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WAR AND PEACE
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

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1. The new world order and the changing security framework

Security has changed profoundly. The end of the Cold War and the East-West confrontation has also meant, for all practical purposes, the end of the nuclear "balance of terror". The prospect of a new global war has faded away. The territory of our nations is no longer threatened by a massive and imminent conventional or nuclear attack. While other threats and risks remain, the world has become more secure.

The end of the ideological divide between communism and democracy has increased the visibility of other imbalances: economic development and welfare, population growth, mass starvation, the availability of natural resources – from energy to water. Democracy is far from being the universal form of government and human rights continue to be challenged and violated. In the military sphere, the global spread of technological knowledge increases the likelihood of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical), which could fall into the hand of rogue political states, but also of terrorist or other criminal groups.

While new forms of ethnic or religious nationalism appear, we are witnessing the crisis of many new and old nation states. A new category of "failed states" is spreading instability around them, while various rogue states are fostering a new and more lethal kind of terrorism, challenging the foundations of our civil society and democracy.

The openness of our societies, the global web of communications, travel, financial services and trade is a powerful factor of individual freedom and economic growth. Yet it also favors the development of international crime, narco-trafficking, mafia-controlled illegal immigration, money laundering, trademark infringements, etc. The financial flow of crime-related money is staggering, and increases the volatility of the international financial system. Moreover, organized crime takes advantage of situations of domestic political or institutional crisis in weaker states in an attempt to establish "kleptocracies": states or wide regions under the control of a "*pax mafiosa*", challenging the rule of law and increasing the risks of instability and civil strife.

At the same time, however, the importance of international organizations and international law is increasing. We are witnessing the birth of a new world order, much more "regulated" than in the past, and in which trade and financial relations, but also important arms control and disarmament agreements, add stability to our relations. Fundamental values such as peace, human rights and fair trade become the shared vital interests of our societies and are translated into national laws and international treaties and regulations that we are supposed to uphold and disseminate.

A new, pro-active, international solidarity and legitimacy is developing to replace the old solidarity, based simply on the common interest of nations to defend their territories and

keep the "balance of terror" under control. This is changing the alliances and the structure of the international security system. While only the United States can claim the role of superpower, other states can be ranked as great powers. The European Union, Russia, Japan, China, India, Pakistan, Brazil and other countries cannot directly challenge the United States, but hold a significant denial power and have the capacity to initiate autonomous policies of global relevance. Any kind of new world order, therefore, can only be based on a successful coalition policy among the only remaining superpower and at least some of these great powers.

2. Towards a new, value-related solidarity

Transition from the old defense-related coalitions to the new value-related solidarity is not proving easy. There is important political and cultural opposition, even inside our countries. A new nationalism is emerging in the United States and Europe. In America, it has sometimes taken the form of neo-isolationism or, more recently, disregard for the interests and policies of other countries, including allies. These are the political forces that also oppose the United Nations and any proposal that could extend the rule of new international legal instruments to the US. In Europe, this new nationalism has favored the development of extremist anti-European movements, on both the right and the left. These tendencies undermine international solidarity and increase the fragmentation of the global security system.

A much discussed alternative to a new system of international solidarity, barring anarchy and war, could be a new system of power politics, with an almost imperial American role challenged by a number of lesser powers. However, the ongoing debate on the development of a "unipolar" world fails to deal satisfactorily with the prospect of increasing conflictuality ensuing from this choice.

The existing alliances and international organizations constitute the fundament and working framework of the global security system. While we tackle the problem of defining the new balance of power and of dealing with a number of limited conflicts and crises, this powerful institutional and political framework allows for a great degree of overall coherence and the necessary level of international legitimacy. Change will be based on the solid base laid by our past achievements.

Yet, the new pro-active strategic priority, shifting from territorial defense to crisis management operations (peace-keeping, peace-support, peace-enforcing, peace-building and the like), modifies the texture and the decision-making of both alliances and international organizations. The old automatic consensus inspired by the immediate threat of a well identified enemy has disappeared. The establishment of a new consensus based on shared values, and parallel (but not necessarily identical) political priorities, is far from certain and requires a more complex and slower process of decision-making.

It is therefore necessary to grapple squarely with the many ambiguities and problems still lingering around this new prospect. Problems of legitimacy, decision-making and effectiveness cannot be pushed aside. The paramount question of coherence between ends and available means must be answered.

3. The ethical and political perspectives of crisis management

Armed interventions in favor of crisis management and peace enforcement have brought to the fore the problem of the relationship between respect of international moral principles and the effectiveness of recourse to arms.

The failure of some of these actions, such as the one in Somalia, have strengthened the conviction that the reference to ethical principles cannot be the only factor considered by international institutions or coalitions, when deciding to intervene to counter the violation of human rights, individual freedoms or social justice.

In deciding upon armed intervention, a mix of ethical motivations and political criteria must be taken into consideration. In general, the aim of international interventions is to re-establish overall governance (not only in the area of crisis but with respect to the entire international community) as well as the rule of law violated by the behavior of a deviant state. Therefore, the ethical motivations behind the intervention must be assessed on the basis of the effects it is likely to have.

This means that a number of political criteria must be brought into play whenever deciding to undertake armed intervention: in particular, *ultima ratio* and effectiveness.

The *ultima ratio* criterion should drive actors to use all diplomatic and economic instruments available to the international community, in the knowledge that they form a single package with the eventual military option. Their use must be considered in a *continuum* with military action, even when the latter is the last link in the chain. Very often in recent events, evaluation of armed intervention and its consequences has come too late, when the mix of diplomatic and economic pressures had already lost its deterrent function.

Before considering armed intervention and including it in the basket of negotiating instruments, its effectiveness must be assessed in light of three factors: 1) military superiority; 2) possible enlargement of the conflict; 3) peace-building in view of post-conflict conflict prevention (see also point 6).

The latter is the most difficult to assess since it largely depends on the evaluation of the other two factors. It is clear that the difficulties encountered in the cases of Iraq and Serbia were primarily the result of the lack of a peace-building solution.

The key, in any case, remains the second factor (possible enlargement of the conflict), which can, on its own, cancel the positive effect of military superiority.

If global governance is to be the final objective of any military action aimed at solving a serious violation of ethical principles, it is rather evident that loss of control of a military action can jeopardize achievement of that objective. Thus, in management of local conflicts, the political criterion must be given priority.

Therefore, it is essential that the main actors involved – above all those that could react negatively to a military action – be addressed in a preventive phase. Preventive diplomacy,

in other words, must not be directed only at the concerned parties, but also at states external to the conflict, yet strategically interested in it.

4. Prevention through cooperation and stronger international institutions

A sensible policy of value-related solidarity cannot be based only on military intervention: it should develop effective deterrence and be able to prevent most crises from happening or reaching unacceptable levels of violence.

For many years, conflict prevention held a dominant position on the international security scene. However, the eruption of (failure to prevent) a number of serious crises in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caucasus and Southeastern Europe weakened public confidence in conflict prevention policies. In addition, the failure to take preventive action in East Timor with respect to a highly predictable crisis may have exacerbated the feeling that conflict prevention policies are not really being pursued.

Still, in an international landscape affected by numerous intra- and inter-state conflicts, prevention continues to be needed to reduce the burden of conflict management in the shorter run, as well as conflict itself in the long run. Prevention could foster domestic reform and international cooperation policies. A common effort is thus needed to restore and strengthen conflict prevention in the framework of international security policy.

Conflict can be prevented by three different set of policies, which vary according to time and the level of available solidarity: (a) fostering cooperative regimes and measures geared to arms control and limitation, as well as disarmament; (b) strengthening broad preventive diplomacy; (c) enhancing middle/long term measures for systemic and structural prevention of conflict.

Existing cooperative regimes to limit armaments must be improved and compliance with them strongly encouraged. Two aspects must be dealt with more effectively:

1   Great power compliance must be made more convincing by enhancing cooperative moves vs. deterrence and shifting more swiftly towards non-offensive defense postures;
2   A more effective and regular regional diplomacy is needed to tackle political sources of conflict, in particular where conflict is not terminated and can re-erupt, such as, for example, in the Eastern Mediterranean, Caucasus, South Asia, Persian Gulf, Horn of Africa, Western Sahara and Middle East.

In addition to pursuing broader actions of preventive diplomacy and long-term preventive policies, in many unstable regions diplomacy has to target specifically the eruption of armed inter-state conflict. In order to encourage concerned states to adhere to or comply with existing cooperative regimes, preventive diplomacy must encourage the establishment of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures to avoid impending conflict and, whenever possible, start a process of structural arms limitations or control. Of course, enhanced compliance mechanisms, equally applicable to all parties of these agreements, should be conceived.

More effective preventive diplomacy requires incremental and relentless efforts of political cooperation and consensus- and institution-building. Stronger or newly established regional and functional institutions and organizations are an essential step to achieve effective preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention policies - be they political institutions like the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe or technical organizations like early-warning or conflict prevention centers.

In order to reach a higher level of consensus where it is weak, the interplay between universal and regional security organizations must be improved. The interlocking of institutions remains a crucial factor for the reinforcement of international security. This interplay requires a more convincing and recognized coordination between universal and regional layers as well as more flexibility, common purpose and openness among regional organizations - a good example is the post-conflict policies presently being conducted in Southeastern Europe, which rely on a complex mechanism of cooperation among different institutions.

Besides these short- and middle-term preventive policies, our policy should aim at focusing more effectively on long-term policies to create structural and systemic conditions for solving or managing conflicts. In the same spirit, international economic cooperation must implement the structural reforms suggested by the Washington Consensus, as well as favor development of the existing trends of globalization and liberalization.

Also, political reforms require a set of more complex and flexible policies and a good deal of compromise, tolerance and constructive dialogue. There is the need for building understanding and co-operation, as well as for joint action on the rule of law and good governance (referred to by the Washington Consensus as well as in the economic realm) to set a more articulated and productive dialogue in motion. Again, this dialogue must take place in a reinforced institutional setting, with fair and accepted interplay between different layers, whether global, regional or functional.

5. Improving international legitimacy

Humanitarian emergencies, such as the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the human rights deprivation and denial of self-determination in East Timor, require an immediate and vigorous response by the international community.

States should serve the interest of peoples and not vice versa. Human rights and good governance have become the common interest of mankind. National interest should be defined in connection with the common interest, as has been pointed out by the UN Secretary General. Pursuing the common interest means serving the national interest.

However, the promotion of these values raises the question of intervention and its legitimacy. Democracy and human rights are giving way to a new kind of very intrusive perception: the new foreign and security policies seem to be concerned mainly with the domestic policy of other states. Intervention into the internal affairs of other countries is becoming more direct under the pretence that it is done in the name of higher principles.

This new reality could create a perception of uncertainty and risk: it is necessary to avoid that these perceptions become a stumbling block on the road to improving solidarity.

Intervention means not only the threat of use of force, but also other forms of coercive diplomacy, such as sanctions against the wrongdoer. Peaceful means should be exerted and interference should become a normal diplomatic practice, serving the cause of human rights and good governance.

Diplomatic means calling on states to abide by their international commitments are legitimate. These means are in the hands of individual states, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations. Diplomatic means are not in themselves a deterrent, however, unless followed by more compelling actions, should the target state not abide by its international commitments.

In this connection, sanctions are an appropriate means, provided they are applied by all states concerned. Sanctions can be decided by a group of states, by a regional organization or by the United Nations. When necessary, sanctions should be backed by forceful means, for example, by a naval blockade or traffic diversion on the high seas. Although humanitarian considerations might render sanctions less severe; shipment of medical supplies and foodstuffs should always be envisaged, provided they are channeled to the population of the targeted state.

In the present situation, the UN Charter prohibits the use of force, save in the common interest. In principle, intervention should be a UN matter. Humanitarian emergency should be considered a threat to peace, under Chapter VII, which gives the Security Council the power to authorize member states to intervene.

Regional organizations are also empowered. However, they require the authorization of the Security Council. Should the international community stand by idly if the Security Council is unable to pass a resolution authorizing intervention?

The international community should not passively tolerate mass killing and genocide and should adequately recognize the importance of universal values such as democracy and the rule of law. We need to define criteria to allow for intervention in case of inaction by the Security Council. These criteria should be embodied in a structural Security Council resolution. Thus, states grouped in a regional organization would be able to intervene legally if the criteria indicated by the resolution were respected and would not have to wait for an *ad hoc* resolution from the Security Council. This procedure could render the deterrent effect of intervention more credible.

Entering foreign territory calls for the consent of the territorial sovereign. However, humanitarian relief by NGOs and other humanitarian organizations should, under certain conditions, be permitted without the consent of the local government. This is particularly true when a foreign country is in a state of anarchy.

Intervention for protecting nationals abroad in mortal danger is permitted under international law and is in the interest of Western countries, which have their nationals dispatched abroad on relief or monitoring missions.

Both the European Union and NATO have defined the goal of intervention (Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty; NATO's new Strategic Concept and non-article 5 missions). A common strategy should be construed. Different views across the Atlantic on the notion of self-defense should be reconciled. It is a common understanding that self-defense might be resorted to in case an armed attack takes place. However, different opinions exist as to the legality of pre-emptive self-defense and other violent measures aimed at fighting international terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

6. Restoring deterrence and reforming the militay means

The re-establishment of a credible deterrence posture is a key factor of future solidarity. Many problems have to be addressed:

- Deterrence of "strong to mad" (or rogue) states: the posture cannot be based on the assumption of rational behavior from all foes. Moreover, it is certainly more difficult to exert a deterrent pressure on non-governmental, terrorist or criminal groups than on national states.
- Deterrence of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: this may be based on the more traditional non-proliferation and disarmament policies, which have however frequently proved insufficient. Alternatively, it could be based on military counter-proliferation moves, which raise the question however of their legitimacy and of sufficient consensus among allies and in the international system.
- Conventional deterrence has normally been considered much less effective and credible than nuclear deterrence, yet the large majority of crises develop well below the nuclear threshold.

Agreement on a number of universally accepted norms (see point 5), particularly regarding non-proliferation and arms control, could certainly strengthen deterrence. At the same time, a more limited, empirical approach should be implemented which, while insufficient *per se*, would nonetheless help to increase the credibility of the overall posture.

The means at our disposal for exerting power to manage crises and implement universal values are weak. They are mostly of a "negative" kind, that is, we can enforce our will through a mixture of military and economic means, but we are much less able to devise "positive" actions to prevent crises or generate positive developments. Eight years of unsuccessful attempts to curb Saddam Hussein do not bode well for our prospects with Slobodan Milosevic. Equally, a future in which our countries will remain indefinitely tied to a military presence in the Balkans – or worse, be obliged to mount new military interventions in these regions – cannot be viewed positively.

Post-conflict conflict prevention (of new conflicts) and peace-building should therefore be considered as part of our new deterrent posture. This will require better organization of civilian as well as military interventions, greater coherence among peace-building policies and the establishment of a credible and effective international ability to project law-enforcement forces and agencies.

On the military side, a greater effort should be made by all parties concerned to develop means especially conceived to perform crisis management. We are now dealing with a number of limited military conflicts with means conceived to fight a major war. While this enhances our technological superiority, reducing the risk of human losses, it also reduces our options, escalating the conflict to higher levels than necessary. The development of new, non-lethal technologies, as well as the timely availability of forces especially tailored to crisis management tasks could multiply our options and increase both our credibility and propensity to intervene sooner, when the crisis has yet to unfold.

7. The importance of the European model

It is no coincidence if most of the more effective examples of crisis prevention and management can be found in and around Europe. This is a direct result of the existence of a well established web of regional international organizations with a high level of effectiveness and a high degree of legitimacy. Structures such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance have proven their worth and are the building blocks of peace and stability on the continent.

This system can and should develop further. The web of "interlocking" institutions should carefully avoid the risk of becoming "inter-blocking". The agreement reached at the Washington Summit of the Atlantic Alliance has paved the way for a better and greater contribution of the European Union to the common task of preserving peace and managing crises. This will require the development of new European military capabilities as well as a new positive working relation with NATO. To maintain and increase their effectiveness, the enlargement process of these organizations should continue and go hand in hand with their institutional reform.

The role of the OSCE and of the other pan-European institutions remains essential and should be strengthened. The full participation of Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union is an essential factor in the implementation of a successful policy of peace and stability. Also, this would require better linkage between these regional organizations and global ones, such as the United Nations and the G-8. Any policy of peace-building should be based on a common and well articulated approach of the financial, political, trade and security institutions, both regional and global (as well as public and private).

The European model must be better understood and promoted elsewhere in the world to prevent the development of erratic or nationalistic behaviors and to increase the level of international understanding and solidarity. It cannot be construed as a hard-nosed, euro-centrist approach to the diverse problems of other countries and areas. After all, the necessary starting point of the European experience was an decision taken autonomously by democratically elected European governments. It is up to the rest of the world to decide if and how such a model can apply to their problems and priorities. We can only say that, until now, we have been unable to find a better model elsewhere and that it therefore seems proper to us to encourage other countries to study our case.

8. The key role of the Transatlantic Partnership

In the end, a new and more effective global governance, and a new, value-based international solidarity will only have a reasonable chance to develop if a positive relationship is maintained, over the long term, between Europe and the United States.

We share many common values. Our societies

a) are based on an open civilization,
b) are not based on fundamentalist assumptions, while respectful of the essential role of religions,
c) carry on silent revolutions,
d) stress the long term,
e) expand themselves through mediation.
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Our democratic systems have proved their resilience and worth. Europe would have been unable to overcome positively the disaster of two world wars without the generous and far-reaching contribution of the United States. America's might and welfare would not be the same without Europe. Both are linked by a strong political and military alliance, as well as by a common economic, cultural and technological system. Yet, these positive accomplishments of our common past need to be revitalized.

Basically, we have moved from a situation of global war to one of global peace. This new situation requires a reappraisal of existing common policies and organizations. The process is already well under way, but requires attention, careful handling and at least some of the far-sighted spirit that enabled our fathers to envisage the existing web of institutions and system of values.

A stronger Europe needs a positive response from the United States. At the same time, it is impossible to conceive of a positive answer to the problem of international peace without a common Euro-American approach.