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BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE
EURO-MED CHARTER ON PEACE AND STABILITY

by Roberto Aliboni

Final report by the EuroMeSCo Working Group on the
Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability

ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

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SUMMARY

FOREWORD

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In its 1998-99 Workplan, beside other smaller Groups, EuroMeSCo established two main Working Groups, a first Group on "Sub-Regional Integration and Co-Operation in the Mediterranean" and a second one on "The Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability".

The first Group's rapporteurs are Dr. Álvaro Vasconcelos, Director of the Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais-IEEI, seated in Lisbon; Dr. Gamal A.G. Soltan, Senior Researcher at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies-CPSS, in Cairo; and Dr. Driss Khrouz, Director of the Groupement d'Etudes et de Recherches sur la Méditerranée-GERM, in Rabat.

The second Group's rapporteur is Dr. Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies of the Istituto Affari Internazionali-IAI, seated in Rome.

This Report has been generated by the Working Group on "The Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability". The members of the Working Group are the following:

• Dr. Stephen C. Calleya, Deputy Director, Mediterranean Academy for Diplomatic Studies - MADS, University of Malta

• Dr. Jean-François Daguzan, Director of Studies, Fondation Méditerranéenne d'Etudes Stratégiques - FMES, Toulon; Senior Researcher, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

• Dr. Thanos Dokos, Director of Studies, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy - Eliamep, Athens

• Dr. Martín Ortega Carcelén, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Western European Union - ISS/WEU, Paris

• Prof. Natalino Ronzitti, Scientific Counsellor, IAI; Professor of International Law, LUISS University, Rome

• Dr. Mohammed Kadry Said, Senior Research Fellow, Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies - CPSS, Cairo

• Prof. Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, Director, Center for Asian Studies, and Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, University of Cairo

• Dr. Claire Spencer, Deputy Director, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London; Centre for Euro-Mediterranean Studies, University of Reading

• Dr. Radoslava Stefanova, Research Fellow, IAI, Rome

• Dr. Fred Tanner, Deputy Director, Geneva Center for Security Policy - GCSP, Geneva.

The Group met twice in its own capacity, in Rome (5-6 July 1998) and in Halki (Dodecanese, 12-14 September 1999). Some papers of the Working Group on the Euro-Med Charter were also presented at the EuroMeSCo general Working Groups meeting in Cairo 18-19 April 1999. The second draft of this Report has been commented in the final EuroMeSCo general Working Groups meeting in Rome 15-16 October 1999.

In drafting the Report, the rapporteur, Roberto Aliboni, has made reference to the papers generated by the members of the Group. These papers are listed in an annex to the Report and enclosed with it. In the Report's text, they are referred to in brackets and in italics.

This Report does not include recommendations and specific conclusions, for the latter will both be included in the Joint EuroMeSCo Report that will round up the entire 1998-99 excercise

1. A FIRMER COMMON GROUND

1.1. Reshuffling priorities

The Conclusions of the April 1999 Euro-Med Ministerial Conference in Stuttgart define the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability as the "instrument for the implementation of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration where issues of peace and stability are concerned". In fact, this functional task had been assigned to the Charter when the latter was put forward, in mid-1996, to replace the Action Plan. The debate on the Charter which has unfolded to date, however, has made clear that the definition of the instruments to make the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) work must be coupled with an important reshuffling of the priorities assumed by the Barcelona Declaration. To a large extent, what it has made clear is that such a reshuffling is the real challenge if the EMP is to survive and succeed. It does not exclude the perspective of co-operation with regard to hard security; yet, it renders the EMP an instrument for achieving co-operation with regard to soft security with an emphasis on partnership-building and conflict prevention. In this light, the drafting of the Charter largely overlaps with the search for a firmer common ground, namely one more attuned than the initial common ground to the real political context and existing political will.

Most of the members of the Group elaborated on the basic incongruities of the EMP and/or the changes in the regional political context which exacerbated or created them. Others have taken them for granted in dealing with challenges ahead. Thus, in its normative and policy-oriented task, much of the work of the Group has revolved around the new directions and priorities the Charter should take on in order to single out a workable common ground.

While the policy-oriented work of the Group, with a focus on Partnership-Building Measures, Conflict Prevention and Peace Support is presented in parts 2 and 3 of the Report, this first part considers a number of broad issues and directions with a view to an overall reshuffling of EMP priorities and strategy.

In this revisionist perspective, first adopted at the June 1998 *ad hoc* Ministerial Meeting of Palermo, the Group felt that it would be very important to allow for <u>options to remain open</u>, even if delayed, this being the case for the establishment "at the appropriate time" of a co-operative security scheme concerning military factors [*Ortega*] or the accomplishment of conflict resolution tasks rather than merely prevention. Nevertheless, the current common ground appears to be less than that required to achieve the complex set of goals set forth in the Barcelona Declaration in the short term. In the Group members' view, the EMP should commit itself to making some progress over time as regards political will so that the early goals may be achieved as well. Such a perspective should be stated clearly in the Preamble of the Charter, thus coupling it to the planned reaffirmation of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration.

1.2. Revising the political and institutional balance

The revision of priorities must be directed first and foremost at the political balance of the EMP in order to make it more of a Partnership than it is today [*Selim; Spencer].* In this sense, revision would have two dimensions - one political and one institutional - the two sides of the same coin.

From the political point of view, since the signing of the Barcelona Declaration it has become increasingly clear that EU and non-EU Partners have different political and security agendas with respect to national security, as well as to human rights,

democratisation and economic development. The prevailing Arab feeling, for instance, is that the EMP was initiated and since then managed by the EU with a rather exclusive view to its own stability concerns, thus overlooking Arab national security interests as well as other non-EU perceptions. The necessity to overcome this kind of perceived EU unilateralism and establish, with the Charter, a shared common ground was clearly pointed out by the Egyptian representative to the 19-20 March 1999 EuroMeSCo - Senior Officials Seminar organised in Bonn by the German Presidency and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Amb. Fathi El-Shazly stated that the "Barcelona process ... entered a crisis of identity that only ended when, in June 1998, 'we started a process of redefining ourselves'" [Block: 3].

This imbalance is reflected in the other relevant dimension, namely the EMP's institutions [Aliboni 1999; de Guttry; Edwards, Philippart; Molnar]. According to one author:

The EMP cannot be regarded as a distinctive organisation in which the EU participates. Rather it has to be seen as a multilateral and holistic extension of the Union's long-standing pluri-bilateral Mediterranean policy. ... [non-EU Mediterranean countries'] initiative is limited in that it is strongly conditioned by EU mechanisms for reaching consensus or otherwise making decisions in the framework of its CFSP. ... To correct this situation, some European governments are now proposing to reinforce the Euro-Med Committee by giving it full competence over initiatives and policies related to all three pillars of the EMP, in particular, the initiatives pertaining to the security and political partnership, presently rather secluded in the Senior Officials Committee. [Aliboni 1999].

The unilateral character of the EMP and the overwhelming initiative held by the EU are pointed out in many passages of this Report as factors weakening the EMP's political cohesion as well as obstacles in the essential confidence-building process. For these reasons, the Report's policy prescriptions are constantly inspired by the need to establish more inclusive decision-making procedures and processes (see, in particular, part 2 on the PBMs - Partnership-Building Measures, and the suggestions relating to conflict prevention policies). Even with respect to the, by definition, unilateral MEDA procedures, one member of the Group recommends that "One approach might also be to set up joint commissions composed of an EU and in-country membership, not only to oversee small funding initiatives but also to sustain a continuing two-way process of communication between the EU and individual southern partners on a variety of 'partnership-building' issues" [*Spencer*].

The "Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability" approved by the EMP Ministers in Stuttgart (hereafter "Guidelines") do not build on "Institutions" or the procedures which would regulate "Joint Operations". However, the final draft of the Charter will have to provide a response on these points, from the political as well as institutional points of view. A political statement about the need for well-balanced institutional and decision-making frameworks would be in order, as obvious as this may appear in principle. Some institutional revisions, adopted by the Charter, should substantiate that statement.

Which institutional revisions? In the Group, EMP institutions were not explored in themselves or in specific detail. Attention was paid, however, to institutional and organisational instruments to make the Charter work. In this respect, the most relevant indication of this Report concerns the strengthening of the Euro-Med Committee and the more regular character it should take on so as to become an instrument for the enhanced political dialogue and conflict prevention policy-making (see section 3.1.1). On the other hand, the reinforcement of the Euro-Med Committee, where the EU will be represented

by the new *troika*, would also allow for a more balanced contribution to the Barcelona process by the different EU institutions.

1.3. Soft security and the Charter's normative character

Following the "major change" given to the Partnership by the ministers in Palermo, the road to the EMP's reshuffling has now been paved by shifts in emphasis from hard to soft security and partnership-building.

What do these shifts entail in substantive terms? The papers generated by the Group show that EU and non-EU interpretations are backed by different basic perspectives. In Southern perspectives, partnership-building is regarded as a process of political co-operation in which a number of soft security issues, such as terrorism or migration, are dealt with in strict inter-state terms and on a case-by-case basis, thus minimising interferences with domestic factors. In this perspective, all that the political dialogue provided by the Charter amounts to is a kind of macro-confidence-building measure [*Aliboni]* geared to creating a partnership that does not exist today. This vision does not rule out some functionalities, but it assigns the EMP a fundamentally reduced task with respect to its potential for taking action.

The EU perspective seems more complex and far-reaching. Partnership-building means that political co-operation has to be upgraded with a view to strengthening the broad and long-term foundations of security (in other words: establishing the conditions for a long-term policy of conflict prevention) by achieving sustainable development, political democracy and good governance. In this sense, the EMP is now rooted in a broader and longer-term notion of security (quite distant from any notion of hard security) and, on the other hand, in a closer tie between security- and democracy-building. This entails a much closer interplay between inter-state and intra-state frameworks, for regional security is dependent on a set of domestic processes of democratisation.

The differences between the two perspectives raise questions about the future of the EMP which are not pertinent to this Report. Yet, independently of their impact on future developments, these emerging perspectives pose specific questions which affect the Charter's possible format and must be tackled here. A first question is to what extent military factors must be excluded from the picture or put off (as suggested by the "Guidelines") to "the appropriate time". A second question, put forward by Spencer [*Spencer]* and Joffé [1998; 1999], regards the way democracy-building processes have to be articulated, whether through straight political reform or the strengthening of the rule of law and good governance. A third question, raised by Tanner [*Tanner]* concerns the relationship between security- and democracy-building. Needless to say, the second and third questions relate to the EU-held perspective and lead to suggestions for the Charter's format that could be divisive.

On the first question, several members of the Group wanted to look ahead to a more distant kind of security co-operation, for example in the field of conflict management [*Calleya on the Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre]* and military-related CBMs/CSBMs [*Said].* It is noteworthy that one such perspective comes from the South. Mohammed Kadry Said says that "The top-down political process of the Charter has to take into account and benefit from the bottom up process of the existing [military and military-related security] measures". One paper [*Ortega*] has articulated a full discourse about the expediency and legitimacy of military co-operation within the EMP framework. Other members of the Group have reflected on the way military factors may be instrumental to non-military ones. In section 2.2, the notion of PBM-attendant CBMs is

discussed. In part 3, a set of measures of a military nature are taken into consideration as factors in EMP conflict prevention policy-making. The response of the Group to the first question seems in line with the idea that the EMP is undergoing a process of shifts in emphasis rather than a change in its tasks. This suggests that the Charter, while postponing a number of tasks to the appropriate time, should take note that the notion of comprehensive security which it seems willing to retain prominently includes military factors as well and that a reminder of the non-military use of military factors might be in order.

Still, the Group proved largely in tune with the shift to soft security and partnership-building. In what follows of this Report, the Group's inputs on these points are referred to in part 2, devoted to PBMs, and the sections on conflict prevention in part 3.

Coming now to the second question, what must be stressed is the response provided by the Group's members to the relative weight the EMP should attribute to components of soft security as diverse as democracy, the rule of law, good governance and accountability. This point is fairly important, for in the debates which have persuaded the Group of the necessity to revise the EMP's common ground, North-South differences over the varying soft security components were no less important (and divisive) than those over the relative roles hard and soft security are supposed to play.

One member of the Group [*Spencer]* has elaborated on the relationship between democracy and the rule of law, pointing out the strategic importance of the latter with respect to the achievement of the former: "An ... approach, and one already subscribed to under MEDA Democracy as well as the Stuttgart Chairman's Conclusions is to concentrate the multilateral focus of the EMP on the promotion of the rule of law. In many ways, the creation of a legal framework is a precondition for ensuring the rights of citizens, including their rights to due process through independent courts. A concentration on the rule of law, as precursor to democracy, could also serve to promote the effective separation of powers within existing governments, as well as submitting the region's military to civil, if not yet democratic, scrutiny." In this sense, the idea of setting up an EMP Consultative Legal Commission, put forward by a member of the Group [*Daguzan*], could give way to the implementation of a PBM (see section 2.3.3.3) rather instrumental to asserting and harmonizing the rule of law in Euro-Med relations.

Also, Spencer recalls what George Joffé [1998; 1999] said about the relevance of the rule of law in the field of Euro-Med economic and financial co-operation, including the attraction of private foreign investment:

The demands of economic restructuring also involve demands for administrative reorganisation and greater financial transparency, These, in turn, often threaten the vested interests of elites within the private sector who also form part of the governing elite. As a result, the economic requirements of the Barcelona Process are having significant effects on the process of government ... . Although this process is still in its infancy ... it could also have a more profound and irresistible long-term effect that might contribute significantly towards more accountable and transparent government in the region ....

What these remarks do suggest is that the intrusive and abstract demand of the North for the introduction of democracy in the South should be replaced by more detailed and substantive understandings on the establishment of legal rules, good governance and accountability. Agreements to gradually establish such rules would amount to an incremental process of democratisation over time. At the same time, they may prove easier to negotiate and stipulate. This focus on the steps to democracy rather than their end result should be received in and articulated by the Charter.

As for the third question, in his paper Tanner [*Tanner*] has highlighted the relationship between good governance and the military realm, suggesting that the EMP may help to narrow the democratic gap resulting from the distorted role of the military in many Mediterranean polities by looking at the gap from a good governance perspective. He stresses the need for democratic control of armed forces and civil-military relations and very aptly points out that "The question of civil-military relations in the security sector is intrinsically linked to liberalisation and democratisation, economic performance and legitimacy of power".

In these analyses, good governance - a concept put forward by the Guidelines" for the first time in the brief history of the Charter's debate - emerges as a focal factor together with the rule of law. How can the Charter give prominence and substance to the achievement of good governance and the rule of law? This is a key question, not only in itself but also because these tasks are shared by the Partners, though in different contexts, with different purposes and with strong ambiguities. Furthermore, it must be noted that any kind of understanding about good governance and the rule of law is bound to have an intra-state impact, thus creating a stumbling block in the EMP's brief history of attempts at co-operation.

The only way out is an early understanding on the <u>normative character of the Charter</u>. In this sense, the establishment of rules or <u>codes of conduct</u> would become the fundamental task of the Charter or, to be more precise, its mechanism of political dialogue. A number of people have insisted on the normative character of the Charter, including the representative of France, Ambassador Courtois, on the occasion of the previously mentioned meeting in Bonn between EuroMeSCo and the EMP Senior Officials [Block: 6], and Fred Tanner in the EuroMeSCo Group. For the Charter to play a normative function would call for negotiations on specific kinds of conduct to be regulated (civil-military relations, economic competition, etc.). Some monitoring would also be needed. Even without entering into much detail, the Charter should very clearly assert its normative task and reinforce its institutional framework accordingly.

1.4. Conflict prevention and conflict resolution

The Group's members were substantially unanimous in considering conflict prevention the most important and natural task of the EMP, particularly if the reshuffling initiated at Palermo is taken into account. Both the enhanced political co-operation and the partnership-building tasks which the Charter is expected to pursue have been regarded as the foundations of a conflict prevention policy. Such a policy would characterise the EMP and give it a distinctive task with respect to other political and security organisations dealing with the same and adjoining areas.

Peace support operations could well be coupled with preventive policies. All in all, however, the new common ground that the Charter is expected to reflect, while not ruling out peace support operations, is thought to be rather limiting with respect to them, especially peace enforcement. Tanner has stressed in his paper [*Tanner*] that peace-building (a broader category than peace operations) seems more fitting with the EMP. In this sense, post-conflict rehabilitation operations should be attuned with EMP capacities. Peace support is discussed in more detail in section 3.2.

As already mentioned in the above, one member of the Group maintains that the Charter should be characterised by a mandate for conflict resolution if it is to reflect Arab aspirations [*Selim]*. His paper suggests that achievement of the Charter's objectives, as stated in the Stuttgart "Guidelines", "necessarily entails the resolution of the major

conflicts among Euro-Mediterranean actors as no common values or shared principles will be reached between actors who are in conflict" (in the words of the "Guidelines", the Charter "will aim to ... promote common values and shared principles").

This point must be understood as an expression of Arab concern for the risk that security co-operation in the Mediterranean may detract from concentrating efforts on solving the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East or give Israel undue gains. Selim says that his point "does not necessarily mean that the EMP will replace present frameworks of conflict resolution, but rather its involvement in the process leading to such resolution at least by making its stand clear on the issues". While the Charter can hardly contradict the crucial statement of the Barcelona Declaration whereby the Partners have stipulated to abstain from interfering with existing conflict resolution processes, the request for a clear stand on the issue is a sensible political question which should, however, be directed less at the EMP than at the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

All in all, a successful scheme of conflict prevention and partnership-building addressing the root political, economic and cultural causes of instability and conflict across the Mediterranean would certainly be an important contribution to the solution of the Arab-Israeli and other ongoing conflicts in the region without detracting from the national security of any Partner in the EMP.

1.5. Fragmentation, Security Indivisibility and Differentiation

In the EMP framework, joint action and policy-making must be multilateral in their application and scope so as to fit the task of establishing a joint scheme of security co-operation in which security is indivisible. The Stuttgart "Guidelines" for the Euro-Med Charter very clearly point out the "indivisibility of security".

This multilateral character is difficult to attain in a context as fragmented as the Euro-Med one. Unlike Cold War Europe and the Middle East today, the Euro-Med area is not a bloc-to-bloc context [Spencer 1997]: (a) there are a number of unrelated sub-regional conflicts, particularly in the South-South dimension; (b) national security agendas are largely differentiated; (c) the nature of threats, risks and perceptions in the South-South sphere is substantively different from that prevailing in the North-South context. In EMP experience so far, the multilateral application of measures or policies has regularly clashed with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arab's already-pointed-out unwillingness to establish any kind of economic or security co-operation with Israel before peace is attained. It may be easily foreseen that similar problems can come up with respect to Partners involved in other, admittedly less acute disputes in the Euro-Med framework.

Variable geometry may well be a response to such challenges, provided the variability doesn't undermine the basic cohesion of the body concerned. Variable geometry is a normal practice in the EU, where it has proven to be a good tactical device in situations of political crisis or impasse, making progress possible in the longer term. In this sense, while the principle of the indivisibility of security must remain the natural pillar of the security co-operation the Partners want to achieve, several members of the Group [*Daguzan; Spencer; Tanner*] have supported the idea that some flexibility must be introduced (and perhaps mentioned in the text of the Charter).

One kind of flexibility could be provided by adhesion on a voluntary basis to specific policies or measures which do not involve principles or the basic mechanisms of the Partnership. Such flexibility has already been adopted, for example in the case of the only semi-operational CBM approved so far by the EMP, i.e. "Co-operation between Civil

Protection Services"[1]: For the time being, adhesion to this CBM is on a voluntary basis. Another important kind of flexibility has been suggested by the 1997 EuroMeSCo Groups' Joint Report [EuroMeSCo: V 12], on the basis of suggestions previously made with respect to the ACRS ([Working Group on] Arms Control and Regional Security), and then reiterated by individual analysts [Tanner: 22; Spencer 1997 & 1998a, who repeatedly speaks of the necessity of a differentiated "sub-regional" approach]. The "differentiation of circles" that the EuroMeSCo Groups' Joint Report pointed out as a negotiating as well as an implementing principle can still be helpfully quoted [V d]:

As in the EMP there are actually different strategic circles not necessarily related to one another, some kind of differentiation could be introduced in the implementation of CBMs: transparency and CBMs in one of such circles could be endorsed by all the members of the EMP, though subsequently implemented in their diverse respective frameworks.

In addition to the principle of "differentiation", that of "sequencing" has also been mentioned by Tanner [22] and the EuroMeSCo Groups' Joint Report [V 14]. Basically it refers to sequences in the field of arms control and limitation: their suggestions are to eliminate sequencing between CBMs/CSBMs and arms control, on one hand, and to accept sequencing across issue areas (for example between a military CBM and economic measures), on the other. While sequencing between CBMs-CSBMs and arms control is irrelevant with respect to the PBM concept introduced by the Palermo Chairman's Conclusions, issue-linkages and related appropriate sequencing may fit well with the partnership-building task of the EMP as it was redefined by the ministers in Palermo. In other words, the classic sequence between the confidence generated by the successful establishment of a CBM/CSBM and the actual reduction or control of arms level is not an objective of the EMP for the time being and it is thus irrelevant. On the other hand, the holistic nature of the EMP and the growing relevance of political and socio-economic co-operation in its framework allow for the establishment of linkages or trade-offs between objectives of different character, for example the establishment of some measure of co-operation in peace support operations against a more flexible stance on human rights or economic support.

The Stuttgart "Guidelines" seems to envisage the introduction of some flexibility where they foresee consideration, in the next versions, of a heading on "Other provisions" relating to groups of countries in special situations. A specific proposal was made by one member of the Group [Daguzan] to introduce in the EMP light institutional setting a kind of reinforced political co-operation along the lines stipulated by articles J-1, 3 and J-3 in the Maastricht Treaty.

1.6. The Charter in a crowded environment

The Mediterranean area is crowded by more or less effective intergovernmental organisations dealing with co-operation in various fields. These organisations may appear less effective than one would wish. Still, they have made and continue to make helpful contributions to economic development and security and in other areas of international co-operation. Other essential contributions come from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the civil societies. The EMP must be very open towards both these contributions. Its normative character should take advantage of the important corpus of norms and rules set out by other co-operative organisations such as the OSCE, the ACRS

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[1] Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, *Co-operation between Civil Protection Services*, Information Note No. 32, in www.euromed.net.

or the Arab League. It should be open also to their joint operations, for instance in the field of peace-keeping [*Tanner*]. With the EMP's perspective hardly being operational, it would be wise to join forces and tasks with more operational bodies or to use co-operation with such bodies to make the EMP more operational.

This openness towards co-operation with other organisations should be explicitly contemplated by the Charter. It would help the Charter to acquire flexibility and credibility.

2. PARTNERSHIP-BUILDING MEASURES

In the Barcelona Declaration the achievement of the Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability is strongly predicated on the introduction of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)[2]. The *ad hoc* Ministerial conference held in Palermo on 4-5 June 1999 set out the goal of establishing first and foremost Partnership-Building Measures (PBMs). This entails important consequences for EMP policy-making.

The introduction of PBMs is not meant to replace that of CBMs, but to make the notion and purpose of CBMs more fitting with the general goals the EMP wants to pursue. What the Palermo decisions point out is that Euro-Med security must be attained primarily by building partnership. In this process of partnership-building, confidence remains a key factor [EuroMeSCo], but measures to attain the latter must be of a scope and have a purpose quite different from those pertaining to European [Aliboni] as well as Middle Eastern [Kemp; Selim] experiences - in the CSCE/OSCE and the ACRS respectively.

In fact, in Cold War Europe the process of confidence-building was strictly related to the management of military conflict. The same is true with today's attempts to bring peace to the Middle East. On the contrary, in Euro-Mediterranean relations the military dimension is rather secondary and fragmented [EuroMeSCo; Spencer 1997], for there is no conflict in the North-South sphere and conflicts in the South-South sphere are unrelated to one another. Euro-Med security relations are characterised by political differences and socio-economic tensions rather than by military conflict. To be overcome, these differences and tensions require a partnership-building process in which confidence takes on much more significance than military factors or conflict.

2.1. Conceptualising PBMs

An early definition of PBMs was provided by Brauch as "political measures primarily in the economic but also in the ecological realm which have a positive impact on the societal and cultural level" [Brauch: 274]. Brauch and Sainz de la Peña [245] also anticipated an important kind of PBMs by pointing out the necessity to establish "tolerance furthering measures" or "exchange-furthering measures", which would be directed at overcoming existing mutual "enemy" images. In fact, PBMs may go well beyond the economic and ecological realms and include cultural and social as well as political aspects. In broader term, PBMs could be defined as any kind of measure geared to enhance mutual knowledge and mutual trust in every possible field, so that further types of exchanges and cooperation are facilitated.

While CBMs and CSBMs have largely been conceptualised, there is no such conceptualisation of the definition of PBMs. For such a conceptualisation to be initiated, the precursors of a partnership-building process must be explored. This exploration would involve, first of all, the basic security perceptions that affect Partners and make them interested in the EMP. The identification of basic political and security "common grounds" between the Partners would, in turn, allow for the conceptualisation of a set of PBM categories or tasks the EMP Partners could share to some degree. Finally, the

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[2] CBMs and CSBMs (Confidence- and Security-Building Measures) were set out in the CSCE context, and then debated but not implemented in the ACRS, as measures intended to establish confidence between hostile parties with a view, first, to avoiding conflict and, subsequently, to allowing for the setting up of structural measures of disarmament and/or arms control. In this sense they are broadly referred to by the Barcelona Declaration. There is a vast literature on CBMs and CSBMs, two basic general references being Krepon, McCoy, Rudolph and Desjardins.

identification of these categories or tasks would make it possible to single out specific PBMs more easily and systematically.

2.1.1. Perceptions and common ground
To explore security aims and perceptions, three groups of Partners have to be taken into consideration: the Arab countries; Israel; and the European countries. In the European group, countries like Cyprus and Malta, with an aspiration to become EU members, have to be included. Turkey's posture in some ways resembles that of Cyprus and Malta. Still, the uncertainty of the future relationship between the EU and Turkey makes the Turkish position towards the EMP somehow ambivalent [Tayfur].

Arab security perceptions [Aliboni 1998] are shaped by the unresolved conflict with Israel and a strong aspiration to preserve political and cultural identities with respect to Western intrusiveness. These aims are jeopardised by the Western unilateralism objectively embedded in post-Cold War international relations, the risk of coercion such unilateralism brings about and the interdiction effects these risks entail. In terms of security, what the Arab Partners expect from their participation in the EMP is a more equal and important relationship with the EU which would (a) enhance and strengthen their international status with respect to other geopolitical areas of European concern; (b) stimulate European interest towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and prevent the possibility of an EU drift toward Israel; (c) provide an institutionalised political co-operation in which the Arabs would have a say and a chance to contain possible unilateral tendencies by the EU and the Western alliances to which the EU members belong; (d) provide a forum of co-operation in which European factors with an impact on domestic situations (xenophobia triggered by migration; pressures to comply with Western-promoted human rights; etc.) may be either shaped or contained.

Israeli expectations are in some respect similar to Arab ones, though such expectations are deemed less important with respect to national security. What Israel expects from the EMP is (a) to prevent a European drift towards the Arab world; (b) to establish a principle of political co-operation with the EU in view of the new regional balance of power which the achievement of the peace process would bring about.

As for the Europeans, security perceptions are dictated by a number of spillover effects generated by the various kinds of instabilities that affect, in particular, Arab Partners and Turkey. From the EMP they expect (a) in the middle-longer term, an attenuation of these instabilities (essentially as a consequence of the economic development and political reform the EMP is assumed to foster); (b) in the shorter term, more effective control of the domestic impact deriving from spillover effects. One important result that the EU expects from the EMP is the reinforcement of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Mediterranean security space being one of the more [Lesser 1999; Lenzi & Martin] or less [Spencer 1998a] important components of the definition of the European security space in combination with other adjoining geopolitical spaces. In this sense, the EU – like the Arabs – is expecting an upgrading of its international status from the EMP. In this status-upgrading perspective, what makes the Mediterranean important to the EU is that in this area, unlike central-eastern Europe or Russia, transatlantic links are somewhat blurred and Europe's feelings about its security identity and tasks are stronger.

A set of Euro-Mediterranean shared tasks or common grounds can be discerned from this analysis: (a) respective enhancement and/or reinforcement of international political status; (b) assurances against unilateral actions and marginalisation; (c) indirect control over and assurances against external factors affecting domestic stability. All in all, ther

broad target shared by the EMP Partners can be defined and summarised as (d) the attainment of greater mutual trust or confidence. Greater mutual trust is not only a broad objective of the EMP but, at the same time, a broad condition for any common ground to be achieved. Above and beyond the different kinds of perceptions and aims that characterise the structure of Euro-Med relations, for historical as well as political reasons, the role of mistrust in these relations is paramount. Hence the primary importance of transparency in building a partnership in this area.

2.1.2. A PBMs Typology: common grounds, functions and time

The common grounds just pointed out provide an indication of the privileged areas in which partnership can be sought and built up. Consequently, PBMs have to refer primarily to these areas and can be divided into three broad categories:

- *status-enhancing measures*, allowing Partners to reinforce, enhance and reassure their international status;
- *reassuring measures*, providing Partners with assurances against and improved control over external and internal factors affecting national security and domestic stability;
- *broad partnership-building measures*, geared to enhancing partnership, exchanges and mutual trust in every possible political, social, economic and cultural field.

This being the basic typology, in another perspective, PBMs could be identified according to their basic functional purpose:

- *information measures,* providing information and transparency through measures largely similar in their mechanism to CSCE-like CBMs of declaratory nature;
- *communication measures,* providing information exchanges by means of some regular background or infrastructure, thus leading to forms and networks of institutionalised or institution-like contacts among governments as well as non-governmental organisations;
- *access measures,* directly or indirectly providing Partners with an enhanced political role internationally and regionally as well as better control over and management of external and internal factors affecting national security or domestic stability;
- *co-operation measures*, fostering co-operation in every possible fields with a view to enhancing mutual trust and confidence.

Needless to say, specific measures may be multi-functional, that is, directed toward the achievement of various objectives, e.g. both access and information. Unlike CBMs and CSBMs relating to the European experience [Darilek] and the ACRS Middle Eastern agenda [Feldman; Jentleson], PBMs exclude any kind of "constraint measures", at least for the time being.

Finally, PBMs could be identified according to time as well, i.e. whether they can be implemented in the shorter or middle/longer run, or whether they can be achieved gradually.

2.2. Military-Related CBMs Working as PBMs

The April 1999 "Guidelines" postpone the establishment of military or military-related CBMs to an "appropriate time".

The unlikelihood of military conflict in Euro-Med relations is what makes CBMs almost irrelevant in the EMP framework. It cannot be overlooked, however, that military threats and risks contribute to shaping perceptions even in today's EMP, particularly on the Arab side. As already pointed out, Arab perceptions of the overwhelming Northern military power as well as Western tendencies towards unilateralism are one important reason for Arab interest in the Euro-Med Partnership. While the EMP is expected to be a process of political co-operation predicated on the implementation of a number of PBMs, there is no

doubt that the military roots of these perceptions call for a confidence-building process similar to those experienced in Europe and other violent conflict-prone spheres. These CBMs may be part of the "reassuring" set of PBMs mentioned above or they may be instrumental to their implementation. Thus, CSCE-like CBMs must be taken into consideration, though in the EMP they would work less like traditional mechanisms and more in the PBM logic.

Surely there are limits to such CBMs working in a PBM logic. First of all, in the present political context they can hardly be directed at performing a structural function (i.e. opening the way to measures of arms control or limitation) or setting "constraints" on Partners' military policies and conduct (as the Vienna-like CSBMs). They will generally be declaratory and, to some extent, operational.

Second, a more or less severe limitation to these military or military-related CBMs comes from the existence within the EMP area of unsolved sub-regional conflicts [Tanner: 13]. Because of the multilateral character of the EMP, the acceptance of CBMs in the Euro-Med context may introduce such CBMs in South-South (or even North-South and North-North) contexts in which CBMs are undesired or premature. This is certainly the case with the Arab policy rebuffing the establishment of CBMs in the Arab-Israeli framework. Within the context of the Western Sahara dispute, this question is less acute but might be raised. Problems may also arise from the Greek-Turkish dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean, for instance in case there were attempts to multilateralise maritime CBMs or even PBMs relating to the regime of the sea and its resources (though one cannot exclude that things might work the other way round and make acceptable in the EMP context what normally does in bilateral relations).

In conclusion, the fact that there are military and military-related perceptions at the origins of the EMP political process, in addition to other more important political motives, makes it possible to use CSCE-like CBMs to make PBMs work. Though the mechanics and content of these CBMs will be similar to those employed in other contexts to avoid military conflict and pave the way for arms control and limitation, their task will be very different. For, in the EMP context CBMs will be subservient to specific processes of partnership-building; that is, they will be PBM-attendant CBMs. This political subservience excludes the introduction of structural CBMs but allows for declaratory and, to a lesser extent, operational CBMs. In a more general way, their use will be limited by the existence of unresolved sub-regional conflicts.

2.3. A Tentative List of PBMs

The principles and tasks illustrated in the above with respect to PBMs, the possible working of PBM-attendant CBMs or CSBMs, and the possible application of principles relating to differentiation of circles and issue-linkages in establishing sequences discussed in section 1.4, can be used in setting out suggestions for the establishment of PBMs. In the following, on the basis of the typology outlined above, a tentative list of PBMs is drafted.

2.3.1. Status-Enhancing Measures
2.3.1.1. EURO-MED MIDDLE EAST INFORMATION GATHERINGS - The purpose of this measure would be to provide regular information on policies and events relating to the Middle East. Information would regard current events and related policies and would be provided on a voluntary basis in *ad hoc* gatherings of invited parties willing to provide information. Information would not be followed by discussion or even

questions. Still, discussing and questioning would be possible in case the parties concerned were available or wished to get reactions from Partners. Information would be provided in gatherings rather than in an *ad hoc* group so as to stress the informal and voluntary character of the exercise. The Partners, however, would endorse such gatherings as part of regular and official EMP activities.

The regular and official character of these gatherings would be their most important feature. In fact, despite its name, from a functional vantage point, this status-enhancing measure would be less about information than about access. Its rationale would be to provide the Partners, in particular the EU and its members, a privileged Euro-Med space to keep in touch with political events that strongly affect the EMP but are dealt with separately by Partners. This situation mostly concerns and is particularly important with respect to the Middle East process, but it also regards other issues, such as developments in Iraq.

Such gatherings could take place at 27 or between the non-EU Partners and the new EU *troika*. In a sense, this PBM could be interpreted as an extension and specialisation of the mechanism for political dialogue (though such an interpretation should not surface, for if it did it could prove detrimental to both the mechanism of political dialogue and the PBM in question). The gatherings should be clearly distinguished from the EMP's existing Committees, so as to give them more visibility and help strengthen the status-enhancing functionality this PBM would be expected to perform. In compliance with the broad structure of the EMP, the gatherings would be chaired by the EU Presidency. Its distinctive character, however, would allow for a rotating or *ad hoc* chair, a measure that would have a positive side-effect on the broad political cohesion of the Partnership. From the EU's point of view, the access functionality of the PBM in question would be reinforced by the release of press-communiqués by the gathering's Chairperson.

It would be up to the parties or the managerial ability of the Chairperson whether or not these gatherings take on a preventive function as well. However, such a function should not (and for the time being cannot) be deliberately attached to the PBM in question. A preventive function could emerge spontaneously over time as a result of the effectiveness of the PBM or specific circumstances.

2.3.1.2. RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - All EMP Partners are concerned about and in many cases involved in post-conflict management operations in the Western Balkans. In this area, some EU and non-EU Partners are contributing essentially (though not only) to peace support operations under the umbrella of the United Nations and the guidance of such regional security organisations as NATO and the OSCE. On the other hand, the EU is pursuing a number of efforts of civilian and economic post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation under the aegis of the United Nations (as in Bosnia Herzegovina and now in Kosovo, where it has taken responsibility for the fourth pillar of UNMIK and to that purpose has established the European Agency for Reconstruction). At the same time, in a more political and security perspective, the EU has also initiated an action of its own through the Stability Pact for Southern Eastern Europe, in which the civilian and socio-economic component is bound to be pivotal.

The EU's important role in civilian and economic post-conflict management operations in this region may give way to the establishment of a PBM in the EMP framework. While the implementation of the civilian and socio-economic operations that the EU-led effort of reconstruction in the area is expected to set in motion would be entirely retained by the EU and the Commission, the purpose of this PBM would concern non-EU Partners'

participation in the political and socio-cultural planning of the operations. When appropriate, non-EU actors could even be associated to operations.

This PBM would be directed first of all at enhancing non-EU Partners' status by increasing access to one of the most politically sensitive peace operations in today's European area. While elements of joint monitoring would associate non-EU Mediterranean Partners in the planning of the processes of reconstruction and rehabilitation, in the implementation stage this PBM could give way to a cluster of specific co-operation measures in the field of social, cultural and community rehabilitation, such as joint training or the rehabilitation of education systems.

Beside access, joint Euro-Med work under this PBM would include important factors of information and transparency. In the eyes of non-EU Mediterranean Partners, notably Arab (and Turkish) peoples, transparency in reconstruction in South Eastern Europe, especially the Western Balkans, would help dispel suspicions with respect to political and military developments that have been regarded by many of them as a Western and European attempt at hegemony and domination in the region.

In the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the Special Co-ordinator appointed by the EU "will be responsible for promoting achievement of Pact's objectives ... in close co-operation with the governments and relevant institutions of the countries, in particular other interested associated countries of the European Union, as well as relevant international organisations and institutions concerned". This agenda seems to allow for consultations with the individual associated Mediterranean countries and institutions such as the EMP. Whatever the interpretation of this passage, it would be better to organise Euro-Med consultations and possibly joint action within the EMP in relation only to civilian and economic affairs and the varying efforts currently being conducted by the EU.

An intergovernmental Standing Group within Euro-Med should thus be established, under the direct co-ordination of the EU Commission, to monitor events and put forward proposals to the Euro-Med Committee for the Barcelona Process. The EU Presidency would then provide co-ordination with the different EU bodies (the European Agency for Reconstruction, the Special Co-ordinator of the Pact, etc.) involved in the management of reconstruction and rehabilitation in South Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.

2.3.1.3. STUDY GROUP ON THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SPACE - EU commitment in the EMP as well as broader EU relations with the Middle East are destined to become a common strategy in the sense given to this expression by Art. J3 of the Amsterdam Treaty. In fact, a common strategy towards the Mediterranean is being prepared by the Union's institutions.

The purpose of this PBM would be to give the non-EU Mediterranean Partners a role and first-hand information in a policy-planning process which is bound to affect their national security and regional relations. This purpose would be achieved by setting up a Euro-Med Group to study the Mediterranean dimension of the European Security Space in parallel with the EU's work to shape its common strategy. In this Group, the EU Presidency and the new *troika* would provide information about the work and the orientations carried out in the EU institutions. The non-EU Partners would be asked to provide comments and recommendations before the EU draws up its conclusions. Though non-EU comments and recommendations would obviously have a non-binding character, the process would increase Mediterranean Partners' access, dispel and prevent mistrust and provide reassurance.

This PBM includes all three components of the PBM typology (status-enhancing; reassurance; and broad partnership-building). Its most important feature is that comments and recommendations are requested before EU decisions are made, in a process of mutual investigation and information. This feature and the focus on Euro-Med security interaction should make the exercise more effective and sensible than the one on the European Security Model carried out in the OSCE.

The Group would in principle be an emanation of the Senior Officials Committee, in which the EU would be represented by its new *troika*. However, as this PBM amounts to a study Group committed to articulating a reflection, it lends itself well to combining official and non-governmental contributions. In this sense, participation of the EuroMeSCo network or other NGOs could be envisaged and would help to reinforce the impact and scope of the PBM.

Needless to say, study Groups like the one suggested here could be established on other topics or processes affecting Mediterranean concerns, e.g. if and when the EU commits itself to setting out a common strategy on Central Asia or the Persian Gulf.

2.3.2. Reassuring Measures

The field of reassuring measures is of particular relevance to the task of building the Euro-Med partnership. It must be pointed out that, beside the measures which are exemplified in the following, very important PBMs may be established in relation to migration and the struggle against terrorism as well as other new transnational risks [Politi]. While PBMs in the field of migration could be directed, among other things, at suppressing xenophobia and easing the movement of persons (for instance through a more effective visa policy), PBMs in the field of the struggle against terrorism and other transnational risks should have the task of reassuring EMP member countries about interferences in their struggle against domestic terrorism (as opposed to domestic political opposition) and helping to establish in the EMP area more homogeneous legal frameworks.These topics are developed in other *ad hoc* reports generated by other EuroMeSCo Working Groups[3]. Consequently they are not developed here.

2.3.2.1. STANDING LIAISON WITH EUROFORCES - As is well known, the establishment of Euroforces, in particular the Euro Maritime Force (Euromarfor), has been strongly criticised by a number of Arab Partners. Euroforces have been set up by France, Italy, Portugal and Spain as a contribution to the development of a European defence identity. For the time being, it is less a military than a political move, pertaining to the European and transatlantic circle rather than any other specific area, let alone the Mediterranean or the Middle East. A European analyst has defined Euromarfor as an "empty gesture" [Pugh: 12]. Still, the Euroforces and Euromarfor are part of a set of initiatives of Western and European alliances triggering perceptions of threat in the Arab world of the kind illustrated in section 2.1.1 of this Report.

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[3] The *ad hoc* Reports are the following:

Xenophobia, Migration and Mutual Perceptions, by Dr. Fifi Benaboud, Co-ordinator, Trans-Med Programme, North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, Lisbon;

International Implications of Domestically-Managed Security Issues, by Dr. George Joffé, Royal Institute of International Affairs - RIIA, London;

The Visas policies in Euro-Med relations, by Catherine Withol de Wenden, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques - CERI, Paris.

Along with other developments involved in the re-organisation of European and Western armed forces (like Navocformed, Stanavformed, the Helios satellite, etc.) [Lesser 1993; Ben Salem; El Dessouqi], the Euroforces remind the Arab countries of their military weakness and division with respect to Europe and the West. In the post-Cold War context, they see them as - to use the familiar CSCE conceptual framework relating to "defence sufficiency" and "non-offensive defence"- Western or European "illegitimate defence requirements" giving way to "legitimate security concerns".

The perception of European unilateralism underlying the Arabs' Euromarfor vision could give way to a unilateral EU CSBM of the kind of PBM-attendant-CSBM illustrated in section 2.2 above. This CSBM/PBM would create a standing Mediterranean liaison unit at Euroforces/Euromarfor headquarters, composed of a limited number of non-EU Euro-Med officers (acting on an individual/national basis). This measure, anticipated in 1997 by the EuroMeSCo Groups' Joint Report [V f] and subsequently by Spencer [1997] and Calleya [1999], has an information as well as an access function, the latter being far more important than the former. It belongs to the category of measures that require a gradual implementation over time.

The PBM in question could be completed and consolidated by a cluster of CBMs/CSBMs relating to what exists of EU military capacities in the WEU [Aliboni 1998]. These measures have already been put forward in recent years by successive WEU Presidencies. In December 1997, the German WEU Presidency organised a visit to the Torrejón Satellite Centre for the non-WEU Mediterranean countries participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue. The visit by the same countries to the Planning Cell in Brussels (May 1998), organised under the Greek Presidency, achieved the same result of establishing a principle of transparency and information.

The WEU satellite capacity is regarded by Mediterranean Arabs as part of the EU/Western military power threatening their national security. It is therefore part and parcel of the issue already discussed above. The Euro-Med liaison unit should therefore be given some form of expanded access, by providing for some kind of access for non-EU Euro-Med Partners to WEU/EU satellite and planning operations. As we are talking about PBM-attendant CBMs, what comes to the forefront here is less the potential of the Planning Cell and Satellite Centre to help verification in relation to arms control than its potential to monitor events in relation to natural and man-made disasters, thus supporting Euro-Med CBMs/PBMs like the one on co-operation between civil protection services. Were this expansion of the PBM to prove unfeasible, the continuation and enlargement of the information CBMs inaugurated by the German and Greek Presidencies should nevertheless be in order.

As pointed out, the measure is expected to be of a unilateral character, but it could well be opposed by a number of European partners and, above all, by the European military. At a minimum, reciprocity would be claimed. The challenge with reciprocity is less the Mediterranean Partners' consent than the locus of such reciprocity in the Arab case. In any case, it must be stressed that the recommendation of this Report to make the PBM in question unilateral is linked to the reassuring purpose the PBM is supposed to achieve with respect to specific Arab security perceptions. In this case, security perceptions are lopsided and what is needed is a PBM in the shape of a CSBM rather than a CSBM proper. Therefore, the unilateral character seems part and parcel of the PBM advocated here.

Other factors which may work against this PBM or reduce its impact are related to the more general Arab thinking about conflict management in the post-Cold War period (and

the Western European role in it) as well as the possible developments which will take place as soon as the WEU is incorporated into the EU structure and capacity .

2.3.2.2. COMMON GUIDELINES FOR THE HUMAN DIMENSION: NETWORKING PRIVATE HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATIONS - Reassurances should also be provided to the EU on its strong perception that a more liberal policy by Southern Partners in the realm of human rights and fundamental freedoms would diminish instability in the South and the spillover effects such instability appears to generate.

In their 1997 Joint Report, the EuroMeSCo Groups put forward the proposal of appointing a Wise Persons Council of independent figures from partner countries, with the task of elaborating on principles and values which today divide European and non-European countries within the EMP and providing non-binding, public recommendations stemming either from their own reflections or from questions raised by public and private individuals or bodies in the EMP [EuroMeSCo III d]. Although everything said about human rights at the first meeting between EuroMeSCo and the Senior Officials, which took place in the Hague on March 4, 1997 to discuss the Joint Report, was harshly criticised by the Arab group of Officials, this proposal could be picked up again. In fact, by providing authoritative and independent, albeit non-binding, responses to cases arising in the field of human rights and minorities, the Wise Persons Council would help the EMP to set the minimum basis for building-up a shared human dimension and would acquire an essential instrument for developing a preventive diplomacy. What should be noted is that in the EMP, as it stands today, unless a common body like the Wise Persons Council sets out common guidelines to deal with the EMP human dimension, this task will be left to EU unilateral decisions in the framework of the political conditionality procedure.

At the Malta Conference, all that the Ministers were able to approve in this field was a declaratory CBM consisting of a procedure for the exchange of information on adherence to international human rights instruments by partner governments. This procedure seems almost completed as of today. Still, as noted by one member of the Group [*Spencer*], such success cannot move the procedure out of its very "general and unspecific level". In fact, common ground relating to human rights is so scarce among EMP governments that, independently of their compliance with the CBM just mentioned (which seems very timid), the governments are unable for the time being to deal with this challenge in any case. What could be retained of the early EuroMeSCo proposal is the idea that, by and large, the human dimension should be tackled by civil society components of the EMP. At the same time, the formula adopted by the Stuttgart "Guidelines" deserves consideration, as it provides a cue for what common ground there may be. In fact, according to the "Guidelines", EMP governments are willing to "promote common values and shared principles" in relation, among other things, to "the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms". This common willingness could give way to a PBM by which these common values and shared principles are jointly explored and then form the basis of what could be a common EMP human rights posture. Despite differences, there is no doubt that there must be an overlapping of the existing different North-South concepts of human rights. The indication provided in the "Guidelines" to identify this overlapping is both correct and promising.

The purpose of this PBM would be to provide a definition of common values and shared principles with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Euro-Med circle. To promote this research, a networking of private human rights associations and institutions on both sides of the Mediterranean should be encouraged and supported by the Euro-Med Committee for the Barcelona process with the task of annually reporting

their conceptual and factual findings as well as an evaluation of Partners' compliance with such common values and shared principles. Though the NGOs' report would not be binding in any way, the report and governments' comments should be given as much diffusion as possible.

As already pointed out, a PBM on human rights is in principle more interesting for the EU countries than for the Southern Partners, for it increases transparency in the eyes of the North and gives the latter increased access to a field that is rather secluded today in the various domestic arenas. However, the mechanism of this PBM is less unilateral and intrusive than it may appear at first sight. It is less intrusive because it would be a non-binding process whose impact in terms of domestic public opinion remains in the hands of the governments. It is less unilateral because the process of investigation and, above all, of conceptualisation would be entrusted to NGOs of different sides, including religiously-inspired groups. Sooner or later this approach would be bound to increase Southern access as well. As the most obviously divisive issues would be put aside by definition (and, perhaps, postponed to an "appropriate time"), the outcome of this exercise should provide guidelines for internationally converging and domestically equilibrating government actions which would not seem or be perceived as disruptive or destabilising responses.

2.3.2.3. EURO-MED ELECTIONS MONITORING – Elections monitoring has performed and is still performing an important role in supporting partners states in the OSCE. In the latter, an *ad hoc* institution, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), takes care of elections monitoring and related tasks directed at upgrading the democratic and legal context of the countries concerned.

The establishment within the EMP of an instrument to perform functions similar to those of the ODIHR is not contemplated by the Barcelona Declaration. There are both political as well as historical reasons for this. The political reasons are that the Barcelona process is a conspicuously inter-governmental body that does not envisage, at least for the time being, any institutional autonomy within its framework. If implemented, elections monitoring in the EMP would have to be backed by intergovernmental agreements and initiated and operated essentially by individual governments. The historical reasons are that the ODIHR was established in Europe in a situation of general disruption and weakness of the concerned states, whereas in the Mediterranean, situations of weak political legitimacy do not necessarily mean disruption, weakness or instability of regional states and governments. In recent times, elections monitoring has been performed in only a few particular situations, namely in Palestine (the EU) and Algeria (where the practise of voluntary invitations to observers has been adopted).

Still, a Euro-Med instrument to monitor elections could work as a helpful reassuring PBM. The purpose of such a PBM should be different from what is suggested by the OSCE/ODIHR experience and its workings should also, in some respects, differ from the way the ODIHR works. Obviously, Euro-Med elections monitoring would be a voluntary instrument: it would work upon request of the concerned state. It would provide observers and/or technical assistance as well as support to networking and education. "It could assume the important and still missing task of creating standard election observation missions" [*Tanner*]. It would concern every EMP Partner. As a rule of thumb, it would be performed by joint North-South EMP teams. The task could be partially or fully entrusted to other security organisations, such as the Arab League, the OSCE or the UN, which could act alone or in combination. Specific tasks could be entrusted to Euro-Med NGOs.

The Euro-Med Committee for the Barcelona process would be responsible for making the necessary decisions and providing directions. The Committee could appoint a task force to overlook the process. The EU Commission would be responsible for implementing the elections monitoring operations.

2.3.2.4. COMMUNICATION NETWORK - The establishment of a communication network among the Partners is the basic reassuring PBM functionally geared to securing the communicating infrastructure for upgrading information and transparency. Whatever its effectiveness, it is destined to serve as a symbol of the existence of a special, regular link between the Partners.

This measure comes from the set of CSBMs approved in Vienna in 1990 to reassure CSCE parties with respect to military events [Darilek]. It was functionally connected to two other CSBMs: an obligation for consultation and co-operation in case of "unusual and unscheduled" military activities; and the establishment of a conflict prevention centre to implement that obligation. A similar functional sequence was envisaged by the deliberations in the ACRS before talks came to a standstill [Peters]. In the EMP, particularly after the Palermo conclusions establishing PBMs as a priority, the military relevance of the communication network must be understood as a sleeping function.

The Malta conclusions brought about the "setting up of a network of contact points for political and security matters". In this sense, and with tasks differing from those of its predecessors, this important PBM is already working, though its purposes and contents may still be undefined.

The communication network, especially where it is considered in combination with the setting up of conflict prevention centres, can be regarded as a mechanism for conciliation and, more generally speaking, conflict prevention. To that end, the functions of the communication network can be expanded to individual sectors; otherwise, a set of sectoral networks could be set up. In this perspective, the mechanism is taken into consideration subsequently, in sections 3.1-3 of this Report.

2.3.3. Broad Partnership-Building Measures
The field of this kind of PBMs is obviously wide. In this Report two specific sets of such measures are developed with regard to: (a) marine invironment and sea resources, and (b) maritime safety and constabulary measures. These indications are but tentative. Many other measures in as many other fields may be indicated. In another topical report by EuroMeSCo, pertaining to its 1998-99 workplan, some measures are pointed out in relation to anti-personnel and land mines[4]. De-mining is referred to by this Report as a model of peace support operations (see section 3.2).

2.3.3.1. MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND SEA RESOURCES - Interdependence is bound to be a major indicator of fields where partnership-building can be broadly developed. This is obviously true for economic relations amongst the Partners, as well as for the regional air space and the sea. In this respect, the latter - the Mediterranean Sea – is of particular importance. The governance of interdependence with respect to the Mediterranean Sea provides the Partners with numerous and significant opportunities to build partnerships in a variety of fields.

In Euro-Med relations, three kinds of co-operation can be set in motion in relation to the sea:

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[4] *The Antipersonnel Landmines in the Mediterranean*, by Dr. Elvira Sanchez Matéos, Fundación CIDOB, Barcelona.

♦ the shared regional organisation and management of the marine environment and the resources of the sea;

♦ the shared organisation and management of civil safety and related search and rescue operations;

♦ the shared organisation and management of sea-related constabulary measures.

This section is concerned with the first. Civil safety at sea and constabulary measures as sources of PBMs are dealt with in the next section (2.3.3.2).

Both the resources of the sea and the regional marine environment refer to important legal and organisational frameworks. The Law of the Sea provides an extensive and strongly consensus-based normative framework on sea resources, which in cases of closed seas like the Mediterranean, however, requires a special effort of co-operation and understanding amongst the parties concerned for its implementation [Ronzitti]. This effort has been weak and uneven so far. Sometimes, as particularly in the case of defining fishing protection areas, there have been situations of tension and potential conflict.

In this respect, there is much scope for promoting Euro-Med co-operation by promoting compliance with the norms and suggestions of the Law of the Sea and, in particular, by promoting a "regional approach" [Attard: 52-3], which could amount to the gradual application of a regional "clause" to the various normative areas contemplated by the Law of the Sea in Euro-Med relations. Such a regional approach has been advocated by the FAO General Fisheries Council of the Mediterranean as an alternative to the ongoing growing tendency towards unilateral and uncoordinated action by the Mediterranean littoral states.

As for the regional marine environment, the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) established in the UNEP framework provides important guidelines for co-operation among the riparian states of the Mediterranean Sea. However, the launch of the Short and Medium-term Priority Environment Action Programme (SMAP) by the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on the Environment, held in Helsinki on 28 November 1997[5], could prove a more decisive step towards more effective and regular environmental co-operation with respect to the region. Without detracting from the importance of the MAP, the SMAP could emerge as the actual "enforcer" of a sound environmental order in the region. Though the EU is part to the MAP (and recently became a full member of the General Fisheries Council of the Mediterranean), the Euro-Med profile of the SMAP is tighter and neater and should bring to bear more effectively the weight and resources of the EU. In a sense, the SMAP could provide the overall "regional approach" which is presently lacking with respect to the Mediterranean marine environment and sea resources. The adoption of well-devised priorities is also an important advantage of the SMAP as well as its institutional link with the financial resources that MEDA can provide.

Above all, co-operation with regard to the Law of the Sea - from boundaries to fishery - requires an effort in terms of new or reinforced international and regional legal agreements amongst the Partners. It also requires stronger harmonisation inside the EU. The Barcelona process and the SMAP can ease but cannot manage these efforts directly and quickly. They can perhaps help to introduce some simple CBMs in areas relating to the exploitation of marine resources, e.g. the prompt release of fishing vessels [Ronzitti: 45-50]. At the same time, the environment-related framework provided by the SMAP can prove more conducive to the implementation of operational co-operation in the shorter

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[5] See www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg11/smap.

term. There is no doubt that the ongoing Euro-Med framework of environmental co-operation started by the 1997 Conference of Helsinki allows for a prompter promotion and implementation of a number of PBMs.

Thus, with regard to environmental protection, a first example of PBMs could be the establishment of a joint system for Integrated Resources Management (IRM) relating to the Mediterranean Sea [Spiteri]. This system of early warning and emergency action would allow for real-time information with respect to sea resources trends and incidents and pave the way for necessary interventions. It would operate through a communication network combining remote sensing, GIS (Geographical Information Systems) and appropriate data communication infrastructures (see section 2.1.3). The IRM requires a strong structured regional framework of co-operation, which could, as of today, be provided by the SMAP. It fits perfectly with the "preventive policies" the SMAP intends to develop.

Two authors have seen in the SMAP [Spencer 1998b] and, more particularly, the IRM [*Stefanova*] a functionalist approach gradually connecting environmental security to soft security and even security in the narrower sense by means of sectoral spillover effects. The link between environmental and soft security corresponds to the link between the early warning and the possible operational dimensions of the IRM: for example, between the detection of an oil spill and the constabulary actions that may ensue. The link with security in its narrower sense is also relevant but it is not essential to the establishment of a PBM, the latter being geared to encourage security less than partnership, for in the EMP context, security may be the content of a PBM but that does not necessarily make it its primary purpose.

Finally, governance of the interdependence created by the Mediterranean Sea also provides an opportunity for exchanging training and expertise, which on the whole can also be regarded as forms of access (with Partners' capacities generally more equally distributed than technologies, as the first implementations of the Euro-Med co-operation on civil protection clearly show[6]).

In conclusion, the Barcelona process in itself and the process initiated by the SMAP can be regarded as frameworks in which effective co-operation regarding regional sea regimes and the environment can be established. It is thanks to the existence of such frameworks that a number of more specific co-operative processes and actions can be set in motion. These frameworks are thus working as a matrix for a set of interrelated PBMs (a cluster-PBM), concerning the establishment of a shared IRM system, as well as measures for easing the access to training, technical help and exchanges of experts.

2.3.3.2. MARITIME SAFETY AND CONSTABULARY MEASURES - Civil safety is a realm in which a first important CBM/PBM on "Co-operation between Civil Protection Services" has been approved in the shape of a pilot project which is in the process of being constructively expanded and structured. Co-operation has been initiated in non-maritime fields, such as earthquakes, flash-floods, forest fires, ground deformation, water-table rises, oil fires (which may also be at sea). Co-operation in sea-related fields remains to be developed.

Coming to undeveloped sea-related co-operation and, in particular, to actions geared to saving human lives, search and rescue (SAR) operations is a field where such co-operation could be successfully set up in the Euro-Med context and yet has not been. It may be that the constant association of SAR operations with military-related procedures

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[6] See www.euromed.net/document/12091998eng.htm.

to prevent incidents at sea amongst warships (INCSEAs agreements) throughout the history of Cold War CBMs and subsequently in the ACRS deliberations has obscured the non-military or the not necessarily military character of SAR operations, which remains first and foremost a humanitarian activity. SAR operations could easily lead to a Euro-Med PBM.

With the negotiating experience acquired while being taking responsibility for trying to develop maritime CBMs in the ACRS context, the Canadian government has identified the technical requirements for taking joint action in the field of SAR operations: "At the lower end of the scale of complexity there were seen to be communications capabilities which would cut across regional and political boundaries. Moving higher on the scale, participants identified the need to familiarize each other with their procedures, training and equipment, and ultimately to standardize these on regional or sub-regional basis" [Jones: 105]. This Report refers to communication networking in section 3.1.3. Apart from the organisation of a shared early warning network, the implementation of this PBM essentially requires that officials/officers learn to work co-operatively and that efforts be made to foster interoperability in relation to hardware. In other words: transfers of technology, training, technical assistance and exchanges of expertise, i.e. the same clustered elements pointed out with respect to the management of sea resources and the marine environment.

Maritime constabulary measures may be regarded as the possible operational side of the sea-related measures considered so far. Maritime constabulary measures may comprise a range of actions regarding environment and safety as well as the issues contemplated by the third chapter of the Barcelona Declaration, namely illegal migration, drug trafficking, other forms of internationally organised criminality and terrorism [*Calleya]* [Pugh]. These measures are normally enforced by national coast guard services (with the involvement of military vessels when legally appropriate). Would Euro-Med maritime constabulary co-operation be feasible and could it be arranged in the form of a PBM?

The range of targets coast guard services pursue seems to require a selective and sectoral approach, in which joint activities could concern, for instance, constabulary environment policing activities rather than countering illegal migration or SAR operations, with a view to gradually expanding joint activities over time.

This approach would also give precedence to intergovernmental co-operation, thus requiring specific accords on sectors, procedures, etc. Another, more institutional approach was submitted to the Group [*Calleya]*. Provided that some form of communication network must be previously established (see section 3.1.3), it is suggested that a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Agency (EMMA) be set up, mandated to co-ordinate the co-operative security network with objectives similar to those carried out by a coast guard.

According to Calleya, hereinafter quoted extensively, the EMMA should initially carry out stop and search exercises in two principal areas: maritime safety and maritime pollution. At a later stage, it could also include monitoring other aspects of security that include narcotics trafficking and the transport of illegal migrants. Areas where co-operation can be strengthened include conducting simulation exercises of oil spills, ensuring that international standards are observed during the cleaning of oil tankers, and monitoring fishing activities with a particular emphasis on overfishing.

Such an early warning mechanism should be open to any of the Euro-Mediterranean partners states that wish to participate, i.e. it should remain voluntary.

In order to ensure that this PBM can become operational in the shortest time possible, the EMMA should consist of sectoral types of soft security co-operation. Any two or more EMP members can start co-operating in specific sectors, such as that pertaining to maritime safety. This would enable the EMMA to evolve along subregional lines.

At a later stage, the PBM could be upgraded to make it more operational. The EMP members should investigate the feasibility of setting up a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coast-Guard (EMMC) with more operational tasks in the sectors they would determine. Like the EMMA, the EMMC would be of a voluntary nature, would pursue a sectoral approach and would act as the harbinger of a subregional division of labour.

The development of the EMMC could link up with that of EMP conflict prevention capacities, in particular the setting up of situation centres (see section 3.1.2.1). In this context, it could contribute to Euro-Med conflict prevention policy-making.

2.3.3.3. EURO-MED CONSULTATIVE LEGAL COMMISSION - According to Daguzan [*Daguzan*] the setting up of a "common space of law" deserves attention. A joint Consultative Legal Commission should be established to perform the task.. It could provide the intellectual framework and the legal infrastructure for areas of EMP co-operation as diverse as environment, constabulary measures, issues of comparative law, etc. It could support with its legal advise all the joint actions the Partners would try to carry out together as well as provide legal advise on fresh and existing disputes. In this sense, it would support Euro-Med conciliation procedures whenever such conciliation is required. The Consultative Legal Commission would not work as a jurisdictional but as a consultative body, thus leaving up to the EMP political institutions whether or not to accept its advice. This Commission could be appointed by the Partners in collaboration with the EU Commission and could provide its advice to those actors of the EMP process who would ask for them.

3.CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE SUPPORT

This part deals with two crucial elements of the Charter as sketched out by the Stuttgart "Guidelines": conflict prevention and peace support. Peace support and possible peace support operations are called differently in the "Guidelines", which refer to "crisis management measures", "post-conflict rehabilitation" and "Euro-Mediterranean co-operation in peace-keeping".

In putting forward these elements of conflict prevention and peace support, the "Guidelines" are extremely cautious. They say that these measures will be developed "on a strictly voluntary and consensual basis ... without interference with other institutions and bilateral efforts". It is likely that this cautious approach reflects Partners' consciousness of the political constraints which limit the Charter's scope and the EMP's capacities today (see section 2.1.1. and [*Aliboni*]).

In the Barcelona Declaration, the Partners adopted a basic perspective of conflict prevention by conceiving of the EMP as an instrument which, while refraining from dealing and interfering with ongoing conflict, has to establish the premises for a conflictless, co-operative area. This approach entails the achievement of structural and systemic conflict prevention through the promotion of partnership (more than the implementation of preventive diplomacy) by means of adequate shorter-term instruments and policy-making. Still, this perspective makes the implementation of preventive diplomacy more feasible than forms of peace support, from peace-keeping through peace enforcement. For these reason, this Report deals with conflict prevention and limits itself, when it comes to peace support, to taking into consideration peace-keeping and post-conflict rehabilitation as forms of peace support operations that can normally be used as instruments of preventive diplomacy with regard to the eruption or re-eruption of conflict and, more broadly speaking, are regarded as less intrusive forms of intervention and may draw consensus more easily than other forms.

3.1. Conflict prevention and good neighbourly relations

As already pointed out, after the decisions taken by the Ministers in Palermo and Stuttgart, there is no doubt that from the security vantage point the Charter (and, as a matter of fact, the whole of the EMP) now has a strong focus on conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy.

The following sections of this Report deal with conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy in the framework of the Charter and report the indications coming from the Working Group about the ways and means conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy can be organised and implemented in this framework.

Good neighbourly relations are included in this part and treated as an instrument of conflict prevention, though the Stuttgart "Guidelines" deal with this instrument on its own and in combination with the development of regional and subregional co-operation.

Conflict prevention is dealt with in the following three sections: (a) the preventive use of the Enhanced Political Dialogue; (b) the Charter's instruments of conflict prevention and their limits; (c) the networking of communication on conflict prevention.

3.1.1. The preventive role of the Enhanced Political Dialogue

The most relevant factor allowing for action in preventive diplomacy, particularly with regard to parties directly concerned by incoming conflict, is consensus [*Stefanova*]. As obvious as this may appear, it must be stressed that, with respect to such consensus, early

warning activities and facilities are only instrumental. They cannot be regarded as factors triggering action. The decision of an intergovernmental body to set up an early warning facility reflects a consensus among the parties concerned that they will at least consider intervention in case of warning. Nonetheless, preventive action can well take place even without the technical information early warning facilities provide. In fact, it can take place as the result of political information deliberately provided by parties concerned as well as of political interaction in the intergovernmental body in question. Such political information or interaction includes consensus thus sufficing to trigger action, if it is so desired by the parties involved.

Without early warning no consensus-based action to prevent conflict can take place. The relevance of political rather than technical information to trigger preventive action is important in every international security organisation, but particularly so in the EMP, where political will and cohesion are still limited and cannot be easily articulated in more or less mandatory institutional sequences. The decision of the Ministers in Palermo and Stuttgart to enhance the political dialogue as a pivotal instrument of the Charter must be regarded, amongst other things, as a way to introduce political early warning information as a possible trigger of preventive action. Thus, the Enhanced Political Dialogue (EPD) should be expected to work as the nucleus of early warning and preventive action in the EMP and, in the longer term, as the source from which EMP conflict prevention policy-making and relating interventions should spring.

In this perspective, the most obvious suggestion [*Aliboni; Daguzan]* is that the EMP institutions adopt a procedure similar to the so-called "Berlin mechanism" (Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation in Emergency Situations), stipulated in June 1991 by the CSCE members for bringing crises to the attention of the Conference and, if necessary, setting preventive action in motion [Bloed]. In the OSCE this procedure provides for emergency meetings of the Ministerial Council. Hereinafter, Aliboni's paper is quoted extensively.

This idea was already present in previous proposals put forward in the EMP's brief history. The Luxembourg draft of the Charter envisaged the possibility that the Senior Officials Committee hold "special meetings" in case of tensions or crises upon the request of one or more Partners. Another solution was planned by Malta's early proposal for a Stability Pact in the Mediterranean. By using the jargon of the OSCE Stability Pact in Europe, the Malta plan advocated the establishment of "round tables" devoted to specific crises, upon demand of concerned parties, which would take place, however, outside the EMP framework: the round tables would thus have the nature of *ad hoc* conferences, initiated but not run by the EMP, and which could be deferred to other institutions. The the idea of holding such round tables, if needed, has never been appreciated by some non-EU Partners.

While the Malta suggestion looks too committing with respect to the present level of political will in the EMP, the Luxembourg draft proposal may correspond to the use of some kind of "Berlin mechanism". The sometimes cryptic language of the Stuttgart "Guidelines" could refer to this mechanism where it states that there will be "consultations between countries to establish structures for crisis prevention meetings": the "structures" could correspond to the procedure to place complaints or ask for information contemplated by the "Berlin mechanism" and this procedure could take place in special meetings of the EMP institutions.

The OSCE "Berlin mechanism" has been used very few times only. Its level (ministerial) may not have facilitated its use. It might be interesting to note that this mechanism has

been superseded by the increasingly regular character of the OSCE Permanent Council meetings. In the OSCE today, information and complaints (i.e. early warning) are dealt with on a day-by-day basis by the Permanent Council.

It has been maintained [Biad; Marquina] that giving the EMP Senior Officials Committee a more permanent character would be especially important in a conflict prevention policy perspective, as it would provide the EMP with more opportunities to build consensus, both in general and with respect to individual crises, by consolidating the habit of working together. However, the situations in the OSCE and the EMP are different. Early warning in the OSCE web of conflict prevention institutions has a diffuse character and results not only from members' initiative but also from uninterrupted diplomatic interaction in the Permanent Council and between the latter and other relevant bodies of the OSCE. Instead, the institutional autonomy and differentiation of the EMP is very reduced.

An evolution of the EMP Senior Officials or the Euro-Med Committees towards a permanent status and a political role similar to that of the OSCE Permanent Council may be desirable but can hardly be envisaged in the near future. Still, the argument that the matrix of any possible joint conflict prevention action should continue to be regular diplomatic and political interaction is a forceful one.

Consequently, the application of the "Berlin mechanism" seems fitting with the stage of political development of the EMP. However, its effectiveness in the EMP would require two conditions: (a) more regular and frequent gatherings of EMP institutions; and (b) Senior Officials should be enabled to deal with information and complaints to an extent and in cases which the Ministers should set out in a limited but precise mandate. In fact, some form of more regular and autonomous interplay is in order and should be secured primarily by both the Senior Officials and the Euro-Med Committee.

3.1.2. Euro-Med instruments and means for conflict prevention

As pointed out in the previous section, the EPD could work as the basis of Euro-Med conflict prevention. By upgrading mutual confidence, it may generate that mix between early warning information and consensus needed to give way to joint action in the field of conflict prevention. Once consensus is there, however, the Charter will have to establish the necessary means, procedures and instruments to set its preventive actions in motion. A set of such means, procedures and instruments is discussed in the following by quoting Aliboni's paper extensively [*Aliboni*].

3.1.2.1. SITUATION CENTRE - The Action Plan taken into consideration by the Senior Officials in 1996 introduced the idea of "setting up a Euro-Med 'Situation Centre'" to work as an "early warning procedure". This idea is not explicitly mentioned in the "Guidelines", but that does not mean that it is out of the question. The "Guidelines" have deliberately been very generally formulated. They speak of a "Euro-Med mechanism for preventive diplomacy", thus leaving it up to subsequent talks to define mechanisms and their extent.

Such a Euro-Med Situation Centre could take on very different profiles. A first one could be a situation centre relying substantially on the situation centres and similar instruments within the EU, like the situation centre about to operate as part of the Cell for Policy Planning and Early Warning under the direction of the Secretary-General of the EU Council of Ministers; the situation centre within the WEU Cell; and the Torrejón Satellite Centre operating within the WEU. The procedure could be arranged through a protocol stating limits and ways the EMP would be enabled to accede and/or the "services" demanded by the EMP. It is very likely that these limits would be very strong or that they

could hardly be defined precisely. From a political point of view, such a solution would unnecessarily expose EU unilateralism instead of healing Southern Mediterranean perceptions relating to it (see section 2.1.1). This kind of procedure has an inclusive character if implemented with respect to East European countries with more or less distant prospects of becoming members of the EU. It could take on an exclusive character in relation to countries lacking those prospects.

A second profile would make the Euro-Med information rely on the EU but would secure access to the EU situation centres by means of a number of PBMs (see section 2.3.2.1). The latter would have the task of securing a convincing liaison with and participation in EU situation centres by non-EU Mediterranean officials and officers.

A third profile would try to achieve the networking of EU and non-EU situation centres, by means of protocols defining limits and purposes of co-operation. The problem with this solution would be the asymmetries between the non-national EU system, on one hand, and a number of national systems, on the other, which would not necessarily be willing to achieve a direct co-operation with other systems, let alone to pool resources or information. Non-EU-situation centres may refer, however, to international organisations' centres rather than national ones. This would be a relevant and operative profile, particularly if the Partners were to decide to focus on non-military and non-political events, such as disasters or environmental developments [*Calleya; Stefanova*] (see sections 2.3.3.2 and 3.1.3).

A fourth solution is establishing a Euro-Med situation centre proper. This solution may be difficult but not unfeasible if, as just pointed out, the situation centre were to focus on non-political and non-military events and work as a gathering centre of information coming from technical-economic centres, in particular international centres. Otherwise, it looks unlikely.

The most feasible profile seems a combination of the second and third solution indicated above; that is, a combination of Southern access to EU systems and a modest Euro-Med cell based on the networking of information coming from international agencies. To such networking the EU could well volunteer information, but this step should be taken very cautiously. All in all, the risk to be countered by all diplomatic skills is that of making non-EU Partners feel overwhelmed by EU capacities. This would increase information but, at the same time, diminish confidence and make information useless.

3.1.2.2. CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE AND GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS - In general, a conflict prevention centre is less an instrument to gather information than one to manage procedures seeking to prevent latent or potential conflict between more or less consenting parties and settle disputes.

The conflict prevention centre set up by the 1990 CSCE Vienna decisions was functionally connected to the obligation for consultation and co-operation in case of "unusual and unscheduled" military activities. Similar mechanisms were envisaged in the ACRS, where three such centres were to be established in Amman, Tunis and Qatar. Given the EMP's willingness to exclude military activities from its scope for the time being, what could be the purpose of a Euro-Med conflict prevention centre in the framework of the Charter?

A conflict prevention centre might be given the task of developing and performing, first of all, the functions outlined by the "Guidelines" as "procedures of clarification, mediation and conciliation for settling disputes between parties by peaceful means of their own choice". The existence of a number of such sub-regional centres would be helpful. These, appropriately located, could be mandated by the EMP central institutions to

proceed on a case-by-case basis. They could be asked to perform fact-finding missions and set up local "round tables for analysis and recommendations" whose outcome would be deferred to the Senior Officials. The sub-regional centres could be directly addressed by parties and thus act as an element of decentralised early warning. In this way, they could be enabled to perform an essential job in securing good neighbourly relations.

Whether in a centralised or decentralised organisation, it can be expected that mediation and clarification would be more successful than conciliation or the settlement of disputes. This is what is suggested by previous experience with "regional" conciliation and dispute settlement. The OSCE has no less than eight formalised procedures for that purpose, according to Lohmann [347], who says somewhat ironically that "It cannot be said that the OSCE is short of procedural tools for the peaceful settlement of disputes". Nevertheless, settlement procedures have never taken place in the CSCE/OSCE – neither within the OSCE itself in the non-legal form of conciliation (the OSCE, it must be recalled, is a politically-binding rather than legally-binding institution) nor after being deferred to legal arbitration outside the OSCE (to the Courts in Geneva or in the Hague, etc.).

The OSCE's experience suggests that, unless specific circumstances invite political conciliation inside the institution concerned, the institution would be better advised to refer to existing international incumbent bodies like the Court in the Hague. The task of establishing EMP procedures for settling disputes may prove too demanding with respect to the EMP's narrow political breathing space. This procedure is envisaged by the "Guidelines" where encouragement of judicial settlement of differences and disputes is foreseen.

3.1.2.3. POLITICAL PLANNING AND ANALYSIS - Functions of political planning and analysis are generally associated to the situation and conflict prevention centres. In particular, the direction given to such a planning function in the new EU Cell for Political Planning and Early Warning is one which emphasises conflict prevention. Could political planning and analysis be established in the Euro-Med framework with a view to helping prevent conflict? The fact of the matter is that this function requires a high degree of political cohesion, so high that even the EU Cell has dropped any idea of full autonomy and is now based on a system of networking among national elements.

The model inspiring political planning for conflict prevention in the EU Cell is the experience of the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) which operated for a while in the Commission as a result of earlier ideas and requests put forward by the European Parliament. This model could prove more interesting for the EMP than for the EU Cell. In fact, what made the CPN of interest was its deliberate and systemic interaction with think thanks, NGOs and other components of the civil societies. In this sense, the EMP, through its links with the EuroMeSCo and Femise networks of institutions of security and economic analysis, respectively, is already operating an embryonic system of analysis and political planning, a system the Partners would be unwilling to operate jointly at governmental level under present political conditions. In his paper, Daguzan suggests an interesting procedure by which EuroMeSCo could contribute quick evaluations on emerging crises [*Daguzan*].

Once collected, however, analyses coming from non-governmental networks must be handled in some way by a dedicated EMP unit (unlikely to be set up) or its Secretariat. The Secretariat is presently managed by the European Commission (which is, in fact, already handling the very few established CBMs/PBMs, like the one on civil protection and the EuroMeSCo and Femise networks). This is not the best solution politically, for

the same reasons indicated during discussion of the establishment of a situation centre above. Still, it would allow for a minimum of joint Euro-Med planning and analysis. In this sense, rather than trying vainly to include political planning and analysis in whatever situation and conflict prevention centres it would be possible to establish, it may be better to foster a strict and well planned co-operation between the EMP institutions and what exists of decentralised co-operation in the Partners' civil societies.

3.1.3. Networking sectoral communication

In section 2.3.2.4, this Report points out the important PBM function of establishing a basic communication network amongst Partners. It also recalls that such a principle has already been accepted by the EMP Partners in the Malta Conclusions. The implementation of this network at a diplomatic level, amongst "contact points for political and security matters", must be under way.

As already pointed out, the setting up of a regular communication network "for political and security matters" can be regarded as an essential preliminary mechanism to provide early warning so that action can be taken in the field of conflict prevention. By strengthening early warning capacities, the existence of a communication network at the diplomatic level - i.e. amongst Foreign Ministries - is both an aspect and an instrument of the basic EPD conflict prevention function considered in section 3.1.1. Also, it is a preliminary, significant expression of the existence of a political will geared to considering crises jointly and possibly dealing with them jointly. It is primarily in this sense that such networking is referred to in this section.

Communication networking can concern political and security matters as well as a number of technical functions performed in sectors pertaining to the implementation of the Partnership. It is also in this sense that communication networking is outlined in this section, though the two tiers of networks must remain functionally separated.

A technical network of this kind, in addition to the diplomatic network of contact points, may have a high value in terms of expanding EMP early warning and conflict prevention capacities. Furthermore, if successfully implemented, technical communication networking would provide a broad upgrading of the political capacity and legitimacy of the EMP as a whole.

In general, such a technical network would relate to the PBMs considered in sections 2.3.3.1-2. Linked to these PBMs, essentially two tiers of communication networks seem relevant in terms of early warning and conflict prevention and thus deserve special consideration:

♦ networks bringing together information on the protection of economic and environmental resources and civil societies, as well as safety of goods and the safety and rescue of persons;

♦ networks bringing together information for constabulary and (soft) security purposes. Though these networks are an indispensable premise for the implementation of operational measures, it must be stressed that they are seen here as instruments to increase information and transparency only. A breakdown into two stages of information and operation is evident, for example, in the implementation of the CBM approved in Malta on "Co-operation between Civil Protection Services". In terms of conflict prevention, these networks provide early warning, but whether any consequent action is taken to prevent (let alone suppress) events, tensions or conflict remains to be seen. For example, there could be an exchange of information on seismic activities but not necessarily joint action for civil protection; likewise, shared information on illegal migration would not

necessarily have to give way to joint actions to prevent or suppress it. Of course, information can lead to national actions. Therefore, in relation to sensitive policy areas, information could be denied.

Even if we limit ourselves to considering communication networks as declaratory rather than operational PBMs, the two tiers of networks outlined above could still have considerable applications and importance. As regards the first tier, protection of the environment and sea resources as well as maritime search and rescue operations are fields in which PBMs can start being shaped out fairly soon and with good prospects.

As a matter of fact, the follow-up mechanism envisaged by the Short and Medium-term Priority Environment Action Programme (SMAP), adopted by the 1997 Helsinki Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on the Environment, could pave the way to other sets of measures. It could provide an excellent start for the expansion and strengthening of the kind of technical communication network we are referring to.

The present network of SMAP Correspondents, with their Steering Committee, annual meetings and system of reporting, could be the basis for the intra-sectoral system of information of the Integrated Resource Management (IRM) of the Mediterranean environment envisaged by Anna Spiteri. In her words, the system would be "... based on the premise of shared information flows not only vertically but laterally, i.e. from sector to sector. The latter flow is then not necessarily restricted towards the top of the sector, as it may indeed occur predominantly at the level where the actual data is required. The basic idea of IRM is based on open networks, the size and the number of the points in the network depending on the task in hand."

She specifies what would be required to set up an IRM: "a data communication technology infrastructure on a regional scale which would also allow for real-time transmission from satellites, and their data input to strategic GIS [Geographical Information Systems] nodes. These GIS data centres will collect, store and have the facilities to utilise instantly information in the environment, especially on coastal and marine resources as diverse as water quality, fish stock movement, coastal urbanization impacts. sea level fluctuations, coastal dynamics and so on." [Spiteri: 145-46].

Suggested in 1994 with an view to the UNEP Mediterranean Action Plan, it is evident that this agenda fits very well with the Euro-Med SMAP and its possible enhancement.

While SMAP's chances of achieving an early warning capacity look fitting and feasible, what exists already should not be overlooked. For example, the MAP already has an early warning and rapid reaction unit (RAMPAC), patterned along the lines of Spiteri's suggestions and based in Malta. Still, it doesn't work. This suggests that, in trying to introduce an early warning capacity in the SMAP, it would be interesting to obtain a preliminary assessment of what exists and the reasons existing early warning resources (including a number of early warning bilateral agreements between the EU and its Mediterranean partners) are not working.

As for SAR operations, the establishment of a communication network is feasible both in case EMP Partners were willing to set up a regional and integrated facility for SAR [Jones: 107] [*Calleya]* and in case they wish to operate nationally on the basis of networked information. It has been pointed out [Jones: 106] that "a good beginning would be made if the regional states were to exchange information on their SAR communication frequencies and their command and control provisions for SAR. This would enable them to contact each other quickly in cases of emergency and to have some idea of the capabilities which others could contribute quickly to a SAR response".

Other communication networks could refer to constabulary co-operation to exchange information and/or as a first step towards joint operational measures. Communication networks would concern international crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration and terrorism. It must be stressed that the boundary between the two kinds of network may be blurred. An oil spill or the violation of a fishing reserve may be detected through an environmental as well as a police network. From an operational point of view, both would give way to constabulary operations, be they multilateral or not. In general, the decision to share information, not to speak of acting jointly, in this field calls for a political understanding much stronger than the decision to set up an IRM or a SAR communication network.

3.1.4. Cultural and civil-military relations

The task mentioned in the Stuttgart "Guidelines" of promoting "better understanding and mutual acceptance of the cultures, religions and civilisations of the peoples of the Euro-Mediterranean region" is in part already tackled by a number of EMP actions, from co-operation in regard to audiovisuals to decentralised co-operation. Further to strengthening and expanding these actions, the accomplishment of the task requires the introduction of *ad hoc* PBMs with a view to helping to reinforce cultural understanding and mutual acceptance. These PBMs - as mentioned at the beginning of section 2.3.2 - have been developed in other EuroMeSCo reports. Here it is worth considering that the task of promoting better understanding and mutual acceptance can also be regarded as a kind of joint action to be taken essentially in a conflict prevention perspective. The mechanism of enhanced political dialogue, while it may encounter some difficulties in trying to develop the instruments for preventive diplomacy that have been taken into consideration in previous sections (3.1.2), should find it easier to take up the opportunities for strengthening the EMP's systemic and structural capacities of conflict prevention by developing cultural co-operation in every possible respect.

The Group looked into another important factor affecting the EMP's conflict prevention capacities in the longer term, namely civil-military relations and the use of military factors to attain civil objectives.

This point can be regarded from two perspectives: one in which military factors are seen as instrumental to meeting non-military, that is, civil community or civil power, needs; another in which the military-civil relationship is seen as a question of good governance (a point which has been already raised by this Report in section 1.3). Under a good governance profile, military factors and resources are re-directed or reduced to make room for meeting civil needs, strengthening democracy and achieving peaceful purposes. The two perspectives - it must be stressed - are complementary, for both are bound more or less directly to re-directing objectives and resources in public policy making and national budgets.

All in all, the target would be to introduce in the EMP framework some elements of the co-operative security perspective on military forces which has gradually prevailed in intra-European relations with the advent of the CSCE. This would make it possible to adopt Petersberg-like tasks in the EMP and, meanwhile, could perhaps help change Southern perceptions with respect to a number of Western security arrangements. More importantly, the target would also be to bring about a basic incremental modification in the relationship between the military and civil components of government in countries where the military has undue weight.

In this sense, many members of the Group [*Tanner; Spencer; Daguzan; Aliboni]* gave prominence to strengthening joint actions in disaster relief within the EMP. The foundation for such an orientation has already been laid thanks to the adoption of the oft-mentioned measures of co-operation among civil protection services. Though the arrangement presently envisaged by the Partners does not explicitly include the use of military factors in disaster relief, the very existence of this mechanism and its development would facilitate the eventual passage to the use of military instruments.

This kind of suggestion can be set in a broader perspective [*Spencer]* by pointing out that "the political dialogue could concentrate on incentives towards allocating defence budgets to more humanitarian ends". In this way, while present political conditions prevent the EMP from acting jointly in the field of non-proliferation and arms control, the re-direction of budgeted resources towards civil purposes would diminish the arms expenditure component of budgets and put the use of existing military factors in a good governance perspective.

Establishing a code of conduct could be a way for the EMP's political dialogue to create "incentives towards allocating defence budgets to more humanitarian ends". Yet a code of conduct regulating military-civil relations in detail [*Tanner]* may appear premature at this stage. A code of conduct influencing the allocation of resources in the budget may admittedly have a more distant and indirect impact, but it could at least be acceptable to Partners.

Other measures to create such incentives concern the establishment of CBMs of a kind that has been already aired in the EMP, albeit without much success. One CBM that would be much in line with the above discourse is establishment of an EMP arms register [Tanner 1997:18] [*Daguzan]*. This arms register should be linked less to tasks of arms control, disarmament or proliferation control than to a kind of joint cost-benefit analysis in terms of social and economic development. The just-mentioned code of conduct would then encourage Partners to make the necessary adjustments in policy-making as well as budgetary terms. In this respect, one should not forget, however, that the possibility of unilateral supply-side measures always remains [Heller; EuroMeSCo V, 15] which would certainly add to the reshaping of the broad military-civil relations being discussed here.

Another important CBM regards training and education of the military. The establishment of a network of national defence centres specialising in academic research and training was discussed in 1996-97 within the Senior Officials Committee, but put on hold by the 1997 Malta "Conclusions": Such activity of training and research should first and foremost make the military familiar with ongoing transformations in the patterns of military-civil relations, along the line of what is presently being done in the NATO-related Partnership for Peace. Second, the same activity may regard a set of "conceptual clarifications" [Tanner 1997] on military-and security-related notions (arms control, CSBMs, defence sufficiency, legitimate security concerns, military capacities going beyond defence requirements), which would make strategic thinking more homogeneous, thus attenuating security dilemmas. While training on military-civil relations would more explicitly and immediately relate to good governance, activities in conceptual clarifications would have less relevance to present developments in the EMP but would prepare the ground for tomorrow's security co-operation. Training and research activities of this kind are already carried out by NGOs such as Malta's Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies and EuroMeSCo.

To conclude on this point, it must be noted that other international security organisations with a Mediterranean dimension, like NATO, the WEU and the OSCE, are already offering training and other exchanges opportunities to selected groups of Southern

Mediterranean countries. This is made possible by the non-multilateral character of their relations with the latter. As suggested in section 1.5 of this Report, an attenuation of the indivisibility clause in the EMP would make it easier for it to work out its contribution to an essential dimension of Mediterranean security and partnership-building.

3.2. Peace support operations

The Stuttgart "Guidelines" mention the "establishment of Euro-Mediterranean mechanisms for preventive diplomacy and crisis management", both of which may entail peace support operations (PSOs). Further, it mentions "Euro-Mediterranean co-operation in peace-keeping". In addition, the "Guidelines" refer to "post-conflict rehabilitation", a field which may overlap with PSO.

To what extent would PSOs be warranted by the current EMP political context? Joint action in PSO is normally largely dependent on strategic and political cohesion. Since the latter is presently weak in the EMP context, the question is whether attempts at co-operation in PSO are feasible and could help reinforce Euro-Med cohesion with a view to security co-operation. Let's first discuss briefly the link between PSO and security co-operation and then their feasibility.

Some EMP Partners have co-operated or are currently co-operating in PSOs under non-EU and non-WEU umbrellas [Echeverria]. Carlos Echeverria has maintained that such co-operation can be successfully transposed into the EU-WEU context, thus strengthening Euro-Med security co-operation. One member of the Group [*Said]* has come to the same conclusion. On the contrary, Michael Pugh has written cogently about the weakness of functional links between PSOs and security co-operation in the Mediterranean with respect to other areas (in particular the area involved in NATO's Partnership for Peace, i.e. Central eastern Europe), due to the absence of strategic and political cohesion in the Mediterranean area: "PSO activities in the Mediterranean will remain dependent on wider political developments towards stronger security relationships. At most they will reinforce such developments rather than initiate them" [Pugh: 10].

More in detail, Pugh is sceptical about the possibility of developing a Mediterranean peace-keeping agenda similar to the one implemented by the Partnership of Peace on the basis of the 1993 Athens Report on Co-operation on Peace-Keeping. Still, while the whole of the programme does not seem suitable for the EMP context, a select number of activities like those envisaged by the Athens Report should not be ruled out (for example, in the field of training and education: see also section 3.1.4 in this Report). If implemented, these activities could stimulate the emergence of the premises of Euro-Med security co-operation lacking today. Such scepticism may be reinforced by Southern Mediterranean reactions to the 1999 NATO air campaign on Kosovo and European participation in it. As is well known, these reactions have been extremely negative and have contributed to eroding the West's legitimacy for initiating PSOs and the possibility, at least in the Mediterranean, of North-South co-operation.

As limited as they might be in their scope and substance, PSOs could be introduced in the EMP Charter in addition to other Euro-Med instruments and possible joint actions. Nevertheless, such PSO limitations have to be taken into full account if the EMP's is to become an achievable agenda.

Given such limitations, what PSOs look feasible in the Euro-Med context? The wording of the "Guidelines", where "Euro-Mediterranean co-operation in peace-keeping" rather than Euro-Med peace-keeping is proposed, may suggest that Euro-Med joint action in this

field should be directed less toward operational tasks directly accomplished by the EMP than to establishing the elements which would make the Partners ready to participate in PSOs under different umbrellas or, more importantly, to acquiring common perceptions and visions about PSOs and their role.

In the EuroMeSCo Group, it is Fred Tanner who has looked more organically than other Group members at the PSO question. Tanner is more open than Pugh to the existence of a functional relation between PSOs and security co-operation. The Report quotes his paper extensively:

In view of elaborating recommendations for peace operations in the Euro-Med context, the following preliminary observations have to be made.

• First, it will be important to allow Euro-Med joint actions to be open to potential outside participation. For instance, the Charter should prepare the conceptual ground for close co-operation (in peacekeeping and other areas) between the Euro-Med Partnership, the OSCE and Arab League, for instance. At the same time, it may be premature to suggest co-operative arrangements with organisations, such as the OAU, that are clearly beyond the Euro-Med parameters.

• Second, it is important to accept the fact that peacekeeping co-operation continues to represent a sensitive matter for states with uneasy civil-military relations at home. Peace operations imply, after all, military-to-military contacts among Mediterranean Partner states—a type of Euro-Med co-operation that has been rejected repeatedly by Partners such as Syria or Lebanon.

• Third, the Euro-Med Partnership lacks the political cohesion and credibility for mandating peace missions or for acting as sub-contractor thereof.

The above constraints still leave the Political and Security chapter of the EMP with a number of options in the broad field of peace support and responses to complex emergencies. The Partnership should be able to prepare peace missions under a Euro-Med hat in the field of training, contingency planning and security sector reform. Furthermore, the Partnership could support peacekeeping operations in non-military domains, such as demining and disaster relief.

Suggestions and Recommendations
Model 1:   Joint peacekeeping training
The Euro-Med security co-operation could concentrate on building capacity in peacekeeping. Areas that deserve particular attention are language training, civil-military relations and humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping. Such training activities are politically very much possible in the Euro-Med context, once the project of Euro-Med networking of defence institutes has taken off the ground.[7] To date, training activities are concentrated in Germany and Egypt. In Germany (Oberammergau), the NATO School offers in the PfP framework a number of peacekeeping training courses to officers from NATO Mediterranean Partners. In Egypt, peacekeeping curricula are offered at Cairo's Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (C.C.P.A.). Currently, the C.C.P.A. is geared towards African countries, but the peacekeeping training could be offered also to military officers and civil officials from Euro-Med countries.
Model 2:   Joint force planning for peacekeeping purposes

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[7] This proposal was launched in 1996, but then put on hold due to objections from Syria and Lebanon. France tried to revitalise it again in 1999.

Joint force planning in the Mediterranean could be designed to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available for multinational training, exercises and operations in a Euro-Med context. Such operations could consist of peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations. Joint planning would not imply any institutional ramifications for the Euro-Med Partnership. Military and political co-operation for peace missions could be done in various venues in the Euro-Mediterranean area. It could deal with the lessons learned of the UN. Also, Euro-Med meetings could work out common rules of engagement, status-of-forces model agreements, prepare the ground for joint contingency planning for peace and humanitarian operations, and agree on stand-by arrangements. Joint force planning would also be essential for jointly preparing non-military operations that require military support especially in the fields of emergency assistance and disaster relief (see also model 5).

Model 3:   Joint peacekeeping module

More difficult to achieve, but conceivable in the long-term may be the creation of regional joint peacekeeping modules. Regional and sub-regional co-operation in peace operations has become very fashionable in the late 1990s. There are now peace support battalions in the Baltic, in Scandinavia (Nordic Battalion) and in Central Europe (CENCOOP). Also, in south-eastern Europe the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe has been established with troop contributions from Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey. In addition, numerous current UN peace missions are made up by the task force principle: On the Golan Heights, for instance, a Slovak unit is integrated in an multinational Austrian-led battalion.

The basic idea behind these arrangements are to prepare multinational peace forces, that are interoperable and that are based on the task force principle. Such a Euro-Med module would be a contribution of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the security and stability in the region. The Euro-Med Partnership could serve as a framework for political co-ordination. Given the low comfort level of some Arab states to military co-operation, such a module could also be conceivable as a non-armed support contingent with priority tasks such as communications, logistics, engineering and transport. Those states that may chose to stay away from such peace forces could participate as observer states.

Model 4:   Euro-Med Co-operation in Mine Action

The land-mine question has taken prominence through the Ottawa process and the mobilisation of the international public opinion in recent years. Furthermore, humanitarian de-mining has become an integrate part of peace operation and peace building. In the Mediterranean region, there are several mine hot spots. There are mines deployed in the Near East, Cyprus, the Greek-Turkish borders and elsewhere in the Mediterranean region. Israel is co-operating with Jordan together with Canada and Norway in an anti-personnel clearing project along the Jordan-Israel border. Egypt, in turn, claims to have 23 million land mines left over from the Second World War and the countries four wars with Israel.

These mines are – in addition to being dangerous - also an obstacle to the economic development of entire areas. For example, the El-Alamein region has a density of up to three mines to the square metre. Egypt has approached several international institutions, including NATO through the MCG, for enlisting support. Individual EU countries have already agreed to support Egypt by sending experts and clearing equipment. A recent Rand study suggests integrating the mine clearing efforts into the NATO Dialogue programme [Lesser et al.: , 45].

Mine action could develop as an important field of co-operation in the Euro-Med Partnership. But the Partnership is not equipped to set up and run a regional mine action centres. In fact, mine action centres are national, given the sensitivity of sovereignty when it comes to on-site missions. The main activities of such centres are to assess the mine problem, make plans for the removal of the mines, work together with the government for the prioritisation, raise funds, train management staff and staff for mine clearance.

The Partnership could, however, play an important role as facilitator, co-odinator and as focal point: It could act as a co-ordination body for mine action in the Mediterranean and provide programmatic assistance to those Partner states who wish to create their own Mine Action Centres. The Euro-Med mine action programme could act as clearinghouse for the creation of tailored mine-clearing programmes; it could assist the Partners in their efforts to raise funds and to establish technical control standards. Given the interrelationship of mine action with post-conflict rehabilitation and economic development, current MEDA programmes could be enlisted to support mine awareness programmes in civil society and the socio-economic rehabilitation of mined areas.

Model 5:   Disaster Relief and Humanitarian emergency response

There exists a clear need for emergency assistance and civil protection programmes in the Mediterranean. Recent earthquake catastrophes in Turkey and Greece in August 1999 revealed the obvious lack of emergency aid co-ordination, despite the excellent work that was done by the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The record of the past indicates that the bilateral approach works much better than assistance through regional or international organisations: during the earthquake in Cairo, France and other countries have sent their support on a bilateral basis.

The envisaged creation of a "Euro-Mediterranean system of prevention, of reduction and of management of natural and man-made disasters" is a first step towards multilateralisation of disaster co-operation. But, it is questionable to what extent the Disaster relief activities could be institutionalised beyond its current steering committee. If an institutionalisation would take place, then it would make sense to link it up with the proposed Euro-Med conflict prevention centre [*Calleya*]. In such an operational mode, the Centre could assume the following tasks: the alert of the Euro-Med Partnership of an unravelling emergency, mobilising resources and channelling emergency contributions, and the co-ordination of the deployment of military and civil protection assets.

It is obvious that such a Centre would need to work very closely with relief organisations such as the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). Also, sooner or later a division of labour needs to be made between an Euro-Med disaster relief programme and the NATO Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) that is actively promoted by the NATO's Mediterranean work programme.

Long-term activities of the Centre could include the exchange of information on disaster preparedness, a Euro-Med model agreement for mutual assistance, joint exercises and border crossing arrangements. Under Euro-Med auspices there could be the development of joint activities such as awareness-raising, team visits, courses and workshops.

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LIST OF THE GROUP'S PAPERS ENCLOSED WITH THE REPORT

Roberto Aliboni, *The Enhanced Political Dialogue In the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*

Stephen C. Calleya, *The establishment of a Euro-Med conflict prevention*

Jean-François Daguzan, *La charte euroméditerranéenne pour la paix et la stabilité: éléments juridiques et politiques*

Martín Ortega Carcelén, *Military Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Charter: An Unjustified Absence*

Mohammed Kadry Said, *Confidence-Building Measures: A Practical Approach* (final)

Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, *Some Conceptual Issues in the Projected Euro-Mediterranean Charter For Peace and Stability*

Claire Spencer, *CBMs and CSBMs and Partnership-Building Measures in the Charter* (final)

Radoslava Stefanova, *Early warning in the Euro-Med context: conceptual questions, procedures and instruments*

Fred Tanner, *Euro-Med joint actions in support of peace-building and good governance: prospects and limits*

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACRS	[Working Group on] Arms Control and Regional Security
CBMs	Confidence-Building Measure
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPN	Conflict Prevention Network
CSBM	Confidence- and Security-Building Measure
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
EMMA	Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Agency
EMMC	Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coast-Guard
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EPD	Enhanced Political Dialogue
EU	European Union
Eurofor	Euroforce
Euroforces	Eurofor & Euromarfor
Euromarfor	European Maritime Force
EuroMeSCo	Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
Femise	Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economic Institutes
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GIS	Geographical Information Systems
INCSEAs	Incidents at Sea Agreements
IRM	Integrated Resource Management
MAP	Mediterranean Action Plan
MEDA	Financial and Technical Measures to Accompany the Reform of Economic and Social Structures in the Framework of the EMP
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Navocformed	Naval on-Call Force for the Mediterranean
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African States
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PBM	Partnership-Building Measure
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PSO	Peace Support Operations
SAR	Search and Rescue
SMAP	Short and Medium-term Priority Environment Action Programme
Stanavformed	Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean
UEO	Union de l'Europe Occidentale
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNMIK	United Mission In Kosovo
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction