrocities came from nearly everywhere in the country.

Once again Damascus made a serious attempt at mediation. Beginning on the 20th of March the Syrian president, Assad, held meetings with Prime Minister Karame (who had just survived an assassination attempt), with ex-prime minister Saeb Salam, with Yassa-Arafat and with Kamal Jumblatt. Arab Moslem representatives were urged to accept a negotiated solution with the Christians. The only Syrian concession was to accept the principle of Frangie's resignation. A face-saving procedure was to be adopted involving a constitutional amendment. Syrian pressure was successful. At the beginning of May Frangie was "honorably" replaced, though not before his attitude had led to the most dramatic phase yet in the international repercussions of the crisis.

On the 29th of March Washington announced American opposition to all foreign intervention and offered to mediate. A spokesman explained that his warning was directed both at Syria and Israel. Given however that in the past Damascus' role had always been approved in Washington, observers feared that the Israelis were preparing to take action. This would have added a dangerous new dimension to the conflict. The American mediation offer took the concrete form of a visit to Beirut, which lasted the whole of April, by retired

diplomat and Arab specialist, Dean Brown. George Gorse, an envoy sent by the French president, was present in the capital at the same time. The two men's main task was to bring back together the different Arab-Moslem forces and to persuade the latter to accept Syrian mediation. Damascus' role was in fact bitterly opposed by the left wing groups led by Kamal Jumblatt. For a short period it was thought that the PLO had taken up position in their favour. At the end of March, Cairo, which already on the 12th of January had proposed an ill-defined "Inter-Arab Action Plan" for Lebanon but which in practice had been cut off from any real involvement, called for the setting up of a symbolic Arab force. The Lebanese Left accused Damascus of having betrayed the Arab League Pact and reaffirmed its intention of struggling to the end for the realization of the "August Programme".

On the 12th of March Syrian troops entered Lebanon in order to block left wing forces. There was some fighting. In the days which followed the Syrians took up positions aimed at cutting off supplies to the left. The tension reached its height at the same time however that a new opening appeared for a solution. Yassar Arafat, the leader of the PLO who, at the end of March had had "timely" talks with the Syrian president, took up a role as mediator between Jumblatt and Assad. On the 16th of April he proposed a seven point plan to the two sides. The plan rejected partition or Arabisation of Lebanon along with any internationalisation of the conflict and called for the continuation of Syrian mediation, the ending of all hostilities and the setting up of a unified Syrian-Lebanese-Palestinian command to supervise the cease-fire. On the 8th of May the Syrian candidate Elias Sarkos, the governor of the Bank of Lebanon, was elected as the new president. The fighting continued with renewed violence.

## A HISTORY OF CRISIS

The 1975-76 civil war merely represents the culmination of a long historical process, during which there appeared many motives for conflict. The whole history of Lebanon has been marked by outbreaks of violence, originally caused, at least seemingly, by ethno-religious divisions and by the well known demographic and institutional

balance between Moslems and Christians. Later the role of social factors, of political divisions between the "notables", the land-owners, the merchants, the financiers and the masses, and of the conflict between modernization and radicalism within the Arab World became far clearer. The development of this last conflict to its present degree of intensity passed through two phases: — firstly the spread of Nasserism, secondly the establishment of the Palestinian guerrillas within the country.

On the fall of the Ottoman empire, Britain, in line with the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, recognized a French sphere of influence in the Middle-East, consisting of Mount Lebanon, Bekaa and, of course, Syria. Lebanon came into existence as a result of this agreement. At the end of the war the division of the country into different spheres of influence proved to be difficult. Whilst Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa were both Christian areas, the coast was predominantly Moslem.

The Haschimiet, King Feisal, aimed, with British support (and with the agreement of Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader) to annex the zone to his own Arab kingdom of Syria. Feisal's plan was for a "Greater-Syria". It was never to be put into practice. Its ghost nonetheless haunts the history of Lebanon.

The French prime minister, George Clemenceau, mistrusted Feisal. On the 10th of November 1919 he promised Hoyeh, the Maronite patriarch, both independence for Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa and access to the sea. The promise amounted to recognising what then was known as "greater Lebanon". On the 25th of April 1920 the Conference of San Remo granted Paris the Syrian mandate which included Lebanon. In December of the same year France detached the predominantly Christian state of Great Lebanon from Syria. Right up to independence the French acted as guarantors of the balance between Moslems and Christians, a balance which favoured the latter and vested interests in the country.

The Lebanon's constitution today is in no way substantially different from that of the French mandate, promulgated on 23rd May, 1926 and amended on the 17th of October 1927, the 8th of May 1928, the 9th of November and the 7th of December 1943, the 21st of January 1944 and the 23rd of January 1947.

At the beginning of November 1943 the

two major groups fighting the elections for the National Assembly, the Maronite "Constitutional Bloc" led by Bishara El-Khoury and the Muslim group, led by Riad El sohl, signed a "Constitutional Pact". The terms of the pact were left vague and thus were in no way legally binding. They led nonetheless to agreement on a union between the Moslem and Christian communities and not only brought independence closer, but were recognised as the cornerstone upon which everything else had to be built. This aspect of the pact became clear on the 8th of November when the Assembly passed a new constitutional law provoking the violent reaction of the French High Commissioner who had the President of the Republic and the whole of the government arrested. This only accelerated the course of events. France was obviously forced to free the prisoners at once and at the same time to accept both this independent constitutional initiative and Lebanon's more general right to independence.

On the basis of the Constitutional Pact the tradition grew up that the President of the Republic should be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunnite Muslim and the Chief of Staff another Maronite. A referendum held in 1932 had already established the principle that in all representative positions there should be a five to six ratio of Moslems to Christians. Provision was also made for the allocation of posts within each community, this being proportional to the relative strengths of different religious groups. Thus in the National Assembly, which in 1960 consisted of 99 members, these were 30 Maronites, 20 Shitites, 11 members of the Greek and 4 of the Armenian Orthodox Church, 5 Greek Catholics, 6 Druzes, 1 Armenian Catholic, 1 Protestant and 1 representative for other groups. Since 1932 there have been no further referenda.

Lebanon was one of the five signatories of the protocol produced by the Alexandria Conference (held from 25th September to 10th October 1944). This protocol laid the foundations of the Arab League which came into official existence in Cairo on the 22nd of March 1945. As early as 1944 France had begun the gradual transfer of powers to the Lebanese government.

Bishara El Khoury came to the presidency in 1943. In 1949 his mandate was renewed for a second term of office. The way in which he organised the Lebanese

state has lasted up until the present day. It was based less on the political groups divided as they were along rigid religious lines (incapable of genuine political activity) than on the mediation of a restricted number of "notables". During 1952 a serious economic and political crisis led to violent demonstrations. On the 10th September El Khoury was forced from office, two years before the end of his mandate.

In 1948 Lebanon joined with the Arabs in the war against Israel, a war which ended with an armistice in March 1949. In Syria, discontent resulting from the Arab defeat cleared the way for a coup d'état. The Lebanese leader of the Syrian Popular Party, Antun Saadeh attempted a repeat performance in his own country. The plot was discovered in 1949. Saadeh was executed. When in March 1950 after two years of negotiations Lebanon refused a Syrian proposal for an economic and financial union a new crisis broke out between the two countries. As a reprisal Damascus closed the frontier for a long period. The borders were only re-opened in February 1952. This helped contribute to El Khoury's economic difficulties.

Lebanon's first president was replaced by Camille Chamun. In 1955 Chamun refused to join either the Baghdad Pact (later to become CENTO) or the anti-Baghdad Arab alliance proposed by the Egyptians, Syrians and Saudi-Arabians. In 1957 Chamun was nonetheless to accept the anticommunist programme of the Eisenhower doctrine. In 1955 Lebanon attended the Bandung conference, taking the side of the anti-communist, non-aligned states.

During the October 1956 Suez crisis Chamun declared a state of emergency but nonetheless maintained diplomatic relations with France and Britain. By this lukewarm approach he sought to prevent the transformation of Arab patriotism into Arab nationalism, a transformation which would have risked a split with "*Libanisme*": — Lebanese nationalism.

This attitude led to a whole series of bloody incidents. In Tripoli and Beirut in November 1956 (where they were blamed on Nasserite agents), in Beirut and in the Druze zone of Mount Lebanon during the election campaign in May and June 1957 (where they were blamed on the Communists) and in November and December throughout the North of the country.

The government reacted by imposing tight

controls on the Palestinian refugees and by declaring the whole northern region a "military area".

In 1958, the year of the union between Syria and Egypt (the United Arab Republic) the crisis reached its height. Chamun reiterated his opposition to any union of the Lebanon with the UAR or with alternative groupings. Arab nationalism was however winning ever greater support and the resolution of its supporters in Tripoli in the North, in Tyre and Sidon in the South and in Beirut, was growing. On the 8th of May 1958, the assassination of an opposition journalist, a Christian, Nessib Metri, led to a general nationalist rising. The rebels took control of several zones of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon and of vast areas both in the North and in the South. Chamun accused the UAR of having inspired the rising. The opposition reacted by calling for his resignation.

On the 14th of July 10,000 American marines landed in Lebanon with the objective of defending the existing regime. Already in the past Chamun had requested American intervention. Washington's decision came in the wake of the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, on the same day as the landing. The beach head created by the marines allowed the American armed forces to keep a close eye on developments in Baghdad and over foreign reactions to events there, that is to say, the nationalist and conservative Arab as well as the British response. The deposed regime had been under British protection. On the 18th of August the Americans committed themselves to the withdrawal of their troops.

Meanwhile, on the 31st of July, the Chief of Staff, General Fuad Chahab had been elected as the new president. As prime minister, he chose Rashid Karame, the leader of the Tripoli revolt. The new regime tried to follow a policy of cautious reform. The results achieved were unspectacular. On the 31st of December 1961 a group of officers, supported by the National Social Party (the ex Syrian Popular Party) attempted a *coup d'état*.

The rebellion was put down on the 10th of January 1962.

The summer of 1965 witnessed the first attacks by the Palestinian guerrillas based in Lebanon. These were followed by Israeli reprisals on Lebanese territory. After the "six day war" the attacks and reprisals were intensified. In May 1968 there was

fighting between Israeli and Lebanese forces on the southern frontier. The most serious reprisal took place on the night of the 28th of December 1968. In response to an attack on an El-Al aircraft in Athens, helicopter-borne Israeli commands landed at Beirut airport where they destroyed thirteen airliners. Many groups of guerrillas crossed from Syria into Lebanon. Their arrival was followed by strikes and demonstrations.

In October 1969 there was a serious worsening in the Lebanese Palestinian problem. The armed forces entered a number of Palestinian camps, their aim being to take control over refugee activities. Rashed Karame's government resigned, stating that it had not been informed of the initiative taken by the military. The president and the armed forces took over direct responsibility for the administration of the country. On the twelfth Washington gave a public guarantee to Lebanon. For several days the Palestinians and pro-Palestinian forces took control of Tripoli. In several regions there were repeated incidents. Syria and Iraq both threatened to intervene. The Syrian threat continued for some time. As a result, on the 21st Beirut closed the frontier. The incidents ended, when on the 2nd of November, in Cairo, Yassar Arafat and General Bustani, the head of the Lebanese armed forces, signed a cease-fire agreement. This agreement, which was complemented by a further accord, reached in January 1970, laid down that guerrilla camps should be situated at a certain distance from the towns; that no military training should be carried out there and that the guerrillas should cross into Israeli territory before opening fire.

Despite the agreement, in March 1970 there was fresh fighting in Beirut between Palestinians and Falangists. In the autumn of that year and during the summer of 1971 many new Palestinian groups arrived from Jordan. Meanwhile Israeli reprisals were intensified. On the 17th of August 1970 Solesman Frangie was elected as president. During the remainder of 1970 and 1971 there were sporadic clashes between Palestinians and Falangists.

In the following two Israeli reprisals against Lebanon were intensified. The government made a further attempt to place the Palestinians under the control of the armed forces. At first, in March 1972 this was limited to the South of the country.

A "modus vivendi" arrived at towards the end of June between the government and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (the PLO) which in effect froze guerrilla activities on the Israeli frontier did not last. In December there were numerous clashes between the guerrillas and the army. The tension reached its height in May 1973. The army and airforce attacked the Palestinian camps. Groups of guerrillas, backed by Damascus, attempted to cross the Syrian frontier into Lebanon but were stopped by the Lebanese armed forces. Arab intervention led to a cease-fire along the lines laid down in the Cairo agreement. The Palestinians committed themselves to removing heavy weapons from the camps. The government responsible for having negotiated the cease-fire, led by Amin Hafez, fell a few weeks later, undermined by Sunnite requests for more posts in the administration. The number of private armies grew. The quality of their weaponry improved. Meanwhile Hafez' successor, Takieddin Sohl, was preparing a reform of the administration which would lead to the "de-confessionalisation" of a number of posts. In February 1974 the Maronites, and the parties which represented them, publicly took up position against the reform. At the same time the Shitite Moslems in the south began to campaign more actively for a greater share of political power and public investment. Under the leadership of Iman Mussa Sadr, they armed themselves against Israel.

After the October war, in which Lebanon took absolutely no part, Israeli attacks continued. In early 1974 these were intensified. The most violent attacks took place in April and May. At the end of July there was renewed fighting between Palestinians and Falangists. This marked the beginning of endemic violence. Under the pressure of Israeli reprisals this spread until it had taken on the dimensions of a full-scale civil war. Amongst the bloodiest incidents were the clash between soldiers and civilians in Sidon in October and, later, the battle between Falangists and Palestinians in Beirut. Rashed Sohl's government, which had been in office since October, was paralyzed by a Moslem demand that Lebanese citizenship should be granted to individuals born outside Lebanon with a long record of residence in the country.

## NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

The recurring crises suffered by Lebanon may mostly be attributed to two closely inter-related factors: — namely the country's international position and its internal social and political balance. Both are involved in the disputes between the various religious communities. The difficult relationship between the different communities is reflected in the pattern of Lebanese institutions and in the country's Constitution. So much is this so, and so great is the influence over the law and the legislature of religious groups and other forces outside parliament, that one would hesitate to define the country as a parliamentary democracy. Part of Lebanese law is created by statute. Another part however is the responsibility of the religious communities and is incorporated by the state into national law. This part covers family law and many basic rights and includes many of the norms binding the individual.

According to Article 27 of the Constitution "the members of the Chamber of Deputies represent the whole nation". Article 24 however creates the principle of the proportional representation of the religious communities. Theoretically the conflict between these two norms is resolved by Article 95 which says that in a framework of justice and concord the communities will for a transitory period be adequately represented in public office and in the various ministries, always providing that this is not contrary to the public good. The only exemption from this law applies to the armed forces. Nonetheless the higher offices of state are Christian dominated.

Although the National Assembly represents, in practice, the religious groups this is not the case in law. Parliament has grown up upon the foundations which were originally laid for it, in parallel with the modernization of the country. Today parliament is no longer a body of group delegates. On the contrary, it acts as a buffer between contrasting positions of principle.

Given the weakness of parliament, the country's presidential regime and the length (six years) of the presidential term of office, there is room for dangerous manoeuvres.

In other words the system seriously weakens the state. The "active" functions of the modern state are practically absent. The national administration is paralyzed by

those same religious criteria which enabled it to come into being and which are now tools in the hands of the dominant interests in the country. The state has no role in social affairs or in development. Public works are inadequate. Private militias and privileges often interfere in the keeping of order and the administration of justice.

Since the 1950s these divisions have been leading to a slow but steady breakdown in the traditional social order. At the same time Lebanon has been affected by the growth in national and social radicalism common to the whole of the Arab world. The traditional power groups are the strongest supporters of "*Libanisme*" — Lebanese nationalism and oppose "*Arabisme*" — Arab nationalism. They belong to both the Moslem and Christian groups. In trade and finance the latter are the most important. In recent years however one may suppose that this position has been offset by a flow of petro-dollars to the Moslems. Recently these groups have been opposed by the masses. This opposition has come mainly from the Moslems. The Christians have however also played a limited role. The opposition has generally been in the name of "*Arabisme*".

In the 1956-1958 crisis the masses made a contribution to the Arab nationalist cause. During the crisis which opened in 1975 they were supported by the Arab nationalists. Objectively speaking the interests of the masses coincided with those of the Palestinians.

Today there has been a major change in the nature of the conflict. Regardless of the numerical weight of the different communities no one any longer denies that Lebanon, is, beyond all doubt, an Arab country within the Arab world. Lebanon was set up apart from the other states which arose from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Today the Lebanese unanimously wish to remain part of a separate unit. What is more, Lebanon plays a role not only in the Arab, but in a wider balance of power. There has been talk of a recent internationalization of the civil war. This is only partially true. Certainly there are international aspects to the Lebanese crisis. The country owes its very existence to international events. Its economic and strategic function is international, and has been since the beginning of the crisis. Recently there has been a growth in international

interest in the Lebanon. For the first time the concept of a "Greater Syria" the historical antagonist of Lebanese nationalism, has begun to play a dominant role.

The Syrian intervention in the 1975-76 crisis was due to Damascus' goal of controlling the whole of the northern front with Israel. Today the Syrians are able to exert a far more efficient control over the Palestinian resistance than they were able to through Saika and the Yarmut brigade. This explains the way in which Syrian intervention has been supported by the Lebanese right, the traditional enemy of any development even vaguely connected with the idea of a "Greater Syria" or with militant Arab nationalism. For similar reasons the Syrian action has been backed by the US Department of state and opposed by the Left, which normally favours Arab nationalism [and by Israel]. Syrian control means that in the future Lebanese politics will be dominated even more than in the past by plans made in Damascus. In theory this could lead to Lebanon taking up a front line position in the struggle against Israel. This would not please the Lebanese Nationalists. In the short term however one thing is nearly certain, namely that the Syrians will use their control over the Palestinians as a bargaining counter in tough negotiations between Damascus and Jerusalem. If, as is expected, these negotiations are successful, this will lead to the disarming of the guerrillas.

Lebanon, in other words, is now fully involved in the war with Israel. Up to a certain point the crisis has deepened the country's contradictions. The State Department and the Lebanese Right favour the Syrian intervention for the effect it is likely to produce on the negotiations between Syria and Israel. Arafat has been forced to accept this intervention as the only way out of his difficulties. He is nonetheless fully aware of the threat it represents. For the left wing groups opposing the Syrians, the intervention shows up the worst side of Arab nationalism, that is to say, the subordination of national and social interests to the short-term designs of individual governments.

Nonetheless, however paradoxical this may seem, Lebanese nationalism, despite short-term tactical manoeuvres dictated by the development of the crisis, is a common inheritance of all Lebanese political groups including the Arabs and Moslems. The only exceptions are groups set up and supported

by forces outside Lebanon, to which no one gives serious credit. Today, there are no longer Lebanese who wish to see their country "drown" in the Arab world.

Internally the most serious cause of friction, lying at the root of the religious conflict, is social, namely the relationship between the self-confessedly conservative upper bourgeoisie and the popular forces. No one has seriously attacked the system of religious guarantees. The politically divided and weakened Christian groups are today in a minority position. The Moslem groups nonetheless show no sign of wishing to take advantage of this situation. This is not their tradition; what is more it would not be in their own interest. The only religious demand made by the Moslems is for a greater say in political decision-making corresponding to the growth of the Moslem population.

The 1975-76 civil war, where the sides were defined in terms of religious and ethnic groupings, has shown up the weakness of the latter. When expedient, alliances have ignored religious dividing lines.

Today, as in the past Lebanon is characterised by a high degree of social inequality. Only a tiny minority benefits from the country's prosperity. In the towns this is mainly a Maronite minority. The Maronites are thus seen as the "urban rich". In the farming regions and in the provinces however this minority is predominantly Moslem. Many observers speak of a hang-over from feudalism. Although it would be more correct to speak of a class of "notables" the use of the term "feudalism" does help one to understand production relations in agriculture, industry and even in finance. These inequalities are worsened by the weakness of the state.

In the course of the civil war this contradiction has come to the surface on several occasions. It was expressed in the agreement between a large number of political groups codified in the August 1975 pact and in subsequent less formal engagements, and its aim was the setting up of a "new kind of state", a state governed by law and the masses. Within this state the notables would be replaced by a genuine representative system. The balancing of different religious groups which at present simply acts as a mask for political manoeuvring would be superceded. The state would represent the citizen within an active legal system where every individual was equal before the law.

## IV. THE GULF

### WESTERN PENETRATION IN THE GULF

Political affairs in the Arabian sub-continent have, in recent centuries, always been strongly influenced by the presence of a number of Western powers. The latter, in order to guarantee the security of their interests, have prevented the emergence of autonomous local actors. They have done this through the setting up of states the independence of which was either purely nominal or in any case compromised by their full integration into the economic and military system imposed on the region. At the beginning of the seventeenth century Portuguese power in the area was eliminated. A similar fate met the Dutch at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century. Having reduced France and Germany's respective roles to insignificance, Britain finally established her hegemony over the whole region, adopting a policy of Balkanization which enabled her to do the groundwork for economic and political penetration without having recourse to the large-scale use of force.

The first US presence in the region dates from the beginning of the twentieth century, when it took the form of Anglo-American common economic ventures. These ventures continued harmoniously until after World War II, when Aramco and Shell began to take opposite sides in local conflicts in southern Oman. Following these disputes between the two oil trusts the 1950's saw the first steps towards a marking out of Britain and the USA's respective zones of influence: Britain took a strip along the Gulf coast (the Trucial Oman), an area past the outlet to the Gulf (Muscat and Oman) and more coastal territory on the west of the South Arabian peninsula (the Aden Protectorate, the Federation of Southern Arabia); the USA took the interior, that is to say, principally Saudi Arabia.

At the end of the 1950's, political hegemony over the Arabian peninsula was transferred gradually from Britain to the United States. One fundamental factor determined this handover of power, namely the growing strategic and economic importance of the region as a vital link in western military communications and as a source of oil. As the Chinese and Russians began to set out their long-term foreign policy

objectives in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia, the Gulf took its place as the world's largest oil producer, responsible for nearly all supplies to western NATO countries. Britain's decision, at the end of the 1960's to give up military commitments east of Suez (and hence in the Gulf) was a simple recognition of reality. It was no longer possible for British imperialism in decline to continue its extremely costly role in SEATO and CENTO defence arrangements.

The British withdrawal may thus be seen as an acceptance of the dominant role of American foreign policy; as a first tactical step towards a renewed Anglo-American alliance. This new policy was planned and put into effect around the end of the 1960's. It was founded on naval strength rather than on the old land-based strategy and aimed on the one hand at the protection of the sea routes linking Britain and the USA to European and Japanese markets and, on the other, at the containment of the Soviet Union. As the centre of a vast telecommunications network stretching from the west Pacific coast to the Red Sea and the islands of the northern Indian Ocean, the Arabian subcontinent played a vital role in this plan. The East of Suez strategy adopted for the region required not only the reinforcing of the VII fleet and of CENTO armed forces but also the strengthening of air and naval bases and the stabilization of allied political regimes. These objectives, pursued through the strengthening or creation of local forces with massive supplies of military aid and technology, have a double implication. On the one hand they allow Britain and the USA to exercise control and organize defence through the exploitation of local human resources. On the other, they excite chauvinist feelings in a way which both blocks internal reform and diminishes hostility between nationalist and conservative forces. Given the need for a well defined division of labour between the partners in this alliance, Britain has been given the task of maintaining strategic support bases in Oman. The tasks of naval control in the Gulf and over the outlets to the Gulf and of the repression of real or potential centres of subversion in the area have been given respectively to two new regional power blocs, the first led by Iran, the second by Saudi Arabia.

This scheme, which began to operate at the end of 1971, has only recently been

complicated, to some extent, by Saudi Arabian attempts to build a coalition which might allow her a more independent role in the region. These attempts are the logical consequence of the contradiction between the role Saudi Arabia has theoretically been assigned by the western powers and the role she has played in practice since the change in the Middle-East situation after the Yom Kippur War and the increase in Iranian interference in the internal affairs of the Southern Arabian peninsula.

The emergence of rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 1973-4 led to a general reshuffling of alliances and a change in the balance of power in the region. This process has always been an ambiguous one. For a time however it showed clearly the tensions and problems which existed on the Arabian sub-continent. Although today, with the reduction of the Saudi role following the death of King Feisal, and the establishment of undisputed Iranian hegemony over the Gulf, regional political development has returned to its previous western-determined pattern these tensions and problems have in no way ceased to exist.

#### IRAN'S NEW ROLE

Between 1973 and 1974 there was a degree of friction between Tehran and Riyadh connected with the expansion of the two countries' roles in their respective spheres of influence in the Gulf and the Middle-East. The transfer of CIA headquarters for the Middle-East from Nicosia to Tehran and the simultaneous appointment of the Agency's ex-director general, Richard Helms, to the post of US Ambassador to Iran, showed the importance of Iran's role in the US plan to strengthen CENTO as a counterweight to Soviet influence in the region.

The choice of Teheran as CENTO's regional information and logistics centre was made with clear geographical and political motives in mind. On the one hand Western interests were now centred on the Indian Ocean rather than in the Middle East. On the other, there was an urgent tactical need for a local ally, immune from Pan Islamic temptations, capable of maintaining relations with Israel and yet of sufficient regional political stature to be able to serve western purposes.

Iran's new position implied moving be-

yond early visions of purely local hegemony in the Gulf to a role beyond the Hormuz Straights extending into the Indian Ocean. Thus Iranian military intervention in support of Sultan Qabus of Oman against the "subversive" Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOOAG) could be officially justified by the requirements of regional security policy within the framework of Iranian commitments to the Western powers.

In December 1973, during air and naval manoeuvres by CENTO and the VII fleet just outside South Yemeni territorial waters, Iranian warships landed 3000 soldiers on the Dhofar coast. This was the first step in a process of escalation leading to an ever broader Iranian commitment, not just in Sultan Qabus' internal affairs but right along the north-eastern coast of the Indian Ocean. This commitment implied a massive build-up of armaments, particularly in the naval and telecommunications sectors, and a policy of regional economic penetration aimed at building a chain of regional alliances to contain the enemy. During 1974 Iran pursued the first of these objectives strengthening her network of bases and military installations along the southeastern flank, and expanding her secure continental base beyond the Gulf towards the Sea of Oman. Her chain of coastal bases (in particular the Bandar Arras naval base) and the important listening station at Abu Mussu allowed close control of entry to the Gulf as well as of the area beyond the Straights. The Iranian navy which had originally limited its role to antismuggling coast guard operations became a powerful force, equipped by Britain and the USA with destroyers, missile-launchers and the world's most powerful hovercraft fleet. The Shah's policy was well-planned and he was able to justify this vast deployment of forces with legal arguments. A series of initiatives from Teheran for the coordination of anti-oil-pollution measures led to the Iranian navy being entrusted with the control of all ships in transit through the Gulf. An agreement between Tehran and Sultan Qabus over the sharing of Iran and Oman's continental shelf gave to Iran the right to exert control up to fifty miles from her coast. Finally, long-distance reconnaissance will be in the near future made easier with the opening of the giant Shahbar air and naval complex close to the border with Pakistan. This base is thought to be the largest of its

kind in the Indian Ocean after the Anglo-American base at Diego Garcia.

Tehran accompanied the strengthening of its continental and off-shore military positions with an intense military and political penetration effort aimed at consolidating existing zones of influence and laying down the foundations for a definitive "regional security" plan.

By the end of 1974 this political offensive was being conducted on three distinct regional fronts. On the southern frontiers Iranian policy towards the Emirates took the form of large-scale commercial ventures and organized migration of Iranian labour into the local oil industry. In the North and South-East Pakistan and Afghanistan received finance and Iranian cooperation in development projects in the turbulent North-Western region and in Belukhistan. In the west, Iran made a number of approaches to Iraq, with the aim of settling a territorial dispute which was casting worrying shadows over the balance of power in the Gulf and which was compromising Tehran's relations with the rest of the Arab world. Now that his Eastern frontiers had been stabilized the Shah found it essential to improve relations with his western neighbour which, quite apart from all other considerations, he saw as the main sanctuary for "subversive forces", in the region (including the Iranian opposition).

#### THE TWO STRANDS OF SAUDI ARABIAN POLICY

During the same two-year period Saudi Arabia's role was to prepare the way, on the basis of the new Cairo-Riyad political axis, for a rapprochement between the United States and the Arab world, a presupposition for the eradication of Soviet political influence and the containment of European economic influence in the region.

Between the non-aligned countries' conference at Algiers in September 1973 and the Rabat summit in October 1974, Saudi Arabian policy developed until it came to be at the centre of the balance of power in the region. Quite apart from King Faisal's personality and his refusal to play a purely subordinate role two objective factors contributed to Saudi Arabia's growing importance, namely the need in the Middle-Eastern region, after the Yom Kippur War, for a change in political and eco-

conomic alliance patterns and the need in the Arabian peninsula for Arab leadership capable of containing the expansion of the Iranian colossus. On both fronts Riyadh's policy was normally extremely cautious. Feisal avoided taking any positions which might conflict with western interests; nonetheless his bitter anti-communism made him very aware of the fragility of the balance on which the local situation depended and prevented him from aligning himself too closely with the United States (except where he might be compensated for so doing by a change in US attitudes towards Israel) or from meekly accepting Iranian interference in the internal affairs of the Arabian peninsula. He knew that to have taken any other policy would have been to run the risk of encouraging the more intransigent Arab countries and for thus strengthening Soviet influence. Thus Riyadh aimed both to rebuild the Arab coalition, including the Syrians and Yasser Arafat's Palestinians and to create a new balance of power on the Arabian peninsula under Saudi hegemony. In so far as the Saudi Arabians believed in Washington's ability to impose conditions on Israel, Riyadh used its good offices, as an inter-Arab mediator to support both the disengagement agreements in Sinai and on the Golan Heights and the more general peace negotiations.

The Rabat summit demonstrated clearly, if unofficially, the main points in the two parallel policies Feisal and his foreign minister, Saqqaf, were pursuing. They may be summarized as follows:

- A full commitment in the Middle-Eastern conflict. Full political support for the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization to represent the whole Palestinian people (a choice which gave only a secondary role to King Hussein). Strong financial aid to belligerent Arab states.
- A plan for a "Saudi political umbrella" covering the Arabian peninsula. This would aim to bind together the weak and divided states of the region, the independence of which was often a mere legal fiction, into a sort of Gulf Commonwealth. The consequences of the success of such a plan would be profound, laying the foundation for a subsequent neutralization of the South Arabian region and the Eritrean peninsula.

The way was cleared for a consolidation of Saudi political influence in the Gulf by long, patient diplomacy, one of the principal aims of which was to find a solution

to the border dispute between Riyadh and the Union of Arab Emirates. Observers have defined the agreement reached between the two sides on the 19th of August 1974 as historic. Its significance lay not so much in the elimination of the specific cause of the dispute (namely) the partition of the Bureimi oasis and thus the oil rights of the two states in the area) but rather in Riyadh's official recognition of the UAE which marked the opening of an Arab "political counter-offensive" against Teheran. The prize at stake was control of the Gulf. Among other provisions the agreement gave Saudi Arabia control of a 16 mile (25 km) long corridor for the building of an oil pipeline from the Southern Saudi oil fields to a 3 mile wide outlet on the Gulf, in UAE territorial waters.

A second step towards a preliminary regional agreement was taken in December 1974 at a mini-summit held at Damman (a provincial capital in the eastern zone of the Saudi oil fields) and attended by the Emirs of Bahrein and Qatar and the president of the Union of Arab Emirates. The meeting was deliberately unofficial. Nonetheless, coinciding as it did with large-scale military manoeuvres by Iran, CENTO and the VII fleet centred on logistic bases in Pakistan (Minlink 74) its political significance was clear.

Although these initiatives in no way worried the Western allies, when seen from Teheran they had disturbing implications. There was even greater interest in a second Saudi initiative in the south of the peninsula. Here first Egypt and later Kuwait acted as mediators between King Feisal's conservative regime in Riyadh and the radical South Yemeni government in Aden. The unofficial improvement in relations between the two states marked by the end of the state of war on the Hadramauth frontiers was, despite its ambiguities, a very significant development.

Since the fall in 1969 of Qathan Shaabis' moderate regime, the USA had entrusted Saudi Arabia with the task of overthrowing Salem Robai'e's new radical government by force. This policy had now, for the moment, failed. In October 1973, thanks to Soviet mediation, the Aden government had granted an Egyptian request to use its territorial waters for the blockade of the Bab el Mandeb straights, designed to prevent Iranian supplies of oil to Israel. The Saudis were even more embarrassed when Iranian intervention in the Dhofar spread

towards the South Yemeni frontier. Feisal could not risk being seen in the same light as the Shah as an aggressor against another Arab state. Thus it was that at the same time as Cairo and Aden resumed diplomatic relations in view of a renewed blockade of the straights at the entry to the Red Sea, Kuwait informed Aden that she was willing to act as a mediator between South Yemen and the Saudi government.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were now convinced that in order to oppose Iranian agrandisement (and the mass discontent in the Gulf to which it was leading) an armistice was necessary on the southern frontier of the Arabian peninsula. In return South Yemen and the guerrilla movement it supported in Oman (the PFLOAG) were requested to cease propaganda against the Saudi and other conservative regimes in the Gulf, thus allowing the latter to give full support to the military and political struggle against Iran and Sultan Qabus' regime.

For at least two reasons the Yemeni Democratic Republic also felt the need to negotiate despite support from the USSR and Lybia (Gheddafi was now convinced, like Feisal, that Aden's nationalist line was of greater significance than the South Yemeni regime's ideological preference). With Iraq reducing her financial and logistic support (a reduction which was probably due to the talks in progress with Iran) it was no longer possible to fight on more than one front. At the same time there was a need for loans and grants from the various Arab development funds, to deal with urgent economic problems. These had so far been blocked by Saudi Arabia. It was soon clear that the negotiations between Aden and Riyadh (even when they took place indirectly through Kuwaiti mediation, witness the visit of the South Yemeni foreign minister to Kuwait in mid-December 1974) were leading to concrete results. Talks began on the joint exploitation of a vast oil field on the edge of the Rob al Khali desert and on a planned pipeline to carry Saudi production through Yemeni territory to an outlet on the Indian Ocean.

#### THE RED SEA AND THE ERITREAN PENINSULA

King Feisal's policy in this region was conducted on two fronts: on the one hand

he improved relations with the Yemen Democratic Republic and financed Somali development plans (despite Somali links with the Soviet Union similar to those of Aden); on the other, he supported in January 1975 the consolidation of anti-radical, Islamic regimes in Sudan and North Yemen. His was an ambiguous regional strategy which, along the Red Sea and on the Eritrean peninsula, as elsewhere, aimed at establishing a local balance of power system outside the spheres of influence of the major powers. As the development of the Eritrean crisis showed, the region threatened to become the theatre for new conflict between the latter.

In Ethiopia the normalization process in which the State Department appears to have taken a direct interest, has met with growing difficulties both within the country proper and in Eritrea. After the split between military and civilians in October and with the upsurge in social and political tension the new holders of power within the Derg seem even more confused and incapable. After Adorn's death the growing instability of the situation led the State Department to adopt a policy of wait and see. Moscow and Peking attempted to seize this opportunity and opened contacts with the Derg. However in no way could cautious moves such as these resolve the junta's problems. Without the support of the radicals it had no power over the masses and was unable to control peasant rebellions in several provinces instigated by the Ras. In Eritrea the attempt to negotiate with a third force, thus isolating the liberation movement failed. At this point the Derg looked for external mediators. However, although it has succeeded in winning the silence of African leaders in the OAU (The Organization for African Unity) it has found no allies in the Arab world.

There is growing military and diplomatic support for the Eritrean guerrillas from both radical and traditional Arab states. This has been particularly important recently since the tactical agreement between the two wings of the Liberation Front, the Popular Forces and the General Command. The motives underlying Arab policy are clear.

First of all the leaders of the ELF have repeatedly declared that the independent, non-aligned state they would like to see, should contribute to the formation of a Red Sea region, outside the spheres of influence

of the super-powers with complimentary economic interests to those of the European countries. Such an objective clearly fits in well with the balance of power policy being pursued by various Arab leaders. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has played a crucial role in the isolation of the Ethiopian Junta. Saudi loans and grants, not only to the Derg, but also to Sudan and Somalia (who are mediating in the dispute) have been made conditional on the acceptance of the conditions laid down by the ELF, i.e. principally, the recognition of the Front as the sole representative of the Eritrean people and the opening of negotiations with the front at an international level.

Added to these considerations is the Arab countries' general mistrust of the Derg due to its internal instability and its ambiguous unofficial alliances with Iran and Israel, both of which supply the junta with arms for anti-guerrilla operations.

The present regional balance of power and the effort which the Arab countries will be obliged to devote to negotiations with Israel, once these have reopened, seem to make Eritrean independence unlikely in the short run. In the longer term, it seems as if a settlement in the Red Sea could follow one of two lines, both of which have been explored in secret negotiations during the last few months, namely a triple alliance between Eritrea, Somalia and South Yemen, closely integrated with the conservative half of the Arab world (which would imply the tempering of radical policy emanating from Aden and Mogadishu) or, alternatively a federal solution with Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti retaining their status as independent states and with special autonomous status for the provinces of Eritrea and Ogaden.

This last solution, proposed semi-officially by Somalia and a number of other African states and supported by the Soviet Union seems, since February 1975 to have won favour with a part of the Derg. This possibility was one of the considerations responsible for the resumption by the United States (already under heavy pressure from Tel Aviv) of military supplies to the Ethiopian regime. Worried by the danger of a new Soviet foreign policy thrust in the Red Sea the State Department decided to partially meet the Derg's requests and supplied seven million dollars' worth of heavy armaments. Ethiopia has always received Israel and United States' support

both under the old Imperial and the new pseudo-progressive regime. The establishment on the Eritrean peninsula of pro-Arab regimes or regimes integrated into the Arab world would be dangerous to Israeli and American interests. In particular an Eritrean-Somali-Yemeni blockade on the entrance to the Red Sea would be as potentially dangerous as Nasser's 1967 blockade at Sharm el Sheik.

In February 1975 official declarations from Addis Abbaba, Tel Aviv and Washington made it clear that "there is no question of the Red Sea becoming an Arab sea". This policy has led to a rapid increase in Djibouti's strategic importance. Although the decolonization process initiated by the OAU seems to be secure, France has, under US pressure, reinforced her defence forces in the region.

#### TOWARDS A NEW REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER

In these circumstances, although the Saudi policy of improving relations with South Yemen, of financing the Somali regime and of giving unconditional diplomatic and economic support to the Eritrean guerrilla movement was originally determined by the goal of reducing the Soviet Union's real and potential room for manoeuvre in the region. It has in practice resulted, at the same time, in a weakening of US positions. The support of a good part, even of the pro-American, Arab world for the Saudi line has intensified this effect.

This situation would tend to suggest that the Americans might in the future try to give new impetus to the Shah's role both in the Gulf and in the Middle-East proper thus rapidly substituting a Cairo-Teheran for the present Cairo-Riyad axis. In today's changed pattern of inter-Arab relations and relations between Europe and the USA the Shah seems an ideal American ally. In the last few months Teheran has played its diplomatic and economic cards in such a way as to win credibility for its policy. Within OPEC Iran has allied with the more radical states such as Algeria and Iraq. Among the third world countries she has relaunched the idea of the so-called "triangular economic strategy", i.e. the establishment in developing countries of industrial enterprises financed by Iranian capital

exploiting European technology. These choices in the field of investment and oil policy show the high degree of complementarity which exists between US and Iranian interests. The Shah needs to industrialize, or at least appear to industrialize rapidly in order to establish a privileged relationship between Iran and the EEC, and to beat the other oil producers in obtaining preferential trading agreements. This objective was shown clearly in Teheran's request to Egypt for a free trade zone along the Mediterranean coast in return for Iranian investment. The USA needs to suffocate at birth any attempt by European countries to relaunch policies directed towards the Mediterranean. If relations between the Europeans and Arabs pass through the trusted mediation of Teheran this becomes a possibility. The Shah's Middle-Eastern tour to Cairo and Amman in January 1975 aimed at giving Iranian support to the main objectives of the Kissinger mission. (It was no coincidence that it took place shortly after the announcement of the cancellation of Brezhnev's visit to the area). Kissinger aimed at the isolation of Syrian and Palestinian led radical forces. He sought a renewed role for King Hussein as a party to the negotiations, the aim being to bypass the resolutions of the Rabat summit, the Shah brought a message from the USA containing Tel Aviv's conditions for disengagement on the West Bank) and also hoped to increase pressure for Israeli disengagement in Sinai. The Shah presented himself as a guarantor of Israel's territorial security and declared himself ready to supply the Israelis with a quantity of oil equivalent to that produced by the Abu Rudeis wells, returned to the Egyptians.

His meetings with Kissinger in Switzerland on the eve of the latter's Middle-Eastern mission, and those with Giscard d'Estaing confirmed the acceptance of Teheran's role and the success of attempts to make Iran into a tool of American strategy towards the most advanced European country in the field of Mediterranean policy. At the trilateral conference in Paris in April 1975 Iran formed part of the restricted delegation from the producer countries.

The Shah aimed at producing a vertical split in the Arab world and at preventing the establishment of direct relations between oil-consuming and oil-producing countries. In February 1975 however Saudi Arabia opened a new diplomatic offensive, the

objective of which was to rebuild old alliances and to guarantee Syria in her isolated position *vis-à-vis* Egypt. Feisal's visit to Amman and the credit and financial aid he brought with him aimed on the one hand at reaffirming the decisions taken at Rabat concerning the representative status of the PLO and on the other at achieving *de facto* reconciliation between Hussein and Yasser Arafat. He failed to achieve a third goal, namely the ending of the Jordani commitment with the Iranians in Oman.

From a European point of view the Iranian diplomatic offensive seems more incisive than Feisal's initiatives. However, despite her poorer prospects for short-term development Saudi Arabia is able, by exploiting her religious prestige and economic strength, to influence Arab governments regardless of their ideological affiliation. As Kissinger's position has weakened she has used this power to offer herself as an alternative to the USSR as a source of material aid. Paradoxically it has been the need to outbid the Soviet Union which has led her to support the principle of a global solution to the Middle-Eastern conflict and to supply sophisticated weapons to countries on the front line. During the first months of 1975 Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait concluded multi-billion dollar contracts for heavy weapons and aircraft to reduce Egyptian and Syrian dependence on the Soviet armaments industry.

On the other side of the Gulf and in the South of the Arabian peninsula Iran too has been giving increasing weight to her armaments policy. She supported Ford and Kissinger's line on intervention and prepared the way for direct US penetration of the region. In February 1975 she transferred to the United States her air and naval rights on the Massadam peninsula around Rous al tabal in northern Oman, a key position for the control of the Gulf. Meanwhile the United States, already installed in Oman, under cover of a private fishing company (Madel) engaged in naval surveillance, asked Sultan Qabus for the right to use the British Masirah air and sea base on the Gulf for strategic purposes (in return for the economic and military cooperation agreements signed in January 1974).

Direct US intervention in the region was apparent not only in Oman but also in intensified air and sea manoeuvres in the south of the Arabian peninsula and in the sending of troops and instructors to oil

installations in the Gulf (under preexisting bilateral defence pacts the terms of which are still binding on the oil-producing states).

The Algiers agreement with Iraq over the Kurdish question (achieved thanks to Egyptian and Algerian mediation) constituted for Iran a new launching platform for her *rapprochement* with the Arab world. This agreement, although it was supported by the USSR in return for Iranian non-alignment and for trade with Teheran (as negotiated during the Shah's visit to Moscow in November 1974) may well come to form an integral part of the Iranian and CENTO policy of building a new anti-Soviet balance of power in the region. Iran now has an opportunity to reduce the large share of her budget devoted to armaments (mainly supplied by the Soviet Union) and to detach herself from a series of anti-Iranian, anti-Saudi alliances with radical regimes and movements in the Gulf (alliances which de facto have already ceased to exist). It seems as if this may lead Baghdad to favour a more discriminating choice of alliance partners and thus an Egyptian style foreign policy.

The resumption of diplomatic relations between Baghdad and Teheran led Colonel Ghedafi to visit Riyadh at the beginning of March 1975. Although like Feisal the colonel was profoundly anti-communist and thus indifferent to the risk that the Soviet Union might lose its privileges on the Iraqi air and sea base at Omm Qasr, he saw in the Algiers agreement a victory for his main enemy, Iran, and a definitive weakening of the Arab front. Overall the significance of his visit to Riyadh lay in the ending of an old quarrel with Feisal and the explicit recognition he gave to Saudi Arabia's leading role in defending the "Arabness" of the region.

King Feisal's murder seems to have interrupted the development of his policy of pursuing a regional balance of power. It has confirmed Iranian leadership in the region. (This was demonstrated by the Shah's visit to Riyadh and Teheran's proposal for a summit meeting to discuss problems of regional security in the Gulf). At the same time it has marked a return of Saudi Arabia to unconditional loyalty to the United States. Direct relations with Washington are today completely under the control of Fahed and Yamani.

In fact, one should recall that, since the first disagreements between Aramco and

the Saudi government, State Department experts had predicted that Feisal's probable successor would be Prince Fahed (seen as an American ally, albeit a leader who could cause the United States problems) a man who could guarantee the continuity of US long-term strategy in oil, finance and defence policy. Under Feisal the military technocratic faction led by the Prince, by Sultan, the Minister of Defence and Yamani, the Minister for Oil had been allowed considerable leeway in determining Saudi bilateral relations with the United States. The Saudis expected that concessions here would be rewarded in the negotiations with Israel.

Furthermore, at Feisal's funeral Vice-President Rockefeller emphasized the United States' desire to strengthen cooperation between Riyadh and Washington, particularly in the mixed economic and military commissions set up to manage the ten-year corporation programme agreed to in spring 1974. The first meeting of the Commission was chaired by Fahed himself. Both the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Colby, and the vice-secretary for security affairs at the Pentagon were present.

However Saudi Arabia began once again to attempt the construction of an alliance capable of balancing Iranian power and protecting Arab interests. This tortuous process was centred around the *rapprochement* between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen.

The resumption of diplomatic relations between the conservative Ryad government and the socialist administration in Aden on the 10th of March 1975 seems to have been dictated less by any Saudi desire to smother the latter's subservive ideology than by Ryad's aim of generally strengthening the Arab front in the region. It is this front which Saudi Arabia is trying to activate in order to oppose Iran's hegemonic aims in the zone. As we have seen it was during the last months of Feisal's reign that the first unofficial moves were made towards a *rapprochement* and that the Saudi Arabians proposed a joint venture to extract oil from the Saudi controlled fields at Rob Al Khali and to transport the oil to a terminal on Yemeni territory on the Indian Ocean coast. Following Feisal's assassination the project stagnated. It was thought that the violently pro-western Wahabite family clan, led by Emir Fahed and Emir Sultan, the group most willing to

accept Iranian military leadership in the Gulf, was about to assert itself. However the deterioration in the atmosphere of reconciliation between Riyadh and Teheran, created by Fahed with the help of US mediation and the failure of negotiations for a series of multilateral Irani-Arab initiatives favoured a return to the alternative pan-Arab line (a line strongly tinted with conservatism and anti-communism). This was the policy which Feisal had favoured. Now it was ably re-exhumed by the other branch of the Wahabites led by King Khaled and Feysal's son, the foreign minister, Saud el Feysal. Once Teheran began to suffer from the first serious economic effects of her accelerated development strategy and thus to lose her power of political persuasion with the Gulf Arab emirates which she had previously been trying to draw into her sphere of influence, Ryad began to make a tougher stand. Rather than the "Regional Security Pact" wanted by Teheran (a pact which given Iranian logistic superiority would inevitably have had to recognize Iran's hegemony over the other countries in the region) Saudi Arabia has recently been proposing an integrated development programme for the Arabian peninsula. This would work through joint commercial and financial ventures. The long term aim would be a regional federal pact. A first step was taken in this direction with the opening of negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for a Gulf Common Market. The Saudis also made the proposition, accepted by the other Arab Emirates, to set up a Special Development Fund for the poorest countries in the Gulf, namely North and South Yemen and Bahrein. This would be based in Kuwait. South Yemen became the cornerstone of Saudi strategy. This was in part due to its strategic position, in part to the South Yemeni government's long-standing policy of hostility towards Iran. The South Yemenis were thus the first beneficiaries of the new Arab fund's development aid policy. The Aden government received a first *tranche* of 400 million dollars of which a part came from Saudi Arabia. This sum was to be used to finance the programmes in the new five year plan. At the same time, at the end of April the presidents of the Kuwait Development Fund (the KFAED) and the Abu Dhabi Development Fund (the ADFAED) visited Aden to examine requests for funds for further Yemeni projects. These initiatives demonstrated Riyadh's objective of giving

credibility to the Yemeni regime.

In return for indirect and direct Saudi support Aden has committed herself to giving political guarantees to the various conservative regimes in the Gulf. This has not, however prevented her from improving relations with the Socialist countries (the USSR, Cuba and China). The recent tour by the Yemeni foreign minister, Mohammed Motieh, during which he visited Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrein, the Union of Arab Emirates and Iraq should be seen in the light of this policy. His aim was to persuade these countries to give their support to the Saudi programme and to cut themselves off from Iranian influence. Aden has also taken on the role of mediator between Riyadh and the government of the Somali Republic. Here the objective has been to open a regional dialogue capable, despite Mogadishu's alliance with the Soviet Union, of guaranteeing Somalia's "benevolent neutrality" within the Arab League towards the Saudi strategic programme. All the countries of the peninsula, with the exception of Oman have agreed in principle to the Saudi plan. In the event of an Iranian blockade on the straits of Hormuz a 1600 Km pipeline network is available to carry Gulf oil to the Yemeni terminal at Mokalla.

## APPENDIX

### YEMEN

Despite Abyssinian, Persian and Turkish domination, Yemeni territorial integrity remained intact from the time of the Queen of Sheba right up to 1840, the year in which Britain began an active policy in the region. Since then the country has been torn by internal struggles between sheiks, sultans and the religious authorities.

At the end of World War I the Turks evacuated the country. The North was left under a monarchy, headed by the Imam, El Badr and the South under British control. (The Aden colony and the Protectorate of Southern Arabia were administered directly; the Southern Arabian Federation, consisting of 23 distinct sheikdoms and sultanates, indirectly).

The first insurrection in the region took place in North Yemen where, on the 26th

of September 1962, after years of struggle, the Imam's obscurantist regime was overthrown and replaced by a constitutional republic, presided over by a pro-Nasserite, General Sallal. The new regime however had to face a drawn-out civil war between republicans and royalists; a war which ended only in May 1970 with a "moderate" settlement.

As was shown by recent coups d'état in June 1974 and January 1975, the struggle for power in North Yemen continues. It represents more than a local factional or tribal conflict. Once again, as in 1962, it is a conflict between "progressives" who once supported Nasserism and are now radical Marxist-Leninists with international backing from China and the Soviet Union) and pro-Saudi Arabian conservative supporters of Pan-Arabism.

Political developments in the North had a deterrent effect on the anti-British movements which had, since autumn 1963, been operating in the South, namely the left wing Arab nationalist National Liberation Front (NLF) active in the Eastern regions of the Hadramauth supported by China and the Soviet Union and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), which operated in the Aden region and received support from moderate forces within the Arab world. Despite their conflicting positions the two movements succeeded in steadily increasing their pressure until Britain was forced, after the Six Days War and the closure of the Suez Canal to abandon the South Arabian Federation and to take up defensive positions in the neighbouring Sultanate of Oman. On the 30th of November 1967 Britain evacuated Aden. The NLF, which in the meantime had crushed FLOSY, founded a South Yemeni Peoples Republic, with Qatan Schaabi as President. London, however, acting in concert with Riyadh, was preparing the way for a restoration of the balance of power in the area.

On the 4th of November 1967 the overthrow of General Sallal and his replacement as president by the pro-Saudi Al Ariani marked the beginning of a return to power by reactionary forces in North Yemen. Their aim was to block any possible expansion of "subversive forces" in the area or in the Red Sea and to create a continual military threat on the northern frontier of the newly-born democratic republic of South Yemen. The return to the past in

the North consummated in May 1970 with the inclusion of royalist representatives in the new government coalition was matched by a radicalization of the South Yemeni regime. On the 22nd of June 1969 the left wing of the NLF replaced President Schaabi, a moderate, with a five-man revolutionary council presided over by Salem Robai's. The different political complexion of the two Yemeni regimes led to a serious deterioration in relations between Sana and Aden. The situation was exacerbated by a series of raids across the northern frontier by armed mercenary bands, led by FLOSY exiles and North Yemeni tribal chiefs, trained by western advisors with support and finance from Saudi Arabia. The Sana and Riyadh governments feared the spread of subversion in the sultanate of Oman where the Dhofar Liberation Front was active) and the strengthening of relations between Aden, the Soviet Union and China. Their policy encouraged the permanent division of the two Yemens and tendencies towards secession in the Eastern oil-bearing regions of the South (Wadia and Hadramautih). These were to be incorporated into Saudi Arabia. The failure between September 1970 and 1972 of policies of intervention and the grave military reverses suffered by the Sana regime encouraged on the other hand Aden's proposals for the reunification of the two states on a popular democratic basis.

To date the agreement reached in Cairo on the 28th of October 1972, which committed the two parties to settle the terms for reunification within a year, has had no practical effect. On the contrary, it has been endangered by a series of coups d'état in the North, organized by Saudi Arabia whenever the Sana leaders have seemed willing to accept proposals for reunification. Prime Minister Mohson Al Aini (who in 1973 had succeeded the conservative Qadi al Ariani) was first weakened by the coup d'état in January 1974 and then finally thrust aside in a ministerial re-shuffle in January 1975. Whilst the Saudi Arabians exerted pressure to reinforce the conservatism of the Sana regime, South Yemeni affairs were further complicated by the escalation in the struggle in Oman, where since the end of 1973 an Iranian expeditionary force had been engaged in operations against the Omani liberation movement which Aden supported. Nonetheless the growing differences between Teheran and Riyadh led to a slackening of Saudi opposi-

tion to the Aden regime. By 1974 the state of war on the South Yemeni northern frontier had, de facto, ceased to exist.

In March 1976 it was announced that the governments of Saudi Arabia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) "in a spirit of Islamic solidarity and mutual understanding" had agreed to establish diplomatic relations. Their aim was to "safeguard the Arabian Peninsula against Israeli or other foreign interference".

The normalization of relations between the revolutionary regime in Aden and Saudi Arabia was logically coherent with the former's aim of breaking out of the isolation in which since 1969 (the year in which it first openly declared its Marxism) it had found itself. This aim had first become apparent at the sixth congress of the National Liberation Front (NLF), held the previous year.

Fattah Ismail was the strong man of the ruling triumvirate which apart from himself included Rubaya, the head of state, and Ali Nasser, the Prime Minister. His statement of the government's intention to begin a policy of "ideological coexistence" with the monarchical regimes of the region drew much criticism. His critics, both within the country and amongst his international allies, believed that this "turnabout" in policy might lead to the capitulation of the PDRY, which had become a symbol and an inspiration to revolutionaries throughout the region.

With time however it has become clear that the ruling group in Aden has directed policy in such a way not only as to avoid concessions on matters of principle but also as to win advantages for the unstable Yemeni economy.

The dialogue with Saudi Arabia which opened under Feisal meant the removal of the Saudi veto on the use of the "Arab Development Funds" to finance projects vital to South Yemen.

In exchange Aden seems to have accepted the need to "neutralize" Yemeni foreign policy. While maintaining relations with the Socialist world the government is willing to consider an opening towards the West.

## OMAN

The Sultanate of Oman resulted from

British dismemberment of the South Arabian region. Through a century and a half of domination over the Sultanate of Muscat, Britain succeeded both in achieving the balkanization of the western coastal region of the Gulf (then the Trucial Oman, today the Federation of Arab Emirates) and at the same time, through the direct occupation of the Masandam peninsula in ensuring control over entry to the Gulf. British hegemony in the region was finally assured when, in 1955, British troops intervened to impose the rule of the Sultan of Muscat on the independent Oman Imamate and over the Bureima oasis. The two regions were thus opened for oil exploration by Shell. Political affairs in Oman during the 1950's and the 1960's were largely determined by conflicts of interest between Shell and Aramco (which operated in neighbouring Saudi Arabia). Even the nationalist struggle against colonialism was affected by this Anglo-American dispute, as well as by complications deriving from conflicts between coastal tribes loyal to the Sultan of Muscat and the agricultural and pastoral tribes in the mountains who followed the Imam. The Imam's theocratic leadership, supported by Saudi Arabia and Aramco led in 1957 and 1959 to anti-British revolts. However it was only with the formation of a genuine national front, freed from British and American influence, that the anticolonial movement took on a strong political and ideological colouring. Established in June 1965 the independence movement, the Front for the Liberation of the Dhofar (the Southern province of Oman) grew rapidly and maintained close contacts with the South Yemeni National Liberation Front which was active in the border zones. The establishment of the South Yemeni Republic in 1967 and the radicalization of the regime in 1969 were partially responsible for the broadening of the strategic objectives of the Front for the Liberation of the Dhofar. The principle of armed struggle against British colonialism, the monopolies and feudal and tribal structures was extended to the whole of the Gulf.

In view of these goals the Guerrilla movement took the name of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). The extension of the armed struggle which in 1969 achieved the liberation of three-quarters of Oman's southern provinces and the establishment in northern Oman of a new guerrilla "foco" organized by a parallel group, the National

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (NDFLOAG) placed the British occupation forces in a critical position. In concert with the United States Britain decided on the rationalization of the regime. The old Sultan of Muscat was replaced by his reformist son, Qabus. The accession of the new Sultan in July 1970 marked the end of the contradictions between US and British politico-economic interests and opened the way for intensive exploitation of the region's oil reserves. At the end of 1971 the two liberation fronts merged forming the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf. The struggle for the overthrow of feudal, autocratic regimes in the area was extended and aid was given to North Yemeni and Iranian progressive forces. The development of the nationalist struggle led, at the end of 1973, to intervention by an Iranian expeditionary force, backed by Pakistani and Jordani mercenaries, in support of the Sultan. In June 1974, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf announced a drastic change in strategy. The objectives of the struggle were once again confined to the Oman. The organization changed its name, becoming once more the Front for the Liberation of Oman.

This change was partly due to the muting of Aden's polemics against Saudi Arabia, in part to profound changes which had taken place within the region. (China had reversed her previous position and had begun to support Iranian foreign policy in the Gulf and the rapprochement between Teheran and Baghdad).

In the early months of 1975 the guerrillas' fortune began to wane rapidly. Secret agreements between Qabus and Kissinger gave the seventh fleet access to the former British air and naval base on the island of Masirah. Meanwhile the Iranians opened their offensive. In the first stage of their action, which lasted from February until June they reasserted government control over the coastal region from Salalah to Huf and opened a supply route between the Dhofar and the Northern regions along the Salalah axis. They also built a defensive line (the Demaiand line) isolating the guerrillas in the mountain zone along the Yemeni border. In a second offensive in October, they delivered the *coup de grace*, conquering the historic Rakiut fortress and those frontier villages through which the guerrillas had received their Soviet and Lybian military

supplies. Whilst military communiqués continued to talk of sporadic fighting and announced the surrender of the Front's two most prestigious leaders (Ami Al Omery and Salem Hol) Sultan Qabus announced the beginning of an ambitious reconstruction programme.

## V. RELATIONS BETWEEN MOROCCO AND SPAIN

Spanish-Moroccan relations date from Moroccan independence. Following the publication of the joint Franco-Moroccan communiqué which on the 2nd of March 1956 announced the ending of the French protectorate, Spain, on the 7th of April, gave independence to that part of Morocco under Spanish administration, thus opening the way to the unification of a country, divided since the Convention of Madrid in 1912. (On the basis of this convention, France, which with the Treaty of Fez had established a French protectorate over the whole of Morocco ceded to Spain the Northern sector of the Sherifian Empire). The 7th of April declaration was politically and perhaps legally unavoidable. Nevertheless, it showed that Spain, like France had decided to talk, to reject classic colonialism.

The handover of power was achieved rapidly being completed on the 28th of July 1956. The special relationship between the two capitals (eased by traditionally good relations between Madrid and the Arab world) were maintained. Spanish policy was adroitly executed and if it had not been marred by one fundamental contradiction, might well have led to the establishment of the cooperative relationship sought by both sides. However, decolonization was incomplete. Madrid retained control over the so-called Spanish Sahara, over Ceuta, Melilla and other minor fortresses on the Mediterranean, and over fni and its hinterland on the Atlantic. Rabat's well-justified claims on these territories resulted in a deterioration in relation with Spain. This caused difficult diplomatic negotiations, often accompanied by use of arms, even though these negotiations and conflicts nearly always found a solution, positive to both sides.

It was towards the end of the fifteenth century that Spaniards, sailing from the Canary Islands, landed where Infi stands today. However both on account of the region's lack of natural resources and because of tribal revolts, European settlement was limited to a few fishermen. In 1860 after the war between Spain and the Sherifian Empire, the agreement of Tetuan gave the former sovereignty over a port and "sufficient territory for the establishment of a fishing station". The port was built at Sidi Ifni. Expansion into the interior began in 1934, seventy-four years after the Treaty of Tetuan. The last ownerless land, which after the Franco-Spanish agreements of 1900, 1904 and 1912, had served as a sanctuary for rebels, was occupied.

After independence Morocco either directly organized or otherwise supported armed opposition within the Spanish enclave. As in the western Sahara armed irregulars, the Greater Saharan Liberation Army, began operations in Ifni, attacking, in November 1957, the Spanish garrison. The Ifni revolt, which had already spread to the Sahara, was put down with great difficulty in December of the same year. This was apparently behind a hardening of the Spanish government line. Ifni was declared to be a Spanish province. Nonetheless the revolt was not in vain. In 1960 agreement was reached in principle, on the future of the enclave. During the 1960's, the Spanish attitude gradually softened. In order to maintain good relations with the Arab world and, more importantly, in order to be able to pursue its claims on Gibraltar, the Madrid government sought to demonstrate its decolonizing zeal. As a result, on the 6th of January 1969, an agreement was signed whereby the Atlantic port and its hinterland reverted to Morocco and Spain was granted fishing concessions and other special rights in the zone.

The settlement of this dispute has not however led to an immediate improvement in relations between the two countries. In fact, in 1969, Spain seemed unwilling to cede its economically and strategically more important possessions. This applies particularly to Ceuta (occupied by the Portuguese in 1415 and acquired by Philip II in 1581), and to Melilla (which has been Spanish held since 1497). There are other less important enclaves, again on the Moroccan

Mediterranean coast, at Peñón de Velez de la Gomera, Penon de Alhucemas and on the Chafarinas archipelago. Moroccan claims are countered by the Spanish government's contention that these are not colonies but rather "plazas de soberania" included, to all effects and purposes, in the territory of the metropolis. What is more the majority of the inhabitants are Spaniards favourable to the maintenance of present links with the mother country.

The only time at which Spain showed some willingness to negotiate was during the campaign for the annexation of Gibraltar. Having failed in this objective the Madrid government returned to its more usual intransigent position, rendering vain all Moroccan attempts to reach a bilateral agreement. At this point King Hassan II decided to go to the United Nations and on the 27th of January 1975 requested that the UN Committee on Decolonization discuss the sovereignty of Spanish territory on the Moroccan coast. After a meeting of the Council of Ministers on the 7th of February the Spanish replied with a declaration denouncing "manoeuvres" by those opposed to what was termed "the peaceful, legitimate, historically justified and internationally recognized" presence of "Spanish populations on the other side of the straight of Gibraltar". Madrid warned that she would resort to "all legitimate measures which might prove necessary". On the 8th of February troops and landing units were sent to the enclaves. This was seen by Rabat as an "intolerable provocation" and a situation of serious tension was created, which gradually diminished over the following months until completely nonexistent. At this point, an agreement having been reached on the Sahara which favoured Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla represented Rabat's "counterconcessions" (officially however, this type of barter was denied).

This agreement imposed some terms on what was the main bone of contention between Rabat and Madrid. The contention over that territory, in fact, did not begin only with nationalistic or ethnic claims but also with conflicting economic interest. At the end of the 1960's enormous phosphate deposits were found on the territory. The Spanish first settled along the Saharan coastline in the fifteenth century. However the occupation proper began in 1884 with the annexation by decree of Rio de Oro and Sequia el-Hamra (which were then

unified as the Spanish Sahara) and the foundation of the town of Villa Cesnires. The borders with French Morocco and Mauritania were defined by the Franco-Spanish agreements of 1900, 1904 and 1912. In 1934, as part of a reorganization of the Spanish Moroccan protectorate the Saharan zone was placed under the centralized administration of the governor of Ifni. After independence Morocco claimed sovereignty over the territory which the Rabat authorities called the Moroccan Western Sahara. In 1957-58 as has already been mentioned irregular forces began guerrilla actions which spread from Ifni to the Sahara. These forces were not directly controlled by the Rabat authorities, at least some of whom favoured negotiation. They came largely from more nationalistic and radical elements on the Moroccan political spectrum (beginning with the Istiqlal).

The insurrection ended in spring 1959. The rebels were finished off by French troops stationed in Mauritania who, in February 1959 had joined the Spanish in a massive offensive. At this point negotiations began leading, on the 1st of April, to an agreement signed at Cintra whereby the ten thousand square mile (25,000 sq km) Tarfaya region, all that remained of the old Spanish Moroccan protectorate, was returned to Morocco. There followed a period of relative calm during which Mauritania entered the dispute. In October 1964 Nouakchott with Algerian support, informed the UN that he intended to begin direct negotiations with Spain over the Sahara. Faced by an initiative which, objectively speaking, was bound to limit his own claims, Hassan II attempted to accelerate negotiations with Spain. Talks held by the Moroccan foreign minister in Madrid in September 1967 failed to achieve any concrete results. Nonetheless the Spanish government seemed almost resigned to losing the territory. In December, following a request from the UN that after consultations with Morocco and Mauritania, (relations between which were anything other than friendly), Spain should organize a referendum, Madrid let it be known that it accepted the principle of self-determination.

In 1970 however there was a radical change in the situation. In July of that year a meeting between the Spanish foreign minister and Hassan II showed that there existed very serious differences be-

tween the two sides, due to new knowledge as to the exact size of the Saharan phosphate deposits, the wealth of which was sufficient to justify the maintenance, indeed the strengthening of the Spanish colonial apparatus.

On the diplomatic front the Spanish emphasized the need for a gradual withdrawal, for "guided decolonization". On the 27th of February 1973 Madrid revealed the existence of a General Assembly of the Saharan People which, on the 20th of the same month had requested the metropolis to organize a referendum on self-determination and had in the meantime reconfirmed its loyalty to General Franco. Rabat's first reaction was measured. Hassan let it be understood that he could accept the referendum only if the franchise was extended to Saharan refugees resident in Morocco. He also asked for international guarantees. However in an audience with Minister Lopez Braco at the end of March, he implied that partly because of a Spanish decision to extend Morocco's fishing zone, he was not totally opposed to the Assembly's deliberations.

Later, however, the Moroccan government took a more radical position, this being due to outright opposition to the Assembly from the Liberation movements (the Morehob, the nationalist movement of the so-called blue men transferred its headquarters from Rabat to Algiers), Algeria and Mauritania. Morocco tried without success to agree with these two governments on a common political line. Even the Agadir summit held in July 1973, between Hassan II, Ould Daddah and Boumedienne ended without any resolution of the basic differences which separated the three countries.

Algeria continued to support independence for the Sahara perhaps as an Algerian protectorate. Mauritanian claims on the Southern sector of the Spanish Sahara, also claimed by Morocco, were maintained. Spain was thus left with considerable room for manoeuvre. After the failure of a visit to Madrid by the Moroccan Prime Minister Ahmed Osman the Spanish representative at the UN announced on the 21st of August 1974, that, in line with a resolution approved at the "glass palace" on the 14th of December 1974, a referendum would be held under UN auspices before the end of 1975. Rabat responded that Morocco could accept the referendum only on condition that

Spanish troops were first withdrawn from the territory and that the question put to the voters was not whether they favoured independence, but rather whether they favoured the annexation of the Sahara by Morocco.

One was dealing with different interpretations of autodetermination and decolonisations that, strictly in the juridical sense, could not be reconciled. However both Spain and UN in their transient "alliance", even though for different reasons, did not succeed in giving weight to their point of view. In May 1975, the government in Madrid presented a note to the United Nations in which it announced its intention to withdraw from the contested territory as soon as possible. This was the last, and the most risky, attempt to give the reins to the Secretary General Waldheim. However the initiations of such action, which essentially consisted in a conference with the participation of all the parties concerned failed due to Moroccan hostility. The long awaited reply of the International Court of Justice of the Hague provided no conclusion. The court, clinching the UN's main deliberations, stated that the Sahara's future was to be decided by a referendum since, even if legal ties existed between some tribes of the Sahara and the Sherif monarchies previously, these ties were extremely transient and therefore insufficient to justify an annexation with Morocco. It was termed inconclusive judgement even though on the one hand Rabat contested it and on the other interpreted it liberally, prohibiting every solution of the question agreed upon and finishing later with the abandoning of the sophist tactics in favour of the use of force.

It is on this practical plain that the legal position was stalemated. In fact, at the end of October, Hassan II launched the so-called green march, a peaceful invasion of the territory by hundreds of thousands of volunteers gathered together under the flag of nationalism. Spain replied to this invasion in an even milder manner. At the roots of Madrid's attitude, seemingly contradictory to the positions formerly taken, was the difficulty of putting together a valid and precise political line at the time when Franco revealed enormous problems. There was, however, also the fact that "objective convergence" of interests between Madrid and Rabat existed, deriving from

the fact that the both belonged to the Western bloc. It was not insignificant that when the volunteers of the green march passed the border between Morocco and the Sahara, it was the mission of the American Vice Secretary of State, Alfred Atherton, which avoided armed conflict and initiated direct negotiations between Spain and Morocco. These were concluded with the agreement of November 14th, which was signed also by the Mauritians. This demonstrated that, still on the practical side, the enmity between the parties had already matured: on one hand the supporters of the annexation and faithfulness to Kissinger, Morocco, Spain and, a little against her will, Mauritania; on the other hand those for independence, progress and non-alliance, Algeria and Polisario. The agreement left the Moroccan troops free to enter the Sahara, while the Spanish forces returned home, and to fight the independence group. The Moroccans entered el Aaiun, the capital, on December 11th. The constitution of a temporary mixed three party administration, the termination of Spain's presence by February 28th 1976, various forms of economic cooperation, respect for the wishes of the national Assembly established in Madrid and composed of local notables (which implied the final renouncing of the referendum) were foreseen. All these points despite Algerian opposition were put into operation. On February 27th, 1976, Madrid's representative left el Aaiun, putting an end to Spain's colonial presence, whilst on April 14th, with the agreement on the new borders between Morocco and Mauritania, the Sahara ceased to exist as an autonomous region. From an economic point of view also, the major problems were resolved with the creation of a mixed society (65 per cent Moroccan and 35 per cent Spanish) for the exploitation of phosphate deposits of Bou Craa.

## APPENDIX

### THE WESTERN SAHARA

The territory of the western Sahara (the ex-Spanish Sahara) is bounded on the north by Morocco, on the south and southeast by Mauritania and on the north-east by

Algeria. It is situated on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean with 1500 kilometers of coastline and is composed of two regions: Saguiat El Hamra and Rio de Oro (the Sahara proper) with an area of 284,000 square kilometers.

Its strategic importance depends on its extensive Atlantic coastline facing the Canary Islands. Nomadic peoples, whose history dates from the Arab conquest of 681 A.D., inhabit the region. The Arabs mixed with the indigenous population (Berber) and in the following centuries the tribes of Saguiat El Hamra became integrated and extended their influence throughout a vast zone of Africa.

Unlike the neighboring North and South where different regimes of a feudal type developed, Saharan society was of a simpler kind with evident characteristics of a patriarchal society — one of shepherders and farmers on very poor land without much agricultural possibility. Frequent droughts forced the inhabitants more and more to nomadism and a continual search for water.

As for the number of inhabitants and the different tribes who occupy the territory there are notable divergences in figures among the sources (esp. between the Spanish figures and those of the Polisario Front). To give an indication, let us refer to data furnished by the United Nations relative to the representatives of the tribes which make up the general assembly of the territory, from which one can deduce the numerical relationship existing between parentheses): R' gheba Sahel (9); Izaeguien (5); Ait Laheen (2); Arosien (2); Ulan Delim (5); Ulan Tidrarin (3); Septentrional (1); Charfas (1); Meridional (1).

As far as the number of inhabitants is concerned, Spanish sources maintain there are 70,000 inhabitants for the whole of the western Sahara, while the Polisario Front insists there are more than 500,000, not counting the refugees or the political exiles in neighboring countries.

No one, however, has ever undertaken a census. As we have seen, almost the entire population leads a nomadic existence. The limited urban agglomerates have sprung up around Spanish military outposts. Only here could an exact count have been made, but the colonizers were never interested in doing so, since they justified their own

presence by declaring that the territory was practically uninhabited.

The forces which have represented the Saharan people, up until the partition of the territory and latest phase in the armed struggle, have been four: the Gemaa or general assembly of the territory; the Party of Saharan National Union (Puns); the Popular Front for the liberation of Saguiat El Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front); and the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of the Blue Men (Morehob).

The Gemaa was set up by a Spanish government decree May 11, 1967, as the representative body of the interests of the "province" and was made up of tribal chiefs and of forty representatives elected from the individual tribes. On Dec. 6, 1975, sixtyseven members of the Gemaa (out of 101), of which three were members of the Spanish Parliament, in addition to various notables of the Saharan tribes, walked out of the general assembly of the territory declaring it dissolved and constituting a provisional national council.

The national council of forty-one members was immediately considered by the liberation movements of the western Sahara (in particularly by the Polisario Front) as a necessary element towards the construction of national unity and an essential condition for acquiring sovereignty and self-determination for the peoples of the territory. The document signed by the ex-members of the Gemaa affirms that "the sole legitimate authority of the Saharan people, in concordance with the conclusions of the investigative mission of the United Nations is the Polisario Front". Now the Gemaa has been dissolved altogether with the adherence of almost all the members to the decision taken Dec. 6, 1975.

The Party of National Unity has been nothing but a convenient tool controlled by local notables and tied to Spanish colonial interest, ever since Spain abandoned the western Sahara. Today it has definitively disappeared.

The Morehob has, on the other hand, played a rather significant role even in the recent past. Initially supported by Morocco, it gradually assumed an independistic attitude (opposed to annexation to Morocco), transferring at the end its offices to Algiers. Today its influence is almost nil among the population of the territory and it is practically extinct.

On May 10, 1973, the Popular Liberation Front of Saguiat El Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) was set up; it began (May 20, 1973) the armed struggle and stepped it up after the partition of the territory. Since its founding the Polisario Front has counted on the support of workers in the phosphate mines of Bucraa and those working in connected installations, young people and students. The organism is directed by an executive of six members, which unites the two branches of the Front, that representing the masses and the other, the military.

The secretary-general and head of the military branch of the Front, M. Mohamed El Quali, proclaimed on Feb. 27, 1976, the birth of an "Arab Saharan Democratic Republic" temporarily directed by a provisional national council. The wealth of the western Sahara depends principally on its phosphate deposits but also on reserves of other minerals. The discovery of an enormous underground lake promises an expansion in agriculture.

The exploitation of the phosphates, discovered in 1947, began in 1969 with the founding — via the National Institute of Spanish Industry — of the joint-stock phosphate company of Bucraa. Effective production got under way in Feb., 1972. There are no exact figures on the direct or indirect participation of foreign capital in the exploitation of phosphates in the western Sahara; however, one of the principal foreign industries associated therein is Krupp.

The phosphate reserves in the western Sahara are estimated to be on the order of 1700 million tons. They lie one or two meters underground and are easily extractible.

The production of phosphates in Bucraa in 1974 was about 2 million tons, 1½ million of which was consumed by the internal Spanish market and the other ½ million exported mainly to Japan and West Germany. According to first estimates production in 1975 reached 3,600,000 tons. The objective of the Bucraa Company is to invest still 15 billion pesos to reach annual production of 10 million tons. The phosphate industry at Bucraa is the most important in the western Sahara; the other two are *la Cobiertas y Tesados* and the *Servicios Militares de Construcciones*.

The presence of other minerals in not negligible quantities has been revealed: ti-

tanium, vanadium-uranium, copper, zinc, iron (estimated at 70 million tons) magnetite (loadstone) and gold (in the proportion of 3 grams per ton of mineral). From the prospecting already done (Esso and Eni) there should also be oil deposits of a respectable consistency.

## VI. IRAQI-IRANIAN RELATIONS

On the 6th of March 1975, at the end of the OPEC summit conference, held at Algiers, the Shah of Iran and the Iraq vice-president, Saddam Hussein, signed a pact of reconciliation. The occasion was as solemn as it was unexpected. The rapprochement between the two capitals had been relatively rapid. The process began in October 1974 at the Rabat summit. First the Egyptians and later the Algerians acted as mediators. In November a number of informal agreements were reached at the UN. Then in January 1975 the foreign ministers of the two countries met in Istanbul. However nothing suggested at this point that these initiatives could lead to such a speedy, and thus necessarily superficial, solution. Even during this period of more or less secret contacts and certainly in the past, relations between the two countries had been stormy and often extremely tense, especially since the October War, that is to say since Iranian diplomacy had begun to try and build solid contacts with the Arab world.

The aims of the two countries in the crucial Gulf region seemed, and to some extent still seem even after the agreement, to conflict. This incompatibility is due mainly to the fact that Iraq and Iran are incorporated into the spheres of influence of rival outside powers. In 1972 Iraq established a close relationship of friendship and cooperation with the USSR. Since then she has played a key role in Soviet penetration of the zone. This alliance has allowed the Ba'ath controlled Iraq government to assume extremely rigid positions on many issues, including the basic one of oil policy, being able to take an autonomous stance with respect to OPEC, to nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company (in June 1972) etc.

It is difficult to see how this line is to be squared with an improvement in relations with Iran which, despite, or perhaps because of her position as a strong local power, has maintained close ties with Washington and the West. Iran has followed an expansionist policy especially since the British withdrawal in 1971.

This tendency has only been reinforced by the economic boom of the 1970's. Her aim has been to win control of the Gulf, and it is this aim which explains her desire to attract the Gulf states into her orbit. At the same time it brings back old memories, for instance of past claims on Bahrein, first made in 1927 and only abandoned in 1970 when a UN commission ascertained that the local population was opposed to union with Iran. Iranian policy has been heavily criticized in Baghdad.

When on the 30th of November 1971, just after the expiration of the defence treaties between Britain and the Emirates and 48 hours before the Union of Arab Emirates' proclamation of independence, Iranian troops occupied three strategically placed islands on the entry to the Gulf of Ormutz. This led to a break in diplomatic relations between the two countries. Relations were resumed, in October 1973, during the Arab-Israeli war, on the unilateral initiative of the Iraqi government which wished to move troops from the Iranian frontier to aid Syria. In line with its general policy of increasing links with the Arab world Iran responded positively. Iranian military and economic penetration of the Arabian peninsula became easier. In December 1973 Iranian soldiers helped the Sultan of Oman to crush a rebellion in the Dhofar. Trade with the Emirates was expanded and emigration organized. This led to a fresh deterioration in Iraqi-Iranian relations (which could only be improved effectively if the political will existed to do so) and to renewed border clashes between the two countries.

Frontier disputes have been among the main causes of the periodic crises which on several occasions have brought Iraq and Iran to the brink of open war. In practice the land frontier has never been precisely defined. (On the 6th of March 1975 commissions were set up to remedy this situation). In several semi-desert zones there are areas of no-man's land, occupied in recent years by one of the two sides, which serve as a base for armed

raids into the territory of the other. These raids are a consequence more of the general climate of tension between the two countries than of any desire to make permanent territorial gains. A more serious problem is constituted by the Shatt el Arab, the river formed at the meeting of the Tigris and the Euphrates, an extremely important water-way, especially for Iraq which without it would be deprived of any outlet to the sea.

The first treaty laying down the border along the Shatt el Arab dates from 1847 (the agreement of Erzerum between the Sublime Porte and the Persian Empire). However, like the 1913 Constantinople Protocol, the Treaty was never applied. After the First World War the Teheran government put pressure on the British government (which until 1930 was the mandatory power) to recognize that the frontier should run along the "Thaweg" (the line linking the river's deepest points). Agreement was reached only on the 4th of July 1937. However this came closer to Iraqi than to Iranian demands. The agreement allowed freedom of navigation to the warships of the two parties and defined the frontiers as the low water line on the Iranian bank. For brief stretches where there were Iranian ports this shifted to the midpoint of the river. The frontier question remained as an obstacle hindering any improvement in Iraqi-Iranian relations. In recent years crises have alternated with periods of calm. During the last of these, marked by a visit by the Iraqi President, Aref, to Teheran, in 1967 it seemed for a time as if negotiations might begin on joint exploration and drilling for oil in contested zones, definition of the legal status of Iranians resident in Iraq and a revision of those clauses in the 1937 agreement covering rights of navigation. Instead a series of provocations, tests of strength and ultimata led, on the 19th of April 1969, to the abrogation of the agreement by Iran. To justify her action Teheran accused Iraq, among other things, of administering the river as if it were her sovereign territory. Baghdad denied all such charges, pointing out that Iran had a 1250 mile (2000 km) long coast line and that she was using the dispute over the Shatt el Arab for purely political ends. She also accused Iran of seeking to divert the waters of the river Karum which flows into the Shatt el Arab, thus reopening the question of the use to me made of rivers, rising in Iran and flowing to the Iraqi frontier. She propo-

sed that the dispute be settled by the Hague International Court. The Shah refused and tension increased.

Then, unexpectedly, on the 6th of March 1975, came agreement. Iranian demands were fully satisfied. The border was henceforward to run along the "Thaweg" of the river. Iraq abandoned her claim to so-called Arabistan (Khuzistan for the Iranians) who exercised sovereignty over the territory) and promised to seek a settlement in her quarrels with Kuwait. This commitment was of direct interest to Iran which in 1973, during the most acute period of the crisis between Baghdad and the Emirate had for obvious reasons sided with Kuwait. (The frontier between Iraq and Kuwait was fixed in 1932 in an agreement between Iraq and Great Britain which exercised a protectorate over the territory. The Iraq republican government however never recognized this agreement and only established diplomatic relations with Kuwait in 1963).

The agreement reached on the 6th of March 1975 eliminated a further serious source of friction in relations between the two countries, i.e. continued interference in each other's international affairs. This had been a two-way process, encouraged and justified by the different political complexion of the two regimes. Nonetheless, although Baghdad had always been willing to receive Iranian exiles, Teheran had been far more active in plotting against the Ba'athist, pro-Soviet regime in Iraq. The Shah was accused of being behind every coup d'état which ever occurred in Baghdad, especially the coups in December 1970 and June-July 1973.

It also seems as if the Kurdish question is in the process of being resolved. The paragraph in the Pact of Reconciliation which speaks of tighter frontier controls probably represents a hidden Iranian commitment to stop the aid which the Shah used to send to the Iraki rebels. Given that secession by the Kurds would have represented a real danger to Iraqi unity, it may well be that this aid was one of the principal factors underlying the dispute between Teheran and Baghdad. The Kurds live in a region with no fixed frontiers which covers territory in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria (there are also small Kurdish minorities in the USSR and in Lebanon). Although the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 recognized the right of the Kurds to self-determination, they have never had a state of

their. Thus contemporary Kurdish history consists of a series of revolts followed by repression. So long as Iraq and Iran had similar regimes (i.e. before the establishment of the Iraqi republic) Baghdad and Teheran collaborated in crushing the rebels. Later the situation was reversed and the Shah began to give military aid and protection to the Iraqi Kurdish autonomists led by Mustafa Barzani. At the same time, however, he took great care to avoid the building of any dangerous ties between the latter and their "brothers" in Iran. (The Shah had every interest in weakening Iraq with a long, drawn-out war. He was opposed however to a Kurdish victory which might have had dangerous consequences, even within his own country).

If, as seems clear from recent events, the Kurdish question has now been resolved, this is obviously of considerable significance not only for Iraqi-Iranian relations but also for relations between Iraq and the USSR. The Kurdish dispute played an important role in drawing Baghdad closer to Moscow.

## VII. CYPRUS

Cyprus has an area of 3613 square miles (9251 km<sup>2</sup>). In 1972 the estimated population stood at 645,000 of whom 82% were Greeks and the rest Turks. The most relevant figure if one seeks to understand the permanent situation of crisis on the island is that referring to the ethnic origin of the population. In Cyprus two ethnic groups confront each other: the Greeks who have lived there since time immemorial and the Turks who have done so since the Ottoman conquest in 1571. For centuries Greek and Turkish Cypriots have developed distinct, autonomous and often opposed versions of nationalism. When in 1960 Cyprus was declared a unified, sovereign state it was as if there existed two nations on the island.

### THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALISM AND IRRIDENTISM ON CYPRUS

Language and religion provide the main bonds between the two communities and their respective mother countries: Greek orthodoxy for the Greeks, Mohamedism for the Turks. Both groups have a long-stand-

ing tradition of partial self-government through the election of representatives to the island's government. After the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 by which the Turks finally ceded the island, it was administered by the British. The first signs of Greek-Cypriot irridentism date from the beginning of the 1930's and were originally directed against British domination. However for reasons closely linked to the turbulent history of the Balkan peninsula, it soon led to antagonism between the two communities. For centuries Greece had been ruled by the Ottoman empire. After independence the country's internal institutions were consolidated through an imperialist war against Kemal Pasha's new-born Turkey. The result was a dramatic Greek defeat. Greek revanchism and the new Turkish nationalism found in Cyprus a suitable battlefield for a renewal of their centuries' old quarrel. The Greek-Cypriot irridentists favoured union (erosis) with Greece and regarded British domination as a transitory phase in the history of the island. The Turkish Cypriots reacted as well as they could but received little support from Turkey, then in the throes of national reconstruction under Kemal Attaturk. They were thus led to lend support to the British who had every interest in such an alliance against Greek irridentist pressures. British relations with Turkey had in any case much improved since the Treaty of Lausanne. This de facto alliance was legally sanctioned in the colony's constitution. The representatives of the Greek community had the same number of votes in the legislative council as those which could be wielded by a coalition of the official members, nominated by the British government and the Turkish representatives. So long as British control in this zone of the Mediterranean was secure neither Athens nor Ankara officially put their national prestige at stake in the Cyprus dispute, simply playing the role of London's eager, attentive advisors. However as the British capability began to decline during the 1950's as a result of the new world balance of power after World War II, Ankara and even more so, Athens, felt able to renew their claims. In 1951 Greek radio and the Greek government began a violent propaganda campaign in favour of Enosis. The nationalists in Athens founded their campaign upon the principle of the self-determination of peoples. It was on this basis that the Cypriot question was first brought before the UN in

1952. Turkey, then in a difficult situation and under psychological Soviet pressure on her borders, hardly reacted. The British had no intention of giving way. Both at the UN and in negotiations with the Greek government it was repeated that as a British colony, Cyprus was an internal British problem. Britain's attitude could be explained by the island's strategic importance both in the struggle against the Soviet Union and for support to her colonies and protectorates in Africa and Asia.

The 1st of April 1955 saw the first terrorist attacks on Cyprus by EOKA — the National Organization for the Struggle for Liberty for Cyprus. EOKA operations were commanded by Colonel Grivas. The movement received its inspiration from Archbishop Makarios, the leader since 1950 of the Greek Cypriot community and the head of the Cypriot Greek-Orthodox church. Several features distinguished this new version of Greek irridentism from its predecessors in the 1930's. The most obvious was the new commitment to armed struggle. The old declared goal of Enosis (union with Greece) remained. However it was now linked to self-determination and national independence. During the 1950's the ambiguity of this formula attracted international support from those most sensitive to the awakening of anti-colonialist national feeling. It was only in 1957 that Makarios declared that he had abandoned his pro-Enosis goals and would now make national independence and self-determination the only objectives of the struggle. The Greek-orthodox church assumed a different role from that which it had played in the 1930's. As early as 1950 it promoted a symbolic, anti-British plebiscite on Cyprus. Later it became directly involved in the struggle for independence in the person of Makarios. The international situation had also changed: — the British empire had declined, the Americans were lending strong support to General Papagos' national-conservative regime in Greece. These were the years of the Cold War and the Turks sought to avoid any deterioration in their relations with NATO. All these factors encouraged the Greek nationalists.

## INDEPENDENCE

Negotiations between Britain, Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus problem opened in

August 1955. As a result of the damage inflicted by EOKA and the weakening effect of the dispute on the Alliance's south-eastern flank the British government had abandoned its previous rigid position. No agreement was however, reached at the conference. The British began direct negotiations with Makarios in his position as leader of the Greek Community, but these were broken off in the following spring. Makarios, clearly implicated in EOKA terrorist attacks, was deported to the Seychelles. On his release in March 1957 he took refuge in Athens. EOKA operations were concentrated in large urban centres, especially Nicosia and Famagusta. On occasion terrorist actions were directed at members of the Turkish community accused of collaborating with the British occupiers. Ankara began to propose partition. The idea was more or less accepted by the British mediator, Lord Radcliffe, in his proposals for constitutional reform. Meanwhile the situation in the Mediterranean was changing. The British had suffered a series of military and diplomatic defeats; first Suez in 1956, then Iraq in 1958 and now Cyprus, where terrorist activity continued and where the situation constantly threatened to lead to armed conflict between two NATO members. At the beginning of 1959 Britain announced that if the sovereign status of her two military bases on the island were guaranteed, she was prepared to leave the settlement of the Cypriot problem for negotiation between Greece and Turkey. On the 11th of February 1959 the Greek and Turkish governments announced in Zurich that they had reached agreement. Their respective foreign ministers were instructed to proceed to London to discuss this with Britain. The tripartite London Conference, held from the 17th to the 19th of February, worked out the details of the Cyprus settlement. Britain kept control over two areas in the South, Akrotiri-Episkopi - Paralimni and Dhekelia - Pergamos - Ayipis - Nikolaos - Xylophagou which were to be used for military purposes. The Cypriot Republic was to guarantee the continued unity and independence of its territory. If these were ever threatened, tripartite consultations were to be held. If this proved impossible each of the three guarantor states, Greece, Turkey and Britain retained the right to take unilateral action. (Turkey was to use this clause to justify her intervention in the summer of 1974). The Cypriot Republic achieved formal independence on

the 16th August 1960. The tripartite guarantee treaty with Greece, Turkey and Britain and the treaty of alliance with Turkey and Greece were annexed to the fundamental law of the Cypriot state. On the 20th of September Cyprus became a member of the United Nations and in March 1961 she was admitted to the Commonwealth.

The leaders of the new state had at no time been allowed to play a role in the negotiations. All decisions affecting the destiny of the island were taken by Athens, Ankara and London.

The application of what had been agreed among British, Greeks and Turks was almost immediately placed in doubt. Despite Makarios' efforts favouring the integration of the two communities and despite the provisions of the agreements made at Zurich and London which gave them rights never previously conceded to a minority, the Turkish-Cypriots continued to mistrust the Greeks. The Turkish community, with 18% of the island's population provided 40% of army manpower and held 30% of seats in public administration, 30% of seats in parliament and 3 out of 7 ministers. In October 1961 vice-president Kuchuk, the head of the Turkish community used his power of veto to block any further integration within the armed forces. The immediate consequence of his action was the organization of the two communities into two independent, parallel armies. Athens sent officers to train the Cypriot National Guard in addition to those permitted by the Zurich treaty. Turkey did likewise. The Greek and Turkish contingents on Cypriot territory whose mission it was to safeguard Cypriot territorial integrity were thus reinforced. Makarios and Kuchuk clashed again (through still at an institutional level) over the organization of Cyprus' five largest municipalities: Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol, Larnaca and Paphos. The Turks sought a greater degree of local autonomy than the central government was willing to concede. Then there was the question of the reorganization of the Cypriot fiscal system, again blocked by a Turkish-Cypriot veto. In November 1963 Makarios gave his support to thirteen constitutional amendments the principal objective of which was to remove the vice-president's power of veto. The Turkish Cypriots reacted violently. In December there was fighting in the streets. Meanwhile a Turkish intervention corps carried out a brilliant military operation close to Kyrenia. In the

following March United Nations sent seven thousand "blue-helmets" to the island. The split between the two communities was now a radical one not least because of the heavy-handedness of Makarios' reaction to the situation. 527 town houses and 109 Turkish-Cypriot villages had been destroyed and 25,000 people deported. Turkish intervention and direct confrontation between the two NATO allies was avoided by the tough stance taken by President Johnson who threatened to use the VIth fleet. However armed clashes, which the United Nation peace keeping force (UNIFCYP) proved incapable of preventing, continued on Cyprus throughout 1964. Faced with this dramatic situation Makarios repeated his renunciation of the "great idea of *Enosis*" and unilaterally abrogated the Treaties of guarantee which in 1960, at the end of the Zurich conference, Cyprus had concluded with Greece and Turkey.

#### TEN YEARS OF CRISIS

The opposition between the two communities degenerated gradually into full-scale armed conflict. In August 1964 Turkish aircraft bombed Tylliria. It was the most dramatic point in the whole crisis. Already in February British attempts at mediation had broken down. At that point all official meetings between the warring parties were cancelled. The attempts to settle the dispute through negotiations had failed. Makarios, who on the 13th of December 1959 had been elected as president of both communities acted in this new situation as the leader of the Greeks who opposed the Turks in an atmosphere of permanent hostility. The Turkish "coup" on the 29th of September 1967, setting up a separate "Turkish-Cypriot administration" with independent powers and functions represented an attempt to give some legal status to the de facto divorce between the two communities. Following clashes at Ayios Theodorus and Kopinou the Turkish government mobilized. On the 17th of November 1967 Turkey delivered a three-point ultimatum to Greece demanding the expulsion from Cyprus of the EOKA leader, General Grivas, compensation for the Turkish-Cypriots and the withdrawal of Greek forces in excess of those permitted by the Zurich agreement. It was a critical moment. War was avoided through the media-

tion of the American envoy, Cyrus Vance, who succeeded in bringing the two sides to agreement. Both the Athens and the Ankara government were to withdraw excess forces stationed on the island. Slightly more than 8,000 Greek soldiers left. Grivas had returned to Athens some time previously. This undoubtedly represented a diplomatic victory for the Turks who were favoured by the international unpopularity of the new Greek regime which had recently taken power in a coup d'état. The coming to power of the colonels increased the distance between Makarios' position and that of the Greek government. In 1968 talks were resumed in Beirut, between Glafkos Clerides, the Greek cypriot leader and Raouf Danktash, the leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The situation was, however, unchanged. The island's major towns continued to be divided in two. In Nicosia the divide was the so-called "green line". The Turks wanted a greater degree of autonomy; the Greek Cypriots were in favour of a strong central government. In practice two separate administrations continued to exist side by side. None, or hardly any, of the institutions set up by the constitution were functioning. Tens of thousands of armed men were ready for battle. In 1971 General Grivas, the ex-commander of the National Guard reappeared. After landing secretly on the island he re-organised the old EOKA into what came to be known as EOKA-B. His terrorist actions against Makarios, willed by and financed from Athens placed the Archbishop in a very delicate position as he tried to defend the Greek community in negotiations with the Turkish-Cypriots. In order to survive this difficult phase in his political career the Archbishop established closer relations with the Akel, the pro-Soviet Cypriot communist party supported by about 25% of the Greek-Cypriot population. In his foreign policy he increased the emphasis on neutralism.

By a policy of maintaining an equal distance from both blocs Makarios aimed at winning diplomatic support from the Soviet Union and third world countries, especially in the United Nations. The Soviet Union was equally ill-disposed towards union of Cyprus with Greece and partition of the island between Greece and Turkey, for in both cases Cyprus would have remained under NATO control. The Archbishop opened fruitful diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union, with Eastern Europe and

with Communist China. Important trading agreements were signed. Makarios' domestic and foreign policy options were not appreciated by the West. In January 1972 he imported a batch of arms from Czechoslovakia for use against Grivas. Turkey and (especially) Greece protested energetically. The dispute was only resolved when the weapons were placed under UNFICYP control.

In March the episcopal synod, under orders from Athens, deprived Makarios of his spiritual powers. The Archbishop refused to submit to the injunction. In July Luns, the NATO Secretary-General, gave an interview in which he expressed disapproval of Makarios' "flirting" with Moscow, emphasizing that the Archbishop was a factor leading to instability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the 1973 elections Makarios was elected president of Cyprus for the third consecutive time, in what amounted to a plebiscite. Negotiations with the Turkish-Cypriots had however reached deadlock. The Greek-Cypriots were unwilling to concede the « local autonomy » requested by the Turkish-Cypriots; still less could they agree to "federation", with the north-eastern sector of the island passing into the Turkish sphere of influence.

At the beginning of 1974 seven regular armies were present on Cyprus, namely: —

- UNFICYP: less than 2,000 men. (Many Swedish, Finnish and Austrian "blue helmets" had, after the Yom Kippur War, been transferred to the Middle-Eastern cease-fire line).
- The Cypriot National Guard. About 18,000 men.
- The Mudjanitier: 10,000 Turkish-Cypriots commanded by about 200 officers from Ankara.
- The Turkish contingent of 650 troops guaranteed by the Treaty of Zurich, plus a further 1,500 troops and 3,000 military police sent by Ankara.
- The 950 strong Greek contingent under the Treaty of Zurich. To those forces should be added the Police Tactical Reserve (the paramilitary pretorian guard set up by Makarios at the beginning of 1973) and British troops on their two bases.

#### THE 1974 CRISIS, PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

At the beginning of 1974 a new element of friction entered relations between Turkey and Greece: — the discovery of large oil fields in the Aegean Sea. Turkey, which had never formally accepted Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands, now considered the occasion ripe to show the strongest possible interest in the oil which lay beneath them and in March sent a ship on an exploratory mission. Athen's resentment was inevitable. Tension rose. Reprisals were threatened. The rigidity of the positions taken up by the two sides was at least in part determined by the difficult problems being faced by the Greek and Turkish governments. Both were internally weak. For months both had been making nationalist claims against Washington. In this situation and given the American "absence" from the international scene owing to Watergate, there were none of the presuppositions for successful crisis management. Athens took the first step. Grivas had died at the beginning of the year. His successor, Karousos, was called to the Greek capital. The Athens junta took direct control over EOKA. Makarios, who was aware of the situation, decided on a trial of strength. A few days after announcing plans to visit five East-European countries, on the 2nd of July he wrote to the Greek President, General Ghizikis, complaining of a plot against his life and requesting the withdrawal of the 650 Greek officers stationed in Nicosia for the training of the Cypriot National Guard. It was announced that the PTR, the Archbishop's auxiliary corps was in a state of alert. While preparations were made for what was to follow, Athens officially denied the Archbishop's accusations. On the 15th of July the Cypriot National Guard carried out a coup d'état against Makarios. The non-Cypriot origins of the plot were unanimously recognized by the international press. Denktash emphasized that the coup was a quarrel between Greeks and declared that he wished to avoid any Turkish-Cypriot involvement. On the 17th the battle was still between Makarios' Greek supporters and his Greek enemies. The Archbishop, whose death had already been announced by the rebel radio, succeeded in reaching sanctuary on the British airbase at Dhekelia whence he was flown to London by the RAF. The presidency was taken by Nikos Theochaou, an adventurer who likes

to be known as Sampson; his activities as a sniper during the guerrilla campaign for Cypriot independence had been reported in the international press. Sampson was neither Grivas' successor, nor had he planned the putsch. His newspaper, *Machi's* ambiguous line on *enosis*, must have convinced those behind the coup to use him as an easily manoeuvrable puppet. With the fall of the fascist junta in Athens he was replaced by the President of the National Assembly and the official leader of the Greek-Cypriot community, Clerides, whose duty it was, by the terms of the constitution to assume presidential functions whenever the president might be incapacitated or absent. During the early hours of the 20th of July, Turkish troops landed on Cyprus. Athens decreed general mobilization. Ankara's intervention was made easier by Turkish proximity to the theatre of operations. Cyprus is just over sixty miles (100 km) from Turkey and almost four times as far from Greece. The Turkish prime minister, Ecevit, known as a left-wing moderate who in the past had opposed intervention, states that his government had been forced to intervene "after having attempted all possible political and military paths to a solution". The Turks enjoyed the support of international public opinion which was aware of the attacks suffered by the Turkish-Cypriot community during the days following the coup and which knew that, given the inertia of the powers, Turkey was entitled to intervene by Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of guarantee. A direct confrontation between Turkey and Greece was avoided only by a change in the official US policy of wait and see and American mediation between Ankara and Athens. An additional factor was the objective deficiencies of the Greek army which was too weak to face the Turks, and opposition to the Cypriot adventure from broad sectors of Greek public opinion. Security Council Resolution 353, approved on the 20th of July, called for a ceasefire. More or less at the same time as the resolution was being approved the UN force on Cyprus blocked Turkish troops as they were on the point of taking over Nicosia airport. On the 23rd Kissinger hinted at a change of government in Athens. The change took place the next day. Many observers have seen this as a sign that the USA was in some way implicated in what had happened on Cyprus. On the 30th Karamanlis' new Greek government, Turkey

and Britain signed an agreement in Geneva on the application of the ceasefire. The terms of the 30th of July agreement were the following: —

- All troops were to halt at positions held on the evening of the 30th of July.
- A "security zone" between the two sides was to be established and manned by "blue helmets".
- The existence of two autonomous administrations on the island was to be recognized *pro tem*.

All the signs seemed to point to a federal solution along the lines proposed by Turkey and supported since the 1964 Acheson Plan by the United States.

The Turks were aware of the internal debility of the new Greek government and of their own complete military superiority. In the days which followed they began to call for full partition and to plan a resumption of hostilities. Their aim was to advance to the so-called Attila line (around the Cape Andreas — Morpheu — Fama-gusta triangle) and to occupy a completely Turkish zone behind it. Britain and the United States attempted in vain to moderate Turkish demands. Callaghan, the British Foreign Minister, proposed a forty-eight hour pause in the Geneva negotiations. The Turkish government refused and in mid-August large-scale military operations were resumed.

It was a *blitzkrieg*. There was fighting in Nicosia along the green line and in Famagusta. By the time a new cease-fire resolution was approved by the Security Council on the 15th of August a third of the island was under Turkish government control.

Mayros, foreign minister in the Karamanlis government bluntly refused an invitation for consultations in Washington. There were anti-American demonstrations throughout Greece and in the Greek zone of Cyprus and in one of these the American ambassador to Nicosia, Roger Dawes, was killed. On the 14th Greece left the military organization of the Atlantic Alliance stating that an alliance which was incapable of preventing conflict between its members was unworthy of support. In Geneva Callaghan severely criticized the Turkish action and the State Department began to qualify its support. Negotiations between Clerides and Denktash were resumed only on the 26th of August. Meanwhile the Turks, who represented only 20% of the

population, controlled 40% of the area of the island, two-thirds of its wealth, two-thirds of all tourist activities and cultivated land, its most important port (Famagusta) and more than 60% of its mineral and industrial activities. Nicosia airport was virtually surrounded by Turkish troops. There were about 200,000 Greek-Cypriot refugees.

In the autumn, Makarios, with open support from the Soviet Union, launched a verbal offensive, the aim being to regain the presidency. Within Cyprus he was supported by the Akel which aimed at the socialization of the Greek sector of the island. On the 7th of December he returned in triumph. The speech he made on the occasion was however relatively moderate in tone and avoided polemics.

The risk was now of a return to the deadlock which had characterized the 1968-73 period. Given the changed situation on the ground and the new pattern which had emerged in relations between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Greece and Turkey on the other, such a deadlock could have proved even more dangerous than in the past.

After the unilateral Turkish proclamation on the 13th of February 1975 of an independent lay Turkish-Cypriot state the Kirenia district became, after the referendum on the 8th of June for all practical administrative and political purposes Turkey's sixty-eighth province. The alteration in the status quo was presided over by 40,000 Turkish troops. In this situation the resumption of EOKA terrorist operations was understandable. The Turks seemed resolved on the permanent annexation of the sector to the north of the Attila line. If the tough stance taken by the American Congress on military supplies to Ankara and European disapproval were incapable of dissuading them from this intent, it was hard to see any way of changing their attitude short of military action by Greece. Makarios, in line with the position he had held to for more than ten years, defended full Cypriot independence. He stated however that he was now more willing than in the past to give effective guarantees to the Turkish minority and proposed a federation of cantons which would preserve the principles of government unity and of central control in the hands of a Greek Cypriot. The negotiations have revealed themselves to be even more complex follow-

ing the resignation of Clerides as negotiator in the spring of 1976.

The Soviet Union, Makarios' international ally, has declared against all proposals for partition, with their implication of a direct or indirect Cypriot role within the Atlantic Alliance. The Soviet proposal to enlarge the tripartite conference to include the United Nations, aims to take the responsibility for deciding the island's fate out of the hands of the Atlantic Alliance. American policy is unclear: the dispute between Congress and the State Department over arms supplies, Kissinger's statements on Turkey which oscillate from the conciliatory to the threatening and the fears aroused by the Greek withdrawal from NATO have shorn all its limitations. The fact is that the United States, in order to avoid a further weakening of the Atlantic Alliance in the area, would prefer not to choose sides between Greece and Turkey.

The probable Congress approval of the negotiations concluded by the State Department with Greece and Turkey and the simultaneous renewal of bilateral Greek/Turkish contracts will contribute towards reconstructing in some way the relationships between these two countries and the Atlantic area.

The most favourable solution for the United States would be partition. The island often referred to today as a "potential aircraft carrier on land" in the Eastern Mediterranean could become a base for NATO action throughout the area and in the Gulf. Meanwhile however the USA must reckon with the Greek decision to leave NATO, which at least in the short-term, appears to be irreversible, and with Turkish threats. In this situation the Soviet Union has not found it difficult to pursue attempts to improve relations with Greece as is indeed shown by Soviet activity as guarantor for the application of Resolution 353, by the Soviet proposal for an international conference on Cyprus and by Makarios' support for the plan. Greece has found that its strongest support comes from the European Community. Following the reactivation of the association agreement, frozen in 1967, many European statesmen, and in particular Giscard D'Estaing, who is furthermore a personal friend of Karamanlis, have taken up positions favouring a strengthening of ties between Greece and the nine. Only Germany has failed to join the group of European coun-

tries favouring Greece. She has maintained the arms embargo, imposed after the Colonels' fascist coup, an attitude determined more by her Atlantic than by her European interests.

## VIII. YUGOSLAVIA, THE BALKANS AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

### NATIONALISM AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE BALKANS

For decades the region which lies between Italy and the Eastern shore of the Mediterranean was known as the "powder-keg" of Europe. It marked the border between the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires and with their destruction saw the breakdown of any unified state authority. Those local nationalisms, which under the Turkish occupation had constituted the region's only bond with Europe, the nuclei around which independent states were to be formed, now flowered. With the Peace of Versailles, sanctioning the defeat of the two empires, new national states arose. Within these, however, there were powerful centrifugal forces: ethnic, social, historical, linguistic and religious rivalries, encompassed within individual states only by means of painstaking and often temporary compromise. The verb "to balkanize" took on its present pejorative sense expressing the difficulties involved in unifying a kaleidoscope of peoples.

This situation remained characteristic of the region in the twenty years between the two world wars. Panslavic and German imperialism fed on the divisions existing between the Balkan peoples, who had been brought together only through the diplomacy of the powers, supported by certain sections of the local ruling bourgeoisie. The Second World War led to the ending of German influence in the area. It was replaced by that of the West and of Britain in particular, now the main opponents of Slavo-Communist expansionism. However there were at the same time two new developments; namely the creation of an island of Latin resistance in the zone, represented by Rumania, and the strengthening of national feeling in the one country, which more than any other in the region, had in

the past been torn and divided as a result of occupation by foreign powers — Yugoslavia.

At the end of the Second World War the Balkan-Mediterranean area was subdivided into six states apparently aligned in a communist bloc consisting of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Rumania and a western bloc opposed to it, consisting of Greece and Turkey. This division into zones of influence was however anomalous with respect to the rest of Europe as was seen, three years later. The Cominform's "excommunication" of Yugoslavia led not only to a divorce between Belgrade and the Communist bloc but also to a resurgence of Albanian nationalism (although the former was only to become evident many years later). Meanwhile the west had intervened in Greece (under the Truman Doctrine) to crush the Communist guerrilla movement there and to maintain Europe's south-eastern flank within the Anglo-American sphere of influence. We thus witnessed a novel and curious phenomenon. The Cold War between the Communist World, led by the USSR and the Western-Capitalist World, led by the United States, had given rise to a new Balkan anomaly: namely two Communist nation states organized along Socialist-Collectivist lines lying outside the Soviet bloc: Yugoslavia and Albania.

Within a short time there was a new anomaly, the drifting of an Eastern bloc state, Rumania, linked to the USSR by military treaty (the Warsaw Pact) and economic alliance (Comecon) towards a national or nationalist policy, going so far as to be a divisive factor within the Soviet system. Finally, in the last few months, the only two countries in the area linked to the Western system, namely Greece and Turkey, have moved towards a new break both with that system and with each other. Greece has left the NATO integrated military organization. The two countries have reached the brink of war over Cyprus.

Thus, as a first conclusion, we may state that since the Second World War, the Balkan Mediterranean area has contained six extremely different states, only poorly integrated with their respective blocs: Yugoslavia, Communist but non-aligned; Albania, totally isolated with respect to existing alliances (following the Chinese rather than the Warsaw Pact on the non-aligned "model"); Rumania, a Communist Soviet-bloc member which nonetheless fails to follow

policies dictated from Moscow often opposing them on nationalist grounds; Bulgaria, a faithful Warsaw Pact and Comecon member within which have even arisen pressures for full integration with the Soviet Union; Greece, a capitalist country which having left NATO's military organization has remained within the western political alliance but yet which has tried to adopt a "French" foreign policy and has hinted at non-alignment; Turkey, again a capitalist country this time fully integrated into the western politico-military system but which has questioned its existing ties and within which there exist pro-Islamic tendencies which could in the future lead it to turn away from Europe towards Asia.

The extreme differences which exist between the positions and attitudes of the countries of the Balkan-Mediterranean area make it a factor of uncertainty in the calculations of both blocs. The zone has always been recognized as the Achilles' heel of the Atlantic Alliance. In practice, although this has yet to be recognized by political and diplomatic observers, the situation for the Warsaw Pact could be very similar. Bulgaria, the only faithful member of the alliance, is geographically isolated. Insistent Soviet pressure on Rumania and Yugoslavia could have a de-stabilizing effect over the entire zone. What is more, quite apart from its role as a potential area of conflict between the western and Communist systems, the region is made even more unstable by its proximity to the Middle-East, a constant source of crisis and tension, and, since the summer of 1974, by the situation on Cyprus.

We can therefore draw a second conclusion. The differences between the six states of the Balkan-Mediterranean area are aggravated by their proximity to areas of confrontation and tension between the two blocs. There is also a third danger, namely the tendencies of the Great Powers to maintain if not to increase pressure on the states of the area, exploiting real or presumed problems in their internal affairs and in their relations with each other to force them, directly or indirectly, back into line.

shown that crises on the borders of the Balkan-Mediterranean area have had repercussions within individual states and have risked not only to weaken the latter but even to destabilize the whole region. As if this were not enough, both blocs have tried to oppose any drawing together of the states of the zone, fearing that it might change the local balance of power, that is to say, that any attempt at regional stabilization might upset relations between them. This has been apparent ever since 1948 when Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria made a first attempt at establishing a regional organization, broken off immediately after the excommunication of Yugoslavia by the Cominform. It became even more clear in 1954 when Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey joined together in a Balkan Pact (which is still technically in force today). Moscow and Sofia viewed the pact with suspicion, thinking that it was directed against Bulgaria. For Belgrade, however, the pact, representing as it did a deviation from the Yugoslav policy of non-alignment, was of purely tactical value. When the USSR withdrew the excommunication and accepted the validity of the Yugoslav road to socialism it ceased to be of any political significance.

There were to be no new initiatives of this kind. The Rumanian proposal to create a "nuclear-free" zone in the Balkans could not really be called a proposal for the drawing together of the countries of the region. Rather the idea should be seen as part of a broader Rumanian policy of using *ad hoc* diplomatic means to insure against Soviet pressures which might compromise Rumanian national independence. The proposal received no support from NATO which did not wish to see itself disarmed in Greece. There was no more talk of regional pacts in the Balkans and this for two reasons. On the one hand such pacts were seen, in the face of the differences existing between the countries of the region, as impracticable; on the other it was thought that they were not the best means of safeguarding the independence of the latter, guaranteed in several cases by the military alliances to which they belonged.

Nor, finally, can the Trans-Balkan Conference held in Athens from January 26 — February 5, 1976, on Greece's initiative and with the participation of Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Turkey be considered an attempt to animate an organic alliance

#### SECURITY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

The events of the last thirty years have

since its objective seemed limited to feeling out the possibilities for increasing cooperation in the economic, ecological, transportation and energy fields among the countries of the region. Exactly because of these predetermined limited objectives (in the so-called "spirit of Helsinki", this initiative may in an indefinite future bear precious fruit; however, inasmuch as one can judge now, not enough to overcome the bilateral and regional rivalries which still are the major obstacle to an effective inter-Balkan cooperation.

Whenever one talks of regional disputes in the Balkans one immediately thinks of Macedonia. However there are similar, if for the moment less significant, problems on the borders between Albania and Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Albania and Greece (Epirus), Rumania and Bulgaria (Dobruja), Bulgaria and Greece (Thrace) and Greece and Turkey (from Cyprus to the Aegean islands). Outside the Balkan region, as strictly defined, Yugoslavia still has to resolve a number of "national questions" along her north-western frontier with Austria and Italy, questions which for the Belgrade government represent a continual irritant, a permanent infringement of national sovereignty, unity and independence. Thus Yugoslavia finds herself under pressure from all sides, from the "B-zone" to Macedonia. This pressure is seen as a threat not only to national independence but also to the country's two peculiar characteristics, her neutrality and her system of workers' self-management.

But why Yugoslavia? Why is Yugoslavia more affected and worried than other countries by events in the Balkan-Mediterranean area? Why has she manoeuvred more effectively than the others? There is an easy first answer. Yugoslavia has more to fear than other countries from any change in her precariously balanced position, both internationally and insofar as regards her internal unity and cohesion. The new Yugoslavia which arose thirty years ago as an autonomous power needs internal unity and cohesion more than anything else. It is certainly no coincidence that in their recurring rounds of polemics with the Yugoslavs (the last of which was fought in April 1975) the Soviets minimize the importance of, even if they do not contest, the fact that Yugoslavia achieved her own liberation from Nazi occupation, without any crucial role having been played by the

Red Army. It was this role of the Red Army which in Moscow's eyes justified the Soviet Union in interfering in the domestic and foreign policies of the Communist states. It was this right that Moscow claimed in 1948. Tito's workers' self-management may have represented a new and original way of resolving the economic problems of the country and of imposing socialist policies with the direct help and participation of the workers. It strayed from the royal road of democratic centralism and centralized planning and was condemned as heresy. Yugoslavia was excommunicated. It became clear just as it was again to become clear in the case of Czechoslovakia that a country's loyalty to the doctrine and practice of Soviet Communism was to be measured by her internal and economic as well as by her foreign policy.

Although it forced its withdrawal, Yugoslavia's successful resistance to the excommunications (and the international pressures which went with it) in no way meant the end of Soviet attempts to influence policy decisions in Belgrade. Periodically "Cominformist organizations" are discovered within the country. This kind of interference is accompanied by pressure from outside, that is to say, mainly from Bulgaria, over the Macedonia question.

The Yugoslavs also at times had other fears, about western attitudes. In particular there was the question of relations with Italy, which was accused of playing the game of those groups within NATO which sought to keep their option open on the border issue in case Yugoslavia should be torn apart following the death of Marshall Tito. These fears should now have been quietened following the announcement, on the 1st of October 1975 of a final settlement of the border problem. This was ratified in a Treaty signed at Osimo on the following 10th of November. This may lead Belgrade to be less suspicious of her neighbour. It is unlikely however to lead to any relaxation in internal vigilance or in fears of interference by the great powers.

If she seeks to avoid international pressure, Yugoslavia has only limited means at her disposal. In domestic policy she can attempt to reduce to a minimum internal disparities in a country where traditional ethno-cultural rivalries, rooted in history, are aggravated by unequal North-South economic development and where the federal power structure provides a purely

institutional rather than a real remedy to the situation. In foreign policy she can insist on the inviolability of her neutrality and can seek to settle local crises and disputes within a system of relations with other states based on the principles of non-interference in each other's affairs, and respect for each other's independence and sovereignty. These principles will only be safe if unresolved problems which might give rise to new disputes and crises can be settled. Formal agreements (such as those reached at the European Conference on Security and Cooperation) are insufficient.

Are such policies capable of maintaining Yugoslavia's "original" features? It is a commonplace that policies are worthless if they are not based on a valid political analysis and executed by capable men. Is this the case for Yugoslav policy today? In its thirty years of existence, although the Yugoslav federal socialist republic has followed a generally coherent line, it has wavered in the way this line has been applied. A period of bureaucratic centralism was followed by one in which too many powers were delegated to the individual republics. This led to centrifugal tendencies favouring the richer, more developed regions and worsening the imbalance between North and South. At the same time separatist feeling was implicitly encouraged, especially in Croatia where it reached alarming proportions. It thus became necessary to return to a more restrictive line, though to democratic rather than to bureaucratic centralism. Greater limitations were placed on the autonomy of the individual republics and on their economic planning. There was a re-evaluation of the role of the Communist Party which in some periods had lost much of its importance. The most recent constitution gives it legal hegemony over the workings of the state. These fluctuations in Yugoslav policy inevitably affected national leaders. Every change in policy was matched by a change in personnel. Those held to be guilty of any given deviation or failing were cast aside and replaced by the faithful supporters of what had now become the dominant line.

Outwardly these internal changes and the fluctuations in economic policy had no effect on foreign policy. There was no straying from the "royal road" of non-alignment. Relations with the outside world in general and the Communist world in particular were nonetheless affected.

Thus certain separatist tendencies could be attributed to Western interference. Policy changes favouring centralism might be seen as reflecting "Cominformist" influence. It is no coincidence that in his many warning speeches Tito has depicted domestic and foreign enemies as working hand in hand to sap the country's unity and strength, to undermine its domestic policy of workers' self-management and its non-aligned foreign policy. Even though on occasions the reference to foreign enemies seems to have been determined by tactical considerations, it is clear that foreign interference has taken many different forms. The East has obviously preferred to use "ideological", the West "political" and economic weapons, in their attempts to divert Yugoslavia from the course she has chosen. Nothing which occurs in Yugoslavia is the simple result of a legitimate autonomous dialectic within the party. Always outside interference plays a role. Thus for the Yugoslav ruling class there is a close connection between their basic policy option in domestic policy (workers self-management) and in foreign policy (non-alignment). Any threat to one of these choices constitutes automatically a threat to the other.

Thus Yugoslavia has to fight on two fronts. An attempt to retreat on either of these would be seen as an attempt to destroy or to compromise the independence of Yugoslav policy-making. This explains why Tito and his trusted followers are so sensitive to the approach of threats to the unity or the territorial integrity of the country. If the case of Macedonia, which we have already mentioned, constitutes the most visible of such threats (in that the Bulgarian refusal to recognize the very existence of a Yugoslav Macedonia represents an embryonic claim to be allowed to annex the territory) there are also fears for other regions. In Croatia, the crisis, four years ago, within the Communist party was worsened by separatist and autonomist tendencies which represented an "internal" threat to the unity and territorial integrity of the state (there was no explicit outside involvement in the crisis). In Kossoco, an autonomous province inhabited by Albanian-speakers, there have been similar problems and at the beginning of 1975 there were nationalist demonstrations. It does not seem as if there were organized from Tirana.

These nationalist phenomena, even when they are not encouraged from outside, give

rise to the fear that after Tito's death, which can no longer be far off, Yugoslavia will undergo a process of "Balkanization", implying the destruction of the unity of the state.

The question of what is to follow Tito is the torment and the delight of the pro-Slav press. The Yugoslavs are fully aware of the dangers and are both attentive and notably suspicious of what is said of them abroad. However the arguments they use are not limited, as would be perfectly logical, to domestic policy, to the safeguarding of national unity. They extend to cover international affairs. In other words, the Yugoslavs see a close connection between the unity of their country and the maintenance of the balance of power in the Balkan-Mediterranean area.

If the dismemberment of Yugoslavia might lead to a chain reaction affecting the whole of South-Eastern Europe the converse also holds. Any destabilization of the region is very likely to encourage centrifugal, nationalist forces within Yugoslavia. Belgrade therefore has attempted to adopt preventative measures both internally and in her Balkan policy. This explains, in domestic policy, the return to tighter centralist system, consecrated at the last Congress of the League of Communists in May 1974; and in international affairs, Belgrade's role in the Cyprus crisis and her insistence, during international negotiations, for example at the European Security Conference, on the indissoluble links between security in central Europe and security in the Mediterranean.

This diplomatic activity is supported by activity on another plane, that is to say, in relations between communist parties. The aim is the same: to maintain Yugoslav independence and sovereignty in the face of the threat of Soviet hegemony. During the long, painstaking preparations for the Conference of European Communist Parties, Yugoslav representatives fought not only for the recognition and practical application of the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states and respect for independent, national roads to socialism but also for the extension of the conference to include delegates from European Socialist parties and other progressive forces. The effect would have been to reduce Moscow's influence over the conference and to bring in new Yugoslav allies. At the moment Yugoslavia

is only supported by Rumania. It seems however that Belgrade's proposal is inevitably going to be rejected, clashing as it does with the USSR's clear aim of reinforcing and perhaps expanding solidarity within the Socialist camp, reducing to a glimmer any hope of evading super-power influence, not only on the military-diplomatic plane but also in the realm of politics and ideology.

Belgrade's insistence on the defence of Yugoslav independence, even in inter-communist affairs, is directly proportional to the USSR's insistence in trying to impose Soviet hegemony over the socialist camp. Moscow is trying to cancel the effect of those centrifugal forces, which, in Soviet eyes, are attempting under the cover of "national roads to socialism" to escape from her influence. We have already seen how the attacks published by a number of marshalls of the Soviet Union, in April 1975, on the role played by Yugoslav partisans in the liberation of their country, were part of a broader pattern of political and psychological pressure aimed at winning recognition of the Soviet Union's "right", as the liberating force behind the transition from capitalism to socialism in the countries of Eastern Europe, to a leading role after that transition. Such recognition would represent for the Soviet Union far more than just an ideological statement of principle. It would have concrete political and diplomatic repercussions enabling the USSR to extend its sphere of influence in the only direction open to penetration, towards the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

#### THE TURKISH-CYPRIOIOT CONFLICT AND SECURITY

Recent events in the region from the Middle-Eastern conflict to the Cyprus crisis have allowed the Soviet Union to play a very important role. Not only have old "Great Russian" expansionist tendencies re-emerged but it appears to have become a goal of Soviet policy to establish a permanent presence in the area. The zone is of vital importance for two reasons. On the one hand, given its proximity to the West's essential oil fields, it holds the key to the prosperity and maybe the survival of the USSR's great historical and ideological antagonist. On the other, a Soviet presence in the area would enable the

USSR to avoid the risk of being surrounded and thus of being forced by the opposite bloc to retreat from its position of influence in the region. Now it is clear that even if the Turkish-Greek alliance represented in the past a barrier not only to Soviet expansionism but even to a Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, a "breakthrough" in the Balkan region, along the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border could always have outflanked such a barrier. The success of such an operation would not only lead to a radical change in the present balance of power in the region but would also leave the Balkans as a prey for the super-powers whose fleets would be masters of the Mediterranean.

At least so far as the West is concerned recent events have made this a possibility, leaving the United States with absolute, uncontested control over the area. Already the French withdrawal from the Atlantic integrated military organization had greatly increased the relative preponderance of the American Sixth Fleet, in no way rivalled or influenced by the Italian, Greek or Turkish fleets, whose role was a purely local one. Now that Britain has announced her intention of completely withdrawing from the Mediterranean, that Greece has withdrawn from the Atlantic military organization and Turkey has "contested" the presence of American bases on her territory, NATO's strategic naval forces are now almost completely American, although Italian ships play a modest role. In other words, within the framework of the Western alliance the European is gradually but inevitably being replaced by an American presence, the result being on the one hand to give added importance to the United States' role in the solution of the Middle-Eastern crisis and on the other to encourage the Soviet Union to increase its own presence proportionately to meet the new American strength in the area.

If the USSR wishes to maintain its presence and contain that of the United States it must secure its rear in the Balkans, including Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is a non-aligned state and her ports are by this token closed to third parties in the event of war or serious crisis. In such circumstances, furthermore, the Convention of Montreux would prevent Soviet ships from passing through the Dardanelles (so long as Turkey remained part of the Atlantic system). A friendly Yugoslavia whose port facilities and waters were available to the

Soviet fleet would be extremely convenient for the USSR. Similarly Yugoslavia's passing into the socialist camp would greatly strengthen the position of Warsaw Pact land forces, which in this way would come into direct contact with a further NATO country, Italy. The Southern front on the Greek frontier would also be broadened. Yugoslavia would thus come to play a key role in Soviet strategy both in Southern and Central-Eastern Europe. The Yugoslavs know very well that in these circumstances their independence and sovereignty would become meaningless.

The most immediate danger for the Belgrade government is thus a dramatic worsening of the situation among Greece, Turkey and Cyprus leaving a vacuum in the South-Eastern corner of Europe, which would rapidly be filled by the two super-powers. The re-opening of the Suez canal has greatly shortened the route to the Indian Ocean, the strategic and economic importance of which is growing rapidly. American and Russian ambitions to reinforce their presence in the Eastern Mediterranean have grown proportionately. Both on the military and on the political-diplomatic plane, a Soviet presence already exists. This was clearly shown in the summer of 1974 when the USSR proposed an international conference, on the Cyprus crisis. She hoped by her participation in such a conference to take the management of the crisis out of exclusively western hands and thus to win acknowledgment of her diplomatic role in an area from which previously she had been rigorously excluded. The Soviet initiative visibly worried Belgrade not least because of the uncertainty which persisted as to the line which Greece and Turkey would take in their relations with third countries and with each other. The disputes over Cyprus and oil in the Aegean sea created a situation of instability which was in no way compensated for by the prospect that in the distant future Greece might leave the Atlantic Pact to join the non-aligned countries. Paradoxically this was not encouraged by Belgrade where it was feared that it might incite the Americans to use any means to prevent a development which would cause them to lose political and military positions of especial importance following the opening of the Portuguese problem at the opposite end of the Mediterranean. Although the consequences of the Portuguese situation were more political than military it nonetheless

accentuated the uneasiness and uncertainties of American and NATO policy.

There were similar doubts on the situation in Turkey where euphoric nationalist and pan Islamic ferment could in the future lead to unforeseeable reversals of policy. Taking all this into account, it is easy to see the risks of instability inherent within the region quite apart from those resulting from the proximity of the Middle-Eastern war theatre.

Finally there is the question of nationalism, at present flourishing in Greece and Turkey. When the nationalist feeling which is still strong in other parts of the Balkans is taken into account, it is clear that we have here yet another destabilizing factor in a zone which, as we have already seen, has always resisted any attempt to build stable regional coalitions. In the summer of 1974 the Cyprus crisis led to the fall of the colonels in a wave of nationalist emotion. Karamanlis succeeded in controlling this but at the cost of Greece's withdrawal from the Atlantic military organization and of setting of similar processes in Turkey. The crisis showed clearly how membership of collective security organizations such as NATO provides no guarantee against national pressures and demands which within certain limits take priority over foreign policy decisions, which have been held to for more than twenty-five years.

Nationalism is hard to control and may have unforeseen results. The Yugoslavs have already seen in their domestic affairs the damage which national feeling can cause to the unity and cohesion of the state. Justifiably therefore they have looked on nationalism elsewhere in the Balkans as a further disturbing element in an already unstable and precarious situation. For this reason, as we saw earlier, far from rejoicing at the damage which would be caused to one of the blocs if, in a moment of irritation at policy decisions taken by third parties

(NATO and the USA) contrary to their interests, Greece and Turkey were to cut their Atlantic ties in favour of a ill-defined "national" policy, the Yugoslavs carefully weighed up the possible repercussions on the balance of power in the Balkan-Mediterranean area. The phenomena of Greek and Turkish nationalism were simply new destabilizing influences in an already delicate and unstable zone. Memories were awakened of the old "powder-keg of Europe". The realization that the area represented the Achilles' heel of the two alliances produced new worries. There was the risk that these new nationalisms would be fed and encouraged by the great powers for their own hegemonic ends.

There has been and there is in Yugoslavia a strong fear that the Balkans might in the future become as in the past a zone of confrontation between rival imperialisms. Yugoslavia herself might be the scene for such a confrontation. Already she has been under growing pressure to turn from the path she has chosen. If this were to occur it would mean the end of Belgrade's policy, unique in Europe, of workers' self-management and non-alignment. In order to avoid this Belgrade has actively been trying to make other, especially European, countries conscious of a danger which threatens not only Yugoslavia but also the whole balance of power in the Balkan-Mediterranean region and thus in Europe.

With what results? Yugoslavia placed great trust in the European Security Conference. These hopes do not seem to have been justified. Both blocs, and especially the Western alliance, seem uncertain as to the future. Both superpowers seem to wish to continue détente. In consequence, as Soviet pressure has grown no one has listened to the Yugoslavs' pleas. The silence and inactivity of the European Community in no way favours the maintenance of the present precarious balance of power in the Balkans.

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