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EURO-MED JOINT ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PEACE-BUILDING AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: PROSPECTS AND LIMITS

by Fred Tanner

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I. INTRODUCTION

This study explores possible areas of co-operation in the Euro-Med region that would require joint actions in the broad field of security. Such areas of co-operation include peace support activities, joint observation and monitoring, as well as possibilities of co-operation in politically cost-efficient fields, such as disaster relief and mine action.

The task of this paper is to examine the prospects and limits of joint actions in view of the current elaboration of a Euro-Mediterranean Charter. The proposals and recommendations are based on the present acquis of the Barcelona process (Barcelona Declaration, ministerial meetings) as well as on the draft charter and its guidelines that were presented at the Stuttgart Euro-Med Conference (15/16 April 1999.)

After undergoing several informal metamorphoses since its conception at the Barcelona Ministerial Conference, the Charter has been presented at the Stuttgart Ministerial in a more elaborated, albeit still very uncommitted fashion. Nevertheless, the Chairman's Statement together with the current guidelines provide us today with a more solid base for elaborating credible options of co-operation in the Political and Security Partnership.

The future Charter for Peace and Stability should serve as terms of reference for the security co-operation in the Euro-Med region on the one hand and provide both a normative and programmatic source of action on the other. It may, in some respect, represent the equivalent to the Mediterranean of what the Helsinki Final Act was to the Euro-Atlantic region. In a long-term perspective, it could prepare the setting for structural conflict prevention in the region. Such a structural approach includes also an intrastate dimension of security, such as the defence of human rights, the building of civil society, and the pursuance of good governance.

A number of caveats should be raised in order to determine the outer perimeter of this study. First, the guidelines for the Charter relegate joint action modalities to a later, non-specified stage of Euro-Med co-operation. Apparently there is no consensus for proposing concrete joint actions at the current stage of Euro-Med affairs. The Luxembourg version of the Charter of 1997 suggested among other activities the election observation mission as one of the joint actions. Election observation, however, has not been retained at the Stuttgart meeting. This should not serve as a reason to henceforth ignore this important activity, on the contrary, this study will explore how monitoring and election observation could be made more palatable for Mediterranean partner states.

A second observation is that the Charter needs to be a <u>living document</u>. It should be engaged in norm building for the Euro-Med Partnership. This should also take into account the various developments that are happening outside the Barcelona parameters. For instance, confidence and partnership building norms in the Mediterranean have been established by the Madrid Document, UN Resolutions, the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1994, the Oslo process as well as political arrangements under the ACRS process. Furthermore, common activities, such as naval exercises, training or seminar diplomacy are taking place in the context of co-operation and dialogue programmes of organisations

such as NATO, the OSCE and the WEU. The Charter needs to acknowledge that the playing field in Mediterranean security co-operation is increasingly crowded.
A third caveat concerns the apparent opposition by some Partners towards the concept of variable geometry in the Mediterranean. First, the language of the guidelines for the Charter clearly reflect the concern of some Barcelona Partners that the Charter may be used as a Trojan horse by those states that would like to push certain items of the international agenda beyond the politically acceptable threshold.
In this context, the "common and balanced approach" requirement as well as the "indivisibility of security" is upheld as sacrosanct by some Partner states. The Syrian Foreign Minister reiterated that point in his speech at Stuttgart, where he argued that "Regional security is indivisible and no country in the region should be exempted from (…) arrangements related to (…) security." Obviously he targeted the NPT, but this principle will also be an impediment for "variable geometry", i.e. voluntary or sub-regional co-operative arrangements in a Euro-Med setting. This will prevent the development of "Euro-Med Partnership projects of the willing".
Given the present obstacles to hard security and defence co-operation, the focus of this work will be on joint actions in the realm of soft security. It is clear that meaningful co-operation with actual security gains can only be expected in the long-term. For this reason the paper will also stress joint actions in training and education in view of creating the necessary conditions of a future Euro-Med security community. The intrastate dimension of Euro-Med security co-operation will represent an integrate part of the analysis, due to the fact that domestic problems have regional security consequences. This is why greater emphasis is placed on questions related to good governance, and in particular on civil-military relations and security sector reform.

II. PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace operations will continue to be important in the Mediterranean region as an instrument for conflict management and peace building. The term peace operation embraces numerous co-operative actions. These are peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, law and order, preventive deployment and peace maintenance missions. In the Mediterranean, the time is ripe to explore various options of co-operation in this field. The suggestions and recommendations submitted in this chapter should be seen in the context of joint actions that are not necessarily associated with peace operations only, but that also fall into the broader category of peace building. For example, humanitarian support, disaster relief or humanitarian de-mining are considered part of joint efforts to support countries in their reconstruction after conflicts or natural disasters.

1. Record of the Past

The Mediterranean region together with the Middle East has the greatest density of peace missions worldwide. But, the regional participation in these operations is minimal at best. Peace forces on the Golan (UNDOF), the Sinai (MFO), Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL), Cyprus (UNFICYP) or the Western Sahara (MINURSO) are coming primarily from European states and Asia.
The peace activities in the region follow the classic "first generation peacekeeping" model; they have interposition roles with a limited tripwire function. Not all of the missions in the Mediterranean are UN operations: The Multinational Force and Observers

(MFO) moved in to replace the UNEFII in the Sinai, after the Soviet Union vetoed an extension of the latter due to its envisaged mission mandate in the Camp David Peace Agreement.

Peacekeeping in the Mediterranean region has a mixed record. UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, for instance, has remained largely unable to prevent infiltration from the north towards Israel on the one hand, nor has it had a chance to block Israeli incursions into Lebanon. Another failure represents the Second Multi-National Force (MNF II) that was deployed around Beirut in 1982 in the wake of the massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. The MNF II, especially the US and French contingents were soon perceived less as peacekeepers but more as warring factions and were targeted by extremist groups.[1] The bloody truck bombings of MNF II barracks finally led to the withdrawal of the peace forces from the region.

Other peace missions are today recognised undoubtedly as a success. They include UNDOF that was established as a consequence of the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement of 1974. UNDOF has been able to stabilise a sensitive area and it projected a certain degree of mutual confidence on the Golan Heights. Also UNFICYP in Cyprus has been successful at performing its mission, even though the underlying conflict has not moved one inch closer to a solution. But, the blue helmets in Cyprus are there as peacekeepers and not as mediators. Other peace operations that can be assessed as successful in the greater Mediterranean region include MFO in Sinai, the Iraq-Kuwait Observer mission, and the missions in the Balkans (IFOR/SFOR, KFOR) that receive particular attention in the Arab world because of the Islamic dimension in the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts.

2. Euro-Med Involvement in Peace Operations

Why should the Euro-Med Partnership get involved in peace operations? There are a number of compelling reasons. First, as the above section shows, the peace operations have been a reality of the Mediterranean for a long time. Second, peacekeeping enjoys universal recognition.[2] Third, peacekeeping promotes civil-military relations. Fourth, the functional aspect of peacekeeping can overcome the political barriers to military-to-military contacts and finally, as the survey of Table 2 (Annex I) shows, numerous Partner states have a history of involvement in peacekeeping operations.

In the 1990s, a number of Partner states have substantially increased their involvement in peace operations.[3] The most outstanding contributions are coming from Jordan, Turkey and Egypt. Jordan's contributions to peace keeping have a high profile in Europe, with their commitments to peace missions in Bosnia and Croatia (military units) and in Georgia and Macedonia (military observers). Egypt has, in turn, according to Carlos Echeverria, "striven to maintain a leading position in the Arab, African and Islamic worlds". Egypt has participated in most of the peace missions of the 1990s. Peacekeeping operations allow Cairo to maintain political influence in the respective regions.

Moreover, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Turkey are involved in the NATO-led IFOR/SFOR peace restoration missions. This implied the close military co-operation with

[1] Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, Macmillan, London, 1990, p. 356-361.

[2] See, for instance, Comprehensive Review of the whole question of Peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, General Assembly, United Nations, A/48/173, 25 May 1993.

[3] For a comprehensive survey of peacekeeping activities of Euro-Med states, see Carlos Echeverria, "Co-operation in Peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean Armed Forces," Chaillot Papers, 35, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, February 1999.

NATO, because the operation ran on the basis of a combined joint task force (CJTF), with an unity of command and a clear division of labour. Egypt's contribution includes also a field hospital provided by the TABA battalion (600 patients per month); Morocco was present with a Motorised Infantry Battalion (SFOR).

The Arab participation in IFOR/SFOR was important for a number of reasons. For many soldiers of the Arab contributing states, it is the first time away from home. In addition to numerous other benefits, it helps these soldiers to gain an insight into civil-military relations. In post-conflict Bosnia, the peace forces are closely involved in institution-building and election monitoring. Furthermore, under the unity of command system, these units work very closely with militaries from other countries. The Jordanians and Moroccan units, for instance, were integrated into the French-lead division.[4]

But, the model of IFOR/SFOR co-operation has been hurt by NATO's military involvement in Kosovo. The self-empowering of NATO for the bombardment of Serbia has certainly damaged the image of NATO in the Arab world, even though the intervention was made in favour of a Muslim population. It can be expected that the non-NATO Euro-Med countries will insist even more on a UN key role in peacekeeping operations. Future participation of Arab states in CJTF arrangements such as IFOR/SFOR will probably become more difficult. To date, Arab states have refrained from participating in the KFOR operation, even though numerous non-NATO states have sent observers and military contingents, including neutral states and Russia.

In view of elaborating recommendations for peace operations in the Euro-Med context, the following preliminary observations have to be made.

- First, it will be important to allow Euro-Med joint actions to be open to potential outside participation. For instance, the Charter should prepare the conceptual ground for close co-operation (in peacekeeping and other areas) between the Euro-Med Partnership, the OSCE and Arab League, for instance. At the same time, it may be premature to suggest co-operative arrangements with organisations, such as the OAU, that are clearly beyond the Euro-Med parameters.[5]
- Second, peacekeeping co-operation continues to represent a sensitive matter for states with uneasy civil-military relations at home. Peace operations imply, after all, military-to-military contacts among Mediterranean Partner states—a type of Euro-Med co-operation that has been rejected repeatedly by Partners such as Syria or Lebanon.
- Third, the Euro-Med Partnership lacks the political cohesion and credibility for mandating peace missions or for acting as sub-contractor thereof.

The above constraints still leave the Political and Security Partnership with a number of options in the broad field of peace support and responses to complex emergencies. The Partnership should be able to prepare peace missions under a Euro-Med hat in the field of training, contingency planning and security sector reform. Furthermore, the Partnership could support peacekeeping operations in non-military domains, such as demining and disaster relief. Finally, it can serve as a focal point and provide assistance for self-help.

3. Suggestions and Recommendations

[4] SFOR Informer Nr. 24, November 1997, Sarajevo

[5] See, for instance, Carlos Echeverria, "Co-operation in Peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean Armed Forces," Chaillot Papers, February 1999, p. 26.

Model 1: Joint peacekeeping training

The Euro-Med security co-operation could concentrate on building capacity in peacekeeping. Areas that deserve particular attention are language training, civil-military relations and humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping. Such training activities are politically very much possible in the Euro-Med context, once the project of Euro-Med networking of defence institutes has taken off the ground.[6] To date, training activities are concentrated in Germany and Egypt. In Germany (Oberammergau), the NATO School offers in the PfP framework a number of peacekeeping training courses to officers from NATO Mediterranean Partners. In Egypt, peacekeeping curricula are offered at Cairo's Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (C.C.P.A.). Currently, the C.C.P.A. is geared towards African countries, but the peacekeeping training could be offered also to military officers and civil officials from Euro-Med countries.

Model 2: Joint force planning for peacekeeping purposes

Joint force planning in the Mediterranean could be designed to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available for multinational training, exercises and operations in a Euro-Med context. Such operations could consist of peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations. Joint planning would not imply any institutional ramifications for the Euro-Med Partnership. Military and political co-operation for peace missions could be done in various venues in the Euro-Mediterranean area. It could deal with the lessons learned of the UN. Also, Euro-Med meetings could work out common rules of engagement, status-of-forces model agreements, prepare the ground for joint contingency planning for peace and humanitarian operations, and agree on stand-by arrangements. Joint force planning would also be essential for jointly preparing non-military operations that require military support especially in the fields of emergency assistance and disaster relief (see also model 5).

Model 3: Joint peacekeeping module

More difficult to achieve, but conceivable in the long-term may be the creation of regional joint peacekeeping modules. Regional and sub-regional co-operation in peace operations has become very fashionable in the late 1990s. There are now peace support battalions in the Baltic, in Scandinavia (*Nordic Battalion*) and in Central Europe (*CENCOOP*). Also, in south-eastern Europe the *Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe* has been established with troop contributions from Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey. In addition, numerous current UN peace missions are made up by the task force principle: On the Golan Heights, for instance, a Slovak unit is integrated in an multinational Austrian-led battalion.

The basic idea behind these arrangements are to prepare multinational peace forces, that are interoperable and that are based on the task force principle. Such a Euro-Med module would be a contribution of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the security and stability in the region. The Euro-Med Partnership could serve as a framework for political co-ordination. Given the low comfort level of some Arab states to military co-operation, such a module could also be conceivable as a non-armed support contingent with priority tasks such as communications, logistics, engineering and transport. Those states that may chose to stay away from such peace forces could participate as observer states.

[6] This proposal was launched in 1996, but then put on hold due to objections from Syria and Lebanon. France tried to revitalise it again in 1999.

Model 4: Euro-Med Co-operation in Mine Action

The land-mine question has taken prominence through the Ottawa process and the mobilisation of the international public opinion in recent years. Furthermore, humanitarian de-mining has become an integrate part of peace operation and peace building. In the Mediterranean region, there are several mine hot spots. There are mines deployed in the Near East, Cyprus, the Greek-Turkish borders and elsewhere in the Mediterranean region. Israel is co-operating with Jordan together with Canada and Norway in an anti-personnel clearing project along the Jordan-Israel border. Egypt, in turn, claims to have 23 million land mines left over from the Second World War and the countries four wars with Israel.

These mines are –in addition to being dangerous—also an obstacle to the economic development of entire areas. For example, the El-Alamein region has a density of up to three mines to the square metre.[7] Egypt has approached several international institutions, including NATO through the MCG, for enlisting support. Individual EU countries have already agreed to support Egypt by sending experts and clearing equipment. A recent Rand study suggests integrating the mine clearing efforts into the NATO Dialogue programme.[8]

Mine action could develop as an important field of co-operation in the Euro-Med Partnership. But the Partnership is not equipped to set up and run a mine action centres. In fact, until now, mine action centres have been exclusively national organisations, given the sovereignty issues when it comes to on-site missions. The main activities of such centres are to assess the mine problem, make plans for the removal of the mines, work together with the government for the prioritisation, raise funds, train management staff and staff for mine clearance.

The Partnership could, however, play an important role as facilitator, co-odinator and as focal point for mine action: It could act as a mine co-ordination body for mine action in the Mediterranean and provide programmatic assistance to those Partner states who wish to create their own Mine Action Centres.[9] The Euro-Med mine action programme could act as clearinghouse for the creation of tailored mine-clearing programmes; it could assist the Partners in their efforts to raise funds and to establish technical control standards. Given the interrelationship of mine action with post-conflict rehabilitation and economic development, current MEDA programmes could be enlisted to support mine awareness programmes in civil society and the socio-economic rehabilitation of mined areas.

Model 5: Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Emergency Response

There exists a clear need for emergency assistance and civil protection programmes in the Mediterranean. Recent earthquake catastrophes in Turkey and Greece in August 1999 revealed the obvious lack of emergency aid co-ordination, despite the excellent work that was done by the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The record of the past indicates that the bilateral approach works much better than assistance through regional or international organisations: during the earthquake in Cairo, France and other countries have sent their support on a bilateral basis.

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[7] Egypt seeks help to clear 20 million mines, Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 December 1996, p. 5.

[8] Ian Lesser, Jerrold Green, F. Stephen Larrabee, Michele Zanini, The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Steps, Rand, February 1999, p45.

[9] To date, there exist 17 Mine Action Centres worldwide, none of which are located in the Mediterranean.

The envisaged creation of a "Euro-Mediterranean system of prevention, of reduction and of management of natural and man-made disasters" is a first step towards multilateralisation of disaster co-operation. But, it is questionable to what extent the Disaster relief activities could be institutionalised beyond its current steering committee.[10] Should some form of institutionalisation take place, nevetheless, then it would make sense to link it up with the proposed Euro-Med conflict prevention centre (see paper of Stephen Calleya). In such an operational mode, the Centre could assume the following tasks: the alert of the Euro-Med Partnership of an unravelling emergency, mobilising resources and channelling emergency contributions, and the co-ordination of the deployment of military and civil protection assets.

It is obvious that such a Centre would need to work very closely with relief organisations such as OCHA and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). Also, sooner or later a division of labour needs to be made between an Euro-Med disaster relief programme and the NATO Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) that is actively promoted by the NATO's Mediterranean work programme.

Long-term activities of the Centre could include the exchange of information on disaster preparedness, a Euro-Med model agreement for mutual assistance, joint exercises and border crossing arrangements. Under Euro-Med auspices there could be the development of joint activities such as awareness-raising, team visits, courses and workshops.

4. Realistic Options for the Euro-Med Partnership

Many of the above-mentioned activities fall in the EU under the Petersberg missions. European planning for such missions are based extensively upon Eurofor and Euromarfor—force postures that have been perceived by Southern partners as a threat. It is very much possible that units and staff officers of EU countries that would be involved in Euro-Med co-operation in peacekeeping would also wear a Eurofor or Euromarfor hat. In view of the critical Southern Mediterranean perception of these forces, it is essential do promote co-operative efforts that could minimise suspicions and build trust. This is why the various forms of peacekeeping co-operation are essential for the Euro-Med Partnership, because they can substantially contribute to the removal of North-South misperceptions on force postures.

The recommended options indicate that the Euro-Med Partnership can get involved in peace support and peace building without that it would have to develop first into a regional organisation, similar to the OSCE or the OAU. Peacekeeping training, contingency planning and the creation of joint peace forces do not require a UN Chapter VIII status, nor does it require an advanced degree of regional integration. In fact, countries in Central Europe or in the Balkans have created regional peace forces without any organisational framework.

It is important to understand all recommendations, including those on mine action and disaster relief in a comprehensive context of peace building. The strength of the Euro-Med Partnership would not stem from the ability to train or field a peace force, but in a capability to effectively address complex emergencies in a holistic fashion. This would offer Euro-Med Partners, other states and relief agencies a focal point for engaging in concerted and coherent actions.

[10] After the first meeting in Rome (13 September 1998), the Euro-Med disaster relief system is currently still on project level. Impetus is expected from the meeting in Cairo in December 1999.

The Euro-Med Partnership could provide to willing states access to administrative structures that could assume clearing and co-ordination functions. Moreover, it could serve as venue for meetings of emergency planners and peace implementers. Thus, in case of humanitarian emergencies, Euro-Med Partnership would not provide any emergency assistance *per se*, but it would co-ordinate such assistance that would be offered by individual states or relief agencies. At the same time, the Partnership could mobilise human resources, civilian expertise, technical assistance and financial contributions from within the Partnership and from the international community at large.

Contingencies in the Mediterranean are less related to post-conflict rehabilitation, but rather to humanitarian emergencies, as it has been the case in Turkey and Greece. Wars are still likely scenarios in the Mediterranean, but the predominately inter-state nature of wars in the region reduces the likelihood of demand for third party assistance. Peace forces in the greater Mediterranean region are usually confined to cease-fire lines and are not involved in post-conflict peace building. Exceptions are the UN forces in the Western Sahara, that have a multifunctional mandate including security, repatriation and the organisation of a referendum.

Humanitarian tragedies of a grand scale, in turn, are more prone to international assistance. They do need multinational co-ordination, logistics for rapid deployment of food and structural assistance and other emergency measures. Logistics and transport under time duress require in many cases the support of military assets.

III. SUPPORT OF GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE SECURITY DOMAIN

Security-building in the Mediterranean also means democracy-building. This link between regional security and democratic transition is dealt with most discreetly in the Euro-Med Partnership. The Charter has to assume the important task to assure that this link is maintained in future Euro-Med co-operation, both on the level of norm-setting and in concrete joint actions. This chapter will show how the external-internal security relationship can be fostered through the notion of good governance and actions that serve the cause of long-term transition towards good governance and democracy.

1. The Charter and Good Governance

In the Chairman's formal conclusions of the Stuttgart ministerial meeting, good governance is mentioned as one of the areas to be strengthened by the Euro-Med dialogue. Even though good governance originates from the UN bureaucratic maze and is associated primarily with sustainable human development (SHD), this notion lends itself very well also to the Euro-Med framework, particularly in view of the North-South cleavage on human rights interpretations.[11] The notion of good governance appears in the Barcelona process for the first time in the Charter Guidelines of 1999, as far as the Ministerial documents are concerned. An inconclusive conference on Good Governance has been held in the framework of the 3rd Chapter of the Barcelona Process in The Hague in March 1997. Also, Good Governance was on the top of the agenda at the Euro-Med Conference on regional Co-operation, held in Valencia, 28/29 January 1999. But, thus far, no link has been established between good governance and security co-operation.

[11] For a conceptual survey of good governance, see The Global Research Framework of the Decentralised Governance Programme, UNDP, New York, May 1997.

Good governance does not only mean transparency, accountability, and the acceptance of democratic rule; it also includes the acceptance of the empowerment of a civil society. In the Euro-Med context, the notion of good governance lends itself rather to much confusion and misinterpretation: the Guidelines mention under "measures to improve good-neighbourly relations and regional co-operation" in a rather cryptic formulation the need to join forces in "the struggle" against "phenomena" that may "pose a threat to good governance". This ominous formulation betrays the various and conflicting interests at work. Regime interests of the ruling elites of southern Mediterranean states may rhetorically embrace notions such as human rights or good governance, but they are in final account different from the Western understanding of "societal interest".

The various perceptions of threats and security are therefore difficult to bring onto a common denominator and the security-related discussions may encounter great difficulties in an Euro-Med setting. There exists still considerable suspicion in the South as Western-proposed security-related arrangements are concerned. This is due to a difference in political cultures and political systems, the problem of legitimacy and the legacy of Western domination of the Arab world. This may also explain why from a Southern perspective, there exists no intrinsic link between international security and human rights.

But, human rights issues are not just a North-South problem; they also concern the relationship of partners such as Israel or Turkey with the European states. In the case of Israel, the Netanyahu government reacted quite testily to the Human Right Commission Resolution of 27 April 1999, that condemned Israel for its settlement policy, the expropriation of land etc in the occupied territories.[12] The Resolution was carried with the support of all EU members. Israel chastised Europe and predicted that "the current decision, and similar ill-considered statements, distance Europe from worthwhile and acceptable involvement in the peace process."[13] In a similar way, the Ocalan crisis has revealed the wide gap between the EU countries and Turkey concerning human rights and good governance.

Due to the various perceptions on the relationship between regional security and domestic conduct, there exists a distinct need to promote both an exchange and structured dialogue about the understanding of peace, security, and stability on levels such as regional, state, societal and even individual. The currently emerging concept of "human security" could be used to bridge the cleavages of perception.[14] UN Secretary General Koffi Annan explicitly describes "threats to human security, such as natural disasters, ethnic tension and human rights violations," as sources of new international conflicts.[15] An emphasis on "human security" and "good governance" in the security debate could help to break the mould that some states have build around their understanding of "national security".

Good governance concerns internal affairs and lends itself not *a priory* to international co-operation. But, the emphasis on good governance in the security sector is justified by the fact that the Med Partners primary security concerns are of an internal nature first. The Charter can have an important influence on the creation of good governance in the

[12] Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-fifth session, agenda item 8, Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine, United Nations, 1999.

[13] Israel rejects human rights commission resolution, Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 28 April 1999.

[14] Astri Suhrke, "Human Security and the Interest of States," Security Dialogue, Vol.30, Nr. 3, September 1999, pp. 265-276.

[15] Kofi Annan, 'Achieving peace and security' , Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 27 August, 1998.

region by encouraging the creation of norms and codes of conduct in the security field with intrastate applications. They should embrace "co-operative security" models where common actions are increasingly based on common norms and common values.
As to concrete actions, this study suggests to tackle those activities that have certain relevance for good governance. These activities reflect an approach "by approximation"; that means they consist in efforts to create a culture of co-operation in functional areas that could at a later stage be used for the direct support of good governance. This approach by approximation seems justified and even necessary because of today's continued critical view of governmental elites of the South towards national and international accountability, democracy and human rights.[16]

Table 1 Good Governance principles and their possible applications

Good governance principles	**Modicum**	**Suggested Euro-Med actions (Chapter 1-relevant)**
Legitimate power	Free and fair elections	Promoting observations and monitoring of elections and agreements in security domain
Rule of law	Norm-setting	Code of conduct
Empowerment and enabling		Training and education
transparency	Free flow of information	Networking, seminar diplomacy
Accountability		Civil-military relations
Broader political participation		People-to-people contacts

As the Table 1 shows, the promotion of monitoring and observation in the security domain may facilitate eventually the move towards free and fair elections. This study will explore the feasibility of this proposition. It will suggest using as an "icebreaker" the promotion of joint (functional) monitoring of security arrangements in the Euro-Med area. As the table indicates, other actions are possible in the security domain in support of good governance. They are, almost by definition, long-term projects that will not yield immediate payoffs for the Partnerships. This study will advance suggestions for Euro-Med involvement in four areas that are linked to the promotion of good governance in the security realm of the Mediterranean: Election monitoring, codes of conduct in civil-military relations, civilian expertise-building in the security sector, and seminar diplomacy and people-to-people contacts.

2. Monitoring and Observation Missions

The holding of elections is generally considered a means of the democratic distribution of power. Elections are therefore often portrayed as a vehicle of good governance. The unease of election monitoring and observation in most Mediterranean Partner countries could be overcome with monitoring activities of functional security arrangement. Such functional monitoring could deflect from red herring notions such as "verification",

[16] For a candid assessment of the ambiguities of the South about good governance, democracy and human rights, see George Joffé, op.cit.

"inquiring" or "investigations". The Euro-Med Partnership could play in this step-by-step approach an important role. The Charter could establish the conceptual link between co-operation in observation and the promotion of good governance.

Election monitoring

There is not yet any culture of election observation in the Arab world and Arab states have, thus, an ambiguous relationship to election monitoring. According to such a view, election monitoring is considered necessary only for states or local governments if there is a manifest lack of legitimacy or capability.[17] Elections are considered national affairs and lend themselves to manipulation and coercion. For instance, when Egypt sent observers to oversee the Palestinian election in 1996, "voters in Gaza joked that the winner was sure to be Egypt's President Mubarak."[18]

To date, of 79 developing countries having asked the UN for electoral assistance only one request came from a Mediterranean partner state: The Algerian government requested UN electoral assistance for the Presidential elections held on 16 November 1995.[19] As for elections to the People's National Assembly of June 1997, Algeria invited the UN, the Arab League, the OAU and NGOs such as the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights to send observers. Furthermore, it also asked all the European Union states for electoral assistance. Election monitoring also took place in the Palestinian territories in 1996. Otherwise, the Mediterranean Partners have been opposed to the idea of election monitoring in their own countries.

The OSCE is trying to reach out to the Mediterranean Partners in the area of observation and monitoring. It invites them as "Guest observers" to OSCE/ODIHR election monitoring operations. A number of partner states has taken up the offer or are interested to elaborate the scheme (Morocco and Egypt). There are currently 12 Field Missions that are mandated by the OSCE. They are often in regions with Islamic populations and are therefore of special interest to Arab states (Tajikistan, Chechnia, Bosnia, Albania). But, by and large, the OSCE offer is not really exploited by the Partner states out of fear that there could eventually be a request of reciprocity from the West that would be difficult to accommodate.[20]

The Euro-Med Partnership could serve as framework that could organise election observation missions at the invitation of participating states. It could assume the important and still missing task of creating standard election observation missions. Such missions should be available for national and local government elections. In case of political sensitivities, the Euro-Med Partnership could simply prepare the assistance to the elections: here, national agencies and NGOs would be involved in election assistance and observation programmes, with the objective such as the elaboration of election codes, improving the electoral legislation or the promotion of voter education programmes.

Observer missions in Hebron (Temporary International Presence in Hebron)

The Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) is a unique monitoring mission in Hebron made up by 6 European states.[21] This observer mission represents an example where the Euro-Med Partnership could play a useful role as a framework for peace-

[17] Interview with S. Aouad, MFA, Cairo.
[18] Arab Autocracy forever, The Economist, 7 June 1997, p. 42.
[19] Horacio Boneo, Electoral Assistance by the United Nations, in Kostakos, Georgios (ed.), Democratic Elections and the Mediterranean, Eliamep, Athens, 1999, p. 97.
[20] Interview with Egyptian Official.
[21] Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey.

building activities. The current mission does not fall into any institutional setting and is a patchwork of some willing states of Europe who want to contribute to peace, security and "and economic development" in the Hebron area.[22] Norway, through its efforts to keep the Oslo process alive is acting as a lead country. The other non-Euro-Med state present in the TIPH is Switzerland.

The mandate for the TIPH was established under the Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It calls for providing the Palestinians with a feeling of security, to promote stability and encourage economic development and growth. The vagueness of the mandate gives the observers the opportunity to exploit their presence also for other purposes, such as support of local community, development aid, etc. TIPH reports regularly to a joint committee made up by the Israeli Military Commander and the Palestinian Commander of the Hebron district. More than half of the TIPH observers is military personnel or police officers.

Nakourah Cease-fire agreement

The Nakoura agreement is an understanding of a cease-fire in 1996 between Israel and Lebanon regarding the attack from Lebanese soil of Israel by Katyusha rockets.[23] Israel, in return, commits itself not to fire at civilians or civilian targets in Lebanon. This agreement is not a cease-fire agreement in the strict sense, as it still permits the use of force for military purposes. This civil-military differentiation makes the compliance monitoring very important, but also very difficult. The monitoring group is made up by military officers from the US, France, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. This agreement enables to bring together officers from Euro-Med Partners that usually consider themselves at a state of war with each other. As the Israeli Minister of Defence, Arens decided to boycott the Nakourah agreement in late June 1999, he was criticised by Israeli militaries because according to them this agreement represented the only arrangement allowing Israeli and Syrian officers to meet.[24] In fact, one of the first governmental acts of the Barak government was to order the return of Israeli officials to the next monitoring committee meeting.[25]

The observation of cease-fire arrangements could in the future be carried out in the framework of the Euro-Med Partnership. This requires, however, the creation of a conflict prevention structure (see paper of S. Calleya) and the downgrading of the Barcelona proviso, that the Euro-Med Partnership should not deal with current conflicts in the region.

3. Code of Conduct for Civil-Military Relations

A politically binding code of conduct would be necessary in the Barcelona process, because it could more clearly establish the link between interstate and intrastate behaviour. It is true that such a code cannot be translated into a common security gain. But, it will produce more transparency. French Ambassador Courtois argued at the Euromesco-Senior Officials meeting in Stuttgart that the primary purpose of the Charter

[22] "The TIPH Mandate", on TIPH homepage www.tiph.org./tiphmand.htm

[23] Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Understanding (26 April 1996). Text of agreement posted on homepage of Israeli Foreign Ministry (www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa).

[24] Kritik in Israel an Boykott der Südlibanon-Kommission, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1 July 1999, p.2

[25] "Israel rejoins Lebanon monitoring committee," Report of Associated Press, posted on CNN Homepage, world-Middle East, 8 July 1999.

is to establish "rules of conduct" between the partners.[26] Thus, such a code could be made an integrate part of the Mediterranean Charter.
The code should not only be the reconfirmation of principles and obligations under the Barcelona Documents and the (future) Mediterranean Charter. The Code should also target the good governance aspects in the security field. Under the notion of civil-military relations it should encourage transparency in security sector planning, management and budgeting. In view of the political prominence of the armed forces in some countries (Algeria, Turkey) and the unpredictable role in others (Morocco, Libya, Lebanon), it is politically delicate, but in the long-term inevitable to tackle this issue-area. The question of civil-military relations in the security sector is intrinsically linked to liberalisation and democratisation, economic performance and legitimacy of power --all important objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
The code of conduct should increase the awareness of this important topic and facilitate policy-makers to pursue their efforts of reform in the political system and the security sector. Topics that are directly or indirectly associated with civil-military relations include: Position of armed forces within the state, the rights and duties of personnel serving in the armed forces, control possibilities through parliament, military justice systems, transparency in defence planning and budgeting, role of women in armed forces, and security sector reforms.
On more operational level, Euro-Med seminar diplomacy, training and education could support the promotion of civil-military relations in the security sector. This could include visits of military delegations to Partner states, presentation of various models of democratic control of military affairs, including the civilian control over the Ministries of Defence, the military establishment at large as well as over the defence resource allocation and procurement process. This is linked to the suggestions of this study to enhance the conditions for national debate by building up and broadening the civilian security communities through training, networking and education.
The delicate nature of the topic will make it difficult for the Mediterranean Partner states to accept the notion of civil-military relations in a programmatic Euro-Med setting. It is therefore crucial for architects of the Charter to highlight the collective nature of these activities.[27] Any kind of support in the broad domain of civil-military relations can only be provided under the "assistance for self-help" paradigm.

4. Euro-Med Training and Education

Training and education are long-term investments in the Euro-Mediterranean Political and Security Partnership. These activities can best support the objective of creating in the Euro-Med security expertise. Currently, in the Mediterranean Partner states, the discussions about security and related topics, such as arms control, disarmament, conflict resolution etc are confined to very few experts who normally are from within the defence establishment.[28] What is missing is a civilian security policy expertise and a political culture permissive to publicly debate on issues related to peace and conflict, national and international security.

[26] SWP-Report, April 1999, p. 6.
[27] [27] See, in this context, Roberto Aliboni's argument about the importance of a "common approach" to co-operation, SWP, The Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean, Mimeo, Bonn, 19/20 March 1999, p. 2.

[28] Turkey, Egypt and Israel are the only countries where extensive security experience exists outside the government.

The broadening of participation in security studies can be promoted by Euro-Med programmes, possibly with the help of EuroMesco, that could act as an intermediary. Universities and institutes around the Mediterranean should be supported in the development of their curricula in security and peace studies, ideally with special emphasis on the Mediterranean region. Such curricula should include approaches on national and international security, arms control, conflict management, peace support and peace-building, including disaster relief and the reconstruction of war-torn societies. Instruments for the promotion of security and peace studies in the region could be supported with Euro-Med Scholarships, exchange programmes of students and faculty, "researcher in residence" programmes and lecture series in the field of peace, international security and arms control.

More geared towards the practitioners, Euro-Med Partnership should also invest in the build up of a Euro-Med network of training in peace support, disaster relief, and election monitoring. Such a network could bring together the elements of peacekeeping training outlined earlier in this study.

Training courses could also cover conventional arms control, CSBMs, implementation and verification. Such courses should be promoted as capacity building initiatives of diplomats, military officers and civilians from the defence establishments.

There exist today already a rich menu of course offerings in the region, but they are confined to specific countries or various political processes (PfP, Dialogue countries) and they have no pan-Mediterranean vocation.[29] For instance, the Nasser Higher Military Academy/IDS/Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping offer courses to officers and civil servants from the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. Also, the NATO Defense College has introduced as of 1998 an annual course for General Flag Officers' Course for Mediterranean states as well as an annual International Research Seminar (IRS) with NATO Dialogue Countries that lasts 3 days.

Euro-Med training activities could, in contrast to courses of NATO or individual countries, prepare the ground for joint development of curricula, dialogue on soft and hard security, and common assessments of the potential risks facing the Mediterranean region.[30]

The advantage of the NATO approach to the Mediterranean lies in the success of the PfP programme, even though Secretary General Solana is very careful about the question of expanding the PfP into the region.[31] NATO would not offer PfP as a political programme, but would rather encourage them to participate in some of the PfP activities on a piecemeal basis. For instance, officers from NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Nations are invited to select number of training courses of the NATO school in Oberammergau, Germany.[32] The building up of an arms control expertise for the Middle East is also pursued by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy that runs under a Swiss-Finnish initiative a number of intensive courses on arms control and disarmament for officers and diplomats from the Near East and the Maghreb.

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[29] An exception is the Information and Training Sessions of Euro-Med Desk Officers run by the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies. But even these sessions are not fully geared towards capacity building in security.

[30] Roberto Aliboni, SWP, 19/20 March 1999, op.cit., p.2

[31] Javier Solana, "NATO and the Mediterranean," Mediterranean Quarterly, Special Issue, vol. 8, No 2, spring 1997, p. 20.

[32] Course topics include Conventional Arms Control Implementation Orientation Course, Environmental Protection of Military Forces Course and Multinational Forces Orientation Course.

5. Seminar Diplomacy, People-to-People Interactions, Networking

The first part of this study has shown that the whole notion of security needs to be clarified and explained. For instance, national security interests of individual Arab states differ from those of the Arab nation. In the Egyptian Defence Academy or the Diplomatic Institute the curricula deals with "Arab national security" and not with that of states. Partner states explicitly address this issue area: Egypt, for instance, submitted to the OSCE as its first objective of co-operation the "developing a common and comprehensive understanding of peaceful interactions (…)."[33]

In order to foster the Euro-Med identity, officials should increasingly participate in colloquia, conferences and meetings as representatives of the Euro-Med Partnership. The Barcelona process was, for example, represented in a panel discussion in the context of the OSCE Mediterranean Seminar, held in Valletta on October 19-20 1998.[34]

Seminars, workshops and expert meetings can help to promote the convergence of the security perception in the region. This also includes military-to-military contacts: top officers exchange visits, hold in-depth discussions of military issues and tour important military sites. Military-to-military contacts would also include port calls by naval forces, and seminars on military doctrines, peace operations. Depending on the degree of co-operation among the partners, discussion could also deal with risk reduction measures, weapon safety and arms control. The framework for such talks could be the (future) network of defence institutes.

It is important that there are structured and programmatic approaches to seminar diplomacy, people-to-people meetings and workshops. They should, like the EuroMesco network, feed into the official Barcelona process. Workshops and meetings should be held on issues that currently still disrupt the security co-operation in the region, such as the non-proliferation of WMD. Non-proliferation remains an important issue, particularly because of the danger of its potential use in Turkish-Syrian or Israeli-Arab conflicts. A corollary to proliferation and not often officially identified as a bone of contention is the North-South export control of dual use technology. Export control from the EU towards Barcelona partners will become politically more difficult to justify with the move towards a Euro-Med free-trade zone. Such working groups could eventually hook up with the ACRS process, should the latter get off the ground again.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The Charter is not supposed to create a blueprint for a new Mediterranean security order. The Stuttgart summit made it clear again that the Charter should stay away from hard security, rapid institutionalisation and involvement in existing conflicts in the region. Rather, it is to mark the opaque security environment of the Mediterranean with normative signposts in order to assure a coherent long-term development of the Euro-Med security partnership. Elements of such signposts are agreed standards and operational guidance for security co-operation. For achieving this purpose, the conditions have to be created for building a collective identity in the Euro-Med space.[35] An essential

[33] "The Egyptian vision on co-operation between the OSCE and its Mediterranean Partners, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt, p. 1 (unpublished paper).

[34] OSCE Secretariat, The Mediterranean Seminar, Valletta 19/20 October 1998, Consolidated Summary, SEC.GAL/96/98, p. 3.

[35] For the topic of collective identity and national security, see Peter J. Katzenstein, Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security, in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 1-32.

part of such an identity is the acceptance that security building in the Mediterranean is intrinsically linked to good governance, democratisation and human rights.

The Security Charter is first and foremost a political document that will have to be consummated internally by the Partner states. The "public good effect" in terms of additional security is not obvious and may have to be "bought" by benefits deriving from the economic partnership. In contrast to the EU relations with the East European states, the EU cannot apply leverage and conditionalities towards Mediterranean Partner states as EU accession is concerned.

The reluctance by some Partner states to bear individual political and financial costs for joint action is likely to be one of the major source of slowdown of the political and security partnership. Step by step measures regionally and bilaterally may be more effective than a grand design nobody wants to sign on to. A modest Charter can always be strengthened, "when political circumstances allow".

There continues to persist conflicting perception on the security dimension of Euro-Med co-operation. It is clear from the prudent and careful wording of the Guidelines of the Charter that peace and security-related terms and joint actions mean quite different things in different parts of the Euro-Mediterranean area.

This is why it is important to promote civilian expertise in the security sector with the help of training, education and other Euro-Med activities that can act as transmission belts. Such activities range from Seminar diplomacy, people to people contacts, and functional co-operation in monitoring and observation missions and peacekeeping co-operation. The comfort level with peace missions has increased over the last years. The domestic trepidation about North-South military co-operation is making exemption to peace operations. Also here, good governance can be promoted via a code of conduct in the civil-military relations, training and education. In the long-term the Euro-Med Partnership should encourage the empowering of national NGOs for election monitoring. The Charter should reflect this in its text accordingly.

This paper is very careful with regard to recommending the creation of institutions in the Euro-Med security domain. In fact, there is little immediate need for institutions: required are provisions for institutional memories, clearing functions and co-ordination in activities such as peacekeeping, mine action or disaster relief. The EMP Senior Officials Committee or the EU Commission may at an initial stage assume such functions. In the mid- and long term, however, the Euro-Med Partnership has to decide if it wants to create "generic" Euro-Med institutions or confide these functions to existing institutions and programmes within the Euro-Mediterranean area.

The adoption of the Charter will only be the beginning and not the end of a process. Nor will institution-building within the Euro-Med Political and Security Partnership necessarily solve the problems related to peace and stability in the Mediterranean. What will matter, in the final count, is the actual implementation of joint actions in an enhanced and more operational Partnership.

Annex I Record of Peace Operations of Mediterranean Partner States[i]

	Police	Troops	Observers	Bilateral and other operations
Algeria	**15** (UNSMIH) **7** (UNMIBH)	**2** (UNTAES) **?** (UNTAC)	**20** (UNAVEM II) **18** (UNAVEM III)	-
Cyprus	-	-	-	-
Egypt	**15** (MONUA) **34** (UNMIBH) **1** (MINURSO) **51** (ONUMOZ) **14** (UNAVEM III) **10** (UNPROFOR) **9** (UNTAES)	**125** (MINURCA) **1** (UNAVEM III) **429** (UNPROFOR) **1675** (UNOSOM) **1** Inf. battalion (IFOR/SFOR)	**3** (MONUA) **1** (UNMOP) **1** (UNPREDEP) **5** (UNOMIG) **3** (UNOMSIL) **18** (MINURSO) **20** (ONUMOZ) **10** (UNAVEM III) **12** (UNPROFOR) **4** (UNTAES) **14** (UNOMIL) **10** (UNAMIR) **50** (UNTAG)	Contributions to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO); Field Hospital in IFOR / SFOR
Israel	-	-	-	**1** medical military unit (UNAMIR) **1** team of military experts (after terrorist attacks against U.S. Embassy in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam)
Jordan	**19** (MONUA) **98** (UNMIBH) **2** (UNPREDEP) **80** (ONUMOZ) **5** (UNAMIR) **21** (UNAVEM III)	**2** (UNAVEM III) **3478** (UNPROFOR) **879** (UNTAES) IFOR / SFOR	**3** (MONUA) **1** (UNMOP) **1** (UNPREDEP) **6** (UNMOT) **87** (UNOMIG) **22** (UNAVEM III)	

	Police	Troops	Observers	Bilateral and other operations
	7 (UNPROFOR) **40** (UNTAES)		**48** (UNPROFOR) **6** (UNTAES)	
Lebanon	-	-	-	-
Malta	-	-	-	-
Morocco	**60** (UNOSOM I, II)	**1000** (UNOSOM I,II) **1400** (IFOR/SFOR)	-	Up to **2000** troops and police (in the United Arab Emirates, in 1996); **1500** troops (in Saudi Arabia during Gulf War in 1990 /1991); **1400** troops (IFOR in Bosnia in 1995); Contributions to UNAVEM
Syria	-	-	-	**30,000** troops in Lebanon under Arab League mandate
Tunisia	**2** (MINURCA) **2** (MIPONUH) **2** (UNMIBH) **4** (UNTMIH)	**40** (UNAMIR)	**10** (UNAMIR) **12** (UNPROFOR) **9** (MINURSO)	Contributions to UNAMIC, UNTAC, UNTAG, UNAVEM, UNOSOM; **1** Military Unit and **1** medical team to US-led force in Somalia (1992)
Turkey	**4** (UNPREDEP) **7** (UNMIBH) **23** (UNTAES)	**1464** (UNPROFOR) IFOR / SFOR	**5** (UNOMIG) **7** (UNIKOM)	TIPH II (=Temporary International Presence in Hebron) and MPF (=Multinational Protection Force in Albania)

[i] **Peacekeeping Operations (with involvement of Mediterranean Partners):**

MINURCA	UN Mission in the Central African Republic, April 1998 - present
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, April 1991 - present
MIPONUH	UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti, December 1997 - present

MONUA	UN Observer Mission in Angola, July 1997 - 26 February 1999
ONUMOZ	UN Operation in Mozambique, December 1992 - December 1994
UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, October 1993 - March 1996
UNAVEM II	UN Angola Verification Mission 2, June 1991 - February 1995
UNAVEM III	UN Angola Verification Mission 3, February 1995 - June 1997
UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, April 1991 - present
UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, December 1995 - present
UNMOP	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka, January 1996 - present
UNMOT	UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan, December 1994 - present
UNSMIH	UN Support Mission in Haiti, July 1996 - July 1997
UNTMIH	UN Transition Mission in Haiti, August - November 1997
UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	UN Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	UN Mission of Sierra Leone
UNOSOM I	UN Operation in Somalia 1, April 1992 - March 1993
UNOSOM II	UN Operation in Somalia 2, March 1993 - March 1995
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force in the Former Yugoslav Republic, 1995 - February 1999
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, March 1992 - September 1993
UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)
UNTAES	UN Transition Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, January 1996 - January 1998