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**REPORT ON
ASSESSING SECURITY RISKS IN THE BALKANS:
A FOCUS ON KOSOVO**

by Radoslava Stefanova

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In the welcome address, **General Vittorio Ghiotto, head of the Working group on the Interforce Doctrine at the Italian Military Center for Research (CeMiSS)**, pointed out to the importance of the topic of the Kosovo conflict, and to the difficulty in finding a satisfactory solution to the complicated problems arising from the issue. **IAI Director, Gianni Bonvicini**, concurred as to the seriousness of the problems about to be discussed, and proceeded to describe the seminar in the context of the research activities of the IAI, as part of a wider project on Turkey, and the Southern Balkans which is being carried out by the Institute with the financial support of the German Marshall Fund and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Gregory Craig, Director of US Secretary of State's Policy Planning Unit, US State Department, provided some insights into the US policy towards Kosovo. Warnings of impending crisis in Kosovo have been reported to the State Department for at least eight months. The US has an interest in preserving the peace process in the Balkans, a fundamental part of which is the Dayton agreement. This determination also extends to Kosovo, which holds a potential for a spill-over throughout the region.

The current crisis began on February 28, when the Serbian police launched a massive police offensive in Drenica, killing about 80 individuals, many of who were women and children.

This crisis has its roots in the Serbian hatred for the Albanians as Ottoman allies, and more recently in the 1974–90 constitutional developments in former Yugoslavia with regard to the status of Kosovo. These developments are clearly politically motivated, and not based on the rule of law. The 1974 gave Kosovo and Vojvodina a de facto status of autonomous provinces, which came close to the status of the constituent republics. However, according to the International Crisis Group, the constitution regulated the status of Kosovo in federal affairs—it did not regulate this status inside of Serbia, which was a matter left with the Serbian government. Thus, even though in 1974 Kosovo had a de jure autonomous status, Serbia had a right to regulate the political status of the province inside its territory. This is the legal justification for the revocation of the Kosovo status in 1989–90, when many demonstrations, riots and killings accompanied the new constitution approved by the Serbian Assembly, which revoked the autonomous status of Kosovo, placing the province directly under Serbian control. This is how Slobodan Milosevic rose to power and mobilized the Serbian population.

Since the beginning of the killings in February, the international activity has intensified a lot: former Prime Minister of Spain, Felipe Gonzales, has been appointed a special representative of the EU and the OSCE, the Contact Group had a number of emergency meetings, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo.

It is worth noting the demographics of Kosovo to better understand the dimension of the problem: 45% of Kosovars are under 18 and 70% are under 30. Kosovo has the highest birthrate for all of Europe: 23,1‰. If Kosovo's population continues to grow by this rate, it will outnumber the Serbian population by 2020. At the same time the percentage of Serbs in FRY has fallen to 62%.

According to the International Crisis Group, which conducted an opinion poll of about

1,000 Serbs, 42% of Serbs want to abolish autonomy for Kosovo, 49% will support some form of autonomy; 40,7% agree to a limited cultural autonomy, and 8,3% agree to some form of political autonomy. What could otherwise be drawn from these figures is that 99% are against secession; 97% are against a republic, and 94% are against partition between Serbs and Albanians. The Kosovars, on the other hand, have polled 89% for independence; and over 50% for some kind of autonomy, according to a Belgrade newspaper.

The 49% of the Serbs that are willing to agree to some form of autonomy might provide more negotiating room than what initially expected. Among the possible solutions are: (1) the status quo, which is unacceptable, despite the fact that is supported by Milosevic; (2) independence is the preferred option of Rugova and Demaci, which is not supported by the international community, because of the potential danger of remaking the borders elsewhere in the Balkans; (3) an international protectorate is strongly opposed by the Serbs; (4) a Serbian intellectual group has proposed a kind of administrative reform, which has yet to be elaborated; (5) autonomy. Autonomy is opposed by the Albanians, but that is a problem which may be confronted by using a different term for it, such as “special status” or “special entity”, a proposal which seems acceptable to both Albanians and Serbs; which is why it can be concluded that solution can most probably be found in this direction. Up-grading the status of Kosovo to a constituent republic along with Serbia and Montenegro within Yugoslavia is probably constitutionally unacceptable and disadvantageous as a negotiation starting point.

The US supports the creation of a negotiating team in Kosovo led by Rugova, and one in Belgrade to start working towards a solution. It is fundamental to take measures to halt eventual violence that could break out during these negotiations, which is why the US has supported a follow-on to UNPREDEP, including some military presence along the Albanian border to preclude the circulation of arms for terrorists, as well as to check Milosevic. According to the US experience, in fact, it looks like Milosevic responds best to a consistent and sustained pressure, such as military action or sanctions.

Milosevic is also a master in creating divisions between his adversaries and in playing off European concerns about a so-called American hegemony. This is where the Europeans and the Americans should create a unified front on the Kosovo question. Mr. Gonzales’s efforts should be supported, as well as sanctions for Serbia. It is also vital to work towards the increase of international presence, such as NGOs, in Kosovo. The message to the Kosovo Albanians should be that the international community will support the greatest degree of autonomy within Yugoslavia, which should be enshrined constitutionally in Yugoslavia. The message to Milosevic should be that he bears the responsibility for the defeat of the Yugoslav state in the war of 1991-95, and therefore, he would bear the responsibility for an eventual further disintegration of that state.

The Kosovo crisis is one of the greatest challenges for both Americans and Europeans, and we should work together at finding a solution for it with due respect for the fundamental principles of democracy and human rights, and if we manage to find a peaceful and durable solution, we will have made history.

Christopher Cviic, an Associate Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs of the United Kingdom addressed the issue of the Serbian predicament in the Kosovo impasse, and the impact of the latest crisis on the wider context of the region. The Serbian situation should be analyzed in the context of aspirations for a “Greater Serbia”, which were rekindled most recently by Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic and by the Yugoslav Army. This endeavor proved to be a complete failure when Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia, seen as an aspired extension of Serbia proper, broke away from Yugoslavia. In the

current rump Yugoslavia, Montenegro has begun to push strongly for the region's lost former autonomy with possible independence claims in the future. Serbia now finds itself in a very weak position, both politically, and economically, quite in contrast to the period of the launching of the Greater Serbia project.

In Kosovo, there is an acute antagonism between the Albanian community, which aspires for independence, and the Serbs, who refuse to even consider granting the region the autonomy it had until 1989. Despite existing tensions, however, there seems to be little willingness on the part of the Serbs to fight for Kosovo, also because of the severe condition of the civilian population in Serbia, which seems exhausted by previous wars.

An interesting development was the fact that Mr. Milosevic has co-opted into his new government the radical nationalist Vojislav Seselj, who has a considerable influence on the Serbian electorate, including on issues, such as Kosovo. Milosevic finds himself in a difficult position, having to appease a former rival (who almost won the presidential elections) and to avoid serious opposition at home.

The Albanians have pursued passive resistance, a sort of Gandhian politics, until recently. However, ultimately they have learned that fighting back Serbian repression gives them more international attention.

Despite the recent up-surge of tensions, it is safe to say that the rest of the Balkans is not in danger of a spill-over, including the Dayton area, and Macedonia, not least because the Kosovo Albanians do not seem inclined to leave the area. That could give Milosevic a margin at which he could stage a mutually acceptable deal, including probably extended autonomy. In the meantime there is ground for many pacification initiatives, short of course from international intervention aimed at expelling a country from a territory that belongs to it by international law, despite the fact that international interference in a state's domestic affairs is increasingly gaining ground.

General Carlo Jean, personal representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, put the Kosovo crisis in the context of the Dayton peace process.

Together with Bosnia, Kosovo constitutes one of the two crisis spots in the former Yugoslavia. However, there does not seem to be a direct linkage between the two. A potential danger in both cases consists in a dividing role they could play in the Contact Group. To avoid such developments it is advisable to agree on what long-term solution the international community is prepared to accept for Kosovo.

During the Dayton accords, the issue of Kosovo was put aside because of the inevitable complication it would have had with regard to the signing of the whole agreement. There is very little that can be drawn from the Dayton agreement for the normalization of the Kosovo crisis. However, the arms control provisions are conceived largely as part of a regional regime.

Some form of autonomy on the example of Alto Adige/South Tyrol might be a successful solution, even though it is not realistic in the case of Kosovo, as it is first and foremost, extremely costly: Italy provides about US \$ 3,000 per capita annually for Alto Adige/South Tyrol.

Moreover, it seems difficult to persuade the Kosovars to agree to any form of autonomy. The overall transformation of the Balkans into modern democracies is undoubtedly a very long process. The project Euroslavia which seeks the gradual economic reintegration of the former Yugoslavia, could serve as a basis for a solution in the long run. NATO presence in Bosnia has been fundamental in preserving peace, but it is clearly not realistic to deploy a similar force to Kosovo. All this leads to a pessimistic view on the further developments of the Kosovo crisis and the actual capacity of the international organisations to deal with it effectively.

Evangelos Kofos, a senior advisor to the Athens-based ELIAMEP research institute, focused on the root causes of the Kosovo crisis. There are two macro-factors predetermining the crisis: (1) a significant burden left over from history, and (2) a legacy of a masters-subjects continuum.

With regard to the first macro-factor, what can be noted is the presence of a large number of nationalist myths. The Serbs believe that Kosovo is the cradle of their medieval kingdom, and as such it is an important historical reference. The defeat of the Serbian army by the Ottoman Turks in 1389 is a sacred date for the Serbs, which later inspired the struggle for their national survival and revival. In other words, as exaggerated as it may sound, in the eyes of the Serbs, Kosovo and Metohia are their Jerusalem.

The Albanians, on the other hand, see themselves as the descendants of the ancient Illirian tribes, the first inhabitants of those territories. Therefore, Kosovo is seen to be the natural and immutable Albanian homeland. Furthermore, the Albanian national revival is traditionally traced back to the 1878 Prizren League, generated on the territory of Kosovo. In the words of a noted Albanian historian, “if the Serbs claim Kosovo as their Jerusalem, then the Albanians can claim it as their Piedmont.” The Albanians feel unjustly treated, more than 1/3 of them remaining under foreign jurisdiction. In the wake of the Yugoslav disintegration, the Kosovo Albanians had reasonable expectations for some form of autonomy or even independence, which were granted to almost all ethnic entities around them (some without even having a distinct ethnic background).

The combination of historical mythology and feelings of historical injustices, coupled with the national aspirations for a great and united national state have been fossilized into national doctrines. Unfortunately, these are successfully transmitted to the new generations. Each of the ethnic groups regards the contested land as its own national cradle excluding the other's right to the same effect.

Second, there is a legacy of interchanging master-subject relationships between the two groups, which has deeply affected the economic, political, and social behavior of both. In the course of history, the change of status meant physical extermination, mass eviction, or “the forceful “-ization”: Islamization, Serbianization, Macedonianization”, which has shaped existing mentalities in a way which excludes cooperation.

During the Ottoman times, the relationship between the Albanian Muslims and Christian Slavs left the most durable imprint of the common memory of the two groups. In that period the Albanian population resided in large areas of the Kosovo-Metohia region, and being predominantly Muslim, identified itself with the Ottoman masters, assuming administrative duties in the empire. The result was an increasing antagonism on the part of the “subject” Christian populations—Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, especially as the latter entered their national liberation movements. However, with the decay of the Ottoman empire, the Albanians initiated their own struggle for emancipation and statehood, anchored in the Kosovo region. They often had to compete with the Christians around for control of the former Ottoman property. Thus, when Serbs emerged triumphant in the wake of the Balkan Wars (1912–13), the Kosovo Albanians realized they had lost their battle for national unity, which also meant the reversal of their previously dominating status to that of a “subject” people. As a result, the Albanians became victims of social, economic, educational and cultural marginalization, eviction, and persecution well into World War II. From 1941–44 the Albanians, with the help of Nazi Germany, reunited with Kosovo breaking away from Yugoslavia, an acquisition they had to soon cede to victorious Yugoslavia at the end of the war. Tito communism altered to an extent the traditional antagonism between the two groups, granting Kosovo the status of an

autonomous region in 1969. This situation was viewed positively neither by nationalist Serbs, who considered Albanians were given too much liberty, nor by Albanians who saw themselves treated as second-rate citizens. However, communist administrators of Kosovo, led by Alexander Rankovitch, contained to an extent the inter-ethnic hatreds.

In 1974 Kosovo's status was up-graded to that of an autonomous province, which left the bulk of local administration in the hands of the Albanians. That event is unprecedented in that, in a contrast to historically violent changes of Kosovo's political status, this time autonomy was the result of a peaceful, constitutional process. However, the Albanians saw the new gains as a prelude to full independence, which they pushed for in late 1970's. Their demands were turned down in 1981. This resulted in mass demonstrations and another heightening of ethnic tensions, followed by the deployment of the Yugoslav federal troops. Thus, nationalist antagonisms were rekindled again, and brought to a crescendo by the inflammatory rhetoric of the Slobodan Milosevic, who annulled the autonomous status of Kosovo in 1989. The Serb constitutional court confirmed the decision in 1990, thus granting the "master" status to the Serbs yet another time.

Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, a member of the community of St. Egidio, and Professor of History of Eastern Europe at the University of Rome, talked about the role of the Community of St. Egidio in promoting a Serbian-Albanian dialog and reconciliation. St. Egidio has been involved in Kosovo since 1993, even though it had followed the situation from Tirana since 1990.

Undoubtedly, the Kosovo problem is an internal one, but the Albanians are convinced that with the help of the US, which they consider *a deus ex machina*, they can achieve independence.

In the autumn of 1995 St. Egidio convinced Milosevic to nominate an envoy for a dialog with the Albanians. The negotiations, however, was greatly influenced by the fact that the just concluded Dayton accords did not have provisions for Kosovo, which left the Albanians greatly disappointed. In the summer of 1996 a negotiation was organized between emissaries of Milosevic and Rugova with the help of the Community of St. Egidio, which led to the education agreement of September 1, 1996. It was signed thanks to a St. Egidio's shuttle without an actual encounter between the two leaders. The agreement was simple—on the basis of humanitarian reasons it endorsed the necessity for normalization of the educational system.

Two different approaches were possible during the negotiation. St. Egidio could have adopted a step-by-step formula whereby a compromise on the general improvement of the social indicators in Kosovo (education, employment, police, health care) could have been achieved gradually. Alternatively, St. Egidio could have concentrated efforts on resolving the impasse on the political status of Kosovo, considering options such as independence, autonomy, federalization of Yugoslavia, etc. St. Egidio chose the step-by-step gradual approach oriented towards social problems, which required a lot of time, but promised some degree of success, as opposed to negotiations on the political status, which in 1993 all independent observers viewed as impossible.

It is worth noting that currently the Albanians continue to use most of the educational buildings, about fifty-five high schools and universities. About 300,000 Albanian children regularly go to primary school, where they study in Albanian. About 60,000 students, who are not inscribed in the public registers of the existing schools, constitute the parallel system. These are the students who were envisioned in the Rugova-Milosevic agreement.

In view of the beginning of the school year in the fall, St. Egidio urged the Serbs to agree to the general principles of the accord, emphasizing that the main victims of the

anomalous situation were children. The specifics, such as the materials, the scholastic programs, etc. would be defined after the beginning of the school year. After a six-month impasse, which was aggravated by the Serbian election and the strong performance of Vojislav Seselj, negotiations resumed in January 1998. The government has essentially accepted the Albanian requests, as seen in the implementation agreement signed on March 23, 1998. Currently, the agreement is in a process of implementation. Some institutions have already been open to Albanians, or completely ceded to them. However, the intensification of tensions in Kosovo, protests of Kosovo Serbs, as well as the presence of Seselj in the Serb government might slow the implementation of the agreement.

Some general observations on the negotiation process: progress was at all times impeded by the political interpretation both sides tended to give to all technicalities of the agreement. The importance of the humanitarian aspects of the agreement is enshrined in the accord, but in reality it is not considered crucial. The kind of civil society existing in both communities seems unable to penetrate the real spirit of the agreement. If both Milosevic and Rugova had a wider view and appreciation for civilian, as opposed to purely political matters, they could rally some international support.

It should be noted that the current Yugoslavia, as well as its ruling elites, are the product of Tito Yugoslavia, essentially a highly politicized state, which easily gave way to nationalism after the fall of communism. Thus, in post-Cold War Yugoslavia the Albanians have found themselves in a genuine *risorgimento*, which hardly works to exalt the values of civil society. More schematically, any concession to the other side is seen as an enormous blow to the national cause. For example, in order to boycott the Serb health care system, the Albanians even refuse vaccination of their children. Another example is the spontaneous reaction of rejoice on the part of a group of Albanians, when, as a result of the agreement, the Institute of Albanology was reopened, which was snubbed by Kosovo politicians as successful Serbian manipulation. The 10% Serbian population in Kosovo, on their part, ignore the existence of the Albanians. Their rights and claims are only viewed as a police problem. Many Serbs are frightened by the Albanian demographic growth. Many live in the hope that the old order will somehow come to prevail, which takes away any willingness for dialog, or cohabitation. This attitude has contributed to the feed-back of Albanian stereotypes about Serbs, and has favored the up-surge of terrorism.

The negotiations on education, which have been taken up by the Contact Group, show progress, and it is not impossible to expect a successful resolution by the end of this summer. Unfortunately, militant extremists on both sides might undermine it. The Albanians insist on the unification of universities in Kosovo, because they hope, due to their demographic majority, to dominate all the school programs. This quite open attitude has provoked unfriendly reactions on the part of the Serbs. Clearly, the lack of agreement on the political status reflects on the education agreement, as well. This is undoubtedly dependent on the lack of confidence between the two communities. Therefore, mutual confidence-building measures are fundamental to work on to resolve the current profound crisis in Kosovo.

Colonel Savino Onelli, Deputy Director of CeMiSS, focused on the geo-strategic importance of South-East Europe, moving from general observations on the security situation in the region.

Nowadays, as democracy becomes more widespread, there is an increasing reluctance to use force in world affairs, coupled with an ever diminishing tolerance to breaches of international law. Therefore, the margins within which an aggressive state could act with impunity have considerably diminished, even though there is still a certain "gray area", which

might be exploited by an undemocratic society.

In Europe, there is a clear concentration of military power in the South—a high percentage of the population, especially in the states of former Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, is mobilized. Furthermore, almost all of these countries spend over 3% of their GNP for defense, the highest military expenditure in Europe.

Rather loosely, we can distinguish the following groups of states from which security risks may emerge: (1) devastated economies with high military spending; (2) states seeking freedom of action to acquire international credibility; (3) states in economic crisis, which are taking advantage of the Dayton truce; (4) states with bilateral regional problems. The Dayton agreement guarantees a balance of ethnic groups in Bosnia but a very precarious one. The risk for violence seems to be highest in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, Albania, and Bulgaria, the first one being much higher with respect to the others.

The worst case scenario would be if military assets are translated into force by “have” states interested in maintaining the status quo, or by “have-not” states or groups which want to change or destroy it. This is a distinct possibility in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of the SFOR mission, due to the ineffectiveness of international response.

A way to prevent violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be a balanced burden sharing formula on the part of the international community. Force reduction could be compensated by rapid deployment forces in the contributing countries, maintaining a centralized permanent or semi-permanent command.

As for the “Albania triangle”, a massive intervention in Yugoslavia could be hypothesized, however it appears unrealistic. The possibility for a spill-over in Macedonia could be countered by a continued peacekeeping deployment. It is important to make a credible commitment to use force, including in the case of internal conflicts. In the case of Montenegro, the quasi-autonomy of that region could be used as a leverage on the Belgrade authorities.

In Kosovo there are much more complicated problems. The use of a combination of political, diplomatic and military measures is required. A working compromise over the region’s status needs to be found, without resorting to the acceptance of morally repugnant solutions, such as ethnic cleansing or a virtual *cordone sanitaire*. A protectorate seems to be a prelude to independence, which is an option the international community has ruled out. However, there is the need to address also eventual flows of refugees through the borders of Albania and Macedonia.

A large-scale military intervention is almost universally judged as unacceptable. However, that does not preclude a credible threat to use force. This is doable on the basis of the establishment of a new steering committee or a consulting body which should also consider an eventual military intervention if needed.

Barnett Rubin, Director of the Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, talked about prospects for conflict prevention in Kosovo.

Kosovo should be regarded as the Hebron, rather than the Jerusalem of the Serbs, because Jerusalem has had a Jewish majority population for over a hundred years, while Hebron has historical importance, but lacks a significant Jewish population. One may note that there is some willingness on the part of Israel to cede some of the political control of Hebron under specific conditions, which might be a good policy prescription for the Serbs.

The Kosovo conflict is a typical regional conflict involving states. It is a conflict over the national status of a territory, and not simply an ethnic conflict. In such cases there are two solutions that can be envisaged: one is based on civic identity, i. e. a non-ethnic definition of citizenship and nationality, which is probably not a realistic solution for any of the ex-Yugoslav

states. Therefore, the most plausible scenario is some kind of separation, which does not necessarily imply independence, but some form of self-rule.

The Dayton accords certainly reflected negatively on Kosovo, whose exclusion contributed to the frustration of the Albanian community, which had until recently only engaged in passive resistance.

Looking at the future, the international community, with the exception of Albania, does not favor complete independence for Kosovo, for reasons including Serbian historical claims, the principle of territorial integrity of states, which is fundamental in current international law, and eventual fear of creating a political precedent for the other large Albanian communities outside Yugoslavia, particularly the one living in Macedonia.

The lack of active engagement in Kosovo on the part of the international community probably consists less in the availability of early warning information, and more in a lack of international cooperation and failure to come to a common strategy, despite the clear danger of a violent spill-over.

In order to coin a successful coordination strategy, it would be wiser to set aside the issue of the status the territory, which is much too divisive to allow for any consensus. There are important humanitarian issues, that need to be addressed, such as education, or more specifically, the reopening of the schools to the Albanian students. An eventual progress on these would make it possible to discuss alternative solutions with regard to the status of the territory, which will offer a kind of *modus vivendi* to the two communities. Some have suggested that Albanians might agree to remain within a Yugoslav, as opposed to a Serbian state.

It needs to be noted that the overall situation in the Balkans will be significantly improved with the spread of institutionalization and democratization elsewhere in the region, which will certainly have a positive effect on the events in Yugoslavia. Ethnic claims will thus be susceptible to transformation, and the original demands for territorial recognition will become more and more irrelevant, i. e. instead of remaking the borders, what is needed is a consistent effort to lessen the importance of borders. In the meantime it should be kept in mind that any progress in Yugoslavia needs to be constitutionally endorsed, and the main difficulty is that today Yugoslavia cannot be considered to be a constitutional state, which points further to the importance of democratic institutions.

The discussion period addressed the following issues:

A solution for Kosovo might be comparable to that of Northern Ireland, where both negotiation and force were used together and over long periods of time. Milosevic felt he was seen as too valuable in keeping the Bosnian peace, so he did not feel constrained to negotiate on Kosovo until the Albanians started to change their non-violent strategy. International action should center on choosing an able mediator who could work towards strengthening confidence building measures.

The surrounding countries are very concerned about a spill-over of the conflict. It should be noted that many of the countries in the area have minority problems similar to the ones in Kosovo, and they are very concerned about a possible outcome that would encourage secessionist movements around the area.

The international community should consider a win-to-win approach for both sides offering acceptable packages, without completely addressing all concerns of each side. This might be coupled with a realistic deadline and intensive negotiations and mediation.

Some of what needs to be done is contradictory. Short-term progress is pendant on pressuring Milosevic. But every such action is interpreted by the Albanians as support for their

independence claims. Therefore, ways should be found to communicate to them that the two are not necessarily linked. Furthermore, Milosevic's role in finalizing the Dayton agreement is still important to keeping peace in Bosnia, so balance should be found between carrots and sticks for the Serbs.

What is the real effect of sanctions? It is not easy to give a one-way answer, although it seems that financial sanctions are more effective than trade sanctions. The relationship varies on a case-by-case basis.

The attitude of the Albanian community in Macedonia is very much influenced by the evolution of the situation in Kosovo, and it will probably react with claims in FYROM parallel to whatever their ethnic brethren in Kosovo have achieved in FRY. Albanians in Macedonia and the ones in Kosovo clearly coordinate their activities, there is a similar structure of parallel institutions in Macedonia, ethnic Albanian concentration to the North-West, similar demographic pressures, as well as similar complaints of human rights abuses. It is, therefore, obvious that any decision or developments in Kosovo will have direct repercussions in Macedonia. Another thing to be considered is that an eventual economic reinforcement of Albania might render claims for Greater Albania more relevant.

However, in the educational field the linkage between the situation in Kosovo and the one in Macedonia might have positive effects. Here there is also a continuity between the two communities—professors in Tetovo were all educated in Pristina. The international community might consider staging a compromise whereby the two communities would mutually complement their educational opportunities, thus creating a multi-country Albanian educational system. This option is not realistic in the immediate future, however.

There is a serious problem of very intense traffic of arms in the area.

We should also consider to propose an acceptable package to the Kosovo Serbs, in order to discourage nationalist extremism in Serbia.