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**EUROPEAN SECURITY BEYOND THE EAST-WEST
CONFLICT
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN**

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The new Europe is at present living in an age that has no name, and which is not characterized by a distinctive political constellation. The rationale of the old order does not apply any longer, and the architecture of the coming epoch has not as yet materialized. Instead, Europe is simultaneously experiencing integration and relative stability on the one hand, and disintegration and instability on the other. In the West a highly complicated system of interdependence is in the process of being negotiated, and yet at the same time the area is witnessing a degree of disintegration. The markets for goods and services throughout Europe are becoming international, and yet at the same time the number of states, national markets and currencies is on the increase. In Central Europe command economies have disappeared peacefully, and yet at the same time there is an outbreak of archaic violence, destruction, alienation and hatred in the Balkans. The phenomenon of these conflicts, which go back to the inter-war period, being fought with a post-war arsenal of weapons emphasizes the importance of shaping an all-European order after Communism. A diffuse feeling of insecurity has become endemic among the Europeans. The continent is in search of an appropriate form. Constellations dating from the time when Europe was divided into East and West are rapidly disappearing, and all the possible kinds of order -- European integration, nation state and region -- are being critically examined with regard to efficacy, integrative effectiveness and ability to shape the future. Patterns long considered obsolete have returned to the political arena: the religiously and culturally demarcated parts of Europe, processes of renationalization and the ethnically based striving for power. The static nature of the East-West conflict has been followed by numerous conflicts of an explosive and dynamic nature. There are nationalist and economic conflicts, conflicts involving territorial claims, power struggles based on religion and ethnicity, conflicts involving minorities, and crises of governmental authority.

The static nature of European security has been replaced by a flux of risk perceptions, institutional changes, conceptual re-definitions and political manoeuvring.

After the East-West conflict, the making of foreign policy and security policy in Europe is confronted with a set of new variables. The overall security relationships have moved from a structure of confrontation to a diffuse non-order in which alliance membership is shifting and different levels of security have emerged. In relative terms, the conflict rationality of the Cold War has been extremely high -- at least much higher than within the present situation of a relative unpredictability of conflict behavior. On the continent, war-fighting has once again become a means to pursue political goals.

The high defense-technological impulse of the past era has given way to a non-regime of as of yet uncontrollable military action: in the former Yugoslavia and the Southern parts of the CIS the peaceful revolution of 1989 has shown its ugly post-dictatorial face. In the light of 1989, the issues of hard security seem to have lost most of their importance. In hindsight, however, it has become apparent that security in times of fundamental change still remains a precious item and a highly political issue. After all, most of the old defense postures and security doctrines in the West have proven to be irrelevant for the containment of the ethnic, territorial or religious conflicts on Europe's periphery.

Beyond the Cold War, security policies in Europe are confronted with fundamental changes that are not new to Western politics but have assumed a new quality after the end of the East-West conflict.

Security and defense can hardly be legitimized with reference to a clear cut threat. Currently, no political ideology and no military potential poses an imminent threat to the territorial integrity and normative stability of the democracies of Europe. This change is all the more important because the rationale of military forces along the central front has been largely built on the evidence of such a threat. As a result, the relatively large and well equipped conventional ground forces in Western Europe lack a credible definition of their purpose.

Furthermore, security and defense policies in Europe have to be supported by electorates that are increasingly less outward looking. In hindsight one might conclude that both the tensions of the inter-war period and its in-built potential for revisionism and the nuclear threat of the antagonistic structure of the recent decades have worked towards the conservation of a foreign policy orientation dating back to the days of the Concert of Europe. For the first time in this century, no overriding international constellation or threat predetermines the policy of governments in Western Europe. Though this situation may just be the characteristic of a transition period, the focus of West European publics has nevertheless shifted to the domestic agenda.

Finally, security and defense policies in Europe have to be conceived against the background of instant media coverage and communication. The CNN mode of consuming international affairs has replaced the world view as communicated by the foreign policy elites in our political systems. Any new crisis and any attempt to deal with it are subject to a continuous assessment on the global TV screen.

Against this background, the current issues of security policy are but attempts to react to the new challenges:

- the old and new ways to think about risks and threats,
- the new questions of keeping peace in Europe,
- the means to modernize integrated security and defense structures of the democracies of Europe,
- the paradigm changes in the international system and the prospects for cooperation and conflict,
- the emergence of the Mediterranean as 'the other strategic problem' of Europe.

I. Geopolitics and the Balance of Power

The end of the East-West Conflict has led to clearly apparent shifts in the political map of Europe. Old ties are losing their significance and are being supplanted by new political allegiances. In the long term foreign policy orientations will change and adapt themselves to the new lines of gravity. Most visibly, the new Europe changes the role of the central regions in Europe:

From being at the center of Western Europe, France, seen in a European perspective, has shifted to the edge of the continent. This will become even more apparent as democracy and free market economies establish themselves to the east of Germany. From being on the periphery of the eastern bloc, Czechoslovakia first shifted directly towards the West European center, and nevertheless subsequently fell apart into two states. Before 1989 Europe did not possess a center that was of any importance in political terms, and thus did not have the problems associated with a constellation grouped around such a center. In the meantime old concepts have had to be reassessed. Germany, which sees itself as part of the West, though under different preconditions, is nonetheless situated between the East and the West. Austria is presently confronted with claims, expectations and opportunities for influence in its immediate neighbourhood that used to be taboo in Viennese foreign policy deliberations. Nor can Italy afford to turn a blind eye to the conflicts on the Balkans. The Adriatic does not only separate it from them; it also forms a link. Other such regions are:

- Southern Europe: the poorer member states of the European Union. They perceive their financial expectations as being in direct competition with the financial transfers to the East;
- the part of Western Europe that includes the two nuclear powers of the old constellation, whose nuclear-based assertion of power and role in the maintenance of international order are declining;
- Western Central Europe, including Germany and Austria, who, as part of the West, are most directly affected by the developments in the East;
- the Adriatic area and Italy, which feels most directly affected by the upheavals in

- Southeastern Europe;
- Central Eastern Europe, including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, whose capacity for reform has increased the distance to their former Comecon partners, though this is currently insufficient in political and economic terms to enable them to participate in West European integration;
- Northern Europe, where the soft transition from West to East and partial neutrality have become meaningless, and which will become part of the European Union;
- Eastern Europe in the vicinity of the European part of Russia, whose perspectives are conditioned by the political distance and the physical proximity of Russia;
- Southeastern Europe, whose distinct separation from Western and Central Eastern Europe is the result of ethnic conflict and the partly latent and partly manifest territorial ambitions of its key states.

These areas have no political organization but their 'members' share some important interests and policy preferences. With a few exceptions -- like Italy -- these geographic and geopolitical positions explain the context of national and integrative political strategies. Here, the different rationales for deepening and widening of the European Union may be found; and this is also the starting point for national concepts of integration, control and the distribution of resources within the European Union.

The aftermath of the NATO ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs will demonstrate this approach. Little will have been changed, a 'bad peace' will be the only solution and Russia has managed to return as a power player -- the rules of this game being very familiar in the Kremlin.

Balance of Power Tactics

Not just Russia but many European states make use of a well-tryed political device in the present interim period. Balance of power policies which aim to preserve and restore an equilibrium have once again become a dominant feature of European politics.

Behind the multilateralist rhetoric of the CSCE, the conflicts between the heirs of the former Soviet Union, the attempts to form a Hexagonale and the cooperation of the Visegrad states stand national assessments of how to balance off the potential of one's neighbours. In Western Europe the process of European integration has become a vehicle for new balance of power policies. France countered the shift in the internal balance of power brought about by German reunification with an offer for further integration. The United Kingdom countered the idea of a European Union with the prospect of widening its membership, thereby hoping to reduce the level of integration. The southern members of the European Union have taken West European financial transfers to the reform states as an opportunity to make new financial demands.

In the western and the eastern parts of the European continent the recourse to balance of power politics provides the key to understanding both conflicts and cooperation. Yet in the present context this process should not be seen as a return to the kind of high-level European cabinet diplomacy that used to exist in the past. Of course, politics and societies sometimes take their bearings from ancient conflicts or strategies. However, they cannot evade the conditions and the instruments of economic and political interdependence. The peculiar nature of present-day balance-of-power politics thus derives from the unusual combination of classical diplomacy and modern integrative procedures. It is also possible to pursue policies of national interest within the European Union, within its legal framework and in the context of its political dynamism. Union institutions and forms of joint decision-making are just as much suited to integration, control and balancing.

As the process of reordering of the continent continues, such balance of power tactics will affect the security structures in Western Europe in three ways:

- First, there will be a significant increase in distributional conflict among the European states. One of the premises of the balance of power is a degree of mistrust of the capabilities and ambitions of one's neighbours. In this light, integration is also seen as a zero-sum game in which the aim is to hold on to what one has.
- Secondly, balance of power politics favor the tendency to renationalization as a way of ensuring freedom of action. In particular in the case of the smaller European states,

further steps towards integration raise fears with regard to the loss of participation rights within the Union.

- Thirdly, this pattern creates structures without leadership, for leading powers and leading roles are immediately suspected of striving for hegemony. This is also the reason for the widespread acceptance of an American role in Europe. The United States can check leadership ambitions and arbitrate power rivalries.

The Western dealing with the wars in former Yugoslavia gives ample evidence to support these assumptions. What is more, the recent events demonstrate how the whole continent is playing out the balance of power tactics: While parts of public opinion still seem to believe in the normative value of post-antagonist European politics, crisis management has long shifted to the minimization of one's own risks and to the containment of the conflict's externalities.

II. Western Strategy and the Transformation of Russia

Focal point of security policies in the new and extended definition of security is the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. In perspective, the relevance and the prospects of the new relationship between West and East in Europe have to be assessed on the assumptions of two basic scenarios, both being based on the somewhat ambivalent notion of 'Western interests'. The first scenario would emphasize the importance of stability and stabilization in the regions east of the western community. The second would move beyond and refer to the Western interests in order-building including the issues of extending the integration processes eastward.

With regard to the first scenario, the crucial question is whether the present measures are sufficient in order to stabilize pluralistic democracies and market economies in the East. The key European interest in this respect calls for the establishment of systems operating on compatible values and structures that would thus not be hostile to the West in the broader sense, i.e. including for example the prevention of mass migration flows. The scope of future cooperation, aid and transfers, so the assumption goes, would be limited by this self-interest of the West. It follows that the amount of those transfers will be subject to competing stability interests vis-à-vis other regions, not to overlook the internal debates about fund allocation within the European Union.

In this context, the issue of 'sufficient help' can hardly be settled on objective terms. Diverging perceptions persist on the state of transformations in the East as well as on the risks and dangers arising from a failure of reform policies. As of yet, the states immediately neighboring the Central and Eastern European regions -- most visibly, Germany -- have been advocating increased stability efforts extending beyond the spheres of economic change. It can be assumed that this 'camp' inside the EC will be strengthened by the first phase of enlargement: Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway bring in important if not vital interests with regard to democratic stability in the East. The South-Western states of Europe have been more reluctant, with France being closer to the German position -- if not for substantive reasons than at least in order to not alienate Germany from the Union. In this sense, the rejection of the Franco-German initiative in the intergovernmental conference on Political Union in 1991 to formally assign the *Ostpolitik* to the Common Foreign and Security Policy falls back on the reforming states: For quite some time to come, the Western Community will not force itself into joint assessment and joint decision-making with regard to its stability and security interests in the East.

Obviously, the developments inside the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States have the greatest potential to offset this interest-based scenario. Should Russian politics continue to be blocked over reforms and, furthermore, should Russia's self-definition center on a great power-status set apart from Europe, the strategic interests of the West vis-à-vis the Western neighbors of Russia will be re-focused. Apart from the dilemma of potentially aiding a future rival or opponent that would seriously influence Western transfers to Russia, policies based on the medium term Western interest would

probably differentiate: On the one hand, those states closest to the West could receive greater support and new ways of closer association with the West might be offered; on the other hand, those states closest to a 'neo-imperial' Russia might be regarded as 'buffers', receiving support but being excluded from closer association or membership.

The developments since December 1993 reveal the short term orientation of the West's *Ostpolitik*. The Partnership for Peace program remains a fair weather concept because it denies the associated states in Central and Eastern Europe a clear message on full membership in the Western Alliance. Any conditions that may lead these countries to want such a signal, will most likely be worse than the conditions of today. If it was impossible to at least assure full participation and full protection in the event of membership in the EU because of Russian security interests, these interests would certainly prevent membership in the future.

This observation leads to the second scenario. It is based on the assumption that a policy of interest alone will not be sufficient for two reasons: First, the strategy of order-building aims at institutionalizing levels of Western support to the transformation process and thus to communalize both the interests and the risk assessments in the West. Second, order-building takes into account that the Eastern democracies themselves need institutional commitments for political reasons. Neither popular support for economic reforms that impose high social costs on the people nor popular consensus on domestic and foreign policy conflicts in the transformation towards democracy or the break-up of states can be taken for granted however strong the disillusionment with the old order might be felt. Governing elites in the new democracies are constantly over-burdened by the simultaneity of challenges. Moreover, their leadership is increasingly challenged by nationalist factions of the political specter. In this sense, order-building implies mutually re-enforcing relationships and commitments.

Measured in these terms of order-building, the current relationship is overshadowed by doubts -- doubts about the credibility of the membership-component in the Europe Agreements; doubts about the willingness of the West to extend not only its access to markets but also the solidarity of its structural funds; doubts about the reliability of Western norms in light of the Western reaction to the Yugoslav crisis. Similar doubts certainly exist on the Western side, with regard to the responsiveness, adaptability and steadiness of the new democracies.

Thus, both the policies of interest and the policies of order with regard to the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe reveal serious shortcomings and face obstacles that will continue to burden the transition of the antagonistic security system towards an all-European security area built on shared principles and mutual interests. These issues will absorb a high proportion of the political attention and the available resources for years to come. In addition, political energy will time and again be wasted on quarrels over status and policies of individual countries from the West. The renationalization of security policies in the wider sense of the word has progressed considerably.

III. European Union, NATO and WEU -- in Search for a New Mix

The inclusion of foreign policy and security policies into the *deepening* of the European Community was based on a range of motives and interests among which three were probably most important:

- the risk of a falling apart of the foreign policy priorities and orientations as a result of the recasting of Europe and a tendency of de-solidarization under the new conditions among essential member-states,
- the interest to maintain and develop an integrated framework for security issues and

- defense, which could also adequately reflect the security challenges and the growing political responsibility of the West Europeans for the organization of their own security,
- the perception of the emergence of new risks and challenges to the stability of the political, economic and social systems in Western Europe, their territorial integrity and normative quality that would not or insufficiently be protectable through the old instruments.

These motives were not and are not shared by all of the member-states. For France and Germany, however, all of them were of special importance. Based on their respective national interest, both states articulated an interest to integrate the other into a common framework. In the inter-governmental conference on Political Union, these considerations shaped the style and substance of the negotiations.

With regard to the results, the Franco-German position has by and large prevailed both in the EC and within NATO: the development of foreign policy making, security and defense in Western Europe was to conceive complementary to the other areas of European integration and that this result could not be achieved through the partial identity of the actors in different organizations.

In the Maastricht treaty, the provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) continue the experimental and pragmatic approach of integration policies since the 1970s. Based on the *aquis* within the European Political Cooperation (EPC) the treaty moves one step forward. In perspective, the provisions sketch out the option of a security union in which the Western European Union (WEU) organizes a common and potentially integrated defense under the roof of the European Union. The treaty language carefully avoids to interfere with any of the rights and obligations within the existing security institutions in Europe. The specific duties and limitations of individual member-states are not touched by the treaty. In principal, however, the Twelve have at least clarified their intentions in two directions:

- The deepening of European integration will not proceed on the basis of a *civilian power* that abstains from the conflicts in international politics.
- Within the future development of the Atlantic Alliance, the 'European Pillar' will be made up by a WEU which is integral part of the European Union. Thus, an old debate within NATO has been settled from the European side. In addition, the West Europeans have offered a complimentary model for both their continuing interest in NATO and the necessities of integration within the EC.

The Maastricht Treaty thus offers a framework for future action. As a blueprint for further developments, the steps outlined below appear to be in line with the initial concept. In the field of foreign and security policies the following points require clarification:

- the responsibility of the Union for Eastern, Mediterranean, aid and development, CSCE and UN policies.
- the formulation of common positions or doctrines with regard to the principles, criteria and goals of Union policies towards certain states, regions or topics.
- the development of an appropriate foreign policy infrastructure which will also make it possible to provide a continual assessment of the situation.

In the more specific areas of security and defense policies, the next steps would focus on the development of credible instruments for the protection and defense of European interests. This would require making decisions on collective defense and collective security.

With regard to collective defense the issue is the adaptation, modernization and cost effectiveness of (integrated) defense structures in Western Europe to deter external aggression. In future, the West Europeans will have to assume greater responsibility in the Western context, and carry out these tasks with reduced manpower and smaller budgets. The unclear and simultaneous existence of different security institutions should give way to a system of Western security that takes into account the security needs of both the United States and Western Europe. Such a system could consist of defense planning and military

integration on different levels:

- On the European level WEU would organize integrated territorial defense. Its planning and command structures need to be compatible with those of NATO.
- The WEU -- as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -- would combine the resources and define the responsibilities of member states in the NATO context.
- A nuclear deterrent -- the Alliance's ultimate insurance policy -- would be retained by the USA in North America and the United Kingdom and France in Europe.
- Joint units set up on a bilateral or multilateral basis would be assigned to the WEU or NATO according to their function.
- When they join the European Union, the states of Central Europe would become members of the WEU, participate in defense integration, and enjoy the complete protection of the Alliance. Early membership of these states in the CFSP would necessitate early integration into the WEU and NATO.

On this scheme the adaptation of the transatlantic partnership with the United States could also be organized. It would then consist of a bilateral arrangement of the US and the EU with a couple of other member states and associated members as well as special roles for individual West European participants.

With regard to collective security in Europe, the continuation of defense integration in the European Union seems to be a crucial precondition for the establishment of a pluralistic security community based on non-aggression and the peaceful settlement of disputes. However, developments in the recent past have shown that the kinds of defense integration and security diplomacy employed so far cannot in themselves effectively maintain peace in Europe. The continent as a whole needs a European order in which peace can be restored on the basis of clearly defined rules, and an escalation of conflict can be stopped by the use of preventive measures. For this purpose it would make sense to strengthen the CSCE as a regional organization recognized under the UN charter. Acting within the framework and in accordance with the rules of the UN, the CSCE could ensure compliance with European peace norms as defined by the CSCE Paris Charter, by the European Convention on Human Rights, by a Minorities Charter, and by EC guidelines on the recognition of new states. If and when required, it would need to be in a position to enforce compliance against the will of an aggressor, and also within a certain state. If other measures prove insufficient, the Europeans should be able and have the will to resort to military intervention. For this purpose the West European Union should equip and have at its disposal integrated bi- and multi-national units. The United States should participate in these in a NATO context. Without a credible conventional deterrent of every kind of aggression directed against the European norms, peace diplomacy and crisis management in themselves will not be able to prevent a return of war and violence to Europe.

However desirable, little speaks for the implementation of any such security arrangement in the course of the next years. Apart from the persisting divergences over foreign policy interests among European states, the national strategies reveal some common shortcomings. Most of them show an imbalance between strategic and military thinking. While defense integration is maintained to function as a reinsurance against a renewal of the Soviet threat, the foreign policies seem to disregard the risks and build upon the stability of the status quo. While on the strategic side the capacities for peace keeping and peace enforcement are gradually built up, the development of respective foreign policy capacities for analyses and decision-making lags behind. In sum, the wide definition of security has not been followed by a widening of the security instruments and the necessary changes in policy planning. The broader notion of security requires a preventive thinking ahead, and it implies the ability to allocate the adequate resources for security policies from a large spectrum of policy areas.

The effects of these shortcomings can be studied in the Mediterranean. The region poses security challenges in the wider sense that are probably of equal weight to the transformation of Eastern Europe. So far, selective attention and short term policies on the

part of many states have led to a low profile in this region. A closer look shows, however, the urgency of action, and a sketch of goals and interests to pursue indicates the amount of political energy required to realize preventive strategies.

IV. The Mediterranean -- the 'other strategic problem' of Europe

The problems of the Mediterranean area are becoming more acute. Europe's southern neighbours are faced with economic and social challenges which surpass their ability to deal with them. Rapid population growth tends to swallow up any kind of economic progress. Unemployment is on the increase. Environmental fundamentals and traditional lifestyles are in danger. The process of urbanization creates new social conflicts. The results of these developments include legitimacy deficits in the political systems, an increase in authoritarianism and growing political extremism fuelled by religious fundamentalism. There is a danger that unstable governments will try to divert internal political pressures into the area of foreign policy.

Western Europe cannot stand aloof from the problems of the Mediterranean area. The consequences of internal development and conflicts between states brought about by territorial disputes, a striving for supremacy or resources will affect Europe directly. Waves of migrants, environmental damage and violence in the Mediterranean area constitute a danger to security and stability. At the same time there appears to be an emerging conflict of values between Europe and the Islamic-Arab world. As a political ideology, Islamic fundamentalism is currently the only system of values that is in conscious opposition to Western values.

The transition to a new order will also alter the conflict constellations in the Mediterranean area. The Middle East conflict has changed from being a conflict between systems, to which there was no solution, to become a regional conflict which, after the end of superpower confrontation, can be resolved on a regional basis. Syria, now without the backing of the Soviet Union, has become a regional power in search of balance and compromise. The defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War has shifted the PLO in the direction of a negotiated settlement for the Palestinians living in areas under Israeli occupation. This process of regionalization opens up new prospects for regional cooperation and integration in the Middle East. In both cases Turkey can play a key role. In regional terms it possesses the potential of a great power, has a crucial interest in development and stability, and can serve as a model of the co-existence of religion and modern society.

It is in the interests of the Europeans to defuse economic and social conflicts to the south of them and to prevent relations from hardening into a 'conflict of civilizations'. In the past European responses to the challenges of the Mediterranean area have been characterized by diverted attention, conceptual fragmentation and weak instruments. A strategic approach would seek to support peace, development and democracy in the context of an overall concept which brings together development, security and cultural policies:

- European policies should promote economic reconstruction in the Mediterranean area, and should earmark a part of the gross domestic product of the Union as European development aid.
- On a societal level, what needs to be encouraged is a just social order and mutual cultural understanding. Thus European policies should establish a link between financial and technical aid and observance of human and minority rights and social norms.
- The European Union should organize measures to prevent further environmental damage. This could be achieved through a joint Mediterranean Environmental Agency and aid targeted at improving environmental administration, legislation and observation.
- Europeans should strive to maintain a social and cultural balance between their populations and immigrants from the Mediterranean area. Immigration policies need to be embedded in a European concept, and the integrative ability and willingness of

- immigrants require specific improvement.
- In political conflicts Europeans should play an active role in promoting peaceful settlements, in supporting the implementation of give-and-take solutions, in developing democratic systems in Southeastern Europe, in the Middle East and in North Africa, and in establishing a lasting cooperation with regional integrative institutions.
- The Europeans also need to support the current peace process in the Middle East. In the medium term they should prepare for the guarantee of the political and economic security of Israel and a Palestinian state once the region has arrived at a consensus.
- It would finally be necessary to include peace and stability in the Mediterranean area in European security policy as a whole, to work towards the effective control and destruction of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the region, to maintain the military balance, to initiate an arms control and disarmament process and to establish common rules governing the export of armaments.

These measures would establish a multi-faceted array of instruments to further political influence. They should be complemented by larger structures of coordination and consensus-building through the formation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). It would provide an opportunity to achieve a balance between the different interests and motives by holding out the prospect of stability and security in exchange for economic cooperation. It could serve to control conflict in crisis situations and promote a consensus in defining norms and values. In the light of the dynamic social tensions in the region, a CSCM based on a common understanding of human rights might also provide a means of ensuring compliance. In the long term, the CSCM could become a system of collective security, a way of organizing economic and ecological development, and the framework for a viable cultural area.

V. Resume

In sum, security politics and security policies in Europe are burdened with unaccomplished duties: The trend towards renationalization and power politics has weakened the institutions of political and military integration with no clear path towards a new order in sight; the biggest single issue on the new security agenda, the transformation to market economies and liberal democracies in the East, lags behind; the restructuring of Western defense institutions in order to bring in line political and military structures with the new strategic challenges is at best stagnating.

All of these factors divert the attention of Western Europe from the challenges in the Mediterranean. Time that is needed for thinking ahead and for preventive action is thus being lost.

Furthermore, this eurocentric preoccupation weakens the sensitivity of the West towards the conflict potential of the larger international political environment. Namely in Africa and in Asia, conflictual constellations loom on the horizon that would imply hard choices for the West should they break up. Four examples may illustrate the wider foreign policy issues for Europe:

- Among others, European policy-makers might have to re-examine their assessment of nation-building and territorial revisionism. The changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the ways and means by which new states have come into being suggest to the outside world a fundamental legitimacy of national organization and territorial revisionism and send the signal that the use of force is paying off. On the other hand, these processes demonstrate to the authoritarian regimes in the world that a repressive aggressiveness could be the only way to try to secure one's rule.
- Also, European preferences in the choice between stability and democracy need to be reconsidered. Up to now, the preference has clearly been in favor of stability in part because of the different notions of democracy that prevail in non-Western countries in the process of transition. Pro-Western authoritarian rule is still preferred over a regime that assumed power through democratic processes but seems incompatible to Western

democratic norms. Coming to terms with ethnic or religion-based governments may turn out to be unavoidable. Currently, European policy-makers have limited experience on how to moderate political systems of this kind.

- Thirdly, European policies need to take into account the fundamental dependence of non-Western countries on outside aid and to calculate those policies pursued to attract attention and to generate support from the First World. Three strategies seem to be obvious: a) to aim at the fulfillment of those normative standards that are compatible to Western values -- this strategy could prove to be counter-effective as the post-election coup in Algeria has demonstrated -- b) to take over regional balancing duties that are in the interest of the international resp. the Western community or c) to attract attention and support by creating fears about the consequences of progressive worsening -- a strategy which is also used by Russian politics in the attempt to secure aid.
- Finally, careful preparation for the reappearance of ideological antagonisms seems indispensable. What are the challenges to pluralistic and democratic value systems? The notion of socialism as an alternative mode of governing a society seems to be discredited in the world, but collective ideologies that claim a 'third way' still seem to be operable. The attractiveness of large models, however, has become questionable -- China will most likely make this experience in the years to come. The European events suggest that nationalism and even racism might be successors to the forms of authoritarian socialism. Religious fundamentalism remains an option for collective regimes. Also, personalized authoritarian rule in the form of charismatic leadership has to be taken into account.

The outlook for the emergence of an international system that will be predominantly organized along cooperative lines appears to be rather dim. With the level of social tensions on the rise, the conflict rationality of political actors remains unsure. Most likely, it will be shaped by:

- a sizable degree of insensitivity to global issues; environmental warfare or black-mail seem to be entirely possible as a source of power;
- a significant degree of political aggressiveness as a result of social frictions;
- a relative low level of predictability on the part of fundamentalist or para-ideological regimes;
- a high probability of gradual proliferation of weapons for mass destruction and respective carrier systems.

On the part of the European democracies, the willingness to take up high commitments can be expected to remain low for publics as well as elites. It is hardly imaginable that political actors engage on issues which could become a challenge to their own security only in the medium and long term.

With respect to the domestic and the international constraints, the European conflict behavior will be limited: It will most likely require obvious conflict structures and apparent violations of European interests, action will have to be calculable in terms of scale and time, they will need prior legal and political legitimation and -- as in the case of the Gulf war -- material compensation. In conclusion, it may well be asked if European publics are willing to react to conflictual turns in world affairs and how well equipped European political systems are to meet these challenges. Unwillingness and inability will result in the erection of fences and walls to encapsulate incompatible parts of the international system. Muddling through the security issues on a short term basis today could become the source for insecurity and conflict tomorrow.

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