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THE COMMUNITY APPROACH**

by Roberto Aliboni

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In Euro-Atlantic geopolitics, Southern Europe comprises the rim of countries lying on the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance, from Portugal to Greece and Turkey, all being involved with both NATO and the European Community.

Turkey, though not exactly a European country, is a pivotal NATO member associated with the Community, and was always included in the notion of Southern Europe during the Cold War. At the end of the 1980s, however, pessimism about the possibility of its joining the Community in those historic times, and changes brought about in Turkey's geopolitical position by the end of the Cold War, shifted Turkey from the European circle to a more Turkish-centered role¹. Though this may well change again in the near future, presently the consequence of this shift is that Turkey, at least for general purposes, is still a crucial Western country but its South European role is fading.

France, on the other hand must be considered a North European country with an important Mediterranean dimension rather than a South European one². Though France shares important interests, views and heritage with Southern Europe because of its southern location and culture, its international role and policies are dominated by factors and goals that are not shared by South European countries (e.g. the Franco-German axis, its nuclear armaments, its peculiar position in the Atlantic Alliance and its attempt at playing a global role in international relations).

Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the broad notion of Southern Europe will include Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece.

During the Cold War--to which the notion of Southern Europe is very much linked--South European foreign and security policies were shaped by three factors: national interests, the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. The Community, though for different reasons and in varying conditions, has played a unique role in shaping the new democratic institutions and contributing to economic development in all four South European countries. Assuming that changes presently arising from the end of the Cold War are bringing about different new options for Southern Europe, what will be the weight and merit of continued membership in the Community? The relevance of a Community approach to Southern Europe is the subject of this paper.

Three arguments will be presented: (a) a general interpretation of the international role of Southern Europe; (b) an examination of challenges arising in the regional areas close to South European countries; and (c) a discussion of the relevance for South European countries of a Community approach to deal with such challenges.

The South European Role: Centrality and marginality

Southern Europe's participation in the Euro-Atlantic institutional network proved very beneficial to the countries belonging to the area. As a result of their Euro-

Atlantic integration, South European countries have been able to develop economically and to mature as viable democracies. Still, their political and economic weaknesses continued to characterize their participation in the life of the Euro-Atlantic alliances.

Their marginality has been stressed by all analyses which have been devoted to Southern Europe**3. They suggest that despite remarkable growth and modernization, major structural weaknesses and imbalances have persisted in these countries, relegating them to a marginal role on the international stage. But this marginality is relative, and differs depending on whether it is considered from the perspective of NATO or the Community.

Within the framework of NATO, the role of South European countries during the Cold War can be considered both marginal and central. Their more or less peripheral location with respect to the main threat emanating from the Communist bloc, i.e. away from the central front, entailed a certain distance from the political centre of the Alliance as well. On the other hand, while militarily and politically marginal within the circle of the Alliance, South European countries were geographically central with respect to the regions south of the Mediterranean. In other words, Southern Europe was marginal with respect to the "global" dimension of the Alliance, but central from a "geopolitical" point of view.

It must be noted that this centrality had a double dimension: (1) within the Alliance, with respect to Southern Europe's role as NATO's southern flank; and (2) out of the Alliance with respect to relations with the regional countries not included in the Alliance's jurisdiction. This has always led to overlappings between "area" and "out-of-area" and ambiguities in South European countries' relations with the US, depending on whether the latter wore its NATO or national hat.

Political marginality pertained more to the Atlantic circle than to the European one. In the Community, there is no doubt that South European countries have gained political weight and enjoyed a substantial parity despite their relative economic weakness. Their membership in the Community helped South European countries to perform a much more significant international role than would otherwise have had individually.

One consequence which is relevant here of course is that the solidarity extended by the Community has given Southern Europe the possibility of compensating for their marginality within the Atlantic Alliance.

In particular, European solidarity eased the management of contradictions arising from the bilateral and multilateral dimensions (i.e. centrality/marginality) of the security relationship between South European countries and the US at the southern fringe of the Alliance. In a broad sense, the existence of the European solidarity made it easier for Southern Europe (and, broadly speaking for all the European members of the Atlantic Alliance) to resist recurrent pressures from the US for NATO to get involved in "out-of-area" operations. In particular, controversies stemming from Mediterranean and Middle Eastern crises, in which the US acted as a global power enforcing its national security goals from military bases located in Southern Europe, were also made more manageable by the existence of this Community solidarity.

It must be pointed out that during the successive US interventions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East which punctuated the 1980s, Community solidarity was manifested, but with all the limits of the so-called European Political Cooperation (EPC), an intergovernmental diplomatic cooperation empowered to do little more than make declarations. Unless the 1991 Maastricht Treaty is enforced, the

Community is not endowed with substantive instruments of foreign and security policy. Thus, as important as Community solidarity might have been up to the end of the 1980s, it has proved limited. As a result, the EPC was able to attenuate, but not to eliminate the situation of marginality and centrality shared by the South European countries on the southern rim of the Alliance's territory.

As limited as its political backing might have been, in the Cold War international context the Community approach did manage to alleviate Southern Europe's predicament twice. First, within the European Community itself the Community approach gave Southern Europe a political weight and an economic support which would otherwise have been very difficult to achieve. Second, the upgraded political status and external solidarity extended by the Community as a whole helped Southern Europe to play a remarkable international role at large and to manage the ambiguities of the individual South European countries' security relation with the US in the Mediterranean, at the border with territories and challenges out of the NATO area.

To complete the picture, it should be said that Southern Europe's strategy of using the Community to compensate for its marginality in NATO or centrality in the Mediterranean has also sometimes worked the other way round, that is by using relations with the US to compensate for marginality in the Community. This was particularly the case for Italy, where an "American party"--as opposed to a "European" one--has always had a remarkable influence and a strong role in shaping both domestic and foreign policies.

Though it would be fatuous to talk about a South European model, there are some regularities in their international predicament that are worth pointing out:

- there is a tendency to compensate for marginality either in NATO or in the Community by stressing relations with the Community and NATO respectively;
- there is a tendency--to some extent close to Third World political patterns--to combine global marginality with regional/geopolitical centrality;
- there is a tendency to compensate for weaknesses in bilateral relations with the US by drawing support from the Community multilateral context.

Is this combination of marginality and centrality coming to an end in the post-Cold War situation? The fluidity of such a situation does not allow for a clear-cut response. The apparent loosening of the Euro-Atlantic framework may increase marginality and weaken South European countries both regionally and within the Euro-Atlantic circle. On the other hand, Southern Europe's proximity to the regions south of the Mediterranean and the Balkans may increase its centrality and attenuate its marginality, as these regions are becoming increasingly central from both an international and a Euro-Atlantic point of view, .

What is new with the end of the Cold War is the nature of Southern Europe's centrality. Whereas this centrality was essentially geopolitical and regional during the Cold War, it seems that it has more of a global flavour in the present situation. With respect to the new kinds of risks, tensions and threats pointed out by the new NATO strategic concept worked out in the December 1991 Atlantic Council in Rome, Southern Europe emerges as a central area. The same is true with respect to the "new arc of crisis" singled out by the Western security community, though in both cases Southern Europe is only a segment of the whole Western area that is exposed to the new dangers.

This is not to exclude the South European tendency to remain marginal within

the changing Euro-Atlantic context. However, this tendency toward marginality combines with a stronger centrality. It is evident that this stronger centrality might be used by Southern Europe to compensate for its marginality.

Before examining the new interaction of opportunities and liabilities present international developments are offering Southern Europe, we have to consider the regional situation around Western Europe, i.e. the determinant of its new international situation.

Regional developments around Western Europe

Even before the end of the Cold War there were significant new developments in the regions south of the Mediterranean. Some of these developments are merely the continuation of trends already at work in the past; others are new. With respect to old trends, the essential change is that the end of the Cold War dissipated military threats coming from the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean area and the risks of horizontal escalation. From a regional point of view, however, old regional sources of instability persist and the new ones are not kept in check by the Cold War "order". To this southern instability it must be added that, as a consequence of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, further sources of instability and concern have emerged in Southeastern Europe. Southern Europe is at the juncture of these two arcs of crises.

The factors contributing to instability and affecting security across the Mediterranean, especially in North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf up to Central Asia, have been explored by a number of works in the recent years**4. These factors are summarized below.

Broadly speaking, socio-economic conditions in the regions south of the Mediterranean, particularly in key-countries like Algeria, Egypt, Iran, are not improving. Though slightly decreasing in the mid-long term, demographic pressure remains very high, leading to unemployment, particularly among young people. Migration, increasingly limited by both European and Arab states, can ease the situation only to a limited extent. These socio-economic conditions favour political radicalism, in particular political Islam or Islamism.

Islamism, from mainstream parties like the Muslim Brothers (now represented in several legislative bodies and even governments) to clandestine and terrorist groups, is increasing almost everywhere--including Saudi Arabia--and is encouraged by the radical international postures assumed by Iran and Sudan. In the space of a few years, religious radicalism has also become a factor in the Maghreb countries, a development that is of particular concern for a number of South European countries.

Religious radicalism is the response of frustrated people to old and new crises in the region, like the Arab-Isreali dispute and Iraq's inconclusive crisis. It is also the response to the failure of Nationalism in delivering Arabs and Muslims an economic and political status commensurate with the important cultural and historical heritage of the Arab and Islamic peoples. Islamism wants to achieve the goals Nationalism proved unable to do and it considers the West as its enemy. Unlike Nationalism, however, Islamism is not striving to gain political and economic parity with the West, but to assert its diversity. The feeling of Islamists towards the West ranges from "separateness" to hostility. Therefore, prospects for international cooperation are bound to be limited. Antagonism and conflict are bound to be the rule.

This new cultural antagonism in combination with the hostility taken up from old Nationalism makes Islamism a factor of international conflict that promises to be more difficult than previous ones. Today, in addition to conflicts fuelled by late-Nationalism (as in the case of Saddam Hussein's Iraq), Islamism is trying to destabilize secular regimes (e.g. Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria), often by using democratic institutions, and non-secular regimes (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). It is constantly narrowing the freedom of non-Muslim communities in the Middle East by the gradual Islamization of society, as in Egypt.

This situation of turmoil in the region is bringing about terrorism and other forms of low-violence. It may bring about conflicts which may involve the West or oblige it to intervene. From the Western point of view, however, the most worrying trend arising from today's relatively impotent Islamist hostility is that it is leading to an increase in the quantity and quality of arms in the region. Islamism is not yet a military threat today, but it may become one tomorrow.

The end of the Cold War has brought about an arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians, and the beginning of a normalization between Israel and the Arab countries. The peace now emerging within the context of the Arab-Israeli crisis is a crucial development for the stability of the region. However, it would be highly premature to speak about the stabilization of the region because of the possible Arab-Israeli normalization. Apart from political instability in the Gulf, the trend that is bringing about instability in the whole of the Arab-Muslim area, cutting across its various regions, is now Islamism and its combination with Nationalism. The predictable opposition to the Arab-Israeli normalization from Islamists and other rejectionist quarters may work as a factor of radicalization of the radical tendencies already at work in the region. This will keep the area in a state of instability (and require effective management from the West).

As for the crisis brought about by the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and by the Serbian combination of aggressive Nationalism and communism, it is only partly linked to instability in the regions south of the Mediterranean--the linkage being the presence of a Muslim component in the crisis (the Muslim people in Bosnia, Sandjak, Kosovo, etc.), making Muslim and Arab countries feel involved.

In principle, this linkage is not enough to merge the two theaters of crisis but it is not to be excluded either. In fact, the tendency toward a linkage between the crisis in Southeastern Europe and those in the regions south of the Mediterranean is reinforced by similarities in their ideological and socio-economic matrices. There is the same intolerance arising from an exasperated search for identity. This intolerance, like that in the Arab-Muslim area, gives rise to significant displacement of people, environmental damage and economic instabilities. Most important, because of present conflicts in the Balkans and the Western inability to manage them, Balkan Islam may well turn to Islamism. This development would merge the Balkans and the areas south of the Mediterranean.

The former Yugoslavia and other areas previously included in the Soviet Union, like Transcaucasia or Tajikistan, may be aptly considered today as part of an enlarged notion of "out-of-area". Some have referred to the "mediterraneanization" of the areas that were peripheral to the former Soviet Union**5. The notion of a new arc of crisis extending from Morocco to the former Soviet Union is now widely accepted**6. Threats and tensions arising from different areas within the new arc of crisis are not necessarily likely to merge, but they pose the same kind of challenges and threats to the West and the international community. A new notion of "out-of-

area" is emerging, in which areas that were part of the Eastern bloc are now considered part of an expanded notion of "out-of-area", with important differences but also important similarities among its countries. The multi-dimensional threat described by the 1991 new strategic concept of the Atlantic Alliance refers to both regions East and South of Western Europe, i.e. to the entirety of its new "out-of-area".

To come back to Southern Europe, some remarks are in order. As we have already noted, its geographic exposition with respect to this new "out-of-area" and the global significance of the "out-of-area" in the present international situation make it more central than it had been in the Cold War. But is this centrality more regional or global in nature?

Despite the presence of important unifying factors among the various components of the new "arc of crisis" (particularly in Southeastern Europe and along the rim of the Russian Federation), it is very clear that it is divided into an eastern and a southern segment, both preserving important distinctive characters and problems. For Southern Europe, one element of centrality in this situation is its location at the juncture of these two segments.

From the point of view of the West as a whole, the eastern segment is more important than the southern one. This may marginalize Southern Europe within the global circle, according to the traditional pattern. But it seems that the eastern segment is a more definite priority for Germany and the other continental European countries than it is for the US. This different strategic emphasis between Northern Europe and the US may have important consequences for Southern Europe.

Finally, it should also be noted that not all of the South European countries are equally positioned with respect to this new arc of crisis. Italy and Greece are more exposed than Portugal and Spain. The two latter countries are definitely more interested in the Maghreb than the former are. This situation entails different regional and global involvements and different alliances within the Euro-Atlantic circle of the two groups of South European countries we have just mentioned.

Southern Europe's Community approach

Clearly, Southern Europe is not equipped to cope with challenges presently emanating from across the Mediterranean and the wider arc of crises lying east and south of the Euro-Atlantic ensemble, neither militarily, nor politically and economically. The individual South European countries may each perform a role in dealing bilaterally a given country, for example Italy with Albania. They may even work effectively as a regional group, as in the case of the so-called Group of "Five plus Five" in the Western Mediterranean--a cooperative scheme that is now at a standstill. But unless they go their way by adopting some futile form of nationalism, the backbone of their policy toward the new "out-of-area" will be provided by their Euro-Atlantic multilateral tradition.

Within this Euro-Atlantic tradition new options are now open. They may opt for a more Atlantic or a more European approach, putting their emphasis on NATO or on the Community; they may even opt for a combined approach.

Broadly speaking, a Community approach would allow Southern Europe to deal with challenges coming from the Mediterranean and the Balkans more easily. A strong Community means a capacity to extend enhanced economic, financial and social cooperation to the countries around the Mediterranean. By and large, this cooperation is deemed very important in helping these countries to stabilize and,

therefore, in reinforcing Community's security. The development of the so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) envisaged by the Treaty of Maastricht should offer the European Union a possibility both for multiplying its cooperation efforts and for using the latter to improve its security within the framework of a common foreign policy approach. Furthermore, the Treaty of Maastricht also gives the Community the chance to add a policy of military insurance to the cooperative dimension of its security policy, thanks to the development of a common European defense within the framework of the Western European Union (WEU) designated by the Treaty to act as the military arm of the European Union.

In principle, the Community approach, particularly if the Community is upgraded into a European Union, would offer Southern Europe an optimal combination of marginality and centrality with respect to the global circle. The existence of a CFSP would attenuate differences between eastern and southern priorities among member states; Mediterranean, Balkan and Eastern policies would emerge as different dimensions (of course, with different weights) of a single CFSP of the European Union. A reinforcement of the Community solidarity would attenuate South European risks of marginality with respect to a weaker Community and the dominance in it of an eastward priority. On the other hand, risks associated with centrality in the Mediterranean would be compensated for by the possibility of sharing them with the Community's partners.

These remarks have to be weighted against two trends: first, the impact of the Community approach on the trans-Atlantic dimension, i.e. US-European relations and, second, the prospects of the deepening of the Community in a post-Maastricht European debate that risks weakening rather than strengthening the Community.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union "L'Europe cessait d'être aux yeux de l'Allemagne une obligation pour devenir une option"⁷. The Treaty of Maastricht has failed to offer Germany's unification a new, attractive European frame in three ways: it did not present Germany with precise commitments to budgetary policies; it failed to offer a more stringent democratic control in the European Union by strengthening its institutions, particularly the European Parliament (a point that is also related to monetary and economic policies); it did not propose to share the burden of the reconstruction of East Germany through financial transfers from the Community as an alternative to the high interest rates adopted by the German government. The consequence of this failure is a tendency toward German re-nationalization, which while not emerging as a clear trend to fragment the Community creates a Germano-centric Community with member countries running at different speeds.

Despite many efforts and initiatives, the Franco-German axis is in shambles. France cannot accept a Community led by Germany, but it does not seem prepared to understand that Germany is no longer obliged to recognize a French leadership in Europe, and that the only way out is to offer Germany a more federal Community.

In this situation Southern Europe's option for a Community approach means the ability to contribute to restoring Community cohesion and to giving new impetus to the move toward European Union. The main argument for Southern Europe to become especially active in restoring the effectiveness of the Community is that otherwise they will be destined to marginality within Europe as well as in the trans-Atlantic circle (to the extent that a fading Community will allow for the survival of the Atlantic Alliance as we know it).

Whether South European countries are willing to restore a Community approach is not clear. All the countries are aware of the vital importance of the

Community for their economy; however, there is a tendency to postpone the deepening of the economic integration planned by the Maastricht Treaty, while taking advantage of the existing communitarian economic solidarity in order to address the current slump. There is also a call for some form of economic renationalization in certain quarters which should not be ignored. As for foreign and security policies, there are mixed results: the Yugoslav crisis has revealed a lack of European political cohesion, but the WEU has taken some steps forward in the wake of the rearrangement planned by the Maastricht Treaty and it was able to arrange for the joint military operations in the Adriatic Sea and on the Danube river. Nevertheless the agreement on Yugoslavia reached on May 22, 1993 at the UN by the US, Russia, France, the UK and Spain, without consulting the other European partners, gave way to complaints by Germany and Italy in NATO and seemed to indicate a weakness in the emerging European security solidarity. In conclusion, it must be said that Southern Europe is not particularly active in contributing to preserve and deepen the Community, despite its special interest in it. Southern Europe reflects the widespread uncertainty presently prevailing among all the Community's members: nobody is deliberately going towards renationalization, but no one has managed to understand how the vicious circle can be interrupted.

The stagnation that is prevailing in the Community is crucial to an understanding of the other factor affecting the South European posture, i.e. US-European relations. The compromise outlined by the Treaty of Maastricht about the CFSP and European defense was heavily biased in favour of the creation of a trans-Atlantic pillar rather than a pillar of the European Union. The Franco-German Eurocorp, which was regarded at the outset as the beginning of a European counterweight to the integrated Atlantic defense, is definitely not regarded by Germany as an anti-Atlantic initiative: Germany considers it an element of the more or less sincere German willingness to preserve the special Franco-German relationship. With the controversies stirred by the Yugoslav crisis within the Euro-Atlantic framework, the European and US-European debates about European defense and security policies now seem obsolete: dissensions within NATO are not generated by the more or less effective will of the Europeans to create a more or less independent CFSP, but by fragmentation within the Community and about strategic perspectives.

The most recent developments in this debate show that, more than ever, the core of dissensions is about the future of NATO. The new American administration seems increasingly willing to preserve NATO as the locus of the coalition that makes American leadership culturally and politically coherent, feasible and strong; it seems willing to redirect NATO to the broad "out-of-area"; it seems unwilling to enlarge it to the East, but intent on increasing its ability to act as an instrument of political cooperation (as in the case of the NACC) both towards East and South. On the other hand, the European side, though definitely willing to preserve NATO and the American military presence in Europe, is strongly reluctant to accept the renewal of NATO's rationale and of the US leadership in it. This is demonstrated by the debate about NATO intervention to police Sarajevo and by the debate taking place under German and Northern European pressures on the enlargement of NATO to the East European states. This enlargement would divide NATO with respect to non-central European countries, Southern Europe and the southern segment of the "out-of-area". It would prevent NATO from assuming the wider global relevance that the emerging American vision is trying to assign to it. In both debates there is an opposition between the US and the varying European groupings.

During the debate that led to the Maastricht Treaty, many US quarters (including the present US Ambassador to Italy, Reginald Bartholomew) were strongly suspicious and hostile with respect to the eventuality of a political and security reinforcement of the Community. What can be seen today is that the Community's fragmentation and failure to develop its CFSP and a stronger common European security identity are emerging as an obstacle to a constructive debate within NATO. This shows how intertwined the trans-Atlantic and European cohesions are: there is a parallel between the weakening of the Community and that of NATO.

This parallel affects Southern Europe, which is both especially interested in the restoration of an effective Community approach and in the continuation of a balancing American presence on the European political stage. In this sense there is a strong convergence of interests between the US and Southern Europe in restoring Community cohesion as a way to allow for a renewal of NATO. Perhaps this is particularly true for Italy, a country which is at the juncture of the areas involved in the current debate. This consideration emerged very clearly during of the Italian prime minister's visit to Washington in September 1993. In order to cope with its dilemma of centrality vs marginality, Southern Europe needs a good combination of European and trans-Atlantic cohesion. The continuation of current tendencies would be detrimental to Southern Europe.

If the Euro-Atlantic framework proves unable to survive present difficulties and goes into a decline, South European countries will probably develop stronger relations with the US. This development will ensure Southern Europe against challenges from the new "out-of-area" and give the US a good logistic platform to manage crises around the Mediterranean. However, European fragmentation might well lead to the re-emergence of major threats from the darkness of recent history, thus making "out-of-area" challenges assume only the secondary importance they had during the Cold War, and diminishing any interest in a stronger US-Southern Europe bilateral relationship.

NOTES

(1) See Ian O. Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War*, Rand, R-4204-AF/A, Santa Monica (Ca), 1992; Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey Faces East. New Orientations Toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union*, Rand, R-4232-AF/A, Santa Monica (Ca), 1992; Paul B. Henze, *Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century*, Rand, N-3558-AF/A, Santa Monica (Ca), 1992. The idea of a new self-centered Turkey, energetically projected in various directions has been pruned especially from US quarters, in the wake of the role played by Turkey in the 1990-91 Gulf war (and with a polemic intention towards the non-role played by the European Community). Recently, the US press reported some skepticism about Turkey's ability to meet US expectations; see: Alan Cowell, "Turkey's Fading Role as U.S. Proxy to Emerging Central Asian Nations", *International Herald Tribune*, August 5, 1993.

(2) Christophe Carle, "France, the Mediterranean and Southern European Security", in Roberto Aliboni (ed.), *Southern European Security in the 1990s*, Pinter Publishers, London & New York, 1992, pp. 40-51.

(3) Roberto Aliboni (ed.), *Southern European Security in the 1990s*, op.cit.; Douglas T. Stuart (ed.), *Politics & Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance*, MacMillan Press, 1988; John Chipman (ed.), *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, London, New York, Routledge with Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1988.

(4) Roberto Aliboni, *European security across the Mediterranean*, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 2, Paris, 1991; Ian O. Lesser, *Mediterranean Security. New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy*, Rand, R-4178-AF, Santa Monica (Ca), 1992; Bertelsmann Foundation, Research Group on European Affairs headed by W. Weidenfeld, *Challenges in the Mediterranean -The European Response* (paper presented to the Conference of Barcelona, Oct. 7-8, 1991).

(5) Reinhardt Rummel, *The Global Security Architecture and the Mediterranean*, paper presented at the International Conference on "The Mediterranean: Risks and Challenges", Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 27-29 November 1992.

(6) This notion was elaborated at the IISS's annual Conference in Zurich, Sept. 12-15, 1991; see G. Joffé's and C. Gasteyger's papers in *New Dimensions in International Security Part I*, Adelphi Papers, 265, Brassey's for the IISS, 1992 ; see also in the same proceedings Z. Brzezinski, *The Consequences of the End of the Cold War for International Security*. See, recently, R.D. Asmus, R.L. Kugler, F.S. Larrabee, "It's Time for a New U.S.-European Strategic Bargain", *International Herald Tribune*, August 28-29, 1993. The latter distinguish between a southern and an eastern section of the arc.

(7) Jean-Louis Bourlanges, "Contro l'Europe platonique", *Le Monde*, August 23, 1993.