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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY (Ukrainian Debate)

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1. Ukraine and European Security

Two years after disintegration of the former USSR and proclamation of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence its role and place in Europe and, in particular in the system of European security, continue to be debated in the international community with increased interest.

There are many reasons for this interest. Among them: unique geostrategic situation of Ukraine; its significant economical, scientific and technological as well as military potential; Ukraine's policy towards the nuclear weapons it inherited from the former USSR; unbalanced and strategically deficient policy of the West toward unconditional and immediate nuclear disarmament of Ukraine, deepening economic crisis in Ukraine that may lead to serious social unrest; and, finally, political development and growing imperialistic ambitions of Russia, current state and perspectives of Ukrainian-Russian relations that do not exclude a threat of a full-scale confrontation with hardly predictable consequences.

Considering the issue of European security in more broad sense one can see that vacuum of security in the East goes along with vacuum of imagination in the West, with chronic inability of Western countries to coincide the short term benefits with long term geostrategic losses. The first results of this short eyed Western policy are quite evident now.

The attempted October (1993) coup in Moscow, the victory of so-called "democratic forces" and further developments in Russia showed to the whole world that the "Russia-style democracy" is something very different from the Western democracy.

Moreover, it is completely evident that B. Yeltsin already paid and will have to pay a high price for military backing during the coup not only by supporting military build-up programs and military-industrial complex as a whole, but also by pursuing further aggressive policy in the "near abroad" aimed at the revival of the empire within its old borders. It is significant that the policy of B. Yeltsin in the "near abroad" finds complete support of the overwhelming majority of Russia's democratic parties and movements that testifies to the thesis that the **Russian democracy ends where the national question begins.**

Russia's policy in the "near abroad" to a certain extent may be understood if one tries to link it directly with the national mentality. Russian mentality has been shaped during recent 500 years as a mentality of permanent expansion and domination over other peoples. The mentality of 250-million people that inhabits 1/6 part of the globe has a great social and historical inertia. It is impossible in principle to have this mentality changed during a few years. It needs decades.

That is why there is a very little difference if any, between the approaches of Russian "conservators" and "democrats" towards the policy in the "near abroad". In fact, the difference between the views of A. Rutskoy and S. Baburin (who now heads one of the popular parties of Russia) and the views of B. Yeltsin and E. Gaidar (last one is as well the leader of the other popular party) has been and is only in the selection of tactical means of ensuring Russia's domination in the geopolitical area of the former USSR and, if possible, beyond its boundaries - in the Central and Eastern Europe.

Poorly camouflaged Russia's ultimatum issued to the states of 4+2 Treaty concerning undesirability of the membership of countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the NATO was a cold shower for many Western politicians.¹

1. Fears of the ruling circles of some NATO nations of Russia confirms, by the way, that inertia of Western mentality is in no way lesser than inertia of the Russian mentality.

Events in Moldova and Tajikistan, externally provoked anti-democratic pro-Moscow coup in Azerbaijan and hasty joining by this state the CIS; analogous, (but a little suspended by the personal ambitions of E. Shevardnadze) scenario in Georgia that resulted in the Russian occupation of this country and transfer of all key military bases, lines of communications and sea ports (including Poti and Sukhumi) under the control of Russia - are the evident testimony that the political ambitions of Russian Federation are in the pursue of the goal of reviving the empire.

One should also mention here direct territorial claims of the Russian Parliament toward Ukraine. Irrespectively of the protests of Ukraine and opinion of the world community, resolution of the UN Security Council, the so-called "democratic government" of B. Yeltsin has no intention of revising the mentioned enactment of the Russian Parliament. That is why Ukraine's concerns over the issues of its national security, including nuclear security have quite substantial grounds.

Facing growing threat to its existence in the practical absence of any allies in the outside world young Ukrainian state had to solve the problems of its national security and building its armed forces relying only on itself and exclusively at the expense of internal resources.

The absence of the support of the West, as well as of its willingness to understand the problems of national security of Ukraine, alongside with the deliberate Russia's (and its special services) campaign aimed at discrediting Ukraine, which was indiscriminately supported by Western mass media in fact leave no alternative for Ukraine in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

The issues of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, their reduction and destruction will be discussed later. Now I should like to stress that the strategy of the West towards Ukraine turned out not only to be bankrupt but also counterproductive and lead to quite opposite results as the public opinion polls show.

During only one year (spring 1992 - spring 1993) the number of respondents who support the full nuclear states of Ukraine more than doubled (from 15-18 to more than 30 %). Vast majority of the population (more than 88%) supported the idea that any further steps toward nuclear-free status are possible only after Ukraine received the full legally binding guaranties from all nuclear powers and full compensation from Russia for nuclear material. [1]

The results of October 1993 wide-spread polls taken by the Parliament newspaper Holos Ukrainy, the Ukrainian Sociological Service together with the Center for Democratic Initiative are even more striking.

With regard to views on nuclear weapons, 66% of the respondents agree that Ukraine should in one or another form maintain its nuclear arsenal. Only 22% believe Ukraine should rid itself of nuclear weapons while another 6% had no opinion. Of the 66% favoring Ukraine maintaining nuclear arms, 27% support keeping nuclear weapons until Ukraine receives international security guaranties for their dismantlement, 33% believe Ukraine should take possession of nuclear power and then initiate global nuclear disarmament along with other nations; while 6% believe Ukraine should declare itself a nuclear power. Essential radicalization of the public opinion takes place in other spheres related to the problems of national security and military matters. [2]

These were the results of comprehension by the public of all spectrum of internal and external threats at state and individual levels as well as the results of heated disputes on the problem of national security - in its political, cultural, informational and other dimensions - that took place both in Ukraine and abroad.

2. National Security Debate

Starting from mid-1991 there was a number of publications which attempted to elaborate basic aims and priorities of Ukraine as an independent sovereign nation, to define the main internal and external threats and to outline fundamental problems of the national security system of Ukraine and the ways for its development.

Basic categories in the sphere of national security and their components were elaborated. In particular, national security was defined as an absence of threats to the human rights and liberties as well as to the basic interests and values of the sovereign national state of contemporary world. [3]

This definition substantially broadened traditional approaches to the defining the notion of national security not only by introducing additional dimensions in economic, ecological, cultural and other spheres, but by declaring unconditional priority of human rights and liberties over the rights of a state.

Such broadened notion became absolutely necessary in present conditions as long as deficiency of attempts to regard national security problems from exclusively military point of view became evident. Traditional orientation of industrially developed countries to rely in the national security sphere basically on a military force, not raises, but reduces the level of their national security, competitiveness of science and culture, and, what is especially dangerous, the very existence of a human being, society and of the Earth as a whole.

The problems of the national security of Ukraine have many features and evolve many specific aspects stemming out from the difficulties of development of a young multinational state that is at the beginning of its statehood as well as from a number of a geopolitical, economical and socio-cultural peculiarities of the country and its international environment. [4]

Ukraine, as it has already been mentioned, just commenced shaping its statehood. But the effective system of national security provides for availability of strong state institutes capable of guaranteeing the observance of human rights and liberties, defense of population from internal and external threats. The absence of adequate state capabilities and of the mechanisms of ensuring national security inevitably brings about a lot of problems of internal and external character.

Other problem is the absence of a stable consensus concerning national security issues. Traditional approach to national security presumes the existence of some kind of social contract (consensus) between population, which is considered to be a bearer of a certain national mentality, and a state. In the absence of such consensus (forming of which requires quite a long period of time), there are inevitably rival ideas of national security shared by different social groups. On one side, it reduces the effectiveness of functioning of state institutes, on the other - brings down substantively the general level of security for all social groups without exception.

The absence of truly democratic parliament and government leads to situation in which the existing power bodies does not reflect the spectrum of interests of the peoples of Ukraine. To a great extent the present day state structures consist mostly of the representatives of the old administrative and command system. With the silent consent of the President and with support of former communist majority in the parliament the government put into life the interests of the old nomenclatura tied together by the common cooperative interests. At the same time having snatched the slogans of the national movement and outplayed democrats on their own territory the ruling circles of the country found themselves unable to propose an effective program of economic and social development.

As a result, the country found itself in a deep crisis, on a verge of political paralysis and is unable to mobilize the existing potential of natural, economic, scientific, technical and human resources. The situation is aggravated by a number of mistakes (and their consequences) made in the sphere of foreign and interior policy which undermined both the

image of Ukraine abroad and a social stability inside. First of all, it relates to the inconsistent and controversial policy of Ukraine on the issue of nuclear disarmament, indecisiveness of the government with regard to the Black Sea Fleet and military units that are under Russia's control, concessions to and pacification of separatist forces and anti-constitutional activities of certain radical and paramilitary groups, sabotage on the part of the government of a number of radical reforms aimed at creating full-fledged market economy.

Potential danger is deriving from the proclaimed intention of Ukraine to become a neutral state which was not thoroughly thought out. Firstly, in present conditions (and moreover, for a country with a potential and capabilities as those of Ukraine) there can not be a full neutrality in principle.

Current security agreements with the CIS countries (taking into account domination and ambitions of Russia) pose for Ukraine the same security as the Warsaw Treaty Organization posed for Hungary in the 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Secondly, hastily proclaimed neutrality in reality hinders the integration of Ukraine into existing structures of European and international security. Feeble and inefficient programs of conversion, building national armed forces and rebuilding of the security service are not contributing to it as well. These and other problems were discussed in the academic circles of the country in 1991-1992 with the participation of the leading Western experts.

By mid-1992 two international seminars on the problems of national security of Ukraine were held. [5,6] There was also a serie of articles in the Ministry of Defense newspaper "Narodna Armiya" which later served as a general methodological basis for elaboration of official concept of the national security of Ukraine.

In particular, basic external and internal threats to the national security of Ukraine were defined:

Internal Threats

1. The collapse of economic reforms, social instability and disorders.
2. Ethnic and regional conflicts and civil war.
3. The "Old nomenclatura" coup with a possible participation of the armed forces.
4. Ecological degeneration mainly as a result of Chornobyl catastrophe.

External Threats

1. Russian expansionism and Russia's military machine.
2. Externally stimulated interethnic conflicts and territorial break-up of Ukraine.
3. Economic blockade and economic (nuclear) blackmail.
4. Territorial claims and Ukrainian involvement in interstate conflicts.
5. Pan - Slavic ideology and Russian socio-cultural domination. [7]

At the same time the first articles appeared in the West which adequately enough reflected the problems of national security of Ukraine. I. Brzezinski wrote for example in spring 1992: "How Ukraine affects Europe will largely be determined by how, and how effectively it consolidate its sovereignty. Critical challenges include economic reform, the institutionalization of democratic governance, and the establishment of national security structures, including defense forces." [8]

Another important step on the road of Ukraine's national security system build-up was Ukrainian-American seminar organized by the Atlantic Council of United States in Washington in September 1992.

During this seminar a group of prominent Ukrainian parliamentarians, state officials and experts on national security problems have had

possibility to discuss with their American counterparts the whole spectrum of issues dealing with national security system of modern democratic state, functioning of its different branches, and distribution of power between the executive and legislative bodies in this sphere. In analytical paper prepared for American delegation T. Sherfic wrote: "The answer to questions of national security [in Ukraine] have never been strictly military ... the Ukrainians do not perceive their security in such a narrow view. President Kravchuk has created a new consultative and advisory body in the system of state executive power subordinated to Ukraine's president ... for determining and implementing state policy in this sphere, which is vitally important to the young and sovereign state." [9]

Parallel to comparative analysis of western countries national security systems and studying of alternatives of national security system building in Ukraine in the academic circles, mass media and different party publications the heated debate had taken place.

It is too early to speak about existence of multiparty system in Ukraine. In spite of the fact that more than 30 parties are officially registered in Ukraine, and a lot of political movements exist on one of the latest official polls 72.5 % of those polled could not identify a favorite political party. Of those that could 9 % favored the popular movement "Rukh"; 5 % Democratic Party; 4 % the Communist Party; 3.5 % the Green Party; and 2% each for Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine and Ukrainian Republican Party. This poll shows very little change from a previous poll taken in June 1993. [10] In such conditions it is impossible (and would be methodologically wrong) to identify the political platforms of different parties, views of their political leaders on national security problems, issues of multilateralism in security affairs, or role of international security institutions with views of different social groups or society as a whole. That could be done only with great degree of conditionality.

The entire spectrum of political parties of Ukraine may be, of course conditionally, divided into 4 basic blocs: right-wing radical parties, right centrist parties, left centrist parties and left-radical parties. Let's assume as a zero point, the position of the President (executive power as a

whole) who always kept to centrist positions with little deviations depending on political conjuncture.

Right-wing radical parties and movements are Ukrainian National Party, Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party, Ukrainian Agrarian Democratic Party, movements "State Independence of Ukraine", Congress of Ukrainian Nationalist, Ukrainian National Assembly, Union of Ukrainian Youth, etc. Representatives of these parties and movements as a rule keep to the nationalistic positions and appeal to the historical experience of past, to the attempts of building independent Ukrainian state in XVII and XX centuries. They are quite cautious with regard to any international alliances, agreements and obligations in the sphere of national security. In the opinion of leaders of these parties national security must be grounded on the basis of inner resources and national armed forces. [Let me remind here that the main reason of the perish of Ukrainian national state in 1918 was a voluntary dissolution by the Parliament of the national 250 thousand strong army.]

The majority of the parties of this orientation stand for preserving the status of Ukraine as a full-fledged nuclear power. They regard nuclear weapons as an important factor of deterrence and the only reliable guarantor of ensuring the independence of Ukraine vis-a-vis imperialistic policy of Russia. They also regard any international guaranties of the national security of Ukraine (especially in the form that are proposed by the West) as absolutely inadequate and insufficient. Historical experience of providing such guaranties and attitude of the West to their violation does not provide any reasons to take them seriously.

For example, Ukrainian National Assembly, while preparing for the START-1 to be discussed in the Parliament, issued an appeal to all political parties and citizens with a thesis that in a present international situation "nuclear status of Ukraine is the best guarantee of peace, security and stability in Europe ..., an instrument of solving the problems of development of fundamental sciences, defense, national military-industrial complex, of promoting geopolitical priorities and long-term national interests". [11]

Attitude of these parties towards international security structures like NATO, WEU, CSCE as a whole is positive but indifferent as with regard to fully impotent institutions unable to restore order even in the former Yugoslavia, without mentioning more serious conflicts.

These parties support in general the idea of Ukrainian membership in NATO and other military-political organizations as an additional mean ensuring national security provided that certain conditions be observed as it was stressed by the leader of Ukrainian conservative party S. Khmara:

- *Ukraine's becoming a full-fledged nuclear state;*
- *absence of Russia among the NATO members. [12]*

Right-centrist parties like Ukrainian Republican Party, Democratic Party of Ukraine, Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Party, movement "Rukh", Congress of National Democratic Forces keep to more balanced positions concerning the majority of issues of external and internal policy, including the issues of national security.

Stressing the necessity of accelerating the building of national statehood, national security system and Ukrainian armed forces the parties of this cluster deem it necessary to combine internal factors of deterrence with the external ones by way of participation in the international security structures and international military-political organisations.

Their attitude towards nuclear weapons varies from demands to immediatly proclaim Ukraine a nuclear-weapon state to a support of a complete nuclear disarmament on conditions of firm legally binding guaranties of the national security of Ukraine on the part of world community, large-scope economic assistance for carrying out programs for disarmament, adequate compensation by Russia for nuclear materials of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.

Strategic nuclear weapons are considered to be the important factor of deterrence the immediate and unconditional refusal from which, taking into account the entire spectrum of external and internal threats can objectively harm national interests of the state.

Attitude towards the possible conclusion of military and political treaty with Russia is negative. The majority of the parties of this orientation also do not accept close forms of economic cooperation with Russia and other CIS countries except bilateral economic cooperation on a mutually beneficial grounds. Ukraine, contrary to Russia, is a European country and should be oriented, first of all towards Western Europe in order to be integrated as soon as possible into all European economic, political and military structures.

Taking as a whole realistic approach towards the estimates of economic and political place of Ukraine in Europe leaders of this bloc of parties and movements regard possible membership of Ukraine in the EC, NATO or WEU sooner as a long-term goal than as a matter of the nearest future. That is why they pay great attention to elaborating theoretical and practical basis of different regional security structures in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular Black Sea-Baltic security belt. During recent years they initiated a number of conferences and international consultations on these issues with the representatives of political parties and public organizations of Baltic states, Belarus, Moldova, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and others.

In the political life of Ukraine left centrists are represented by the party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine, Social-Democratic Party, "Green" Party, Ukrainian National Democratic Party, Liberal and Liberal-Democratic Parties, political grouping "New Ukraine" and others.

The character feature of the programs of left-centrist parties of Ukraine is their liberal-democratic, cosmopolitic nature. It is not strange as long as majority of parties of this bloc represent interests of the middle class, in particular, of the new class of entrepreneurs. They have the largest support in Eastern regions of Ukraine, among Russian-speaking population.

Strongly supporting the idea of state independence of Ukraine significant number of parties of this bloc at the same time speaks for preserving in one or another form of the CIS as a confederation of truly independent states. They also speak for the establishment of closer economic relations

with Russia and other former republics of the USSR. The representatives of these parties share pacifist anti-nuclear views; their general orientation is aimed at neutral, out-of-blocs and non-nuclear status of Ukraine.

It should be mentioned that recently the position of these parties underwent certain changes, in connection, first of all, with the political developments and instability in Russia, direct territorial claims of Russia to Ukraine. Thus, one of the leading parties of this bloc - Party of the Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine, which is well known for its pacifist mood, while preparing its position for debates in the Parliament on the issue of START-1 ratification, stressed in its statement: "Judging from the analysis of the situation in Russia, the members of the P.D.R.U. suggest to Verkhovna Rada, the leaders of Ukraine:

Firstly, if to agree to elimination of the missile-and-nuclear potential, it should be on conditions that sovereignty, territorial integrity and integrity of non-nuclear status of Ukraine be guaranteed...

Secondly, if Ukraine does not receive such guarantees - the implementation of the provision concerning non-nuclear status of the Declaration on state sovereignty of Ukraine should be postponed". [13]

Left radical parties are represented, first of all, by the Socialist Party of Ukraine, the Communist Party of Ukraine, the bloc "Civic Congress of Ukraine" and by a number of regional separatist organizations like "Republican Movement of Crimea", "Movement for Revival of Donbass" and others. The ideological basis of these parties has been and remain marxism and the socialist alternative for development. These parties are popular in the Eastern regions of Ukraine, in Crimea and among the Russian-speaking population as a whole. The abundant financial support of their activity on the part of a number of Russia's structures and special services determine in a majority of cases their pro-Moscow orientation, opposition of the national-democratic movement and the government of Ukraine.

Irregarding the existing differences in the views, for example, of the Socialist Party that officially supports state independence of Ukraine and the "Republican Movement of Crimea" or the "Movement for Revival of Donbass" that stand for the unification with Russia in the framework of the new Union the activities of this bloc, in general, are aimed at revitalizing the new empire under the domination of Russia. Appeals for a full membership in the CIS, demands of immediate and complete nuclear disarmament or transfer of the strategic nuclear forces under the full control of Russia, orientation towards conclusion of military-political agreements with Russia, formation of a joint military command and single military-strategic space are stemming from this basic position.

The representatives of these parties also were united in insisting on the lifting ban on the activities of the Communist party of Ukraine, which is the third largest party in Ukraine and has, according to its leader P. Simonenko, more than 120.000 members. As Mr. Simonenko stressed in his interview to the Ukrainian television: "Our strength is to grow sufficiently. We are the successors of the party that was before August 30, 1991". [14]

Defeat of the October coup in Moscow and ban on the Communist party of Russia had a great reflection on the tactics of the parties of this bloc. However strategy underwent no changes, especially in the light of the process of revival, under the new names, of the old pro-communist parties and movements in Russia. It is also important that, as was mentioned earlier, there is very little difference in the policy towards Ukraine between communist and democratic parties and movements of Russia. Taking into account deep economic crisis and possibility of social unrest in Ukraine the threat of coming to power of left radical parties is quite real.

Summing up the analysis of positions and approaches of different parties of Ukraine concerning the issues of national security and, especially the possible membership of Ukraine in various military structures it should be stressed once more that in the existing social and political situation it is not the parties orientations but direct polls of public opinion that are much more objective and are indicating the following:

30% of the respondents favor Ukraine joining NATO regardless of whether other (CIS or East Central European) countries join the alliance while another 17% favor Ukraine joining NATO along with other CIS nations. 30% favor Ukraine remaining a neutral state while 9% favor Ukraine joining CIS military alliance, 14% proposed other alternatives. [15]

3. National Security Policy and International Institutions

The policy of Ukraine in the sphere of national security during first two years after the proclamation of independence can hardly be called consistent. The reasons for this phenomenon stem both from objective difficulties of external and internal character, which we already spoke of, and a number of subjective factor or, to put it bluntly, serious political mistakes made in the course of attaining and institutionalizing independence.

Among last one is already mentioned a hasty and not well thought-out proclamation of non-nuclear and neutral status of Ukraine. Analysis of national security doctrines and basic strategic concepts of developed countries proves that in a contemporary world a country with a potential and geo-political situation as those of Ukraine has in principle two possible ways of ensuring national security.

The first one is based on the primacy of building one's own armed forces, equipping them with modern high-precision weaponry and, if economical, technological and political possibilities exist, creating and maintaining nuclear deterrence forces. It should be mentioned that, notwithstanding all humanistic political declarations the member-states of the nuclear club are not in a hurry to refuse from nuclear weapons, which are not only the most effective but the cheapest deterrent factor as well.

It is clearly and unequivocally stressed in the national security doctrines of nuclear weapon states that nuclear deterrent forces continue to remain, even in new conditions, the basis of security of these countries. "The

modernization of our Triad of land-based missiles, strategic bombers and submarine-launched missiles will be vital to the effectiveness of our deterrence in the next century" - one can read in the official national strategy of the USA. [16]

Refusal from nuclear deterrence, -moreover unilateral refusal, especially under the existence of external threats and territorial claims on the part of an aggressive neighbour state-may be regarded as a worthwhile only on conditions of a country's membership in a powerful military system of a collective security. That should be a system capable to provide clear guarantees (including by means of nuclear deterrence) of security and independent development of this peaceful and trusting nation.

Having simultaneously proclaimed neutrality in parallel with a non-nuclear status Ukraine in fact blocked the other way to ensuring its national security by means of joining military blocks and alliances.

The attempts to receive some valid security guarantees from other nuclear weapon states as a prerequisite for destruction of all nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine in fact brought no results. Moreover, as long as Western states failed to prove timely understanding of Ukraine's security concerns, as well as the geo-strategic importance of its existence as an independent state for the entire system of the European security, an ungrounded political and economic pressure started to be exerted in order to make Ukraine disarm immediately and completely.

This pressure lead to quite opposite results: sharp increase in pro-nuclear sentiments and ratification of the START-1 by the parliament of Ukraine with a number of reservations and conditions aimed at limiting its possible hazardous impact on the national security of Ukraine. Above-mentioned factors are of principal importance. In fact, they determined basic directions of building the system of national security as well as the strategy of Ukraine in the sphere of foreign and military policy.

In October 1993 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted in the first reading the general concept of the national security of Ukraine. In accordance with this document the basic threats to the national security of Ukraine are

in the state and political sphere:

- *interference into the internal affairs of Ukraine on the part of other states;*
- *territorial claims to Ukraine and other encroachments on its state sovereignty;*
- *military and political instability and conflicts in neighbouring countries;*
- *encroachments upon the constitutional system of Ukraine;*
- *unresolved issues of strategic nuclear weapons of the former USSR and of the presence of foreign troops on the territory of Ukraine;*
- *separatist trends in some regions of Ukraine;*
- *absence of an effective system of combatting corruption and organized crime;*
- *existence of illegal paramilitary formations.*

in the sphere of economy:

- *inefficiency of the executive power, leading to mismanagement of the economy, decline of material production and hyperinflation;*
- *existence of structural disproportions, monopolism of producers and inconsistency in reforming the economy;*
- *unresolved issues of resources and technology dependence of the national economy on other countries;*
- *growing trends of economical isolation of Ukraine from the world economy system;*
- *absence of national priorities in economical and science and technology development, incomplete defense industry and lack of systematic approach to defense conversion process;*
- *drain of intellectual and material resources.*

in social sphere:

- speedy decline of people's welfare level, broad masses of population being socially unprotected, growth of unemployment rate;
- moral and spiritual degradation in the society;
- growth of uncontrolled migration of the population;
- deterioration of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations.

in the sphere of ecology:

- technogenous overload on the environment and its destruction, large-scale use of ecologically hazardous and imperfect technologies;
- growing impact of the aftermath of the Chornobyl disaster;
- uncontrolled import into Ukraine of ecologically unsafe technologies, substances and materials.

In order to timely identify and to estimate objectively the threats to national security interests, to choose and to employ adequate means of protection of these interests a system of national security is to be created. This system provides for a coordinated internal, external, economical, social, military, environmental, science, technology, demographical, migrational and informational policy. For this purpose the system of national security unites the activities of state organs, public organizations, officials and citizens. It also includes the complex of legislative acts which regulate relations in this sphere. To coordinate the policy in the sphere of national security the National Security Council is established.

The President of Ukraine:

- Heads the National Security Council and appoints its members;
- directs the elaboration of the basis for the national security policy and determination of the priorities of national interests;
- submits for the consideration of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine annual reports on the status of the national security of Ukraine;

- issues relevant decrees and enactments and takes measures in order to ensure national security of Ukraine.

National Security Council of Ukraine:

- works out basic directions of the strategy and drafts programs of the state policy of ensuring national security of Ukraine;
- works out proposals on optimizing the system of national security of Ukraine;
- forecasts the impact of decisions of state organs in the field of internal and external policy on the national security;
- coordinates the activities of the organs of executive power in the process of planning and carrying-out measures to implement the decisions of the Council;
- works out recommendations concerning the prevention of emergency situations;
- prepares proposals concerning introduction, prolongation or lifting the state of emergency in Ukraine or its separate regions;
- functions in the special period and in the war-time as the Council of Defense of Ukraine in accordance with its prerogatives. [17]

Potentially NSC could develop not only as coordinator but as principal creator of the national policy. But for better or for worse such flow of events will be, - taking in to account cadre policy of the President and his partiality to various unconstitutional structures, - remains to be seen.

In the same month the military doctrine of Ukraine was officially adopted. According to this Doctrine, that has strictly defensive character the main strategic tasks of Ukraine in military sphere are the defense of its state sovereignty, maintaining territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders.

Decision of Verkhovna Rada stated that the total amount of national military forces at present stage would be 450.000. This figure includes 200.000 strong Army, 90.000 strong Air Force and 50.000-60.000 strong Navy. That makes-up 0.8% from the total population of Ukraine and corresponds to the average internationally accepted standards. For

comparison for France this index is equal 0.9 and for Greece - 1.9. Further plans based on analysis of economic possibilities and limits and assumption of stable and secure international environment stipulated deeper cuts of the Armed Forces up to 200.000-250.000 men to the fall of 1998.

In more distant future (in the end of millennium) Armed Forces of Ukraine should be stabilized on the level of 180.000 men.

One of the important features of Doctrine is the absence of definite potential enemy. "Ukraine will consider as potential enemy,- is stressed in the document, any country whose long term policy will create a military threat to Ukraine, will lead to intervention in its internal affairs, will endanger its territorial integrity and national interests."

[18]

Unlike the Military Doctrine of Russia that presupposes the possibility of first nuclear strike against not only nuclear but non-nuclear countries as well, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine proclaims its desire to become in future a non-nuclear state. Ukraine as it is stressed in the Doctrine, excludes in principle from its policy the possibility of use or threat of use of the nuclear weapons. But Ukraine links the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons on its territory with adequate steps of other nuclear states and international community in a whole with proper and legally binding guarantees of the national security of Ukraine.

On November 18, 1993 Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) of Ukraine ratified the START-1 on behalf of Ukraine as a successor state to the former USSR.

One should add here that from the very beginning the President and the Government were in favor of the issues of ratification START-1 and the Lisbon Protocol and accession to the NPT being considered in a single package. The parliament and the executive power of Ukraine hoped to persuade the international community, first of all nuclear and other influential powers to make reciprocal moves on their part by providing reliable guarantees of national security of Ukraine and meeting its needs

of adequate financial assistance necessary for destruction of nuclear weapons and legitimate demands for compensation for nuclear components of those weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons.

The decision of Verkhovna Rada is a first step of Ukraine towards the elimination of nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. In accordance with the limitations set by the Treaty for the former USSR and the principle of equality of all successor states of the former Soviet Union Ukraine takes an obligation to reduce with a subsequent destruction 36% of delivery systems and 42% of nuclear warheads of the strategic offensive arms located on its territory. This does not exclude the possibility of elimination of any additional launchers and warheads pursuant to procedures which will be determined by Ukraine.

In the process of START-1 ratification the parliament undertook the comprehensive consideration of the following issues:

- *role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent in situation that pose real threat to the territorial integrity and the very existence of the Ukraine as a sovereign state.*
- *economic capabilities of our state to implement fully the Treaty without endangering the economic and social stability*
- *imperatives for providing ecological and nuclear safety while reducing and destroying nuclear weapons.*

As a result the majority of Verkhovna Rada deputies came to a conclusion that the hopes of Ukraine turned to be in vain: no reliable guarantees of security were provided to Ukraine, the promises of assistance are not sufficient in comparison to our needs, the issue of compensation for tactical nuclear weapons remains unresolved. That is why Verkhovna Rada during START-1 ratification proceeded from the real situation and ratified the Treaty with certain reservations.

It was stated that in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, all components of Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Forces deployed in Ukraine, including

their nuclear warheads, are state property of Ukraine. As an owner of the nuclear weapons inherited from the former USSR, Ukraine exercises administrative control over Strategic Nuclear Forces deployed on its territory.

As the state-owner of nuclear weapons Ukraine also shall move towards non-nuclear status and gradually get rid of the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory if provided guarantees of its national security under which nuclear states shall assume obligations to never use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, never use conventional armed forces against it and refrain from the threat of force, to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Ukraine and to refrain from economic pressure as a mean of resolving any disputes.

Reaffirming its right to the ownership of the nuclear weapons Ukraine does not strive to acquiring operative control over these weapons. It only emphasizes the legal grounds for its demand concerning compensation for components of strategic and tactical warheads dismantled outside its territory.

Conditions and schedule to transfer of nuclear warheads for their dismantlement and elimination shall be determined in relevant agreement or agreements providing for the return to Ukraine of components of nuclear weapons for their peaceful use, or compensation for their value. Conditions for compensation shall also apply to the tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn from Ukrainian territory to Russia in 1992.

The Parliament also recommended to the President and the Government of Ukraine to conduct negotiations with respective states on following issues:

- *international guarantees of national security of Ukraine;*
- *conditions of economical, financial, scientific and technical assistance in the implementation of the commitments under the Treaty;*
- *guarantee and author's supervision of nuclear warheads and missile complexes;*

- revision of conditions of inspection activity financing under the Treaty;
- possibilities of the reliably controlled use of silos for peaceful purposes;
- conditions of the use of weapons-grade fissile materials removed from the nuclear weapons in the course of their elimination;
- guarantees of fair compensation for nuclear weapons components' value.

In the course of discussion in the Parliament it was stressed that the NPT which had been concluded more than 20 years ago did not provide for unique situation that emerged after the disintegration of a nuclear-weapon-state - former USSR and creation of a number of its equal successor states. The parliament proposed to work out a definition that would reflect the reality of Ukraine as a state that possesses nuclear weapons but exercises no operational control over it and has no intention of acquiring such a control in future. The resolution of the Verkhovna Rada stressed also that entry into force of the START-1 and its implementation will open a prospect of resolution by Verkhovna Rada of the issue of accession of Ukraine to the NPT.

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Ukraine is a European state and all its neighbours are European or at least Asia-European countries. All-European political process, in particular, in the framework of the Conference on security and cooperation in Europe, the issues of ensuring all-European security, the problem of disarmament in Europe touch Ukraine's vital interests, influence its internal and foreign policy.

Ukraine takes an active part in the negotiations in the framework of the new CSCE Forum for security cooperation. At the Forum Ukraine confirmed its principal position with regard to such basic principles as territorial integrity and inviolability of European borders, peaceful settlement of possible disputes and ethnic conflicts, unconditionally supported the development of multilateral process of negotiations in the

sphere of strengthening of confidence and security, arms control and disarmament in Europe, stressed the importance, of non-military aspects of security.

The issue of the harmonization of obligations, agreed upon by the CSCE participating states in the framework of various documents in the sphere of arms control, disarmament and strengthening confidence and security in the Europe, Vienna Document of 1992, "Open Skies" Treaty, is also of importance for this country. Ukraine supports elaboration of new measures for stabilization in the military sphere, in particular, providing more transparency, openness and predictability in the military sphere, including the exchange of relevant information concerning the strength, structure, training and equipment of armed forces, defense policy, doctrines and budgets. Ukraine does not object to elaborating a regime of the global annual exchange of the general information on weapons and equipment limited by the CFE Treaty, on the personnel of conventional armed forces and production of the military equipment.

Ukraine fully supports the idea of adoption of the CSCE code of conduct in the sphere of security. Its essence is in the systematization and codification of existing and, may be, new international norms which regulate the actions of states in order to ensure international and internal security. Special attention in the framework of the Forum for security cooperation is to be paid to the issues of conflict prevention, in particular, settlement of conflicts between Georgia and Abkhazia and Georgia and Osetia, activity of the long-term peacemaking mission to the former Yugoslavia and Nagorny Karabakh.

The above-mentioned spheres of activity will play a major role in determining the agenda of the Forum during the period before the CSCE summit to be held in Budapest in summer 1994, at which a lot of important documents and arrangements on the issues currently discussed at the Forum are expected to be signed.

Let's dwell upon the approach of Ukraine toward the EC proposal concerning the conclusion of the European Stability Pact. The EC proposal provides for the Pact consisting of a number of agreements

between participating states to be signed by European countries. It will let start the process of building mutual understanding and cooperation in order to promote stability in Europe. It is proposed that the main content of the Pact be the clarification and implementation of recognized principles of respect for existing borders and the rights of national minorities in countries that have not determined their attitude towards the European political community by means of bilateral agreements on national issues to be concluded by these countries under the aegis of the EC. The institutions to ensure guarantees of these principles to be observed should also be organized and their activities coordinated. It is also envisaged that implementation of this proposal will bring closer the participating states to joining the EC as long as it contribute to establishment of relations between them corresponding to the demands set by Kopenhagen agreement with respect to countries that wish to join the Community.

The proposal, as a whole meets the position of Ukraine on the issues of European security and has much in common with the initiative of the President of Ukraine concerning the establishment of the zone of stability and security in the Central and Eastern Europe.

At the same time, the draft proposed by the EC does not provide for clear guarantees of the inviolability of borders of participating states. The way of solving this issue as proposed in the draft - bilateral agreement to be concluded between the interested states - gives to a stronger state the unlimited possibility to put pressure on a partner in negotiations. The same approach is proposed with regard to the issue of national minorities. The very possibility of conclusion of such agreements between some Eastern European countries is doubtful which bears a threat of the entire proposal to be undermined. The provisions of the draft according to which the Community and its members ensure the dynamic development of the initiative in fact provides a status of arbiter in Eastern European affairs.

There is also a threat that, taking into account the active support of the EC proposal by Russia and pro-Russian position of France (which has already declared that the Russian Federation is to be invited to

participate in the Pact), it may be turned into a new mechanism of restoring the political influence of Russia in the Eastern Europe with a silent consent of the West. Then, instead of bringing closer Eastern Europe as the draft Pact provides for, its conclusion, on the contrary, will again separate them.

Thus, supporting the idea of the Pact as a whole Ukraine has certain reservations concerning possible consequences of its implementation and insists on the necessity of its further development on the basis of equal participation of Eastern and Western Europe.

The process of Ukraine's integration into Western-European military and political organisations, systems and sub-systems of European security stems from the objective needs of the protection of national interests and has a long-term goal - full membership of Ukraine in these organisations. This process should be synchronized with the general dynamics of creation of all-European security structures, with organic coupling of them with CEE regional structures, with the existing Western European organisations and with practical steps of Ukraine towards membership in EC, Council of Europe, numerous European economic structures which is an important prerequisite of Ukraine's full membership in military and political structures.

At the same time the policy of Ukraine towards European military and political organisations in recent years was differentiated and tried to take into account both the specifics of these organisations and their vision of prospects and forms of development of relations with Ukraine.

NATO/NACC. As it has already been mentioned, development of interaction and cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, filling the "security vacuum" that emerged in this region after the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization became not only one of the main directions of the NATO strategy in the present situation but also an important condition of the political survival of this organisation.

Creation of NACC as a main coordinating body of this interaction and cooperation allowed NATO without assuming any formal military and

political obligations to estimate really and to influence to a certain degree the policy of the CEE countries, to regulate and to differentiate the process of their integration into European military and political structures, among them NATO. This process, however, should be regarded in the historic perspective. There is the understanding in Ukraine that the real time of the CEE countries joining NATO will depend first of all on their political stability, general level of economic development, integration into European economic structures and, possibly, will vary for different countries within 5-15 years.

However, it should be taken into account that NATO's analysts started consideration of the alternatives of Spain's entry into NATO 12 years before this event.

According to M. Worner, "Hungary, for example may raise the issue of its membership in NATO in nuclear future. As for Ukraine, it has to solve a lot of problems, in particular the proclaimed intention to become a neutral state. One should think twice what kind of guarantees Ukraine could be given". [19] The indetermined status of Ukraine in certain political and military structures of the CIS, the absence of real market-oriented reforms, the crisis in the political, economical and financial systems should be also added to the list of these problems.

Political and military leadership of NATO understands well the geopolitical role of independent Ukraine in the future system of the European security and tries to render it certain support through the structures of NACC, NAA and others. But, today NATO is not ready to cooperate with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, on a bilateral basis, formally referring to the multilateral nature of the organization. New initiatives of NATO, in particular "Partnership for Peace", open some prospects in the sphere of developing new forms of cooperation, including on the bilateral basis. However, any real changes may be expected only after the NATO summit in January 1994.

Real danger also exists that American initiative would re-establish a new division of Europe and privileged role for Russia over CEE with kind American permission and support.

At the same time there is a certain caution of the approach of NATO nations towards relations with Ukraine which may be explained, on one side, by an undesirability of worsening their relations with Russia. On the other side it is objectively determined by the political and economical situation in Ukraine, uncertainty on the part of the leadership of NATO (and Western states) concerning the direction and prospects of the development of processes in the region as a whole.

From the point of view of the interests of Ukraine the activities of the NACC in general may be evaluated positively. The participation of Ukraine in the NACC enables it to raise and to discuss current issues of foreign and military policy, to explain its position and its view-point, to block proposals aimed against national interests of Ukraine. The most pressing issues, in particular of relations between Ukraine and Russia (issues of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, issues of presence of foreign troops on the territory of other countries, etc.) also have been raised and discussed in the framework of NACC.

An important role, from this point of view, can be played by NACC in building-up the mechanisms of interaction of Western European military and political organizations and the new regional structures like Vishegrad Group, Central-Eastern European Initiative, Black Sea Economic Commonwealth and others, as well as in creating under the aegis of the CSCE the all-European space of stability and security.

The proposals put forward at the NACC ministerial meeting in Athens in June 1993 concerning the broadening NACC mandate (USA), closer coordination between NACC and the UN and CSCE (France, Poland, Italy) and the NACC support for the President Kravchuk's initiative on the creation of zone of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe (Ukraine) could be a basis for practical steps in this direction.

NAA. Formally North Atlantic Assembly is completely independent from NATO. However, today this is the only forum where the

parliamentarians of Europe and North America work together. Taking into account that NAA in fact is a link between NATO and the parliaments of individual countries Ukraine considers that NAA plays an important, though intermediate role in shaping the policy of NATO. What's also positive is that after granting the status of "associate delegations" to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, NAA strives not only to play the role of inter-parliament forum of the NATO countries, but also to become a factor of promoting democratic changes and development of democratic structures of power in "post-communist" countries.

For this purpose the Assembly organized a number of special seminars and programs on the most important issues of developing parliamentary democracy in the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, disarmament, security and prospects for cooperation in Europe in which the parliamentarians and scientist, including Ukrainian, took part.

Ukraine regards strengthening of links with the parliamentary structures of NATO countries as one of the most important directions of its foreign policy.

WEU. Unlike NATO, Western European Union wishes to develop relations with Ukraine, as well as with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, on a bilateral basis. The Secretary General of the WEU stressed the desire to develop special relations with Ukraine based on mutual interests. Attention should be paid to the opinion that the USA and Russia do not belong directly to the sphere of interests of this organization as long as it plays the role of the "European pillar" of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The issue of establishing new forms of cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and creation of the body analogous to the NACC is regarded by the WEU as an important factor of intensifying its activities. Thus, positively estimating, as a whole, the status and prospects of cooperation between Ukraine and Western European military and political structures it should be mentioned that:

- refusal of Western states to quickly grant Ukraine as well as others CEE countries full membership in their military and political structures or formal security guarantees is determined by a number of objective economic and political reasons and should not be regarded as a refusal to cooperate with them or to support their development as of the independent nations;
- main factors of braking speedy development of cooperation on the part of Western European states is the controversy of Ukraine's policy in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, slow processes of democratization, reforms and transition towards market economy. It objectively determines the cautious approach of the Western states to a speedy broadening links with Ukraine, including in the military and political sphere;
- on the other side, there are some fears among the European NATO members to worsen relations with Russia with its economic and military power and to push Russia aside from the cooperation with NATO thus putting under threat the very basis of functioning of this organization under new historic conditions;
- in its turn in Ukraine, in the majority of structures of legislative and executive power there is an absence of understanding that NATO, WEU, NAA, EC, Council of Europe are not homogenous structures, that there is a great differentiation of views and positions of their members which are hardly to have a single coordinated policy with regard to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Irregarding of the above-mentioned difficulties an active work towards comprehensive integration of Ukraine into existing European military and political structures is one of the most important aspects of ensuring national security and sovereignty of Ukraine.

4. Uncertain Future or Do We Need Us ?

We, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe are the integral part of Europe and of the European cultural tradition. From the historic, geostrategic, political and even moral viewpoint we have the full right to be an inseparable part of the new European system of stability and security. This was stressed on a number of occasions by the presidents of Central and Eastern European countries - V. Havel, L. Valensa, L. Kravchuk and others. Moreover, it is absolutely evident that this very system in any of its possible variants is indivisible. Under present conditions there can not be in principle a reliable security system in Western Europe without an adequate security system in Eastern Europe. This is axiomatic.

It is possible to build this comprehensive security system only by way of joint efforts of all European nations, efforts aimed at overcoming the residuals of the "cold war" and uniting Europe, not by a new division of it into spheres of interests and influence. Regretfully, debates and events of last months relating the security of the new Europe and the future of such organizations as NATO and WEU cause not only disenchantment of Central and Eastern European countries but fears concerning the possibility of the new version of Munich and Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact emergence.

It was said that the history repeats itself twice: first time as a tragedy and the second time - as a farse. And the role of producer of this farse can be played by the governments of some NATO countries led by the US administration. As for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe they may be left with a role of a scape-goat and silent spectator trying to no avail to find an answer to the question: Do We Need Us ?

Mentioned above panic fear of some Western countries of Russia which leads to an unconditional surrender to Russia in the issue of a possible NATO enlargement Eastward practically crossed out the hopes of Central and Eastern European countries for a speedy integration into

European security structures. The "Partship for Peace" Plan put forward by the USA cannot be estimated otherwise than a bad surrogate of initially good idea of a full membership of some countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the NATO and of an associated membership for other countries of Eastern Europe.

Diminishing the idea of creation of a comprehensive security system to the possible consultations and technical cooperation with NACC and CSCE countries puts under question the very reason for NACC existence. In the light of the desire of the USA to establish special relations with Russia (supported by some NATO members) and to guarantee a special role for Russia in maintaining security and stability in the entire geopolitical area of the former USSR the advertised "Partnership for Peace" initiative can also be but qualified as the first step toward new division of Europe into the spheres of domination.

This policy is not only mistake but also extremely dangerous both for Eastern and Western Europe. For Eastern Europe it practically opens clear way for Russia towards recreating of a new empire within the old borders (with the possible exclusion of Baltic countries) and renewal of the zone of domination up to the Western Borders of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The consequences of this for the Western Europe would be no less serious, but more prolonged in the time. Concession of the West to the pro-imperial forces of Russia can only slow down or completely stop the process of development of the Russian democracy (as it has already been stressed, the process already is very conditional and ambiguous).

Restoration under the aegis of Moscow in the absence of true democracy of the enormous potential of the former USSR, modernized and equipped with new technology thanks to the assistance and credits of the West combined with the old imperialistic mentality will inevitably lead to a new East-West confrontation and returning to the times before 1985.

From the general analytical point of view one may envisage four alternatives of the NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe:

1. *Expeditious enlargement of the NATO resulting in granting full membership to the majority of Central and Eastern European countries in order to fill the "security vacuum" in the region, and associate membership to other East European countries without special security guarantees.*
2. *Partial enlargement of the NATO membership (mainly associated) and simultaneous broadening of NACC mandate, turning the latter from discussions forum into an organ capable of adopting and implementing decisions in the sphere of its competence.*
3. *Conclusion on the basis of Partnership for Peace initiative of a system of a bilateral agreement between the NATO and countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including formal treaty of alliance with Russia, to define the areas of cooperation, mutual obligations, areas and code of peacekeeping activities, etc.*
4. *Creation of regional security structures analogous to the "zone of stability and security" proposed by Ukraine and other countries and conclusion of bilateral agreements between the NATO and these regional structures.*

Let us dwell upon this last alternative. In the February of 1993 the President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk proposed to create a "zone of stability and security" in the CEE region. This idea in certain aspects coincides with the principles put forth by the President of Poland L.Valesa ["NATO-BIS"] and French Prime-minister E.Balladure [European Pact of Stability]. All these initiatives have some common approach but Ukrainian initiative is one of the most significant as it in our view better meets the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE documents.

This initiative does not imply the setting of any military blocs or replacing the previous ones. By no means it is designed against any other state. In our opinion, any country of the region can join the initiative. Thus idea of regional stability and security zone is aimed at complementing and not substituting the efforts of such institutions as CSCE, NATO, NACC, WEU.

To a great extent the creation of regional structures of stability and security in Europe could contribute to better division of labour between NATO, UN, CSCE, WEU and these new structures in the framework of general concept of interlocking institutions. Regional structures could also really prevent undesirable parallelism and duplication of the functions of military and political organisation of Europe, promote transparency and coordination of activities of these organisations with regard to a number of aspects of regional security.

Supporting the very idea of Euro-Atlantic Alliance and contributing to the strengthening of transatlantic links regional security structures could at the same time play an important role in establishing European defence and security identity, promote the building-up of the new comprehensive system of European security.

Under any circumstances NATO, if it wishes to preserve "raison d'etre" is doomed to occupy the central place in creation of this comprehensive system of European security. However, it should be kept in mind that a bridge is to be built from both sides and if direct idea of the expansion of Alliance Eastward meets difficulties or counteraction on the part of a certain country or a bloc of states the support for creation and development of allied security system of Central and Eastern European Countries from East and Westward is, probably, more worthwhile.

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