

**DOCUMENTI  
IAI**

**THE TWELVE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA.  
OLD AND NEW CHALLENGES**

*by Gianni Bonvicini*

Paper presented at the Conference "Regional and global responsibilities of the European Union in the 1990s: the potential limits of the Common Foreign and Security Policy",  
Bruxelles, 28-29 January 1994

IAI9450

**ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI**

# THE TWELVE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. OLD AND NEW CHALLENGES

by Gianni Bonvicini

One of the main task for CFSP was that of defining areas and issues of common interest. The exercise proved to be more difficult than expected. National perceptions and interests did frequently prevail. Therefore the outcome was a broad and generic description of European priorities in foreign and security affairs. The experience of these few years of CFSP has shown that a better a more detailed definition of prioritarian areas and issues is a precondition for its more effective functioning.

In general, the European Union has to address in depth the meaning of the radical changes of these last years and assess its role in matching the challenges and risks which have emerged. The starting assumption is that the present crisis is not a completely negative notion. On the contrary, there seem to be a series of good chances for a great step forward towards a good management and an economic, social, human and political growth in Europe and in the neighbouring Regions. Today, however, such result is not taken for granted, as strong adverse elements could jeopardize it or make it exceedingly difficult to be achieved.

## **1. The multilateral system in crisis**

Among the positive aspects, there is the dissolution of a large totalitarian empire, stretching out over a large portion of Europe, that was both economically self-supporting and militarily aggressive, without the breaking out of international wars. This great "peaceful revolution" has been made possible, to a considerable extent, by the presence and fundamental resistance of that complex and seemingly-superfluous web of institutions and multilateral or bilateral agreements that, at different levels and to different extents, has governed relations between countries and groups of countries in ways other than wars. Such organizations as the United Nations (UN) and such international political commitments as the ones undertaken within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) did have a significant relevance; yet, a fundamental role has been played by international institutions created within the context of the old "western" world, such as the Atlantic Alliance and its military organization (NATO), as well as the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development itself (OECD).

However, this achievement in itself, no matter how significant, is not enough. The emergence of a "new international order" was expected within the international system, announced by US president George Bush in 1991, after Iraq had been defeated by the international coalition acting on behalf of the United Nations. On the contrary, the sharpening of crisis-originating factors has been witnessed to, within the system (1). The powerful strength deployed in the Gulf war proved to be a short-lived one, just when it had to turn into a world governing authority.

A fundamental long-standing problem in the international-system management is now making a comeback; it is a well-known issue, but it had been seemingly neglected due to the successful results in the first half of 1991. Actually, the new system is based both on the power

and on the weaknesses of the old international system. This was founded on political pre-requisites and outlooks which were bound to change rapidly.

The United States are the only global military superpower left, even if Russia keeps a huge nuclear arsenal, but it wants to cut down defense spending and does not seem to be either ready or able to play the "balancing" role within the international system it had played after World War II and later on, thanks to international balance polarization into two blocks. The US, however, is the only country that can rapidly make popularly-impressive and operationally-demanding decisions, though they will be ever more inclined to scale down the size of their interventions, comparing to the past.

This situation leaves a widening gap open to the initiatives of several "incomplete" powers, among which Russia, the European Union, Japan, China, India and a range of ambitious and combative countries, willing to increase their leverage, especially in the military sector, by acquiring nuclear weapons and missiles. Actually, these "incomplete" powers are challenging the US leadership at the top of the international system. None of them can control or manage the new international system and none, individually, can confront directly with the United States. However, each one, to a certain extent, can block US initiatives and all together, on the whole, highlight the need of an overall review of the international system and its traditional hierarchy.

The ensuing situation can usher in several different scenarios, two of which seem to be the most interesting and topical:

A - a possibly positive situation: the creation of a new more stable and balanced "oligopolistic cartel", involving all major powers and ensuring a new and evenhanded sharing of charges and tasks. However, such "oligopolistic cartel" runs the risk of giving way to a state of international strife likely to result from the confrontation of ambitions and the relating spheres of influence.

B - a definitely negative situation: the "incomplete" powers' failure to take on their charges and tasks ensuring a good management of the international system, thus giving way to anarchy or maybe even to a last-resort attempt, by the United States, either to restore a two-pole balance, conflicting and co-operating at the same time, or to reshape the image of the foe-partner for the new Russia (this would become possible if conservative trends gained ground in such a country), not to mention the possibility to shift the confrontation more decidedly on the economic level, against Japan and possibly even against the EU.

Meanwhile, we are witnessing to a series of national fragmentation crises and to the overwhelming presence of a growing number of "small wars", important issues relating to global environmental management, open and substantial violations of the most fundamental human rights as well as nuclear and technological and military proliferation.

Europe is squeezed between two areas affected by a deep crisis: the first one at East, where the former USSR was located together with the old communist system - which included Yugoslavia as well -, and the other one stretching from the Mediterranean towards Africa on the South and towards Asia and the Middle East on the East.

Considering these dramatic changes, late in 1991, hopes were raised that the agreements on

the European Union reached by the European Council at Maastricht would enable a sort of step forward, at least by the Twelve: a new "constitutional covenant" that could foster a rapid growth within the European "incomplete" power. Europe would thus take on a considerable share of the charges and responsibilities involved in the international-system management, in close co-operation with the USA, restoring a stable central area within the international system. Subsequently, Japan could add up, further enlarging the area of co-operation, security and stability towards East and South. On the contrary, in the last few months, this prospect, though not entirely swept apart, has been undoubtedly reappraised and delayed, focusing a deeper attention on national - or even chauvinistic - approaches, decidedly unable to raise the same resource standards and ensure the starting of a similar "virtuous circle".

## **2. The great international crises**

Since 1991 a crumbling international system has been marked by several crises, none of which has been settled down. International institutions, starting from the more global organizations such as the UN and the CSCE, increased their efforts and launched an extremely relevant political and institutional strengthening process (2). Yet, they had to limit to a damage-minimizing approach, rather than engage in a real policy of crisis management and settlement.

### **Former Yugoslavia**

The most impressive case is obviously represented by the Balkans (3). In January 1992, Yugoslavia's breaking-up was definitely acknowledged, thanks to Europe's recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and, subsequently, of Bosnia-Herzegovina. While Slovenia's strife was over by the summer of 1991, Croatia's turmoil was turning into a military standstill, with Serbian forces occupying about one third of the Croatian territory, and UN intervention troops (UNPROFOR) deployed in the contended regions of eastern and southern Croatia.

In contrast with the recommendations contained in the EC "Badinter Commission"'s report, this unconditioned recognition gave way to a complex regional issue related to the principle of the right to a nation state, a dangerous precedent, ominously foreboding an intricate tangle of diverse nationalistic rebellions. The formal recognition, strongly urged by Germany, was an important signal even within the western countries, as it marked a new assertive role of the unified Germany's foreign policy (4).

By the following spring, the conflict had extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina, officially recognized in April by western countries. Muslim slavs found themselves encircled by an ambiguous alliance between Serbs, Croatians, and indigenous pro-Serbian irregular troops. The atrocities committed in this bloody warfare, still unlikely to come to an end, aroused a mounting feeling of frustration and helplessness in the West, especially for the self-evident contrast with the intervention against Iraq in 1991. A growing awareness on the urgent need to take action was actually coupled by the realization that a military engagement would be far more demanding and dangerous than the previous year's intervention in Kuwait.

The military situation on the ground has been progressively deteriorating, despite the growing UN humanitarian involvement and the strengthening of monitoring activities to prevent the running of the blockade against Serbia and Montenegro, both in the Adriatic sea and along the Danube. Most significantly, there are fears that the war, already spread out to Bosnia-Herzegovina (with appalling human right violations and allegations of mass extermination confirmed by the so-called "ethnic cleansing" practice in the territories controlled by opposing factions, but especially by Serbian forces), could be extended against the Albanian population in the autonomous province of Kosovo, thus directly affecting the Republic of Macedonia and Albania, and, indirectly, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. In this case too, nationalistic concerns have driven Greece's stance, hindering the CFSP with regards to Macedonia and preventing its recognition for a long time - again in contrast with the "Badinter Commission"'s recommendations. This would pave the way for a widespread international conflict in the Balkans, that could even see allied countries - within NATO and the WEU - lining up on opposing fronts.

#### Central and Eastern Europe

The European policy was more successful with regards to the newly-founded democracies in central and eastern Europe (5), despite the serious economic and political crisis still ravaging in these countries. In this case, the joint Italian-Austrian initiative to attempt the setting up of a grouping of central-European countries (initially called the Quadrangular and now, renamed Central European Initiative, including the countries concerned by the Visegrad agreement as well as Hungary, Croatia, Bosnia and Slovenia), though a clever move on the political and planning level, has been actually obstructed by the aftermath of the Balcanic war as well as by the the lack of a matter-of-fact approach in the implementation of common projects (6). This was a further evidence that the trend to group together in sub-regional blocks is far from being natural and easy.

The European countries once belonging to the Warsaw Pact and at least one of the new Republics of former Yugoslavia - Slovenia - wish to join the EU and become member of NATO or at least of the WEU, to ensure and shore up their domestic stability. The problem is that such a process cannot be only one-way direction, but should be based on a clear evidence of a sound co-operation approach within these very countries. Unfortunately, the actual freeze of the Visegrad agreement (between Poland, the Czechk Republic, the Slovakian Republic and Hungary) is the result of an escalating regional conflict likely to threaten future prospects, even if it could still be successfully managed.

#### Former Soviet Union

The issue of the former Soviet Union is still a pending one. During 1992, after the failed coup in August 1991, the USSR broke up, fragmented into several independent republics, eleven of which (excluding Georgia and the Baltic republics) set up the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (7). Since the beginning, the CIS has been pervaded by political and institutional inconsistencies that have seriously undermined its very existence until the present deadlock, apart from assurance of the Russian control over the strategic nuclear weapons left in three of the Republics.

By way of simplification, the main problems in the breaking-up mostly concerned the territory and ethnic minorities. Above all, the most relevant was the dispute between Ukraine and

Russia over Crimea, but even more serious troubles are looming to the fore between Russia and Kazakhstan as well as between Moldova and Ukraine. The war between Armenians and Azerbaijani is still ravaging in southern Caucasus, while in northern Georgia, claims by Ossetians, Abkazians and many other groups have been violently expressed - though still on a small scale - inside and outside the new Russian Republic.

Secondly, former Soviet republics negotiated the splitting-up of former Soviet armed forces. Within this framework, agreements were reached - whose implementation will take some time - on delivery of strategic nuclear forces back to Russia (tactical forces were all transferred on the Russian territory during the first half of the year) and on the subdivision of conventional force quotas available to the USSR under the CFE treaty.

Finally, several talks began on the sharing out of former Soviet infrastructures, of movable goods and real estate property as well as of the foreign debt. As yet, with all these ongoing negotiations, both in the preliminary and implementation phases, the relations between CIS countries are still characterized by a widespread uncertainty, although no dispute connected with the Soviet disintegration has resulted in an open war between the republics.

On the whole, a gloomy picture can be drawn: a looming failure of economic reforms in Russia, with a serious social impact. The risk of an authoritarian resurgence, fostered by an ever more singular alliance between militarymen, former communist bureaucrats and right-wing nationalists, could be made even more threatening by the general political disarray, by Boris Yeltsin's flagging popularity, by nationalistic disputes in the federation's peripheral areas and by the lack of reliable democratic alternatives.

#### The Mediterranean and the Middle East

In the Middle East and in the Mediterranean, the international-system crisis is all the more evident, as the expectations of a new world order were based on the ability to settle these regional conflicts themselves.

The international instruments for crisis-management proved to be ineffective, firstly owing to a lack of cohesion between the members of the Security Council and secondly, because of the local actors' reluctance to adopt integrated security systems in the region.

The Arab-Israeli peace settlement is going on, though at a sluggish pace. Given the irrelevance of the Russian patronage, the pattern of regional talks with individual countries is affected by the exclusive dependence on Washington, whereas a coherent joint supervision could ensure a more attentive monitoring and lead to more comprehensive breakthroughs (8). Even the multilateral negotiations on the aids and economic support to be released to the Palestinian people are influenced by hierarchical rankings among western partners, not to mention Europe's failure to consistently co-ordinate its participation, except for claiming a higher profile that no one is ready to grant.

Even more serious is the setback - if not the utter failure - of the policy concerning self-restraint in arm exports to the region by the Security Council's permanent members, responsible for 85% of the world exports. Apart from undermining any chance for an effective

monitoring on proliferation in this region and elsewhere, this standstill is covering up massive weapon transfers to the area by the Council's members themselves, it is fostering the local actors' unwillingness to adopt joint security systems and it is raising both the chances and the lethal effect of future conflicts in the area (9).

Even in the Mediterranean, political and economic-integration policies, advocated by the southern European countries and partially retained by the European Union, are losing their effectiveness, considering a declining Union's cohesion. Consequently, while the Union's Mediterranean policy cannot ensure even the meeting of previous standards of economic and financial co-operation in the region, the institutions in charge of the North-South integration in the area - for example the Group of Ten in the Mediterranean - have not managed to play a significant role, compared to the disintegration trends prevailing in the area.

Finally, Turkey's delicate and important political strategic situation should not be undervalued. Turkey has an associate status to the EU and the WEU, and is a NATO member that supported both the anti-Iraqi coalition and the Atlantic allies' policy during the Gulf crisis. However, the country is being pervaded by waves of Islamic religious resurgence, is shaken by a deep domestic crisis concerning Kurdish minorities and is involved in the Balkan conflicts. Turkey attempted its own strategy for regional co-operation - similar to Italy's move on the Central European Initiative - with the countries belonging to the Black Sea basin and it has strong traditional cultural and linguistic ties with the new republics in central Asia. Turkey is at the heart of any strategic policy for crisis-management and co-operation in the area. Its alliance with Europe and the US provides these powers with a secure strategic advantage, but is now being challenged by integration problems, mounting regional strife and, most significantly, by a delicate domestic situation, originated even before the death of President Ozal (10).

### The Third World

The end of the bipolar balance is putting into question the very notion of Third World and is strongly highlighting differences between countries and regions within the whole area. Income and resource disparities are increasingly evident and more clearly perceived, together with the contrasts, expectations and ambitions of a growing number of individual states.

On some occasions, these ambitions are supported by leadership and assertiveness objectives. On some others, within the context of the void left open by large communist nations - the USSR and the Yugoslavian federation - they are just the expression of uncertainties and material needs, urging the populations concerned to rally on ethnic and national solidarity.

The overall result is a Third World fragmentation whose extent is much more considerable now, compared to the past. The current fragmentation is now riddled with conflicts and frustrations. The Third World does not trust existing international institutions and their weakness, its conflicts are not curbed in any way by the international system and each country is trying to secure its own survival rather than helping in the creation of common international institutions.

These evolving trends have already ushered in the generation of new conflicts and the deterioration of old ones, especially at Europe's southern borders, namely in the Arab-Muslim world and in Africa, as well as on Russia's southern frontiers. In the next future, these trends are

expected to result in an arm race coupled with a high degree of instability that, in some way, is bound to involve Western and European countries.

### **3. A wavering Europe**

The situation in the Twelve does not look any better. What had been feared soon after 1989 is now taking place: the new nationalistic trends in Eastern Europe are undermining even the institutions and policies of what the Americans had called, a few years ago, the "European Fortress". Within a few months the EU has shifted from a long period of Euro-optimism to a climate of widespread disenchantment, resembling, in some respects, the gloomiest phases of the Community pathway (11).

This sudden Europessimism upsurge in the European Union, mounting soon after the Maastricht Treaty had been officially signed, can be explained by different reasons, referring to both the complex subjects and the limitations of the text approved and, most significantly, to the occurrence, in that same period, of situations and events both inside and outside Europe.

Above all, a leadership crisis within all EU countries is to be taken into account, as it is expected to be a long-lasting one, with no apparent viable solutions both in terms of new emerging leaders and of innovation programmes. This pattern is particularly evident in post-Thatcher Britain, where the new cabinet cannot alter the country's seemingly-irreversible trend to isolationism. Contradictory political signals are also coming from other EU peripheral areas, such as Italy and Spain, once staunch supporters of integration. However, the most worrying events are occurring in central Europe, with a serious setback in president Mitterand's leadership. The only exception remains chancellor Kohl, but without a strong partner in France the European engine, the Paris-Bonn axis, cannot work properly. Within the context of a difficult and divisive transition phase in the Union, inattentive or low-influential leaders are a hindrance slowing down any progress and innovation.

A weak leadership also results in cabinets that are more concerned about gathering support on the domestic side, rather than focused on foreign issues: a national-interest approach thus becomes the keystone to political survival. As a result, the prospects for new alternative scenarios to Maastricht are now less certain. Yet, future events might have such a relevant impact as to force governments to search for these alternative solutions and, in any case, it would be wiser to get ready for this.

Economic stagnation and transnational speculations - that cannot be properly tackled either by member countries or by a still undefined Union - represented additional concrete elements affecting the enforcement of Maastricht provisions. After all, Europe has no protection from international speculations and counteracting defense measures are likely to have very high financial and social costs. The Maastricht Treaty has been put into question mostly because of this phenomenon and this is why effective remedies should be taken to prevent it from occurring again.

At the same time, external pressures are increasingly being put on the Union and on the individual member countries that, however, cannot respond adequately. The Union cannot meet



the demand for increased responsibility-sharing because, due to the recession, it can only count on a limited budget. All member countries are faced with huge public deficits and increased unemployment. As a consequence, they will be less inclined to work out rescue plans to support eastern economies, the Mediterranean and other developing countries.

Comparing to the past, however, external pressures are not limited to economic demands, but increasingly call for political, security and military responses. Security in Europe is suddenly becoming a Union's responsibility. Once again, like other times during its history, the Union is measuring the gap between the role it is supposed to play considering the ongoing events and its geographically-strategical location and the almost absolute lack of suitable means and policies to meet the new changes.

The climate of uncertainty and pessimism following the signature of the Maastricht Treaty has justified the starting of a review process. The wave of Europessimism has been exploited by governments, political parties and businessmen to begin a critical reconsideration of Maastricht. On the one hand, its flaws are criticized, on the other its constraints. Whatever its outcome, the review process has already begun.

Obviously, the evolution of this process will be influenced by the presence or absence of some important factors: economic recovery, a decrease in currency speculations, the rapidity of German recovery, a stabilization of the situation in Russia, the limitation of the war in the Balkans.

In any case, the solutions envisaged to come out of the Maastricht standstill are basically two opposing options: the first one consists in speeding up the stages provided for by the Treaty, with a small and virtuous group of members - the so-called "core" countries -, while the second is represented by a more political approach, through enlargement of the Community to the countries applying for membership, with a special treatment for Eastern European countries.

In principle, both options have significant grounds to be upheld, although a different judgement is to be drawn if their foreseeable impact is considered. Now, looking at the second option, i.e. immediate enlargement, the reasons urging Third countries to apply for Union membership should be fully understood. The obvious answer, in view of the international setting, is economic and security stability. Now, what kind of stability can be provided by the Union? Considering the monetary and free-market aspects, most concerning for EFTA (European Free Trade Area) countries, recent events have showed that the present strategy consisting in pre-determined stages to achieve the EMU (Economic and Monetary Union within the European Union) is favouring speculation and instability, undermining even the single market effectiveness (especially the capital market). If we look at the macroeconomic effects in Eastern countries, it is difficult to understand how membership can favour convergence and adjustment to internal market rules when there is still no viable plan for funds and investment transfer to the most seriously-affected areas (opposition to the Plan Delors 2 and the Plan to revamp the European economy). Considering security-related stability, which is maybe the most pressing demand from Eastern European countries, it is unconceivable that the common foreign and security policy, with its WEU and Eurocorp annexes, can provide the guarantees requested.

As far as "Core" countries option is concerned, the only possible group of countries which could be envisioned in this context is the Group of Five: the three Benelux countries, France and

Germany. As the original Schengen group and as an area of monetary stability, these five countries may easily constitute a markedly homogeneous nucleus. Military integration based on the Eurocorp could also become a reality in a short time. While formally a group of five, it would actually be little more than a cosmetic variation of the Franco-German duo as the main engine of a new and different process of integration. It is thus an extreme case which would be difficult to actualize for obvious political reasons, not to mention that it would be highly destabilizing for a large number of excluded countries. This option would be pursued only in the event of a serious disintegration of the Community - one in which the countries of the South would diverge not only in economic terms, but also in terms of political stability; and the countries of the North would become increasingly unwilling to commit themselves to concerted efforts toward integration. In other words, this scenario would serve to maintain the prospect of integration at least in "hard core" Europe at a time of serious crisis at the periphery.

#### **4. Some criteria for Union's future foreign and security policy**

In any case, institutional scenarios must respond to the real need and interests of the European Union. This is an essential exercise if one wants to clarify the future of CFSP and of its role. Starting from the international analysis, which has been just carried on, the Union should take account of certain basic factors which have recently emerged:

- the growing diversity of risks and challenges against which nations and institutions must be prepared;
- the need to tackle new crisis with a comprehensive approach which uses a full combination of diplomatic, economic and military means;
- the question of the legitimacy of the use of force outside EU territory, not just for peacekeeping purposes;
- the increasing need for economising in view of diminishing resources (which implies a division of labour and transfers of sovereignty);
- the imperative for multinational structures as a hedge against renationalisation;

More in general there is, in terms of the Union's interests, a mix of endogenous and exogenous factors pushing towards a growing role in foreign policy, but especially a step forward towards a common defence. The most pertinent are as follows:

- the growing role of regionalism in global affairs;
- the progressive US disengagement from Europe;
- the new concept and instruments of comprehensive security;
- the qualitative different meaning of any future enlargement of the Union with respect to a reinforced foreign and security policy of the Twelve and finally;
- the new role that the concept of integration is bound to play in the future pan-european architecture.

If an agreement can be reached on the validity of these new factors, the next question is how should the Revision of Maastricht be oriented to achieve an effective foreign and defence policy for the European Union.

A precondition for improved prospects for CFSP is a strong political will to rebalance the

process of European integration in the direction of defence by putting less emphasis on economic integration (which has been considered a priority since the establishment of the Community); politics must be brought into the forefront once again.

A second essential orientation is that of strengthening the trend towards a progressive communitarization of the institutional procedures in CFSP field, through joint actions by majority voting, a greater role for the European Parliament, common budgetary procedures, etc. It is clear that the "communitarization" of European Union policies, both old and new, remains an open question for now. Maastricht represents a clear example of the difficulty of applying the concept of "communitarization" to a variety of different fields of action and common policies, that is, the difficulties in the progressive passage from a functional integration in the economic field to a similar form of procedure in the foreign and security policy camps. In fact, Maastricht continues to maintain a different legal approach in the two fields, essentially leaving the CFSP in the realm of the classical intergovernmental approach (albeit with some minor concessions to the communitarian method). The risk is that of creating competitive decision-making processes in the two fields of cooperation and weakening the efficacy of the Community's external role.

A third initiative should be that of improving the operational capability of common defence through the creation of a European WEU Command, the full integration and multilateralisation of the Eurocorp, the setting up of a European Armament Agency. In other words, there is a need for machinery capable of responding effectively to the new security and military engagements.

Fourthly, the Union should play an international role in the security field through the WEU, by promoting a policy of regional alliances with countries or groups of countries (e.g. the "group to group" policy of the EU and CFSP). Alliances could be formed with the Maghreb, Russia, the Gulf Council, Egypt, etc. Essential here is the role of external projection of a common defence policy, aiming to create confidence and cooperation among groups of countries.

Finally, the relationship between Europe and United States should be transformed into a new kind of special partnership both outside and within Nato (a "hard core" of WEU members and the US within NATO, the appointment of a European Permanent Representative for security policy to the White House). In particular the following should be ensured when reforming NATO: a) a high degree of cooperation between Europe and the US, b) status as the privileged Atlantic interlocutor of Russia and the CIS; c) logistic infrastructure for common out-of-area operations.

These transformations call for a strong reinforcement of the political character of the future European Union and could have a negative impact on the process of Union enlargement and even on the Union's present composition. Many countries would not accept the practical consequences of such a Union. To choose the appropriate strategy is an open task for politicians: the urgency is clear and the risk of fragmentation still present. Specific criteria and carefully thought out scenarios should be used as guides to ensure the preservation of a certain degree of integration in the presence of a totally new geostrategic situation and with the aim that the Union remain a point of stability on the Old Continent and an example of integration for the rest of the world.

## NOTES

1) See S. Silvestri, *The New World Order: Too Good to be True?*, *The International Spectator* 4\1991, Rome, pages 19-38.

2) See N. Ronzitti (edited by), *La nuova Europa della CSCE*, Collana *Lo Spettatore Internazionale*, Angeli Publisher, Milano, 1994.

3) See R. Spanò (edited by), *Jugoslavia e i Balcani: una bomba in Europa*, Collana *Lo Spettatore Internazionale*, Franco Angeli editore, Milano, 1992.

4) E. Greco, *Crisis-management in post cold-war Europe: the Yugoslavian case*, Doc IAI 9204, Roma, 1992.

5) See IAI, *La Comunità Europea e le nascenti democrazie dell'Est*, Report to Mr. Delors by the six European Institutes of International Affairs, Collana *Lo Spettatore Internazionale*, Franco Angeli Editore, Milano, 1991.

6) M. Cremasco, *From the Quadrangolare to the Central European Initiative*, Doc IAI 9213, Rome, 1992.

7) M. Carnovale, *In the wake of a Failed Coup: Moscow and the fate of the Union*, *The International Spectator* 1\1992, Rome, pages 47-67.

8) L. Guazzone, *the Mediterranean and the Middle East in western policy: New rules for an old game?*, Doc IAI 9132, Rome 1991.

9) R. Aliboni, *European Security across the Mediterranean*, *Chillot Papers* n.2, Paris, 1991.

10) See D.B. Sezer, *Turkey's Grand strategy Facing a Dilemma*, and I. Lesser, *Turkey and the West, after the Gulf War*, *The International Spectator* 1\1992, Rome pages 17-32 and 33-46.

11) About the new European Community problems see:  
L. Guazzone (edited by), *L'Europa negli anni '90. Tomo I: la geopolitica del cambiamento*, *Lo Spettatore Internazionale*, Franco Angeli Editore, Milan, 1991.  
G. Bonvicini, *The future of EC Institutions*, *The International Spectator*, n. 1, January-March 1992, pp. 3-16.