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COOPERATIVE SCHEMES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN LINKS AND OBSTACLES

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Introduction

In the broad Mediterranean area, there have been many attempts to establish cooperative schemes predicated on concepts of comprehensive security [Aliboni 1995]. Some of them failed to work or even to be implemented. Others are going on, like the "Mediterranean Dialogues" initiated by NATO and the WEU, respectively in 1994 and 1992; the "Mediterranean Dimension" of the CSCE/OSCE, going back to 1975; the Forum for Mediterranean Dialogue and Cooperation, established in 1994; the MENA Economic Summits, initiated in 1994; and, lastly, the "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" (EMP) set up in Barcelona in November 1995.

Formats and memberships of such schemes vary considerably. Some of them focuss on regional relations, like the ACRS (the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security within the Middle East peace process); others on sub-regional relations, like the AMU (Arab Maghreb Union); others on sub-inter-regional relations, like the "Five plus Five" group of Western Mediterranean countries as well as the above-mentioned Forum; and others on inter-regional relations, like the EMP and the OSCE Mediterranean Dimension. Obviously, these geo-political definitions may be put in question, just because diverse regional, sub-regional and inter-regional perspectives are possible and legitimate. What matters here, however, is that, while all these attempts witness a diffuse aspiration to establish forms of cooperative security in the Mediterranean area (as it is understood in this paper[1]), Mediterranean cooperative schemes and projects may be too many and thus give way to risks of duplication and overlapping. This may not be the least important factor of the high rate of casualties among such schemes as well as the poor and uneven performance of those which survive.

This paper seeks to single out some indications for making Mediterranean cooperative organisation more effective. It starts from and concentrates on the most important scheme functioning today, i.e. the EMP, with the aim of taking up other schemes subsequently, so as to come to an overall view about the"rational" way cooperative security could be organised in the Mediterranean.

With the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995, the European Union (EU) became Party to the EMP together with twelve non-European Mediterranean countries[2]. Why did the EU

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[1] The "Mediterranean" considered by this paper corresponds in principle to the scope of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the EU plus North Africa and the Levant countries). Nonetheless, the definition of the "Mediterranean" area is less a parameter than an element of the very issue discussed in the paper. For example, as it will be pointed out later on, a stronger trans-Atlantic cooperation may entail a "Greater Mediterranean" or a "Greater Middle East" [Gompert & Larrabee; Blackwill & Stürmer] that would be larger than the "Mediterranean" encompassed today by the EMP.

[2] Seven Arab countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia) plus the Palestinian National Authority and four other Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Israel, Malta and Turkey).

foster such Partnership? Arguably, the EU Mediterranean policy, as enshrined in the EMP, entails two main objectives:

- first, establishing an instrument geared to stabilize neighbouring Southern regions economically and politically, thus broadly improving EU's security [Bin; Aliboni 1996; Kebabdjian; Rhein];
- second, strengthening the Union's cohesion and, thanks to the development of a full-fledged external policy -i.e. including political and security aspects beside economic and commercial ones- structuring and reinforcing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union and its Defence and Security Identity (DSI) [Barbé; Edwards & Philippart].

If these two aims are taken into consideration, it seems clear that from the EU's point of view the success of the EMP, as a factor reinforcing both European security and political integration, is mostly dependent on the success of the new security dimension which characterizes the Barcelona process. There is no doubt that any success in implementing the free trade area and supporting Southern Mediterranean growth contributes all the same to increasing stability and security, for the EMP's economic dimension is regarded by the EU --in its comprehensive-security perspective-- as a relevant component of Mediterranean security. There is no doubt either, though, that the political investment made by the EU with its new Mediterranean policy is heavily relying on the security dimension of such policy. It is important, therefore, to evaluate this security dimension, that belongs to the family of cooperative security schemes [Handler Chayes & Chayes], referred to by the Barcelona Declaration as the implementation of a Euro-Mediterranean "area of peace and stability".

The Emp's Area of Peace and Stability

After two years, the balance-sheet of the EMP's political and security dimension --as it results from the second ministerial meeting in Malta in April 1997-- appears somewhat disappointing. While the economic and trade dimension of the Partnership is more or less progressing, political and security (including "soft" security) aspects are lagging behind. To be precise, political consultations, both inside the Euro-Med Committee and the High Officials Committee, do work. But, the High Officials Committee, that negotiates "hard" security and the implementation of the "area of peace and stability", don't manage to deliver any significant result[3].

Which are the stumbling blocks? The implementation of a comprehensive and cooperative security regime like the EMP, its success and feasibility, are affected of course by challenges of different nature. Seemingly, three out of them deserve to be taken into consideration:

- different North-South views about the respective role socio-economic and politico-military factors are supposed to play in the EMP;
- the opposition between tendencies to authenticity and globalization (to some extent an aspect of the previous challenge);

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[3] The inability to achieve results in the field of stability and security seems coupled by a weakening of the aim to consolidate the CFSP. In fact, after the ministerial meeting in Malta, the EU members, which were represented in the Euro-Med Committee by the troika, felt the necessity to be represented individually beside the troika itself [Edwards & Philippart].

- the strategic status of the EU in the region and the actual strategic relevance and significance of the EMP region, a challenge which has emerged in the shape of an exceedingly strong dependency of the EMP on the Arab-Israeli conflict[4] (a frustrating one-way linkage between the success of the Madrid process and that of the Barcelona process) but is also related to more structural factors.

Different weight to different factors - First, although both "northern" and "southern" Parties to the EMP agrees on the comprehensive character of Mediterranean security, they assign different importance to the ingredients of security (and opinions differ among the EU members as well).

In southern view, economic and social factors are most important. Military or military-related factors and, to some extent, political factors are regarded as something less relevant to southern interests and less fitting with EU basically "civilian" identity. In fact, southern Mediterranean countries do not recognize any significant strategic role to the EU (and partly to its members). In their eyes, such role is undoubtebly played by the United States. This is reflected in the fact that the implementation of the Barcelona Declaration's security policy is subordinated to the advancement of the peace process in the Middle East, a process in which the US play a leading political and military role.

On this point there are differences between Arabs and Israelis. Arabs do not rule out the possibility of a European strategic role and look at it as a helpful factor of balancing with respect to their interests in the area. From the Arab point of view, a growing political -- though not fully military role-- of the EU in the Mediterranean and the Middle East is in itself a valuable strategic factor. Israel tends to regard a possible EU strategic and military role as a factor which could damage its national security.

As for political factors evaluations differ according to partners and specific aspects. Turkey is a special case, because this country regards the EMP as a framework which risks to downgrade its status with respect to its aspiration to be fully integrated in the EU political process. For this reason, Turkey just tends to downgrade the role the EMP may play in its own relationship with the EU (and upgrade the possible role NATO might play in organising security in the area). Conversely, the Arab countries, and to a large extent Israel as well, are mostly appreciative of the framework of political consultations the Partnership makes available to them. From the Israeli point of view, the EMP discontinues the Euro-Arab trend and replaces it by a multilateral relationship between Europe and an indifferentiated Middle Eastern and North African region. For the Arabs, the relationship with the EU secured by the EMP is an important factor of reassurance with respect to Western trends towards concentrating on the European East as well as globalization and US perceived unilateralism.

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[4] This dependency is embedded in the Barcelona Declaration, whose preamble states that " the Euro-Mediterranean initiative is not intended to replace the other activities or initiatives undertaken in the interest of the peace ... The participants support the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East ...". The considerable results acheved by the High Officials in the negotiations conducted in 1996 have been gradually vanified by the progressive stall emerged in the peace process after the May 1996 elections in Israel and the consequent appointment of the government lead by Mr. Netanyahu.

There is, however, another side of the coin. Political relations within the EMP includes democratization and human rights as an important goal geared to secure regional stability and European security. The European insistence on democracy and human rights, accepted by southern partners in principle, is always very much contested as an interference in practice, especially by Arab countries and Turkey (though the Israeli-Palestinian "file" cannot be neglected either).

All in all, the content of political relations within the EMP remains somewhat undefined in between a more or less general interest of the EU's partners to develop the mechanism of political consultations and a strong reluctance to accept democratization and human rights as a target of such political consultations. From the point of view of a cooperative security framework, like the one the EMP is geared to, this difference makes the implementation of conflict prevention policies somehow unlikely or difficult.

In sum, it can be said that southern partners tend to narrow the scope of the EMP with respect to that envisioned by the Europeans. They like political consultations, for the latter tend to enhance their international integration, but they dislike such political factors as human and democratic dimensions as well as "hard" security and military-related factors. On the contrary, from the European perspective, and particularly from the perspective of the earliest EU partners (the latecomers coming from "neutral" foreign policy experiences which make them to feel that military-related factors are unimportant), the implementation of the "area of peace and stability" is very important, not only because of their strategically-oriented way of thinking (in which military-related factors do matter) but because a success in implementing this aspect of the EMP's cooperative security scheme would expand the circle of the Union's CFSP and strengthen EU's defense and security identity in itself as well as inside the Atlantic Alliance.

Beside the tension between oldest and latest members of the EU about the relevance of military-related factors, there is another tension among EU members between the relevance that ought to be assigned to political factors, in particular to the "human dimension". To be sure, on the relevance of democratization and human rights for Mediterranean stabilization there is a basic consensus and differences are by far less important than with respect to the importance of military-related factors in the EMP. Though, there is a difference of feelings -with impacts on national communitarian policies- between central-northern EU members and southern members, the latter believing that, just in case, stability may matter more than EU-favourite political evolution towards democratization and compliance with human rights.
Despite differences on emphases among EU members, they strongly agree on the role security and political factors should have in the EMP, however. On the contrary, in the view of Southern partners the most helpful contribution the EMP can do to reinforce Mediterranean security relates to economic and social factors as well as political consultations in a very broad sense.

Globalization and authenticity - A second issue that may affect EMP's prospects of cooperation is the opposition between the strong tendencies in the Middle East and North Africa to preserve authenticity in cultural as well as in political terms and the seemingly stronger trend towards globalization. Notwithstanding the (weakly and vaguely worded) commitments of the Barcelona Declaration to make room to cultural and political identities,

the EMP goal of implementing a free trade area is in itself a commitment to economic globalization, with obvious and unavoidable cultural and political implications. The identity vs. globalism opposition is not an issue that concerns radical religious groups only. It concerns secular nationalists as well as moderate religious streams of opinion and governments. In fact, even those countries and regimes that evolved towards more moderate forms of nationalism cannot escape the imperative of preserving identity because the latter remains an essential element of legitimacy in the region.

Within the EMP, this opposition between authenticity and globalism undercuts cooperation and makes understandings on a number of important points, like human rights, immigration, etc., more difficult. For sure, a special effort within the EMP framework will be devoted to foster a North-South cultural dialogue, especially by encouraging and supporting contacts and exchanges at the level of the respective civil societies. However, while this efforts will help only in the middle-long run, tensions stemming from authenticity vs. globalization opposition may seriously hinder progresses in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. More and more immediate attention to these aspects, especially "soft" security issues like immigration, on the part of the northern partners would help the EMP to improve its performance.

EMP's weak strategic coherence - The last issue to be mentioned is wheter the EMP's format fits with the strategic and security challenges it is supposed to tackle. The EuroMeSCo report [ch. V] stresses the incoherence of the EMP strategic setting with respect to the security challenges of the region. Its conclusion is that, while security challenges and perceptions in the South are mostly related to the South-South circle, the EU --as already noted in the above-- is not fully qualified to deal with them. On the other hand, in the North-South circle no mutual military threats are perceived. In the North-South circle what the Arab countries perceive is a sense of exclusion from and a lack of transparency in the reforms and rearrangements going on in the Western alliances. This perception, however, cannot be attributed to the EU alone and de-linked from the trans-Atlantic relationship and NATO. In both circles, the EU is not a complete strategic actor but part (and very often only a minor part) of a trans-Atlantic strategic ensemble which depends essentially on the United States. For this reason, on the southern side of the Mediterranean there are doubts on the relevance of the EMP in terms of "hard" security.

In arguing the strategic inadaptability of the EMP to the military challenges of the region, Israel is sometime more radical than the Arab countries. According to Israeli analysts, such inadaptability has a structural character that can hardly be overcome. On the Arab side, there is a more flexible view suggesting that if the Middle East political stall is solved a scheme of cooperative security in the EMP framework could be feasible and would make sense. The difference is not without consequences. The Arab view entails that if the Middle East peace process succeeds the EMP can work and help building security in the region. According to the more radical Israeli view, even if the peace process proceeds and allows the Barcelona process to advance, the latter will remain unable to deal with military challenges of the region because the EU will remain a non-strategic actor.

The Israeli argument may be correct intellectually; less so in a dynamic and factual perspective. On one hand, is less an analysis than the expression of a broad distrust for Europe with respect to Israel's national security. On the other hand, it doesn't take into

consideration that the EU is a process in which there is a permanent interplay between policies and institutions, so that what happens is not that the EU is prevented from acting because it lacks a strategic status but that it acts precisely to attain such status. Functionalism may fail to deliver but may well work as a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Whichever the merit of such arguments, according to the less radical interpretation the working of a cooperative security scheme in the Mediterranean is not unlikely but is subordinated to an Arab-Israeli political settlement that five years of "peace process" have still failed to deliver. Without such political settlement, the Arabs are unwilling to implement any confidence-building measures (CBMs). On the other hand, without CBMs it is not possible to attain measures of arms control or limitation. Furthermore, minding the Israeli nuclear weapons, the Arabs argue that cooperation in the field of CBMs and arms control would be made possible in a situation of fair balance of power only. A fair balance of power and the absence of major territorial or political disputes, according to Arab analysts[5], were the conditions which prevailed in Europe during the Cold War. These conditions made it possible for the countries concerned to move towards cooperation and build up the CSCE cooperative regime gradually[6]. The absence of such conditions prevents cooperative security from emerging in the Middle East and *a fortiori* in the EMP framework. In fact, as soon as the peace process began to fade away and the hopes of a political settlement downgraded, the ACRS, first, and then the EMP's area of peace and stability were also prevented from progressing.

Let's now try to draw some conclusions on whether and to what extent the EMP may act as a cooperative security scheme with respect to military and military-related factors (i.e., "hard" security):

- it is clear that the EMP "area of peace and stability" can include both Arabs and Israelis only if the Middle East peace process is completed; a working EMP without a working ACRS is unthinkable; as it was said very plainly by an Egyptian analyst "Arab states are reluctant to get involved in security arrangements, that bring them together with Israel, before ending the Israeli occupation of Arab land" [Soltan]; accepting a security cooperation within the EMP without achieving political peace in the Middle East would correspond to a kind of Arab self-circumvention; such extreme dependence of the Barcelona "hard" security process from the Middle Est peace process has been underestimated by the EU, probably in a moment in which the prospects of peace appeared particularly favourable; consequently, the EMP must be better adjusted to realities and maybe get less ambitious;
- it is not true that, whichever the outcome of the peace process, the EMP is strategically incongruous and security irrelevant; on the contrary, it is quite evident that, once the peace will be made, the EMP --with its multidimensional and comprehensive security approach-- could well serve to consolidate and develop security conditions in the region

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[5] For one such statements see Selim: "It has worked in Europe because there were no territorial disputes, and because Europe began the process of establishing CBMs from the point of strategic balance" [p. 87]. In fact, political and territorial disputes in Europe were not lacking at all (suffice it to think of Poland and Germany). What is true is that these disputes were "suppressed" by the global security challenge of bipolar confrontation.

[6] A well-noted American analyst like Geoffrey Kemp [p. 410] shares his Arab colleagues' point of view: "..contemporary European history suggests that rapid progress in the Middle East arms control,and security issues must be preceded by advances in the political realm".

and help post-conflict peace-bulding; while waiting for peace, two kinds of action can be undertaken: (a) the EMP can pursue a more modest security agenda, on the lines suggested by some analysts [EuroMeSco; Tanner] and, most of all, consolidate political consultations as a CBM in itself; (b) the EU can adopt a more deliberate two-track strategy, by increasing its effort to play a political role in the Middle East peace process in the very moment its EMP endeavour is weakened; in the end, the action conducted by the EU's special Middle Eastern representative proved positive and so did the initiative of proposing a code of conduct; to a large extent it is the EU members inertia and lack of cohesion (and only to avery limited extent US exclusiveness) that prevents the EU to "emerge from the sidelines" [Peters] of the peace process in the Middle East; contributing to restart the peace process depends very much on the political will of the EU members and, if they will manage to provide such contribution, this will help resetting the EMP "hard" security process as well;

- having said that, it remains true that the EMP is affected by a fundamental strategic incoherence of the EMP remains unsolved; while the peace in the Middle East would attenuate the asymmetry between the EMP format and the South-South strategic circle, in the North-South circle EMP's credibility will be still affected by the need of clarifying the trans-Atlantic security nexus and EU's Defence and Security Identity. Furthermore, it must be stressed that the EMP's weak coherence in the South-South circle can be attenuated but not eliminated. In fact, the geographic scope of the EMP neglects important factors of Middle Eastern security, like Iraq, Iran and, more broadly speaking, the linkakes between the Near East and the Persian Gulf. These links are crucial in the strategic perspective of both the Southern Mediterranean countries and the trans-Atlantic allies. For these reason, a trans-Atlantic understanding is needed for the EMP to set out its right format either by dismissing some of its present ambitions or by taking them up more clearly and extensively. This brings us to take into consideration the possible role of NATO in arranging cooperative security in the Mediterranean.

Nato and Weu in the Mediterranean

As things stand today, NATO is the best equipped institution for fostering and managing military cooperation in a scheme of cooperative security. This is what NATO is doing in Central-Eastern Europe within the framework of the Partnership for Peace. Furthermore, in the same area NATO is also developing a base for strategic cooperation by training nuclei of armed forces in the countries concerned for joint multinational or multilateral interventions aimed at keeping peace and international order. Can NATO pursue a similar agenda in the Mediterranean?

This question can be taken into consideration from two diverse angles: because such an agenda would be a response either to the needs of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean area or an item in the new trans-Atlantic agenda, in which such response is mostly instrumental to re-organise NATO in the new international security context and provide new strength to the alliance between the US and Europe. To be sure, these two diverse angles can be taken into consideration together, in varying combination. The literature on this point [Winrow, Balanzino] is by far dominated by a trans-Atlantic concern [Larrabee et al. 1997; Aliboni 1997; Gompert & Larrabee; Asmus et al.].

Whichever the angle, NATO's initiative towards the Mediterranean has been weak: the "Mediterranean Dialogue", after an ambitious false start in 1994 by the then Secretary-

General, Willy Claes, is mostly devoted to information. A project for instituting a Partnership for Mediterranean, fostered by Spain and Italy in 1994-95 has not given way to any substantive follow-up. In 1997 a NATO Mediterranean Group has been set up in Brussels, but the obvious evidence is that NATO is presently pursuing other overwhelming priorities in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. On the other hand, what NATO could do in the Mediterranean and how its action could contribute to the strengthening of a new trans-Atlantic agenda is not very clear nor urgent, which makes the Mediterranean to rank very low in NATO's agenda.

A slightly earlier "Mediterranean Dialogue" is pursued by the WEU as well. The rationale of the WEU's "Mediterranean Dialogue, predicated on the seven actions set out by the Petersberg Declaration in 1992, is perhaps clearer than NATO's. A WEU intergovernmental Mediterranean Group is active since many years. Nonetheless, not very much can be expected from the WEU "Mediterranean Dialogue" just because of the undefined broad mandate of WEU within the Union and its Treaties. The Treaty of Amsterdam has subsumed the "Petersberg actions" but the opposition among the EU's members about WEU's role keeps on and the risk is that the Union's members will continue to take action in order to make the WEU more operative but, despite the new decision-making procedure instituted in Amsterdam ,they will prevent the WEU from operating, as it happened in the case of Albania. Going back to the Mediterranean, it must be stressed that because of such opposition between EU's members, the WEU, like the US, was not invited to attend the Barcelona conference. Nevertheless, a good number of issues and goals inscribed by the Declaration in the EMP would require the involvement of the WEU and its development.

While a development of WEU Mediterranean activities would be quite natural and helpful, the EU reluctance to allow for such developments depends on (a) doubts about whether the involvement of a military-related body would help building up cooperation in the delicate political frame of the EMP, but (b) most of all, the implications within NATO and the trans-Atlantic relations of such WEU's involvement in the Mediterranean (and elsewhere).

If these remarks about the Mediterranean role of NATO and the WEU are taken into consideration, it seems evident that the attempt at developing a military-related dimension in the EMP cooperative security scheme is not hindered by its linkages with the Middle East process only, but also by the weakness of NATO and WEU Mediterranean role and, most of all, by the absence of coordination between the two organizations (or, maybe, by the unsolved conflict between the EU's Atlantic and European defense and security identities). To clarify the question, let us assume for a moment that the peace process does advance and that the way to the implementation of the EMP area of peace and stability is open. In this case, unless more substance is provided to the WEU and the relations of the latter to NATO is clarified, the implementation of many CBMs more related to military security and to arms control as well as arms control in itself would require the Europeans to coordinate with NATO and/or the US or would not be implementable without the participation of NATO and/or the US. Only a limited number and kinds of CBMs (like common exercises, joint military training, and so on) could be implemented in the EMP framework independently of NATO.

By the same token, whenever intervention in Mediterranean conflicts were required, the EU might easily happen to be unable to intervene without a logistical NATO and American support. It may also happen that NATO would be preferred to EU, the EMP notwithstanding. For example, in case there were an Israeli-Syrian agreement on the Golan heights and this agreement asked for an international force of observers, one can easily imagine that the request of setting up such force would be more likely addressed to NATO than the EMP or EU/WEU.

What has been just said is not to argue that there is no room for an EU security role in the Mediterranean and that the EMP area of peace and stability is doomed. The argument here is that, in order to take action on Mediterranean security, some more coordination is needed in the transatlantic circle: from *ad hoc* coordination up to giving WEU more substance as well as solving the enigma of EU' Identity of Defense and Security within the Alliance framework and enabling CJTFs to work. If such coordination will not be effected, the EU attempt at creating a cooperative security scheme in the Mediterranean may get futile or discredited. And this, in turn, would weaken rather than reinforce EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Nonetheless, this is but a side of the coin, i.e. it is the issue as seen from the trans-Atlantic angle. The other side is to ascertain whether a better coordination in the Western alliances to develop cooperative security and make peace intervention possible, is welcomed and accepted by the Southern Mediterranean partners. As it is well known, Arab countries are fundamentally suspicious of Western alliances and, with respect to their actual security problems, they don't see the substance nor the point of the cooperation the West wants to sell to them [Joffé; Ben Salem; El-Dessouqi]. Once again, for example, this Arab attitude emerged at the occasion of the establishment of Eurofor amd Euromarfor in 1995. A better Western military coordination would solve problems from the trans-Atlantic point of view, but in the end it is doubtful whether a better coordinated Western approach would change perceptions (maybe it would worsen them) and improve the negative experience made so far by the EU inside the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Taking bot sides of the coin into consideration, <u>optimal</u> policies geared to shape cooperative security across the Mediterranean basin should respond to three principal requirements:
- being conducive to trans-Atlantic strategic convergence; for example, *ceteris paribus* both European and American policies should foster the implementation of some kind of institutional subsidiarity, avoid duplication, etc.;
- preventing such trans-Atlantic policies from hindering an EU Defense and Security Identity from emerging;
- assuring consistency with Southern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern national security and security policies; the trans-Atlantic rationale for US-EU security cooperation cannot be the same as that of Atlantic-Mediterranean security cooperation; for this reason, to be implementable and acceptable, optimal trans-Atlantic policies should take into consideration the goals and limits to security cooperation in the Southern Mediterranean countries.

It must be said that in the European and American debate about the Mediterranean (a debate which is marginal with respect to the broad trans-Atlantic debate) this latter point is a little bit neglected, whereas it may be that it is crucial for shaping a cooperative security framework in the Mediterranean area.

Conclusions

Cooperative security in the Mediterranean or Euro-Mediterranean area is not impossible. It is affected, however, by a number of limitations and constraints that have to be taken into account by governments if a minimum of cooperative security is to emerge in this area. Some out of these constraints and limitation can be superseded by riorientations in the current schemes and projects of cooperation. Others require exogenous and sometime important policy shifts outside the Mediterranean framework proper, as in the case of the Mediterranean links with trans-Atlantic relations. Let's give some indications, which summarize the analysis conducted in the above.

If the southern point of view is taken in due consideration, two basic facts must be pointed out:
- military-related security is perceived as an ambiguous gift from the West, entailing interferences and chances of strategic cooperation which may easily reveal undesired and destabilizing for southern countries; a comprehensive notion of security. bringing about more social and economic than military or security cooperation is by far preferred;
- the possible implementation of a military-related dimension of cooperative security in the Mediterranean is subordinated to the consolidation of some scheme (like the ACRS or a CSCME-Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East) of cooperative security in the Middle East; cooperative security must have a more clear-cut inter-regional character and go on across rather than within the Mediterranean.

These two guidelines would not exclude the possibility for the EMP to pursue a military-related cooperative agenda in the Mediterranean, but would provide some more realistic proportions and limits to such agenda. Once the right proportions of the EMP "hard" security agenda will be clarified, two further points must be taken into consideration by the EU, particularly in the perspective of a reinforcement of its CFSP:
- more substance must be given to the EU's DSI within the Atlantic framework; as a matter of fact, this solution is a kind of *préalable*;
- however, without waiting for a trans-Atlantic Godot (and with the aim of making it arrive) there is no doubt that a minimum of political cohesion and resolve by the members of the EU would allow for the upgrading of EU's Middle Eastern policy [Perthes; Hollis]: such policy requires that factual responses to specific issues be given by the EU instead of self-commiseration.

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