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CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO AND OF  
THE US POSITIONS ON NATO ON THE DEVELOPMENT  
OF A COMMON EUROPEAN DEFENCE POLICY**

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# IMPACT OF THE DIFFERENT SCENARIOS CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO AND OF THE US POSITIONS ON NATO ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON EUROPEAN DEFENCE POLICY

by Stefano Silvestri

The May 1997 Madrid Summit of the Atlantic Alliance has decided the enlargement of NATO to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The Final Communique contains some strong hints that a new enlargement round, in 1999, will consider favourably the access of Rumania and Slovenia. Further down in time the question will arise of including also the three Baltic Republic of Estonia Latvia and Lithuania, and possibly Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic. Meanwhile, the European Commission has proposed to start immediate EU enlargement negotiations with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and Estonia. Some Member countries oppose this selection, which sets apart a small number of countries among many, and suggest instead to start negotiating with all the candidates at the same time (including countries such as Turkey, the other two Baltic Republic, Rumania, Bulgaria etc.) albeit with the understanding that only a few of them may be elected for a faster track, while others will have to wait much longer. In sum, both enlargement processes are under way and booming. They are concerning more or less the same countries. What is different is mainly the time frame. Ten or fifteen years from now, the two enlarged NATO and EU will probably look very much alike on the European map, with marginal exceptions. Until then, however, the two memberships will appear increasingly different. This temporary phenomenon may negatively affect the development of a European Security and Defence Identity related to both the EU and NATO.

The Atlantic Alliance, in an attempt to defuse Russian preoccupations and protests over its enlargement, has signed in May 1997, in Paris, an agreement establishing a new Permanent Joint Council with Russia. This agreement, if properly implemented, could give Moscow a very important, almost central role, in all Allied decisions pertaining to European Security. The first meetings of this new Council have identified a very large agenda and have started to work through it at a rapid and dynamic pace. Some significant results may be on the table already by the end of 1997, allowing for a more reasoned evaluation of its scope and effectiveness. The relationship between the EU and Russia did not establish a similar institutional mechanism.

By the end of 1997, NATO should also be able to wrap up its debate on a new Command structure. The reform aims at maintaining only 20 Allied Headquarters in Europe, out of the existing 65, while increasing their international composition. Work is underway to make the CJTF (*Combined Joint Task Forces*) concept work. Meanwhile, France has declared that it will not reintegrate fully the NATO military structure over disagreement on the degree of *européanization* that will be achieved by the NATO Commands. The main bone of contention has been that the NATO Southern Command will continue to be headed by an American *four stars* Admiral. Yet France has declared also that it will continue to work closely with NATO and will not oppose its planned reorganization.

Thus, NATO is rapidly changing. The enlargement process will expand its borders Eastward and later on, possibly, also in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union, while establishing a brand new and totally untested relationship with Russia. Yet, the geographical scope and the structural depth of these changes still are unclear. The Atlantic Council has

not defined the geographical, political and military limits of its future enlargement, leaving open all possible options, including the inclusion of Russia and/or Ukraine into the Alliance. Also the strategic, operational and economic consequences of the enlargement already planned remain undecided, as well as the division of burdens among the Allies. While the CJTF could open the way for a greater and more visible autonomous European role in the Alliance, the decision-making mechanisms remain confusing and possibly too slow and burdensome to be of any practical use. Most important, the political question of how and where the Europeans should attempt to put their act together has not been solved.

The program to develop a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) inside NATO, through the establishment of CJTF and through a stronger relationship between NATO and the WEU, laid down at the Berlin Atlantic Council in 1995, presupposes a greater operational flexibility of the Allied military structure (almost a kind of *variable geometry*), emphasizing the principle of the *coalition of the willing and able countries*. According to NATO authorities the Allied work on the Berlin decisions is proceeding speedily. Yet, the French decision not to reintegrate NATO fully, coupled with the suspicion that the so-called *europeanization* of the Alliance will end up being just a diplomatic lip service to some European political babbling, without military operational substance, increases the doubts on the viability and implementability of this formula.

The EU is enlarging at a slower pace, but is considering from the beginning a greater number of countries. The new Amsterdam Treaty, however, following the path of the previous Maastricht Treaty, has failed to establish new administrative, decision making and voting procedures to guarantee that an enlarged Union will remain at least as effective as the present one, and possibly more. At the same time, the eventual creation of a European Monetary Union, which could include from its beginning eight or ten of the present fifteen EU Members, may lead to a *de facto* two or three tiers enlarged EU, further complicating the development of a Common Foreign, Security and eventually Defence Policy. Also, the Amsterdam Conference has avoided any decision on the future merger between the EU and the WEU. The two organizations remain separate, thus fuelling further inefficiencies and delays into the European decision-making mechanism. This non-decision may diminish the probability of the establishment of an effective ESDI inside NATO. In fact, the analysis of a possible Joint European Action through NATO would involve too many decision making bodies.

The activation of such an initiative would normally start in the European Council of the EU, than it should proceed through the WEU Council which will *elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the EU which have defence implications*. The WEU shall act consistently with the guidelines established by the European Council and shall prepare the necessary arrangements to allow to participate also those Members of the EU which are not Members of the WEU and that are willing and able to take part in the proposed actions. Then, the WEU will present its package to the Atlantic Council which may take it up for a common (not necessarily European) Allied response, kill it or allow for the setting up of a European CJTF. One small problem to consider will be the possible participation to the proposed actions and to all relevant decisions of EU members which are not NATO Members (see above). In any case, moreover, the initiative would remain inside NATO, but (according to the WEU declaration annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty)) the WEU will develop *operational links with NATO for the planning, preparation and conduct of operations using NATO assets and capabilities under the political control and strategic direction of WEU*. It should be noted that the above statement does not contain the word *command* and that the word *control* is qualified by the adjective *political*. Therefore, it

suggests that the WEU could control politically a NATO-ESDI operations (using CJTF), and could help in its planning, but would not command nor control it in the military operational sense. The all-important command and control function seems to remain a NATO prerogative. Finally, according to this scheme, the relationship of the Joint Action with the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU would be at the very best far and indirect, depending on the useless and redundant bridging role of the WEU. It is not surprising, therefore, if the hopes attached to a new and central crisis management role of the WEU are regularly dismissed. A direct relationship between the EU and NATO would be much easier and straightforward. Yet, this obvious solution has not been implemented.

Meanwhile, the repeated failures of the WEU to put its act together in crisis situations, from the African Great Lakes to Albania, and the decision of four key WEU Members (France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy) to establish a separate structure for armaments cooperation, distinct from the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), confirm the little importance and priority given to this organisation, as well as a lingering scepticism over its usefulness. The paradox is that, from one side the common military institutions are striving to achieve greater relevance and operational flexibility, but on the other side their actual use in crises is frequently delayed or made impossible by increasingly different perceptions and priorities of the Member countries. While in theory many decisions could be made utilizing procedures like the constructive abstention or other consensus mechanisms, *de facto* the requirement of a unanimous vote is punctiliously confirmed.

Yet, in the real world, some events suggest a possible evolution of the situation towards more flexible and ad hoc solutions which may in turn influence the changes going on inside NATO and the EU. First, the decision of some able and willing countries to put together a military intervention in Albania, under the auspices of the UN, has demonstrated the possibility of conducting a successful peace-keeping mission in Europe without direct US participation or backing. Second, the development of independent European multilateral forces (from the Eurocorps to the Eurofor and the Euromarfor), committed in principle both to NATO and to the WEU, but practically autonomous from both of them, underlines a very empirical approach to operational military integration among a limited group of countries. Implicitly, it suggests also some dissatisfaction towards the existing alliances and command structures, as if those would not, or could not, fully meet all the political and security requirements of their Members. Third, the already quoted Common Armaments Organization of four WEU countries could favour a badly needed reorganization and liberalization of the European armaments market in line with the recommendations of the EU Commission.

These evolutions should be seen in the light of changing NATO roles. The Alliance has been for almost fifty years the uncontournable centrepiece of European security and the living proof of the strong Euro-American relationship. Today this same Alliance is perceived more as an insurance against unforeseen negative developments in the security field and as a kind of universal military tool to fix a wide range of separate and sometime conflicting problems. The large array of uses conceived for the Alliance and the still undefined nature of its new *raison d'être* (after the end of the Cold War) could rapidly undermine its effectiveness.

Where the changes are most visible is in the Mediterranean region. They did not come about easily nor without costs. NATO's crisis management policies were (and still are) not clearly defined. The commitment of NATO forces in Bosnia has followed years of bitter contrasts among the Europeans and with the US and has been made possible only by a significant change of the American policy. Finally however, the Balkans have been the

theatre of the first ever military NATO operation. This has been a peace-making and peace-keeping operation under the mandate of the UN Security Council: something very different from the scenarios usually conceived by the NATO Commands, and outside the area of Allied responsibility defined by the Washington Treaty. The many missions developed by the Alliance (from Sharp Guard to Deny Flight, Close Air Support and Air Strikes, up to I-FOR and S-FOR) have been put under the responsibility of various NATO Commands, according to their composition, nature and importance, or even according to political expediency. None of these Commands, however, had been conceived to perform these tasks. Some of their assigned Forces were not lent by Allied countries, nor by NATO Partners, but by Third World countries. At the same time, some of the national Forces normally earmarked for the operations of those same Commands were not made available to them, nor called upon. Also the logistical chain and the availability of bases for NATO operations, was decided case by case, following specific negotiations between the NATO Commands, the concerned NATO Members and other non-NATO countries. Finally, from the political and institutional point of view, while formally NATO's commitment had been decided by the Atlantic Council, the practical, day-to-day decisions and the general political and military strategies to be implemented were the responsibility of a different, ad hoc body, the Contact Group: a kind of informal directoire convening only some NATO Members and Russia. While these experiences have confirmed the usefulness, effectiveness and adaptability of NATO's military structures to unforeseen and urgent requirements, they also suggest that the existing decision-making and Command structure, as well as the legal frame established by the Washington Treaty have been somewhat distorted and require urgent repairs, especially if NATO shall continue to perform tasks of this nature.

These are just some of reasons why NATO's future role is open to debate. In the North, NATO confronts the question of the three Baltic Republics and of its relationship with Finland and Sweden, members of the EU but not of the Alliance (nor of the WEU, for the time being). The enlargement of the Alliance to Poland will certainly increase NATO's visibility in the Baltic Sea. The Swedish refusal to become Member of the Alliance could be reversed by domestic political changes. At the same time, the likely development of a deeper security relationship with Russia would recommend the search for a new kind of security model for the entire Northern region, less confrontational and at the same time more responsive to Russian priorities than has been the case until now. Some think in terms of *indirect* security guarantees and of specific arms control arrangements limiting the freedom of peacetime NATO deployments. Others suggest specific political and military regional arrangements, binding together all the Baltic countries including Russia and the USA, fully or partially at variance with NATO. In any case, these scenarios hint at the possibility of *differentiated* security regimes, possibly incompatible with the military and political coherence and cohesiveness of the Alliance.

The Central NATO region also could be negatively affected by future developments, especially after the completion of the enlargement process. Its main problem are the failure of the reintegration of France, the declining value of its military assets (and national defence budgets), the rapid decrease of the Allied stationed troops in Germany and the exceptional military status of the new German Lander (under the 4+2 Agreement). It is somewhat surprising that NATO Forces will deploy into Poland or the Czech Republic while at the same time only German soldiers will be allowed in the former East Germany, and the general level of Allied Forces and capabilities will decline. Certainly, the threat has also greatly diminished, yet this does not provide a fully satisfactory answer. Why, then, to enlarge at all, and to plan for a dramatic refurbishing of the military forces of the new Members? How

to assess the future defensive credibility of the Alliance in the changed situation? Moreover, should a Russian threat surface again, first of all in the nuclear field (conventional forces requiring a much longer and costly rebuilding), what kind of extended deterrence posture will be available, and what kind of *coupling*? Understandably, under the present circumstances the Alliance is not keen to confront such exacting questions, also because they appear somewhat remote, thus pointless. Yet, their seriousness could be abruptly revealed by some sudden political change, over which NATO may have very limited influence.

In the Southern region, the conflict between Greece and Turkey (and on Cyprus) is warming up again (America's *wonder negotiator*, Richard Hollbrook, has been recently nominated to mediate among the parties). The domestic Turkish situation is highly unstable. The Balkan countries are calling for a greater NATO presence in the area (eventually through further enlargement of its membership) which could mean a greater military involvement too. The continuing volatility of stability and security in the Black Sea and Caucasus areas is of immediate interest to NATO even if, for the time being, no NATO Forces will be deployed there with the exception of Turkey and of a limited naval presence in the Black Sea. The Mediterranean dialogue set up by NATO with six countries of the area (Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Egypt, Israel and Jordan) has overcome the initial misgivings created by the foolish remarks of a past Secretary General on Islam. Today NATO does not identify any specific security or crisis management role of the Alliance in the region (with the exception of the Balkans). On the contrary, it conceives its role as one of accompanying and possibly supplementing the initiatives taken by others, be it the European Union or some Member country (first of all the USA). This apparently unpretentious approach, however, has its own drawbacks. The decision to limit the NATO dialogue to six countries, for instance, has the advantage of bypassing some of the more assertive hardliners and could simplify the agreement on a number of issues. But the linkage with the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue (which is a multilateral forum including practically all the riparian countries) deprives the NATO dialogue of its selectivity and has already caused the failure of some proposed confidence-building measures. Equally, the leading military role played by the Americans in the Mediterranean region could backfire and void the security dialogue exactly when it would be more needed: in periods of crisis and controversy. Moreover, the linkage established between the two Mediterranean initiatives could adversely affect the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue of the EU.

The US NATO policy is full of possible pitfalls. The Americans have unwaveringly pressed for a rapid enlargement of the Alliance to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, while denying it to Slovenia and Rumania, for no other serious reasons than their domestic political perceptions. The US Government is now claiming that the enlargement process should go on with further candidates, projecting a second and possibly a third wave in which other countries as well should be considered, including the three Baltic Republics. At the same time it is attempting to charge the greater share of the enlargement costs on its European allies, both old and new. It maintains that NATO should shoulder greater responsibilities for the stability of the Euro-mediterranean area, but it also reserves its position on each single crisis, on the basis of its national political agenda. It has accepted in principle the perspective of the ESDI inside NATO, but it actively opposes the possibility of a political European group inside NATO (sometimes scorning it as the *ganging up of the Europeans*). It has expressed many reservations against a greater operational role of the WEU and strongly resists the perspective of a confluence of the WEU in the EU and of a direct relationship between the EU and NATO.

The Europeans have their own faults. Their failure to develop a more credible and effective CFSP of the EU cannot be attributed simply to American diffidence. The WEU is far from becoming a significant security and defence organization. Policy differences among the major European countries have negatively affected the overall European performance in the various Balkan crises. Budgetary cuts and the persistence of strong protectionist industrial policies in the defence sector are greatly diminishing the European ability to act independently from the Americans. More on the point, the practical failure of the Intergovernmental Conference on the second pillar issues (and especially on Defence and the perspective of a fusion of the EU/WEU Treaties) means that no European Defence Identity will be developed, for the time being, from the EU/WEU core, but that the process may only develop in an incremental and very empiric way inside NATO. This greatly limits the short term perspectives and enormously increases the relevance of NATO possible evolutions. At the same time, those interested in the growth of a European Identity should consider with greater caution those developments that may increase the elements of structural or political incoherence between NATO and the EU.

A problem is that the European strategies towards this kind of development are not well harmonized. The idea of developing an ESDI inside NATO has a different meaning in the various countries. France has followed this path half-heartily and only as a second best alternative to its original idea of developing a fully independent European defence core around the Franco-German axis. Later on, the French position underwent more uncertain developments when President Jacques Chirac decided to press for the a full reintegration inside NATO: the following failure of this move has practically left France, for the time being, without clear and precise options. Great Britain, on the contrary, did sponsor the ESDI inside NATO because it didn't want the development of an independent European military perspective alienating the USA. Equally, its insistence on maintaining the EU and the WEU well separate was probably due more to its belief that only NATO should be given defensive responsibilities in Europe than to its mistrust towards a *federalist* development of the EU. More surprisingly, even Germany, at the Amsterdam Conference, did not support the proposal of a WEU merger inside the EU, contrary to a common document it had signed a few months before with France, Italy and the Benelux countries. Probably, however, this German position (which effectively killed the proposal), should be explained on the basis of short term, tactical calculations made by Chancellor Helmut Kohl to increase the likelihood of the success of the European and Monetary Union. In sum, it would be wrong to say that the ESDI, inside or outside NATO, is in trouble only because the Americans have moved to undercut the Europeans: all the major European countries have largely helped to accomplish the same failure.

All of the above means that the general outlook of NATO's future and of the future security relations between the US and Europe is neither clear nor fully satisfactory. This leave us with the need to identify some possible future scenarios of the NATO-Europe relationship, starting from the possible evolutions of the Atlantic Alliance.

We will discuss five possible alternatives:

- 1- the Security Alliance
- 2- the Variable Geometry Alliance
- 3- the Special Groups Alliance
- 4- the Global Alliance
- 5- the Euro-Atlantic Alliance

Each alternative has different probabilities to be actually implemented: my personal bet is that these probabilities decrease from the first to the last entry of the above listing.

Each of them would have different consequences on the ESDI and on Euro-Atlantic relations.

### **The Security Alliance**

Many signals point in this direction. Among them stand up the definite intensification of the Partnership for Peace programs and the upgrading of the common multilateral institutions linking the PfP partners to NATO. Another is the creation of the Permanent Joint Council between NATO and Russia. Should NATO continue to be involved in European crises, like Bosnia, it is likely that its relationship with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) will also grow and become more important politically.

At the same time it may seem quite likely that the enlargement process will not be matched by a parallel and commensurate growth of NATO's military capabilities. In fact, the debate in the Atlantic Council is going the opposite direction. The first calculations made more than a year ago by a RAND study were suggesting the necessity of new NATO military investments ranging from more than 100 to about 36 billion dollars in a period of 10 to 13 years. Already the calculations made by the State Department for the US Congress, at the beginning of 1997, choose to present only the inferior amount in order not to upset the future ratification process. It seems very likely that the Atlantic Council, deciding by consensus, will figure a much inferior set of assumptions and numbers, and will leave the implementation of the spending plans to the goodwill of the Members, not even attempting to identify some clear targets (with the possible exception of some mandatory programs to be implemented by the newcomers). In this case, however, the overall military credibility of the Alliance will diminish and its defensive strategy will be largely based on the assumption of a permanently reduced strategic threat.

Such an Alliance would almost inevitably experience a loss of political and strategic relevance which in turn would entail a parallel loss of political cohesion among its Members. The traditional paramount importance given to the Atlantic relationship over and above all the other possible disagreements (for instance on trade matters, or on the attitudes towards *rogue* states, etc.) will disappear. The Alliance will not perform the same, almost automatic, Euro-American consensus building role it did ensure many times in the past.

At the same time, the smooth working of this model requires that the relationship between NATO and Russia (and especially between the USA and Russia) remains steady and continues to deepen. While this does not necessarily means that a new bipolar, Russian-American, directorate will be imposed on the Alliance, it will certainly indicate a strong possibility that all the major European countries (and particularly Germany and France) will also consider their relations with Moscow with greater care. In other words, Russia will become an integral part of the European political scene on a par with the other major European powers. Article V of the Atlantic Treaty will loose most of its meaning, while the utilization of NATO for crisis management operations will depend on all-European political agreements or will simply supplement the initiative of some ad hoc coalition.

As far as Europe is concerned, this scenario will probably favour a parallel, and possibly even larger Eastward enlargement of the European Union, provided that a workable economic agreement will be reached between the EU and Russia. While it is unlikely that the EU could regress to some kind of free-trade area only, it is also much less probable that it will develop a strong political and even less security identity. On the same vein, the

evolution of NATO towards a security alliance will probably ensure that the WEU will be put in some kind of arcane political recess, not to upset the new European security scene.

### **The Variable Geometry Alliance**

While most of the above mentioned trends are likely to develop anyway, they could also combine with some other developments to produce a different result. First of all, while the relationship with Russia might continue to grow, it is also likely that the USA and some of its European Allies will maintain somewhat different or separate global interests and priorities. The NATO-Russia relationship will be far from being all-embracing, also on European affairs. It will allow for a more relaxed attitude towards defence and security, but it will not rule out strategic competition over the long term.

At the same time, the eventual launching of the European Monetary Union will *de facto* identify a *harder core* of the European Union, partially shielded from the watering down effects of the enlargement process. A kind of *deepening* will occur which could strengthen also the other pillars of the European Union, including foreign policy, security and defence. Moreover, should the future EMU embrace almost all the founder Members of the EU and some of their more significant partners, including eventually Great Britain, its evolution towards a *hard core* with security and defence ambitions will be much more simple and likely.

In this case, it is possible that also the Atlantic Alliance will *de facto* develop a kind of *variable geometry*, possibly based on a conceptual evolution of the CJTF, which could assure different levels of cooperation and solidarity between the USA and its various Allies. The Alliance could for instance reorganize its specific defensive role taking into account a specially strong relationship between the USA and the European *hard core*. Also, it could allow for ESDI based crisis management operations.

On the negative side, however, a *variable geometry* Alliance which would not identify and recognize the special role of the European *hard core* could end up developing a number of different security levels, undermining the overall credibility of Article V guarantees. It would not be difficult to imagine, for instance, a Northern Tier Alliance inside NATO which would be more security oriented (more similar to the previous scenario), while a Southern Tier Alliance could be more defence oriented. The first could see a very limited presence and commitment of the American Forces while the second would be based on a very significant American military presence in the Mediterranean.

These two sub-options suggest a very different Euro-American relationship and could have very dissimilar consequences on the ESDI. The first sub-option (the *hard core*) is coherent with the development of a European defence identity: indeed, it will be much more probable if such an identity will develop. The second sub option on the contrary (the *differentiated security*) could have disruptive effects on European solidarity and would enlarge the perceptions gap among the Europeans.

### **The Special Groups Alliance**

The previous scenarios may appear somewhat too clearcut and excessive if we take into account what is really happening on the European military and defence scene. The common European identity is not developing, neither inside nor outside NATO, but many bi- and multilateral defence and military agreements are worked out by the European countries. At the same time there is a clear understanding of the political importance of

maintaining some degree of common European security and foreign policy perspectives of the EU, while also NATO should be maintained at an acceptable level of military viability. In sum, while no European country seems ready to commit itself to a significant qualitative jump towards common defence, none of them would like to see this perspective disappear altogether and all are convinced of the opportunity to increase their military integration and interoperability.

This could allow for the development of some special relationships of more interconnected countries inside the EU as well as in the Alliance: not a single *hard core*, but various smaller and less cohesive *special groups*, which may differently combine according to specific issues, but that would nurture the long term perspective of a larger and stronger European identity far off in the future.

The problem of this scenario is the role of the United States. It would probably be present along each group and it may play, in that way, some kind of unifying and equalizer role, similar to the one it played in the past, at the beginning of the European construction. Alternatively however it may apply a differentiated and discriminate attention to the various groups according to its national priorities, thus accelerating the process of *differentiated security* discussed above. This scenario may see the development of a competition among the Europeans to be chosen as preferential partners by the USA.

Europe by itself would be probably unable to influence the Americans either way, being too weak and fragmented. The future of the ESDI would linger on the long term strategic assumptions made in Washington.

## **The Global Alliance**

Irrespective of the possible European developments and of the agreement with Russia, the USA is confronting a difficult problem of global governance. The Americans alone cannot mobilize enough economic and political resources to maintain a well organized and peaceful global system. Also militarily, the US forces, at least for budgetary reasons, are partially dependent from the cooperation of the Allies. NATO, and a strong alliance with Europe are an important factor of continuing American supremacy.

To be fully coherent with this objective, however, NATO and the Europeans should accept a progressive *globalization* of their Atlantic relationship and of their responsibilities. The Alliance should no more be centred on Europe alone: the present *out-of-area* would become its main *raison d'être*. Such a development, however, should overcome many obstacles. Among them we can rapidly list the following: differences of perceptions and interests, European unwillingness to fight far away battles, declining defence budgets, etc.

On the practical side, such a development could greatly strengthen the direct relationship between the UN Security Council and NATO, but may require a reform of the Security Council itself to make it more coherent with the overall American objective. It may also create the image, if not the reality, of a global North-South confrontation which could negatively affect the acceptance of the global order objective and possibly even deny its feasibility.

On the European side, it would be perfectly coherent with the development of an ESDI inside NATO provided that such European identity would remain politically dependent from the American leadership. Thus, no European defence identity should develop inside an independent European Union. Alternatively, this scenario could accommodate the development of a relatively small *directoire* inside the Alliance, where

some of the stronger European countries would trade their political independence for a greater role inside the new global system.

### **The Euro-American Alliance**

This scenario is the most cherished by a majority of the Europeans, but is also the most difficult to achieve. It would require at the same time the good disposition of the USA and the strong and coherent will of the Europeans. It would probably entail big rewards as far as global governance, European security and crisis management ability are concerned, but it would have to overcome many suspicions and well established behaviours. I would not attempt its discussion, but simply observe that its appeal seems to be inversely proportional to its feasibility: that leaves many doubts on the political and historical stature of our present leadership.