

DOCUMENTI

I AI

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ACQUISITION

by Stuart Croft

Paper presented at the International Conference on "The Mediterranean: Risks and Challenges"

Rome, 27-28 November 1992

ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

THE MEDITERRANEAN: RISKS AND CHALLENGES

Conventional Weapons Acquisition

*Dr. Stuart Croft
The University of Birmingham
November 1992*

Introduction.

This paper seeks to address the issue of weapons procurement in the Mediterranean in order to throw some light on the question of threat assessment for the region. It seeks to assess whether there are strategic threats developing in the area, particularly threats to the NATO countries of the Mediterranean. In order to do this, the paper first seeks to give some scale of the level of military developments in the region. It seeks to give a working definition of the countries of the Mediterranean, and then looks at their military holdings. From this, an assessment of the most heavily armed and militarily dynamic states is arrived at. Finally, the paper looks at the implications of this for Mediterranean NATO states.

It is very difficult to discuss the security issues of the Mediterranean region if those security issues are to be defined rather narrowly in terms of military matters. There are a whole variety of states that border the Mediterranean Sea. The first issue is to consider which states might be included in an analysis of weapons procurement in the region, for this is not self-evident. Should Portugal be included, even though it does not have a Mediterranean coast, given its political interest in the region? Should the naval and other forces of non-Mediterranean states be included, for example the United States and the United Kingdom? Should the states that border the Adriatic Sea be seen as Mediterranean or not? For ease of definition, this analysis will concentrate on those nations with Mediterranean borders and thus will define out the armed forces of non-Mediterranean states including Portugal, but given the proximity of the Adriatic to the Mediterranean and the complexity and intensity of Balkan security issues, the successor states to the former Yugoslavia will be included along with Albania.

This is not an end to the difficulty of examining security issues in the Mediterranean, however. In military terms, there is a tremendous variety amongst Mediterranean nations. Some

states are consumed by considerable domestic chaos, such as Lebanon and Croatia. Other states are militarily insignificant, for example Malta, Slovenia and Cyprus. Other states are involved in intense regional military rivalries and are heavily armed, and yet their forces have limited ranges that would be unlikely to have major military ramifications for the Mediterranean region as a whole; one might include Israel, Morocco and Syria in such a category. Other states have significant military holdings without as yet clearly defined enemies: Italy, Spain, perhaps even Libya. There are important countries where the military plays a significant political role and yet those states are relatively lightly armed, with Algeria being a classic example. Finally, in a class of its own, France has enormous military assets - including nuclear forces capable of covering the entire region - making it at least potentially a Mediterranean superpower - and yet it has interests spread much more widely than just the Mediterranean.

There is thus a wide variety of states that comprise the nations bordering the Mediterranean. They may be categorised in a variety of ways. For the purposes of considering the significance of weapons acquisition in the Mediterranean, and consequently threat assessment, Table 1 outlines the military expenditure of states from 1986-90, and also indicates the percentages of gross domestic product spent on the military. From this it would appear that the militarily significant states in the Mediterranean - those with military expenditure above \$1000 million per annum or spending over 5% of gross domestic product on defence - are Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Libya, Morocco, Spain, Syria, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia. Those states who meet both criteria - spending over \$1000 million per annum on defence and over 5% of GDP on the military - include still fewer states: Egypt, Greece, Israel, Libya and Syria. From this one might conclude that the states of the Mediterranean as a whole are not highly militarised, particularly if one considers that most of the latter states are involved in one of the most intense security struggles in the world over the Middle East. In addition, it is important to note that most of the states of North Africa and the Middle East have actually reduced defence expenditure in the late 1980s.

Table 1: Military Expenditure at constant 1988 prices in US \$ m. and, in brackets, Military Expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product¹

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Albania	163	176	180	179	172
Algeria	1050 (1.7)	1040 (1.7)	1026 (1.5)	1053 (1.9)	1208
Croatia	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cyprus	31 (0.9)	37 (0.9)	44 (1.0)	55 (1.4)	60
Egypt	5013 (6.1)	4067 (6.2)	4089 (4.8)	4021 (4.5)	3652
France	35118 (3.9)	36137 (4.0)	36105 (3.8)	36494 (3.7)	36393
Greece	3152 (6.2)	3144 (6.3)	3326 (6.4)	3116 (6.8)	3041
Israel	4318 (11.3)	4234 (10.2)	3811 (9.1)	3830 (9.2)	3807
Italy	16964 (2.2)	19199 (2.4)	20429 (2.5)	20559 (2.4)	20160
Lebanon	97	..	26	..	106
Libya	2784 (12.7)	1866 ..	1978 (8.6)	1780 (7.4)	..
Malta
Morocco	876 (5.1)	896 (5.0)	929 (4.2)	988 (4.3)	1032
Slovenia
Spain	6772 (2.2)	7672 (2.4)	7171 (2.1)	7583 (2.1)	7531
Syria	2573 (14.4)	1601 (11.3)	1482 (9.2)	2070
Turkey	2772 (4.8)	2647 (4.2)	2664 (3.8)	2770 (3.9)	3418
Yugoslavia	2491 (3.9)	2300 (3.6)	2082 (3.3)	1810 (2.9)	1786

How, then, might one consider the issue of conventional weapons acquisition in the Mediterranean? There seems to be two alternatives. The first is to consider the implications of the acquisition of weapons by the more heavily armed states for security and stability for the Mediterranean region as a whole.

The second would reject this approach in favour of identifying sub-regions in the Mediterranean within which assessments of changes in military holdings might make more sense. This paper will look at each in turn.

Strategic Military Threats in the Mediterranean.

To view the Mediterranean as a coherent security environment is a relatively new idea, one that owes much to the collapse of cold war structures and the old East-West confrontation. It may be that the new front-line for NATO countries is the Mediterranean, with the East-West confrontation being replaced by a North-South division.

There are certainly areas of challenge to be faced by Mediterranean NATO countries in the relationship with other Mediterranean countries. As already noted, Syria, Egypt, Israel and Libya have developed militarised economies, and the political relationship of the West with both the Syrians and Libyans has at times been fraught. Many of these countries have also developed ballistic missile capabilities. There is a fear that these ballistic missiles pose a danger for NATO countries. But how significant are these arsenals?

The Syrians possess some 24 FROG-7 launchers with 96 missiles, 12 SS-21 Scarab launchers with 36 missiles, and 18 Scud B launchers with 54 missiles. In addition, there have been negotiations between the Syrians and the Chinese over the purchase of the Chinese M-9 ballistic missile.² Turkish territory could be at risk from all these systems, and particularly from the Scud B with a range of some 280 km; this problem would be extended if the Syrians were able to purchase the 600 km M-9.³ However, it is clear that the Syrians have been developing a ballistic missile capability with Israel much more in mind than NATO countries, and also with an eye on Iraq. The scale and range of these systems certainly does not add up to a strategic threat.

Another country with a significant ballistic missile programme is Israel. The Israelis have some 60 Lance launchers with 160 missiles supplied by the United States, an unknown number of Jericho 1 launchers with perhaps 50 missiles developed in collaboration with France, while the Jericho 2, with a

projected range of 1450 km, is still in development.⁴ However, it is extraordinarily difficult to conceive of circumstances in which these systems would be of concern to NATO countries.

Egyptian ballistic missile holdings are also unlikely to concern NATO countries. Egypt possesses an unknown number of short range, fairly obsolete FROG-5s, 12 FROG-7 launchers with 72 missiles and 12 Scud B with 100 missiles.⁵ None of these systems could threaten the territory of NATO countries, in the at present unlikely political circumstances that any Egyptian government should wish to consider the possibility. The status of the Scud 100 programme is unclear in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of Iraqi financing; while the Condor 2 development has been cancelled.⁶ If deployed, the Scud 100 would have a 600 km range, capable of threatening south western Turkey and southern Greece.

Of perhaps greatest concern to Mediterranean NATO countries is Libya. However, the Libyan ballistic missile force is relatively modest. There are some 48 FROG-7 launchers with 144 missiles with a range of only 70 km, and 80 Scud B launchers with 240 missiles.⁷ The only area of NATO Europe within reach of Libyan Scud Bs is the Italian island of Lampedusa, the victim of a Libyan Scud attack in 1986.⁸ Of greater concern might be a Libyan purchase of the Chinese M-9, which would bring Sicily within range.

The only other non-NATO country in the region with ballistic missiles either deployed or in development is Algeria, with 12 FROG-7 launchers and 32 missiles: the FROG-7 has a range of only some 70 kilometres.⁹

The ballistic missile threat to NATO Europe is thus extremely limited. In addition, a cursory examination of the levels of conventional weaponry possessed by NATO Mediterranean countries in comparison with other countries in the region illustrates that there is certainly no military imbalance to concern NATO countries. Tables 2, 3 and 4 outline rough holdings of major weapons types by states in the Mediterranean region.

Table 2: Main Equipment Holdings - Army¹⁰

	Main Battle Tanks	Armoured Combat Vehicles	Artillery
Albania	597	150	210
Algeria	960	1375	625
Croatia	200	200	150
Cyprus	52	70	229
Egypt	3090	3360	1308
France	1343	940	1436
Greece	1879	2091	1908
Israel	3890	5000	1520
Italy	1220	3879	1952
Lebanon	240	220	90
Libya	4300	2090	1050
Malta
Morocco	284	555	247
Slovenia	120	20	?
Spain	838	1900	1355
Syria	4600	3750	2336
Tunisia	84	268	145
Turkey	3928	3940	4235
Yugoslavia	1000	1095	1448

Table 3: Main Equipment Holdings - Navy¹¹

	Principal Surface	Submarines	Patrol and Coastal
Albania	0	2	60
Algeria	3	2	23
Croatia	0	1	12
Cyprus	0	0	0
Egypt	5	4	39
France	41	17	23
Greece	13	10	37
Israel	0	3	61

Italy	29	8	15
Lebanon	0	0	7
Libya	3	6	45
Malta	0	0	0
Morocco	1	0	27
Slovenia	0	0	0
Spain	16	8	39
Syria	2	3	30
Tunisia	1	0	20
Turkey	20	12	47
Yugoslavia	4	5	54

Table 4: Main Equipment Holdings - Air Force¹²

	Combat Aircraft	Combat Helios	Naval Combat Aircraft	Naval Combat Helios
Albania	112	0	0	0
Algeria	242	58	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	?	?	0	0
Egypt	492	74	0	17
France	808	0	145	52
Greece	381	0	0	15
Israel	662	93	0	0
Italy	449	0	2	36
Lebanon	none?	?	0	0
Libya	409	45	0	31
Malta	0	0	0	0
Morocco	90	24	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0
Spain	207	0	21	28
Syria	639	100	0	17
Tunisia	38	18	0	0
Turkey	573	0	22	15
Yugoslavia	480	136	0	0

To what extent does this imply that a new threat line is emerging? Certain states are readily identified by the above analysis as being more militarised than the Mediterranean as a whole, excluding the NATO countries. Middle Eastern countries, it is estimated, receive around two-thirds of all armaments delivered to the developing world.¹³ Some of the equipment holdings are of very modern equipment; for example T-72 tanks and MiG-29 combat aircraft in the Syrian armed forces, and the sale and transfer of Apache helicopters to Israel. Further, modernisation of armed forces has continued despite a reduction in oil revenues in the late 1980s and early 1990s through barter, offset and net back agreements, with a good example being the Libyan purchase of the SU-24 fighter-bomber in 1989, an aircraft capable of directly threatening Italian territory.

Yet from an examination of these tables, it is clear that there is no real strategic challenge from the South, certainly nothing to rival the strategic challenge formerly posed by the Warsaw Pact. The heavily armed non-NATO states are poorly equipped with naval forces, limiting greatly their power projection capabilities across the Mediterranean Sea. Although these states are heavily armed in terms of land and air assets, these are essentially aimed at neighbours rather than NATO countries. Thus it appears that there is no one state nor one grouping of states able to militarily destabilise the Mediterranean region, unless assumptions are made about political-strategic alliances being formed which do not seem credible. The proposition that NATO's frontline has moved from the East-West axis to a North-South one cannot be supported in military terms. The balance of military and economic forces is very unevenly balanced in favour of NATO countries, unlike the old East-West divide. To underline the point, whereas there is no political let alone military coordination or collaboration in the South, the NATO countries are bound together by the common political commitment and the military training and expertise of the NATO structure. There is, in fact, no overall military balance, for the non-NATO forces are too weak and disparate outside their regional contexts. Geographically there is almost no areas where forces could meet, with the important exception of the southern flank of Turkey, given the relative weakness of

navies in the South, and the modest range of airpower and ballistic missile holdings in the region. There is a lack of an overarching coherence to non-NATO forces, and for the moment at least, even militant Islam seems unable to provide such direction.

One of the great fears expressed over the last few years has been that the winding down of the East-West confrontation could handicap NATO Mediterranean countries from being to meet new challenges developing in the region. Were new military threats to be developing in the Mediterranean, the CFE Treaty in particular, it might be thought, could have provided a problem for NATO Mediterranean countries. The CFE Treaty set a series of limitations on the holdings of military material affecting all NATO countries at a time when significant arms build-ups were taking place in North Africa, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf "regions which are all geostrategically linked, directly or indirectly, with the Mediterranean area and Southern Europe."¹⁴

However, too much can be made of the limitations in the CFE Treaty. Firstly, the southern area of Turkey was specifically excluded, given Turkish fears of a future Syrian threat in the context of the historical Syrian claim over the Turkish province of Hatay. Secondly, and more significantly, the CFE Treaty has actually led to an increase in both the level and the quality of weaponry held in the southern region through the NATO policy of cascading. It is important to be clear on the size and scope of this qualitative improvement in the equipment holdings of NATO Mediterranean countries. Although many NATO countries were to be committed to major reductions through CFE - notably the United States (2063 Treaty Limited Equipment or TLE), the Netherlands (775 TLE), Italy (659 TLE) and France (427 TLE), other NATO countries were able to expand their holdings of TLE: above all Turkey (2015 TLE), along with Greece (918 TLE), Portugal (537 TLE), Germany (400 TLE), and Spain (320 TLE).

Table 5: CFE Impact on Mediterranean NATO Countries¹⁵

	Period	Tank	ACVs	Art.	Air.	Hels	Total
France	Nov. 1990	1343	4177	1360	699	418	7997
	Change+/-	-37	-357	-68	+101	-66	-427
	After CFE	1306	3820	1292	800	352	7570
Greece	Nov. 1990	1879	1641	1908	469	0	5897
	Change+/-	-144	+893	-30	+181	+18	+918
	After CFE	1735	2534	1878	650	18	6815
Italy	Nov. 1990	1246	3958	2144	577	168	8093
	Change+/-	+102	-619	-189	+73	-26	-659
	After CFE	1348	3339	1955	650	142	7434
Spain	Nov. 1990	854	1256	1373	242	28	3753
	Change+/-	-60	+332	-63	+68	+43	+320
	After CFE	794	1588	1310	310	71	4073
Turkey	Nov. 1990	2823	1502	3442	449	0	8216
	Change+/-	-28	+1618	+81	+301	+43	+2015
	After CFE	2795	3120	3523	750	43	10231

Not only were Greece, Spain and Turkey to be allowed to expand their equipment holdings, but they were also to be encouraged to upgrade their holdings through cascading, which referred to the movement of excess high quality equipment from central Europe to the flanks, where more obsolete equipment would be destroyed. The Greeks were to obtain 700 tanks and 100-150 pieces of artillery, while the Turks were to obtain some 1000 higher quality tanks, and between 500-600 armoured combat vehicles, all to replace equipment which in some cases dated from the Second World War.¹⁶ In subsequent negotiations, it was agreed that Spain would obtain 420 tanks, 100 armoured combat vehicles, and 83 pieces of artillery.¹⁷

Table 6: Cascading in NATO¹⁸

Cascade	Importers	Tanks	ACVs	Arty	Total
Turkey	Cascade imports	+972	+500	+72	+1544
	Destruction	-1000	-	-	-1000
	Total	-28	+500	+72	+544
	CFE Requirement	-28	+1618	+81	+1671
	Procure/ destroy	0	+1118	+9	+1127
Greece	Cascade imports	+916	+150	+172	+1238
	Destruction	-1060	-	-202	-1262
	Total	-144	+150	-30	-24
	CFE Requirement	-144	+893	-30	+719
	Procure/ destroy	0	+743	0	+743
Spain	Cascade imports	+420	+100	+83	+603
	Destruction	-480	-	-146	-626
	Total	-60	+100	-63	-23
	CFE Requirement	-60	+332	-63	+209
	Procure/ destroy	0	+232	0	+232

Note Procure/ destroy means TLE that either still have to be eliminated to comply with CFE levels, or TLE that can be procured to increase holdings to CFE ceilings, or a shortfall of weapons below CFE ceilings.

This evidence suggests that there is no coherent strategic military challenge from the South to the security and stability of the Mediterranean as a whole. Of course that does not mean that there are no security challenges; there are, particularly with regard to questions of migration and possibly terrorism. However, these are not strategic threats to the region and to NATO, and in these security challenges, the military dimension is limited. This should not be surprising, for as will be argued in the next section of this paper, a focus on the military security issues of the Mediterranean is a false level of analysis.

The Irrelevance of the Mediterranean as a Security Concept

It was argued above that there are two alternative ways of considering the issue of conventional weapons acquisition in the Mediterranean. The first is to consider the implications of the acquisition of weapons by the more heavily armed states for security and stability for the Mediterranean region as a whole to ask whether there is a strategic threat to NATO from the South. As the above analysis has tried to demonstrate, it is

extraordinarily difficult to consider the Mediterranean region in security terms to be a coherent region. It is simply not the correct level of analysis. The second approach therefore rejects looking at the Mediterranean as a coherent whole in favour of identifying sub-regions in the Mediterranean within which assessments of changes in military holdings might make more sense. It will be suggested that it is much more comprehensible to think of security issues in the Mediterranean as forming a variety of sub-regions which geographically impinge upon the Mediterranean. Instead of looking at Mediterranean security issues, it would be of more value to look at regional security issues that impinge on the Mediterranean geographically.

The most determined effort to treat the Mediterranean as a region by the West was probably the introduction of the Global Mediterranean Policy of the European Community, originally announced in 1972. This was an attempt to put onto a more regular basis the series of preferential trade agreements arrived at or in the process of negotiation with most of the countries of the Mediterranean. The Global Mediterranean Policy sought to allow duty-free access for the manufactured goods of the Mediterranean countries into the European Community market, preferential treatment for agricultural products from the region, and the provision of financial aid. The Global Mediterranean Policy included all the bordering countries of the Mediterranean Sea with the exception of Albania and Libya.¹⁹ This attempt failed as it did not really address the central issues for the majority of states. For Greece, Spain and Portugal, it was more important to become full members of the European Community. For other countries such as Turkey, Malta and Cyprus, it became important to try to follow that route into the Community. For the countries of the Maghreb, the aim was to develop independently of the European Community though creating a customs union with the development of the Arab Maghreb Union. Finally other states, such as Israel, Syria, Yugoslavia and Lebanon remained engrossed in their own domestic and regional dramas, relatively disinterested in both the European Community and the Mediterranean region. But the key to the failure of the Global Mediterranean Policy lay in the greater desire of the European Community countries to strengthen their own economies regardless

of the impact on the Mediterranean countries. Access for products covered by the common agricultural policy declined, non-tariff barriers on manufactured goods grew, and finance for the poorer Mediterranean countries was never forthcoming at the levels that the recipients felt was appropriate.²⁰

There may well be lessons here for the relationship of NATO or indeed other security organisations with other countries in the Mediterranean. Before entering into policies designed to cover the entire region, it is important to be clear that there is a coherent region to be covered, particularly that the region is perceived as such by states in the South. Failure to comprehend this, and entering into commitments which are later broken (over aid, for example) may only lead to a strengthening of natural regional identities, as has occurred in the Maghreb. And in terms of military security policy, the Mediterranean does not appear to be a coherent region. With regard to military security issues, there seems to be five issues.

The first is the continued tension in the Middle East. However, this is not centrally a Mediterranean issue since it involves relations to with states to the east and to the south. Although the Arab-Israeli dispute is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that the Middle East Peace Process, if successful, offers possibilities for arms control - and conceivably arms reductions - in the region. It is not clear that an agreement based on territorial compromise could be acceptable to Israel without strict limitations on weapons levels and new weapons systems which would include Israel.²¹ In other words, the continuation of an arms race in the Middle East is not a forgone conclusion, unless the prior assumption is made that the Middle East Peace Process is doomed to failure.

The second region is the continued tension between Greece and Turkey. This does have implications for a variety of other states but, again, is regional in nature. This has become a region of particular interest for NATO since the end of the cold war. Partly this is because it is the only area of NATO which directly connects with the Middle East / North African region (with the exception of the Spanish enclaves). At least equally importantly, this reflects a desire on the part of most NATO countries to encourage a more positive relationship between

Greece and Turkey. The Eastern Mediterranean was the site for the "Display Determination '91" exercise in October 1991, involving forces from Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and Spain, an attempt to display determination not only against potential aggressors in the Middle East but also to display determination to keep the Greco-Turkish relationship as quiet as possible.²²

The third region is the Balkans and the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. When examined by states in various international fora such as the United Nations, the European Community and the CSCE, Yugoslav problems are considered in a Balkans rather than a Mediterranean context. Although naval and other forces are involved, the Yugoslav tragedy is more commonly interpreted in terms of what this says about the relations of the NATO nations with the former communist states than in terms of North-South relations and the wider issues brought about by a Mediterranean focus.

The fourth region is the Maghreb. Many - in particular in France, Spain and Italy - are concerned about stability in this region. It would be serious "if it became apparent that the recent demonstrations [winter-spring 1992] in the Arab world were the first signs of a deeply felt rejection of the West and its values and principles. Will we be able to maintain our credibility vis-a-vis these countries and reconcile the democratic principles on which our societies are founded with medium-term or long-term policies for the region? These question marks apply in particular to the Maghreb, where all countries suffer from similar economic, social, political and cultural problems, ills which are quite independent of the nature of the regime in place."²³ However, at least in current political circumstances, these dilemmas are about economic and political stability, and the challenges posed by underdevelopment, possible economic collapse and the creation of vast numbers of economic migrants rather than a coordinated military threat from the Maghreb to NATO Europe.

The final matter concerns certain national interests, such as the continuation of Spanish control in the enclaves of Ceuta and Mellila, or British control over Gibraltar. These are sensitive national arguments between states, and there seems to

be little Mediterranean direction to them to make these issues notably different from similar dilemmas in other parts of the world; for example, over Hong Kong.

Conclusion.

The Mediterranean, then, is a region that is touched by a variety of conflicts, but is a region not central to any of them. No-one sees that Mediterranean as the focal point of military conflict. The Sea is not an area of military dispute, and the states on the south of the Sea have no military capabilities for waging major war across, over or on the Sea. To look at the variety of sub-regional military issues through the prism of the Mediterranean region is merely to confuse and to simplify complex situations. The Mediterranean is not a locus of military security issues, but rather, with the end of the cold war, it is something of a security vacuum in terms of military relations similar in some senses to the South Atlantic Ocean.

This does not mean that there are no security issues in the Mediterranean, however. There are several. It is still very possible that terrorism emanating from the region might again become a significant issue for many NATO countries, as it is still an important issue for many of the states of the Mediterranean outside the European Community umbrella. Of the other issues, one of the most significant may well be the challenge of migration. It cannot be in the interests of any of the countries of the Mediterranean, north or south, east or west, to witness large movements of peoples. A concern with the military security issues of the region can lead to insufficient attention being paid to the other security issues facing southern Europe and northern Africa. Discussion of military security issues often heightens concern about a North-South confrontation developing across the Mediterranean, a concern that does not stand up well to an examination of levels of armaments, let alone political desires. Where is the political interest in creating a strategic threat to NATO from the South? Where are the armaments being stockpiled, and levels of military integration being developed?

The greater security challenge almost certainly lies at the level of regional instabilities and with concerns about domestic

political and economic stability, and the implications for migration. These security concerns can largely only be addressed cooperatively, and it is to these measures that most attention should be addressed. It is important that, as the NATO Strategic Concept made clear in November 1991, security should be seen to have "political, economic, social and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security".²⁴ In the case of the relations between the states NATO and those of the rest of the Mediterranean, it may well be that security measures seen in this light will be the most significant, and that economic and political cooperation will be the most enlightened way to proceed. There are simply no enemy states for the NATO countries in the Mediterranean, with the very arguable exceptions of Libya and Syria. A focus on military issues might unbalance the political debate. NATO countries no longer refer to threats emanating from the former Soviet Union but rather of risks emanating from instability, and talk about relations with the former Warsaw Pact countries in terms of cooperative security. These would seem to be excellent principles for NATO countries to develop in relation to the states in the various regions of the Mediterranean.

Notes.

1. See Saadet Deger and Somnath Sen "Tables of world military expenditure, 1981-90" in SIPRI Yearbook 1991 Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1991, pp.164-178.
2. Aaron Karp "Ballistic Missile Proliferation" in SIPRI Yearbook 1991 Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1991, p.342.
3. Conceivably, the United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas could also be threatened by the Scud B and the M-9.
4. Aaron Karp "Ballistic Missile Proliferation" op cit, p.340.
5. Ibid, p.338.
6. See "The Condor is Grounded" The Economist 8 June 1991, p.80.
7. Aaron Karp "Ballistic Missile Proliferation" op cit, p.341.

8. On the attack on Lampedusa in 1986, see for example, W.S.Carus Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conflict New York and London: Praeger 1991, p.53.
9. Aaron Karp "Ballistic Missile Proliferation" op cit, p.337.
10. Data drawn from the information on individual countries published in The Military Balance 1992-93 London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992.
11. Idem.
12. Idem.
13. Based on a Congressional Research Service Report, and reported in Jane's Defence Weekly 26 August 1989, p.338.
14. Maurizio Cremasco "The Southern Region of Europe: Problems and Perspectives" in Armand Clesse and Lothar Ruhl (editors) Searching for a New Security Structure in Europe Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990 p.332.
15. See Jonathan Dean and Randall Watson Forsberg "CFE and Beyond: The Future of Conventional Arms Control" International Security Vol.17 No.2, summer 1992, table 1; also Focus on Vienna No. 22 February-March 1991, p.3; and BASIC Reports No.12 17 December 1990, pp.2-4.
16. See "CFE Redistribution 'Cascading' of weapons among the Allies" Atlantic News No.2339 12 July 1991.
17. "Spain to buy CFE surplus tanks" Jane's Defence Weekly 25 January 1992, p.107.
18. This is based on the figures in Jonathan Dean and Randall Watson Forsberg "CFE and Beyond: The Future of Conventional Arms Control" op cit, table 5. The table here indicates amount of weapons cascaded in or out of the country in question, the amount of weapons destruction required, the net total of these two figures, the increase or reduction in TLE mandated by the CFE Treaty, and the resulting increase or decrease in TLE available for procurement. This table only applies to ground weapon TLE, and excludes aircraft and helicopters in all calculations.
19. On this see, for example, Alfred Tovias Tariff Preferences in Mediterranean Diplomacy London: Macmillan 1977.
20. See Richard Pomfret "The European Community's Relations with the Mediterranean Countries" in John Redmond (editor) The External Relations of the European Community London: Macmillan 1992, pp.77-92.
21. See "Security remains the key to a Middle East solution" Jane's Defence Weekly 9 November 1991, p.876.
22. See Jane's Defence Weekly 9 November 1991, pp.891-3.

23. Juan De Luis "The Mediterranean and European security"
Quarterly Newsletter West European Union Institute for
Security Studies No.5, Spring 1992, p.1.
24. Rome Summit - NATO New Strategic Concept Brussels: NATO
1991, para.25, p.6.

iai ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA
n° Inv. <u>12400</u> 3 DIC. 1992
BIBLIOTECA