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THE MED-2000 PROJECT

**Cooperation and Stability in the Mediterranean
An Agenda for Partnership**

Report issued as part of the MED-2000 Project
prepared for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
April 1994

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*Cooperation and Stability in the Mediterranean
An Agenda for Partnership*

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April 1994

INTRODUCTION: THE MED-2000 REPORT

On numerous occasions and in various fora in late 1993 and early 1994, the Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister underlined the need to relaunch and strengthen cooperation between the countries of the European Union and those on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Their views merged with those of both the French and Egyptian governments, and have led to two initiatives:

- (a) An informal meeting (based on what is known in Community diplomacy as the "Gymnich model") between the foreign ministers of those countries which are currently interested in resuming dialogue on Mediterranean cooperation (i.e. Southern European countries, Turkey, and North African countries, with the exception of Libya). This meeting will be held in Alexandria, Egypt in July 1994.
- (b) The drafting of an "Agenda for Partnership", in consultation with a group of independent experts from the Mediterranean, aimed at identifying feasible directions for political, cultural and economic cooperation in the current context.

In order to draft the Agenda for Partnership, the Italian Government commissioned the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, to undertake an independent study on Mediterranean cooperation, which has been called the "Med-2000 Project". This project is evidence of a firm conviction held by both the Italian Government and the IAI: that society at large and the private sector can and must play an important, irreplaceable role in the promotion and achievement of international cooperation in the Mediterranean.

The MED-2000 Project was divided into two stages: drafting the Agenda for Partnership; meeting with a group of independent experts from the Mediterranean (MED-2000 Group) in order to discuss and enhance the draft Agenda. The final version of the «Agenda» benefitted from comments by the Med-2000 Group, but the IAI takes sole responsibility for the text, which is presented in Part 1 of this Report. The document presented in Part 2, on the other hand, is the product of discussions by the Med-2000 Group, based on many of the conclusions in the IAI Agenda. The Report closes with an Appendix in which the IAI outlines some of the most feasible actions indicated in the Agenda and in the document by the Med-2000 Group.

The Project was organized by a task force set up by the IAI and including the following staff members:

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PART 1 - MED-2000, AN AGENDA FOR PARTNERSHIP

Interdependence and Cooperation

The Mediterranean, a place where different regions and interests converge, can be the locus of greater cooperation among countries which are profoundly different but closely linked. But it is also an area of instability, significant risks and unsolved problems. Though the countries lying along its shores are highly interdependent in many fields (e.g. trade, energy, security and migratory flows), this interdependence is not managed by an equally high level of cooperation. Thus it can easily become a source of friction, hostility and international instability.

A closer examination of the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean (not the Asian shore, which poses different economic, political and strategic problems) reveals that 40 percent of the total population is concentrated on the southern shores but generates only 6 percent of the total GDP. The average per capita income of the inhabitants of the northern shore is approximately 11 times that of their southern counterparts, a ratio which has not changed significantly in the last 25 years.

This gap is exacerbated by the difference in the population growth rate: while almost zero in the north, it is very high in the south. The European population currently represents 61 percent of the total population of the Mediterranean area. If the present growth rates are maintained, however, that percentage will have dropped to less than 54 percent by the year 2000 and to approximately 47 percent by 2015. Over the same period, the population of the 12 European countries will increase by 13 million, while that of the Mediterranean countries will grow by more than 170 million. Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Turkey will have a total population of 270 million persons, mostly young city-dwellers.

According to an econometric model, a very high GDP growth rate is required to prevent an increase in unemployment in Southern Rim countries: 12.2 percent in Algeria (where it has been constant at 2.5% for the last three years); 8.8 percent in Tunisia (now 3.3%); 12.7 percent in Morocco (now 2.3%) and 11 percent in Egypt (now 4.2%). In the last three years, growth rates have been well below expectations in all of these countries, even in the more modern and industrialized sectors which have shown above average growth (3.5%, 4.5%, 4.2% and 5%, respectively, in the countries mentioned). The result has been strong migratory pressure and high conflict potential within the countries.

We are faced with the prospect of a complex multidimensional crisis in the countries and societies of both the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. Political, cultural and religious factors combine with economic and strategic factors in generating processes of delegitimation of the governments and of cultural and institutional identities. Thus, domestic political consensus, which is threatened by various forms of fragmentation (ethnic, religious, linguistic or nationalistic), must be reestablished.

Attempts at renationalization of international policy aggravate the situation by giving credit to the simplistic idea that international relations are a zero-sum game among participant states, in which each gains only that which the other loses. Protectionist and mercantilist pressures are adding to political, social and cultural tensions, driving governments towards conflictual choices, with the illusion that they can govern the effects of global processes which are actually beyond the control of single nation states.

A Pragmatic and Flexible Line

The exceptional changes that have taken place in the former Soviet bloc have ushered in a new era of hope. But this new era calls for a greater effort on the part of the international community, both in terms of economic and financial resources and in terms of political and security commitments. Europe is deeply involved in the process of change which now predominantly claims the attention and activity of many international organisations and alliances, both global and regional. The Mediterranean, on the other hand, despite its strategic importance, receives much less attention and resources.

This is not to draw a parallel between the East and the South (or between Central-Eastern Europe on the one hand and the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries on the other). We should remember that the Eastern European countries are undergoing a momentous change, involving their political and institutional systems, economic models, and international alliances. Nothing similar is going on in the Mediterranean, with the possible exception of the eventual consequences of a successful peace process among Arabs (especially Palestinians) and Israelis. Still, the Mediterranean suffers from instability and important risks which could give rise to fragmentation and confrontation. Thus, it deserves no less attention than the former.

In the Mediterranean, as in Europe and the rest of the world, the best policies and instruments needed to manage interdependence have not yet been found. Nor has the problem of effective management of the North-South relationship been solved. This calls for a pragmatic and flexible regional cooperation policy, with objectives that are complementary for the African and European shores. In Africa, some important social and economic causes of domestic instability and the delegitimation crisis must be dealt with, while the distinctive role and the values of these societies in the global framework must be confirmed and emphasized. In Europe, instability must be contained, the risks deriving from the gap between economic and demographic factors reduced, and transformation of the Mediterranean into a new conflictual frontier avoided.

The common objective is to ensure greater stability and security in an interdependent framework so that the necessary process of change and growth can continue. Stability requires a positive link between internal and external factors: the formulation and constant assertion of a common set of values and priorities related to the domestic perceptions of Mediterranean societies.

International cooperation and the process of reconstruction and strengthening of consensus are two sides of the same coin: in a period in which direct military threats to national security seem relatively less important, security also depends on the concrete capacity to deal in a timely manner with risks arising from political and economic divergences and systemic crises, without increasing international divisions.

Important undertakings must be devised and begun in the fields of economy and development, politics and security. But in order to produce greater international cooperation, they must be set in a more general framework of political cooperation and must deal with the basic cultural dilemma of living with the inevitable dialectics arising from the clash between the specificities and deep roots of the various historical, cultural and religious heritages on the one hand, and the progressive globalization of the economy, politics, communications and security on the other. These dialectics can result either in harsh conflict, throwing the Mediterranean into a period of instability and creating a serious fracture to the south of Europe and to the north of the Arab world, or in a new process of international cooperation and coexistence.

Much attention has already been directed at the problem of what is needed to achieve cooperation in the Mediterranean. But cooperation is stagnant nevertheless and the attempts made at the beginning of the 1990s to reorganize it have failed. The little that exists today is the result of isolated initiatives and fragmentary policies. The proposals that have already been put forward must be reviewed, in order to establish a line of action based on feasibility and pragmatism. In particular, the overly ambitious objectives and abstractions of the past must be avoided.

A Wealth of Studies and Proposals

Several initiatives for multilateral collaboration have been made, over the years: the EC Mediterranean policy, the Euro-Arab dialogue and the proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM), and various bilateral policies in different sectors. Unfortunately, this wealth of ideas and proposals has not been sufficient to neutralize the conflictual processes under way. Given the important changes that have taken place on the international scene and in the Mediterranean it is useful to draw on these ideas and proposals in view to stimulate new undertakings and to gain insight into ways to strengthen initiatives already in progress or to avoid some of the errors that prevented their complete implementation. Rather than ignoring the past, the Agenda, proposed here, will try to benefit from it.

The Mediterranean Forum, an initiative by the Egyptian government--not unlike the ideas put forward by the Moroccan government at the end of the same year--has the advantage that it is an open and flexible, only slightly institutionalized formula. It should aim more at pursuing feasible projects than at building consensus. It should not be an alternative to other existing proposals or cooperation schemes.

Like Europe, the Mediterranean is a region in which the governments of many countries, even those lying beyond its littoral, have vital interests. All of them have good reason to be active in the region and, just as they could be drawn into conflictual situations, they have the right to be involved in possible cooperation schemes. The countries situated on the Mediterranean--a crossroads of various regions and experiences--cannot be forced to accept common views and interests that are quantitatively or qualitatively different from (much less superior to) those that originate in their respective geo-strategic, geo-economic, cultural and religious positions. Interdependence and the importance of inter-Mediterranean economic and political links does not justify such a loss of identity. Thus, progress must be empirical, step-by-step and by small groups of countries at a time. Only concrete results can gradually strengthen the force of cooperation. In this way, the institutionalization of cooperation can be extended to the countries and sectors which seem ready for it, neither in opposition to external factors, nor dependent on the will of external factors and other interlocutors not directly involved.

The above involves not only countries and their governments, but also their citizens. This is particularly true of the Mediterranean area, in which civilian society has always demonstrated a concrete capacity for cooperation, a generosity and an inventiveness often lacking at the official level. Indeed, the very concept of a "Mediterranean" culture or society continues to exist (almost despite rather than thanks to the states that lie along the sea's perimeter) as a result of the free and inexorable process of meetings and exchanges among individuals.

To this must be added the growing importance of the activity of countless non-governmental organisations (NGOs), research centres, and above all entrepreneurs and workers, whose mobility (South-North, but also North-South) has continued to grow. Governments must support and reinforce the initiatives of these organisations, but without infringing on their autonomy

Essential Elements of Cooperation

The essential points of the line of action proposed by this Agenda are the following:

*a framework for cooperation among the Mediterranean countries must be set up and

- given a light and flexible institutional form in order to ensure better conditions for multilateral cooperation;
- *cultural and economic cooperation between the societies and the states in the Mediterranean must be intensified; this should generate greater political interaction, strengthening the mechanism of the (more or less) formal political cooperation underlying this process;
 - *without closing the door to further membership, cooperation must be launched by those Mediterranean countries that have currently shown a priority interest of doing so, namely Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey;
 - *Mediterranean cooperation requires a specific institutional framework within which the Community countries of Southern Europe can take on a special responsibility towards both their partners on the Southern Rim and northern European countries. Whatever its degree of institutionalization, this framework must be linked to the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP);
 - *the institutions for political cooperation must pursue two main objectives:
 - a)to increase the coherence between the consensus-building mechanisms in individual countries and international cooperation so that better management of interdependence and global economic, social and cultural processes may be achieved, thus attenuating and solving possible crises and reducing risks;
 - b)to establish the type of dialogue required to bring the Mediterranean area into the processes of globalization, thereby reducing tensions between globalization and specificities; the human dimension is bound to be predominant in Mediterranean cooperation;
 - *public and private policies for cultural cooperation and dialogue must be worked out. More solid channels for communication and exchange between the two shores of the Mediterranean will play an all-important role in the implementation of this project;
 - *more generally, while the role of intergovernmental cooperation is essential in providing momentum and coordination, the concrete development of multilateral cooperation depends largely on the broadening of non-governmental actions and initiatives; constant and effective interaction between the official and the private/non-governmental levels is required;
 - *economic cooperation among Mediterranean partners must be concentrated on fundamental problems, namely the huge gap separating the South from the North and the latter's responsibility in dealing with the problem with adequate "vision"; this vision must be supported by three fundamental pillars: the opening of the European market, immigration policy, and European responsibility in ensuring sustainable growth and environmental protection;
 - *alongside the strengthening of non-governmental action and society's various levels of autonomy, the accent in the field of economy must be put on the rebirth of decentralized institutions, competences and actions. A long period of centralization of decision making and resources at state level has hindered the spread of a sufficiently flexible economic structure in society, weakening other important factors (crafts, trade, state property). The current lack of flexibility of the economies in the southern Mediterranean is a significant factor contributing to their underdevelopment.

Political Cooperation

A flexible and pragmatic process calls for a minimal, but coherent and effective level of institutionalization, aimed at managing the dialectics between globalization of the processes of the economy, information, society and communications, and the specificities of domestic political consensus, cultural and religious identity, development models and, in some cases, security. The institution must provide two things: the political cooperation needed to determine and strengthen common values and priorities, deal with crisis situations and reduce risks; and the instruments needed to implement specific cooperation policies or projects. We will call this institution Mediterranean Political Cooperation (MPC).

MPC should not be seen as one complex, multi-faceted institution, but rather as a body endowed with "light" institutions which can be adapted to circumstances and requirements and kept in line with the level of possible cooperation. It should be able to link up in different ways with the other existing international organisations and multilateral cooperation activities when the latter involve important interests or commitments in the area or for specific initiatives.

The MPC's tasks should be dialogue and consultation among governments and the organisation of multilateral communication between the public and private spheres. Ideally, the MPC should set up a list of priorities and objectives to serve as a stimulus and guideline for all cooperation (whether bilateral or multilateral, public or private). It should constitute a useful institutional interlocutor and a possible instrument for verification of progress in the desired direction.

Various types inter-Mediterranean cooperation have been advanced in the past. Of particular interest is the proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), especially the version set down in the Final Document adopted at the 1992 Malaga meeting of the Interparliamentary Union. However, the time is still not ripe to take up such a broad and ambitious proposal. In particular, some of the major issues defined in the document, such as international crisis management and aspects linked to military balances and threats, must be reviewed in the light of possible developments in the United Nations, the course of the Middle East Peace Conference and the solution of the many problems in the Balkans. It will also depend largely on the evolution of the strategic picture in the former Soviet Union (including all the independent republics bordering on the Middle East to the west and the Caspian Sea to the east). The point of view of the present Report is that attention must be focused on political dialogue.

The institutional framework of MPC could, therefore, be based to some extent on the proposals for the CSCM set down in the Malaga Final Document. While concentrating initially on establishing and strengthening political dialogue, it should be open to the inclusion of institutions for crisis management and military aspects in the future.

Political dialogue should be characterized by various levels of commitment: governmental and non-governmental, public and private. MPC can hardly be formalized in the same forms and with the same substance as Atlantic or European cooperation, but it must be given depth, relevance and above all continuity.

From this point of view, the MPC must be equipped with a permanent network for consultation (with special technical equipment) among participating countries. Another permanent network can be envisaged for exchange of information between countries not involved in cooperation. Both would be linked to the European CFSP. These networks could also be integrated by periodic meetings at different levels and *ad hoc* meetings. This effort would integrate the proposal put forward in the European Union by the Italian and British governments to associate Central-Eastern European countries to the CFSP. While full association can only be open to other

European countries, a greater Mediterranean reach of the CFSP would be a concrete way of stressing the strategic and political importance of this area for the EU.

MPC would also include multilateral consultations on the more general issues of global security (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) and other issues that go beyond foreign policy, so as to touch upon politically important subjects like the legal matters dealt with by European cooperation, the fight against organized crime and international terrorism, and other aspects of government policies.

In order to be fruitful in the long term and to lead to more intense cooperation in a context of greater political consensus, dialogue at the governmental and non-governmental (parliamentary bodies, professional associations, etc.) levels should deal with the problem of the relationship between Mediterranean cultures and the social and human dimension. MPC should be seen as a twin exercise, governmental and non-governmental, at two autonomous but mutually supportive levels. The participation of parliamentarians and diplomats to the non-governmental level would be one of the ways to link the two. A starting discussion point will be the eight principles set down in the Malaga Final Document mentioned previously. The objective should be to verify the extent to which those principles pertain to the actual situation, and to consider how they could be improved and more generally respected.

Cultural and economic cooperation should receive special attention and should be seen as a preferred instrument for implementation of political dialogue.

MPC should be equipped with the instruments needed to establish direct and regular contacts with the NGOs that play or will play an important role in the development of cooperation in the area. It should also be able to mobilize the necessary financial resources.

MPC could support periodic publication of a Mediterranean Report on the state of cooperation and conflict in the area, and the measures to be taken to improve and strengthen cooperation. Drawn up by private sources, it would not be attributable to any government. This report could provide the basis for discussion at an annual intergovernmental meeting like the one held in Gymnich, and could stimulate continual interaction between the two levels. The report could be initiated by the international studies institutes of the countries in question, as they have already set up significant independent channels of communication and scientific collaboration in the framework of groups such as the Mediterranean Study Commission.

Sectors for Cooperation

The various frameworks for cooperation and related activities reflect different levels of development and elaboration. Consequently, policy guidelines and recommendations are bound to vary. Economic cooperation is very structured at both the bilateral and the multilateral levels and is based on a vast body of knowledge and study. Environmental cooperation is structured at the multilateral level and has benefitted from the framework established by the 1975 Barcelona Convention and the Mediterranean Action Plan. Government action is preeminent and decisive in both fields. Cultural cooperation is more significant at the bilateral level and represents a less crowded field than the other two. Private action is already widespread in this field, though it still lacks coordination. These inequalities are reflected in the proposals for action listed below.

Cultural Cooperation

Before appropriate policies may be formulated, the people in the countries concerned must recognize their common historical and cultural background. This is a prerequisite for the

development of cultural cooperation. Attention must be drawn to shared events, the lives of historical figures significant to both shores of the Mediterranean, the history of Mediterranean cities and the crossroads of the region, and common artistic traditions. The critical role of women in the development of Mediterranean culture must be stressed. The emergence of a Mediterranean image could form the basis of a shared identity. Such an identity is indispensable for the growth of dialogue and cooperation in the cultural domain. This objective cannot be pursued through a specific policy, but must be implicit in all the policies which are called for in this section.

Mediterranean cultural cooperation should be concentrated on lines of action that correspond not only to the common needs determined by governments, but also to the areas of convergence that have emerged independently in the respective societies. These two lines of action should give rise to initiatives aimed at enlarging these areas of convergence between the societies, thus multiplying the possibilities for collective action by the states based on common needs.

Cultural cooperation should meet the following criteria: synergy between the public and the private sectors, continuity, visibility and decentralization. The three main areas in which it should operate are (a) common development needs, (b) exchanges between civilian societies, (c) expansion of areas of convergence. It is in these three main areas that strategic sectors in which to concentrate efforts will be identified.

Strategic sectors of common development needs in the cultural field are the enhancement of human resources, especially women and the young, and the promotion of research and development capacities. Channels for formal education can make an appreciable contribution in this direction, but their ability to adapt and create synergies must be adequately stimulated and supported.

Possible actions in education:

- *establishment of a programme for trans-Mediterranean mobility for university studies, benefitting from the experience and linked to the existing programmes of the European Community in this sector: *Erasmus* (intraCommunity) and *Tempus* (EC-Central and Eastern Europe). Parallel to the EC programme *Avicenna*, for scientific and technological cooperation, this programme (which could be called *Averroës*) should not be limited to the movement of students and the enrichment of their pre-doctoral education (for which *Erasmus* has become well-known in Europe); taking the specificities of Mediterranean intercultural relations into consideration, it should also promote the mobility of teaching staff, thereby contributing to filling the gaps in the curricula of Mediterranean universities.
- *transformation of the EC's *Med-Campus* programme into a permanent cooperation programme (the current project undertaken in the framework of the Mediterranean policy will end with the 1995-96 academic year), increasing the programme's financial resources and revising the mechanisms for participation so as to provide more support for non-governmental research centres.
- *creation of a "Mediterranean Phd", that is, a doctoral programme common to all Mediterranean countries. This would make use of the educational facilities offered by the various universities, making them available to students from countries in the area. Students would receive academic recognition that would be valid in the participating Mediterranean countries. This project would create a high level of integration and dialogue, as it does not merely imply transferring knowledge from the North to the South using northern resources, but rather making resources from the South available to the North. This project is feasible almost immediately, as it can be worked out in keeping with the proposal of UNIMED's Mediterranean Universities consortium at limited cost (essentially required to permit the mobility

of the students and the teaching staff).

Government initiatives are not a driving force in cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean. Far more important is the network of private initiatives: twinship between cities and schools; direct collaboration between research centres, trade unions, and professional associations; and joint actions in the field of art, entertainment and sport.

This level of cooperation is implemented by a sector that is strategic for cultural cooperation: the so-called civil society, whose wealth and autonomy provide a fundamental guarantee of cultural pluralism. Civil society in Mediterranean countries also constitutes the most important laboratory for promoting a dialogue to overcome cleavages between global trends and distinctive identities -- a laboratory where cultural borrowing and delocalization has the greatest possibility contributing to economic and artistic production and social solidarity.

The rich flow of non-governmental cooperation does not need to be directed towards specific objectives. What is required is support and reinforcement by national governments and, above all, by regional and local governments, private foundations, and international organisations such as the EC and UNESCO. The most useful kind of support in this non-governmental sector is in the circulation of information on activities already under way so as to avoid duplication and to facilitate synergies and information on public and private channels willing to provide financing.

Possible actions by non-governmental organisations include the following:

- *organisation of top-quality cultural events specifically dedicated to the Mediterranean or extended to the Mediterranean, following the example of the "RomaEuropa" Foundation Festival, Montpellier Festival, etc.;
- *establishment of a centre for Mediterranean initiatives which would create: a directory of regular cooperation activities (festivals, networks, fairs, etc.); a directory of regular sources of financing (foundations, bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental agreements, awards, etc.); and up-dated databases on activities and financing in each sector;
- *adaptation of the experience gained by the EC *Med-Invest* and *Med-Campus* programmes to Mediterranean cultural cooperation. The programme should provide incentives for association between private and public institutions in preparing, implementing and financing projects in entertainment, cultural tourism, publishing and the fashion industry;
- *establishment of Mediterranean Consultative Groupings (including women, trade unions, publishers, local authorities, etc.) on various aspects of cooperation (e.g. human rights, primary education, etc.) to give independent opinions on the lines of cooperation to be pursued and the instruments required to do so. These consultative groupings should also be integrated into the decision-making process of intergovernmental cooperation. Elected representatives of the associations involved would participate in these bodies on a rotational basis.

The actions explicitly aimed at expansion of areas of cultural convergence among Mediterranean societies are the most important for cooperation. Formal and informal education and the media (particularly television) are strategic sectors in which to concentrate action.

Possible actions in this sector include:

- *use of Mediterranean university cooperation programmes (see above) and/or the creation of *ad hoc* chairs to fill the gaps in the humanistic curricula of Mediterranean universities with courses on comparative study of Mediterranean history, in

- particular, studies of the contributions of pre-Islamic Mediterranean civilizations (Egyptian, Phoenician, Greek-Hellenist) to the Arab-Islamic civilization; studies of the contribution of Arab-Islamic civilizations to European culture (history of science, history of philosophy, history of art) and that of the Ottoman culture;
- *joint preparation and administration of educational units for the pre-university teaching of the history and geography of Europe and Arab countries; these educational units could be used for preparation of a "Mediterranean Day" to be held annually in primary and secondary schools in selected regions (on a rotational basis) in the participating countries; the preparation, up-dating and teaching of these units could become a part of teacher- training programmes;
 - *joint preparation of information units (orientation to history, doctrine, law, customs and habits) on the three great Mediterranean religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam); after adaptation to the various national situations, the units could be brought into the training courses (and exams) for professionals in the social services (nurses, social workers, police forces);
 - *joint preparation of information units on human rights, particularly women's rights, to be integrated into the formal and informal education mentioned above. All units should be the product of cooperation among the interested professional associations (teachers, social workers, etc.), public and private research centres, competent local and national institutions;
 - *revision of history textbooks to reflect a common perception of historical and cultural events in the area;
 - *promotion of collaboration and development in the field of electronic information systems;
 - *rationalization and strengthening of existing bilateral and multilateral initiatives in support of the coproduction of fiction and nonfiction for cinema and television. For example, actions to strengthen support for decentralized cooperation, following the EC *Med-Media* model; bilateral agreements among public television corporations of the interested states for planning of quotas for Mediterranean products (whether coproductions or not). It is very important for people to see that cooperation initiatives are linked to concrete images of Mediterranean cultural solidarity. To this end, it would be useful, as has been said, to produce documentaries on common historical events, the lives of historical figures significant to both shores of the Mediterranean, the history of Mediterranean cities and crossroads, and shared artistic traditions;
 - *more translations and a wider circulation of the masterpieces of the Mediterranean literatures (such as the works of the Andalous writer Ibn Hazm or Cervante's Don Quixote).

Emigration and Employment

The problem of emigration is economic, social and cultural. Migratory flows are part of a broader movement of persons which is not necessarily economically motivated (e.g. refugees). Policies concerning these movements of people are bound to play an important role in the future of cooperation relations in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the priority given to this problem in the overall strategy of Mediterranean cooperation will be important and will constitute a decisive security and confidence-building measure.

From a socio-cultural point of view, the continuing absence of any kind of common European Union policy is far more negative than any restrictions that such a policy could have.

What is urgently needed is a common European policy concerning the entry of citizens from outside the Community, their treatment and their rights.

The overall policy and strategy response within the European Union to growing migratory pressure has been to give priority to regulation and control of inflows of non-European Union workers and to insist upon non-discrimination between workers from the European Union and "legal" non-European Union workers in terms of placement, work standards and social security. These policies should be accompanied by measures aimed at providing better guarantees for the personal dignity and respect for the culture of immigrants, assigning them a more precise role in the host societies and providing them with prospect for political integration.

A relaxation of the regulation and control policy is desirable, but it is feasible only in a context of greater expansion of job opportunities in the Southern Rim--the only long-term remedy to growing labour market tensions in the region. Employment growth has not been the primary focus of structural adjustment policies, strategies and programmes. This approach must be reversed: structural adjustment plans should be devised and assessed on the basis of their capacity to create and sustain productive employment. Therefore, changes should be made in structural adjustment policies, in the sectoral emphasis and contents of investment programmes, and in project appraisal and selection criteria. The countries of Southern Europe should urge the European Union to adopt this approach in its cooperation policy.

The employment and migration ramifications of a more clearly focused EU Mediterranean policy will only be felt after several years. In the short term, the following recommendations of the International Labour Office scheme to identify employment creation strategies and programmes should be among those implemented to stem migration from the Southern Rim countries to those of the Northern Rim:

- *to improve training and credit schemes to help establish youth cooperatives and make them operational;
- *to develop supporting infrastructures to promote "industrial districts" in internationally competitive sectors;
- *to establish funds to guarantee migrant workers' deposits and help channel their remittances towards small and medium-size enterprises preferably organized in "districts";
- *to strengthen micro-enterprises emerging in the informal sector so that they can develop into small and medium enterprises, preferably organized into "districts";
- *to improve infrastructures, credits, marketing and living conditions in the agricultural sector, which is expected to continue to provide work for over 25 percent of the labour force of the Southern Rim countries in the first decades of the next century;
- *to retrain returning workers and create institutional mechanisms to help channel their savings and remittances toward productive job-creating investments;
- *to study the feasibility of introducing common EU quotas to regulate seasonal migrant workers. If "migrant worker quotas" are introduced by major labour exporting areas, they ought to take account of the long-standing links and relationships within the Mediterranean Basin and of the strong interdependence between the Northern and the Southern Rim.

Food and Agriculture

Despite strong constraints, there has been intense growth in the agricultural sector of the countries of the southern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, this sector, as strategically important as it may be

for the development and security of the countries involved, is still very weak. In addition to traditional actions (creation of infrastructures, land improvement, adaptation of crops, etc.), the strengthening of the sector calls for the adoption of varying degrees of action and, therefore, cooperation, including the following:

- *structural actions aimed at changing market conditions by eliminating prices controls, as well as restrictions on the choice of crops, and on international transactions (short-term negative effects on the socially weaker strata of the population may be contained by special social support policies);
- *actions to strengthen the competitiveness of enterprises, train businessmen and upgrade the agronomical knowledge of farmers.

Whereas the institutional and operational framework in the field of food and agriculture is already working, technical assistance and cooperation can be improved.

Crucial for the strengthening of the food and agricultural sector in the Southern Rim is the strengthening of infrastructures for the conduction and regulation of water. The new technologies available allow for highly efficient investment in this field. In the context of broader industrialization, water is a sector in which current efforts are insufficient and must be strengthened and concentrated.

Even if pursued successfully, a strengthening of the agricultural sector will not be able to achieve self-sufficiency in food production in southern Mediterranean countries. Thus, satisfying food requirements will call for expansion of export capacities to provide financing for food imports.

While the countries in question have adopted policies liberalizing trade in their markets, the European Community continues to have measures that limit entry into the market and, therefore, the export possibilities of southern Mediterranean countries in the agricultural sector.

The lack of positive prospects in this sector is contributing to urbanization and, therefore, to unemployment and emigration from the cities. Opening up the European market must be considered a medium-term measure to strengthen employment in the Southern Rim countries and contain migratory flows. Thus, it is crucial in the framework of North-South cooperation in the Mediterranean. Like emigration, it must be central in Europe's vision of North-South relations and must contribute to confidence building.

The plan to set up free trade zones between the European Union and some North African countries now under consideration must envisage total liberalization of the agricultural sector and leave behind the protectionism and closure found in present trade agreements.

Energy and Industrial Development

Energy, water and chemicals constitute the pillars of an industrial development strategy that can offer Western, Arab and international capital interesting investment opportunities. It can also serve as the basis for widespread growth throughout the territory. The lines of a possible concerted economic programme for the North African countries must have the following objectives:

- *to increase the supply of cheap energy in the form of gas and/or electricity to the coastal cities of the southern Mediterranean to promote industry and the crafts and to improve the well-being of the population; recent calculations carried out by the Observatoire Méditerranéen de l'Energie suggest that the converting natural gas into electricity could have an exceptionally low cost;

- *to create new infrastructures for exporting energy (gas or electricity) to Europe through new gas pipelines and an electrical network;
- *to implement a water project benefitting from the new available technologies, to revitalize agriculture and to force back the desert;
- *to launch a chemical industry programme to transform *in situ* the existing feedstocks, and/or to transport them to Europe, and to produce non conventional fuels for transport and combustion in order to free oil for export.

This project should be implemented without government-to-government aid, which would simply go to subsidize basic consumption. Efforts must be focused on specific investment projects to be implemented through joint ventures with Western companies, and money must be provided to set up the local share of the equity of these projects (it is important to note that foreign financing stimulates local capital investments in a ratio of 5 to 1).

Under these conditions, full cooperation of the international financial system and the oil-rich Gulf countries can be obtained. This could be important both for finance and for the gas pipeline programme.

Environment

Strong investment in the sectors in which North African countries are naturally endowed immediately raises the issue of sustainable development, that is, development compatible with the protection and conservation of the environment.

The main recommendation of the Blue Plan--to incorporate territorial and environmental policies into development strategies--has not been respected to date. Individual Mediterranean countries have passed quite different environmental legislation. The European Community has dedicated more attention to the environmental problems of Eastern and Central Europe than to those of the Mediterranean. But in spite of everything, and thanks above all to the Mediterranean Action Plan, a framework for international environmental cooperation has been set up and could be strengthened relatively easily. In fact, actions aimed at implementing the recommendations of the Rio de Janeiro Conference (the Agenda 21) in the Mediterranean are already under way.

Ensuring sustainable development and adequate environmental policies in the Mediterranean is to a large extent the responsibility of the European Community, the most important partner in the development of the countries of the southern Mediterranean. This is a medium-term action which must be central to the EU's "vision" for the area.

In the short term, useful actions for cooperation in the environmental field can be worked out at multilateral, bilateral and subregional levels. At the multilateral level, suggestions include establishing a Mediterranean centre for "clean" productions, the extension to the Mediterranean of the Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (already in force in the European Union), application to the Mediterranean of the UNECE/per esteso programme "*Efficacité énergétique 2000*". The technical and political foundations for these projects have already been laid; there is also interest in the industrial world.

Bilateral or subregional initiatives could involve the launching of a navigational aid system (VTS) in some areas with particularly high risk of accidents, or the development of alternative technologies in the refrigeration ("Greenfreeze") and lighting (high-efficiency lights). A closer look at some of these programmes is in order.

The UNEP and UNIDO support the setting up of Regional Clean Production Centres (RCPCs). One of these should be situated in the Mediterranean. The RCPC project arose from a desire to encourage the introduction into national development planning of technologies and

production processes with zero environmental impact. In the Mediterranean area, such productions could play an important role, particularly in agriculture, the pulp and paper industry, refrigeration and chemicals (especially the chlorinated solvent sector).

The Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control lays down and implements a navigational aid system for ports. It also provides a databank service (based in France) regarding the state of the fleet, the outcome of inspections, etc. Extending this service to the major Mediterranean oil terminals could be done at relatively low cost and could contribute significantly to containing the risk of accidents at sea.

The navigational aid system (VTS) has already been set up in France and Canada in some areas of particularly high risk of accident, and is almost in place in the Straits of Messina. Together with the Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, the VTS, for which know-how and equipment are available, could bring about a considerable improvement in maritime traffic conditions around huge terminals such as those in Egypt, Algeria and the Suez Canal (soon to be expanded).

PART 2 - MED-2000, AN AGENDA FOR PARTNERSHIP
SUMMARY BY THE GROUP OF INDEPENDENT MEDITERRANEAN EXPERTS

The objective of this Agenda is to facilitate the search for greater stability and security in the Mediterranean within an interdependent framework. Developing international cooperation and strengthening domestic consensus in the process of change are two sides of the same coin: the search for and assertion of common values and priorities related to the domestic perceptions of Mediterranean and European societies; and the launching of important initiatives in the field of international economy and development.

Taking into account the different economic realities, regional cooperation will, in the long term, be essentially shaped by the decisions of the European Union. The prospect of EU enlargement toward the East increases the need for the Union to make its nearest southern region a priority.

Mediterranean cooperation will be an open and flexible initiative, with a "light" institutional structure, aimed at concrete implementation of common policies and projects. It will not be an alternative to other proposals or cooperation schemes. It will involve not only the governments, but also the *society*, particularly non governmental organisations.

This Agenda will be launched by those Mediterranean countries that currently have shown a priority interest of doing so, though future wider membership is not excluded. It will aim at increasing the consistency between the consensus-building mechanisms in individual countries and international cooperation so that better management of interdependence and global economic, social, and cultural processes may be achieved, thus attenuating and solving crises and reducing tensions stemming from cultural or national specificities.

Public and private policies for cultural cooperation and dialogue must be worked out, and more solid channels for communication and exchange must be established. Public policies with clearer objectives and better defined means must be found. While the role of intergovernmental cooperation remains essential, the concrete development of cooperation will depend on the broadening of non-governmental initiatives. Constant and effective interaction between these two levels must be sought.

Economic cooperation must concentrate on bridging the enormous North-South disparity; addressing the problem with mutually compatible "visions" on matters such as free markets, immigration, and employment, in order to ensure sustainable growth and environmental protection. The accent must be put on the revival of decentralized economic institutions, competencies and actions.

During this process, to sustain and complete its development, a framework for political cooperation among the participating countries must be set up. It should be linked with the political cooperation of the European Union and should encourage the development of other integration processes.

Political Cooperation

This Agenda calls for a minimal, but coherent and effective level of institutionalization providing two things: the political cooperation needed to determine and strengthen common values and priorities; and the instrument to implement specific cooperation policies and projects. This exercise will be called *Mediterranean Political Cooperation (MPC)*.

MPC should be seen as a body endowed with "light" institutional links which can be adapted to circumstances and requirements. It should be seen as a twin exercise, one at the governmental level and one at the non-governmental level. The two levels will progress in parallel and be mutually supportive, but each will be autonomous. The governmental level could initially be defined by the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers of a group of Mediterranean countries (to be held in Alexandria, Egypt, in July 1994). The non-governmental level should establish regular membership representing the fields of education, media, business, as well as institutes of international affairs and other research centres. It could be linked to the governmental level through parliamentarians and diplomats.

The task of the MPC should be dialogue and consultation among governments; and the organisation of multilateral communication between the public and private spheres. It could constitute a useful institutional interlocutor and a possible instrument for verifying and monitoring the decisions made. It could include multilateral consultations on general security issues (e.g. arms proliferation, terrorism, etc.) and other issues that go beyond foreign policy as such, touching on various aspects of government policies and concerns. It should foster a governmental and non-governmental dialogue between Mediterranean cultures on the social and human dimensions, and on the process of democratization and human rights, with the aim of strengthening the rule of law and economic and political pluralism--a base that is necessary in order to foster cooperation in all fields and to involve other international actors and interests.

While concentrating on establishing political dialogue, the MPC should be open to the discussion of crisis management and security aspects, with the aim of preventing crises and helping to establish a framework of greater transparency, confidence-building and more secure and stable relationships. At the governmental level, it should be equipped with a permanent network for consultation among participating governments, which could be envisaged so as to include other countries and institutions. MPC should benefit from the full participation of the European Union, and there should be periodic meetings between MPC and the political cooperation of the European Union.

The MPC could support the periodic publication of a *Mediterranean Report* on the state of cooperation and conflictuality in the Mediterranean, and on the measures taken to improve the situation. This will be the responsibility of the non-governmental level of MPC and could be coordinated by the international studies centres of the countries in question. This *Mediterranean Report* could provide the basis for an annual informal discussion among governments (on the Gymnich model).

Cultural cooperation

Mediterranean societies enjoy a rich heritage of cultural and historical traditions. The objective of the countries that are participating in the Mediterranean cooperation process is to promote the awareness of this heritage, encouraging the freedom of cultural and intellectual exchanges. This is aimed at attenuating the tensions between the competing trends toward globalization and

cultural specificity, and at the long-term attainment of understanding and collaboration.

Three lines of action are central to Mediterranean cultural cooperation: promoting mutual development; encouraging exchanges between members of the different civil societies; and increasing common ground. Concrete efforts along these lines must be made to foster the emergence of common values and priorities. Specific cooperation policies must place priority on enhancing the value of all aspects of the historical heritage of the Mediterranean, and should be aimed both at the élite and at public opinion.

Concrete actions in the field of cultural cooperation must include the following: promoting greater inter-university cooperation sustained by specific funds for the creation of a doctorate in Mediterranean studies; supporting private and local initiatives, such as the development of tourism focused on cultural interests (particularly among students); establishing twinships between cities; organizing high-quality cultural events; creating educational units on the three great Mediterranean religions and on human rights to be used in pre-university teaching and in the training of social workers, nurses, etc.; commissioning more translations and promoting wider circulation of the masterpieces of the literary traditions of the Mediterranean countries; supporting Mediterranean co-productions of films and television documentaries.

The development and implementation of cooperation initiatives should be conducted in concert with specialized international and regional intergovernmental organisations (e.g. UNESCO) and private centres (e.g. major cultural foundations), according to their respective competencies.

Economic Cooperation

Economic cooperation among Mediterranean partners must be concentrated on the huge gap separating the South from the North, and on the responsibility of the latter in dealing with the problem with adequate "vision". This vision must be supported by three fundamental pillars: the opening of the European market; immigration policy; and European responsibility in ensuring sustainable growth and environmental protection.

The role of the European Union and initiatives of non-governmental organisations are of primary importance for the fulfillment of these objectives.

Economy and trade

In a EU Mediterranean policy which aims both to address particular sub-regional needs (in the Maghreb, Near East, etc.) and to account for the overall strategic importance of the Euro-Mediterranean relationship, it is important to examine the following questions pertaining to the Euro-Mediterranean relationship.

- * what is the current situation in the field of tariffs and trade following the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations?
- * what are the advantages of the southern shore of the Mediterranean as a result of the process of delocalization (the new division of labour between the northern and southern shores)?
- * what are the conditions and instruments necessary to intensify economic exchange and cooperation among the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean?

An assessment must be made of the implications of agreements to create a free trade area or a customs union proposed by the EU to its Mediterranean partners. In particular, more ambitious goals must be set regarding the opening of the Community market to agricultural products for which the Mediterranean partners have a clear comparative advantage.

Economic/Financial Partnership

The countries of the Mediterranean are involved in processes of structural adjustment aimed at revitalizing the bases for their development. The extent of the required adjustments and the social upheaval associated with the transition call for a more decisive European commitment in two areas: cooperation to facilitate and accelerate the adjustment process; and intervention to attenuate the associated social costs.

Increased employment levels must be the priority goal of structural adjustment policies, strategies and programmes. There must be a common effort to ensure that this is reflected in EU cooperation policy.

In order to launch co-development initiatives, it must be recognized that this is a strategy aimed at reinforcing the effects of economic exchange between countries of different levels of development. Mutual opportunities and direct investments are the driving forces of interdependence, and these must be strengthened within the framework of the partnership.

In this critical phase for the partners of the southern shore, the financial efforts of the European Union must be comparable to those directed toward the East. This is necessary for the emergence of a financial partnership able to sustain the development of a partnership in production. Considering the limits of multilateral financing, local credit institutions must be strengthened in order to ensure better channelling of funds toward new private initiatives at the local level.

Migration Flows

Though emigration is associated with social problems, it also contributes significantly to the economic and financial life of many Mediterranean countries (through remittances of emigrants). Whatever the projected demographic fluctuations, however, employment and emigration will continue to be problems in the Southern Mediterranean.

In light of this situation, the European Commission proposed that the EU undertake an immigration policy on three main issues: entry regulation; integration of immigrants into the receiving countries; cooperation with a view to the development and creation of jobs in the countries of emigration.

Of these three issues, it is important that "entry regulation" does not prevail over the others.

It is also important that migration flows be managed through more open collaboration between the Union and its Mediterranean partners. Such openness should not raise unfounded expectations about the northern shore's capacity for substantially increasing the numbers of immigrants it can accommodate; rather, it should allow for greater flexibility in managing the existing migration flows toward Europe and in strengthening a spirit of co-development aimed at

creating jobs in the South.

Environment

The main aim is to incorporate territorial and environmental policies into development strategies. In the medium term, the European Union must ensure both sustainable development and adequate environmental policies in the Mediterranean.

At the multilateral level, suggestions for the short-term include the following:

- *establishing a *Mediterranean Centre for Clean Productions* (along the lines established by UNEP and UNIDO);
- *extending the *Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control* to the Mediterranean;
- *applying the UNECE programme *Efficacité Energetique 2000* to the Mediterranean

Bilateral or subregional initiatives could involve:

- *launching a *navigational aid system (VTS)* in areas at risk;
- *developing alternative technologies in refrigeration (*Greenfreeze*) and lighting (high-efficiency light).

APPENDIX - SOME FEASIBLE ACTIONS

In light of the work by the Istituto Affari Internazionali on the "Agenda for Partnership" and the discussions in the MED-2000 Group, the IAI has selected a number of feasible actions. Suggestions pertain to both the framework of political cooperation, and to concrete actions to be taken in the main fields of cooperation: culture, economy, and environment. The IAI believes that there is significant potential for such actions, and that they may be rapidly achieved. They could be placed on the government agenda in a short time so that necessary common policies may be formulated.

Political Cooperation

- * Creating a flexible and pragmatic institution of political cooperation: a Mediterranean Political Cooperation (MPC). The MPC should be endowed with "light" institutions. It should be able to link up in different ways with the other existing international organisations and multilateral cooperation activities, particularly with the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The MPC would integrate the proposal put forward in the European Union by the Italian and British governments to associate Central-Eastern European countries to the CFSP.
The tasks of the MPC should be dialogue and consultation among governments and the organisation of multilateral communication between the public and private spheres. Ideally, the MPC should set up a list of priorities and objectives to serve as a stimulus and guideline for all cooperation (whether bilateral or multilateral, public or private). While concentrating initially on establishing and strengthening political dialogue, it should nevertheless be open to the inclusion of institutions for crisis management and military aspects in the future.
- * Creating regular exchanges between the governmental and non-governmental levels. MPC should be seen as a twin exercise, one at the governmental level and one at the non-governmental level. The two levels would progress in parallel and be mutually supportive, but remain autonomous one from the other. The non governmental level should seek permanent members from the academic and business world, the media, international affairs institutes and other research centres. The participation of parliamentarians and diplomats would be one of the ways to link it to the governmental level.
- * Supporting the periodic publication of a *Mediterranean Report* on the state of cooperation and conflictuality in the Mediterranean and the measures taken to improve the situation. Drawn up by private sources, it would not be attributable to any government. This report could provide the basis for discussion at an annual intergovernmental meeting like the one held in Gynnich, and could stimulate continual interaction between the governmental and non-governmental levels. The report could be initiated by the international studies institutes of the countries concerned, as they have already set up significant independent channels of communication and scientific collaboration in the framework of groups such as the Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo).

Cultural Cooperation

- *Setting up an "Averroës" programme for trans-Mediterranean mobility for university studies. Benefitting from the experience of and linked to the existing programmes of the European Community (*Erasmus*, *Tempus* and, to a more limited extent, *Avicenna*), it would favour the mobility of students and the enrichment of their pre-doctoral education (it should also contribute to filling gaps in the curricula of Mediterranean universities).
- *Creating a "Mediterranean Phd" common to all Mediterranean countries, according to the proposal of UNIMED's Mediterranean Universities consortium. This would make the educational facilities offered by the various universities, available to students from countries in the area. Students would receive an academic recognition which would be valid in the participating Mediterranean countries.
- *Transforming the EC's *Med-Campus* programme into a permanent cooperation programme (the current project undertaken in the framework of the Mediterranean policy will end with the 1995-96 academic year). Expanding the EC's *Avicenna* programme, increasing financial resources and revising the mechanisms for participation so as to provide more support for non-governmental research centres.
- *Encouraging interested professional associations (teachers, social workers, etc.), public and private research centres, competent local and national institutions to prepare educational units for secondary school instruction in the following: history and geography of Europe and Arab countries; the three great Mediterranean religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam); human rights, particularly women's rights. All of these are to be integrated into formal and informal education.
- *Promoting the publication of a "History of Women in the Mediterranean", along the same lines as the "History of Women in the West", by Georges Duby and Michelle Perrot, published by Laterza.

Emigration and Employment

- *Studying the feasibility of introducing common EU quotas for of seasonal migrant workers. If such quotas are introduced, account must be taken of the long-standing links and relationships within the Mediterranean Basin, as well as of the strong interdependence between the Northern and the Southern Rim.
- *Promoting "industrial districts" in internationally competitive sectors by developing necessary infrastructures; such districts should contribute to strengthening the micro-enterprises emerging in the informal sector so that they can develop into small and medium enterprises and youth cooperatives. It should also serve to attract local savings and migrant workers' remittances;
- *Improving training facilities and credit schemes to help put youth cooperatives into operation and retrain returning workers;

Energy and Industrial Development

- *Increasing the supply of cheap energy in the form of gas and/or electricity to the coastal cities of

the southern Mediterranean to promote industry and the crafts and to improve the well-being of the population;

- *Creating new infrastructures for exporting energy (gas or electricity) to Europe through new gas pipelines and electrical powerlines;
- *Implementing a water project that benefits from new technologies, to revive agriculture and to force back the desert;
- *Launching a chemical industry programme to transform *in situ* the existing feedstocks, and/or to transport them to Europe, and to produce non conventional fuels for transport and combustion in order to free oil for export.

Environment

- *Establishing a "Mediterranean Centre for Clean Productions" (along the lines established by UNEP and UNIDO).
- *Extending the "Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control" to the Mediterranean.
- *Applying to the Mediterranean the UNECE programme "*Efficacité Energetique 2000*".
- *Launching a "navigational aid system" (VTS) in areas at risk.
- *Developing alternative technologies in refrigeration ("Greenfreeze") and lighting (high-efficiency lights).