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ITALY AND AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA  
SECURITY VIEWS AND PERSPECTIVES

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### *Africa South of Sahara in Italy's foreign interests*

At the end of the Second World War, Italy was deprived of its former African colonies (Africa Orientale Italiana, AOI - i.e. Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia - and Libya). The government, though, carried out a strong endeavour to preserve responsibility with respect to some of them. As strenuously opposed as they were to each other, the new political parties, albeit for different reasons, supported the Italian aspirations to return to Africa. Eventually, all Italy obtained was the trusteeship on Somalia (Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana in Somalia, AFIS), which lasted ten years and ended up in 1960 when Somalia became fully independent.

Thereafter both the Italian government and the Italian society maintained with its former colonies in Africa South of Sahara (ASS) privileged relations, predicated on political, cultural and economic links, especially in the case of Somalia. At the same time, in the 1970s, new important relations were initiated by both the Italian government and private entities with liberation movements in Southern Africa, especially in Angola and Mozambique, and later with the new countries and national governments issued from independence.

The important events cropped up in the 1990s, the end of the Soviet and Communist presence in the Horn, the independence of Eritrea, the national and social fragmentation in Somalia, the national reconciliation in Mozambique and the end of the *apartheid* in the Republic of South Africa (RSA), coupled with the changes the end of the Cold War has brought about in Italy and Western Europe, are likely to put Italy's national interests towards ASS in a new perspective.

Before taking into consideration this new perspective and the significant changes it entails in Italy's ASS policy, one should wonder what is the place of ASS today within the broader framework of the Italian interest and security abroad.

Within such a framework, ASS role appears limited. Italy's trade with ASS (see tab. 1) is a very small part of its total trade, with a tendency to become even smaller over time. In 1994, Italy's export to ASS share on its total export was 1.29% and Italy's import from ASS share with respect to total import 2.55%. The extremely reduced importance of ASS as a market for Italian export is confirmed by the fact that ICE, the national agency for promoting export, is presently running two branches only in ASS out of a total of 80 branches abroad. To be sure, ASS remains an important source of raw materials and primary products and in this role its share in the Italian trade is not negligible. However, though ENI, the national oil group, is active in ASS (Angola, Congo, Nigeria), the most relevant Italian supplies of hydrocarbons come from elsewhere: Russia, the Middle East and North Africa and Northern Europe. Moreover, current investments are mostly directed towards the Mediterranean area and Central Asia.

On the other hand, ASS is the most important recipient of Italian development aid (see tables 3-7), particularly grants (tab. 5). Since 1994 there has been a dramatic drop in the Italian appropriations for development aid as a consequence of the necessity to reduce public expenditures and the unveiling of corruption. Today, the Italian development cooperation represents no more than 0.1% of the GNP (0.42 in 1989 and 0.32 in 1992), the lowest current share amongst the most industrialized countries. Within this extremely reduced amount, ASS maintains its relative ranking (tab. 4). The importance given bilaterally to former Yugoslavia, Albania, North Africa and the Middle East is however increasing (see chart 1), as a consequence

of new political priorities affecting Italian interests. In the next years, the ASS concessional aid priority may be preserved. However, there is no doubt that, broadly speaking, the Italian aid policy will be more and more concentrated around the Mediterranean.

From the military point of view, one has to point out that after the withdrawal of the military attaché in Mogadishu, there are only two Italian military attachés in ASS: in Ethiopia (with responsibility for Eritrea and Kenya too) and Mozambique (also responsible for Zambia and Zimbabwe). The Ministry of Defence is currently considering whether crediting a military attaché in the RSA.

Furthermore, the only regular Italian military training mission in ASS was in Somalia. The mission was closed at the end of the 1980s with the change of the political situation and the beginning of disturbances in the country. A limited number of officers from a few ASS countries, particularly from the Horn and Southern Africa, are traditionally trained in the Italian Military Academy. A great part of the officers who gave way to the Barre's regime, including General Barre himself, came from military training in Italy.

The possibility of assuming the training of the new armed forces of Mozambique (which will integrate both governmental and opposition troops) has been taken into serious consideration by the authorities of both countries. So far, it didn't materialize, however.

Finally, though not negligible, ASS is not a most important market for Italian arms exports (tables 8-9).

From a diplomatic and political point of view, ASS is given attention and resources even beyond the circle of privileged historical relations mentioned above. The network of Italian diplomatic posts in ASS numbers 21 embassies covering 48 countries, a network that in comparison with other areas is somehow overextended. Political relations are well established also in the multilateral network, in the African Development Bank and the related Fund, where Italy is an active member, in the ACP association as well as in the UN. Italy has always taken good care of political relations with the ASS members in the UN (beside good traditional relations with Latin American members), a policy that helps Italy's to hold a role within the UN and the Security Council, especially - as Italy hopes for - in the event of a reform of the latter.

From the highlights provided above, it appears that from the point of view of today's Italy ASS is not a first-priority area, neither politically or economically, nor from a security angle. At the same time, ASS remains an area of direct concern for Italy (and for the European Union). What will be the future development of Italy-ASS relations? To respond to this question, some insights into Italian ASS policies are in order.

### *Factors in Italy's ASS policy*

Many factors and interests have contributed to shape post-Second World War Italy's policies towards the ASS, from its historical heritage through the wider role Italy plays in the international arena as one of the seven most industrialized countries in the world.

After the end of the Second World War, the historical colonial heritage brought about memories and controversies within the domestic political circle and, most of all, a resident community which influenced Italian domestic policy and, consequently, Italian ASS policy up to the 1960s. The Italian communities in Eritrea and Ethiopia emerged as more economically and politically independent than the one in Somalia. In Somalia the AFIS gave way to a mixed result: on one hand, it let the old Italian settlers, like the bananas growers, to preserve their vested interests and their colonial spirit; on the other hand, the relatively illuminated official administration allowed the old colonial relationship to shift into the beginning of a modern cooperation and solidarity.

In Somalia, these two trends - collusion for economic exploitation and cooperation for

modernization - lasted well beyond post-colonial experience: official development cooperation turned sometime into corruption, while new forms of genuine solidarity took place in the wider Italian-Somali relations. Today, the Italian community in Somalia has disappeared and those in Eritrea and Ethiopia are extremely reduced. They have ceased to be a factor influencing Italy's relations with the Horn of Africa, both domestically and internationally. On the other hand, in Italy itself the influence of the civil society's segments committed to Third World development and security has greatly increased.

Delinked from the past, the Italian civil society has acted as a very important factor in the relations between Italy and ASS. This factor has worked with different intensity according to whether one takes into consideration the strong increase in personal and private commitments within the framework of official and non-official development cooperation or the political and ideological interaction between the different civil societies involved. The latter has been more important and characterizing than the former. The role played in Italy's post-Second World War era by Catholic, Socialist and Communist political forces (and their related economic and cultural networks) goes well beyond the crucial humanitarian role played by the NGOs and seems almost unique within the framework of North-South Italian relations. This role has been moved by ambiguous factors: the drive towards solidarity and universalism inherent in the Communist, Socialist and Catholic ideologies as well as the weakness of the Italian state with respect to the parties and the tendency of the latter to take over state's functions and assert particular over general interests. Independently of its moral value, however, the role of the civil society in shaping Italy-ASS relations has been crucial.

With the changes impressed on Italian politics by the end of the Cold War, it may be that the influence of this factor will somewhat diminish in the years to come. In any case, its impact on Mozambique has provided Italy's policy towards ASS a lasting direction. Furthermore, this direction may be strengthened by the interaction with the numerous Italian community living in the RSA, a community that so far hasn't played any role in the Italian relations with ASS.

Another factor which contributes to shape Italy's ASS policies is the interest of the European and Western allies and the international community towards this very poor and conflict-ridden part of the world. Serving the international interest to stability and cooperation towards ASS within the framework of the so called new world order is regarded as part of Italy's responsibility towards international security as well as part of Italy's policy aiming at asserting and securing its self-perceived international role of great middle-power. The post-Second World War Italian focus on former colonies has gradually given way to a wider perspective on ASS predicated on firm bilateral concessionality and greater participation in international and multilateral political, military and economic efforts. It is in this involvement that the security dimension of Italy's policy towards ASS is more closely included, for it is by taking part in such a multilateral effort that Italy contributes to the implementation of national interests, like the safe transport and production of essential raw materials, which it would be unable to secure by itself. By the same token, Italy manages to earn the prestige it needs to secure its international status within the Western alliances and the international community.

All this explains the steady Italian participation in international peace missions, particularly since the end of the 1970s (see tab. 2), especially with respect to ASS. Italian missions in ASS have been no less important than in the Mediterranean, an area closer to Italy and more relevant for its security. This fact makes clear the non-geopolitical, i.e. multilateralist, character of the Italian notion of security with respect to ASS.

The contribution of military resources for humanitarian and peace-related missions in ASS - and elsewhere - is probably going to become more important in next years, because the end of the Cold War has weakened Italy's international status and diminished the economic

resources needed to sustain its international role otherwise. The use of military resources makes up for these weaknesses. Though they have a cost, this cost will never be as important as that of the Italian previous programme of development cooperation. Furthermore, in a sense is a cost Italy has anyway to bear in order to carry out the badly needed modernization of its national armed forces. International missions will be anyway part of this modernization and the expenses the latter will entail.

### Italy's ASS policy at work: the Horn

The factors and interests which affect and direct Italy's ASS policy can be more substantively discerned in the framework of three most important political sequences of events wherein Italy has played a role: the Italian attempts over time at working out a viable territorial and political balance in the Horn of Africa; the participation in the "Restore Hope" and UNOSOM operations in Somalia; the Italian political role in bringing about a national reconciliation in Mozambique and the new Italian perspective in the emerging peaceful Southern African area.

As it is well known, the Horn of Africa is thorn by intractable territorial disputes, irredentism and national questions deriving from Ethiopia's millennial imperial expansion, colonial interferences and more recent national and independentist aspirations. This situation makes the Horn one of the most unstable and conflictive area in ASS with spill over effects on neighbouring areas and countries and the continent itself, whose commitment within the OAU to keep the boundaries left by colonialism, as arbitrary as they may be, has been often betrayed but also provided a helpful guideline. For these reasons, the territorial and political balance between the regional actors has always been the most important security problem to deal with from the point of view of the international community and especially the external actors which, friendly or unfriendly, happen to play a role in the area.

Broadly speaking, three strategies have been constantly pursued with the purpose of solving the Horn's conflicts or at least containing them: (a) diplomatic mediation and the implementation of some kind of regional balance of power; (b) the firm strengthening of one regional actor, implicitly assigning it the task of policing the area; (c) an overall regional arrangement predicated on the authority, the strength and the political guarantee of an external power.

The third strategy was attempted in two occasions: by Italy in 1936 and by Cuba in 1977 (with the Soviet Union in the background). After the conquest of Ethiopia in 1936, all Italy had to do was to unify the region under the name of AOI and divide it in administrative units which accounted for the economic, religious and ethnic factors actually characterizing the area. In the contemporary history of the Horn, maybe it has been the only time a "rational" solution was implemented. In March 1977, Fidel Castro, after visiting Tripoli, Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, gathered the Presidents of Somalia, Ethiopia, and the PDRY and proposed a federation among their respective countries with ample autonomy for Eritrea and the Ogaden. President Castro's proposal was not accepted. It was based on the conviction that the internationalist and socialist ideology shared by the governments in question and the authority and guarantee provided from outside by the Communist bloc, in particular the USSR, could unify the region and allow for a "rational" solution. The Communist bloc's authority proved insufficient.

After the end of the Second World War, having lost authority and strength in the region but being nevertheless involved in it, Italy's governments and two important Italian parties, the PCI (the Communists) and the PSI (the Socialists), attempted at implementing the other two strategies.

Attempts at negotiating, mediating and keeping the balance of power have been countless and, despite their constant failure, even today they constitute the official policy of the Italian

government (which at times is expressed by a more passive "equidistance"). Negotiations between Somalia and Ethiopia were first undertaken by Italy within the AFIS framework, also because they were part of the UN mandate, but to no avail. After Somalia became independent, Italy shared the European policy primarily aimed at keeping a fair military balance in the region, avoiding conflict and rearmament and possibly fostering negotiations. In 1963, Italy - also on behalf of Germany and the US - rebuffed the Somali request to set up and train an army of 20,000 men and instead made itself available to train an army of 6,000 men. (As it is known, few months later Somalia's aspirations were met by the USSR). At the time of the Ogaden War, the Italian policy of proposing mediation and negotiation was steadily pursued, though with no result. In the 1980s, a substantive amount of aid was extended to Ethiopia in order to balance the important support provided to Somalia but also to recognize - as other donor countries were also doing - the basic regional role played by Addis Ababa. The last attempt at mediating that can be mentioned here took place in the last part of 1990, in combination with the Egyptian government, with the aim of setting up a round table for negotiations between the dying Siad Barre's regime and its opponents, still without success.

A "taking side" strategy has been pursued by the UK and then by US with respect to Ethiopia in the 1950s and 1960s; by the Soviets and the PCI again in favour of Ethiopia, after Castro's internationalist principled proposal had failed to materialize; in favour of Somalia, first, by the PCI in the 1970s, when the Barre's regime appeared progressive (and the Soviets were in Berbera) and then by the PSI and the PSI-led government in the 1980s. The PSI and the governments in which this party participated construed their at times glamorous support to the by now badly authoritarian Barre's regime as an anti-Communist contribution to the West and to Italy.

In the sequences we have just discussed, the two factors which coalesce to shape Italian policy towards ASS can be easily discerned: the importance of domestic actors and Italy's strict adherence to allied and international policies. While the PSI policy has contributed to seriously weakening the longstanding Italian influence in this country, other policies - as cooperative as they may have been - proved less damaging and at times helpful, still fundamentally unsuccessful for Italy, its allies as well as other external powers. Is any role left to Italy in the Horn?

It may be that the stabilization strategy predicated on some kind of external authority and guarantee is not wrong in itself but has to be based on something more than a scheme of balance of power. In the past experiences two elements were not included or were only marginal in the varying efforts to create a broad regional arrangement in the Horn: firstly, a convincing and sensible scheme of regional economic cooperation, and, secondly, a substantive multilateralist approach on the side of the external powers. One scheme of regional cooperation only has been tabled in the region so far, i.e. the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IDAGG), primarily intended to secure food security. This regional scheme was supported most of all by Italy in the 1980s but then put somewhat aside. Today, it seems that a scheme like IDAGG - which meanwhile the US came to support with reference to the Greater Horn - could be resumed and expanded. A scheme for regional economic cooperation in the Horn, supported by a Western and European multilateral effort could be the right framework for Italy to return to play a role in the Horn.

### *Somalia and Southern Africa*

Both the Italian contribution to "Restore Hope" and UNOSOM in Somalia and to UNOMOZ in Mozambique stem from Italy's goal of complying with its international responsibility and supporting simultaneously its international status. Between the two sequences of events there is,

however, an important difference in that the intervention in Somalia is by now delinked from any national policy towards this country (nor is it particularly directed at restoring any more or less special bilateral relationship), whereas the presence in Mozambique is linked to a bilateral relation, which by the way seems to emerge as the new crucial Italian connection in ASS. Moreover, while the intervention in Somalia took place within an empty political frame and at a moment the longstanding Italo-Somali relationship had come to an end, that in Mozambique can be regarded as the natural and promising development of previous Italian outstanding contributions to the national conciliation between the FRELIMO's government and its RENAMO opponents.

The debate on Italy's participation into "Restore Hope" took place when the Cold-War-era domestic Italian policy was eventually about to collapse. The Italian PSI-led involvement with the discredited regime of Siad Barre appeared at that moment as part of the sad legacy of that collapse. With the civil war and the fall of Siad Barre the Italian government began to avoid any involvement in the country. In view of returning in Somalia with "Restore Hope", the argument raised in the Parliament by many representatives and the government itself was that Italy was indebt to Somalia for previous mismanagement and involvement and consequently had to contribute to the humanitarian endeavour put forward by the US and the UN. However, the real mover behind the Italian government desire to participate in the operation was Italy's broader necessity to strengthen its international position, somewhat scared by domestic instability and economic difficulties. In other words, the contribution to "Restore Hope" and UNOSOM was due principally to the Italian goal of enhancing its international status by contributing to the implementation of the new world order. ASS as such was not ranking high in this policy.

As it is known, the operation was marked by serious disputes between Italy, on the one hand, and the UN and - most of all - the US, on the other. The Italian military, fully supported by the government in Rome, asked for a place in the joint command as to have a more effective say about policies they didn't share. Italians were probably right in maintaining that peace could not be enforced without accounting for political conditions in Mogadishu and the country and by interfering in the domestic political process. This is a very important argument in relation not only to Somalia but to the broad challenge put today by the post-Cold War international disorder to the international community. Sticking to Somalia, however, some Italian commentators pointed out that eventually nobody knows - not even the Italians - which are the determinants and the social-economic backgrounds of Somali politics today. At the climax of the dispute between Italy and the US, French and American commentators pointed out that Italy, as the former colonizer of Somalia, was better aware than other countries of the social, ethnic and religious roots of the conflict. But a number of Italian and non-Italian analysts have stressed that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Somali new parties and groups are predicated on the new necessity to unite to appropriate extremely scarce resources and not on traditional notions of "kabyles" or other clanic, religious or social affiliations.

In conclusion, the Italian intervention in Somalia has been more effective and productive from the general vantage point of the international security in the post-Cold War order than from a Somali or ASS security angle. It demonstrates Italy's capacity to contribute to international security but also the disappearance of any special relation between Italy and Somalia, not to talk about widespread Somali despise for the former Italian partner. The PSI-led policy in the 1980s has brought about this outcome. Italy can hardly be regarded today - and probably for some time to come - as a specific factor of security in the Horn (though this doesn't exclude positive bilateral actions towards Ethiopia and Eritrea).

The Italian policy towards Southern Africa, Mozambique in particular, is also affected by non-governmental factors. Since the mid-1970s, the PCI extended its support to the leaderships

of Angola and Mozambique. In the same years, the then close relations between the PCI, on the opposition, and the parties of the governmental coalition, especially the DC (Christian Democratic party) and the PSI, influenced the government's cooperation policy programme by introducing aid to Southern African front-line countries as a priority. At the end of the 1980s, while the persistent conflict in Angola and the international attention on it had dwarfed the Italian role in the country, in the Mozambique the links previously established by the Italian parties and the government allowed Italy to play the role of mediator in the negotiations between the government of the Republic of Mozambique and the RENAMO initiated in July 1990 and ended up with the December 1992 conference in Rome and the peace agreement of October 1993.

The mediation has been performed by a combination of private and official entities, i.e. the Comunità di Sant'Egidio (CSE, a Catholic secular brotherhood based in Rome), the Mozambique's Catholic Church and the Italian government, a combination that can be easily traced to Italy-Mozambique relations in the previous two decades. While the CSE and the Mozambique Church have provided the political and ideological background to the negotiations, the Italian government increased its aid (becoming the first donor country since 1989); proceeded to consolidate (in 1992 and 1994) and then cancel (142 million US\$, in January 1996) parts of Mozambique's debt owned by Italy; approved a programme for funding the national pacification activities at the occasion of the 1992 conference in Rome (a commitment of 162 billion Lira, whose disbursement will end up in 1996); and sent a considerable Italian military contingent within UNOMOZ between March 1993 and December 1994 to support the beginning of the political and civilian normalization in the country.

Almost inadvertently, a longstanding interaction between the Italian civil society and Italy's government has brought about a serious success in establishing security conditions in Mozambique and contributing to security in the Southern African area and development in the SADC (Southern African Development Community) region. A new and effective combination of the factors influencing Italy's ASS policy - a universalist and internationalist civil society and a government interested in asserting its international status and responsibility - has brought about in the last year a change in the Italy's ASS foreign and security policy which may supersede the old colonial legacy in the Horn. It must be eventually noted that this development takes place and is strengthened by the parallel reinforcement of the EU-SADC relations, after the decisions made in the Berlin conference of September 1994 and entry of the RSA entry in the SADC.

### *Conclusions*

After the end of the Second World War and the loss of the colonies, ASS could in no way represent a source of threats to Italy's national security. Nevertheless it has emerged as part of the Italian more comprehensive security notion.

During the Cold War era, Italy retained and developed important links with its former colonies, especially Somalia, and tried to secure their stability and development as part of its national security and its contribution to Western security. While Italy pursued this task successfully from the AFIS period through the end of the seventies, the strong support given by the Italian government and the PSI to the more and more authoritarian Barre's regime contributed to Somalia's involution and eventually backfired by seriously weakening (perhaps destroying) the longstanding good relationship between Somalia and Italy.

Albeit Somalia and the historical African heritage of Italy seems now gone, Italy will continue to give some priority to its relations with the Horn of Africa, at least with Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, Italian relations with the Horn will hardly return to be politically central within the ASS policy framework. An entirely new and positive relationship is now coming up in



Southern Africa with Mozambique. This new relationship will allow Italy to participate in the undertaking of developing peaceful and economically fruitful relations in the Southern African region, a task certainly very important for the security of both the West and the entire international community. It may well be that this new relation will be the locus wherein the political substance of Italy's ASS policy will be concentrated.

While the historical heritage is declining, the emergence of Southern Africa as a new concentration point of the Italian ASS policy is due to factors which play a broader role in the making of Italy's policy - the civil society and the interest in contributing to maintaining an orderly international community. These factors will continue to stimulate the Italian contribution towards securing international economic development and maintaining international security and order. Participation into peace operations will be probably privileged by Italy in the years to come for the reasons that were pointed out above. It may be that peace in South-eastern Europe and the Mediterranean will be given priority by Italy, but there is no doubt that Rome will remain interested in ASS. In this perspective, Italy will certainly encourage the efforts underway within the WEU to design and set up a Euro-Arab and Euro-African political and military cooperation to prevent crises and to keep or enforce peace in the vast ASS area, more and more prone to poverty and instability.

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Tab. 1 - Italy's trade with ASS, 1985-94 (billion Lira)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Export	3,607	3,145	3,783	3,615	3,908	3,482	4,055	3,182	3,742	3,929
Import	9,328	6,339	4,991	5,181	6,457	6,151	5,902	5,597	5,886	6,881
balance	-5,721	-3,194	-1,208	-1,566	-2,549	-2,669	-1,847	-2,415	-2,144	-2,952
export:										
<u>% ASS</u>	2.41		1.72	1.41	1.29					
World										
import:										
<u>% ASS</u>	5.40		2.83	2.53	2.55					
World										

Source: ICE

Tab. 2 - Italy's military missions abroad, 1979-1996

Location	Framework	Duration	Manpower	Aero-Naval Component	Goal
Lebanon	U/UNIFIL	0278-	52	x	monitoring
Egypt (Sinai)	M/MFO	0382-	88	x	monitoring
Lebanon	M	0882-0484	10,000	x	peace management
Mar Rosso	M	0884-1084		x	monitoring
Iran-Iraq	U/UNIIMOG	0888-0291	15		monitoring
Namibia	U/UNTAG	0389-0490	107	x	monitoring
ex-Yugoslavia	M-EU/ECMM	0291-	58		monitoring
Iran-Iraq	U/UNOSGI	0391-	1		monitoring
Iraq-Kuwait	U/UNIKOM	0491-	6		monitoring
Iraq	U/UNSCOM	0591-	1		monitoring
Iraq (Kurdistan)	M	0591-1091	1,700	x	humanitarian
Mozambique	M/COMIVE	0691-1092	2		monitoring
Western Sahara	U/MINURSO	0791-	6		monitoring
El Salvador	U/UNUSAL	0891-1095	20		monitoring
Albania	I/PELLICANO	0991-1293	5,000	x	humanitarian
Cambogia	U/UNTAC	0592-1193	77		monitoring
Somalia	M-U/UNOSOM	1292-0593	17,000	x	peace management
Mozambique	U/UNOMOZ	0393-1294	4,734		peace/monitoring
ex-Yug. (Danube)	M-WEU	0493-	64	x	policing
ex-Yug. (Adriat.)	M-NATO&WEU	0693-		x	policing
West Bank	M-HEBRON	0494-0794	2		monitoring
Bosnia (Mostar)	M-WEU/UPFM	0794-	20		policing
Somalia	M	0295-0395	2,100	x	peace management
ex-Yugoslavia	M/ICFY	0195-	2		monitoring
Guatemala	U/MINUGUA	0795-	10		monitoring
Angola	U/UNAVEM III	1195-	4		training
Bosnia	NATO/IFOR	0296-	2,500	x	peace management

Sources: E. Magnani, *Oltremare. Le missioni dell'Esercito italiano all'estero*, Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, Bari, 1993; Istituto Affari Internazionali, *L'Italia nella politica internazionale*, varying issues; *Interarma* (Rome), varying issues; Italian Ministry of Defence.

Notes to tab. 2

- M = multinational; U = UN.

- In general, manpower figures provided for finished missions reflect personnel's turnover during the entire missions, whereas for on-going missions figures reflect personnel on duty ca. in January/February 1996. For only-naval missions no personnel figure is provided.

- Missions' taxonomy is not official.

- War missions (Iraq-Kuwait) are not included.

- As it starts in 1979, the table includes all the on-going missions to which Italy is participating but two UN monitoring missions initiated respectively in 1948 (UNTSO, 7 peoples) and 1949 (UNMOGIP, 8).

- Citizens and non-citizens rescue operations are not included (Somalia & Ethiopia 1991; Rwanda & Yemen 1994).

Tab. 3 - Italian Aid: disbursements by main regions, 1994-95 (billion Lira)

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	<u>291294</u>	<u>230895</u>
Total	1,018	168
of which:		
Europe	65	10
MENA	65	27
ASS	368	78
Latin America	142	12
Asia	39	4
unallocated	338	36
Bilateral	573	120

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Source: Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs

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Tab. 4 - Italian Aid: main ASS's recipient countries in 1994 (billion Lira)

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	<u>commitments</u>	<u>disbursements</u>
Mozambique	102.663	108.738
Ethiopia	69.127	52.019
Somalia	47.499	51.706
Senegal	10.996	27.874
Angola	9.552	16.862
Tanzania	2.113	13.348
Rwanda	11.556	12.376
Niger	4.840	11.086
Eritrea	12.974	8.868
Kenya	13.443	5.913

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Source: Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Tab. 8 - Italian Arms Exports to non-NATO areas, 1992-94 (shares)

	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>
ASS	2.41	17.05	5.34
North Africa	4.77	1.61	1.29
Middle East	53.10	13.54	50.40
Latin America	7.70	22.42	1.13
Asia	3.15	21.57	10.42
South-east Asia	21.21	10.79	20.81
Non-NATO Europe	0.99	2.98	6.55
Oceania	6.67	10.04	4.03

Source: Camera dei Deputati, *Relazione sulle operazioni autorizzate e svolte per il controllo dell'esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali di armamento nonché dell'esportazione e del transito dei prodotti ad alta tecnologia*, 1992, 1993 & 1995.

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Tab. 9 - Italian Arms Export: value of the governmental clearances for non-temporary export to ASS, 1992-94 (billion Lira)

	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>
Burundi	0.124	-	-
Congo	-	-	89.884
Ethiopia	-	1.868	-
Ghana	0.169	30.672	0.822
Kenya	1.293	0.154	-
Lesotho	0.014	1.557	-
Nigeria	11.206	16.024	-
Tanzania	0.326	0.057	-
Zambia	2.352	-	-
Zimbabwe	0.863	0.044	0.047
ASS	16.347	50,376	90.753
Total value	2,330.162	1,576.321	2330.162
ASS/Total	0.70	3.19	3.89

Source: see previous table.