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## **INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: THE RUSSIAN DEBATE**

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THE RUSSIAN DEBATE

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The events of October 1993 in Moscow led to the new deep changes of a political landscape in Russia and brought new uncertainties in future Russian foreign and security policy. Liquidation of the Russian Supreme Soviet, perspectives of new elections in the Federal Assembly and a Referendum on new Constitution made to some extent irrelevant all previous debates on foreign and security issues which were going on in Russia during last years. At the same time the very fact that among first important documents issued in a new political situation there were "The Main Foundations of the Russian Federation Military Doctrine" adopted by the presidential decree on November 2, 1993 and the report prepared by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service on "The Perspectives of NATO Enlargement and the Interests of Russia", introduced to the journalists on November 25, 1993, demonstrates the top priority of these problems in the Russian political agenda.

It is clear that the process of searching of national identity for the new Russia in the foreign policy and security areas is far from completion and debates on the vital national interests of Russia and her attitudes towards international institutions as well as the role in multipolar world are not comprehended and defined by the Russian political leadership.

1. The debates on the Russian vital national interests:

"Eurasians" versus "Atlantists".

The changes in a military-political environment in the world and in Europe in particular made it evident the necessity to reconsider the attitudes towards the European international organizations already for the Soviet Union in the last period of its existence. The discussion was focused upon the relations with NATO and the future of this organization and to the much less extent upon the future transformation of the CSCE. The other European Institution - WEU - draw much less attention of the Soviet political elite due to lack of understanding of its mission and insignificance of the military political role at that moment.

The August 1991 events appeared to be the watershed after which the perspectives of principally new relations with NATO started to be the subject of broad public discussions. Already several days of the coup-de-taunt failed in Moscow the prominent Soviet analyst Sergey Blagovolin published the article titled "Does the USSR Need to Join NATO?". One of the first conclusion the author publicly made in this article stated that "for the foreseen historical period just the cooperation of our country with the West will form the character of an international climate."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>. Rossijskie Vesty (The Russian Herald), August 1991 #16, p.11.

In the same article the author said about "the necessity of the closest relations with NATO," but stressed out that it is not the time yet to "raise the question about immediate joining NATO by the USSR because such a decision presupposes long and complicated process, which includes high compatibility of the political structures, armed forces and developed system of a civilian control over the military sphere." Resuming his analysis Mr. Blagovolin concluded that "our military posture, our military strategy should be oriented on the participation together with the West in the "security belt from Vancouver to Vladivostok"<sup>2</sup> (the idea introduced by the US Secretary of State J.Baker).

After August 1991 and the break up of the Soviet Union first official formulation of the vital national interests of the newly emerged Russian state and guide line for its foreign and security policy were oriented on closest partnership and allied relations with the West. A month after the coup failure in Moscow the Russia Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote that the interests of the Russian foreign policy must be aimed on historical goal - to transform Russia "from dangerous and seek giant of Euroasia into the participant of the Western zone of common prosperity." He stressed as well that "the Western experts should directly participate in realization of joint programs either in economy or in security and conversion issues."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>. Ibidem.

<sup>3</sup>. Nezavisimaia Gazeta (The Independent Paper), August 16, 1993, p.5.

In January 1992 the Russian Foreign Minister A.Kozyrev published the article where he formulated priorities of the Russian foreign and security policy and characterized the USA and developed countries of the West as "natural allies to Russia." Later on the idea that "the Western democracies are as natural allies to democracy in Russia as they are enemies of totalitarian regime" was repeated by him many times.<sup>4</sup> This view defined the Russian Foreign Ministry official attitudes towards the development of closest collaboration with the West and the international institutions in security area in the initial period after Russia was recognized as an independent state.

But along side with the deepening of economic and political crises in Russia and growth of opposition to the 'Atlantists' foreign policy, associated with the Mr. Kozyrev's name, in the Supreme Soviet the severe debates and political clashes started to erode "pro-western position of democrats". The right wing nationalists accused democrats and their representative in the Foreign Office as the traitors who are trying to conduct the foreign and security policy where real national interests of Russia are replaced with abstractly understood "human rights" and "human values".

Political opposition in the Supreme Soviet insisted for instance that Russia should conduct the own foreign policy because following the Western demands Russia already lost at least 17 billion dollars due to joining the economic sanctions

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<sup>4</sup>. Ibidem.

imposed on Yugoslavia, Libya and Iraq by the United Nations. Such assessments were based on extremely primitive and non-professional analyses of potential income, in case if Russia would have continued to provide the terrorist regimes with all sorts of military and economic assistance, and did not take into consideration neither military consequences for Russia's own security, nor a growth of tensions in relations with the rest of the world democratic community which would have been an unavoidable result of such provocative policy. Cumulative effect of the changes in the Russian foreign policy which nationalists insisted on would mean the real catastrophe for the new Russia.

Nevertheless the leader of opposition block "The Russian Unity" N.Pavlov, who actively acted in the Russian Supreme Soviet before October 1993 events, stated in his interview to "Narodnaia Pravda" ("The People Truth) paper. "Till the moment I have an opportunity to struggle against this pro-American, puppet regime in the frame of law , - said Mr. Pavlov, - I'll do it just in this way. But I'll take arms in hands immediately hardly the threat of aggression appears."<sup>5</sup>

In the Supreme Soviet the same radical nationalists stated that in accordance with here traditional policy towards Southern Slavs Russia should unconditionally support Serbs in conflicts on Balkan peninsular. But among such a political demagogy there were expressed serious concerns and launched attempts to really describe the political identity and vital national interests of

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<sup>5</sup>. Moskovskie Novosty, (The Moscow News), #41, October 10, 1993, p.6B.

the new Russia. That related primarily to the criticism against overwhelming orientation on the "Atlantic" or Western direction and international institutions existing their in expense of "Eurasian" dimension in the Russian foreign and security policy.

Many analysts stressed out that the Russian foreign policy should concentrate beside the western direction on at least two others; Muslim (South) and Chinese (Far East). The Russian expert in Far Eastern affairs Sergei Goncharov in his article titled "The Specific Russian Interests: What They Are" wrote: "Even in the case of the most favorable development on Western direction of the Russian foreign policy any confrontation whether it occurs with Muslim states or with China can bring enormous damage to the Russian vital interests."<sup>6</sup> It sounds reasonable to think that such conflicts whether they take place in the nearest three-five years when Russia is passing the most painful and the most vulnerable stage of the internal democratic reform and when she is extremely weak can undermine the very idea of democratic changes and support the restoration of a totalitarian regime in the country.

In his article Mr.Goncharov draws several hypothetical actions of Russia in the foreign policy area which to his analyses can bring to the very destabilizing consequences. For instance he considers that joining NATO or creating other formal military political alliance with the West would mean for Russia a necessity to join any actions of the Western partners aimed at

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<sup>6</sup>. Izvestia, February 25, 1992, p.3.

the protest against the human rights violations in China. But if for the Western country a predictable Chinese reaction would be a diplomatic protest, for Russia it can bring growing tensions on the Russian-Chinese border. Besides that the other analysts consider that any formal military political alliance of Russia with the West would unavoidably lead to the reciprocal counteralliance of leading Muslim countries with possible inclusion of China and formation of the new sort of global confrontation with Russia in the epicenter of a conflict.

Of course such an assessment is at least debatable firstly because the numerous and deep confrontation inside the Muslim world but it would be wrong to reject some reasonable elements in this analyses. As it was concluded by S.Goncharov Russia should strengthen its partnership with the West what proves her position in the South and Far East and the growing partnership with South and East in turn gives her much more independence in dealing with Western counterparts. But at the same time Russia should never join formal military political alliances which could be perceived as oriented against any side. He proposed to characterize the desirable Russian foreign policy as "a constructive non-alignment with definite preferences to the West."<sup>7</sup>

It was stated as well that the previous Soviet Foreign Ministry was justfully criticized for the "Euro-Americo-centrism" of its policy. But the current Russian foreign policy not only failed to overcome but even deepened this evident weakness and

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<sup>7</sup>. Ibidem.



"tends to exclude South and East from its top priorities list." Such "Euroasian" approach towards formulation of Russia's vital national interests and optimal model of the foreign policy should not be understood as an attempt to revitalize either communist or imperial stereotypes. The observer of Radio Liberty Alexander Rahr wrote in his article "Atlantists versus Eurasians" that "Euroasian criticism has nothing in common with reactionary and obsolete communist or imperial thinking. "Euroasians" wish to keep good relations with the West too."<sup>8</sup>

Speaking about possible consequences which could follow for the West from possible strengthening of Euroasian elements in the Russian foreign policy he concluded that "Eurasians reorientation of the Russian foreign policy not necessarily contradicts the Westers interests. For the USA, France and Great Britain democratic Russia would play a decisive role as a counterbalance to the new world giants - Germany in Western Europe and Japan in the Pacific region. Russia whether it accepts the democracy would be much better partner for the West in stabilization of situation in the Middle Asia than Turkey which is supposed to play this role now."

During 1992 several other analytical documents which were prepared by independent experts and contained recommendations on more balanced approach to the Russian foreign policy appeared in the Russian media. For instance there could be mentioned the report "Strategy for Russia", prepared by the experts of the

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<sup>8</sup>. Nezavisimaia Gazeta, August 8, 1993, p.4.

Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, public nongovernmental organization. This document says about the Russian long term interest in "preservation of NATO and development of the partner relations with this organization." But at the same time the report stresses out that "the Western direction is of high priority but one-sided orientation to the West would be counterproductive. Russia should consistently develop political and economic relations with the important partners in Asia. These are India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Arab Emirates, Israel, Iran."<sup>9</sup>

The multidimensional nature of the Russian vital national interests, being comprehended by the policymakers, sufficiently influenced the position of the Foreign Office and even led to some contradictions in the positions of its key figures. The mostly visible was a long indirect dispute between Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who represented in the election in the Federal Assembly on December 1993 the "Choice of Russia" group, headed by the acting Vice-Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, and the Russian Ambassador to Washington Vladimir Lukin, who was one of the other "constructive democratic opposition" group "Yabloko" (An Apple) leader.

In his article published in September 1993 Mr. Lukin spoke already about the negative consequences of too dependent pro-Western Russian foreign policy where to his mind radical romantic stereotypes prevailed. It seemed that rejection of communist ideology and declaration of commitments to democracy

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<sup>9</sup>. Nezavisimaia Gazeta, September 19, 1993, p.5.

ideals as well as acceptance of subordinated American partner role in international arena will be enough for the West to invite Russian in the family of civilized nations and to bring prosperity to her. The realistic views and respective corrections in the foreign policy were brought too late.

"The West has already acquired the poor experience of too easy life with the New Russia (and before that with M.Gorbachev and E.Shevardnadze). Our Western partners appeared to be unprepared to more independent Russian policy and part of our public confused with the lack of promised Western assistance turn back from the West even started to see there the main source of the Russian problems. Anti Western and especially anti-American views became popular again to define the part of political reality."<sup>10</sup> Concluding his analysis Ambassador Lukin formulated stated that "We need from the West two main things: first, this is recognition of our legitimate interests in NIS (preferably with reasonable support to the integration processes there), and liquidation of obstacles to the fulscale participation of Russia in the world trade and economic cooperation."

During electoral campaign in October 1993 the Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Ambassador Lukin formulated their views on the problem of the partnership with the West already as the representative of definite political blocks. Developing his traditional position the Foreign Minister wrote: "For the democratic Russia the choice in favor of partnership and in a

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<sup>10</sup>. Segodnia, (Today), September 3, 1993, p.10.

perspective the union with the West is natural. ... During the centuries Russia joined the coalitions just with the states which were called "Western" by the ideological mythology of the second half of twentieth century. But partnership and alliance never mean unification. Russia had and will have her own interests."<sup>11</sup> Responding this assessment Ambassador Lukin stated: "I am sure that it is possible and necessary To collaborate with the USA but not in expense of out own political and economic interests."<sup>12</sup>

Summarizing this analyses one have to conclude that during historically short period from the Soviet Union break up in 1991 to the tragedy of October 1993 in Moscow and declaration of the new elections in the Federal Assembly the Russian foreign policy substantially evolved from the stand which could be characterized as a "romantic pro-western "Atlantism", based on assumption about full coincidence of the vital national interests of all democratic states, towards more realistic understanding of national identity and specificity of the new Russia's vital national interests and bringing "Euroasians" elements into Russian foreign and security policy. Searching reasonable balance between the positions of "Atlantists" and "Euroasians" in this period dominated to a very large extend debates on military security issues and the future role of international institutions in this area.

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<sup>11</sup>. Moskovskie Novosty, (The Moscow News), #43, October 24, 1993, p.15A.

<sup>12</sup>. Ibidem.

## 2. The international institutions and formations of the Russian approach towards the European security issues.

It should be stressed out that the internal debates on European security issues from the moment of new Russia birth were focused upon primarily and some time exclusively on the relations with NATO and its role in future international security system. Much less public attention was drawn by the CSCE, mainly in connection with NATO readiness to allow CSCE to utilize its infrastructure and military capabilities for peace keeping operations in Europe. Only in the latest period with formation of the European Union and Franco-German-Belgium corps, which was understood as an embryo of European army and possible revitalization of the WEU, the discussions on durability of the American direct engagement in European security system started among the political analysts in Russia. But NATO continues to be central issue of all debates on the European security matters in Russia.

In the introductory remarks to this chapter it was mentioned already that the idea of close partnership and even participation in NATO had strong proponents in analytical community and good support among the top officials in the Russian political leadership. At the same time even among those who was definitely committed to the ideals of democracy and partnership with the West there were serious doubts about possible role of Russia whether she joins this organization. It would be interesting to mention in this connection the article published by the prominent Russian specialist Alexei Arbatov in March 1992 under symbolic

title "Russia and NATO: Do we Need Each Other?". This article is very representative as one of the first attempt in Russia to answer the question raised in its title not from the position of traditional ideological stereotypes but relying on new political realities.

The author is seriously trying to define possible mission of Russia in NATO. As he wrote "up till now there is clear cut distribution of missions in NATO. The United States took the responsibilities of security guarantor for the Europe in case of the Soviet aggression. ... The Western European countries in turn took the obligations to contribute in collective defense and to grant the USA their territory for military bases and other military facilities.

This is just a nucleus of the mutual interest and sharing of rights and responsibilities in NATO which is preserved till now."<sup>13</sup> It is evident that in such scheme Russia hardly can pretend to play the role of the security guarantor for the Western Europe. Her own internal problems hardly allow to take any military security obligations outside the territory of the former USSR. At the same time Russia does not need any military protection from the USA against an aggression from abroad. There is no neighboring state including China which could represent serious military threat to Russia in the foreseen future. All real threats to her security and stability are linked now with Russian internal problems, which NATO is absolutely unable to

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<sup>13</sup>. Nezavisimaia Gazeta , March 11, 1992. p.2.

solve.

It does not seem realistic to expect that NATO will be able to control Russia like this alliance did with Germany to prevent from revitalization its military power. If instabilities and risks of the scale and nature which currently exist in Russia are brought in NATO with her participation it would probably explode the alliance from inside. Resuming his analyses Dr. Arbatov concluded that to the moment when "situation in Russia is completely normalized and she is ready to join NATO this alliance will immediately become meaningless. This will be the time to set up real system of collective security which would include the USA, European countries, Russia and her current neighbors, Japan and other states. If the North Atlantic alliance will evolve in such a security system it will preserve only its name but even this seems unlikely."<sup>14</sup> Let us remember that this conclusion was made in March 1992 but the political situation in Russia is changing now faster than any analyst can comprehend it.

With deep changes in NATO military posture, further arms reductions, and creation of NACC where Eastern European countries, Russia and NIS were invited new discussions on principles of future European security and the role of international institutions were initiated. There were at least three basic reasons which these debates followed from. First, it became clear that all existing international institutions, including NATO, strategic concepts, and military instruments

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<sup>14</sup>. Ibidem.

built up for "confrontational type" security system, which existed in Europe during the Cold War period failed not only to be efficient but even implementable for new types of risks and challenges towards international security Europe is facing now. Conflicts in former Yugoslavia and in the territory which used to be the USSR the most pictorial examples.

Second, the Eastern and Central European countries which security concerns were associated mainly with political instabilities in Russia and NIS accelerated dramatically their efforts to formally join NATO which should to their mind saturate military vacuum existing in Central Europe after WTO and Soviet Union break up and provide them with security guarantees against possible restoration of totalitarian and aggressive regime in Moscow. And at last third reason was linked with the growing conflictness in NIS and Russia herself which could directly challenge European and world security and stability. In broader sense the principle question of these debates could be formulated as the following: should future European security system, whether European countries need any formal cooperation in security area at all, base on idea of gradual enlargement of NATO membership till the Russian border, or any other approach should form its foundations.

Till August 1993 situation in this debates looked stable and clear. ECE countries planned membership in NATO as a desirable but the long-term goal which can become the reality not early than next century, NATO countries were ready to closely collaborate with ECE but did not express any enthusiasm in connection with their formal joining NATO, and Russia being



preoccupied with internal problems made it clear nevertheless that she will never agree with NATO expansion to the East. The unforeseen explosive political move happened during President Yeltsin visit to Poland. The Declaration he signed with the Polish President L.Valensa on August 25, 1993 stated that Russia does not see any threats to her interests whether Poland becomes the NATO member state. This passage in the Russian Polish declaration was understood as a fundamental change in the Russian position towards this issue and blessing for the other ECE countries to follow the Polish examples.

The Polish Foreign Minister K.Skubishevskiy in his speech on October 4, 1993 declared that "Poland can't be secure, prosperous and civilized without close link with European Community and NATO. ... We expect that NATO in January 1994 Summit will set up a perspective for its enlargement. ... The Polish aspiration to NATO is irreversible. This is a process but not a short time event."<sup>15</sup> The wish to join NATO was expressed by Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Baltic states. In September-October 1993 NATO previous position towards possibility of its enlargement was substantially modified. NATO Secretary General M. Werner for instance stated that "it is time to propose the real perspectives for the ECE countries to join NATO." The similar views were expressed by many Western politicians. German Defense Minister Folker Rue during his visit to the Czech Republic supported the idea of Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic to join NATO in the

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<sup>15</sup>. Segodnia, October 16, 1993, p.5.

nearest future.<sup>16</sup>

The observers in Russia were practically unanimous in their assessments of this surprise change negative consequences for either for international security, or for internal stability in Russia. It was strongly criticized not only by radical nationalists or opponents to pro-western, "Atlantists" orientation of the Russian foreign policy, but those whose names were traditionally associated with such policy. As it was stressed out by Sergei Karaganov, member of the Presidential Council, (informal advisory board), "an inclusion of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO sphere will not lead to the growth of military threat to Russia. But political and psychological consequences of such step would be very devastative. It will unavoidably raise negative reaction of the main part of the military elite, which influence in society is substantially growing, and will be rejected by politicians of different orientation...

In the NATO military staffs, while the Eastern European countries appear there with their claims to the imperial policy of the old Russia and the USSR, the anti-Russian feelings can grow up...

The West should avoid military political isolation of Russia... We are practically unable and must not prohibit our neighbors to join the alliances they like. But Russia must make it clear that NATO enlargement would deepen her isolation and

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<sup>16</sup>. Segodnia, October 16, 1993, p.2.

would directly threaten her democratic development... Russia should insist on her simultaneous with Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary joining NATO... Our partners should comprehend that the choice is either to invite Russia in NATO, or to openly isolate her."<sup>17</sup> This analyses demonstrates that the main concern related to the consequences of possible NATO enlargement was focused upon military political isolation of Russia and restoration in new form confrontation in Europe.

There were examples of much stronger recommendations on attitudes Russia should follow in her relations with NATO. For instance Sergei Melnikov analyst from "EPYcenter" - analytical expert organization headed by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, leader one of the political blocks "Yabloko", gave to his publication a very pictorial title - "NATO Is not a Friend to Russia". Firstly he put under serious doubts the Karaganov's conclusion that NATO enlargement "will not increase military threat to Russia." To his view the "extension of NATO alliance which was set up as a counterbalance to the communist USSR closer to our current borders would definitely worsen her military strategic posture."<sup>18</sup>

The other important point which was stressed out by Mr. Melnikov is based on the understanding that NATO enlargement by the ECE countries would mean interference of this alliance into the zone of the Russian national interests. He clarified that

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<sup>17</sup>. Moskovskie Novosti, #38, September 19, p.7A.

<sup>18</sup>. Novaia Egednevhaia Gazeta (The New Daily Paper), September 22, 1993. p.5.

shares the view expressed by prominent Russian philosopher G.Fedotov who wrote that "Baltic, Polish, and even Balkan interests of Russia belong not to the "imperialistic" additions to her policy, but to organic themes of her history... It would be strange to hope, - continued Mr. Melnikov, - that Russia will reject her aspiration to Baltic inherited from Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. But at the current moment the Western goal is to get what is given for free."

The author is convinced that Russia is still a prisoner of the illusion that "everybody will love and help her only because she "defeated the communism"... The Western approach is much more realistic and pragmatic. Its long term goals are political and economic expansion in Russia... The development of events brings all relatively honest and responsible politicians to the imperative to look at the West through the prism of the Russian national interests."<sup>19</sup>

Such a broad criticism resulted in some serious moves in the official Russian position on NATO enlargement issue. Already less than a month later the signing of the Russian Polish declaration the Russian President B.Yeltsin sent confidential letters to the leaders of the Western countries where he argued against possible NATO extension to the East. The letter said that such an extension would confront with the conditions of the Treaty signed by the USSR, USA, DDR, FRG, France and Great Britain on Germany unification which contain the article about non-enlargement of

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<sup>19</sup>. Ibidem.

leadership of the NATO countries took very seriously Moscow's main argument against NATO enlargement to the East which linked such a step with possibility to undermine internal stability in Russia and support indirectly right wing nationalistic forces in their struggle for power. The further events of September-October 1993 in Moscow confirmed the seriousness of this concern.

Confrontation of the two power structures in Russia resulted in bloody clash in Moscow which demonstrated for the West that the internal situation is weak and vulnerable. Many observers in Russia agreed that October events in Moscow appeared to be the decisive factor which forced the Western leaders to review their position towards ECE countries formal participation in NATO and to change their initial plans. It is interesting to note that even Germany who was the main proponent and "lobbyist" of the ECE countries in the NATO structures has changed her mind. German Foreign Minister K. Kinkel called on preservation NATO in its current posture.<sup>23</sup>

That is why the new NATO initiative "The Partnership for Peace" which was announced by the US State Secretary W. Kristopher during his visit to Russia in October 1993 was understood in Moscow as a step in a right direction. This plan proposed a broad spectrum of bilateral contacts between ECE countries and NATO including joint military exercises, coordination and planning did not give them direct security guaranties or status of the alliance full right members. Mr. Kristopher stated that the

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<sup>23</sup>. Segodnia, October 14, 1993, p.3.

the NATO membership.<sup>20</sup> In this letter the Russian president proposed, instead NATO enlargement, to provide the ECE countries with mutual security guarantees granted them simultaneously by Russia and the United States. Hardly the information about President Yeltsin letter became publicly available, analysts mainly agreed in their assessments that the paragraph in the Russian Polish Declaration saying that such a "decision of the sovereign Poland would not contradict neither the European integration process, nor Russian interests"<sup>21</sup> should be considered as a wrong fluctuation and an example of poor improvisation in the foreign policy area made by someone of the presidential closest aids or by the President himself.

These fluctuations in the Russian foreign policy put her partners and herself in very uncomfortable positions. The ECE countries recognized the President Yeltsin's letter as an attempt to intervene their legitimate right to join any international organizations and to chose the way how to ensure national security. The NATO countries have made it clear that in their decision making process they are not going to follow a dictate from Moscow. The US Defense Secretary Les Aspin has clarified this position: "We are not afraid of the Russian threats and are not going to grant anybody the "veto right" on NATO enlargement" but this enlargement should go in such way to create at least less new problems than were settled."<sup>22</sup> At the same time the

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<sup>20</sup>. Segodnia, October 14, 1993, p.3.

<sup>21</sup>. Izvestia, October 2, 1993, 1993, p.3.

<sup>22</sup>. Izvestia, October 23, 1993, p.3.

American proposals will allow "to shorten an evolution way for Russia to a membership in NATO."<sup>24</sup> In other words the United States and the other NATO countries, whether they accept the American proposals, demonstrate their understanding the necessity not to isolate Russia but to integrate her in future European security system, but rely on the proposition that this system will base on more organize and gradual enlargement of NATO, which will include Russia as well.

The most impressive contribution in the debates on possible enlargement of NATO in Moscow was done by the organization which traditionally did not intervene public debates. In the end of November 1993 the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service head by Academician E.Primakov introduced in the public press conference the report "The Perspectives of NATO Enlargement and the Russian interests." The report contains two parts and eight chapters and the second part is completely devoted to the analyses of NATO enlargements through the prism of the Russian interests. Speaking about the perspectives of NATO itself the report marks that "many Russian concerns on possible joining NATO by the ECE countries could have been liquidated whether the guarantees were given on either faster changes of alliance missions, or parallel widening of its political functions with geographical extension. But these guarantees are absent. First of all the perspectives of NATO transformation are vague enough."<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> . Nezavisimaia Gazeta, October 26, 1993. p.3.

<sup>25</sup> . Izvestia, November 26, 1993, p.2.

The other important concern of the FIS in this chapter is linked with the fact that the ECE countries, while entering the alliance, will engage it in solution of the problems existing inside and among them and threatening with severe political struggle. In this case "the alliance can face the objective necessity to harden its position. The NATO transformation in universal peacekeeping and stabilizing power can be delayed." Such absence of synchronism between NATO mission transformation and its geographical extension can "diminish chances to finally overcome the division of the continent and lead to the relapses of the block policy."

The next chapter in the second part of the report deals with geostrategic aspects of the problem. It analyses the argument which are used by the ECE countries to prove their possible joining NATO. Two of them are saying that firstly NATO extension will bring closer to the Russian borders the zone of stability and security (NATO responsibility are) and, secondly, the ECE countries participation in NATO will open the way for Russia to join the alliance. But the Russian experts came to conclusion that in proposals already made to Russia the mechanism of the partnership is still vague and unclear. But it is of crucial importance for Russia what are the missions of the alliance she is proposed to join and what will be her role in this organization. The report quotes the NATO Secretary General speech made in October 29 1993 in Madrid where he said that "together with common defense the main goal of the alliance in the current situation is keeping of strategic balance in Europe. The second point can be interpreted as a continuation in new conditions one



of the "Cold War" period global functions of NATO. If so the NATO move to the Russian borders demands either her military strengthening, what confronts contradicts with the proclaimed goals of economic development, or her accord on asymmetry in the security area what does not correspond with her security interests as well."<sup>26</sup>

The other new NATO mission which was mentioned by Mr. Werner and analyzed in this chapter is formulated as "projection" of stability on ECE and Middle Asia countries. "If the "partnership" or any other form of NATO enlargement, - says the report, - means inclusion in the alliance zone of responsibility the Middle Asia countries this could be interpreted in Russia as the set up of the security system alternative to the collective security arrangements inside the CIS. The extension of NATO responsibility area on two regions directly neighboring Russia on the West and on the South could raise well proved suspicions about creation of new geopolitical situation extremely unfavorable for Russia."<sup>27</sup>

Next chapter of the FIS report is devoted to the analyses of the military consequences of NATO enlargement for Russia. It start with the statement that "it would be wrong to suppose that geographical extension of NATO will be used as a play-ground to attack Russia or her allies. But this does not mean that such an enlargement has nothing to do with the Russian military security interests." The report rejected the speculations that Russian generals are trying to utilize their grown influence on the

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<sup>26</sup>. Nezavisimaia Gazeta, November 26, 1993. p.3.

<sup>27</sup>. Ibidem.

Russian Government to impose it the hard line in security matters. But the FIS analysts have distinguished the sequence of four major points which would logically follow from such an enlargement.

1. The fact that the biggest military organization having enormous offensive potential is moving to the areas directly neighboring the Russian borders will lead to review of all defensive concepts, reorganization of the TVD (Theater of the Military Actions), creation of additional infrastructure, redeployment of huge military formations, and changes in operational planning. This consequences would represent routine military reaction on change in military strategic environment and have nothing to do with political assumption that NATO is not considered any long as an adversary.

2. The realization of steps, mentioned in the previous paragraph would be a heavy burden for the state budget and unavoidably weaken the Cumulative defense power of Russia in this transitional period.

3. In such circumstances we will put under threat the existing programs of reduction, reorganization, and proffessionalization of the armed forces, as well as the programs of providing them with modern high-tech equipment.

4. If the Russian Government will be unable to provide the armed forces with necessary financial, human and material resources, and to ensure the social rights of the military it could provoke discontent in military circles which would undermine the positions of the Russian leadership.

Among the other military consequences the report speaks about possibility to revitalize the problem of the state borders in Europe even in some unexpected forms. For instance it discusses the hypothetical case when Romania joins NATO and tries to utilize the alliance potential to prove her claims on Moldova. The report stresses out as well that NATO enlargement can undermine several arms control treaties primarily CFE Treaty which was based on idea of definite balance between parts of Europe and which become completely irrelevant while NATO absorb ECE countries.

The final chapter of the second part of FIS report is dealing with internal consequences of NATO enlargement for Russia. It mainly refer on difficulties in changing long lasting mental stereotypes. In particular it says that "an extension of NATO responsibility area on the former allies of the USSR will be perceived by the substantial part of the society as the "threat coming to the borders of the Motherland." This can initiate activities of anti-Western forces and provide them with arguments in their struggle against governmental course."

The report is concluded with some remarks and recommendations. Firstly it is said that Russia does not have rights to dictate ECE countries whether they should or should not to join NATO or other international organizations. Russia is interested in synchronization of two processes: NATO enlargement and transformation of its missions. Final recommendation sounds as the following: "In the current time Russia should conduct a

multidimensional policy of intensive cooperation with all international institutions able to contribute in the build up of the collective security system in Europe."<sup>28</sup>

Publication of this report has completed a definite stage in debates on possible NATO enlargement by extension of its zone of responsibility on ECE countries in short term perspective would seriously undermine its vital national interests and lead to a revitalization of the division of Europe. This position was confirmed by Galina Sidorova the Adviser to the Russian Foreign Minister who stated that the position of the Foreign Ministry as well as the position of the President is defined with three principles: "We do not see in NATO a treat to the security of Russia; each state has a legitimate right to ensure its security in a way which it likes; we consider that NATO enlargement without Russia would be counterproductive and harmful for her."<sup>29</sup> As one may see the assessments of FIS analysts and the key elements of the Foreign Ministry position, which was announced as a presidential one, were very close with may be one exception. In November statement Foreign Ministry indirectly agreed with NATO enlargement while Russia is joining this organization, but the FIS report definitely recommended a collective security approach where NATO will be an integral part but not a dominant power.

But on the next day November 26 V.Kostikov, the Press-secretary to the President Yeltsin has clarified: "The concerns expressed by Mr. Primakov are shared not only by the FIS

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<sup>28</sup>. Nezavisimaia Gazeta, November 26, 1993. p.3.

<sup>29</sup>. Segodnia, November 27, 1993, p.4.

but by the Armed Forces, and by the Russian citizens and those political forces which are concerned with the strategic interests of the state."<sup>30</sup> This preferences to the different variants of the cooperative security system were confirmed in December 1993 in Brussels during the NACC session. Russian Foreign Minister has stated that in Brussels "the idea of quick numerous enlargement of NATO was buried."<sup>31</sup> The American idea of "Partnership fore Peace" was transformed as well. Moscow proposed to transfer NACC from subordinated division of NATO into an independent organization which would embrace NATO, WEU, CIS and other regional organizations what can be assessed as a beginning of the new round of discussion on the future European security architecture.

It is hardly possible to make final conclusions about the Russian position towards different international institutions and their role in future security system but some key elements of this position are seen already now.

- For the foreseen future the idea of the European security system based on direct enlargement of NATO will continue to be unacceptable for Russia. The scheme of the European security system which is based on a cooperative approach embracing at least three equal parties - NATO, ESE countries, and Russia looks much more productive and promising.

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<sup>30</sup>. Ibidem.

<sup>31</sup>. Segodnia, December 7, 1993. p.2.

- It seems likely that the Russian position on the international security matters will rely more and more on the Russian vital national interests which will not necessarily coincide with the interests of developed Western countries. It should be understood not as a retreat from commitments to the ideal of democracy but as a normal process of the new country comprehension of her national identity.

- New Russia and the West have objectively a very broad area of common risks and challenges in international security field what define enormous potential for the further security cooperation.

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