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**THE WEST AND TURKEY: VARYING ROLES
COMMON INTERESTS**

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United States and European approaches to Turkey

The West and Turkey: varying roles common interests

John Roper

During the Cold War, the United States, Western Europe and Turkey had a common foreign and security policy. For all three the overwhelming priority was given to responding to the perceived threat of the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War there is much greater variation in the assessment of priorities in external relations, and a diminution, at least in the case of the United States and Western Europe, of the relative priority given to defence and security issues within government. Not only is there less homogeneity of assessment between the three partners, but within each of them there is less homogeneity. Different groups within governments and more widely within societies have different external policy agendas with different rankings of priorities. The countries of the European Union have perhaps found this most acutely when the avowed intention to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has coincided with a period when there is in fact less commonality among member states about priorities in external relations. More generally the end of the Cold War has led to a tendency to "renationalise" foreign and security policies.

In looking at the convergence and divergence of Western European and United States approaches to Turkey and the opportunities for cooperation or conflict in the light of our common interests and varying roles, it must first be recognised that within the European Union there are only common approaches on some aspects of relations with Turkey, and that within the United States there are sometimes differences in different parts of the administration on aspects of policies towards Turkey and the

European Union¹, with Congress also sometimes having different views from the Executive Branch.

In the same way within Turkey, as Ian Lesser has discussed in his paper for this meeting and elsewhere,² Turkey's security concerns have widened with the end of the Cold War, there are now a wider group of actors playing a part in the internal foreign policy debate in Turkey, and with the end of the Cold War "Turkish national interests are being promoted more assertively, and sovereignty concerns are at the forefront of key relationships, not least with the US."³ While the European reluctance to give Turkey any clear prospect of integration in its institutions has contributed to changes in Turkey's attitudes, there are also independent internal developments which affect her foreign policy stance.

There is a temptation to Cold War nostalgia when confronted with the inevitable tensions of the divergent interests of the present situation. However this does not provide a very constructive basis for constructing healthy relations in the present situation. The essential difference between the United States and Europe in the analysis of post Cold War security challenges is that the United States shares with Turkey a view that security must be increasingly seen on a trans-regional basis while the countries of the European Union still concentrate, to a much greater extent, primarily if not exclusively on problems of European security. This, as will be

¹ For instance, those parts of the administration dealing with agricultural issues might not feel that early enlargement of the European Union to Turkey would necessarily facilitate agricultural negotiations with the EU in the WTO.

² Ian Lesser, unpublished paper for Washington Institute for Near East Policy conference, July 1998. As will be seen from what follows this paper had a very formative influence on my thinking on this subject.

³ Lesser, *op cit* p.3.

seen, has implications not only for the scope of the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) but also for NATO and for the future cooperation among Western Europe, Turkey and the United States within that structure.

I. The substance of the geo-political relationship of Western Europe and the United States with Turkey

As Lesser has argued "at the broadest level, Turkey, Europe and the United States have a shared stake in regional stability, and share a status quo rather than revolutionary outlook in international affairs."⁴ I want to examine in a number of more specific areas the extent to which interests are shared and the extent they differ in approach

1. Turkey as part of the European Security System.

During the Cold War, Turkey played a critical role as part of the barrier protecting the West from Soviet advance, but even then the culture of NATO tended to 'central frontism'. This concentration on the problems of the Central Front and failed to credit Turkey with the role it played in 'locking up' 24 Soviet Divisions which would otherwise have made an addition to the direct threat to Western Europe. On September 27 1989, only weeks before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the then Turkish Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal, addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe could appeal for a fundamental change of attitude to Turkish membership of the European Union, claiming that as Turkey had shared for forty years the burden of the defence of Europe against Communism, it should share the benefits of European economic growth. Everything that has happened since then has widened the gap between Western Europe and Turkey and reduced the perception in both Turkey and Western Europe that they are in the same security system..

⁴ Lesser op cit p.13.

Whoever else has enjoyed a European "peace dividend" since 1989 it has not been Turkey. Indeed the post Cold War developments have distanced Turkey from Western Europe in two different ways. The proposed enlargement of the Union to include the Central and Eastern European countries is argued for in part as a means of strengthening European security by including these countries in the Deutschian "security community"⁵ which has been established among the members of the European Union. The ten candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe have taken priority over Turkey in the queue for European Union membership, and that has inevitably distanced Turkey from Western Europe. It is not correct to place the responsibility for European reticence on Turkish membership of the European Union on Greece, although the long running Greco-Turkish conflicts have meant that Turkey has not been perceived as part of the existing Deutschian "security community", in Western Europe and this has been one factor leading to Europeans including Turkish problems in the "too difficult" basket.

The second factor of divergence has been that, with the end of the Cold War, there has been a difference in appreciation between Western Europeans and Turks as to the nature of developments in Russia and the future of relations with it. This is in part a question of geo-politics, the end of the Cold War meant that the Red Army withdrew some thousand kilometers on the Central Front, and although with the breakup of the Soviet Union they are no longer on the physical borders of Turkey, Russian armed forces are still a good deal closer to Turkey than to Western Europe. In addition Turkey's possible partners in Central Asia are still much more part of Russia's "near abroad" than are the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Even the Baltic States have made a cleaner break with Russia than the

⁵ Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton University Press, 1957) p.5 The term 'security community' refers not to an institutionalised community of states, but to a region in which military force is no longer contemplated as a possible way of resolving inter-state disputes.

members of the CIS. Europeans, and indeed Americans, are more inclined to be optimistic about developments in Russia than Turkey is.

This can be seen rather directly in the negotiations taking place to adapt the European conventional arms control treaty, the CFE agreement. Turkey feels that the withdrawal of Russian forces from Central Europe has increased the pressures on the northern and southern flanks. Russia facing complex problems inside its own borders in the Caucasus, and in neighbouring CIS countries where it has forces deployed, wants to maintain the maximum flexibility in force deployment. Western European members of NATO and the United States, both of whose primary priorities lie in trying to find adaptations to the 1990 Treaty to take into account NATO enlargement to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, are frequently felt by Turkey not to be sufficiently sympathetic to her position. In practice Turkey finds more support in dealing with flank issues from the "GUAM" countries, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, who share many of Turkey's misgivings about Russian deployments.

The development of the ESDI within both NATO and WEU has been carried out by Western Europeans in ways which they feel have attempted to meet Turkish sensitivities. Following the signature of the Treaty of European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) in 1991, which for the first time enunciated the defence vocation of the European Union and the role of WEU in implementing this as "an integral part of the development of the Union", an invitation was extended to Greece, as a member of the European Union, to join WEU, although the accession agreement, to the disappointment of many Greeks, made it clear that Greece could not make use of the security guarantees included in Article V of WEU's Brussels Treaty in any conflict with a NATO partner (i.e. Turkey). Turkey, along with Norway and Iceland, as members of NATO not being members of the European Union, were invited to become Associate Members of WEU and have since then

attended all the weekly meetings of the WEU Permanent Council.⁶ It has been recommended by Stephen Larrabee that Turkey should become a full member of WEU,⁷ but this is considered by the existing WEU members to be incompatible with the vocation of integrating WEU into the European Union. Meanwhile the three Associate Members, including Turkey, participate fully in the military planning of WEU and their officers, along with those of the full members but not of the Observers or Associate Partners, make up the staff of WEU's Planning Cell.⁸ The WEU Erfurt Ministerial Declarations of November 1997, which, followed negotiations on WEU-led Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) with NATO, have made it clear that Turkey would have the right to a full role of participation and decision-making of any WEU-led operation which made use of NATO assets and capabilities. (this covers a much wider range of operations than WEU-led CJTFs). This, in fact, goes a long way to achieve the objective of integrating "Turkey more fully into the mainstream of European security planning." ⁹

On the other hand the extension of EUROFOR (European Rapid Deployment Force), at present made up of France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and EUROMARFOR (European Maritime Force) with similar participation, both of them being forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU), to Greece but not to Turkey, as has recently been

⁶ The ten full members only meet in practice on their own to deal with institutional and personnel matters.

⁷ F. Stephen Larrabee in Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer (eds), *Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East*, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1997, p.169..

⁸ The WEU Observers are the four members of the European Union who are not members of NATO and Denmark, the Associate Partners are the 10 Central and Eastern European countries who are negotiating entry to the EU, (but not Cyprus). The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland will become Associate Members in 1999 when they join NATO.

⁹ Larrabee op cit p.169..

suggested, would be very badly received by the Turkish Defence Staff.

The issues of Turkey's long term relations with the European Union must influence the security relationship. This is discussed in more detail elsewhere at this meeting, but there is no doubt that there has been considerable American impatience with what it perceived as European clumsiness. General Cevik Bir, then Deputy Chief of Turkish General Staff, made clear the attitude of the Turkish military in his March 1998 speech,¹⁰ He criticised the European Union for "ousting Turkey from the European Union process", and criticised Europe for "not being interested in what is going on beyond the wall that it has created, yet everything important that is happening in the world is happening in the region of which Turkey forms the centre." Having described the European Union's decision as a "senseless" move, he continued that "It is necessary to educate, awaken and warn Europe. . . Breaking off with Europe is out of the question; on the contrary it is necessary to unite with Europe to remove this wall and to explain this to Europe."

It is at least encouraging that the decision by the European Commission to provide a progress report on Turkey as one of the candidates for admission on whom it reported to the Council of Ministers in November 1998 will in the words of the Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem "open the way for an improvement in relations."¹¹

While there are very few in Turkey, Western Europe or the United States who have accepted the whole of Huntington's analysis of a "Clash of Civilisations" as a replacement for ideological dispute and an explanation of the geopolitics of the post Cold

¹⁰ Cevik Bir, speech on "New Security Architecture for Turkey and Europe in the 21st Century", reported in *Istanbul Sabah* (Internet Version) in Turkish, 29 March 1998 and in English in FBIS Daily Report, 26 June 1998, FBIS-WEU-98-177.

¹¹ *Financial Times*, (London Edition), 6 November 1998. p.3.

War world, one does find attenuated elements of it in some discussions.¹² This is a factor tending to take Christian Western Europe away from Muslim Turkey, and also finds Turkey worried about an Orthodox bloc bringing Russia, Serbia and Greece, and possibly Armenia, as an antagonistic alliance.

2 Turkey as a partner in the problems of South East European Security.

Turkey has of course central historic roles throughout the Balkan peninsula, the area which divides her geographically from Western Europe. There have, throughout much of the Cold War period, been disputes between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean and over Cyprus. These were managed by NATO and Western Allies because the cost of a dispute would have had strategic implications. The end of the Cold War has if anything intensified these disputes and the continuing stresses are reflected in the perpetuation of the militarily inefficient arrangements for NATO's command structure in South East Europe, where two Joint Sub Regional Commands, one South-Centre based in Larissa, Greece, and the other South-East based at Izmir, Turkey, have been maintained for purely political reasons. The conflict over the uninhabited Kardak-Imai islands in the southern Aegean in 1996 was resolved thanks to direct intervention by Ambassador Holbrooke. The problems unfortunately continue as seen by the events in 1997. Following the US brokered agreement of May 1997 whereby Cyprus agreed not to invite Greek military aircraft to overfly the island during a joint Cypriot-Greek military exercise, Turkey committed itself not to overfly Cyprus as long as Greece did not do so. However within less than six months, in October 1997, Greece and Turkey held the *Nikiforos* exercise and in November Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots responded with the *Toros* manoeuvres. Thus both

¹² The statement by six mainly Christian Democratic Heads of Government on 4 March 1997 that they opposed Turkish European Union Membership in part because of cultural differences is an example of this. *Financial Times*, 5 March 1997, p.2.

parties violated the moratorium on overflights of Cyprus they had signed six months previously.

Many attempts at mediation of the Cyprus dispute have been made in recent years without success, but the relatively stable division is now under challenge for two reasons. Under pressure from Greece the European Union has agreed to begin negotiations for Cyprus's entry to the European Union along with the five Central and Eastern European countries¹³ who are on the "fast-track". There are many existing EU members who feel Cyprus cannot be admitted to the Union while it is divided, but the prospect of negotiations for admission which were initially seen, perhaps naively ¹⁴, as a catalyst for change are now seen to be complicating rather than helping the resolution of the problems between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island. In addition the Cypriot Government ordered in January 1997 some S-300 (S-10 Grumble)¹⁵ air defence missiles from the Russian Federation which were originally planned to be delivered in August 1998 but this has been postponed to November 1998. This is seen as an aggressive act by Turkey which has made it clear that it will not be able to ignore this threat to its security.

Both Western Europeans and the United States have tried to resolve these disputes, if the United States has been able to do so more directly and apparently energetically it is because Greek membership of the European Union does inhibit the operation of the CFSP in this area. This should not however be

¹³ The five are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Five other countries, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, are also recognised as candidates for admission but on a longer time horizon.

¹⁴ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, Random House, New York, 1998. p.61.. claims that this was done by the European Union "under American pressure."

¹⁵ These missiles have a range of 90 miles, which is significantly less than the distance from Cyprus to the Turkish coast.

taken as meaning that Greece has gained the support of her EU partners in these disputes. In most cases both parties are considered equally responsible, and Greece frequently manages to irritate her European partners with her attitudes.

Turkey has earned respect for her restrained but generally helpful part in sharing in Western efforts to settle the conflicts that have arisen since the end of the Cold War in former Yugoslavia and Albania. There have been significant Turkish contributions to UNPROFOR from the end of 1993, (1,469 Turks out of a total of 19,000 troops in 1995), NATO's Operation "Deny Flight" (18 F-16s), IFOR and SFOR (1,300 troops) as well as in the Italian-led Operation Alba in Albania in 1997 (700 troops).¹⁶

Turkey's relatively low profile position may have arisen because in the first half of the nineties she was too busy developing a new post Cold War strategy towards the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, regions which had more strategic priority for her than the Balkans. In spite of a strong internal emotional reaction both on grounds of religious solidarity, and because many Turks saw in Bosnia another secular Muslim Society,¹⁷ there was relatively little public pressure from Turkey on Western negotiators.¹⁸ Turkey played a helpful role in the meetings of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).¹⁹ There was a limited amount of Turkish food and medical

¹⁶ All figures for Turkish forces from IISS *Military Balance*, 1995-6, 1996-7, and 1997-8

¹⁷ This view was not entirely reciprocated. President Izetbegovic refusing to visit the tomb of Kemal Atatürk on his visit to Ankara on the ground that Atatürk had undermined the Islamic character of the Turkish state.

¹⁸ David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, Victor Gollancz, London 1995, p.113.

¹⁹ Holbrooke, *op cit* p,121

aid to Bosnia, but this was rather less than Turgut Ozal had promised at the outset of the war and the Bosniaks anticipated. Initially Western European governments felt the Turkish participation in UNPROFOR would have been unhelpful, but in practice the Turkish infantry battalion deployed in UNPROFOR in Bosnia at the end of 1993, which it had been anticipated would have produced very negative Serb reactions, had very few problems.

Where there was a difference between European and American approaches were in the Turkish preparedness to assist in arming the Bosniaks. It is not clear how far Turkey was involved in the supply of arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina in contravention of the UN embargo prior to 1995 although some suggestions have been made that the Bosnian government moved much of its arms purchasing to Turkey in 1993-4.²⁰ A more serious difference between Western Europeans and the United States involving Turkey arose over the US inducement to Bosnia-Herzegovina to agree to the Dayton agreement by promising a programme to "Train and Equip" the Federation army. The Western Europeans disliked this proposal and in general refused to participate in it. A conference was held in Turkey in March 1996 of those willing to cooperate on this without Western European participation. Turkey is playing a significant part alongside the United States in this programme, and this is seen by the United States as a way of replacing any alternative Iranian influence on military developments in Bosnia. However there is still a friction here with Europeans and this could increase if, under domestic pressure, the US presence in the Balkans were to be withdrawn and that lead to Turkey from its role in "Train and Equip" taking on "an independent political role as protector of the Balkan Muslims."²¹ It is important not to exaggerate this risk, but

²⁰ Julian Pettifer, *The Turkish Labyrinth, Atatürk and the New Islam*, Penguin Books, London, 1998, p.178.

²¹ Pettifer, *op cit* p.179.

there is a potential for friction if this is not treated with considerable care.

In the southern Balkans the post Cold War situation has seen a considerable improvement in relations between Bulgaria and Turkey primarily due to wise policies by Bulgaria.²² Turkey has played a useful role in Albania during the Italian-led "Operation Alba" in 1997 providing about 10% of the total force. They have subsequently at the invitation of the Albanian government sent a military contingent advisers to help rebuild the Albanian armed forces. However as an experienced Albanian military commentator has noted Greece and Italy have also accepted such invitations and "only time will tell whether these countries' representatives will be able to set aside their own disputes and participate in a joint effort together with the Albanians, to re-establish a military capable of external defence."²³ In the situation in Kosovo Turkey has fully shared in the position of its NATO partners in terms of military threats to Serbia and in supporting the political opposition to Kosovan independence. Whatever its sympathy with the largely Muslim Kosovan Albanians, Turkey is worried that an independent Kosova might be seen as a precedent by Kurds. A similar reticence is seen in relation to Macedonia²⁴ and the position of the Albanian community there.

Possibly in the long term one of the most important development would be the construction of the proposed Highway 8, linking

²² The final points of dispute were settled in November 1998 when the Bulgarian Prime Minister on an official visit to Ankara agreed to pay pension to Turkish-Bulgarian former employees of Bulgarian state enterprises who had been expelled from Bulgaria by the Zhivkov government in the 1980s.

²³ Halit Daci, *Albanian Army and Regime changes*, Harmonie paper No 3, Centre for European Security Studies, Groningen, 1998 p.78

²⁴ Except for the fact that Turkey recognised the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under the name Macedonia, and insists on footnoting this fact to NATO communiques!

Durrës, Tirana, Skopje, Sofia and Istanbul. Although it is not clear when if ever the economic resources will be found for this, important infrastructural development, it would also certainly have an important geopolitical impact on the South Balkans. It would presumably become the main trade route between Western Europe and Turkey.

3 Turkish Kemalism as a model for the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia.

During the Cold War but perhaps more importantly immediately after the Cold War, the Kemalist secular model for a Muslim country was widely seen as one that could be transposed to other states in the Middle East and North Africa as a form of governance which would be significantly easier for the West to deal with than the alternative fundamentalist models which were developing. This view could be found both in Western Europe and the United States and provided an argument for maintaining and developing good relations with Turkey and in particular persuading the European Parliament to ratify the EU-Turkey Customs Union in 1995. Since then this argument has become less effective, both because of a realisation that it was not so easy to transfer models of governance, and because the Kemalist model has begun to look less attractive to outside observers.

Domestic developments in Turkey have raised questions about the Kemalist model in the eyes of observers, and the dominant role of the military in Turkey, a long-standing NATO member, has proved perhaps more worrying at a time when NATO has been trying to give lessons in political military relations to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe who are candidates or would-be candidates to join the Alliance.

One important dimension of the problem is seen in the rise of Refah, the Islamist "Welfare" Party which received 21% of the votes in the December 1996 General Election, and whose leader Necmettin Erbakan formed a coalition government with Tansu Ciller's True Path Party in June 1996 only to be eased out of

office by military pressure in June 1997 and the party closed by the Constitutional Court in January 1998. There is an ambiguity in Western attitudes to the obligation within the Kemalist state model for the army to act as a guarantee of the Constitution. The role of the army is seen as having contributed in important ways to modernising and westernising Turkish society, and the armed forces have been the strongest point of contact for NATO and the United States in particular, but Western Europeans now find the role of the armed forces in the Turkish state system,²⁵ and their interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, quite out of keeping with Western practice. There was during the Cold War a greater tolerance to the internal policies of Allies, as seen by the acceptance of Caetano's Portugal as a member of NATO from 1949, or the position of Greece from 1967 to 1974 under the Colonels, but this tolerance has been much reduced in Western European Parliaments and the US Congress by the end of the Cold War.

The failure of the Kemalist structure to provide an inclusive framework for Islamist politics is paralleled by its failure to find a satisfactory place in Turkish politics for the Kurds. The continuing problem of the 13 million Kurds in Turkey, some 20% of the Turkish population and more than half of the total Kurdish population, is, like some of the problems of South Eastern Europe, inherited from the break-up of the Ottoman empire in the first decades of this century. The Kurds who existed as a people within the Ottoman were divided principally between Turkey, Iraq and Syria after the first World War. The question of what status they should have within the three countries, or in their own entity, presents a problem for each of the three countries and for relations between them. Since the Gulf War of 1990-91 it has been linked to the United States and United Kingdom use of the Turkish base at Incirlik to

²⁵ This is symbolised by the fact that the Chief of Defence Staff of the Turkish armed forces cannot accompany the Minister of Defence to NATO ministerial meetings as in Turkish domestic protocol he is senior to the minister!

provide assistance to Iraqi Kurds through "Operation Provide Comfort" and to maintain the "no fly zone" over Norther Iraqi airspace.

There is no consensus among the Kurds as to how their national objectives should be obtained and Turkey has had to respond to the violent policies of the militant left-wing Kurdish faction the PKK which has maintained an armed struggle since 1984 against what it considers to be Turkish oppression. Although the bulk of the Kurdish population are in south-eastern Turkey, a significant minority have now moved into the expanding urban centres of western Turkey and particularly Istanbul which may now have over two million Kurds in its population.

Western Europeans can understand the need to respond to PKK acts of violence, although there was less support in Western Europe than in the United States for the various Turkish army incursions in hot pursuit into Iraq. There is much more difficulty in understanding Turkish resistance to finding a political solution to the problem. There is therefore a risk of significant political differences between Western Europe and Turkey on this, General Bir in his March 1998 speech said that "Europe is practising double standards, whereas America is aware of the situation."²⁶ Among the possible continuing grounds of friction are the judgements on the outstanding backlog of some several hundred Turkish-Kurdish cases before the European Court of Human Rights²⁷, Turkish anger at the satellite Kurdish language television programmes broadcast from London and

²⁶ General Cevik Bir *op cit*

²⁷ There are in addition up to a thousand other Turkish cases before the Court.

Brussels by Med TV,²⁸ and attempts to hold sessions of the Kurdish National Assembly in Western European cities.²⁹

4 Turkey as a partner in Middle Eastern problems.

The differences between Western Europe and the United States may appear to be greatest in terms of their different approaches to the potential role of Turkey in the Middle East. The Turkish view of this difference is very clearly described by General Bir in his speech, "After all, there is a big difference between the United States and Europe, Europe approaches the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Eurasia not with political goals but with short term economic interests. The approach of the United States, however, is in line with the importance of the region, and its policy is in accord with Turkey."³⁰

While in fact the degree of accord between United States and Turkey on policies towards a number of individual countries is not necessarily so clear, what is the case is that the United States has persuaded the Turkish authorities, and particularly the Turkish armed forces, that in the post Cold War situation they consider Turkey as still important because of its potential as a partner in the region. This Europe has failed to do.

The Turkish-Israeli relationship, which survived the period of Refah participation in government, is seen in part by Turkey as providing an alternative source of armaments given the restrictions placed by the US Congress on US sales to Turkey. It is assumed by Turkey to be a way of gaining support from the

²⁸ These broadcasts are reported to be frequently jammed by the Turks.

²⁹ At least no Western European Parliament has yet gone as far as the Russian Duma where on 4 November 1998, 298 deputies voted for a resolution, with no votes against, to ask President Yeltsin to give Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader, political asylum in Russia.

³⁰ General Cevik Bir, *op cit.*

friends of Israel in the United States, but it is not clear whether it has had this effect. However regrettably limited the European Union's participation in the Middle East Peace Process has been, it is by no means clear that Turkey's has been greater.

Turkish-Syrian relations have been bad as have European-Syrian and United States-Syrian relations, but for three different sets of reasons. There is very little congruence here. A deterioration of relations between Turkey and Syria, which for a period looked likely in the autumn of 1998 and the possibility of military conflict in which Turkey might wish to rely on NATO's Article V to require Allied support would as Ian Lesser has pointed out "be a major test of post Cold War security relations between Turkey and the West."³¹

Similarly in relations with Iraq Turkey would like for purely economic reasons to see an end to sanctions and a resumption of the full flow of Iraqi oil through its pipeline. Lesser estimates that "Ankara will be most unwilling to place Turkish facilities at the disposal of a US-led coalition in a renewed confrontation with Saddam unless the operation aims at permanently altering the regional order."³² It is therefore difficult to see any closer relation between US and Turkish policies: this is more in common with some Western European countries.

There has been little sympathy in Ankara for Washington's hard line policy to Tehran, particularly since the election of Khatami, and here Turkey has a position very close to that of the European Union. The only exception would be on the question of the choice of oil pipelines where, for reasons of national interest, Turkey shares the United States strong preference for a Turkish rather than Iranian route.

³¹ Lesser, *op cit* p.12.

³² Lesser, *op cit* p.14.

5 Turkey and the geo-politics of energy.

It is, therefore, perhaps here as much as anywhere where there is a very strong correlation, at least at the declaratory level, between United States and Turkish positions. The problem here is that decisions are by no means exclusively in the hands of governments driven by geo-political considerations. In the United States and Western Europe oil companies are relatively long term in their thinking, but their ultimate responsibility is to maximise returns for their shareholders. Thus decisions on the choice of pipelines will not necessarily follow the political preferences of governments, unless the latter are prepared to back their political preferences with significant amounts of their taxpayers money. It is not clear how far the taxpayer should be involved in the subsidisation of supply routes for oil companies.

There have been very wide variations in the estimates for Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas reserves. Recent analysis suggests a more cautious approach to oil resources in the region than some of the earlier estimates of the US State Department.³³ The IISS in their 1997/98 Strategic Survey suggest that, "instead of the 16% of world reserves the US State Department implies, the true figure for the Caspian is likely to be closer to 3%."³⁴ The combination of this, the relatively low price of oil and the prospects in the medium-term of a resumption of Iraqi production, and the defeat of Senator d'Amato in the November 1998 Senatorial election in New York may mean that Iranian pipelines will become more attractive than pipelines through Turkey.

³³ Heinz Kramer and Friedemann Müller, *Relations with Turkey and the Caspian Basin Countries* in Blackwill and Stürmer, *op cit*, p.19-4.

³⁴ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1997-98*. OUP, London 199, p.24.

6 Turkey and WMD and BMD

Turkey's geographical position makes it more sensitive than the Western European members of NATO to the threats of weapons of mass destruction. While this does not seem to have led it to a very forward position on Iraq and UNSCOM, it certainly has been among those taking an active interest in US initiatives within NATO on counter-proliferation policy and ballistic missile defences. This is another area in which it may, outside the Alliance, see scope for common developments with Israel. Although there is a difference in priorities here with Western European members of NATO which may lead to bilateral cooperation with the United States, if it does not prove possible to develop joint programmes among a wider group of NATO members, this does not seem one of the areas where there is likely to be any significant stress between the United States and Western Europe because of Turkey's particular position.

7 Turkey and new transnational risks.

Apart from the possible spillover risk of Kurdish PKK violence to Western Europe, which until present has been relatively limited, and the more substantial flow of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers from Kurdish Turks, the more serious way in which Turkey affects Western European security in terms of the new transnational risks is through the flow of drugs. It is generally accepted that the principal supply of heroin into Western Europe comes through Turkey and that the vast majority of opium/morphine that transits Turkey from Afghanistan and the Golden Triangle is processed into heroin in Turkey. This is not a problem which directly affects the United States, but unless more effective patterns of cooperation can be developed between the Western Europeans and Turkey it could lead to considerable friction and provide another argument against Turkish candidacy for the European Union. The alternative argument that Turkish membership of the European Union is the only way to deal

satisfactorily with this problem does not seem to have much credibility.

II Developing common approaches .

In trying on the basis of this survey to see where the future strains on relations between Western Europe and the United States and Turkey and how these might effect relations between the United States and Turkey there would seem to be three key areas, the differing perceptions of the importance of internal developments, the stronger European concern over the risks of serious deterioration of relations between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, and the discrepancy in the extent to which United States and the European Union are seen by Turkey as security partners on a wider range of trans-regional security issues.

On the first the difference was well summarised by Kramer and Müller "Concerning Turkey's domestic situation, the US government is mainly interested in a 'stable and democratic' Turkey, whereas the driving European interest seems to aim at a 'democratic and stable' Turkey."³⁵ This is not only because of the possibility of Turkey's candidature for the European Union, but also in the light of her membership of the Council of Europe where the democratic credentials of members are necessarily more central than they are within NATO.

The Greco-Turkish-Cypriot issues were of greater security concern during the Cold War as an explicit dispute would have serious implications for the Alliance, now they are more important in terms of their implications for the European Union and its enlargement.

The final discrepancy reflects the concentration of the members of the European Union on the problems of integrating the post-Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, and the substantive difficulties in developing a common foreign and

³⁵ Kramer and Müller *op cit*, p.183..

security policy for a group of fifteen states who have often found the centrifugal pulls of national interests more powerful than the centripetal effect of integration and solidarity in the disorienting period of the post Cold War world.

Western Europeans and the United States have a common interest in working at getting solutions to the nexus of problems linking Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. In spite of the depressing results of attempts at mediation in recent years, there is a case for a major exercise involving the most senior figures from our countries. The European Union is not best placed to lead on the given Greek membership. The Contact Group, given Russian participation, is not right either, but an ad hoc arrangement perhaps between the country holding the presidency of the European Union and the United States might be one approach. The present Greek government might welcome a *deus ex machina* to resolve the issue. At present Greece spends 4.6% of its GNP on defence which is more than twice the NATO average and a serious obstacle to Greece meeting the 'Maastricht criteria', a precondition to its joining Economic and Monetary Union.

How can the European Union build on the slight *détente* on relations with Turkey following the November 1998 European Commission report on Turkey as a potential applicant? Would Turkey now participate in the European Conference between existing members and all candidates which it rejected in the first half of 1998 when it was proposed by the British Presidency?

Does the proposal of the British prime minister Tony Blair to reexamine the relationships between WEU and EU provide the possibility of developing a mechanism whereby, if the functions of WEU were subsumed under a restructured second pillar, Turkey's Associate Membership of WEU could be 'grandfathered' into some associate relationship with CFSP. There seems to be something of a precedent in the way that Norway and Iceland's have been through the Nordic Passport Union 'grandfathered' into

the Schengen Agreement and thus indirectly into the Third Pillar of the European Union.

Can ways be found to enable NATO to develop more credibility as a means of true security consultation among its members, rather than the exchange of stale information which is labelled 'consultation' at present? NATO has proved the case for maintaining itself as an excellent instrument of military cooperation. It has been far less effective since the end of the Cold War as an instrument for the development of policy among its members. The NATO instrument does give us considerable leverage with a key group in Turkish society - the Turkish military. Are we using it as effectively as we could? As Lesser has argued, the new NATO strategic concept is very likely to define a number of new functional missions - counter-proliferation, peace support operations and possibly counter-terrorism - that are "far more likely to be performed on or near Turkey's borders than elsewhere in the European security space."³⁶

The central instrument of developing policy for the Balkans since 1993 has been the Contact Group, it was enlarged to include Italy in 1995 and given the constructive and responsible role Turkey has played in the Balkans what are the arguments, apart from Greece, for not enlarging it further to include Turkey?

Larrabee has argued that Turkey should participate in the Transatlantic dialogue between the United States and the EU.³⁷ Such a development of the dialogue into a triologue would not be appropriate for the totality of the areas considered but an arrangement should be explored to see how a triangular element could be introduced when topics such as the Middle East or Central Asia were being discussed. A regular triangular

³⁶ Lesser *op cit*, p.18.

³⁷ Larrabee *op cit*, p.170..

discussion between the US Secretary of State, the Foreign Minister of Turkey and the Foreign Minister of the country holding the Presidency of the European Union together with the Vice President of the European Commission responsible for external policy might be one approach.

III Conclusions.

Many of the problems of the last decade has arisen from our failure to recognise how much was changed with the end of Cold War. Nowhere is that more true than in the case of relations between the West, the United States and Western Europe, and Turkey. The future pattern of developments will turn more than anything else on the evolution of Turkey herself. Predicting that goes beyond the scope of this paper. It is in the interest of the West to maintain a security partnership with Turkey, although both the substance and precise institutional framework of that partnership could take a variety of forms. Certainly one of the principal tasks of transatlantic relations between the European Union and its members and the United States will be to ensure that the security dialogue with Turkey is strengthened wherever possible.

