

Implications of COVID-19 on East Africa–EU Partnership on Migration and Forced Displacement

by Tsion Tadesse Abebe and Ottilia Anna Maunganidze

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly impacted the current state and prospects of partnership between the East African countries and the European Union on migration and forced displacement. The pandemic has exacerbated the root causes of migration and forced displacement. This is manifested by the continuation of irregular arrivals in Europe including from East Africa, after a brief decline in the initial phase of the COVID-19 response. The strong economic impact of the pandemic on the region has also disrupted the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees that aspires to address forced displacement challenges through facilitating refugees' self-reliance. These challenges require East African countries and the EU to work towards establishing a better migration governance system with a people-centred approach and with a view to addressing the root causes of migration. East African states should drive their migration and forced displacement policies in ways that benefit their citizens. This should include devising ways of engaging the EU in line with its proposed talent partnerships in its New Pact on Migration and Asylum. The EU should work towards easing the economic burden of countries in East Africa including through providing additional development support and debt cancellation.

European Union | East Africa | Migration | Refugees | Coronavirus

keywords

Implications of COVID-19 on East Africa–EU Partnership on Migration and Forced Displacement

by Tsion Tadesse Abebe and Otilia Anna Maunganidze*

Introduction

East African countries' priorities on migration and forced displacement and those of the EU are divergent. Expansion of free movement of persons is the key priority of East African states with the objective of facilitating job opportunities for their citizens. The EU's priority is return and readmission of migrants in cooperation with its partner countries, which includes countries in East Africa. The European Commission's New Pact on Migration and Asylum¹ includes facilitating legal migration for skilled migrants among the EU's cooperation priorities with its key partners, including in Africa. Subsequent to this, the European Commission issued a communication on enhancing cooperation on return and readmission in February 2021.² With respect to refugees, the EU would like to see integration of refugees within the East African context, whereas much less emphasis is placed on the expansion of resettlement opportunities.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the already poor socio-economic situation of countries in East Africa, which has direct consequence on efforts to address root causes. Irregular arrivals in Europe including from East Africa have continued despite the movement restrictions. Efforts of East African states to enhance refugees' self-reliance through implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) is also impacted, mainly by the pandemic's economic effects.

¹ European Commission, *A New Pact on Migration and Asylum* (COM/2020/609), 23 September 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0609>.

² European Commission, *Enhancing Cooperation on Return and Readmission As Part of a Fair, Effective and Comprehensive EU Migration Policy* (COM/2021/56), 10 February 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0056>.

* Tsion Tadesse Abebe is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies based in Addis Ababa. Otilia Anna Maunganidze is the Head of Special Projects at the Institute for Security Studies.

This paper was prepared with partial support of the Open Society Foundations, in the framework of the project "A New European Consensus on Asylum & Migration". Views expressed are the authors' alone.

The sum of all these factors can greatly impact future cooperation between East African countries and the EU, particularly in addressing drivers of migration and displacement as well as conflict and governance dynamics. This implies that macro-economic challenges exacerbated by the pandemic need to be taken into account when designing funds or setting implementation priorities linked to East Africa–EU cooperation on migration and refugees. It is also equally important to pay attention to the broader and longer-term implications of movement restrictions for irregular migration patterns, smuggling dynamics and the risks faced by people on the move.

Analysing implications of COVID-19 for the partnership between countries in East Africa and the EU with respect to migration and forced displacement is the major focus of this paper. The paper has four sections. The first section provides a brief outline of the context of migration and forced displacement in East Africa. This is followed by a discussion on cooperation on migration and forced displacement between countries in East Africa and the EU. The third section provides an analysis of the impact of COVID-19 on the countries in the region and East Africa–EU partnership on migration and refugees. The paper concludes by highlighting key points that should be considered by both parties in designing and implementing future cooperation mechanisms.

1. Migration and Forced Displacement in East Africa: Trends, drivers and policy frameworks

The East Africa region consists of 11 countries: Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.³ The region is characterised by high levels of migration and forced displacement. It is one of the epicentres of intra-regional, inter-regional and inter-continental movement of people.

The region hosts the highest number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the continent. At the end of 2019, East Africa hosted 4.3 million of the 6.3 million refugees and 9.5 million of the 18.5 million IDPs in Africa.⁴ Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia, three of the leading African refugee-hosting countries, are located in the region. Each of them respectively hosts 1.3 million, 1 million and over 700,000 refugees.⁵ Most of the refugees in the region originate from South Sudan and Somalia. At the end of 2019, 2.2 million refugees and over 900,000

³ There are different geographical classifications regarding which countries belong to the East Africa Region. This paper refers to the greater East Africa region that consists of countries in the Horn of Africa as well as those that take part in the East African community.

⁴ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2019*, Copenhagen, UNHCR, 18 June 2020, <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019>.

⁵ Ibid.

refugees originated from South Sudan and Somalia respectively.⁶ Countries in the region have also been highly impacted by internal displacement. At the end of 2019, Ethiopia and Somalia respectively hosted 3 million and 2.6 million IDPs, while South Sudan and Sudan hosted 1.8 million each.⁷

The movement of people within the region is not limited to forced displacement. Economically or otherwise motivated intra-regional mobility is facilitated by free movement arrangements of regional organisations. For instance, the East African Community, one of the eight regional economic communities in Africa, has established an area of free movement that includes a common passport and the right to work.⁸ In 2019, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), another important regional economic community that also actively works on migration and forced displacement, also adopted a protocol on the free movement of persons.

Migrants and refugees also move to other parts of Africa and outside the continent through three major routes: the eastern route that goes from the Horn of Africa to the Middle East and the Gulf via Yemen; the southern route to countries in Southern Africa, and the Central Mediterranean Route through North Africa leading to Italy and the rest of Europe.

Most of the East African migrants and refugees move to countries in the region, while those heading outside the continent use the eastern route.⁹ In 2020, 445,000 movements were tracked from the region through four major migration routes.¹⁰ While 59 percent of those movements were within the Horn of Africa region, 35 percent were towards countries in the Arab peninsula; 4.3 percent towards countries in Southern Africa and 1.4 percent across the Central Mediterranean towards Europe.¹¹

This indicates that only a small percentage of mixed groups of refugees and migrants from East Africa go to Europe, crossing land borders through Sudan, Egypt and Libya and then to Italy via the central Mediterranean route. Between 2016¹²

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ The East African Community has six member states, namely Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania, that have a total population of 177 million people with a total GDP of 193.7 billion US dollars. See, East African Community website: *Quick Facts about EAC*, <https://www.eac.int/eac-quick-facts>.

⁹ Danielle Botti and Melissa Phillips, "Record Numbers of Refugees and Migrants Arrive in Yemen amidst Intensifying and Complicated War", in *Mixed Migration Centre Articles*, 19 August 2019, <https://mixedmigration.org/?p=4023>.

¹⁰ IOM Regional Data Hub for East and Horn of Africa, "A total of 445,005 movements were tracked along the main #migration routes network in 2020...", *Twitter*, 1 February 2021, <https://twitter.com/RDHONairobi/status/1356241543892508672>.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² UNHCR, *Desperate Journeys. Refugees and Migrants Entering and Crossing Europe Via the Mediterranean and Western Balkans Routes*, February 2017, <https://www.unhcr.org/58b449f54>.

and 2018,¹³ the number of Eritreans and Sudanese arriving in Italy decreased from 20,718 to 3,300, and from 9,327 to 1,600 respectively. This decline is largely due to the reinforcement of the EU border control and surveillance activities – including through Frontex operations in the Mediterranean – as well as the strengthening of the EU’s partnership with Libya on migration control.

Conflict is the leading factor driving migrants and refugees within and out of the region. East Africa has “one of the world’s highest occurrences of conflict”, featuring seven “clusters of distinct but interrelated conflict systems”.¹⁴ These intra- and inter-state conflicts include: Somalia; Sudan and South Sudan; South Sudan; Sudan; Ethiopia; and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda.¹⁵ Al-Shabaab also operates in the region and has made deadly attacks including in Somalia, Kenya and Uganda. In 2020, 54 per cent of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council country/region specific sessions were also dedicated to conflict situations in the Horn of Africa.¹⁶

There have been many efforts to resolve these conflicts, but with limited progress. These include deployment of peace-keeping missions such as the African Union (AU) – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The AU initiative Silencing of the Guns in Africa, which aims at addressing root causes of conflicts and promotes conflict prevention and resolution, has also been ongoing since 2013.¹⁷

The combined effect of conflict and climate change has also led to major displacements in the region. In 2011–12, the interplay between conflict and climate-related drought has caused mass displacement of Somali refugees to neighbouring countries.¹⁸ Monthly arrivals of Somali refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia in 2011 totalled 13,600 and 8,400 respectively.¹⁹

¹³ UNHCR, *Desperate Journeys. Refugees and Migrants Arriving in Europe and at Europe’s Borders, January–December 2018*, January 2019, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/67712>.

¹⁴ African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and African Governance Architecture (AGA), *The Africa Governance Report: Promoting African Union Shared Values*, January 2019, p. 60, <https://au.int/en/node/36836>.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Amani Africa, “2020 Review of the Peace and Security Council”, in *Insights on the Peace & Security Council*, 8 January 2021, p. 3, <http://www.amaniafrica-et.org/images/Reports/ThePeaceandSecurityCouncilin2020Council.pdf>.

¹⁷ Wafula Okumu, Andrews Atta-Asamoah and Roba D. Sharamo, “Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020. Achievements, Opportunities and Challenges”, in *ISS Monographs*, No. 203 (August 2020), <https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/silencing-the-guns-in-africa-by-2020-achievements-opportunities-and-challenges>.

¹⁸ Sanjula Weerasinghe, “In Harm’s Way: International Protection in the Context of Nexus Dynamics Between Conflict or Violence and Disaster or Climate Change”, in *Legal and Protection Policy Research Series*, No. 39 (December 2018), <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/globalconsult/5c1ba88d4>.

¹⁹ UNHCR, *Global Trends Report 2011*, July 2012, p. 12, <https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/country/4fd6f87f9>.

Despite the multiple challenges, countries in the region follow open-door policies towards refugees. As a continuation of this practice, East African countries were among the first to sign up for the Global Compact on Refugees. Adopted in 2018, the Compact is aimed at combining development and humanitarian aid to support refugees and host communities. It is guided by four objectives: easing pressure on host countries, enhancing refugees' self-reliance, facilitating voluntary repatriation and expanding resettlement.

Six of the eight African GCR roll-out countries and situations, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Somalia, are located in the region. The adoption of policies on refugees' socio-economic inclusion and facilitating refugees' access to education opportunities are among the areas where the countries have shown progress in implementing the Compact.

In 2016, Rwanda adopted a national strategy on economic inclusion of refugees.²⁰ To this end, the country has started issuing identity cards and access to health insurance. Ethiopia also adopted a revised refugee proclamation in 2019 that offered refugees freedom of movement, the right to work and documentation. In addition, Ethiopia has started civil registration of refugees. Uganda, a country that has already offered health and education services to refugees on equal terms with its citizens, is now working on enhancing socio-economic inclusion of refugees. Its Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPe) Strategy that was adopted in 2016 plays a critical role here. ReHoPe provides the roadmap to Uganda's "integration of refugees into the National Development Plan II (NDPII, 2015/16–2019/20), through the Settlement Transformation Agenda (STA)".²¹

The region has also shown strong progress in enhancing refugees' access to education in line with the GCR. Here, a significant role is played by IGAD's Djibouti Declaration on education, which aims at facilitating inclusion of refugees in national education systems. The Declaration is part of IGAD's Nairobi Process that facilitates comprehensive responses to forced displacement challenges as outlined by the GCR.²² The Nairobi Declaration (2017) and Kampala Declaration on Jobs and Livelihood (2019) also form part of the Nairobi process.

Prominent steps have been taken in facilitating education opportunities for refugees in the region. In 2017, Djibouti passed a National Law that offers refugees better access to services such as education, healthcare and employment.²³ Kenya

²⁰ Rwanda Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR) and UNHCR, *Economic Inclusion of Refugees in Rwanda*, June 2017, <https://www.unhcr.org/rw/?p=10543>.

²¹ Uganda Government and World Bank, *ReHoPE – Refugee and Host Population Empowerment. Strategic Framework Uganda*, June 2017, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/64166>.

²² IGAD, *The IGAD Support Platform Launched at Refugee Forum is Proof of Commitment to Progressive Refugee Policies by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda*, 16 December 2019, <https://igad.int/divisions/health-and-social-development/2016-05-24-03-16-37/2321>.

²³ UNHCR, *UNHCR Welcomes Djibouti's New Refugee Laws*, 12 December 2017, <https://www.unhcr.org>.

is also finalising its refugee education policy that expands refugees' access to education;²⁴ it already offers education access to a significant number of refugees on equal terms with nationals. Refugees' participation in pre-primary, primary and secondary levels in Ethiopia has also reached 55 per cent, 68 per cent and 17 per cent respectively as of September 2020.²⁵

Despite these improvements, the implementation of the GCR has faced different challenges in the region. The major challenge for the implementation of the Compact is the inability of refugee-hosting countries and donor countries, which include the EU and its member states, to reach an agreement on responsibility sharing. Donor countries push for greater inclusion of refugees in the national systems of host countries, while showing little commitment to provide sustainable finance.²⁶ Refugee-hosting countries, on the other hand, request assurances of continued support. Inclusion of refugees in national systems is not only expensive,²⁷ it can also be politically costly.

In December 2019, three months prior to the declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic, the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) was organised. The GRF aimed at mobilising all-round support – also through financial resources – to all GCR roll-out countries, including those in East Africa. Accordingly, a financial commitment of close to 8 billion US dollars was made by the international financial institutions, the private sector, states and other actors.²⁸ It is expected that the majority of these contributions will be channelled to African states.²⁹ Hosting the majority of refugees in the continent, the East African GCR countries would receive a large share of these funds.

org/news/briefing/2017/12/5a2f9e7f4.

²⁴ Laura Hammond et al., *Comprehensive Refugee Responses in the Horn of Africa: Regional Leadership on Education, Livelihoods and Durable Solutions*, London, Research and Evidence Facility (REF), February 2020, p. 40, <https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/files/2020/03/CRRF-report.pdf>.

²⁵ First Author's personal communication with experts from UNHCR, 10 December 2020.

²⁶ Nicholas Crawford and Sorcha O'Callaghan, *The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework: Responsibility-sharing and Self-reliance in East Africa*, London, Overseas Development Institute, September 2019, <https://www.odi.org/publications/11451-comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-responsibility-sharing-and-self-reliance-east-africa>.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ UNHCR, *Outcomes of the Global Refugee Forum 2019*, June 2020, p. 25, <https://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/5ecd458c4>.

²⁹ Ibid.

2. Cooperation between East African countries and the EU on migration and forced displacement

Addressing irregular migration and implementation of the GCR are two key areas of cooperation between countries in East Africa and the EU. Beyond these areas, expansion of free movement of persons, within and outside the region including towards Europe, is a key priority of East African countries, which are primarily interested in facilitating job opportunities for their citizens, especially the youth. This is clearly demonstrated in the East African Community and IGAD free movement of persons protocols. Contrary to this, return and readmission as well as facilitation of integration of refugees from East Africa within the region are among the cooperation priorities pushed by the EU.

The European Commission's joint communication "Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa" and the Council conclusions issued in 2020,³⁰ linked to the Africa-EU Strategy that is under negotiation, also reflect the EU's interest in continuing collaboration in these areas. Migration and mobility is one of the five priority areas of the joint communication and the Council conclusions. Cooperation on migration and mobility focuses on four key areas: fighting irregular migration, improving return and readmission, cooperation on refugee management and expanding legal pathways.

With regard to the fight against irregular migration, countries in the region participate in different platforms spearheaded by the EU. Seven East African countries, namely Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda, take part in the Khartoum Process, which aims at combatting human trafficking and smuggling, fighting irregular migration, enhancing return and readmission and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement.

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) also allocates part of its funding to addressing irregular migration, including initiatives focusing on tackling the root causes. Between 2016 and 2020, the EUTF allocated 1.4 billion euro to projects spanning nine countries in the region: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Some of the ongoing projects include "Resilience Building and Creation of Economic Opportunity in Ethiopia (RESET II)", a 48 million euro project that aims to enhance livelihood opportunities of the most vulnerable communities.³¹ A 30 million euro project aiming at creating

³⁰ European Commission, *Towards a Comprehensive Strategy with Africa* (JOIN/2020/4), 9 March 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020JC0004>; Council of the European Union, *Council Conclusions on Africa* (9265/20), 30 June 2020, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9265-2020-INIT/en/pdf>.

³¹ EUTF website: *Resilience Building and Creation of Economic Opportunity in Ethiopia (RESET II)*, <https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/215>.

economic opportunities for youth and women is also ongoing in Sudan.³²

Efforts have also been made by the AU to improve migration governance in the continent. With regard to managing irregular migration, a statute for the Establishment of Continental Operational Centre in Sudan for Combatting Irregular Migration was adopted at the AU Heads of States Summit in February 2020.³³ The Centre aims to “improve the overall migration governance regime in Africa, specifically the management of irregular migration”.³⁴

The EU’s strategy on fighting irregular migration and improving return and readmission heavily relies on partnerships with third countries,³⁵ some of which are located in the region. Four of the 16 priority countries under the European Commission’s 2016 New Partnership Framework with third countries are from the region, namely Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan.³⁶ When it comes to cooperation on return and readmission, the interests of countries in East Africa diverge from those of the EU, mainly due to the high political costs involved for the former. This is illustrated by the fact that Ethiopia is the only East African country that has concluded an informal agreement with the EU. Despite the political repercussions of the agreement, Ethiopia could be pressured to sign as it was undergoing a critical political transition where the political parties badly required the support of key allies, including the EU.³⁷ Beyond Ethiopia, the fact that only three other African countries, namely Guinea, The Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire, have signed such informal agreements³⁸ demonstrates that return and readmission is an area of cooperation where EU and African interests significantly diverge.

Implementation of the GCR is another key area, where the GCR roll-out countries in the region and the EU have been collaborating. In 2017, EUTF allocated 15 million euro to the EU Regional Development and Protection Programme in the

³² EUTF website: *Support to Economic Opportunities for Youth and Women*, <https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/2560>.

³³ The Statute for the Establishment of African Centre for the Study and Research on Migration (Mali) and the Statute for the Establishment of African Migration Observatory (Morocco) were also adopted at the same summit.

³⁴ African Union, *Draft I Statute for the Establishment of Continental Operational Centre in Khartoum*, October 2019, p. 5, https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/37472-wd-statute_for_the_establishment_of_continental_operational_centre_in_khartoum-english.pdf.

³⁵ Tsion Tadesse Abebe and Aimée-Noël Mbiyozo, “Focus on Migrant Returns Threatens AU–EU Negotiations”, in *ISS Today*, 22 October 2020, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/focus-on-migrant-returns-threatens-aeu-negotiations>.

³⁶ European Commission, *Establishing a New Partnership Framework with Third Countries under the European Agenda on Migration* (COM/2016/385), 7 June 2016, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0385>.

³⁷ 2018 was the year when political protest and unrest reached a tipping point in Ethiopia and pushed the ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, to change its top leadership in the middle of its five-year term. Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegne resigned and was replaced by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali.

³⁸ Jonathan Slagter, “An ‘Informal’ Turn in the European Union’s Migrant Returns Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa”, in *MPI Articles*, 10 January 2019, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/node/16384>.

Horn of Africa, which aims at addressing protection and development challenges in Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda.³⁹

EUTF supports different projects in the region that are linked to the GCR. This includes projects in Ethiopia related to the institutionalization of the GCR such as integrating refugees and host communities in the Urban Productive Safety Net Program (UPSNP) and strengthening socio-economic opportunities for refugees and host communities.⁴⁰ EUTF also supports projects in Kenya that facilitate “better economic integration and self-reliance of refugees and host communities in the Kakuma and Kalobeyei area through supporting market-led solutions that strengthen and deepen local markets and respond to key development challenges”.⁴¹ In addition, EUTF allocated 15 million euro to support the Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Plan (KISED) in Kenya between 2016 and 2019/2020.⁴² KISED provides a “framework and tool to manage the presence of some 180,000 refugees (40% of the population of Turkana West) in a manner that is of benefit to all – both the refugees and their hosts”.⁴³

3. Impact of COVID-19 on East African countries and EU partnership on migration and forced displacement

Socioeconomic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, together with the mobility restrictions introduced to contain the spread of the virus, have impacted the cooperation between East African countries and the EU on migration and forced displacement in three major ways. First, cooperation on addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement is hugely impacted as COVID-19 worsens the already poor socioeconomic situation of the countries in East Africa. Conflict and poor governance, two other root causes of migration and displacement, are also aggravated by the pandemic. Second, the implementation of the GCR is disrupted due to the strong socioeconomic impact of COVID-19. Third, movement restrictions led to a further decline in the number of irregular arrivals in Europe from the region in the initial phase of COVID-19 response, but picked up from the summer of 2020 onwards, despite restricted mobility and closed borders, which indicates that the demand to move out of the region continues to be a reality.

³⁹ UNHCR, *Unique EU Programme to Benefit Refugees and Host Communities in Kalobeyei*, 8 February 2017, <https://www.unhcr.org/ke/?p=2078>.

⁴⁰ Tsion Tadesse Abebe, “Civil Society Input to EU-Africa Cooperation on Migration: The Case of Ethiopia”, in *ECRE Working Papers*, No. 9/2020 (February 2020), p. 3, <https://www.ecre.org/?p=10025>.

⁴¹ EUTF, *Piloting Private Sector Solutions for Refugees and Host Communities in North-West Kenya – Action Fiche*, September 2018, p. 1, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-hoa-ke-58_-_piloting_private_sector_solutions_incl._addendum.pdf.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ UNHCR, *The Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Programme*, 2018, p. ix, <https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/12/KISED.pdf>.

3.1 Root causes exacerbated

COVID-19 has exacerbated all aspects of the root causes of migration and forced displacement in East Africa, which are linked to economic conditions, security and poor governance. Addressing root causes is very critical to provide alternative options to populations other than irregular and precarious forms of migration and to prevent displacement, while contributing to working migration and displacement management systems. Gaining a better understanding of how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted on the drivers of migration in East Africa is therefore key for adapting East Africa–EU cooperation mechanisms to this new reality.

3.1.1 Economic contraction

On the economic front, the African continent is expected to face COVID-19-related economic contraction with an average reduction of gross domestic product per capita by 348 US dollars for lower-middle-income countries and by 50 US dollars for the continent's low-income countries.⁴⁴ Djibouti, Kenya and Tanzania are classified as lower-middle income countries, while other countries in the region are low-income economies.⁴⁵ In 2020 alone, the economic impact of COVID-19 will result in 14 million more Africans living at incomes below the 1.90 US dollar extreme poverty threshold, across the continent.⁴⁶ This will increase poverty among host communities and refugees. High levels of debt further exacerbate COVID-19-related economic contraction.⁴⁷ The continent has "a high debt burden, spending roughly US\$40bn annually on servicing its debt".⁴⁸ Countries in East Africa are no exception.

The economic contraction together with the COVID-19-related movement restriction has led to food price increases since production and distribution supply chains have been disrupted. In Bujumbura, Burundi, for instance, the price of maize increased by 49 per cent in April 2020 and 37 per cent in May 2020, compared to the same months in 2019.⁴⁹

The increase in food prices can be further aggravated due to the worst desert locust invasion facing the region. The desert locust is one of "the most dangerous

⁴⁴ Jakkie Cilliers et al., "Impact of COVID-19 in Africa: A Scenario Analysis to 2030", in *ISS Africa Reports*, No. 24 (July 2020), p. 7, <https://issafrica.org/research/africa-report/impact-of-covid-19-in-africa-a-scenario-analysis-to-2030>.

⁴⁵ World Bank's Data Help Desk: *World Bank Country and Lending Groups*, <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519>.

⁴⁶ Jakkie Cilliers et al., "Impact of COVID-19 in Africa: A Scenario Analysis to 2030", cit., p. 15.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴⁹ UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), *Facilitating Cross-border Trade through a Coordinated African Response to COVID-19*, Addis Ababa, UNECA, July 2020, p. 7, <https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/43789>.

migratory pests in the world”.⁵⁰ A small swarm can consume an equivalent of food for 35,000 people in one day.⁵¹ This could significantly “exacerbate food insecurity in a region where up to 25 million people are reeling from three consecutive years of droughts and floods”.⁵² This will heavily impact the most vulnerable members of society including refugees and host communities who reside in less developed peripheral areas with limited socio-economic opportunities.

Refugees are already impacted. In October 2020, in Uganda, host of 1.3 million refugees mainly from South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, “more than 400,000 refugees are considered to be at crisis hunger levels and 135,130 children acutely malnourished and in urgent need of treatment”.⁵³ The decision of the World Food Programme to cut food rations and cash-based transfers to refugees in Uganda by 30 per cent in April 2020 has clearly fed into the aggravation of the situation.⁵⁴ This decision has heightened the risk of starvation for refugees, whose small businesses have already been paralysed due to the lockdown.⁵⁵

3.1.2 Impact on conflict dynamics and peace processes

COVID-19 appears to also impact peace processes and conflict dynamics in East Africa, a region where conflict is the primary driver of forced displacement. Continuing conflict and violence alongside disruption of peace processes are likely to take their toll on local populations already facing greater socioeconomic challenges due to COVID-19 impact. Despite the pandemic, terrorists and non-state armed groups have continued their attacks against civilians. In March 2020, Al-Shabaab attacked a UN compound.⁵⁶ Further, the group made two attacks in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, in August 2020. In one of these incidents, eight soldiers were killed and 14 others wounded in a bomb attack near a military base.⁵⁷ The second attack on a beachfront hotel in Mogadishu claimed the lives of 16

⁵⁰ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), *East Africa’s Locust Crisis in Numbers*, 25 January 2020, <https://unocha.exposure.co/east-africas-locust-crisis-in-numbers>.

⁵¹ Aimée-Noël Mbiyozo, “Migration Is a Safety Net During Climate Change Disasters”, in *ISS Today*, 20 May 2020, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/migration-is-a-safety-net-during-climate-change-disasters>.

⁵² Nita Bhalla, “Climate Change Linked to African Locust Invasion”, in *Reuters*, 29 January 2020, <https://reut.rs/320CbyZ>.

⁵³ Samuel Okiror, “Aid Cuts and COVID Force Uganda Refugee to Brink of Starvation”, in *The Guardian*, 9 October 2020, <https://gu.com/p/f3yja>.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Tsion Tadesse Abebe and Allehone Abebe, “How Africa Can Reduce COVID-19’s Impact on Displaced Persons”, in *ISS Today*, 12 May 2020, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-africa-can-reduce-covid-19s-impact-on-displaced-persons>.

⁵⁶ Mohammed Dhaysane, “Somalia: Al-Shabaab Attacks UN Compound in Capital”, in *Anadolu Agency*, 19 March 2020, <http://v.aa.com.tr/1771163>.

⁵⁷ “Eight Soldiers Killed by Al-Shabab Suicide Bomber in Mogadishu”, in *Al Jazeera*, 8 August 2020, <https://aje.io/a2a3t>.

people and wounded many others.⁵⁸ This is despite the call for an immediate global ceasefire by UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the Chairperson of the AU Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat.

The COVID-19 pandemic has also disrupted diplomatic and political consultations that aim to bring peace to ongoing conflicts.⁵⁹ For instance, the planned trilateral summit between Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia has been postponed. Implementation of peace agreements has also been faced with challenges such as those in South Sudan. As governments' primary concern is containing the pandemic and addressing its socioeconomic impact, peace processes have been pushed down the political priority ladder. Mobility restrictions and social distancing measures also make meetings more difficult, leading to postponements.

Peace support operations have also been affected as rotations are halted or delayed to prevent the spread of the virus. This makes it difficult for new offensives to be launched, and affects operations in the region such as AMISOM and UNMISS.

3.1.3 Exacerbation of governance challenges

The COVID-19 pandemic is offering reason to postpone scheduled elections, invariably reversing gains towards democratic consolidation in the region. Postponed elections due to COVID-19 include Ethiopia's parliamentary election delayed from May 2020 to June 2021; Kenyan elections for county assembly and National Assembly from April 2020 to December 2020; and Somalia's presidential election from November 2020 to later in 2021.⁶⁰ Only Burundi and Tanzania held national elections on previously scheduled dates in May 2020 and October 2020 respectively.

The experience of Ethiopia clearly demonstrates the potential of COVID-19-related election postponements for aggravating existing political tensions. The decision by the federal government to postpone national elections – originally scheduled in June 2020 – first indefinitely, and later on to June 2021, was not supported by all political parties in the country. The Tigray regional state – one of the nine regional states in the country – unilaterally decided to hold the regional elections in September 2020, strongly contesting the federal government's legitimacy. This has led to unprecedented political tension, climaxing in the current Tigray crisis.

The COVID-19 pandemic has also adversely affected efforts to promote electoral credibility and to strengthen electoral institutions by disrupting the deployment

⁵⁸ "Somalia: Over a Dozen Killed in Hours-Long Mogadishu Hotel Siege", in *Al Jazeera*, 17 August 2020, <https://aje.io/mhz38>.

⁵⁹ Fred Oluoch, "Maalim: Region Losing Chance to Cement Gains Made on Peace and Security", in *The East African*, 30 October 2020, <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/mahboub-maalim-peace-security-2726408>.

⁶⁰ International IDEA, *Global Overview of COVID-19 Impact on Elections*, last updated 26 February 2021, <https://www.idea.int/node/307787>.

of observer missions and the provision of technical assistance respectively. Such missions have been either stalled or cancelled due to COVID-19 control measures. For example, breaking with the EU's strong tradition of regularly observing elections in the region, EU election observers did not take part in the Burundi and Tanzania elections.⁶¹

This exacerbates one of the drivers of migration and forced displacement in the region: poor governance. The majority of conflicts in the region have their roots in poor governance such as "state mismanagement, misgovernance, high-level corruption, historical injustices and grievances, poor handling of electoral processes and social diversities, incumbents manipulating political processes or constitutional orders, foreign interference".⁶² These are central to violence, persecution and severe human rights violations – which force people to flee.

The sum of all these factors generates significant implications for the cooperation between countries in East Africa and the EU on addressing the root causes of migration and forced displacement, particularly with regard to implementation. These include the Khartoum Process and the projects funded by the EUTF. The health emergency necessitates a redefinition of funding priorities, leading to a channelling of financial resources to immediate health response.⁶³ Beyond the pandemic's effects on existing projects, processes and funds, the overall economic impact on the EU and its member states can also lead to a reduction of resources available for addressing the root causes, exactly at a time when the needs of the most vulnerable, including refugees and host communities, increases.

3.2 GCR implementation disrupted

COVID-19 has disrupted the implementation of the GCR in the region. Enhancing refugees' self-reliance is central to GCR implementation, and the strong economic impact of COVID-19 makes it an even bigger challenge. The pandemic's economic effects will have direct consequences on newly enacted policies related to the GCR, including those that aim to facilitate refugees' access to employment opportunities and to education. Expansion of out-of-camp policies is also part of the plan, partly inspired by experiences of urban refugees participating in the formal and informal sector. The majority of refugees live in camps. While some of these refugees are affected by factors including declining food rations, lockdowns have forced many of the urban refugees in the region to stop working, which steals their means of income as well as their agency of self-reliance.

⁶¹ European External Action Service (EEAS) website: *List of EU EOM and EEM Missions 1993-2019*, <https://europa.eu/Fv66Ud>.

⁶² Wafula Okumu, Andrews Atta-Asamoah and Roba D. Sharamo, "Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020", cit., p. 6.

⁶³ For instance, in April 2020, EUTF allocated 45 million euro to support a social protection system that addresses COVID-19 preparedness and response in Sudan. See, EUTF website: *EU Support for the Family Support Programme and for the Consolidation of Social Protection in Sudan, 2020*, <https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/2469>.

The strong economic effects of COVID-19 can also impact the commitment of the GCR roll-out countries, as paying back loans – that constitute part of the international financial support they receive – will become a major challenge for many of them. Substantial amounts of financial support come to the region from the World Bank’s IDA-18 and IDA-19 regional sub-window for refugees and host communities (IDA 18 RSW and IDA 19 RSW) that support low-income countries hosting large numbers of refugees.⁶⁴ The GCR roll-out countries are beneficiaries of IDA-18, which has provided 2 billion US dollars from 2017 to 2020,⁶⁵ and IDA-19, which foresees 2.2 billion US dollars for the 2020–2022 period.⁶⁶ EU member states are major contributors to IDA-18 and IDA-19. Support through the regional sub-windows is split between grants and loans. Considering the high debt levels in the region, some countries were already contesting loan-based international financing mechanisms to support GCR implementation before the pandemic. For instance, Tanzania withdrew from the GCR in 2018, refusing to “borrow money from the World Bank in order to support greater opportunities for refugees”⁶⁷ and turned down the IDA-18 offer of 100 million US dollars in loan and grant.

The severe economic consequences of COVID-19 put in further jeopardy the ability of those East African countries that are party to the IDA-18 to pay back their loans dedicated to GCR implementation. Consequently, some of them might be forced to withdraw from the process. International donors, including the EU, should therefore take into consideration the severe negative effects generated by the COVID-19 crisis on economic conditions and already existing challenges related to indebtedness in refugee-hosting countries in East Africa when designing future funding mechanisms, also bearing in mind the GCR objective of easing the pressure on host countries.

COVID-19 can also affect the co-existence between refugees and host communities. Even prior to the pandemic, trends have indicated that “promoting the self-reliance of refugees in an environment where the host communities are worse off can have adverse implications”.⁶⁸ The COVID-19-related economic weakening could spark mass protests, as the experiences of the 2007–2008 food crisis remind us.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Volker Türk, “The Promise and Potential of the Global Compact on Refugees”, in *International Journal of Refugee Law*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (December 2018), p. 575-583 at p. 578, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eyy068>.

⁶⁵ World Bank website: *IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities*, <https://ida.worldbank.org/node/1541>.

⁶⁶ World Bank website: *Window for Host Communities and Refugees*, <https://ida.worldbank.org/node/5936>.

⁶⁷ Alexander Betts, “Don’t Make African Nations Borrow Money to Support Refugees”, in *Foreign Policy*, 21 February 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/21/dont-make-african-nations-borrow-money-to-support-refugees>.

⁶⁸ Tsion Tadesse Abebe, “Refugees’ Self-reliance: The Dilemma of Implementing the Global Compact on Refugees in Africa”, in *Refugee Law Initiative Blog*, 3 April 2019, <https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/?p=1206>.

⁶⁹ UNECA, *Facilitating Cross-border Trade through a Coordinated African Response to COVID-19*, cit.

Here, it is important to note that most of the host communities in the region live in peripheral areas with low levels of development. Such social upheavals make refugees more vulnerable to targeted violence and xenophobia, positioning them as scapegoats of economic situations exacerbated due to COVID-19.

Even prior to COVID-19, the EU has been working to address this issue, allocating resources through EUTF to improve governance and conflict prevention. In light of this, since 2015 it has been running a project on strengthening social cohesion and stability in slum populations in Uganda. The 4.3 million euro project aims to solve causes of inter-communal conflict in slum populations, addressing sources of grievances and strengthening community cohesion.⁷⁰

Applying conflict-sensitive approaches, which base interventions on in-depth understanding of local contexts where such refugee inclusion programmes take place,⁷¹ would therefore be even more critical for policy responses and cooperation initiatives in the upcoming period. This would bring significant benefits in terms of foreseeing the potential impact of interventions – such as those within the GCR framework – on the interaction between refugees and host communities.⁷² This enables the parties to make the necessary preparation to mitigate risks and minimise potential damages, which is particularly important considering that rising tensions and further conflict can displace many more people.

3.3 Irregular arrivals in Europe continue

The early phase of COVID-19-related movement restrictions led to a decline in the number of irregular arrivals in Europe of African migrants and refugees, including those from the East Africa region. The arrivals picked up in June/July 2020 despite the restrictions.⁷³ This underscores the fact that the demand to move on (towards the EU or elsewhere) continues to be a reality despite securitised borders and restricted movement – a reality to which smuggling networks seem to have quickly adapted.⁷⁴

The potential for further increase in the number of people willing to move to Europe from African countries including from East Africa, due to the economic stress caused by COVID-19, is likely to ring alarm bells in the EU. In fact, this development would encourage the continuation of the securitisation of intra-African migration, partly through the implementation of EU-spearheaded policies

⁷⁰ EUTF website: *Strengthening Social Cohesion and Stability in Slum Populations*, <https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/172>.

⁷¹ Tsion Tadesse Abebe, "Refugees' Self-reliance", cit.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Marion MacGregor, "Migrant Arrivals to Europe Increase as COVID-19 Restrictions Ease", in *InfoMigrants*, 19 August 2020, <http://infomi.gr/18Yv.T>.

⁷⁴ Amanda Bisong, "Will COVID-19 Change Migration Cooperation between Europe and African Countries?", in *ECDPM Briefing Notes*, No. 121 (October 2020), <https://ecdpm.org/?p=41003>.

in Africa to stem Europe-bound African migration.

The pandemic has revealed – and could further amplify – the critical role of migrant workers in the EU in sectors such as agriculture, service delivery and health care. Yet, the overall economic stress caused by COVID-19 is expected to discourage EU member states from developing more open policies on labour migration, despite the commitment in the New Pact to expanding legal migration and mobility channels as part of the EU’s relations with its key migration partners. This means that return and readmission will most likely remain the key priority for the EU, as also manifested by the strong emphasis placed on decreasing irregular migrant arrivals and enhancing returns in the New Pact.⁷⁵

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted, and will continue to impact, cooperation between the EU and the East African countries on migration and refugees. Its overall economic impact is exacerbating the root causes of migration and displacement and making the socioeconomic inclusion of refugees in host communities through the GCR an even bigger challenge. It also makes addressing irregular migration complicated. The only immediate impact that might be considered positive by the EU was the decline in the number of irregular arrivals in the EU from the region in the early phase of COVID-19 response. The continuation of arrivals stresses the role of COVID-19 in aggravating economic situations in many of the African countries including those in East Africa.

This requires both parties to turn the challenges presented by COVID-19 into an opportunity to build a better migration governance system that follows a people-centred approach with the ultimate goal of addressing the root causes of migration and displacement. In doing this, they need to apply a whole-of-government approach, paving the way to tackling the economic, security, conflict and governance challenges that keep people from leading a safe and better life at home.

The East African countries should drive the migration and forced displacement policy in a way that benefits their people and in coordination with similar ongoing continental efforts. It goes without saying that the EU is an important partner in this process and the countries of the region should work with the EU in correcting the distorted narrative on African migration and refugees – including from this region. In contrast to the dominant narrative of mass migration from Africa to Europe, the majority of the African migrants and refugees move to another African country. Moreover, most migrants from the region who opt to move out of the

⁷⁵ Tsion Tadesse Abebe and Aimée-Noël Mbiyozo, “New Pact’s Focus on Migrant Returns Threatens Africa-EU Partnership”, in *ASILE Forums*, 11 December 2020, <https://www.asileproject.eu/?p=3091>.

continent head east to the Middle East and the Gulf.

The EU should also further invest in identifying ways for easing the economic burden on countries in the region, including through additional development support and possibly also debt cancelation. Creating tangible opportunities that enable youth to earn their living should be central to the EU's fight against irregular migration. Given that it has now been five years since the start of implementation of most of the EU's projects on fighting irregular migration, it is time to evaluate them along the lines of their impact in creating opportunities for citizens of East African states to earn their living.

Future funding mechanisms aiming to support refugees and host societies within the GCR framework would need to take into consideration the exacerbated economic challenges that will confront refugee-hosting countries in East Africa in the post-pandemic context. The first step in this respect is understanding the multifaceted impact of COVID-19 on East African host communities.

Finally, to address the issue of irregular movement, the EU should look beyond control-oriented measures, and particularly into ways of expanding legal means of entering the Union, prioritising those with talents, skills and qualifications who opt to move onwards for lack of opportunities at home. In this respect, the New Pact's proposal for talent partnerships to facilitate legal migration is an encouraging development. Similarly, the EU should consider expanding resettlement opportunities, considering the stress that increased forced displacement continues to generate in the Eastern Africa region.

Updated 2 March 2021

References

Tsion Tadesse Abebe, "Civil Society Input to EU-Africa Cooperation on Migration: The Case of Ethiopia", in *ECRE Working Papers*, No. 9/2020 (February 2020), <https://www.ecre.org/?p=10025>

Tsion Tadesse Abebe, "Refugees' Self-reliance: The Dilemma of Implementing the Global Compact on Refugees in Africa", in *Refugee Law Initiative Blog*, 3 April 2019, <https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/?p=1206>

Tsion Tadesse Abebe and Allehone Abebe, "How Africa Can Reduce COVID-19's Impact on Displaced Persons", in *ISS Today*, 12 May 2020, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-africa-can-reduce-covid-19s-impact-on-displaced-persons>

Tsion Tadesse Abebe and Aimée-Noël Mbiyozo, "Focus on Migrant Returns Threatens AU–EU Negotiations", in *ISS Today*, 22 October 2020, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/focus-on-migrant-returns-threatens-aeu-negotiations>

Tsion Tadesse Abebe and Aimée-Noël Mbiyozo, "New Pact's Focus on Migrant Returns Threatens Africa-EU Partnership", in *ASILE Forums*, 11 December 2020, <https://www.asileproject.eu/?p=3091>

African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and African Governance Architecture (AGA), *The Africa Governance Report: Promoting African Union Shared Values*, January 2019, <https://au.int/en/node/36836>

African Union, *Draft I Statute for the Establishment of Continental Operational Centre in Khartoum*, October 2019, https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/37472-wd-statute_for_the_establishment_of_continental_operational_centre_in_khartoum-english.pdf

Amani Africa, "2020 Review of the Peace and Security Council", in *Insights on the Peace & Security Council*, 8 January 2021, <http://www.amaniafrica-et.org/images/Reports/ThePeaceandSecurityCouncilin2020Council.pdf>

Alexander Betts, "Don't Make African Nations Borrow Money to Support Refugees", in *Foreign Policy*, 21 February 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/21/dont-make-african-nations-borrow-money-to-support-refugees>

Nita Bhalla, "Climate Change Linked to African Locust Invasion", in *Reuters*, 29 January 2020, <https://reut.rs/320CbyZ>

Amanda Bisong, "Will COVID-19 Change Migration Cooperation between Europe and African Countries?", in *ECDPM Briefing Notes*, No. 121 (October 2020), <https://ecdpm.org/?p=41003>

Danielle Botti and Melissa Phillips, "Record Numbers of Refugees and Migrants Arrive in Yemen amidst Intensifying and Complicated War", in *Mixed Migration Centre Articles*, 19 August 2019, <https://mixedmigration.org/?p=4023>

Jakkie Cilliers et al., "Impact of COVID-19 in Africa: A Scenario Analysis to 2030", in *ISS Africa Reports*, No. 24 (July 2020), <https://issafrica.org/research/africa-report/impact-of-covid-19-in-africa-a-scenario-analysis-to-2030>

Council of the European Union, *Council Conclusions on Africa* (9265/20), 30 June 2020, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9265-2020-INIT/en/pdf>

Nicholas Crawford and Sorcha O'Callaghan, *The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework: Responsibility-sharing and Self-reliance in East Africa*, London, Overseas Development Institute, September 2019, <https://www.odi.org/publications/11451-comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-responsibility-sharing-and-self-reliance-east-africa>

Mohammed Dhaysane, "Somalia: Al-Shabaab Attacks UN Compound in Capital", in *Anadolu Agency*, 19 March 2020, <http://v.aa.com.tr/1771163>

EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), *Piloting Private Sector Solutions for Refugees and Host Communities in North-West Kenya – Action Fiche*, September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-hoake-58_-_piloting_private_sector_solutions_incl._addendum.pdf

European Commission, *Enhancing Cooperation on Return and Readmission As Part of a Fair, Effective and Comprehensive EU Migration Policy* (COM/2021/56), 10 February 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0056>

European Commission, *Establishing a New Partnership Framework with Third Countries under the European Agenda on Migration* (COM/2016/385), 7 June 2016, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0385>

European Commission, *A New Pact on Migration and Asylum* (COM/2020/609), 23 September 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0609>

European Commission, *Towards a Comprehensive Strategy with Africa* (JOIN/2020/4), 9 March 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020JC0004>

Laura Hammond et al., *Comprehensive Refugee Responses in the Horn of Africa: Regional Leadership on Education, Livelihoods and Durable Solutions*, London, Research and Evidence Facility (REF), February 2020, <https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/files/2020/03/CRRF-report.pdf>

IGAD, *The IGAD Support Platform Launched at Refugee Forum is Proof of Commitment to Progressive Refugee Policies by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda*, 16 December 2019, <https://igad.int/divisions/health-and-social-development/2016-05-24-03-16-37/2321>

Marion MacGregor, "Migrant Arrivals to Europe Increase as COVID-19 Restrictions Ease", in *InfoMigrants*, 19 August 2020, <http://infomi.gr/18Yv.T>

Aimée-Noël Mbiyozo, "Migration Is a Safety Net During Climate Change Disasters", in *ISS Today*, 20 May 2020, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/migration-is-a-safety-net-during-climate-change-disasters>

Fred Oluoch, "Maalim: Region Losing Chance to Cement Gains Made on Peace and Security", in *The East African*, 30 October 2020, <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/mahboub-maalim-peace-security-2726408>

Samuel Okiror, "Aid Cuts and COVID Force Uganda Refugee to Brink of Starvation", in *The Guardian*, 9 October 2020, <https://gu.com/p/f3yja>

Wafula Okumu, Andrews Atta-Asamoah and Roba D. Sharamo, "Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020. Achievements, Opportunities and Challenges", in *ISS Monographs*, No. 203 (August 2020), <https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/silencing-the-guns-in-africa-by-2020-achievements-opportunities-and-challenges>

Rwanda Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR) and UNHCR, *Economic Inclusion of Refugees in Rwanda*, June 2017, <https://www.unhcr.org/rw/?p=10543>

Jonathan Slagter, "An 'Informal' Turn in the European Union's Migrant Returns Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa", in *MPI Articles*, 10 January 2019, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/node/16384>

Volker Türk, "The Promise and Potential of the Global Compact on Refugees", in *International Journal of Refugee Law*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (December 2018), p. 575-583, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey068>

Uganda Government and World Bank, *ReHoPE – Refugee and Host Population Empowerment. Strategic Framework Uganda*, June 2017, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/64166>

UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), *Facilitating Cross-border Trade through a Coordinated African Response to COVID-19*, Addis Ababa, UNECA, July 2020, <https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/43789>

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Desperate Journeys. Refugees and Migrants Arriving in Europe and at Europe's Borders, January–December 2018*, January 2019, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/67712>

UNHCR, *Desperate Journeys. Refugees and Migrants Entering and Crossing Europe Via the Mediterranean and Western Balkans Routes*, February 2017, <https://www.unhcr.org/58b449f54>

UNHCR, *Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2019*, Copenhagen, UNHCR, 18 June 2020, <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019>

UNHCR, *Global Trends Report 2011*, July 2012, <https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/country/4fd6f87f9>

UNHCR, *The Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Programme*, 2018, <https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/12/KISED.Pdf>

UNHCR, *Outcomes of the Global Refugee Forum 2019*, June 2020, <https://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/5ecd458c4>

UNHCR, *UNHCR Welcomes Djibouti's New Refugee Laws*, 12 December 2017, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2017/12/5a2f9e7f4>

UNHCR, *Unique EU Programme to Benefit Refugees and Host Communities in Kalobeyei*, 8 February 2017, <https://www.unhcr.org/ke/?p=2078>

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), *East Africa's Locust Crisis in Numbers*, 25 January 2020, <https://unocha.exposure.co/east-africas-locust-crisis-in-numbers>

Sanjula Weerasinghe, "In Harm's Way: International Protection in the Context of Nexus Dynamics Between Conflict or Violence and Disaster or Climate Change", in *Legal and Protection Policy Research Series*, No. 39 (December 2018), <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/globalconsult/5c1ba88d4>

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)

The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli. IAI seeks to promote awareness of international politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and multilateral cooperation. Its focus embraces topics of strategic relevance such as European integration, security and defence, international economics and global governance, energy, climate and Italian foreign policy; as well as the dynamics of cooperation and conflict in key geographical regions such as the Mediterranean and Middle East, Asia, Eurasia, Africa and the Americas. IAI publishes an English-language quarterly (*The International Spectator*), an online webzine (*Affarinternazionali*), three book series (*Global Politics and Security*, *Quaderni IAI* and *IAI Research Studies*) and some papers' series related to IAI research projects (*Documenti IAI*, *IAI Papers*, etc.).

Via dei Montecatini, 17 - I-00186 Rome, Italy

T +39 06 697683

iai@iai.it

www.iai.it

Latest IAI PAPERS

Director: Riccardo Alcaro (r.alcaro@iai.it)

- 21 | 08 Tsion Tadesse Abebe and Otilia Anna Maunganidze, *Implications of COVID-19 on East Africa–EU Partnership on Migration and Forced Displacement*
- 21 | 07 Nicoletta Pirozzi, Luca Argenta and Paweł Tokarski, *The EU One Year after the Covid-19 Outbreak: An Italian-German Perspective*
- 21 | 06 Adel Abdel Ghafar, *Between Geopolitics and Goeconomics: The Growing Role of Gulf States in the Eastern Mediterranean*
- 21 | 05 Alessandro Marrone and Ester Sabatino, *Cyber Defence in NATO Countries: Comparing Models*
- 21 | 04 Katarzyna Kubiak, *Reviewing NATO's Non-proliferation and Disarmament Policy*
- 21 | 03 Mehdi Lahlou, *EU–Africa Partnership on Migration and Mobility in Light of COVID-19: Perspectives from North Africa*
- 21 | 02 Jean-Pierre Darnis, *Le relazioni transatlantiche al tempo del digitale: la questione del trasferimento di dati*
- 21 | 01 Arnout Molenaar, *Unlocking European Defence. In Search of the Long Overdue Paradigm Shift*
- 20 | 48 Massimiliano Frenza Maxia, *Blockchain statale e yuan digitale: "game changer" di Pechino nella competizione imperiale con gli Usa?*
- 20 | 47 Alessandro Picchiarelli, *Per un'intelligenza artificiale a misura d'uomo: una possibile regolamentazione valoriale?*