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## **MAKING EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY WORK**

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## 1. The Origin of "European Foreign Policy"

The ambition to create a European foreign and security policy is a goal that runs parallel to the entire history of the integration process, from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1952) to our own day, marked by the fourth major revision of the Treaty of Rome, which had instituted the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957).

But, contrary to the history of the Community, which can boast an extraordinary continuity, attempts to cooperate in the foreign policy field have suffered a series of setbacks and resurrections. This checkered history has made the prospects of arriving, sooner or later, at a genuinely "common" policy, rather than a simple coordination of national foreign policies, much more precarious.

Only with the Treaty of Maastricht (7 February 1992) was the first serious attempt made to "communitarize" European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the intentions of the framers of the Treaty this attempt should have been completed in the space of five years (art. N) in what has come to be known as the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference (16-17 June 1997). As we will see, this process has remained incomplete, and today it is still difficult to speak of a common foreign policy in the strict sense.

After so many years of experience and numerous treaty reforms, we must ask ourselves why CFSP has had such a difficult history compared to the undoubted progress made in the Community sector(1). The pat answer having to do with the deeper roots of foreign policy in national sovereignty explains nothing, except, perhaps, the fact that in this sector the process began much later than in the economic sector. National foreign and security policies are subject to processes of globalization analogous to those we experience in the economic sphere. And today, in particular, with the emergence of concepts such as that of "comprehensive security", their bond with economic policies is even more obvious and direct. All the same, the resistance of governments to relinquish their residual sovereignty in this sector is still extremely strong.

The real reason, probably, is tied to contingent historic factors which have set European foreign policy in a given ideological context of integration rather than another. In fact, European foreign policy has traditionally been viewed as an expression of the "cooperative", as opposed to the "integrative", ideology and, for this reason, it has become the involuntary object of the battle over the type of Europe to be built that has divided entire generations of politicians and intellectuals.

These differences were manifested from the very start in formal terms, as well. European Political Cooperation (EPC) was conceived in 1970 by a protocol of agreement among the member governments, at a level, in other words, far inferior to that of a simple international treaty. For this reason, EPC lacks authentic legal status. Its quite circumspect appearance on the European scene was also, in political terms, very different from that of the EEC. Beyond diplomatic circles and a narrow group of scholars, no one was actually aware that a first attempt to coordinate national foreign policies had begun.

In the first draft of the Davignon Report the organs of EPC represented little more than the organizational structures of a club of willing people. There was no autonomous executive, no assembly, no voting procedure. To avoid confusion with Community institutions, the Council of Foreign Ministers was initially called "Conference", while remaining identical in composition. A Political Committee had the task of preparing the ministers' meetings and implementing their "directives", which were not, however, binding in nature(2).

The EEC, on the contrary, has a far more solid and complex structure. It is the fruit of an international treaty and has a unique binding and legitimate character. More precisely, the Treaty of Rome, which to a large extent was anticipated by the ECSC Treaty of 1952, was traditionally defined as an international treaty of a type all its own -- ad hoc or supranational --, and, therefore, an even more intensive in character. In fact, the Treaty of Rome expressed a capacity to "govern" that was virtually unknown in traditional international organizations, and its political ambition was to gradually transform the Community into the "United States of Europe", as was often repeated at the time of its foundation (3). This capacity to govern was based not only on the binding nature of the laws approved, which were directly applicable in the member countries (by means of their "compulsory" transformation into ordinary legislation), but also, and primarily, on the presence of an Executive, the Commission, representing the common interest and with exclusive power of initiative, and on the qualified majority vote within the Council of Ministers. Moreover, beyond the formal "legitimation" it possessed through national ratification processes (which were also valid for other international agreements), the Treaty of Rome contained a provision of substantive legitimation through passage of an electoral law (art. 138) for the Strasbourg Assembly, which would allow the future European Parliament to come directly into contact with its citizens. In short, elements all familiar today, but worth a mention to stress once again their revolutionary character in the context of the international relations represented by the birth of the EEC.

From the institutional and legal standpoint, these two structures are totally different from each other. The first structure is "rigid" while the second has the "flexibility" typical of intergovernmental agreements. From the outset it was apparent that any sort of "linkage" between them would prove difficult. In fact, the question of the bond between them has proved to be one of the thorniest over the years.

As we pointed out at the start of our report, the political origin accounts for the structural differences. The EC was born out of a compromise between the federal and confederal philosophies termed "neofunctionalism". For EPC the question never even arose. From its inception EPC has represented the confederal approach at its most radical. In effect, the different birth dates (the first in the early Fifties, the second in the early Seventies), not to mention the traumatic historical experiences arising from the European integration process in that span of time, underlie these two profoundly different conceptions (4).

If, for the EC, the basic goals are to overcome nationalism and to achieve a convergence of interests for the joint reconstruction of the European economy, for EPC these issues count little or not at all. EPC only answers to the need to enhance the visibility of Europe's role in the world (even then one spoke of a European Identity) and to complete economic integration with political integration, without running the risk of traumatic ruptures, such as the one experienced at the time of the "empty chair" policy

provoked by French suspicions over the excessively supranational character of the EC. Or the fracture experienced in 1954 in the sector of political integration with the shelving of the European Defence Community by the French parliamentary assembly. This is why the painless and infinitely less challenging road of the intergovernmental approach, in its softest version, was chosen.

## **2. The Evolution of EPC and the Development of Cooperation with the EC**

In functional terms EPC is based on a pragmatic method of the incremental development of its organs and activities. EPC has followed the technique of "Chinese boxes", adding from time to time, on the basis of its experiences, new procedures and new organs to make its external action more effective (5).

So there was a transition from the first Davignon Report to the second, in 1973, marked by the addition of the Group of European Correspondents (a sort of Coreper, but with officials sitting in their respective ministries rather than in Brussels) and by the doubling of the annual number of meetings of the Conference from two to four. The 1981 London Report introduced other improvements, both within the Presidency, with the inauguration of the "troika" system, and procedurally, with the possibility of convening an emergency meeting within 48 hours. And for the first time the political aspects of security were listed among the issues to be dealt with. After the failure of the Genscher-Colombo plan in 1983, which had sought to introduce voting mechanisms into EPC, a new step forward was achieved with the inclusion of the protocols relative to EPC in art. 30 of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. This article attempts to make order in EPC procedures and adds a permanent Secretariat (in its "lightest" version) to the pre-existing organs. Despite its insertion into an international treaty, EPC once again remained strictly intergovernmental and with no binding aspect (6).

Nevertheless, as we have already noted, EPC's primary problem was that of its relations with the pre-existing structures of the EEC. The rapprochement between the two "legs" of Europe's external activity, the economic and the political, was achieved very gradually and with a significant dose of mutual suspicion.

The key point in dispute was the role of the Commission. Initially, the Commission was excluded from consultation to avoid interference in the delicate mechanism of diplomatic cooperation. Only as of 1973 was the Commission partially "associated" for issues of economic competence. But it was actually the Commission itself which viewed the birth of EPC with misgivings, seeing in it a challenge to its own external economic competences. As we know, the positive collaborative experience between the services of the Commission and the working groups of EPC in preparing the 1975 Helsinki Conference on CSCE was the turning point for better mutual relations. In the 1981 London Report and, subsequently, in the SEA, the Commission is termed "fully associated" with EPC (art. 30, para. 3.b).

A similar fear of "contamination" was, at the outset, also felt by the Council, which kept Community issues strictly segregated from political issues. The limit was reached in the notorious case of the splitting (geographical and otherwise) of the meeting of foreign ministers, who were obliged to meet in Brussels in the morning on Community

questions and in Copenhagen in the afternoon on foreign policy matters (Danish Presidency, 1973).

All the same, the force of events and the pressures exerted by third countries obliged the Europeans to advance along the road of progressive cooperation between the two decision-making structures (7). The concept of "consistency" introduced in the SEA (art. 30, para. 5) was born of this experience. There was a growing conviction that the Community's external relations could not be based on the distinction between the commercial/economic and political spheres much longer. The interrelations between the two spheres are extremely powerful, especially from the perspective of third countries, who struggle to and are sometimes even vexed by having to distinguish between EC and EPC. The concept of "consistency" proved to be the precursor for the subsequent adoption of the principle of "comprehensive security", through which the potent bond between the various aspects of international, political, economic and military relations is underscored.

The application of the "consistency" concept and, subsequently, the addition of an increasingly clearer security dimension to foreign policy created the dilemma of whether EPC was drawing nearer to the EC, in institutional terms, as well, or whether the EC was advancing towards EPC. This question loomed large, particularly in the aftermath of the Maastricht signing and continues to be topical to this day.

Actually, the Treaty of Maastricht attempted to translate into institutional terms this drawing together of the two structures, which under the reign of the old EPC had seen only practical progress, but no institutional progress. From this perspective, and in light of the experiences following the signing of the Treaty, the key elements in this rapprochement between the procedures of the two pillars were the qualified majority vote, the partial power of initiative of the Commission and the possibility of recourse to the Community budget.

We have often asked ourselves what has been the result of this operation, especially in regard to the four basic requirements of European foreign policy: effectiveness, representation, legitimation and, not least, the security dimension.

### **3. Initiatives for a More Effective European Foreign Policy**

This is perhaps the oldest problem of European foreign policy. Accusations of ineffectiveness have been uttered over the years. And today, in the light of the Balkan experiences, the critical voices are louder than the others (8).

The first aspect of effectiveness is represented by the capacity to rapidly respond to crises, as was decided in London in 1981, with the clause to convene emergency meetings within 48 hours.

But the key problem has always been the need to pass from the "declaratory" phase, a typical result of the experiences in European foreign policy, to the action phase. In short, to make the shift from words to deeds. For many years, the deeds were those

represented by the economic tools at the disposal of the EC, in both the positive sense, through cooperation and association agreements, and the negative sense, with the application of economic sanctions. Certain very significant case studies, such as the one on the 1982 Falklands crisis, have revealed the importance of Community tools used in support of EPC positions.

The third, and last, aspect of effectiveness has centered around voting procedures. It seemed rather absurd that on the same issue or in regard to the same third country unanimity had to be reached in EPC, a factor which also slowed the taking of any action, while the EC utilized a qualified majority vote, at least for certain issues such as those relative to trade policy (9).

Maastricht offered the occasion to respond to the accusations voiced by EPC critics that the organ was, in essence, declaratory. The few examples of "active" policy were entrusted to fact-finding missions, which began after the establishment of the troika in 1981, and the use of the Community's economic tools, basically economic sanctions, during episodes of international crisis. But there was certainly no appropriate formula to favor the passage from words to deeds. For this reason, the Treaty of Maastricht designed an elaborate procedure that would permit a very gradual transition from the "principle" of a joint action to the "execution" of the same in a decision-making continuum that would directly link the various phases of the emerging European foreign policy. At least theoretically, a step forward was taken towards the definition of European "foreign policy" made up of positions and consequent actions, which was certainly not represented by the old EPC (10).

When we deal with the issue of joint actions, we must also deal with the problem of their credibility. From this to the introduction of the qualified majority vote was, in theory, only a short step. In fact, however, since this was a traditionally intergovernmental area, the adoption of the qualified majority vote was beset by rather serious obstacles, such as, for example, overcoming the required prior double unanimity. Faced with the prospect of a substantial "communitarization" of CFSP, the reaction of the governments was to reiterate the priority of "consensus", even at the cost of undermining the guideline of effectiveness which, logically, would have led to the introduction of the majority vote.

To make the adoption of joint action and its continuity over time more palatable, an "opting out" clause was inserted for the countries who found it difficult to continue the action. This clause also had another purpose: to reiterate the primacy of the national interest in CFSP. So joint action was diluted by the addition of further cautions, such as, precisely, the freedom of a member country to withdraw from a common commitment in the course of its application, although this in itself did not hinder continuation of the objective by the other parties. But this clause contributed to jeopardizing other important aspects of foreign policy action, such as its continuity over time and its comprehensive credibility.

In the same perspective of making CFSP more effective, we must point out the concession of a partial right of initiative granted to the Commission, which at the time of EPC was kept on the sidelines of the decision-making process. This concession was considered by institutional experts of CFSP as another small revolution. In political terms, as we mentioned above, the Commission was long considered a foreign body in diplomatic activity and, as such, was for years even excluded from COREU, the telex

network connecting the offices of the European Correspondents. Thus, the decision to divide the power of initiative between the Council of Ministers and the Commission marked the end of the great formal exclusion. Moreover, the recognition of a function such as the power of initiative, typical of the communitarian Pillar, assumed great symbolic significance. The sole difference, and not a trifling one, lay in the fact that the exercise of initiative was not exclusive but concurrent. Still, this held promise of a gradual assumption of responsibility by the Commission in CFSP, which, in theory, left open the option of a future "communitarization" of the intergovernmental structure.

#### **4. The External Representation of the Union: Speaking with "One Voice"**

Another capital question had to do with the external representation of the Community through the so-called "single voice". Attempts made over the years to strengthen the role of the rotating Presidency respond to this need to propose EPC as the "sole interface" with the rest of the world. The troika formula, launched in London in 1981, was formulated for this purpose, but the success it has achieved since then has been rather negligible. In the perceptions of a third government it was virtually impossible to understand why, for Community matters, it could turn to a single interlocutor, the Commission in Brussels, with a good chance of receiving credible answers, while for EPC matters it had to address the rotating Presidency in its respective capital with very slim prospects of receiving competent and exhaustive answers. The great "external" limitation of EPC was the lack of a fixed representative with ongoing competences. Instead, it relied on a structure based solely on the concept of rotation and the national origin of the organs (from the Political Committee to the Correspondents Group). The SEA attempted to fix this by creating a permanent Secretariat, but in its lightest and most innocuous version, to the point that the famous and oft-repeated question posed by Henry Kissinger regarding the existence of a telephone number for the Union's foreign policy has gone unanswered (11).

The possibility of entrusting mandates to the Presidency (art. J. 5, para. 2) runs along the same lines. The idea of bestowing greater visibility and autonomy on the Presidency is reflected in this proposal to charge it with the task of representing "in principle" the Union's position on a specific common action. Besides meeting a general need for the "personalization" of CFSP, the message in this article was aimed within the Union, to avoid, by anticipating them, individual national initiatives, and outside the Union, to credit the image of a "single" negotiator. In fact, this competence should have been exercised in the international organizations or conferences, venues in which the matter of the "representation" of the Union was an old and unsolved problem.

Finally, there is the matter of the Secretariat. With Maastricht it came to coincide with that of the Presidency of the Council. This decision was also a step towards the greater rationalization of CFSP tools and the enhancement of the role of the rotating Presidency, which has always remained the true engine of European foreign policy. This measure also gives an indication of a certain significance on the need to make the organizational structure of CFSP permanent. It further formulated the first initiative of a "light secretariat" launched by the SEA. Obviously, this was a transitional solution that

left the road open to more serious institutional choices, such as the "heavy secretariat" or "Ms. PESC", as became clear immediately after ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht.

## **5. The Difficult Process of Legitimation**

This is a much neglected issue in the history of EPC. The institutional mechanism was in the hands of diplomacy, which was more inclined to engage in confidential negotiations than political debate. The foreign ministers themselves, by limiting the activity of EPC solely to the declaratory phase, rarely felt the direct consequences of a national parliamentary verification.

For its part, the European Parliament played only a marginal role in the decision-making process, and only with the London Report was it placed in more direct contact with the political summit of EPC, through the six-monthly reports of the rotating Presidency and the hearings of the ministers before the Political Commission. Despite the fact that EPC limited itself to little more than "cosmetic" initiatives with regard to the European Parliament, the latter had, since the mid-Seventies, exercised emphatically all possible attempts to propose itself as the true political interface with EPC. The European Parliament did so by initiating debates and passing resolutions on all the major foreign policy issues, including security and defense policy, then still quite distant on the horizons of EPC itself. The resolutions on the deployment of Euromissiles in Europe and backing Europe's action in support of Great Britain in the first phase of the Falklands crisis have remained in the annals. Both these positions acted as a useful cover for numerous national parliaments in a quandary over the decisions to be made.

Furthermore, the European Parliament sought to conduct an authentic foreign policy of its own, inviting the major leaders of the moment, among them Sadat, Gorbachev and Reagan, to speak before the plenary assembly. But, almost unnoticed, the Parliament gained a real foot inside the mechanisms of Community foreign policy with the SEA, through the "power of consent" on association and enlargement agreements. When they were granted, these powers seemed quite modest, but now, with the new geopolitical scenario in Europe, they have certainly gained new status. In short, the question of legitimation and democratic control has been an issue that has gradually and laboriously made headway in the history of EPC. Today it has assumed a far more direct and urgent character than in the past.

Along this same line, the Treaty of Maastricht provides for the faculty of recourse to the Community budget. Since the old EPC involved intergovernmental activity, the financial contributions were always national and the European Parliament was held at bay from the actual decision-making processes. This new norm was another significant innovation in the final draft of the Treaty because, on one side, it introduced the concept of financial "solidarity" for foreign policy actions and, on the other, it paved the way for a more effective role for the European Parliament in defining European foreign policy.

Partially linked to the issue of legitimation is another innovation introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht to confer upon CFSP the competence of protecting the rights of Community citizens in third countries (art. J, para. 2) (12). Beyond the substantive importance of the norm, in political terms it endeavored to gain legitimation in the eyes of the citizen. EPC had never before sought direct contact with the "European" citizen,



since the concept of citizenship enjoyed validity only nationally. The sole interlocutors of EPC were the governments and, in part, the European Parliament, which, theoretically, could have acted as an indirect intermediary between the citizens and EPC. But the Parliament's lack of competences on EPC weakened this theoretical link. The decision reached at Maastricht to insert into the Treaty articles on European citizenship (8 c) revealed a first tangible possibility of anchoring CFSP activity to the direct interests of the citizens and to make the embassies of the EU members in third countries work on behalf of their rights and safety.

## **6. The Security and Defense Dimension of the Union**

Security and defense policy formally enters the Treaty of Maastricht for the first time. At least in formal terms this too represents a "virtual" revolution when we recall that security, in only its political aspects, had been inserted for the first time into the London Report (1981). The economic aspects were added in the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart (1983), and entered in this double sense in the SEA (art. 30, para. 6 a).

In the span of another five years (1986 to 1991) even defense, and not just security, became an issue, if only as a future prospect. The overcoming of the traditional Irish opposition (neutrality) and Danish misgivings (anti-integration) was clearly the by-product of the new climate that emerged in 1989. This climate was less favorable to Irish-type neutralist positions and was rooted in the conviction that, sooner or later, the Americans would delegate to Europe a greater share of the responsibilities for its own defense, placing in doubt the very role of NATO. The forecast did not occur as this line of reasoning would have had it. Precisely because of a strong recovery of NATO as an indispensable factor in Europe's new security, the debate returned to its starting point, as the drawn out negotiations on the role to confer on the Western European Union (WEU) on the eve of the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference in 1997 attest (13).

In effect, the introduction of defense and security policy into the Treaty of Maastricht proved to be little else than a cosmetic operation. Although the WEU got off to a quick start (in 1992, even before ratification of the Treaty was completed, the WEU approved in Petersberg the main lines of its own recovery, from the planning cell to peacekeeping operations), the facts soon exposed the limits of the decision-making process in the defense field. Even more so than in the foreign policy field, in the defense field the very strict rules of the intergovernmental method applied, beginning with unanimity. The consequence was the gradual disappearance of the WEU in the crisis areas as soon as the specter of military intervention loomed.

At the beginning of the Bosnian crisis the WEU succeeded in playing a sufficiently effective role beside the UN, patrolling the Adriatic and the Danube. But as the military confrontation intensified, the WEU was forced to give ground to NATO, which was better organized and more determined in military and decision-making terms. The disappearance of the WEU was even more glaring in Albania, in which responsibility was essentially handed off to OSCE.

So the issue of security turned out to be the major failure in the initiative to reform the old EPC in the new, but incomplete, CFSP drafted into the Treaty of Maastricht (14).

## **7. The Limits of Amsterdam and the Future of CFSP**

The overall experience of CFSP in the span between Maastricht and Amsterdam was, therefore, unsatisfactory, not only for the scarce effectiveness demonstrated, but also for the incompleteness of the experiments conducted. And this certainly debilitated the prospects of reform as the Amsterdam conference drew near (15).

In the first place, the trial period of the new policies and new procedures was too short to be able to judge its effectiveness thoroughly. The Treaty of Maastricht officially came into effect in October 1993, at the end of an extenuating and agonizing period of national ratifications. Negotiations for its revision officially got underway on 29 March 1996, at the European Council of Turin. But unofficially they had actually begun much earlier, in the summer of 1995, with the creation of the Westerdorp Reflection Group. For a subject such as foreign and security policy, so deeply ingrained in national sovereignties, such a short period to test the will to "communitarize" the few innovative procedures introduced by Maastricht was certainly an obstacle to acting with "souplesse", as might have been possible had the trial period been longer.

As we have seen, the negotiations leading up to Amsterdam began in 1995. They were carried out in an atmosphere of deep disappointment over the functioning of CFSP, felt not only by the experts, but also by public opinion. There was a widespread perception that the Union was not in a position to assume the role and the responsibilities that the explosion of serious border conflicts entailed. The call to do more and better is echoed in much of the European press. The Reflection Group and, subsequently, the personal representatives of the foreign ministers found themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to answer mounting criticism and, concurrently, acting as custodians of national sovereignty, which was still strongly felt in the field of CFSP. This longstanding ambiguity takes us back to the origins of EPC and is reflected in the difficulty of following a precise path in dealing with the institutional changes to be made to CFSP.

In the second place, certain key regulations, such as the qualified majority vote for common actions, were never experimented. A united front in view of Amsterdam proved impossible to rally on this issue. Even though several valid compromise proposals were advanced, it is quite clear that a decisive "communitarization" of CFSP on voting procedures is still inconceivable. Even countries such as Italy, notoriously inclined to make the entire structure of the European Union more communitary, adopted a very conservative stance on the qualified majority vote in CFSP, accepting the continuation of unanimity at least in the sphere of general principles and strategies. The intergovernmental approach and the protection of national sovereignty are still deeply ingrained.

The same prudence marked the approach to the Commission's right of initiative. The Commission moved very cautiously, knowing perfectly well that in the history of EPC it itself was the key component in the fear of the member states of losing control over common foreign policy and security. In this manner, the Commission was able to dodge the accusation of activism which, in the past, had haunted it when it had dared to anticipate the Council's slow reaction to certain international crises.

Furthermore, the Commission stayed on the defensive to protect its "foreign policy" competences, deriving from the power attributed to it in the Treaty to promote the Union's external economic policy. As always, the fear regarded the possible "contamination" by the intergovernmental method (characteristic of the second pillar) of the first, Community, pillar, in which the Commission enjoys an especially prominent role. For example, humanitarian actions were the object of dispute between proponents of Community jurisdiction and their opponents, supporters of giving CFSP the right to initiate them. The same objection was made for the new article 228.a) of the Treaty of Maastricht relative to the use of economic sanctions. On one hand, this article was hailed as a remedy for the defects of the Treaty of Rome on this matter. In the past, beginning with the Falklands-Malvinas crisis in 1982, articles 113 (trade policy) and 224 (measures in derogation of trade agreements) were utilized in a very ambiguous and controversial manner. In fact, the two articles were "bent" to the needs of European foreign policy to adopt sanctions, while never mentioning this possibility (16). Article 228.a) sought to remedy this anomaly by providing for the explicit recourse to economic sanctions. But the way the procedure was conceived created the suspicion of prevarication by the intergovernmental procedure over the Community procedure, even on a matter, such as trade policy, traditionally considered among Community competences. The mention of common positions or actions as the starting element of a decision-making procedure in the area of sanctions conjured the obstacle of prior double unanimity (art. J. 3) and, therefore, the "dominance" of CFSP over the EC. In other words, the positive effect achieved in terms of the link between CFSP and EC risks dilution because of suspicions of the "intergovernmentalization" of the first pillar by the second. This was, in short, exactly the opposite of everyone's expectations for cooperation between foreign policy and community activities on the eve of the Maastricht signing.

Recourse to the Community budget was also the object of numerous disputes and diverging interpretations between the Council and the European Parliament. The former was reluctant to suffer controls over foreign policy actions, while the latter was eager to play a more active role in CFSP. The request by the European Parliament to have the Council classify expenses relative to joint actions under the item "non-obligatory" expenditures, which would give Parliament the power of veto, was not frequently accepted by the Council of Ministers, since the Council preferred to maintain total control over the management of foreign policy. What had been considered an indirect path for the intervention of Parliament on CFSP questions and an interesting gambit for a greater legitimation of common foreign policy proved to be more a hotbed of procedural contention between Parliament and Council than a substantive democratic control.

Nor was progress made on the front of "external representation", mentioned by the Maastricht Treaty through the tool of "mandates" to be entrusted to the Presidency. With Amsterdam on the horizon, all sorts of proposals were made, from a Mr. PESC to a Secretary General (17). This point was hotly debated and could have been an important signal of the will to make a qualitative leap forward in the conception of CFSP. The lack of an internal and external "reference point" for CFSP was from the very start one of the basic snags in augmenting its overall credibility. The light secretariat of EPC and of the Council of CFSP certainly both fell short of solving the problem. What should have been expected was a decisive upgrading of the competences of the organ (not the person) in charge of CFSP. In other words, either a Mr. PESC or a Secretary General would have

been fine, as long as he possessed certain powers, particularly the right of initiative, a budget at his disposal and a general responsibility before the European Parliament. In short, a sort of Commission for CFSP. This line was never accepted, and the focus was placed more on the "level" of the organ (or person) than on its competences. But a telephone number without power does not solve the identity problem of CFSP as an international actor.

The great paradox of this entire matter is that to permit the Union to fulfill its international role in a more credible manner almost all the governments of the Union recognized the necessity of further improving CFSP mechanisms (18). The negotiators for the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference moved in this direction. But once again the need to mediate between divergent positions prevailed, and the changes enacted did not substantially alter the nature of CFSP. The problem of a European foreign policy has remained largely unresolved, and the march towards a more convincing "consistency" among the Union's old pillars requires additional progress along the road of effectiveness, representation, and legitimation. In short, neither the Treaty of Maastricht nor that of Amsterdam solved the problem of the persistent imbalance between the tools at the disposal of the EC and those in the hands of CFSP. In carrying forward common foreign policy, the Fifteen possess an impressive array of economic tools, from associations to sanctions, a certain number of diplomatic tools, from declarations to joint actions, and no truly military device. In this incomplete condition, it is genuinely hard for the Union to deal with the emerging policy of "comprehensive security", which requires the combined use of economic, diplomatic and military means in a continuing and effective manner. If this proves impossible, the overall credibility of the Union suffers in the eyes of third countries. In short, the activities of conflict prevention and conflict resolution current geostrategic circumstances require of the Union cannot be performed (19).

In the future, this imbalance is destined to grow. With the introduction of the Euro, the European Union will inevitably be forced to play a bigger international role. As a "global currency", the Euro will require a policy towards the dollar and the yen, with unavoidable repercussions on the Union's foreign policy. But with a "European government" for the economy, it will be even more difficult to count on a "government" for foreign policy, should foreign policy remain as established in the current Treaties. The two main pillars of the Union will continue to support a dangerously inclined roof, making the voice of the Union in the world precarious and scarcely credible. And with possibly negative results for the affirmation of the Euro as a global currency in competition with the dollar. In today's world, the bonds between economy and foreign policy are growing ever tighter, and both contribute to the general credibility of the system.

So the discourse on the role of CFSP vis-à-vis the EC must be explored in depth. The simple introduction of flexibility clauses, as provided in Amsterdam, will certainly act to shrink the area of dissension between governments in a sector in which national interests are still deeply rooted. But this will not suffice to solve the basic question regarding the consistency between the two main pillars of the Union. Flexibility without clear mechanisms linking the EC and CFSP is destined to generate confusion and competition between the two. The single voice of the Union is represented in both the foreign policy (and security) dimension and the economic dimension, and coordination between the two must be close and automatic. Another Amsterdam is needed to solve

this crucial question. And it must concentrate on this vital horizontal link and on the institutional mechanisms to make it effective. Otherwise, the Union will be unable to perform its role as the international actor recent history has assigned it.

## Notes

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