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**DIVISION OF LABOUR BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE IN CONNECTION WITH
PEACE-KEEPING**

by Gian Luca Burci

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1. Introduction

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)² emerged from the cold war as an exception among European regional organizations. Whereas the other European bodies were the product of a "bloc mentality" and attempted to be mutually exclusive and antagonistic, the OSCE was from its outset a veritable bridge between Eastern and Western Europe. In this capacity, it was able to develop the core of fundamental common values codified in the Helsinki Accords of 1975. This unique position, as well as the broad membership of the OSCE, justify the ambitions of its members about its role in the new European security architecture, which largely found expression in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990³ and the Helsinki Summit Declaration of 1992.⁴

Within the European scenario, the end of the cold war led to the dissolution of the then-existing Eastern European institutions and called for a rethinking of the raison d'être and the role of Western European organizations. The role of the United Nations (UN) within Europe was also affected by the changed political circumstances; whereas the strategic importance of Europe for the two superpowers during the cold war had made it a taboo area for the UN, this obstacle largely disappeared and was soon replaced by frequent requests for UN involvement in crises in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the ex-Soviet area.

The prospect of a growing UN involvement at various levels in a number of conflicts worldwide, as well as the new possibilities opened for regional organizations by the end of the cold war, called for a rationalization of the division of labour in the maintenance of international security, in which the Security Council and the Secretary-General could rely on a number of strengthened and cooperative regional institutions acting within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, while preserving at the same time the primacy of the UN.

The OSCE placed itself at the crossroad of this development in July 1992, when its members declared, at the Helsinki Summit, their understanding that the OSCE was "a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations", and that the Organization "will work together closely with the United Nations especially in preventing and settling conflicts".⁵ It was the first occasion in which a regional organization had made such a policy statement. At the same time, the Helsinki Summit decided to boost the operational capabilities of the OSCE by providing for the possibility of OSCE peace-keeping operations (PKOs), independently or in cooperation with other European or transatlantic organizations.

The configuration of the relationship between the OSCE and the UN, and of a possible

¹ Legal Officer, Office of the Legal Counsel, United Nations. The views expressed are only those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

² For ease of exposition, only the acronym "OSCE" will be used, even when reference is being made to events or documents relating to the "CSCE" before its change in appellation at the Budapest Summit in 1994.

³ See ILM, Vol XXX, 1991, pp. 190-228.

⁴ See ILM, Vol. XXXI, 1992, pp. 1385-1420.

⁵ *Supra*, note 3, p. 1392. This statement of understanding was welcomed in a statement made on 28 January 1993 by the President of the UN Security Council on behalf of its members. UN doc. S/25996.

division of labour in the peace-keeping area for a more rational use of their comparative advantages, is a function of a number of factors, such as the following:

- The mandate and capabilities of the OSCE in the peace-keeping area, particularly the kind of operations envisaged, and the suitability of the OSCE institutional structure for the conduct of military field operations;
- The relationship between the OSCE and the UN, within the broader context of the relations between the UN and regional organizations;
- What kind of "peace-keeping" is or should be carried out within the OSCE area, in view of the peculiarities of the European and ex-Soviet context, and whether the OSCE and the UN are suited to deal effectively with such peculiarities.

2. Mandate and role of the OSCE in peace-keeping

The decision of the Helsinki Summit 1992 to give the OSCE an explicit and quite elaborate mandate in the peace-keeping area represents an attempt by its Members to ensure the centrality of the then Conference in the new European scenario, by giving it a more structured institutional setting and equipping it with a full complement of instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management. There was a definite preference by non-NATO countries, in particular the Russian Federation, to promote the OSCE as the primary European organization in the field of security as a counterbalance to the potential domination in the European theatre by NATO and WEU as the military agencies of the victors of the cold war.

It emerged during the preparatory work to the Helsinki Summit that there was a consensus as to the politically legitimizing role that the OSCE should have played, as the only pan-European organization, in authorizing and mandating non-UN peace-keeping within its area. As to its operative role, there were more marked differences between countries advocating an autonomous role of the OSCE, and countries which aimed at a pragmatic division of roles based on the evidently higher credibility of NATO as a security guarantee mechanism, not affected by the presence of the Russian Federation. NATO could have then drawn from non-NATO resources through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) so as to make possible the involvement of all OSCE participants.⁶

The decisions of the Helsinki Summit seem to have chosen the more ambitious course, and devote to OSCE peace-keeping ample space within Section III, entitled "Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Management (Including Fact-Finding and Rapporteur Missions and CSCE Peacekeeping), Peaceful Settlement of Disputes". Peace-keeping by the OSCE is thus seen as one of the options, alone or in combination with others, on a continuum of functions and resources aiming at the maintenance of peace and security within the OSCE area. Even though the peace-keeping functions of the OSCE are analyzed in the contribution of Prof. Ronzitti, some remarks are relevant for the assessment of the potential for cooperation between the OSCE and the UN.

At the outset, the possible functions and terms of reference of a peace-keeping operation (PKO) by the OSCE cover many activities which have been discharged by first- and second-generation PKOs launched by the United Nations. The exemplification set out in paragraph (19) spans from the monitoring of cease-fires to the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance to refugees. This is coupled by the provision that PKOs can be composed by both military and civilian personnel. Another point of comparison with recent UN operations lies in

⁶ CSCE Sanctioned Peacekeeping, Discussion paper by the US, 13 May 1992.

the explicit provision, contained in paragraph (17), that PKOs can be deployed in conflicts within participating States, besides international conflicts. This is an important corollary of the comprehensive concept of security, which has become a landmark among OSCE commitments. This concept gives full relevance to violations of human rights and democratic institutions which may trigger OSCE's involvement, as stated by the 1991 Moscow meeting on the human dimension as well as in the mechanism on the human dimension. In view of the fact that conflicts in post-cold war Europe have largely been of a predominantly internal nature, the absence for the OSCE of a statutory limit comparable to that of Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter is an important consideration in the analysis of possible interactions between the two institutions.

A second element worth noting is the strictly consensual nature of OSCE peace-keeping. The Helsinki decisions emphasize that OSCE PKOs will not entail enforcement action and that they will only be conducted impartially and on the basis of a number of commitments by the parties concerned, such as the explicit acceptance of an OSCE presence and a commitment by the parties to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. The decision to establish a PKO, as well as subsequent revisions of its mandate, have to be adopted by consensus, which is the strongest safeguard for the State or States concerned. This may hinder timely decisions and may give excessive leverage to the States more directly involved or parties to the conflict. The limitations implicit in the consensus rule are even more evident when one considers that the policy-making organs of the OSCE are all plenary organs, in which consensus must be reached among 53 participants. At the same time, the establishment of a PKO by consensus should create a particularly strong sense of identification and commitment for the participating States, and should thus militate in favour of a substantial political support for the operation. The exceptions to the consensus rule are, for the moment, quite limited. In the area under consideration, a role can be played by the emergency mechanism, which allows the convening of a meeting of the Senior Council upon a request by a participating State endorsed by at least any twelve other States. This mechanism can seize the Council of a situation in a way which could eventually lead to the launch of a PKO.

Another important element in an evaluation of the potential for cooperation between UN and OSCE is the institutional framework for peace-keeping by the latter. According to paragraph (26) of the Helsinki decisions, a request to the CSO through the Chairman-in-Office (CIO) can only come from one or more participating States, to the exclusion of the Secretary-General. The organs involved in the planning, establishment and conduct of a PKO are rather numerous: the supreme policy-making authority resides in the (Ministerial) Council, or the CSO/Senior Council acting as its agent; the overall operational guidance pertains to the CIO, who is assisted by an ad hoc group established at the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC),⁷ and who nominates the Head of Mission subject to endorsement by the CSO/Senior Council. Mention is also made of the Consultative Committee of the CPC, which should assist in the preparation of the terms of reference of the operation and ensure continuous liaison between the operation and participating States. The chain of command thus appears somehow fragmented, with a number of organs or sub-organs of a political nature controlling various stages of the operation. Subsequent decisions taken at OSCE meetings have not altered this internal division of labour. The primary policy-making role thus pertains to the Senior Council, whereas the main operative role belongs to the CIO.

⁷ The ad hoc group includes the Troika as well as States contributing to the operation. From its composition, it seems that this organ can exert a remarkable political influence on the conduct of the operation, going beyond the "overall operational support" and monitoring provided for in paragraph (39).

An element worth underlining is the virtual invisibility of the OSCE Secretary-General in the decisions in question. Unlike the UN Secretary-General under Article 99 of the Charter, he does not have the authority to bring to the attention of the CIO or the intergovernmental organs of the OSCE “matters which...may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security”. Moreover, he does not have a specific operational or administrative role in the implementation of the decisions of the Council/CSO, in total contrast with UN PKOs which are under the operational control and command of the Secretary-General. The fact that the operational control resides with the CIO places the conduct of a PKO in the hands of a political organ which changes every year, and raises doubts as to the consistent management of a PKO by subsequent participating States with differing policies. The fact that the exercise of operational authority is so different in the OSCE as compared to the UN has to be taken into account when assessing their potentialities for cooperation.⁸

Finally, OSCE peace-keeping is to be exercised in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and with due regard to UN responsibilities in this field. Paragraph (2) of Section IV, devoted *inter alia* to relations with international organizations, adds that “[t]he rights and responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council remain unaffected in their entirety”. This stated respect for the leading role of the United Nations calls for cooperation and harmonization of policies between the two organizations. Harmonization, in turn, means that the four permanent members of the Security Council that are also OSCE participating States, should ensure the consistency of their policies in both institutions. This has not always been the case, and it is another element to assess when analyzing possible forms of cooperation.

3. Relations between the OSCE and the United Nations

As the only body which has so far given itself the label of "regional arrangement" in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter, the relations between the OSCE and the UN has to be seen precisely in the context of that Chapter and the policy directions which the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General are in the process of formulating.

An interest in promoting and rationalizing the relations with regional organizations has emerged within the policy-making bodies and the Secretariat of the UN since the early 90's, in view of the increasing involvement of the organization in peace-keeping, peace-making and preventive diplomacy activities around the world.

From the point of view of the Secretary-General, the two major policy statements concerning cooperation with regional organizations are: "an Agenda for Peace" of 1992⁹ and its supplement of 1995.¹⁰ In both documents, the Secretary-General reconfirms the principle of the primary responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international security. At the same time, he advocates a flexible pattern of forms of cooperation with regional organizations, not inspired to an unrealistic fixed universal model, but rather tailored to the diverse capabilities of the various organizations in question, and the requirements of specific

⁸ Several authors have called for a strengthening of the role of the Secretary-General, and the attribution of powers parallel to those enjoyed by the UN Secretary-General under Article 99 of the Charter. See for example V.Y. Ghebali, "C.S.C.E Basic Needs Before the 1994 Budapest Review Meeting", *Studia Diplomatica*, XLVII (1994), 73.

⁹ B. Boutros-Ghali, "an Agenda for Peace", 1992, pp. 35-38.

¹⁰ Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 1995, UN doc. A/50/60 - S/1995/1, pp. 20-21.

situations. Cooperation must in any case be grounded on certain general principles, namely: agreed mechanisms for consultations; the primacy of the United Nations, which requires inter alia that regional bodies not assume a level of UN support not yet agreed upon by its Member States; clear division of labour to avoid overlaps and institutional rivalry; and consistency of policies by States members of both organizations .

Throughout the two documents, a certain caution concerning the scope of the authority that regional organizations should appropriately exercise is clearly detectable. The 1995 Supplement, in particular, sounds a cautionary note in highlighting the conditions that regional bodies are to meet in order to effectively assist, rather than hamper, the efforts of the UN. Recent experiences have confirmed the belief of the Secretary-General that the overall primacy of the UN should be the paramount consideration, and that the integration of regional bodies in an overall security structure should be “guided” along political and operational lines to be established by the Security Council and the General Assembly.

From a policy-making perspective, the Security Council has made a number of general statements concerning cooperation with regional organizations, mainly as part of the process of review of the recommendations contained in the Agenda for Peace and its supplement.¹¹ The Council has stressed the important role that regional agencies and arrangements could and should play in the maintenance of international security by inviting them to enhance their capabilities and to consider ways and means for assisting the UN; by undertaking to support their peace-making and, where appropriate, peace-keeping efforts within their areas; and by calling for effective coordination with the United Nations and for assistance by the Secretary-General in developing capacities for preventive action, peace-making and peace-keeping. At the same time, as in the case of the Secretary-General, the approach of the Council is rather flexible and "non-committal", in view of the wide differences in mandate and capabilities among existing agencies, and the well-known reluctance of the Council to enter into substantive commitments of a general nature. While not minimizing the role of regional organizations, the Council does not seem to commit itself to a general philosophy as to the division of labour and the distribution of jurisdiction between them and the UN. Peace-keeping, in particular, is not highlighted as an area in which regional bodies are expected to play a major or somehow privileged role.

Finally, the General Assembly has adopted, at its forty-ninth session on 9 December 1994, resolution 49/57 containing a "Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security", which had been negotiated within the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization upon an initiative of the Russian Federation.¹² The Declaration is in part a solemn restatement of the principles of Chapter VIII. It also aims at maintaining the flexible approach noted above between the prerogatives of the UN, the autonomy and independence of regional arrangements, and the importance attached to the consistent respect of the basic Charter principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention.

The Declaration also highlights a number of areas in which States members of regional arrangements should concentrate their efforts (confidence-building, prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes), and contains in paragraph 10 the following provision concerning peace-

¹¹ Of particular interest concerning cooperation with regional organizations and arrangements are the statements of the President of the Security Council contained in UN docs. S/25184 of 28 January 1993; S/25859 of 28 May 1993; and S/PRST/1995/9 of 22 February 1995.

¹² See the preparatory works in the reports of the Committee: UN docs A/47/33; A/48/33; and A/49/33.

keeping:

"Regional arrangements or agencies are encouraged to consider, in their fields of competence, the possibility of establishing and training groups of military and civilian observers, fact-finding missions and contingents of peace-keeping forces, for use as appropriate, in coordination with the United Nations and, when necessary, under the authority or with the authorization of the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter".

This rather open-ended statement is, so far, the most explicit policy indication on peace-keeping by regional organizations in relation to the functions of the UN. It foresees autonomous PKOs by regional bodies or, in unspecified circumstances, regional peace-keeping forces under the legal and political umbrella of the UN.

The institutional relations between the OSCE and the UN have obviously been enhanced by the decisions adopted at the 1992 Helsinki Summit and by the growing instances of cooperation between the two organizations in central and eastern Europe and Asia. The two organizations concluded a "Framework for Cooperation and Coordination" in May 1993,¹³ which sets out general parameters for cooperation both at Headquarters level as well as in the field. It should, once again, be stressed that contacts and exchanges take place, under this arrangement, mainly between the Secretariat of the UN and the Permanent Mission of the country holding the OSCE chairmanship. The OSCE Secretary-General is described as playing a supportive role, in particular with regard to contacts in Vienna, since there are no OSCE observer missions in New York and Geneva. Besides the customary provisions concerning exchange of information and consultations, specific reference is made to PKOs planned or launched by either side, in particular: prior consultations concerning timing, terms of reference and composition; the possibility of joint reports; mutual assistance in the field; and examination of the possibility of joint missions.

The General Assembly has inscribed since its 47th session in its agenda an item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe"¹⁴ and, by resolution 48/5 of 22 October 1993, granted observer status to the OSCE. Such observer status, together with the 1993 framework agreement, constitute the institutional parameters of cooperation between the two organizations. These are reinforced and complemented, at the political level, by the provision contained in the 1994 Budapest Summit Declaration, that OSCE "participating States may in exceptional circumstances jointly decide that a dispute will be referred to the ... Security Council on behalf of the CSCE",¹⁵ and at the practical level, by the informal understanding that there should be a pragmatic division of labour between the organizations based on a case-by-case approach.

At the field level, the OSCE has not yet launched a full-fledged PKO. Thus, for the sake of analysis one could consider the long-term missions deployed in several countries, as well as other field assignments carried out by the OSCE, as falling within a broad definition of "peace-

¹³ UN doc. A/48/185 of 26 May 1993. The exchange of letter was signed on behalf of OSCE by the Foreign Minister of Sweden as CIO.

¹⁴ Under this item, the Assembly adopted without a vote resolutions 47/10 of 28 October 1992; 48/19 of 16 November 1993; 49/13 of 15 November 1994; and 50/... The Secretary-General, at the request of the Assembly, has submitted a number of reports spelling out the modalities and areas of cooperation. See UN docs A/48/549 of 2 November 1993; A/49/529 of 17 October 1994; and A/50/564 of 16 October 1995.

¹⁵ See ILM, Vol XXXIV, 1995, p.768.

keeping". Even from this broader perspective, the relations and the division of labour between the two organizations have been altogether marginal. OSCE long-term missions have maintained contacts with the UN PKOs deployed in the same areas (e.g. Georgia, Tajikistan, Yugoslavia and Macedonia). Relations have mainly consisted in the OSCE observing UN-sponsored meetings of the parties; exchange of information and reports between the respective missions; logistical support by the UN to the OSCE (e.g. in Sarajevo); and technical advice by the UN Department for Peace-keeping Operations to the OSCE High-Level Planning Group for the PKO in Nagorny Karabakh, which completed its initial work on the concept of the operation and its rules of engagement in 1995. In Georgia, the two organizations have implemented the model of alternate lead in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which turned out to be an unusual arrangement since the two conflicts are somehow part of the same problem. Both organizations, moreover, are cooperating in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The OSCE has established a mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is responsible for military confidence-building measures; the supervision of the electoral process; and monitoring of respect of human rights. The UN is deploying an International Police Force and some human rights monitors, and acts through UNHCR to assist returnees and displaced persons. In addition, both organizations are closely associated with the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council.¹⁶

It has been noted that, notwithstanding the good general framework for cooperation, at the implementation level the lack of a clear division of labour and prestige considerations have sometimes led to a competitive rather than cooperative relationship. In Georgia, for example, the UN has refused to be represented in South Ossetia, while the OSCE has never gained a meaningful presence in Abkhazia. There have been no joint reports, and the UN has consistently rejected the idea of joint high-level representation.¹⁷

Finally, it is worth mentioning the deployment by the OSCE and the European Union of Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) in countries neighbouring Yugoslavia, in order to assist them in the implementation of the mandatory sanctions against that country. The SAMs and SAMCOMM have established a sophisticated communications system with UN Headquarters and kept daily contacts with the Secretariat of the Sanctions Committee on Yugoslavia, ensuring a constant interaction between political consideration and practical requirements. This exercise has so far been the most successful in terms of cooperation and division of labour between the OSCE and the UN.¹⁸

4. The challenges of peace-keeping within the OSCE area

An assessment of the possible division of labour in the peace-keeping field between the UN and the OSCE cannot be made in a vacuum, but has to take into account the political landscape in the geographical area of competence of the OSCE, and the challenges that peace-keeping, as a form of conflict management, faces in such area.

¹⁶ The report of the London Peace Implementation Conference is reproduced in UN doc. S/1995/1029, 12 December 1995. The concept of operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is contained in decision MC(5).DEC/1, adopted at the December 1995 Budapest Ministerial Council, and reproduced in UN doc. S/1995/1030, 12 December 1995.

¹⁷ W. Kemp, "The OSCE and the UN: A Closer Relationship", in Helsinki Monitor 6 (1995), p.26.

¹⁸ For the establishment and terms of reference of the Office of the Sanctions Coordinator for the SAMs and SAMCOMM are contained in UN doc S/25272, 10 February 1993.

As the recent experience of the UN shows, it is fair to say that peace-keeping in Europe - particularly the former Yugoslavia - has brought that very concept to a breaking point.¹⁹ Even though the circumstances prevailing in the former Yugoslavia are to a certain extent unique, still they (together with a number of trends in the former Soviet area) reveal certain peculiarities of the OSCE scenario which have to be taken carefully into account. Firstly, the post-cold-war scenario is characterized by a prevalence of vicious internal conflicts of a broadly "tribal" nature, with a measure of external support for the factions involved. This kind of conflict is the most impervious to a traditional "peace-keeping treatment", and this has led to a growing reluctance by the international community to provide the military and financial resources necessary for a credible PKO.

These conflicts have confronted the international community with large-scale humanitarian disasters, and have pressed governments into having to "do something" in response, thus limiting policy options for the international organizations involved in peace-making and/or peace-keeping functions. Their particular nature, moreover, makes it much more difficult for an international agency tasked with an essential peace-keeping mandate to maintain its impartiality in the perception of the warring parties.

The European scenario is also well endowed with a number of regional institutions of a political, military or economic nature (e.g. OSCE, NATO, WEU, EU, CIS, Council of Europe), whose involvement in these conflicts sometimes led to rivalries, confusions and overlaps between them and with the UN. The definition of the roles of such institutions, and a broad consensus to make them complementary and "interlocking", has been one of the main recent challenges for European States. At the same time, it was equally visible that the main European powers, as well as the USA, were (and remain) extremely reluctant to engage directly in conflicts as intractable as that in Bosnia, and to invest heavily in them in political, financial and human terms. The involvement of a plurality of international bodies, particularly in the Yugoslav conflict, has been the sign of the absence rather than the presence, of a clear policy.²⁰ It has also contributed to the establishment, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of hybrid and contradictory mandates for peace-keepers, where traditional peace-keeping functions were combined with humanitarian assistance functions within an on-going conflict and with enforcement functions for which the Force was not equipped.

A much more cautious trend concerning further peace-keeping commitments in Europe or elsewhere is very visible within the Security Council. This restricts the analysis of the possible forms of cooperation between the UN and OSCE to more traditional, and strictly consensual, PKOs.

A second element which deeply influences OSCE policies, and has considerable repercussions in the peace-keeping field, is the Russian attitude vis-a-vis its "near abroad" and the management of the conflicts still open in that area (e.g. Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan, Nagorny Karabakh). Russian policy in the OSCE and the UN has been adamantly in favour of preserving a sphere of influence for the Russian Federation as the sole effective guarantor of security within the former Soviet area, particularly in order to control the oil and gas resources of the Caucasus. This has gone in parallel with the development of peace-keeping capabilities, dominated by Russia, within the CIS.²¹ Russia sees the OSCE as the European security

¹⁹ S. Tharoor, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Europe", in *Survival* 37 (1995), pp. 121-135; and id. "Should UN Peacekeeping Go Back to Basics?", in *Survival* 37 (Winter 1995-1996), pp.52-64.

²⁰ V.Y. Ghebali, "L'ONU et les organisations Européennes face au conflit Yougoslave", in *International Geneva Yearbook* 8 (1994), p.27.

²¹ See K.A. O'Brien, "Russian Peacekeeping in the Near Abroad", in *Peacekeeping and International Relations*

institution in which it can play a meaningful role and more immediately pursue its aim of excluding or minimizing the role of outsiders in the CIS area, particularly NATO members acting through the UN or the OSCE.²² Accordingly, Russia has adopted a sometimes aggressive and sometimes ambiguous position within the OSCE and the UN, trying in practice to play one against the other so as to weaken them and strengthen its own freedom of movement.²³ Russia has been consistently promoting the idea that the CIS is a sub-regional organizations within the OSCE, just as the OSCE is a regional organization vis-a-vis the UN. Consequently, on the one hand, a UN involvement or endorsement of an OSCE-CIS PKO would be required, thus allowing Russia to influence Security Council's policies; on the other hand, the institutional configuration advocated by Russia would ensure the CIS a right of first intervention in local conflicts, under a general OSCE legitimizing umbrella. The challenge for the OSCE is acute: by accepting as participants all former Soviet republics, the Organization has assumed the responsibility to ensure the upholding and enforcement of OSCE commitments in their respect, first and foremost that of the indivisibility of security in the OSCE area. Acquiescence to a Russian imperialistic policy towards its near abroad would risk reverting to a block mentality and the fragmentation of European security arrangements, denying the very basis of the OSCE approach to security and weakening the positive developments of the end of the cold war.

The peace-keeping formula approved at Helsinki in 1992 is clearly based on a multinational approach which would allow participation by any OSCE member. At the same time, the sheer importance of the Russian military capabilities, besides obvious political considerations, make a Russian peace-keeping role impossible to downplay. A reluctant attempt at compromise has been sought at the Rome Council of 1993, in which the Council decided that the OSCE "could consider, on a case-by-case basis and under specific conditions, the setting up of CSCE co-operative arrangements in order *inter alia* to ensure that the role and functions of a third party military force in a conflict area are consistent with CSCE principles and objectives".²⁴ This decision, even though dictated by expediency and the search for compromise, confirms in any case the important legitimizing role of the OSCE, as the active "custodian" of the basic political values applicable to wide strategic area.

The problem of containing ethnic conflicts within the ex-Soviet area as well as the "creeping imperialism" of current Russian foreign policy is very relevant also for the UN: the two PKOs currently deployed in the CIS area (UNOMIG in Georgia and UNMOT in Tajikistan) aim at observing the first, and complementing the second, an independent peace-keeping effort by CIS contingents dominated by the Russian Federation. From this point of view, at least in the eyes of the United States and most European States, the two organizations

23 (1994), p.14; and M. Shashenkov, "Russian Peacekeeping in the Near Abroad", in *Survival* 36 (1994), p.46.

²² For a particularly critical assessment of Russian policy, and the stakes that this creates for the OSCE, see S. Blank, "The OSCE, Russia and Security in the Caucasus", in *Helsinki Monitor* 6 (1995), pp. 65-80.

²³ Thus, during the discussion at the 1994 Budapest Summit on the ill-fated Dutch-German proposal of "OSCE first", Russia supported the central role of the OSCE while at the same time proposing language that ensured the right of any UN member to submit a dispute to the Security Council, where Russia has veto power. See W. Kemp, loc. cit., footnote 18, supra, p.28. Similarly, while accepting, probably under intense US pressure, the proposal of an OSCE rather than Russian PKO in Nagorny Karabakh, Russia obtained the insertion in the relevant paragraph of the 1994 Summit decisions of a reference to "an appropriate resolution from the United Nations Security Council" as a condition for the deployment of the operation and as a means to subject the OSCE to some form of UN authorization.

²⁴ "CSCE and the New Europe - Our Security is Indivisible", Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting (1993), section II, paragraphs 2-3.

can play complementary or mutually reinforcing roles for keeping Russian expansionism under control.

5. Division of labour between OSCE and UN: guiding principles and possible developments

The lengthy analysis that precedes is important in that it provides the complex framework within which cooperation and division of labour between the OSCE and the UN can be envisaged. Indeed, in the absence of clear-cut policies by both organizations about a precise distribution of jurisdiction and definition of forms of cooperation, their relationship in the peace-keeping field will be probably characterized by a pragmatic approach, based on a case-by-case basis upon the requirements of specific situations, considerations of comparative advantages, or the policies of key players in either institution. In this section, therefore, I will try to highlight some possible models for this interaction, which could be used in isolation or in combination, according to political and practical consideration.

What matters is that such cooperation should be based on a few essential principles agreed upon by both organizations, so as to avoid as much as possible overlaps or rivalries and ensure complementary and mutually reinforcing roles. These principles, analogous to those stated by the UN Secretary-General in the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, should be: the primacy of the UN as the highest instance for the establishment of general policy directives and the management of conflicts; the use of both organization in such a way as to put to full fruition their comparative advantages; and the fact that the OSCE should embody and express a "European approach" for the management of European conflicts. Moreover, the legitimizing function consisting in providing political and legal legitimacy to forms of external "intervention" in a conflict, should be kept conceptually (even if not always practically) distinct from operational responsibilities.

The considerations provided in the foregoing sections highlight in my opinion the basic fact that the real strength of the OSCE lies in its unique role within the Eurasian context as the sole regional organization with a membership "from Vancouver to Vladivostok", as well as in its function as the repository and advocate of the basic common political values of the area in question. Its inclusiveness allows, *inter alia*, the Russian Federation to focus on the OSCE as a non-antagonistic regional security body in which its interests can be brought to the fore and where it can play a meaningful role. Moreover, the military low profile of the OSCE, its consensus decision-making process and its lack of enforcement powers make it a less "threatening" organization than other institutions such as NATO or WEU or, for that matter, the UN. Conversely, there are doubts about the actual operational capabilities of the OSCE beyond the performance of its current small missions or *ad hoc* operations such as the SAMs. Its main weaknesses in the peace-keeping field have already been highlighted in section 2 and will not be repeated here. An additional consideration in this context is the particularly complex nature of recent European conflicts, which have so far largely defied attempts at facilitating their settlement through peace-keeping operations, and whose parties have rarely genuinely entered and respected commitments to accept the presence of an impartial international force and to cooperate with it. The juxtaposition of these elements, coupled with the competition for an operational role in Europe from WEU and, above all, NATO, suggests that the most significant peace-keeping role for the OSCE could be that of legitimizing peace-keeping efforts by other organizations, or act as a link between the UN and regional or sub-regional organizations for the management of conflicts in a peace-keeping perspective. I do not think

that, with the possible but not certain exception of Nagorny Karabakh, the OSCE will or should try to play a strong autonomous role in launching medium- or large-scale peace-keeping operations.

At the same time, it should also be taken into account that the UN is undergoing an overall painful transition, in which its peace-keeping and peace-making functions are being critically reexamined, especially with regard to its recent and unsuccessful efforts in the former Yugoslavia. The failure at achieving a veritable "mission impossible" has led to calls for a "return to the basics" of peace-keeping.²⁵ The conceptual retrenchment which the Organization is undergoing could lead to a reduction of the UN's involvement in European conflicts, especially in terms of peace-keeping. Still, its experience and resources in the peace-keeping area are undeniable, as it is its legitimizing role as the sole universal political organization.

The foregoing considerations lead to the identification of three main areas in which the question of a division of labour between the OSCE and the UN can be specifically addressed.

The first area is the distribution of jurisdiction in relation to conflicts within the OSCE area. This issue, of course, is preliminary to, and at the same time goes beyond, the consideration of peace-keeping functions. It actually calls into play the basic issues raised by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and its somewhat difficult compromise between universalist and regionalist tendencies. It also involves the rather open-ended policy indications formulated by the organs of the UN, which have been summarized in section 3 above.²⁶

In this scenario, three main patterns of interaction between the OSCE and the UN can be considered: alternate lead; referral of disputes from one organization to the other; or joint jurisdiction on specific disputes. The alternate lead of either organization is the current working arrangement in several cases in the ex-Soviet area. Under this arrangement, one organization actively deals with the substance of the conflict while the other provides political and diplomatic support to the efforts of the first one. It has sometimes been criticized as having led to irrational situations such as separating the management of the two conflicts in Georgia.²⁷ Still, it is in principle a valuable model insofar as it can rely on the existence of coordination and consultation mechanisms that can ensure a joint assessment by the two organizations of a specific situation and its political and operational requirements. The current framework arrangement offers a working basis for such coordination, especially since the State holding the OSCE chairmanship can probably serve more effectively than representatives of the OSCE Secretariat as a focal point for an essentially political decision. Moreover, informal consultations among key players may frequently replace more institutionalized contacts, and eventually lead to formal decisions by the policy-making organs of the two organizations.

The second model is joint exercise of jurisdiction, meaning a joint, coordinated and complementary effort by the two organizations (with the possible participation of further organizations if necessary) to deal with the same situation. This model would allow each organization to concentrate on the functions in which it is more credible - for example, the OSCE on human rights monitoring or military confidence-building measures, and the UN on humanitarian assistance or monitoring of cease-fires and disengagements. Such arrangements could be decided upon at the initiative of either organization along the pattern set out in Article 52 of the Charter, i.e., either the OSCE in case its efforts proved insufficient or the UN by

²⁵ S. Tharoor, loc. cit., note 20, supra.

²⁶ For a rather elaborated commentary on Chapter VIII, see B. Simma et al. (eds.), "The Charter of the United Nations - A Commentary", 1995, pp. 679-752; and R. Wolfrum, C. Philipp (eds.), "United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice", 1995, vol.2, pp. 1040-1051.

²⁷ See W. Kemp, loc. cit., note 16 supra, p.26.

partial reference to the OSCE. They would necessitate a high degree of coordination at the policy-making as well as the implementation levels, higher than in the case of alternate lead. At the peace-making level, this model would imply an effort to integrate activities in order to increase their political weight, for example through high-level joint representation in the conflict area (i.e. a single representative or two representatives acting together through an integrated structure), or the preparation of joint reports to be submitted to both organizations. To my knowledge, this scenario has not yet been proposed or seriously analyzed at the policy-making level by either organization; concerns about mutual independence and the "primacy" of the UN do not militate in its favour. As mentioned in section 3, the OSCE had proposed similar arrangements in Georgia; it is somehow unfortunate that the UN rejected them.

The third model is referral of conflicts between the two organizations, as foreseen in Article 52 of the Charter. In recent practice, the UN has not yet "referred" a particular conflict to a regional body, but has rather stepped in in the light of the inability of regional organizations to deal with certain situations. In view of this trend, and of the above-mentioned attitudes of the Security Council, it seems unlikely that the Council, once seized of a certain conflict, would somehow transfer jurisdiction over it to a regional organization. The reverse possibility, that of "OSCE first" for all European conflicts, with joint referral to the UN in case of failure of OSCE efforts, offers more potential, particularly with regard to peace-keeping and peace-enforcement. This was precisely the Dutch-German proposal to the 1994 Budapest summit, which seemed virtually unopposed until the end of the Summit but then unexpectedly failed, reportedly due to the objections of Armenia but probably also for the scarce enthusiasm of France, Russia, the UK and the US for codifying a possible relinquishment of jurisdiction by the Security Council.²⁸ An integral part of that proposal was the joint referral to the Security Council even without the consent of the State(s) directly involved, which would have considerably eroded the scope of consensus within the OSCE. It is to be hoped that efforts to build up consensus along these lines may lead soon to positive results. A clear political decision to designate the OSCE as the instrument of first choice would strongly increase its relevance, clarify its role vis-a-vis the other European and Atlantic organizations, and avoid "institution shopping". If OSCE procedures failed, a joint referral to the Security Council by about 50 UN members (including four permanent members of the Council), providing an analysis of the situation and the steps undertaken, as well as a recommendation for action, would carry a great weight and would create an as yet lacking indirect possibility for enforcement of OSCE policies. The Dutch-German proposal also provided that the OSCE would have assisted in the implementation of Security Council's measures and would have sought a corollary commitment by other European-Atlantic institutions. This would have placed the OSCE at the center of the European security architecture as the link between the UN and the other Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The second area for a division of labour between the OSCE and the UN focuses on the legitimizing function played by an international organization through its power to legally and politically legitimize or authorize a peace-keeping operation, define its scope, terms of reference and participation, and thus exercise a form of political direction over the management of a conflict. The operation in question can then be carried out by the same organization or by [an]other organization[s].

As noted above, this seems to be the function in which the OSCE can play its strongest role as the only pan-Eurasian and transatlantic institution, a role parallel to that of the United

²⁸ W. Kemp, loc. cit., note ..., supra, pp. 29-30.

Nations as the sole universal political institution.

A legitimizing function by the UN vis-a-vis the OSCE is shadowed by the provision, in the 1994 Budapest decisions, of "an appropriate resolution from the United Nations Security Council" for the establishment of an OSCE PKO in Nagorny Karabakh.²⁹ This sentence was introduced at the request of Russia, and could suggest, if used in this direction by Russia, a devaluation of the OSCE as a "sub-contractor" of United Nations decisions, potentially more easily directable by the Security Council.³⁰ In fact, the 1992 Helsinki decisions on OSCE peace-keeping make no mention of the need for a UN "enabling" resolution. Moreover, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter shows that, short of an enforcement action under Article 53 or of an active referral of a conflict by the Security Council to a regional organization under Article 52, there is no legal need for such a resolution. That decision could more constructively be interpreted as a request for clear political support by the Security Council, of the kind that the Council has already expressed in its several resolutions and presidential statements on Nagorny Karabakh.

On a more general level, it is important that this model be used not as an attempt by one international organization to subordinate another (which would certainly backfire) but as a form of coordination and cooperation between "interlocking institutions" based on the principle of comparative advantage. In this light, it could be envisaged that the Security Council decide in principle that a certain situation threatens international security and thus action is necessary, and seek the cooperation of the OSCE and/or other regional bodies (NATO, NACC, WEU, EU) in this respect. The action to be taken could be left to the consideration of the bodies concerned, or could be suggested by the Council. In view of the nature of the OSCE, military enforcement measures under Chapter VII and VIII should not be included. It could, moreover, be agreed between the two organizations that, whenever enforcement actions are not considered, the UN make explicit mention of the central role of the OSCE, which would reinforce its position as "the" political Eurasian institution and as the possible institutional link between the UN and regional or sub-regional organizations.

As far as the OSCE is concerned, the Helsinki decisions of 1992 foresee that the OSCE may draw upon, on a case-by-case basis, the resources of the EC, NATO, WEU and the CIS. While this reference aimed at obtaining resources for OSCE PKOs, the language in question could, in the presence of the necessary political will, be used to lay out a regional division of labour in which the OSCE, with or without a previous action by the UN, discharge a legitimizing function by calling for action in a specific situation and seeking the cooperation of European military institutions for taking measures including peace-keeping. The current generalized need for consensus would make it necessary that the State[s] involved participate in such a decision, which should ideally be taken by the Senior Council to give it a higher political profile. In the presence, once again, of the required political will, the OSCE could even provide the general mandate for peace-keeping by other regional institutions. This would enable them to take action both at the policy-making and the military implementation levels. The possibility could also be envisaged of peace-keeping by *ad hoc* groups of OSCE participating States which volunteer military contingents and financing.³¹ The OSCE would

²⁹ Loc. cit., note 15 supra, p.777.

³⁰ See J. Borawski, "The Budapest Summit Meeting", in Helsinki Monitor 6 (1995), p.10.

³¹ As has been noted, a European legitimization of European peace-keeping might have remarkable importance for Eastern European and ex-Soviet States, and lead them to a greater confidence than is currently the case in the capabilities of the OSCE as a security structure which could assist them until they are covered by NATO's military guarantees. See J.E. Goodby, "Peacekeeping in the New Europe", in The Washington Quarterly 15 (1992), p.166.

work as a link between regional institutions and the UN also by keeping the latter informed about regional peace-keeping activities, as prescribed in Article 54 of the Charter.

This legitimizing function of the OSCE also plays an absolutely crucial role in its efforts to contain the role of the Russian Federation in the conflicts in the former Soviet area. The planned operation in Nagorny Karabakh offers a good example in this respect, as before the 1994 Budapest Summit it was configured as a Russian separation force, and even after the major achievement of the Summit in moderating Russian ambitions, the extent of Russian participation was reportedly still under discussion.³² The above-mentioned provision of the 1993 Rome Council clearly appears an attempt at drawing the minimum conditions under which the OSCE would agree to set up "cooperative arrangements" in connection with CIS or Russian peace-keeping.³³

In this regard, as noted above, the OSCE and the UN could be playing a useful complementary role in putting pressure on Russia to moderate its imperialistic tendencies, while at the same time involving her in multilateral processes for conflict management, and integrating her in the OSCE community of values. The OSCE should use, with UN backing, the Russian need for legitimization and support of its peace-making and peace-keeping in the near abroad to ensure as much as possible a multilateral and cooperative approach and the definition of conditions and terms of reference respecting OSCE's principles and objectives. The authorization by the OSCE of Russian or, preferably, CIS PKOs on the basis of an agreed mandate and with clear reporting requirements would represent a concrete possibility in this sense.

The third area for a possible division of labour between the OSCE and the UN is field deployment in the context of peace-keeping operations. The structural and procedural features of the OSCE which militate against its assumption of an effective operational capability have already been highlighted above.³⁴ A possible operative role of the OSCE, and how this can be coordinated with that of the UN should, therefore, be seen with great realism. As recalled above, a decision was taken at the 1994 Budapest Summit to deploy a PKO in Nagorny Karabakh, the preparatory work for which was reportedly completed in 1995 but whose prospects are dubious in view of the unwillingness of the parties to agree on a permanent cease-fire. With the exception of this exercise, as we have seen, the OSCE has limited itself to deploy small diplomatic missions, has deployed Sanctions Assistance Missions around Yugoslavia, and is participating in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. There is no mention in recent OSCE documents of trying to establish new PKOs or to amend the 1992 decisions which provide strict conditions for the establishment of operations and exclude peace-enforcement.

The above-mentioned exigence of realism is also dictated by the recent setbacks suffered by UN peace-keeping and peace-making in the former Yugoslavia, and which may confine the UN's operational role in Eurasia to a relatively modest one for some time, focused largely on assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. The UN PKOs currently

³² J. Borawski, loc. cit., note 29 supra, pp. 8-10.

³³ The principles defined as essential are: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; consent of the parties; impartiality; multinational character of the Force; clear mandate; transparency; integral link to a political process for conflict resolution; and a plan for orderly withdrawal. See loc. cit., note 24 supra.

³⁴ What seems crucial in order to increase the operational potentials of the OSCE would be, first and foremost, a limitation of the use of consensus, which can be a valuable instrument in other contexts but is unsuitable to cope with the swiftness required by operative decisions, and for the excessive leverage that it gives to the States involved in a dispute. Proposals to reduce or overcome the use of consensus are numerous but cannot be analyzed in this contribution. See those mentioned in J. Borawski, loc. cit., note 29 supra, p.7; R. Zaagman, "Focus on the Future - A Contribution to Discussions on a New OSCE", in Helsinki Monitor 6 (1995), p.46.

deployed are those in Cyprus, Macedonia, Eastern Slavonia, Georgia/Abkhazia and Tajikistan. These are all relatively small-scale missions with a "first-generation" peace-keeping mandate, with the exception of the transitional administration in Eastern Slavonia.

The settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina has seen the emergence of NATO as the leading regional peace-keeper and the only security structure enjoying full US support. This makes it possible to envisage a leading role by NATO also in the settlement of future conflicts in Central Europe, for example in possible disputes in the Balkans (e.g. Yugoslavia/Albania, Greece/Macedonia, Greece/Turkey), besides the obvious interest of Eastern European States to see an extension of NATO's military guarantees to their territories as soon as possible. This scenario might further reduce the possibility of a UN peace-keeping role besides the existing operations, or might confine the UN to participate in some aspects of operations dominated by other organizations, as is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In view of all foregoing considerations, a number of possible forms of division of labour and interaction concerning field deployment can be considered. Firstly, it is likely that the current level of relations between UN and OSCE mission will continue in the future, especially within the framework of existing missions. This is certainly positive, but it would necessitate a measure of streamlining of procedures and of enhanced willingness to involve the other organization and share resources and information, especially on the part of the United Nations. In the absence of an increased mutual involvement, relations between the two organizations can only remain altogether marginal and disconnected, and the political and operational advantages deriving from their synergy would inevitably be lost.

In addition to the continuation of the current forms of field interaction, a theoretical alternative model would consist in a request by the Security Council for some form of PKO by the OSCE. Along recent practice, this request would probably be couched in the form of an authorization issued to unspecified Member States and "regional agencies or arrangements", rather than as an outright request, which would imply a "subcontracting" by the UN and a resulting subordinate role for the OSCE. In this case, the UN would exercise the "legitimizing function" referred to above, while the OSCE would provide the first line of European peace-keeping. This might be the scenario for the OSCE PKO in Nagorny Karabakh if Russian policy is adopted. It is so far a largely theoretical possibility, especially in view of the operational limitations of the OSCE. It could, however, be politically consonant with the spirit of the 1992 Helsinki Decisions, in particular the statement that the OSCE provides "an important link between European and global security".

Other possible patterns would utilize models of interaction between the UN and regional organizations, which have already been experimented in UN practice.³⁵ Such patterns could be the following:

- 1) Co-deployment. Under this scenario, a small-scale UN PKO would be deployed in conjunction with a larger OSCE PKO, in order to support it and verify that it discharges its mandate in a manner consistent with positions adopted by the Security Council. In this case, the main operational burden would be carried by the regional organization, while the UN would have to ensure the consistency of the operation with UN policies, which would thus maintain their primacy. The UN has employed this mechanism in Liberia, where UNOMIL observes the activities of an African peace-keeping force; and in Georgia/Abkhazia, where UNOMIG, among other tasks, observes a CIS interposition force. This scenario has been described as a promising possibility for the future by the UN Secretary-General, but it can open delicate

³⁵ Some of them have also received a positive assessment by the UN Secretary-General in his supplement to An Agenda for Peace. See loc. cit., note 9 supra, pp. 20-21.

political, operational and financial questions and should be explored with caution. In particular, the relations between the two organizations and their different functions should be carefully and precisely spelled out in advance. In the OSCE scenario, this model could be used to make more acceptable to both organizations an OSCE PKO with a predominant Russian component deployed in the CIS area.

An alternative form of co-deployment could be along the line of the on-going peace mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which NATO, OSCE, UN and EU are all involved under the umbrella of the Dayton Agreement and the London Peace Implementation Conference, and carry out complementary but separate tasks. Contingents and components would be deployed in parallel by the OSCE and the UN, and would either report separately to their Headquarters or jointly to both. Lines of communication and liaison would be established to ensure that both division of roles and cooperation are maintained. This scenario would avoid possibly delicate questions arising from deploying one organization to monitor, in practice, the behaviour of the other, and would allow each participant to focus on the activities in which it enjoys a comparative advantage.

2) Commencement of an operation by one organization, and continuation by the other. Among UN PKOs, this has taken place in Rwanda, where the first PKO, UNOMUR, was later absorbed by UNAMIR. More recently, numerous military contingents as well as civilian personnel that were serving within UNPROFOR throughout the former Yugoslavia have been transferred to various operations with a different mandate and occasionally under a different organization: UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia, UNPREDEP in Macedonia, and especially IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is under NATO rather than UN, command. This model could be utilized between the OSCE and the UN in both directions, according to the prevailing circumstances. For example, an operation launched by the UN could be taken over by the OSCE (possibly with a residual UN presence in a monitoring mode along the lines illustrated in the previous number) once its main military functions are largely completed, and the civilian component becomes the priority. Conversely, an initial OSCE PKO (e.g. that in Nagorny Karabakh) could be taken over by the UN, with the same or a revised mandate, if the composition of the force should become an obstacle to the effective discharge of its functions in view of changed political circumstances. The succession of the UN to the OSCE would then allow the injection of non-Euroasian military contingents. Also this model would require delicate arrangements at the policy-making as well as implementation levels for carrying out such a transition, for example from a financial point of view.

3) Joint operations. In UN practice, this has successfully taken place in Haiti through the civilian human rights monitoring mission, MICIVIH, which is staffed, directed and financed jointly by the UN and the Organization of American States. Also this model would require careful arrangements, and would probably best be limited to small- or medium-scale missions of a civilian nature. It could be envisaged, for example, that an OSCE long-term mission such as that previously deployed in Sandjak, Kosovo and Vojvodina could be jointly deployed on a larger scale by both organizations. The presence of both OSCE and UN could make such mission more acceptable to the host State; the sharing of resources could allow precious economies of scale in a time of financial stringency while increasing the effectiveness of the monitoring functions carried out by the operation.

6. Conclusions

Both the OSCE and the UN are in a transition phase, and are searching for a clearer identity in the post-cold war environment. Also the political scenario throughout the Eurasian region is in transition, largely due to the instability and convulsions in central and eastern Europe. In addition, the attitude of the US and Russia vis-a-vis conflict management in Eurasia is far from predictable in the medium- and long-term; the forthcoming US presidential elections could lead to a further disengagement from Europe while those in Russia to a return to the imperialistic policies of the past.

In this uncertain scenario, and in view of the particularly complex and daunting nature of recent conflicts within the OSCE area, it is difficult to imagine a coherent and clear-cut division of labour between the two organizations. I have tried in my contribution to indicate and analyze the factors and variables that will influence decisions concerning the planning and carrying out of peace-keeping activities, as well as the basic conflict management policies that will be overarching a possible division of labour.

It seems to me that a future (hopefully more intense than at present) division of labour will inevitably be decided more with an eye to the needs of the moment than to a general philosophy of the relations between the OSCE and the UN. By disposing of alternative and interactive models which conform to a few basic principles, therefore, policy-makers could more easily take decisions which spouse operational needs and political expediency with the respect for the unique roles and characteristics of both organizations.