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**THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE:
THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL POLICIES**

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In this paper 'national policies' are not understood as EU countries' bilateral responses to external challenges. Rather, the paper relates to EU policies, to be understood as the outcome of a 'communitarian' decision-making or political process intended to provide EU member states with the foreign and security 'common actions' needed to face external challenges. The first section of the paper elaborates on this communitarian political process.

In the other sections, EU-Maghreb relations, within the context of broader Mediterranean relations, are taken into consideration so as to evaluate EU responses to challenges emanating from these areas.

The second section deals with the debate on the institutional format EU relations with the Mediterranean area and the Maghreb should be given. The third section is devoted to economic co-operation. The fourth section, before the conclusions, looks into political and security issues, i.e. into what is described as the implementation of a peace and security zone in the document approved at the June 1995 European Council in Cannes [1] and then discussed at the 27-28 November 1995 ministerial Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona.

Though the structure of the paper reflects the approach of the document above, the paper is predicated on issues (institutional frameworks, economic relations and political co-operation) which predate the Cannes' document --in a debate [2] which has gone on since the end of the 1980s, to say the least. The same debate will continue to be central to any discussion related to North-South relations across the Mediterranean sea, independently of the Barcelona conference follow up.

The Mediterranean area in the EU political process

The EU political process [3] reflects compromises among its members predicated on the traditional trading of mutual concessions and/or more sophisticated issue-linkages (e.g.: concessions in the monetary realm in order to attain objectives in the field of security). The EU process, however, also includes a prominent interest in preserving and increasing EU cohesion. The EU is a political coalition with a natural interest in survival. For this reason, within the EU cohesion is a 'public good' and some members can be interested in making a variety of concessions just for the sake of preserving or increasing such cohesion. In other words, in the process of shaping common institutions and policies the EU members have to find a balance between individual interests, policy effectiveness and cohesion. This means that policies agreed upon by the EU members have to face trade-offs and eventually to come to some mixed decision that may emphasise cohesion at the expense of effectiveness, or individual interests at the expense of both effectiveness and cohesion, etc.

Historically, the development of the EU's external relations has very often been connected to the Union-wide interest in cohesion. Thanks to the interest in EU membership, in the Community's process it has been possible to narrow important divergencies among different national interests. One early example is the policy of co-operation towards Africa south of the Sahara, mainly a legacy of the French colonial empire which --at the time the Treaty of Rome was being negotiated-- Germany was reluctant to accept. It accepted this policy, however, precisely to allow cohesion to emerge within the then EEC.

To some extent, the same is true for the EU's Mediterranean policy, which was initiated by France and Italy as a way to offset perceived power imbalances in intra-EC relations: stronger Community relations with the Mediterranean area were intended to provide a strong multilateral backing to the security and political interests of southern European countries and increase their weight within the EC's political process [4]. This was a case in which the national interests of some individual member states are met by their partners so as to avoid national perceptions of inequalities and discontinuities in collective security, thus strengthening the Community's cohesion.

The tendency of the southern European countries to act like 'mentors' of the southern Mediterranean countries so as to make their national interests conveniently reflected in the EU political process (and in the allocation of EU resources) was strengthened by the inclusion of Greece and the Iberian countries. This southern European tendency is a constant in EU politics and it has re-emerged in the last years as a response to Germany's unification, the transition to democracy in the Eastern European countries and the EU's trend towards preferring relations with Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and the growing political and economic instability which has emerged south of the Mediterranean sea, on the other hand.

After the long debate on the East-South opposition within the post-Cold War EU [5], the decisions made by the June 1995 European Council in Cannes [6] have provided a solution which comprehends both the EU's Eastern and Southern partners (the so-called 'arc of crises' [7]) and has a cohesive effect on both EU members' varying security requirements and the EU political process.

The guidelines approved in Cannes for the future of EU Mediterranean policy give substance to an EU policy level wherein national policies will be enabled to coalesce and adjust to one another. This is not to say that other policy levels, be they bilateral or non-EU, will fade away or become less important. It is to say that, as a result of the decisions made in Cannes, both the EU's 'common actions' towards the Mediterranean and its diverse components (Maghreb, Mashraq, Arab Maghreb Union, Gulf Co-operation Council, Arab-Israeli negotiations, Casablanca Economic Summit, etc.) and the EU's policies of economic co-operation will be an important point of reference and co-ordination for EU members' national policies.

Following the argument made above, this paper will evaluate EU policies towards the Mediterranean and the Maghreb in relation to their ability to maximize compatibility between EU policy effectiveness, on the one hand, and intra-EU cohesion, on the other.

Another important yardstick to for an evaluation of EU Mediterranean policies is their co-operative character with respect to the international context. EU policy success and feasibility have to be assessed not only according to their inherent effectiveness (ability to reach goals), but also according to their ability to provide cohesion inside, and complementarity outside the EU. By implementing its policies in the Mediterranean, the EU cannot help facing trade-offs between complementarity and competition in its internal relations, as we already know, but also in its relations with other international and regional actors. For example, a policy of commercial preferences towards Mediterranean countries may be regarded as competitive by other EU trading partners; the development of a WEU security policy towards the Mediterranean may be felt by the US as a duplication of NATO, etc.

In sum, this paper will not take into direct consideration national levels of policy (French, German, Italian policies towards the Mediterranean) but will evaluate EU Mediterranean policies in relation to two tiers of factors or trade-offs: (a) providing compatibility between EU Mediterranean policy effectiveness, on the one hand, and intra-EU

cohesion, on the other; (b) providing complementarity, and attenuating or avoiding competition, between non-EU and EU policies and frameworks.

Three main themes: (a) institutional framework

As already mentioned before, three main themes affect the EU political process related to the Mediterranean and the Maghreb: (a) the institutional framework of EU Mediterranean policy, (b) economic co-operation and (c) political and security relations with southern Mediterranean countries.

In the last five years many proposals were put forward by European and South Mediterranean countries alike to suggest some kind of institutional framework to make Mediterranean-wide co-operation possible. The Gulf War [8] and the beginning of the Arab-Israeli negotiations prevented these proposals from succeeding [9]. Other schemes, like the 'Five plus Five' grouping in the Western Mediterranean, were frozen by other developments.

On the other hand, the EU, despite a variety of initiatives (the 1990 Renovated Mediterranean Policy, its special programme for supporting the Palestinians within the Arab-Israeli negotiations framework, the 1992 Lisbon and Petersburg Declarations intended to reinforce the EU and WEU dialogue with North African countries) proved unable to give way to any significant policy towards the Mediterranean and came under harsh criticism from its Mediterranean partners for both allegedly using double standards in political relations with Arabs and preferring Eastern countries in political-institutional and economic-financial relations.

With the November 1995 Barcelona Conference, the EU multi-bilateral framework of Mediterranean relations may emerge as an effective focus in addition to other focuses which today tend to be more attractive in the area (like the Arab-Israeli negotiations). At the same time, the decisions made in Cannes have improved the balance between Eastern and Southern directions in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). These decisions may allow for more cohesive EU common actions in the Mediterranean and, as a consequence may strengthen the EU's role in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, a variety of issues remains unsolved with regard to the format and the scope of EU policy.

First, global trends (the Arab-Israeli negotiations with both its multilateral Working Groups on Regional Economic Development, REDWG, Arms Control and Regional Security, ACRS, the Casablanca Economic Summitry, etc.) and regional trends (EU initiatives, 'Five plus Five', Forum for the Mediterranean Dialogue and Co-operation, etc.) seem less complementary than competitive. Despite a broad willingness to work out complementarities and co-operation, one cannot overlook important difficulties in accommodating the aims and goals of different main Mediterranean actors.

Both the Arabs and the Europeans are confronted by the challenge of how their Mediterranean co-operation should be linked to their respective pan-Arab and trans-Atlantic political hinterlands. As the 1990 Italo-Spanish proposal to establish a CSCM (Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean)[10] derived from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, quite naturally it planned the inclusion of both the US and the USSR. The Euro-Arab Dialogue was extended to the entire Arab World, including the Arab Gulf countries, but excluded the US. Both these frameworks have failed to emerge or consolidate. Today, the new EU-Mediterranean framework excludes the Arab Gulf countries and the US, leaving to the Euro-Mediterranean partners the task to accommodate this Mediterranean format with their non-Mediterranean and non-EU alliances. From an Arab point of view, the problem lies less in the absence of the Arab Gulf countries than in the

presence of Israel. From a European point of view, co-ordination with trans-Atlantic ties and the substantive presence of the US in the Mediterranean area are issues the EU cannot overlook, particularly as far as security relations are concerned. Should European security in the Mediterranean be provided by solely European institutions? Should NATO be the shared EU-US institution for dealing with security matters in the Mediterranean, as the creation of the CJTFs within NATO and the action launched by the new NATO Secretary-General at the beginning of 1995 [11] seems to suggest? Should there be a locus, in NATO or elsewhere, for systemic trans-Atlantic consultations [12] on security in the Mediterranean and elsewhere? These questions are far from being solved.

Typically, the US request to participate as an observer at the Barcelona Conference raised a debate in the EU between those who emphasise the necessity for the EU to maintain a firm security link with the US and those who saw the Barcelona Conference as an opportunity to stress EU Mediterranean specificity, assert the EU security identity and increase EU political visibility in the area (particularly in view of the fact that the EU role in the Arab-Israeli negotiations is politically dwarfed).

Other evidence of creeping EU-US competition in the Mediterranean is the launching of the Casablanca Economic Summit process [13] at the very moment that the EU is trying to start its reinforced third generation Mediterranean policy of economic co-operation. Many in the EU would like to offset US political dominance in the Arab-Israeli negotiations circle by strengthening the EU role in economic co-operation with the region, thereby attaining a form of division of labour. In the absence of a stipulated EU-US concertation, the launching of the Casablanca process under prevailing US sponsorship sounded competitive to many European ears.

Second, there is no clarity about the way all-Mediterranean approaches (like the CSCM) should coexist with sub-regional approaches (like the Group of 'Five plus Five', the EU-Gulf Co-operation Council relations, the Forum for Mediterranean Dialogue and Co-operation, etc.). In particular, there is uncertainty about the merit of distinguishing Western and Eastern Mediterranean, Maghreb and Mashraq, Mediterranean Arabs and Gulf Arabs, etc. This uncertainty is upgraded by the confusion prevailing on the Arab stage between wishes to restore a pan-Arab framework and tendencies to actual fragmentation.

Both points above raise important questions about cohesion and complementarity. If trans-Atlantic complementarity is not secured or proves insufficient, not only the effectiveness of EU policy in the Mediterranean can be affected but so can cohesion between EU partners more sensitive to the primacy of Atlantic ties in providing security to Europe and others, a fault-line inherent in the European political process that could find new ground in relation to the Mediterranean.

The effect of implementing a new and more effective policy framework for dealing with Mediterranean affairs within an integrated and well articulated CFSP framework, is mostly cohesive for the EU partners. But, the way this framework will be structured raises questions from the point of view of complementarity with non-EU partners, particularly the US. For now, the broad EU approach seems rather eclectic, with elements of both globalism and regionalism. In any case, it seems less doctrinaire and more flexible than it used to be at the beginning of the 1990s and this could favour the search for a more EU-cohesive and Atlantic-complementary Mediterranean framework.

(b) economic co-operation

The Cannes document on EU Mediterranean policy and, successively, the Barcelona Declaration set out the main guidelines the EU will adopt in its future Mediterranean policy: a

free-trade area aimed at fostering private investment and horizontal co-operation in the regions south of the Mediterranean, supported by increased financial effort mainly directed at strengthening civil societies and diffusing entrepreneurship (small and medium firms) in the economies of the countries concerned.

With the beginning of the Arab-Israeli negotiations there was an important academic debate about the effects and feasibility of economic integration and co-operation in the region and the conditions necessary to implement it [14]. Less analytical work has been devoted so far to the effects of an eventual implementation of some form of regionalism in relations between Europe and the Middle Eastern-North African area (MENA)[15]. The effectiveness and the success of EU plans depend on many factors: the ability to regulate migrations and to create new jobs; the ability to increase horizontal co-operation south of the Mediterranean, particularly in the Maghreb; the ability to induce a positive interaction between political and economic reforms so as to allow private investors to be less reluctant to move towards an area presently perceived as fairly unstable. In this paper the relevant question, however, is less the merit of these policies than their impact on cohesion and complementarity, and the relations between the effectiveness of economic co-operation in the MENA region or in the Euro-Mediterranean circle, on the one hand, and cohesion and complementarity, on the other.

Cohesion is predicated on the EU's ability to increase its commercial openness and its financial generosity without creating inequalities or imbalances between members' interests and their preferred directions. There will be a difficult exercise in balancing EU members' different geo-political and geo-economic different directions: Germany's and the DEM zone countries' interest towards the East, on one hand, and Southern Europe's interest towards the South, on the other. The agreement reached in Cannes suggests very clearly that Germany is willing to integrate the Mediterranean in the CFSP of the Union but that Southern Europe must be ready to bear its fair share of the cost. The cost of cohesion for southern Europe remains to be seen.

Another issue with a strong possible impact on cohesion is immigration, in combination with other human movements (such as refugees, displaced persons, etc.). Migration is not explicitly part of the EU Mediterranean policies set out by the Cannes document, because from the EU point of view it has a wider scope and is more related to the issue of attaining freedom of movement inside the EU itself than to policies towards individual areas of origin. However, no Mediterranean policy can be conceived of or implemented without making reference to migrations. This may complicate an already thorny issue within the EU itself and affect either cohesion or policy effectiveness, or both.

Complementarity is predicated on the ability of the EU, the US and the Arabs to set out coherent international economic policies or an effective division of labour in pursuing co-operation. A case in point concerns the links between economic restructuring, employment and migration. Employment and migration are conspicuous for their absence in the restructuring plans implemented under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as well as in the REDWG and the Casablanca Economic Summit process. Conversely, they are included in the EU's proposals and policies, though perhaps they are not that prominent in the Barcelona Declaration and the EU documents that prepared the ministerial Conference. This difference in emphasis and direction, like others, may have a negative impact on the effectiveness of economic co-operation.

(c) political and security relations

The Mediterranean dimension in political and security policy is new with respect to previous EU policies. At the same time, this dimension is given a prominent and leading role in the

strategy outlined by the EU papers in preparation for the Barcelona Conference, though it is may be less prominent in the Barcelona Declaration itself. These papers are an expression of the EU identity, as they stress the European belief that democracy and human rights are meant to play a cardinal role in stirring economic and social development. Economic and social development are in turn expected to bring about stability and to provide security.

The linkages and feedback upon which EU policy seems predicated are strongly debated in the literature [16], comparing experiences as different as that of the Arab world and Southeast Asia. Broadly speaking, opinions are rather sceptical about the sequence underlying EU strategy. At the same time, from the point of view of EU cohesion (and deepening), a success on political and security grounds would be very important, because --putting it very plainly-- the EU's ability to implement a policy that is strongly shared by member states (and very similar to the one the EU is betting on in Eastern Europe) would contribute to consolidate the shaky foundations of its CFSP. How feasible is the political and security strategy the EU is about to put forward as an important ingredient of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership?

All the existing EU-Mediterranean countries association agreements, like those with the Eastern European countries, include a standard declaration about democracy and human rights. However, it is well known that, while Eastern European countries want to align themselves with these notions, the same is not entirely true with respect to southern Mediterranean countries. For these countries the standard declaration included in the EU association agreements is accepted with strong as well as tacit reservations. Societies on the southern shore of the Mediterranean are involved in a complex debate about democracy and human rights. Governments look at European insistence on democracy as a risk for their very survival; liberal and islamist oppositions look at it, in different ways and for different reasons, as an interference they cannot accept.

This is not to say that the EU has to renounce the assertion of its goals of democratisation, but the way its policies should be articulated is probably more complex and uncertain than EU members think. There will be difficulties in pursuing a reasonable balance between the implementation of conditionality and the interest of the EU in good relations with southern Mediterranean areas, the latter's stability and the survival of the Euro-Mediterranean framework of co-operation itself. These difficulties may translate into as many tests for EU cohesion and put in question the possibility of whether a fair balance between cohesion and effectiveness may be implemented.

A similar issue is put in the opposition between the notion of crisis management and that of crisis prevention. The southern Mediterranean governments, in particular those of North Africa, are looking for common institutions and complex understandings with the EU to reinforce their domestic legitimacy and attain more stability. From their point of view, however, these institutions should minimise management (i.e. European interference) and maximise prevention (i.e. giving them resources to act effectively within their respective countries on both economic and political grounds). It may be that these requests cannot be easily and entirely met by the EU. Again, there are difficult trade-offs from a European point of view between cohesion and effectiveness.

Other challenges are put forward by complementarity. Complementarity with non-EU trends is primarily related to security: how should security be arranged in the region so as to meet internal and external actors' requirements?

On the one hand, complementarity between pan-Arab and Middle Eastern circles (like the Arab League or the multilateral group on Arms Control and Regional Security, ACRS) and EU policy demands a more precise EU policy with respect to the security and politics of

the Arab-Israeli negotiations as well as clarifications about the evolution of both the CFSP and the WEU. Furthermore, the European involvement in Nato's possible role in the Mediterranean should be clarified, though --unlike Russia-- Arab countries do not differentiate between NATO and EU security institutions.

On the other hand, complementarity between NATO and the EU is also to be clarified. Current attempts at looking for a NATO role in the Mediterranean have been mentioned above. These attempts do not look very sensible as long as a trans-Atlantic concertation about roles and tasks continues to be missing. NATO should remain the locus for setting out global policies, among which anti-proliferation (in and outside the Mediterranean area) is most important. In this sense, an EU-USA understanding is a relevant element for the future of the Mediterranean stability, an element which is to influence not only complementarity but also regional effectiveness and intra-EU cohesion.

Conclusions

The new EU Mediterranean policy will be the outcome of a complex compromise between effectiveness of EU policies, intra-EU solidarity or cohesion and complementarity/competition between actors performing on the Mediterranean stage, particularly the US.

The mix that will emerge out of these three elements is to a large extent unpredictable. However, a few trends can be singled out. First, it seems evident that the effectiveness of EU Mediterranean policies is bound to be primarily influenced by intra-EU solidarity and EU-US complementarity. A large degree of EU cohesion coupled with a strong trans-Atlantic complementarity should have a very positive impact on EU policy effectiveness. In fact, in such a case EU policy would be supported by both a stronger EU determination in conducting its CFSP (which eventually includes economic co-operation) and a sensible division of labour between the US and the EU. As the US is an extremely important partner for the MENA area, trans-Atlantic complementarity will not be less important than intra-EU solidarity. Conversely, trends like renationalization of foreign policies within the EU, weakening of EU cohesion and persistent ambiguities in trans-Atlantic relations will affect in a more or less negative way any effective attempt at setting up a viable Euro-Mediterranean regionalism (similar, e.g., to North-South regionalism in North America).

Another way to look at the same question is whether the development of a new and stronger Mediterranean relationship can affect positively either intra-EU cohesion or trans-Atlantic complementarity, or both. As stressed in the paper, the decisions made in Cannes by the European Council have already provided an upgrading of EU cohesion, but this cohesion is now going to be tested by the simultaneous implementation of both the Mediterranean and Eastern European policies. What will be influenced by what --whether cohesion by effectiveness or the other way round--is something difficult to anticipate: there is a strong interaction and one has to wait to see how this interaction is going to work. In any case, as seen in the previous sections, there is no doubt that the Mediterranean area will pose several difficult question to the EU and its members, such as migrations, cultural/political oppositions, etc., and these difficulties will amount to as many sharp tests to EU cohesion.

As for trans-Atlantic complementarity, it will be the outcome of what trans-Atlantic solidarity or cohesion will turn out to be as a result of the ongoing debate between Europe and the US. Will the Mediterranean emerge as a particularly severe test or obstacle to the transformation and reinforcement of trans-Atlantic ties? An inter-Atlantic disruption because of the Mediterranean seems to be ruled out, but it may well be that an EU failure to activate an effective policy in the Mediterranean area predicated on a sound intra-EU cohesion, and on

the continuation of petty disputes and ambiguities would contribute to the tendency towards disaffection and detachment between allies.

Notes

[1] In Cannes The European Council approved the document prepared by the European Commission, *Renforcement de la Politique Méditerranéenne de l'Union Européenne. Etablissement d'un Partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen*, COM(94) 427 final, Brussels, 19 October 1994.

[2] On these issues see the review by Victor-Yves Ghebali, 'De la CSCE à la CSCM', *Bulletin Interparlementaire*, No. 2, 1992, pp. 149-52, and Roberto Aliboni, 'Institutionalizing Mediterranean Relations: Complementarity and Competition', *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, Bonn, No. 3, 1995, pp. 290-99.

[3] On Communitarian decision-making see Emil Joseph Kirchner, *Decision-making in the European Community*, Manchester & New York, Manchester University Press, 1992; Paul Taylor, *The Limits of European Integration*, London & Sidney, Croom Helm, 1983.

[4] On Southern Europe's Community policy see: John W. Holmes (ed.), *Maelstrom*, Cambridge Massachusetts, The World Peace Foundation, 1995; Roberto Aliboni (ed.), *Southern European Security in the 1990s*, London and New York, Pinter Publishers, 1992; Douglas T. Stuart (ed.), *Politics & Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance*, MacMillan Press, 1988; John Chipman (ed.), *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, London, New York, Routledge with Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1988.

[5] On the East-South opposition with reference to EU politics see Gianni Bonvicini, 'The Mediterranean and Eastern Europe: Two Worlds in Competition?', in *Vers une nouvelle Europe?*, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1992, pp. 169-76; Roberto Aliboni, 'Europe between East and South: Security and Development Co-operation', in *The International Spectator*, Rome, vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 5-15.

[6] See the conclusions of the Presidency in *Europe Documents*, No. 1942, 29 June 1995.

[7] George Joffé, *European Security and the new arc of crisis: Paper I* and Curt Gasteyger, *European Security and the new arc of crisis: Paper II*, Adelphi Papers, 265, Winter 1991/92, pp.53-81.

[8] Ghassan Salamé, 'Les enjeux d'une crise', *Monde Arabe Maghreb Machrek*, No. 130, October-December 1990, pp. 5-13. On the Maghreb in particular see: Abdelwahab Biad, 'Le Maghreb et la guerre du Golfe', in IREMAM, *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, vol. 29, Paris, Editions du CNRS, 1992, pp. 439-52; Yahia Zoubir, 'Reactions in the Maghreb to the Gulf Crisis and War', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 83-103; Nadji Safir, 'Les opinions maghrébines et la guerre du Golfe', *Peuples Méditerranéens*, No. 58-59, January-June 1992, pp. 39-47.

[9] David McDowall, *Europe and the Arabs. Discord or Symbiosis?*, London, Royal Institute

of International Affairs, 1992.

[10] Victor-Yves Ghebali, 'Towards a CSCE in the Mediterranean: The CSCM' in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), *The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation*, Baden Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993, pp. 336-43; Julia Olmo, 'La Reunión de Palma: la CSCE y el Mediterráneo', *Política Exterior*, vol. 5, No. 19, Winter 1991, pp. 180-87.

[11] The NATO Permanent Council "decided to establish mechanisms for forming regular contacts with non-NATO member Mediterranean countries" essentially at an academic level: see *Atlantic News*, No. 2688, 25 January 1995, p. 1.

[12] Asmus R.D., Kugler R.L., Larrabee F.S. (1993) 'Building a New NATO', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, No. 4, Sept.-Oct., pp. 28-40; see also: Nanette Gantz, John Roper (eds.), *Towards a New Partnership. US-European relations in the post-Cold War Era*, Paris, Rand Co. & the Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1993; Laurence Martin, John Roper (eds.), *Towards A Common Defence Policy*, Paris, European Strategy Group & the Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1995.

[13] See David Kimche, *Casablanca. Sowing the Seeds of Economic Co-operation*, Jerusalem, Institute of the World Jewish Congress & Israel Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Forum No. 5, 1995

[14] Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrick, Elias Tuma (eds.), *The Economics of Middle East Peace. Views from the Region*, London & Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1993; more recently: Dirk Vandewalle, 'The Middle East Peace process and Regional Economic Integration', in *Survival*, vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, pp. 21-34.

[15] Jacques Ould Aoudia, 'Proche-Orient: processus de paix, intégration régionale et partenariat euro-méditerranéen', *Monde Arabe Maghreb Machrek*, No. 148, April-June 1995, pp. 3-16; Isabelle Bensidoun, Agnès Chevallier, 'Les échanges commerciaux euro-méditerranéens', *Economie Internationale*, Paris, No. 58, 2nd quarter 1994, pp. 111-30; Rodney Wilson, 'The Economic Relations of the Middle East: Toward Europe or within the Region?', *Middle East Journal*, vol. 48, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 268-87.

[16] Tim Niblock, Edith Penrose (eds.), *Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East*, London & New York, British Academic Press, 1993, pp. 40-54.