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### **NATO: AN ALLIANCE IN TRANSITION**

*by Amedeo De Franchis*

Paper presented at the Conference "Security in Europe after the Cold War: what Role for International Institutions?"  
*Rome 10-11 December 1993*

**ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI**

AMB. AMEDEO DE FRANCHIS

**"NATO: An Alliance in Transition"**

**Key-note Luncheon Address by the Deputy Secretary General  
at the IAI Conference  
"After the Cold War:  
What Role for International Security Institutions"**

Rome, 10-11 December 1993

**Ladies and Gentlemen,**

**You may have heard the story about the luncheon speaker who just went on and on, for almost an hour, boring his audience and spoiling an otherwise splendid lunch. When he finally finished, the host stood up, thanked his guest for his moving and comprehensive address, and noted that he would remember to invite his guest again in the future -- when he would have less time. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to attend this conference and discuss the transition of the NATO Alliance with such a distinguished audience. I intend, however, neither to spoil your**

**lunch, nor my own chances of being reinvited by the Istituto Affari Internazionali after I leave my post at NATO and return to Rome next month. So I will try to be brief and concise.**

**This is a time of frantic political and diplomatic activity in virtually all major international fora, including our Alliance. I have come to Rome in the wake of Ministerial meetings by our North Atlantic Council, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and Defence Planning Committee. In exactly one month, the Alliance's Heads of State and Government will convene in Brussels to carry forward NATO's ongoing transformation and adaptation. Where do we stand in this process, and where are we heading?**

**Our January Summit meeting will be an important opportunity, first of all, to revitalise the transatlantic partnership, the fundamental underpinning of our Alliance. I firmly believe that now, as during the Cold War, the strategic community between the North American and West European democracies remains the most important geopolitical asset on this globe. How could we seriously**

**hope to overcome the challenges posed by the post-Cold War strategic environment, and achieve a more stable world, without the alliance of these two power centres?**

**NATO provides us with the key forum for coordinating and harmonising transatlantic policies in the broadest sense. The United States continues to play an important leadership role in rallying the international community into action. It also provides the unique military capabilities that still make the difference between success and failure.**

**I believe, furthermore, that one of the greatest achievements of America's commitment to Europe through NATO, has been to put an end to the bad habits of European power politics and provide for a stable balance between former rivals and enemies. By contrast, the dissolution of the Alliance and the disengagement of the United States from Europe would be damaging not only for Western Europe and the United States. It would also gravely affect democratic and market-oriented reform**

**in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which urgently look for links to the political, economic and military institutions of the West.**

**These fundamentals of the transatlantic relationship have not, of course, been unaffected by the end of the Cold War. Successor generations have come to power and economic pressures have mounted on both sides of the Atlantic. Both facts impact on our Alliance and underline the need to revitalise our Alliance. The launching of the European Union by the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty provides us with a clear opportunity to do just that.**

**This leads naturally to another major Summit issue, namely how to re-balance the Alliance so that Europe assumes a greater share of responsibility for security in Europe and beyond. Let me state very clearly from the outset that I view a greater European role not as a threat but as a precondition of NATO's longer-term vitality. The WEU has an essential role to play in this**

**regard, and I regard it as one of NATO's accomplishments to have established a very close working relationship with the WEU. Our longer-term objective is to coordinate our planning so that forces assigned to NATO can operate under WEU authority in those crises that affect first and foremost European interest.**

**NATO Defence Ministers took an important step in this direction this week by considering the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces for peacekeeping and other contingency operations. If endorsed at the Summit, which is to be expected, this would earmark resources within the integrated military structure for non-Article 5 missions in addition to their role in collective defence. In a crisis these resources could be used in conjunction with non-NATO contributions. This could provide the basis for "separable but not separate" forces which could accommodate both the needs of NATO and of an emerging European Security and Defence Identity.**

**This leads me to a third issue that the Summit must address; the further development of the Alliance's capabilities for crisis management, peacekeeping and peacemaking. I would maintain -- notwithstanding the frustration about Yugoslavia -- that NATO's track record in this area has been good. For the first time in its history NATO has acted outside the territory of its member states in support of a peacekeeping mission and under a direct mandate from the United Nations. In the former Yugoslavia, we are enforcing the UN embargo at sea and the no-fly zone in the air. We have offered NATO airpower in case of attack against UNPROFOR or attempts to strangle safe areas. Our offer to help with the implementation of a UN peace plan for Bosnia, if one can be agreed, also remains on the table.**

**Our experience in former Yugoslavia underlines, at the same time, the need for a truly integrated approach to potential crises which permits and indeed encourages international security institutions to act simultaneously and effectively. The United Nations retains primary responsibility for maintaining international**

**peace and security, but is overburdened, underfunded and in need of support by regional organisations. The pace and severity of events in former Yugoslavia have helped the UN to overcome initial apprehensions regarding NATO and benefit from its unique organisational and material assets in the way that I have just outlined. The forthcoming Summit will likely see an affirmation of continued NATO support, not as an ad-hoc subcontractor but as a full-fledged partner for UN crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic area. The closer our interface with the UN, the better the chance of obtaining a mandate suitable for effective implementation.**

**There clearly are possibilities to make Allied assets more relevant not only to peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but to crisis prevention as well. In Brussels, next month, Allies will undoubtedly affirm their interest in further cooperation with the CSCE. We may expect this affirmation to materialize in enhanced concrete support to CSCE monitoring and observer missions in such areas as transport, logistics and intelligence.**

**A fourth issue that the Summit will address is counter-proliferation. Already in 1991, the Alliance's Strategic Concept stated that the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction should be given special consideration. A viable solution to this growing problem will, in my view, require a complementary approach of various elements, focusing first and foremost on traditional prevention mechanisms, such as export controls, but also including political disincentives and missile defence. Opportunities are being explored to deal with this issue within the framework of the Alliance. The Summit will likely draw up a road plan for further action.**

**Finally, decisions may be expected at the Summit to boost consultation and cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Allies have been determined to develop interaction in the multilateral and non-differentiating framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Last week, NACC Foreign Ministers adopted a Work Plan for 1994 which includes such significant new areas for cooperation as defence procurement, air**

**defence and civil emergency planning. Peacekeeping also features prominently in the Work Plan and in the focus of a special NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping. Ministers last week endorsed the second report by the Ad Hoc Group, which I have had the pleasure of chairing this past year.**

**In addition to this enhancement of multilateral NACC Cooperation, the Summit should see the endorsement of an American proposal for a "Partnership for Peace". This proposal, which has been very well received by Allies and Cooperation Partners alike, is aimed at furthering concrete bilateral military cooperation, tailored to the specific needs and concerns of interested countries and facilitating, but not guaranteeing, their eventual membership.**

**I wish to stress at the end of my presentation that NATO has never been a closed shop, and is open in principle to new members. However, the fundamental security objective that will shape Allied decision making, both at the Summit and beyond, is**

**the security of Europe as a whole, and not action which one or more countries might perceive as threatening. At a time when we see only vague contours of what the future European security architecture may one day be, that challenge is clearly an enormously difficult one, but one that the transforming Alliance can surely meet.**

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