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EUROPEAN SECURITY OUTSIDE OF EUROPE

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I. Introduction

The end of the Cold War has not only changed the security settings in Europe significantly, but has far reaching consequences with regard to security problems beyond the traditional boundaries of NATO. With the Soviet menace gone, conflicts and crises on the European periphery and bordering areas turn out to be of tremendous security relevance, in spite of their geographical remoteness. Traditional terms, like "in area" or "out of area" have become less and less suited to mirror the real security challenges, because they tend to delude preferences and hierarchies, which no longer exist.[1] The disintegration of more or less solid political structures and the sharp increase in the number of willful players in the European political orchestra have lead to a significant decline of political stability in large parts of the former "Warsaw Pact" and to a constant flow of weapons and military equipment out of the former Soviet empire. Technical progress tends to sustain some of the adverse repercussions of the end of the Soviet empire, like the dangers arising from weapons proliferation. Since long range missile capabilities are now under development in many so called "Third World"-countries, conflicts in these areas as well as the threat stemming from weapons of mass destruction can no longer be regionalized.

This 'new world (dis)order' puts substantial pressure on the existing European security alliances like NATO or WEU, demanding for modified processes of crisis management and decision making. Contrasting to the Cold War situation, contemporary conditions allow a wider range of behavior by Alliance partners, which might increasingly be driven by 'national interests'. Western nations will be less

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[1] Michael *Ruehle*, David *Law*, Die NATO und das "Out-of-Area" Problem, in: Europa-Archiv, 15-16/1992, pp. 439 - 443.

inclined to subordinate national preferences and national pride to a collective effort, as previously required by strategic imperatives and sustained by U.S. leadership. Hence, policy differences will be more common and will prove more difficult to resolve. That does not necessarily indicate that Western allies will re-nationalize their defences and their strategic thinking or that they will return to the conflictual patterns of the past. But cooperation will be more problematic in the years to come, but possible to implement nonetheless.[2]

This article's aim is to illuminate the problems of risks and dangers affecting European security from outside and to provide some thoughts on how to cope with these challenges. But first of all the term "outside of Europe" requires some clarification since the political definition of "Europe" is still in doubt. For the purpose of this analysis, the regions on the Eastern periphery of Europe, notably Russia and the Ukraine, will be regarded as outside of Europe, at least with regards to threats and risks. Notwithstanding the fact that parts of that region belong geographically to Europe, political instability and unpredictability combined with the sheer unlimited availability of all types of weapons would be likely to turn any major crisis in that area into a threat to European security organizations which they would have to deal with.

A second explanation appears necessary with regard to the main actors in providing European security. Since the major security institutions in Europe, NATO and WEU, are still "Western" organizations, this paper will focus primarily on the problems of Western European security. Such a distinction might be regarded as preliminary and to some sense artificial since some of the Eastern European coun-

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[2] Michael *Brenner*, Multilateralism and European Security, in: Survival, Summer 1993, pp. 138 - 155.

tries get more and more involved into "Western" security structures. This holds specifically true for the Visegrad group,[3] Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia. These countries have a clear perspective for membership in the European Union, and will develop close ties to transatlantic security structures, which may lead to a formal membership in NATO in the end. In addition to these more visionary prospects, concrete and pragmatic security ties to some Eastern European countries have already been fostered.[4]

However, notwithstanding the tendencies to broaden the scope of European Security it seems justified to focus on Western Security, because the number of Eastern European candidates for membership in NATO, EU, or WEU is still limited. What is more, any new member of one of the institutions mentioned above would automatically be "Westernized" since membership would require the fulfillment of the (Western) political, economic or military standards of these organizations. It is worth noting that particularly the Visegrad countries are already actively fostering the process of "self-Westernization".

Based on these definitions, a first section tries to identify some of the crucial threats for European security which may develop outside the continent. A second section analyzes how effectively European security institutions have dealt with security challenges in the recent time, like the Gulf war, the conflict in

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[3] In February 1991, representatives from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland met in Visegrad (Hungary) to agree on close trilateral consultations on political and economic questions. See Joshua *Spero*, The Budapest-Prague-Warsaw Triangle: Central European Security after the Visegrad Summit, in: European Security, No. 1/1992, pp. 58 - 83.

[4] Hungary received some tacit security commitments by WEU and NATO for its support for the WEU patrol mission on the Danube river and for NATO's AWACS flights over Bosnia. See Karl-Heinz *Kamp*, Expanding NATO Eastward: Problems and Options, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, (forthcoming).

Yugoslavia[5] and the UN-Operation in Somalia. Thirdly, some conclusions will be drawn for the European ability to take on external threats, and some suggestions will be made for improving European capabilities for multilateral crisis management and military action.

II. Types of Future Security Challenges

Having painfully realized that the demise of the Soviet Union does not herald the disappearance of major threats to European security, some West European policy makers now tend to advocate a somewhat adverse position: to regard nearly any place on the globe as of 'strategic importance' that deserves European attention and engagement if a crisis should occur. According to this view, any case of conflict or armed aggression not only weakens the stability in the region concerned, but affects European security at least indirectly. Yet, dealing with all these challenges to world order would certainly overburden Western Europe. There are neither sufficient resources available nor adequate public support expectable to pay due attention to every trouble spot in the world. Rather, Western Europe will cope with these issues on a very selective basis, depending on individual security interests, public attitudes, costs of required actions, and the availability of partners for cooperation. It is therefore hard to foresee under which circumstances Western Europe, respectively its security institutions, will be prepared to take action. Hence the description of security challenges from outside of Europe will concentrate on those

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[5] Yugoslavia is without any doubt a European case, and not an "out-of-area" issue. However, it provides important insight for West European inability to find a common and coherent approach to take on a military conflict, which does not inflict vital interests of most of the key players.

threats and risks to which European responses are more urgent and therefore more likely.

One feasible way of analyzing possible security challenges is by considering them under two broad headings: primary security challenges and secondary security challenges.[6]

Secondary security challenges are those which might have an impact on Europe, but would affect European security in a more indirect manner. One example could be the danger of internal instabilities in Northern Africa, particularly in the Maghreb region. Because of the geographic proximity large scale political upheaval in that area and the prospect of widespread migration could have severe repercussions on broader European security interests. Also a region of concern is Turkey, as a member of NATO, occupying a central strategic position on a potential arc of crisis that stretches from southeastern Europe and the Balkans to the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. Another looming crisis, albeit more distant to the European territory, but still of importance for European security interests, is the possibility of an outright war between India and Pakistan. Both countries are concidered nuclear weapon states, having nuclear warheads in an unassembled mode. An military clash between India and Pakistan over Kashmir might escalate in a nuclear exchange. That would not only have cataclysmic consequences for the region concerned, but it would also end the "nuclear taboo" which has existed for nearly five decades, leading to unpredictable consequences for world security. It is also the nuclear dimension that enhances the significance of another flashpoint for

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[6] Mark *Curtis*, Western European Security and the Third World, in: Mark *Curtis* et al. (eds.), Challenges and Responses to Future European Security: British, French and German Perspectives, European Strategy Group, 1993.

European security: the Korean peninsula. What worries is not only the fact that two heavily armed adversaries face each other, but that North Korea is charged to have a reasonably developed nuclear programme, with sufficient nuclear know how and some 20 - 25 kg of weapons grade plutonium. If these suspicions prove to be true this would be another indication for the dilemma that even members of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) - like Korea[7] and the Iraq - are able to pursue clandestine nuclear weapons programs, in spite of intense inspections by the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO). The case of North Korea - if it can not be solved satisfactory within the NPT regime - is likely to further aggravate the subliminal crisis of the concept of nonproliferation. A collapse of the NPT, however, would have long lasting implications for European security.

Notwithstanding the undeniable relevance of challenges outlined above for the security landscape in Europe they are not of Europe's utmost concern in a sense that they are not likely to compel a unilateral European reaction. This is much more probable with regard to primary security challenges which are those dangers that possess a capability of threatening Western European states' security in its narrowest sense - that is by potentially threatening the very survival of Western Europe.

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[7] North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 but refused to come to a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEO. In 1990 an agreement was negotiated but North Korea constructed a linkage between its adherence to the NPT and American tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. Finally, the IAEO Safeguards Agreement was signed by North Korea in January 1992.

In this category attention is focussed on two main issues:

- the spread of former Soviet nuclear arsenals within the CIS and the danger of a proliferation of these weapons in the trouble spots close to Europe, particularly in the Middle East;

- challenges to Europe's vital economic interests, specifically with respect to the European dependence on the oil supply from the Gulf region.

1. Nuclear Risks Arising From the Disintegration of the Former USSR

The nuclear posture of the former Soviet Union still creates a major security concern for the CIS, its neighboring states and for Western Europe. The disintegration of the nuclear superpower "USSR" has lead to the emergence of four nuclear armed states: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.[8] What they all have in common is a high measure of political instability combined with a disastrous economy, and a grim perspective for the management of the transition towards prosperity and democracy. What is more, the relations of two of the successor states, Rus-

[8] The characterization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan a "nuclear weapons state" may be controversial, since it is highly questionable that these republics have full operational control over the missiles they host. On the one hand, the Ukraine, for instance, indicates its ability to overcome the technical and organizational hurdles and barriers formally erected to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, many Western analysts hold the view that the Russian centralized control is still intact, and that none of the Republics is technically able to operate a nuclear posture. See Kurt M. *Campbell*, et al. Soviet Nuclear Fission, CSIA, Harvard University, Cambridge 1991. But besides these largely technical disputes it is nevertheless necessary to bear in mind the political value of these weapons in a major crisis or conflict. One can argue that possessing nuclear weapons might give these republics a political "leading edge" toward their non nuclear adversaries in a crisis, whether they really can operate the weapons or not.

sia and the Ukraine, are characterized by sharp tensions, which might end up in open hostilities. In light of these unfavorable parameters, nuclear weapons in the respective countries could become a serious threat to European security. This relates not so much to the (rather unlikely) danger of a direct nuclear strike of one of the republics against a neighboring state or against Western Europe, but much more to the overall implications of an insufficiently controlled nuclear posture. This holds all the more true since the sheer size and the structure of the Soviet military nuclear legacy is still not exactly known.

One example for such an immediate repercussion is the present problem of "nuclear smuggle" into European countries. Following the perceived international demand for nuclear weapons technologies, criminals in the CIS and in Eastern Europe might seek to fill the supply side of the international market by illicitly exporting nuclear material to European countries. Although recent reports of some 100 arrests linked to attempts to smuggle nuclear technology out of the Soviet successor states in Germany alone are highly exaggerated, the illicit flow of nuclear materials into Western Europe must be taken very seriously.[9] Uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear material and critical technology-components, as well as "loose nukes" within the CIS are challenges which do not only increase the danger of an unauthorized nuclear detonations but also spur the threat of political black-mail and nuclear terrorism by extremist groupings all around Europe.

Even more bothering are the dangers deriving from an uncontrolled proliferation of CIS nuclear weapons and nuclear know how into highly fragile regions like the

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[9] Many of the smuggling cases in Germany turned out to be "false alarms". A close examination of this issue reveals that there were nine attempts of nuclear smuggling detected in 1992. None of the discovered material in these cases was of military relevance. In most cases, the substances were stolen from medical facilities or from nuclear power plants.

Middle East. Vast nuclear arsenals require a 100 percent security, which is quite difficult to achieve even under solid and stable political conditions. If in the wake of further economic and social decline of the CIS republics only a fraction of one percent of the more than 30 000 nuclear weapons of the CIS would find its way to some of the rogue nations in Middle East, the dangerous impacts on European security were hard to foresee. Given the radicalism of countries like Iraq, Iran or Libya it is imaginable that their leaders use nuclear weapons to foster their claim for regional supremacy. Moreover, the example of the Libyan missile attack against the American radar station on the Italian island of Lampedusa in 1986[10] painfully indicated the new vulnerability of European territory to threats from abroad - in perspective even with weapons of mass destruction.

2. Western Economic Survival and the Security of the Gulf Oil

The Middle East region contains 66 percent of world oil reserves, almost all concentrated in the Persian Gulf.[11] Presently, oil accounts for some 45 per cent of the EC states' total energy requirement, only one fourth of this comes from indigenous oil production, mostly from the platforms in the North Sea. Hence, for the Western

[10] In reaction on the American air attack on Tripoli and Bengasi, Libya had shot two missiles on the US "Logan" radar station on Lampedusa on the 16. of April, 1986. Both missiles missed their targets without doing any harm to American or Italian installations.

[11] Saudi Arabia contents roughly one fourth of the Gulf oil, Iraq contains 10 per cent, Kuwait 9.5 percent, and the Iran 9.3 per cent.

industrialized countries there is no more vital resource than oil.[12] This crucial dependence of Western economies on the continuous flow of Gulf oil is unlikely to abate. On the contrary, despite improvements in overall energy efficiency and the use of other energy forms, worldwide oil consumption is expected to raise constantly in the years to come.[13]

At present, there is not so much the danger of a complete cut-off of the Western oil supply, because the strategic oil reserves of the West will last for a few months.[14] Therefore, short term disruption of oil supplies might be endured without serious consequences. What really matters is the necessity to ensure reasonable and consistant oil prices. As long as supply and prices are chiefly regulated by market forces and by a largely ineffective cartel of oligopolists (OPEC), Western countries can live with their dependence. If, however, oil prices should spiral upwards, be it as a result of a major change in the political or military constellations in the Gulf, the consequences for the Western economies would be disastrous - probably leading to a collapse of the European economic, political, and social system followed by grave political and social uproar.

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[12] Until the late 1980s another critical Western dependence was seen in the field of "strategic minerals". The concentration of key minerals (platinum group metals, chrome derivates, manganese etc.) in South Africa and the Soviet Union has lead to a West European import dependence of nearly 100 per cent. See Uri *Ra'anan*, Charles M. *Perry* (Eds.), Strategic Minerals and International Security, New York 1985. The demise of the USSR and the recent political changes in South Africa, however, have reduced the political impact of these dependences significantly.

[13] Reinhard *Wolff*, Western European Policy Responses to Future Security Challenges, in: Mark *Curtis* et al. (Eds.), Challenges and Responses to Future European Security: British, French and German Perspectives, European Strategy Group, 1993, pp. 139.

[14] Existing EC law requires each country to maintain oil reserves for 90 days, but there is a tendency in Europe and in the United States to keep up larger stockpiles.

III. Lessons From Recent Crises

It is obvious that none of the major security challenges, whether they belong to the "primary" or the "secondary" category, can be mastered unilaterally. This would necessarily overburden the resources and the capabilities for political and military action of a single European country; in some cases even the capacities of a single security institution. The creation of a European "security architecture" composed of different institutions - some of them already existing, some which needed to be established - deemed to be necessary. This plain logic has led in late 1990 to multilateral consultations between the NATO General Secretariat, the EC Commission and the WEU General Secretariat as a first step towards a "framework of interlocking institutions".[15] NATO, WEU, CSCE, and UN should be orchestrated in a way which makes use of the specific abilities and qualifications of each institution. Moreover, national preferences of Europe's major players should be properly coordinated to avoid duplications of capabilities and missions.

However, such an organic development of a security structure in Europe could not be achieved yet, mostly because none of the respective organizations evolved sufficiently enough to meet the new requirements of a completely changed security environment, and because hardly any of the European states has yet adequately redesigned its national security priorities and structures. These failures became obvious in some of the recent crises on the European periphery and abroad: the Gulf war, the case of Somalia, and the Yugoslav conflict.

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[15] Uwe *Nerlich*, NATO Between the Gulf War and Strategic Disentanglement in Europe, Conference Paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen 1991.

1. Lessons From the Gulf War

The war of coalition forces against the Iraqi aggression in the Gulf was not only the first test case for the "New World Order" - a term created by the former US President George Bush - but it also proved to be illuminating with respect to the European ability to take on a conflict outside of Europe.

First of all, the Gulf war clearly revealed how a geographically remote crisis can quickly become a major menace for Western security interests. With regard to its security implications the Iraqi aggression turned out to be a "primary" challenge in the two respects outlined above. It threatened Europe's vital economic interests by implying the probability of a military predominant Iraq with a strong anti-Western attitude, controlling significant parts of the Western oil supply. In addition, Iraq's apparent struggle for nuclear weapons encompassed vital threats not only for the region concerned but for the West in general. Nuclear capabilities in the hands of a "rogue nation" like Iraq has been one of the worst case scenarios, the long established regime of nuclear nonproliferations tried to prevent.

In spite of these severe implications of the Gulf crisis for European security, the institutional performance of Western Europe has been poor. In the weeks prior to the attack of the Gulf coalition against Iraqi forces, the EC did not come to the fore. Members of the Community took unilateral initiatives to free their citizens captured as hostages by the Iraq, or, like France, came up with uncoordinated peace proposals at a time when military action against the Iraq was seen as inevitable. Even the WEU, which synchronized some operations of European naval forces in the Gulf, played no significant role in military or political terms.

On the individual level, however, some European countries, notably France and Great Britain, contributed considerably to the military success of the "Anti-Iraq-Coalition". France provided 20 000 troops, 350 tanks and 40 aircraft to the ground war operations. Great Britain even sent 42 000 troops, more than 350 tanks, and 80 aircraft in the campaign against the Iraq.[16] Germany however was still paralyzed by its domestic debate on the deployment of the German armed forces in "out-of-area" operations and was not only unable to send armed forces to the Gulf but had also a bitter public debate on even deploying Bundeswehr soldiers within the NATO territory.[17]

But the operation "Desert Storm" demonstrated three other realities.

- It has been a successful demonstration of forming and sustaining an ad hoc coalition composed of participants out of the region affected and of countries from distant areas.[18]

- It proved the ability of NATO to furnish deterrence, crisis management, and military action far beyond the traditional East-West pattern. Albeit NATO was not involved in combat operations as an organization, it provided the necessary framework for political and military coordination and for essential logistical support.

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[16] William F. *Taylor*, James *Blackwell*, The Ground War in the Gulf, in: Survival, No. 3/1991, p. 237.

[17] When the German government announced the transfer of 18 "Alpha Jet" aircraft as part of the Allied Mobile Force (AMF) to Turkey in early January 1991 as a visible sign of alliance solidarity, this lead to significant criticism from the political left and among the public.

[18] Even Morocco contributed 2000 troops; Czechoslovakia provided 350 chemical warfare and medical troops.

- It showed clearly that both the success of the ad hoc coalition and the effectiveness of NATO was only possible because the United States as a superpower took the lead by keeping the alliance together and by preparing the political setting for a rapid agreement within the UN Security Council on legitimizing military action against the aggressor.

2. The Case of Somalia

If the crisis in the Persian Gulf can be regarded as exemplary for primary European security challenges from outside of Europe, then the case of Somalia is just the opposite. Western initial engagement in this country, fostered and legitimized by the United Nations, was not driven by Western perceptions of an existing or emerging threat, but primarily by humanitarian considerations. The complete breakdown of political, economic, and social structures had led to destitution and misery all over the country. Reestablishing governmental structures and ending the anarchy was seen as the only chance to prevent thousands of people from starving to death. A Western military engagement promised the option of a quick emergency aid at a low risk of failure or of Western casualties. In addition, some of the Western participants in the UNOSOM mission combined a self-serving purpose with their readiness to provide humanitarian assistance for the troubled region. For Germany for instance, a military engagement in Somalia offered an opportunity to further erode the political gridlock of the "out-of-area" debate, which has been dragging on for years. To break that deadlock the German government has pursued a step by step approach of taking minor but decisive steps to broaden the role of the Bundeswehr, notwithstanding the constitutional limits

cited by the opposition. The transfer of 1700 Bundeswehr soldiers to Somalia to provide logistical support for the United Nations "blue berets" was one of these decisive steps.[19]

The widespread optimism concerning the success of the Somalia operation, combined with expected political payoffs in some countries, and the sincere intention to provide humanitarian relief prevented a sober analysis of the strategic rationale of the mission particularly in political circles of the West. Notably the political and military objectives and the anticipated timeframe for achieving these objectives remained somewhat ambiguous.[20] This lack of clarity became obvious right from the beginning of the mission when the first disagreement came up among the UNOSOM partners and the UN headquarter in New York on how rigid the occupation of parts of the country and the disarmament of marauding gangs should be exercised. Later, when the first casualties occurred the domestic support in those countries engaged in Somalia declined significantly. Finally, the obvious success of the Somali General Aidid and his supporters against the US forces and the hasty announcements of a quick withdrawal of Western forces from the African country indicated at least partly a failure of the mission. Humanitarian intervention proved neither to be a riskless issue, nor to be a self-explaining value to all players in the region. Somalia also highlighted another crucial condition of any military action - apart from individual and collective self defence: to bring the specific national interests in line with the particular requirements of the operation.

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[19] Karl-Heinz *Kamp*, The German Bundeswehr in Out-of-Area Operations - to Engage or Not to Engage, in: The World Today No. 8-9/1993, p. 166.

[20] This has lead to critical voices from the military side, most prominently by General Colin Powell.

3. The War in the Balkans

The third case quoted with regards to Europe's ability for an engagement in distant crises and conflicts - the war in the former Yugoslavia - is also not a appropriate example for an external security challenge, first and foremost because it happens within Europe (even if some European countries currently handle the issue as if it were not a European case). It is also true that up to now the European reaction to the Yugoslav crisis took place primarily on the declaratory level. The reason why the war on the Balkans is mentioned at all in this analysis is because Western Europe, in particular the EC, saw the Yugoslav conflict as a possible catalyst for a common foreign and security policy

When the Community took the first steps to intercede in the conflict on the Balkans in early summer 1991, the foreign minister of Luxembourg, Jaques Poos, crowed that 'the hour of Europe had struck`.[21] But compared to the euphoria towards the possibility of an European Community's diplomatic self-reliance the real capabilities of the EC for conflict management and war termination on the Balkans kept far behind the high expectations. Certainly, as early as late June 1991 a troika of EC intermediaries was made up of the foreign ministers of Italy (Gianni de Michelis), Luxembourg (Jaques Poos), and the Netherlands (Hans van den Broek). But all the cease fires negotiated by the troika in the following months were broken only after a couple of hours - a fact that progressively diluted the credibility of the EC as an "honest broker" in the eyes of the conflicting partners. In consequence the EC activities on the Balkans came down to a minimalist approach as the "lowest com-

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[21] Michael *Brenner*, The EC in Yugoslavia: A Debut Performance, in: Security Studies, No. 4/1992, p. 568.

mon denominator", which was limited by and large to humanitarian aspects. It is worth noting, however that this does not so much indicate any institutional shortcomings but was more the logical consequence of a significant lack of strategic interests in the Balkan region among all EC partners and among the West in general, plus a missing agreement on which party should be defined as aggressor or as victim.[22]

On the other hand, Yugoslavia turned out in some respect to be a catalyst for the cooperation between NATO and UN. The fact that NATO provided the UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia with material support and intelligence data corresponded with a new UN policy to make increasingly use of regional organizations. In turn, NATO expected a new legitimacy for its own existence from the mandates of the United Nations. Notwithstanding these positive tendencies it cannot be overlooked that the West in general mostly practiced sheer activism instead of effective crisis management. Concrete operations like naval patrols in the Mediterranean or on the Danube river, or the establishment of no-flight zones still belong to the category of "symbolic security policy" (Lawrence Freedman).

IV. Prospects for European Action Outside of Europe

In light of the examples outlined above, the prospects of an effective and coordinated European response to a security challenge outside of Europe look rather grim. Notwithstanding the difficulties of drawing valid deductions from individual crises, because each of them is characterized by specific and somewhat unique cir-

[22] In that sense it is incorrect to blame the EC or any other security institution for their passivity, since this only mirrors the indifference of the respective member countries.

cumstances, some serious deficiencies might be extracted from the recent European performances in "out-of-area" conflicts.

A more pessimistic judgment holds particularly true for Europe's capability to act in a unilateral manner.[23] The WEU as the military pillar of a true European union, which is still to be created, could not yet fulfil the high expectations of its proponents. Even the newly formed WEU capacities for military planning, by some proponents hailed as a significant step towards a military posture, as barely linked to the political realities - at least with regard to the Yugoslav issue. Until now, the West has never seriously intended to conduct significant military operations in the Balkans. Hence, it was all the more easy for the WEU planning cell to discreetly develop ambitious contingency plans.

Lacking an external federator in the shape of a vital threat to all Western European nations, and an internal federator in the form of an allied superpower able to provide clear leadership, the WEU still remains ill suited to provide sufficient security for its members. This holds particularly true for the material side of this organization, even if it should be provided with true military capabilities by its members. A military campaign in a major crisis outside of Europe might require huge numbers of troops and military equipment. More than 860 000 troops stemming from 17 countries have been involved in the operations in the Gulf with some 530 000 US troops providing the bulk of the forces. Compared to this, the European capabilities for power projection over long distances are more than limited. Even the more than 60 000 British and French forces involved in "Desert Storm" were crucially reliant to US support. Nearly all armed forces of the EC-

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[23] The author is indebted to Michael Ruehle for many points made on this issue.

countries, in the past perfectly designed for "central front" contingencies, do neither have sufficient transport capacities, nor a satisfying capability in strategic intelligence, not mentioning tactical ballistic missile defence assets - something that might be of critical importance in any future conflict outside of Europe. In light of a significant decline in the defence budgets of all major EC-partners, most of the eloquently advocated political declarations for quickly restructuring European armed forces towards increased mobility and a greater "out-of-area" capability will remain sheer theory - at least for the near future. Consequently, the WEU will continue to be heavily dependent to the NATO infrastructure dominated by the United States. This implies an American de facto veto position in all major WEU operations. Therefore, in the short and medium term the role of the WEU will be limited to a means of coordination in those cases in which the United States do not intend to fulfil a leadership role.

1. Political Requirements

If a unilateral action of Western Europe is hard to foresee, the fruitful cooperation between NATO and WEU remains essential. But a harmonious concert of both organizations is complicated by the fact that the WEU's dual identity as the European pillar of NATO and the defence organization of the European Union has lead to different views on both sides of the Atlantic as to the priorities and tasks of these organizations.[24] Both institutions, NATO and WEU are in a process of

[24] One striking example for the transatlantic dissonances on the future role of the WEU was the famous "WEU Demarche" of March 1991, signed by the US Undersecretary for International Security, Reginald Bartholomew, and directed to the governments of the EC-countries and to WEU's General Secretary Willem van Eekelen.

adjustment to the new realities, but follow a different timetable.[25] NATO has committed itself to a course of continuous reform towards an unstated termination point while the EC is heading for reaching a political union. Building a European defence identity is regarded as essential to Community construction. In that sense, a common security organization becomes a means to a compelling political end. In light of such a precondition practical issues such as military needs and effectiveness are in danger of being subordinated. A prominent case for such a subordination of military needs under political purposes is the Franco-German "Euro-Corps". The creation of this cooperative military unit on the basis of the already existing Franco-German Brigade was unquestionably an important symbol for a successful Franco-German defence cooperation. In addition, it was seen as the nucleus of a European defence identity but for a long time its military purpose and its relation to NATO remained unclear.[26] Even when some clarification could be reached in the so called "SACEUR Agreement" in June 1993 important problems still remain to be solved: for instance the dichotomy between the intended ability to act outside of Europe on the one hand, and the simple fact that Germany as one of the important cooperation partner has not yet clarified the constitutional conditions for deploying Bundeswehr forces in combat operations outside of Europe.

The Franco-German "Euro-Corps" is not only an example for a preference for political symbolism instead of military effectiveness but to the same extent an illustration for the tendency of embracing a "function follows form" approach in the process of shaping a European defence identity, instead of the reverse logic that

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[25] Michael *Brenner*, Multilateralism and European Security, in: Survival, Summer 1993, pp. 138 - 155.

[26] This had lead to some bitter complaints from the American side. See Jeanne *Kirkpatrick*, A Second European Defense Force - To Exclude America?, in: Washington Post, May 30, 1992.

"form follows function". But the idea that the process of constructing new organizational structures has to take precedence to the definition of tasks and purposes of these structures is a risky one. Shaping a security landscape in such an order implies the danger of seriously damaging successfully existing organizations, like NATO, without putting something similar effective in its place.

These major deficiencies in developing a European and Transatlantic security architecture need to be overcome for enabling Western Europe to act efficiently in conflicts outside of Europe. This requires a change in the perception of NATO and WEU as competing organizations - a view which finds still a great deal of support in some Western capitals. Any development of an European pillar without harmonizing European and American political interests implies the danger of widening the gap between Europe and the United States. The argument that the Europeans have to make provisions for the time when the US will terminate their presence in Europe and thereby sharply reduce their political commitments to their transatlantic allies is a valuable one on the one hand. But on a second look it reveals the danger of a self fulfilling prophecy in a sense that it might accelerate the process of European-American estrangement.

This is by far not an argument against a closer European integration in the field of security policy and a greater self reliance of the European Union. In light of the changed political realities in Europe more independence and greater flexibility is indeed highly necessary, since there are many crises outside of Europe imaginable, which are of much more concern to the Europeans than to the United States. Here a purely European reaction might be inevitable. It is even imaginable that in some cases the barrier between military engagement and non-engagement is not the Atlantic but goes right across the European continent, by requiring only the

engagement of those allies which are mostly concerned. With regard to the primary challenges, however, an American engagement remains necessary to enforce European capabilities for crises management and military action. In light of the severity and the universal character of primary challenges, as outlined, a US engagement is not only indispensable but also very probable, since American vital interests are most likely to be concerned as well. Such an option for a rapid and coordinated reaction of Europe and the United States must not be hampered by a creeping process of transatlantic alienation

As to the WEU, steps to enhance its capabilities should be measured mainly in terms of net improvements to the Alliance effectiveness in meeting important security needs of the member states. The contribution of the institutional development of the WEU to achieving European political union should no be the primary measuring rod. As far as NATO is concerned, the step to further widening its geographical writ inevitable. If NATO has been and still is an organization to safeguard the security and territorial integrity of is member states, it has to be able to deal with all vital security challenges, regardless of their geographical origin. This has to include peacekeeping missions as well as combat operations for peace enforcement. A legitimization of NATO's and WEU's military operations by the UN Security Council or by the CSCE is important, but the ability to take on a vital threat must be guaranteed in those cases as well, in which these organizations are blocked. With regard to the CSCE its sheer size of more than 50 members with completely different political structures and cultures makes it very unlikely that this institution should come to a consensus in a real crisis. But in the United Nations as well, much of the post-Gulf-war-euphoria concerning the prospects of the concept of collective security is irretrievably gone. Disagreement among the members of the UN Security Council is still likely to paralyze truly UN operations in

significant political or military crises. Here, it is worth noting that article 51 of the UN Charter might prove a sufficient basis for legitimizing collective military in cases like the war against the Iraq.[27]

But the possibility of a further evolution of Western security institution towards a greater effectiveness outside of Europe requires a readiness among the allies to adapt their national policies to the new requirements. This holds true, for instance, for the willingness of the united Germany to accept a greater responsibility outside of Europe. But it also relates to French reluctance to allow a wider role for NATO, and for the US to react less sensibly to all tendencies of autonomy in Europe's further development.

Only after the prudent political decisions have been taken by all allies concerned, the necessary means of strengthening Europe's military capacities to act outside of Europe need to be procured. Force multipliers, like airlift capacities, tanker aircraft, long range surveillance capabilities remain worthless, if the political decisions to act coherently and effectively cannot be taken.

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[27] Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations states that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."