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THE NATIONAL INTEREST AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR

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The first thesis of this paper is that, after the end of the Cold War, a contradiction has developed in the way security problems are approached in Europe. On the one hand, there is a generalized tendency toward multilateral solutions to European vital security problems. On the other hand, one can detect a renewed nationalist trend as many states on both sides of the former Iron Curtain increasingly narrow their focus on purely national interests.

The apparent contradiction among these two tendencies can be resolved if one accepts the thesis proposed here that security in Europe has to be re-defined in a way that vital security interests are no longer national interests, and national security interests are no longer vital.

A corollary contention of this papers is that West European and American security interests are more intertwined in the new geopolitical scenario that emerged from the dissolution of the Eastern bloc than they were before. Increasingly, this commonality of interests involves the former socialist countries as well.

Security Institutions in Europe after the Cold War

Since the last few years of the Cold War, a wide international consensus has developed on the need for the establishment of an institutionalized international system of cooperative security. In Europe, this has been particularly

true among Western states and the Soviet Union—and later the states emerging from its dissolution. Gorbachev began talking about the "Common European House" rather early on in his tenure, and one of the most common phrases at the twilight of the Cold War was the need for a common security "architecture". More recently, the Central and Eastern European states have been in the forefront of initiatives to overhaul the European institutional structure. To a significant extent, and despite excruciating subsequent disappointments, this broad consensus on principles has shaped the foreign policies of major international actors. Consequently, it has aldo influenced the thinking on and the development of the diplomatic and military instruments which are intended to serve those policies.

The need for a profound restructuring of international security institutions has come forcefully to the fore since the 1989 democratic upheaval in Eastern Europe and the subsequent collapse of the Eastern bloc, which marked the end of the Cold War. These epochal changes highlighted the increasing inadequacy of existing institutions, which had been created to cope with what have now become non-issues: the United Nations (UN) to manage the post-World War II global geopolitical reorganization; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deal with the Soviet threat; the Western European Union (WEU) to contain the danger of a resurgent Germany and to consolidate a special

relationship between France and the UK; and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to mitigate various aspects of a conflictual East-West relationship. Also the role of the European Community (EC), initially concerned only with the integration of member states, has evolved to the point where the nascent foreign and security policy of the European Union (EU) that was born out of the Maastricht Treaty now includes a greater opening toward security issues outside of the Union itself.

The urgency for stronger international security institutions has been further emphasized by the disappointing realization that the end of the Cold War did not make Europe "whole and free". Rather, it produced a new array of conflicts. As of late 1993, several new post-Cold War wars have either broken out or seem about to explode. In many parts of Eastern Europe, the end of communism has been accompanied not by the flourishing of democracy but mainly by the virulent revival of old, long-repressed cleavages. As several old Cold War problems have been solved (mainly in the field of arms control and confidence-building) a number of new problems have developed, in the realms of economic cooperation, sub-regional arms control, human rights, ethnic disputes, border disputes, etc.

International institutions have been widely seen as the best suited instrument for dealing with these new problems. In the West, the reasoning has

been that only through cooperative multilateral arrangements didi the post-Cold War transition from confrontation to cooperation, as well as the momentous break-up of the Soviet bloc, stand a chance to be managed peacefully. Post-Soviet and East European states themselves, desiring to emancipate themselves from the isolation of the Soviet times, have been eager to join in whatever forum the West has been willing to accept them. Existing institutions have been earmarked for additional responsibilities and expanded membership. New institutions, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) have been created *ad hoc*.

International security institutions have already evolved since the end of the Cold War: the UN has been increasingly active in various parts of the world, so far with mixed results; the CSCE has considerably increased in membership thus becoming truly pan-European; the EC and the WEU have been given increased responsibilities, at least on paper; in NATO, the debate among member states over the adaptation of the organization's missions to changing circumstances is still on-going. The burning question of expanded membership is on the table.[1] In some cases, old European institutions are even being considered as models for new ones in other parts of the world (e.g. the proposed creation of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in Asia).

[1] See the paper by Jamie Shea in this project.

policies. This trend has been caused by several factors, which vary from country to country, though some common denominators do apply, in varying degrees, to most of all of them. The main question which applies to all European countries is: What do states and nations expect of international security institutions? The following paragraphs will aim to create a sort of "map" of political forces which are for or against additional security roles for international institutions, and to analyze how they might be intertwined and assess their relative strengths and weaknesses. The analysis will cover the major countries from Western Europe, the United States, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Eastern Europe.

In the United States, strong bipartisan support has developed for continued American involvement in world security affairs through international institutions. At the same time, certain tendencies toward unilateralism and isolationism may be observed as well. Some have argued for a unilateral US role as the world's only superpower, able to persuade or compel all others to follow a policy of political democracy, free-market economy, and respect for the law and human rights.[5] In European affairs, the US has placed a strong emphasis on the UN and NATO; it has been largely skeptical of the CSCE; and it has displayed a

[5] This was the thesis of the "Defense Planning Guidance", a document leaked from the Pentagon in early 1992, but never officially issued by the US government.

An additional argument in favor of the multilateralization of security policies is that, as contemporary problems become intrinsically multidimensional, they therefore require a multilateral approach.[2] A final reason to push toward multilateralization in Europe is the sad realization that nationalism (whether it is a real one or, as is often the case, it is built-up spuriously around not real nations but manipulated fictitious "imagined communities"[3]) is likely to be associated with war. Sometimes it is a cause of war, other times it is a consequence of it, most often, and most dangerously, it is used by political élites a catalyzer of military and other resources toward the achievement of war aims.[4]

The re-nationalization of security policies

Paradoxically, while security institutions have gained increasing appeal and face more challenging tasks ahead, the end of the Cold War has also ushered in a trend toward reinforced national outlooks in foreign and security

[2] Hassner, Pierre: "Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism", *Survival*, Vol. 35, No.2, Summer 1993.

[3] Kitromilides, Paschalis M.: "«Imagined Communities» and the Origin of the National Question in the Balkans", in Blinkhorn, Martin and Thanos Veremis (Eds.): *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality* (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1990).

[4] Posen, Barry S.: "Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power", *International Security*, Vol. 18, No.2, Fall 1993.

thinly veiled opposition to a greater EU role in security issues; it has, however, generally supported a stronger role for the WEU.

In most of Western Europe, prevailing political forces are still at least nominally in favor of an increasingly multilateral approach to security policies, but there is a lesser degree of consensus than before. Germany is a special case that is addressed separately below. In the UK, a continued adherence to the Atlantic Alliance clashes with the British reluctance to contribute to the creation of a supra-national European pillar within it. In France, a continued propensity toward national solutions contradicts a renewed interest in co-ordination with the US and NATO. In Italy, there is both a continued consensus on the NATO and Union framework of reference and some embryonic brewing of nationalist ambitions in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

More or less everywhere in the Western world, there is a diffuse if somewhat rudimentarily articulated feeling that the disappearance of the Soviet enemy means there is no longer any need for common security arrangements, much less for commitment to a common defense. Because the common Soviet threat is no more, the reasoning goes, national priorities among the Allies now prevail over collective ones, and they just happen to diverge, thus requiring unilateral ways and means to address them.

There is abundant evidence of this in recent history—e.g. in the different

perceptions among the major Western sates toward the crises in Yugoslavia, in Somalia, and in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. In addition, domestic security problems, such as the survival of a viable defense industry, become more pressing, and politicians must tackle them on a national basis. Therefore, there is now a need to re-orient Western security postures toward a revaluation of national instruments to be used for national purposes.

This sentiment becomes manifest in two ways: some argue for a straightforward re-nationalization of foreign policy in general and of defense posture and procurement plans in particular. Defense budget cuts also contribute to impairing collaborative procurement programs—though the laws of economies of scale should suggest otherwise.

Others in Western Europe and in the US argue that collective defense arrangements, to make sense, must enlarge their membership or risk becoming out-of-date. According to this view, Eastern Europe is no longer a potential enemy but a security cooperation partner to be integrated as soon as possible in Western security institutions. In some cases, this second view might be used by the advocates of the first to provoke a dilution of the effectiveness of international institutions in security affairs: the British advocacy of EU expansion to the East comes to mind.

For Germany, the issue is complicated by the fact that the re-nationaliza-

tion of its foreign and security policy is part of its reacquisition of full national sovereignty. The re-unification and the re-acquisition of full sovereign rights have catalyzed a process of national re-assertion. German predominance in the EC becomes more manifest, not only in the economic and monetary field, but also in foreign policy, e.g. in the case of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. In 1992, the decision was taken to send troops out of German territory (for the first time since World War II) when they were earmarked to contribute to the UN operation in Somalia. Whether Germany's new activism will be an expression of renewed nationalism or a contribution to collective, multinational and institutionalized Western policies remains to be seen. An important test-case will be how Germany will handle its increasingly assertive request for permanent membership (and right of veto) in the UN Security Council.

Much of the same that was said above with respect to Germany applies, *mutatis mutandis,* to the Eastern Europeans and non-Russian former Soviet states. Defeated Germany had to accept limited sovereignty and military integration with the United States. Eastern Europeans see the nationalization of foreign and security policies as an instrument of emancipation from the forced integration they were subjected to under the Soviet Union.

The post-Soviet Russian government has been in the forefront of the former communist states' effort to gain co-optation into Western multilateral

security institutions. At the same time, the on-going re-nationalization of Russian foreign and security policy is partly the result of national re-birth after the collapse of the USSR. Also, nationalism in foreign policy is perceived by many in Moscow as a means to maintain world-power status without competing with the US according to Western rules. More recently, nationalism in security policy has been a tool in the hands of conservatives and would-be restorers of autocracy, who have argued that the Gorbachev and Yeltsin leadership have been selling the country out to the West. Economic failures, the lack of decisive Western aid, and recent disagreements over the role of some international institutions in world crises (notably in the ex-Yugoslavia and Iraq) have dangerously reinforced this trend. Whether and how Russia will contribute to the institutionalized and multilateral management of security will depend to a large extent on the outcome of the domestic political struggle. A victory of the "Westernizers" will produce a more cooperative, multilaterally-oriented Russia; a victory of some combination of "Slavophile" forces, on the contrary, would likely produce a more inward-looking and nationalist attitude.

Much like in Eastern Europe, nationalism in foreign and security affairs has been an instrument of nation-building in many non-Russian ex-Soviet republics. While Central Asian republics have shown a propensity to retain close ties to Moscow, the new independent Caucasian and European states have

displayed greater national assertiveness. However, the viability of these national choices remains to be seen, and it is hoped that national identities will develop in an institutionally cooperative context rather than through the assertion of mutually incompatible national claims. The challenge for the West (and for those Western states, like Turkey, which have the greatest influence in that region) is to assess what, if anything, can be done to channel national debates in some of the major non-Russian ex-Soviet states toward the exploitation of the best opportunities for a cooperative rather than a conflictual approach to multilateralism.

In sum, the end of the blocs is not bringing a romantic cultural renaissance of the of pre-Yalta European nations, but rather the revamping of national perspectives which might lead to a network of incompatible and therefore conflictual claims. In some cases this is the myopic resurgence of narrow-minded political chauvinism, often masqueraded behind the old spiritual and moral values which for centuries pitched Europeans against Europeans in a tragic sequence of negative-sum wargames.

National and Vital Security Interests in Europe

Like most political paradigms (both domestic and international, and virtually everywhere in the world) the concept of "national interest" has changed

after the Cold War. This is especially true in security affairs. Despite the rather bleak picture presented in the preceding paragraphs, there do exist genuine national interests which are perfectly compatible with a cooperative multinational approach to security. These may be economic interests (e.g. milk or steel production capacity; or agricultural import quotas in the EU). They may be related to the environment (e.g. the regulation of international transit rights for cargo, control of polluting emissions that have a tendency not to be very respectful of national borders).

National interests may be political, as country A may jostle for political advantage vis-a-vis country B by establishing special bilateral ties with country C, in order for example to push its export products, to obtain special access to C's economic resources or technologies or to foster the rights of its affiliated ethnic community in country C.

Finally, there may even be military-related security interests, as might for instance be the case in future contingencies similar to that which engaged the UK in the Falklands war, or to the US-Libyan clashes of 1981 and 1986, or to the Grenada or Panama interventions. But the interests involved in this type of operations can hardly be described as vital.

The interests described in the preceding paragraphs are definable and defensible at the national level, but they are not vital. In light of this contradic-

tory trend to look at security problems from an international perspective, while nationalist pressures build up at the same time, it seems appropriate, in the contemporary European landscape, to refer no longer to "national" security interests, but, rather, to "vital" security interests. How can these vital interests be defined?[6]

The most fundamental vital interest remains the protection of the physical safety and territorial integrity of nation states against the danger of attack from resurgent, residual or new military threats—including internal threats from within existing states. While the Soviet threat is gone, a variety of actual or potential military threats still exists. Russia is a security partner today, but it is not yet certain that it will be tomorrow—and one will likely have to wait much longer than the December elections to find out. While the danger of post-Soviet proliferation is usually exaggerated in the press, other nuclear powers might emerge from the ashes of the USSR. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a distinct possibility around Europe's Southern periphery. Any of these developments could threaten the vital interests of European states.

The second vital interest is to maintain a minimum standard of living and economic development. This implies, among other things, the preservation of a

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[6] For a discussion of this issue, see Zelikow, Philip: "The New Concert of Europe", *Survival*, Vol. 34 , No.2, Summer 1992. For a slightly different set of definitions, see also Cucchi, Giuseppe: "Gli Interessi Vitali che l'Italia Protegge", in *Relazioni Internazionali*, ISPI, Milano, Giugno 1993.

free market economy, unimpeded access to both sources of raw materials and to foreign markets, freedom of navigation over the high seas. Recent events in the Gulf have demonstrated—had there been any doubt!—that the defense of this vital interest can not quite be taken for granted even after the end of the Soviet threat to NATO sea-lines of communication.[7]

The final, and most important, vital interest lies in the protection of the Western way of life—which, despite all its shortcomings, is increasingly accepted as a pan-European model. This translates into the preservation of a pluralist democracy, which in turn means freedom of movement for people and information (and hence open borders) but also support for the social order of civil society (and hence regulation over migration flows).

Other formulations could be devised, but the above are by and large what Western civilization has come to define as "vital interests". However, none of these is a "national interest": none is nationally definable or defensible, by any state, but especially by European medium powers. The following paragraphs will discuss why this is true now even more than during the Cold War.

When two blocs divided Europe, Western nations had to join up forces to counter the Soviet Union. The possibility always existed, however, that one or more could, in extreme circumstances, try to strike a deal with Moscow, for

[7] For an extensive discussion on maritime security after the Cold War, see the forthcoming special issue of *The International Spectator*, No. 4, 1993.

example in order to avoid the escalation of nuclear war on its territory. This possibility applied to the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic. Such fears were based on rational calculations of national interests which took into account the probable behavior of concerned parties. Today, sources of resurgent, residual or new threats (nuclear, conventional, or anything in between, as they might come) are unlikely to be as amenable to the same rational thinking as was the centralized and monolithic Soviet state; hence, it is unlikely that the freedom of "opting out" would still be available in a future continental crisis.

This is not the place to discuss increasing international economic interdependence. Suffice it to say that the end of the Cold War has opened far greater opportunities for international economic exchanges and therefore for growth. As recent vicissitudes in the Gulf have demonstrated, however, free access to raw materials must sometimes be guaranteed by collective efforts. On a different plane, the GATT negotiations demonstrate how, *mutatis mutandis*, an equal degree of collective commitment is necessary to produce free access to markets, the other essential ingredient of economic growth and prosperity.

As for the third of the vital interests considered here, during the Cold War, it was possible, indeed obligatory, to protect democracy in the West while avoiding any determined effort to promote it in the East. Today, without the Iron Curtain, consolidating democracy in the East is increasingly becoming a pre-

condition for maintaining it in the West. Indeed, as European borders are wide open to flows of people and information, it is utopian to think that a privileged island of prosperity and freedom can be maintained only in selected parts of the continent. Again, multilateral effort are indispensable, for it is unthinkable that any single state, however influential, could pursue such an ambitious goal single-handedly.

Does the preceding analysis then suggest that national interests no longer exist in Europe today? Does it lead to a prescription of exclusively multilateral solutions? It does not. There do exist interests that can be defined at the national level, just as there are other interests that can be defined at the regional, provincial or municipal level. In fact, it is not a coincidence that this time of increasing nationalism is also a time of increasing demand for regional and local autonomy throughout Europe, both East and West.

More Europeans are rediscovering the value of local autonomy than are revamping that of national independence. The recent support build-up garnered by Flemish separatists and Northern Italian secessionists are the latest additions to what seemed to be the isolated exceptions of Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. The nineties are more likely to go down in history as a decade of threats to nationhood than as a decade of nation-building.

Multilateralization vs. Renationalization of Security?

The preceding section has argued that national approaches are not adequate for the defense of post-Cold War vital interests, in both Western Europe and in what used to be its political antagonist. Therefore, there is a need for a renewed multinational effort to the solution of the new challenges to those interests, and this is true especially when it comes to defense.[8] The major challenge in contemporary European security is then not whether, but how to make international security most effective to address these more likely and more controversial risks before they escalate to uncontrollable levels of violence.

Assuming then that the future harbors the necessity for a multinational approach, the question arises as to how to pursue it. Two basic avenues are possible: the first is that of *ad hoc* coalitions, in which, states reserve the right to act on a case-by-case basis.[9] The advantage of this type of multilateral action is that it is easier to achieve, as it does not demand any renunciation of national sovereignty on the part of those states which agree to take part in it.

An approach of this kind was adopted, for example, in the multilateral response to the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. It might suffice in extreme circum-

[8] Mahnke, Dieter: *Parameters of European Security*, Chaillot Paper No. 10 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, 1993).

[9] Jean, Carlo: "Ripensare la Sicurezza nell'Età dei Mazionalismi", *Limes*, No.1-2, 1993.

stances, those which are most threatening, least controversial but also least likely (e.g. Gulf). However, the international community, or even just the Western community, will not have the luxury of such clear-cut circumstances very often.

It is more likely that most future security threats will be less extreme, and therefore more controversial. In these cases, improvisation might be risky, and there is a need to develop a set of pre-arranged criteria, rules, standard operating procedures (SOP); in other words, there is a need for an institutionalized approach.

One example where improvised decide-as-you-go decision-making process failed is the crisis that unfolds in Yugoslavia. The perceived security threat has been considered (rightly or wrongly) as less than an extreme danger by Americans and Western (but also most Eastern) Europeans. Institutions have not been empowered with either the necessary mandate or the instruments to intervene effectively. *Ad hoc* collective arrangements have turned out to be half-hearted and fumbled.[10] States have preferred a largely national approach, and the result has been a failure.[11] Most states (and some scholars) have unfairly blamed various institutions for this failure, but the main responsibility rests with the member states which, unlike in the Iraq/Kuwait case, did not put those

[10] See the paper by Maurizio Cremasco presented at this conference.

[11] Burg, Steven L.:"Why Yugoslavia Fell Apart", *Current History*, Vol. 92, No. 577, November 1993, pp.362-363.

institutions in a position to act effectively.

Conclusions

International security institutions are indispensable for an adequate approach to the post Cold War security problems of Europe. Because of the new strength gained by old pre-Cold War (rather than new post-Cold War) thinking, multilateralism is all too often seen as an unaffordable luxury.[12] One does not need to be an "idealist of the post-cold war mend-the-world school"[13] to realize this. On the contrary, it is *realpolitik*, not idealism, which calls for a wider and more structured pattern of international cooperation in order to best serve the vital interests of European democracies (both old and new).[14] On the contrary, it would be naïve idealism to presume that those interests can be served through the romantic restoration of the nation-state to its pre Cold War cultural and political prerogatives.

To deepen and widen international security cooperation, Europe does not have to start from scratch. Much has been done during the cold war which can

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[12] International Institute for Strategic Studies: "Perspectives", *Strategic Survey 1992-1993* (London: Brassey's, 1992), p.14.

[13] *The Economist, 2 October 1993, p.13.*

[14] Smith, Tony: "Making the World Safe for Democracy", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No.4, Autumn 1993.

be used if it is properly built upon. As for the first vital interest, to maintain a collective security and collective defense apparatus, NATO is the obvious place to start. The WEU has been revived after the end of Cold War, and there is no question that it can work as the future European pillar of the transatlantic alliance if the political will is there to make it work. The member states of these organizations clearly possess (together, but not individually) the necessary military, technological and economic resources to face the new risks of the post Cold War world in which Eastern Europe in no longer an enemy but a partner.

Partnership with the former Eastern adversaries is however still fragile. Collective security bridges to Eastern Europe are being built, among others through the NACC and the WEU's Forum for Consultation. There is no certainty of success here, however: it is not enough to pile economic, military, and technological resources. There is a need to build a political coherence among states and peoples which have long been suspicious of each other. This will take time, but there is no reason to think that the successful construction of a collective security system in Western Europe in the '50s and '60s could not be replicated.

As for the second vital interest, defined here as unimpeded access to raw materials and fostering of market economy, the energy sharing schemes of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and of the EU have proven largely

successful. It can be further improved to guarantee access to primary sources and provide a safety net in case of emergency.

Here, too, there is a need to expand the multilateral approach to Eastern Europe. Again, there is some degree of similarity to what was done in Western Europe in the '60s and '70s, when the democracies, threatened by rising prices and the two oil crises, overcame their narrowly defined national interests in order to foster the common good, and did so with impressive effectiveness.

As far as the third vital interest considered in this paper is concerned, the strengthening of democracy, the currently on-going gradual opening of frontiers to movement of goods, people, and ideas does strengthen democracy. The CSCE and the Council of Europe have contributed to achieve this, and their further strengthening will be useful to do more. But their action, particularly in the case of the CSCE, will need the backing of adequate military force by other institutions if necessary.

Unlike during the Cold War, when the West had to close its eyes to human rights violations because of overriding security concerns, today ignoring violations of those human rights can be a determinant of political instability. During cold war, stability was a synonym for preservation of the *status quo*. Stability today, on the contrary, can only be maintained through a careful management of change, and change is moving in the direction of increased

democracy; to be successful, it must be actively assisted. Again, Yugoslavia shows how spontaneous unassisted democratic evolution can be all too vulnerable to outside interference.

Implications for the Atlantic Alliance

The broad conclusion that emerges from this analysis for North American and European vital interests (as defined in this paper) is that they are even more inseparable after than they were du

ring the Cold War. It is becoming increasingly evident, and this will come up repeatedly in other papers presented at this conference, that Europe is less than fully prepared to act alone if the US does not lead.

It is also evident that the US is not ready to act alone (whether because it can not afford do so—politically or militarily—or because domestic politics will not allow) if Europe does not contribute in a primary way. If the US can not face post-Cold War security challenges unilaterally, it would be preposterous to think that others can.

Therefore, in the context of the debate over a new European security identity, a true post-Cold War "Europeanist" is an Atlanticist. A supporter of a European security policy or defense identity that is separate from that of North America is more likely to be a nationalist in disguise.

In recent cases where real post Cold War security challenges had to be met (e.g. Iraqi aggression, nuclear proliferation, the break-up of the USSR and of Yugoslavia) one lesson has emerged clearly: where the US has become involved, the Europeans have acted. Where the US has been recalcitrant, Europeans have hesitated.

The Euro-Atlantic relationship has changed in the past, and must change again. While the US inexorably re-orients much of its political and economic attention toward the Pacific, Europeans must take up a greater share of both burden and responsibility for the handling of Atlantic security.

This means Europeans must expand their security horizon, not contract it as they have progressively done after World War II. If Europeans will continue to retreat and narrow their security focus to national interests, they will not be able to protect their vital interests.[15] This means assuming a greater burden for the common European security cause.

For most West Europeans, the increased role of international institutions has the additional function of keeping the US involved in European security affairs. In addition, some institutions continue to be the venue for West Europeans to integrate their own foreign and security policies and postures, to implement burden-sharing, to build coalitions on an *ad hoc* basis, and to

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[15] Zelikow, Philip: "The New Concert of Europe", in *Survival*, Vol. 34, No. 2, Summer 1992.

exchange information.

The US, of course, can protect its vital security interests on a national basis to a greater extent than Europeans, but not much more. It, too, requires multilateral political legitimation and allied military cooperation for the protection of its interests, in Europe and elsewhere. In the past, the US has sometimes been less than forthright about its position vis-a-vis the formation of a European identity in foreign and security policy.[16] It might be helpful, in the near future, if this ambiguity were resolved in favor of an unequivocal recognition that increased European commitments (both political and in terms of economic and military resources) additional European responsibilities in the transatlantic decision-making process on security affairs.

There is, in sum, an urgent need for what has been referred to as a "new partnership"[17] between the US and (initially Western) Europe. This is necessary to keep the transatlantic alliance strong in these rapidly changing times, and it

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[16] Murray, Christopher W.: "View from the United States: Common Foreign and Security Policy as a Centerpiece of U.S. Interest in European Political Union", in Rummel, Reinhardt (Ed.): *Toward Political Union* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).

[17] Steinberg, James B.: "The Case for a New Partnership", in Gantz, Nanette C. and Roper, John (eds.): *Towards a New Partnership* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, 1993). For a detailed proposition on how to re-structure allied military and political relations, see Brenner, Michael: "Multilateralism and European Security", *Survival*, Vol.35, No.2, Summer 1993.

is therefore also a pre-condition for a fruitful expansion of this historically successful partnership eastward. Only a strong and renewed Western alliance would be able to satisfy the quest for collective security (and perhaps, later, of collective defense) that is coming from its earstwhile adversaries. It would be improdent, however, to think that this strengthening and renewal could be delayed until after additional commitments are undertaken.

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