

DOCUMENTI

IAI

THE GLOBAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

by Reinhardt Rummel

Paper presented at the International Conference on "The Mediterranean: Risks and Challenges"

Rome, 27-28 November 1992

ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

The Global Security Architecture and the Mediterranean

by

Reinhardt Rummel

Contribution to the

International Conference on "The Mediterranean : Risks and Challenges"

Rome, 27-29 November 1992

Draft, Nov. 92

European and Mediterranean security: an imbalance to be redressed?

It seems obvious that most of the dynamics during the recent years of remodelling of the global security architecture were devoted to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. All of the new institutions in Europe (among them the G-24, EBRD) and the new links of cooperation (such as NACC, Euro-Agreements) have an Eastern focus and meet the concerns of those who feel primarily affected by the transition from the Cold War order to a new all-European security structure. The same is true in the evolution of existing security related European institutions: the enlargement perspectives of the European Community point toward the North East, NATO's reforms are mainly guided by defense and conflict management scenarios located in the East or South-East of the Continent; the CSCE has been enlarging its membership mainly by East European states including the five Asian countries of the CIS. The Mediterranean did not play a prominent part in this restructuring process. Yet, one of its subregions, the Balkans, and one of its neighboring regions, the Middle East, have attracted most of the recent operational security preoccupations.

Why is it that Mediterranean countries are nearest to actual conflict and war, but farthest from the structural modernization of security architecture? Several answers are popular:

- Some deny that Mediterranean countries are not involved in the reshaping of the security setup in Europe and, therefore, claim that they have deliberately supported innovation where it was most urgently needed, but now priorities should be reconsidered.
- Others hold that the defense and security structures in the Mediterranean are reliable and flexible enough to deal (in collaboration with other allies and institutions) with a range of challenges from Yugoslavia to Iraq and need no specific treatment during a time of transition elsewhere.
- Still others suggest that Mediterranean countries are not specifically affected by this new range of contingencies, which are an issue for a much wider group of countries, if not the world community.
- Finally the perspective may be taken that the security situation in the Mediterranean would well deserve a respective change of security measures and frameworks, but the region continues to suffer from the traditional marginalization by a transatlantic-central European dominance.

Whatever the explanation, there seems to be no denying the fact that, so far, the focus of rebuilding security structures in Europe has not been oriented toward the Mediterranean. While this may have been justified in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, it is no longer so. The future may ask for a redressing of the balance in the light of a reassessment of the new

3

constellations and challenges in and around Europe.¹ This, in turn, would entail a fresh view of the concepts and instruments to cope with security in the Mediterranean and to evaluate the chances for institutional change.

Features of the new constellation

While one would hope that the opportunities for extending the zone and level of security cooperation in Europe and the northern hemisphere at large are fundamentally sound, recent events suggest they are not. The peaceful end of the Cold War order was deceiving. It led to an underestimation of the potential for violent conflict previously controlled by the confrontative security order in Europe and beyond. Hence, the existing set of security institutions has been less helpful in coping with unexperienced challenges in Europe and beyond despite some impressive reformative efforts by the CSCE, NATO, WEU and EC. At present, progressive as well as regressive elements form a mixed constellation in Europe and its Southern peripheries. War in Yugoslavia, war against Iraq, and the uncontrolled arms race in the southern Mediterranean are factors which contradict a basically cooperative constellation in Europe and in the world. Thus, the wider framework within which Mediterranean security is included remains open in many respects and forms shifting backgrounds for both the potential escalation of instabilities and the effective control of them.

The chief significance is that conflicts can and should be taken at face value. During the Cold War, of course, the European security order was basically spelled out along East-West lines. The overriding concern even in events located at the Southern or Eastern rim of the Mediterranean was very often identified as ideological confrontation, as superpower rivalry, or as a balance of power problem between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This predisposition to use East-West categories in order to explain and treat any emerging conflict is outdated. The end of the bloc-to-bloc structure in Europe suggests that the strategic value of regions in Europe and at its periphery has to be reevaluated. Regions within Europe are becoming the centers of interest depending on both their specific sets of security challenges and the appropriate response to them. In this regard, the Mediterranean shares the status of a specific region with other groups of states in Europe such as the Baltic countries or the states bordering the Black Sea.

¹ Most of the academic literature, showing the same reflex as policymakers, concentrates primarily or exclusively on Eastern Europe. As an example see R. Panis, *Foreign-, Security- and Defense Policy within the European Union*, Brussels: GEPE-SEP 1992. For one of the rare exceptions see: Roberto Aliboni (ed.), *Mediterranean Security*, 1992.

Within the Western Alliance, subregions like the Mediterranean used to be perceived and treated in transatlantic rather than in European or North-South terms. The view that the Mediterranean NATO countries are at the periphery of the Euro-atlantic security setting is not justified anymore, but may linger as a pattern of nostalgic perception nurtured by some Southern European countries and extrapolated by traditional Central Europeans and Americans. The new openness of the political constellation in Europe and at its borders as well as its historical tensions do not allow for a fixation on just one strategic region. The Mediterranean is neither flanking nor replacing the former Central front but rather constituting a conflict region of its own, which is in many respects as disconnected from the rest of Europe as any other region in Europe is separate from the Mediterranean, but which at the same time may affect areas of common West European, transatlantic or all-European concerns and, therefore, can not be grasped on a solely regional basis either.

This decentralization does not do away altogether with the influence of the former major powers in Europe, but it forces them to play differing roles according to the specific stakes in critical European regions or sensitive global issues such as arms proliferation. Thus, new strategic actors arise such as Turkey, while former major players such as the US and Germany are in search of a new role. At the end of the Cold War the Bush administration decided to withdraw most of its forces from Europe and to reduce its base forces in the US. This process is now been driven by financial rather than strategic reflections. It is unlikely that Bill Clinton will be able to reverse priorities and develop a concept for America's role in Europe and, more specifically, in the Mediterranean while disregarding financial constraints at home. What is the rationale for Congress to fund which type of force deployment, to reallocate which units in Europe and to keep or dismantle which bases in the Mediterranean? Does the American military presence in Europe serve primarily symbolic purposes? Is it to guarantee Washington a continual say in the strategic restructuring in Europe or is it to buy the solidarity of the Europeans for contingencies in other parts of the world?² Depending on the answer to these questions, the context for Mediterranean security, its conceptual needs, its operational resources, and its institutional structures will have to take on different shapes.

What is Germany's role going to be, given its constraints to act militarily in cases beyond territorial defense?³ Bonn is redefining its security interests and restructuring its military forces. And so are London and Paris. France has always tried to live up to its geostrategic position

2 For the analysis of the military implications of different missions of US forces in Europe see Richard L. Kugler, *The Future U.S.: Military Presence in Europe. Forces and Requirements for the Post- Cold War Era.* (Rand 1992).

3 For a good description of the new German security dilemmas see Luc Rosenzweig, *L'Allemagne, géant entravé*, *Le Monde* 14 November 1992, p. 7,8.

facing toward central as well as southern Europe.⁴ Since the disintegration of the Soviet empire, the Iraq War and the Yugoslav War, countries like Turkey, Greece, Italy and Spain have been placed in a significantly new strategic environment. This demands above all a new analysis and innovative response on a subregional level, but requires also an assessment in a wider setting such as the EC, WEU, NATO and CSCE in order to coopt understanding and support. Moreover, as the Mediterranean region includes countries which are not participating in the CSCE process, relations between Southern and Northern rim countries need special treatment. This fact raises the strategic relevance of the region and demands a whole set of additional approaches to security. In fact, it is the main factor which distinguishes the Mediterranean from any other region in Europe. (The five Asian CIS states are "non-European" despite their membership in CSCE.) Solutions to security in the Mediterranean might well have to be paradigmatic for relations between Europe and other continents.

Just as Europe at large, the Mediterranean region depends on the predominant constellation and its deviation from the status quo. It is doubtful that political evolution will prevail without the orchestrated effort of all those European states which have the potential to act. Given the relative autonomy of regional strategic policy within the post-antagonistic world, the local Mediterranean actors are able to contribute in more significant ways in shaping progressive constellations than at the time of central front priorities. On the other hand, regional actors need to accept their new strategic responsibility. In both respects, the Mediterranean is no exception to the rule in other regions of the wider Europe.

Scope and nature of security concerns

During the Cold War the main threat to Western interests had been piled up in the center of Europe, especially in the two Germanys. Today, Russia is not replacing the Soviet Union as the dominating factor of Western threat perception, although the instabilities of the Russian federation are still the single most important factor of uncertainty in Europe. Russia still possesses a formidable military war machine, but any challenge is likely to be characterized less by an imperial drive than by internal suppression and coercive behavior in the immediate neighborhood. It is unlikely in the near future that the Mediterranean will be threatened by a Russian demonstration of power in this region. It remains, however, crucial to exclude a reconstitution of an aggressive Moscow. One way to do this would be to stabilize the progress of political and economic development in Russia and Eastern Europe at large. This would also

⁴ For an excellent discussion of the conflicting ambitions and predicaments of the "double destiny" of France see in Roberto Aliboni (ed.) *op.cit.* p.

6

reduce other challenges, such as mass migration, which spring from economic and political under-development.

The list of security challenges and risks in Europe and at its peripheries is becoming longer and more diversified every day. It ranges from social instability to ethnic rivalry, from religious clashes to military imbalances, from territorial claims to cultural suppression. These conflicts are occurring in a political environment, national and regional, which is neither sophisticated nor strong enough to absorb and diffuse such disputes. Concerning the variety of conflicts and the tools to deal with them, the Mediterranean is no exception to the rule in the post-Cold War Europe. It is an exception only in retrospect: the Mediterranean has long lived with these types of diversified security risks. In this regard, the rest of Europe, especially its Eastern regions, are simply become "mediterraneanized". This basically equalizing effect highlights regional differences that demand regional answers. To this end, the Mediterranean countries concerned should collaborate in a challenge assessment enterprise which does not only look into transmediterranean relations but includes the domestic scene of all problem countries.

The new security challenges in Europe contrasts ever more with those during the Cold War, when it comes to such questions as: Who is affected most and for what reason? Is the distance from a crisis more or less important? Which instruments are available to manage structurally diverse conflicts?

In the new Europe, the number of crises which can be handled exclusively by NATO is likely to be almost zero. Also in the Mediterranean a territorial aggression of a significant kind remains unlikely for the foreseeable future. Still, a range of foreseeable and actual dangers and wars cannot be denied, either on the regional and subregional or on the European scale. One of the main risks posed by so-called low-level conflicts is that their disruptive potential can be underestimated, in part because, after four decades of East-West confrontation, any regional conflict simply appears less threatening. But the question remains, what exactly is at stake for all European states in a local, low-level conflict?

One answer is that each regional conflict is potentially creating a chain of consequences long enough eventually to reach each corner of the Continent. This may be via migration which pressures European societies, via a terrorist attack as a reaction to social and ideological frustration, a trade dispute and a disturbance of monetary flows, or even a blockage in international fora. The situation may also ask for funds and investments in one region which are then not available anymore for other parts of Europe, lead to an asymmetric preoccupation of

political leaders in European regions and obstruct institutional evolution and security cooperation in larger parts of the Continent.

A second answer is that a low-level conflict will undermine the very civilization which European societies have achieved. Take an obvious example. Notwithstanding the UN sponsored measures (sanctions, peacekeeping), the present security culture of Europe seems to tolerate wars such as those in ex-Yugoslavia. European countries are under no obligation to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing, territorial occupation and assertive self-determination. Who is responsible? The consequences of this tolerance remain to be seen. So far, it seems as if some European states are not particularly affected. Others, in the neighborhood, are -- not by the spillover of the war, but rather by a flood of refugees. This, in turn, affects trade and business. It also burdens state budgets. And help must be provided once the war is over. All of this, to be sure, may be a bearable burden. But the more important question remains: can the civilian Europe survive with barbarianism in its midst or in its immediate neighborhood? Can a civilian Europe isolate itself from problem countries on the Continent or at its fringes? Is the Western-based security culture and its social, political and economic stability endangered if the Eastern and South Eastern neighborhood remains unstable. And if that is the case, does the same argument apply to an unstable Southern Mediterranean region or is this "out-of-area"?

What is intolerable in ex-Yugoslavia must be intolerable in post-Soviet republics, European and Asian alike. Why should the Arab World be an exception? A recent WEU report on Mediterranean security points out that North African and Middle East states were divided over the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the reaction of the Coalition Forces to it, but did not address the implications of this on security culture? "North-South relations", is said rightly, "cannot be the same as East-West relations."⁵ To be sure, there is certainly reason to believe it is more difficult to reach understanding on common values around the Mediterranean than within Europe. The question, however, is whether one accepts the differences of security culture along a Mediterranean faultline or whether one tries to develop a common security culture.

Do the new constellation and the new security concerns create a pressure to turn the partly common perception of cultural identity and the awareness of common risks into a stronger solidarity and security identity of all the Mediterranean countries or particular groups of them? Should this lead to a "communauté de vue" or even an active group of action, if only within other multilateral organizations? Or as an actor of its own (see the 4+5 grouping)? Where is the

⁵ See WEU-Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr Martinez, European security and threats outside Europe - the organization of peace and security in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. (Document 1271, 13 May 1991), p. 236.

point where perceptions will be turned into common reaction? Or is the trend rather moving in the opposite direction: the relatively low level of cooperation is endangered by a more asserted nationalism in a diversified field of conflicts?

In the new constellation of post-Cold War security challenges the Mediterranean as a region and a group of countries continues to be characterized by fragmentation of interests as far as subregional conflicts are concerned. The question of how to safeguard a common security culture in Europe and how to connect it with the neighboring Arab security culture should, however, unite at least Northern Mediterranean countries in a conceptual as well as practical effort. This, then, would be part of an overall agenda for building a new security architecture. Europe has to solve both its primary internal problem, namely the asymmetry of wealth on the Continent, and its chief external problem, namely the need to develop a cooperative security-related structure with societies at its fringes.⁶

Adapting the instruments

The nature of the present challenges does not justify a collective defense system of the kind the Soviet threat had required. Rather, it is appropriate to look at the new range of crises on the basis of its own character: the variety of conflicts, their uneven distribution in Europe, their specific implications on some and indirect implications on all European states, their non-military roots and their cultural dimensions. This, then, allows for and demands a more differentiated approach for which the tasks of policymakers and analysts alike has hardly begun.

New instruments with particular use for Mediterranean contingencies have been developed rather as a byproduct of the evolution of the existing security institutions in Europe than in response to the specific structure and scope of challenges in the Mediterranean. CSCE has always had a "Mediterranean section" attached to its various official documents, but never liked the idea of giving the Mediterranean a special preoccupation or of picking up the proposal of a CSCM. The recent "institutionalization" of some of its functions do not seem to catch the main thrust of Mediterranean problems either. The Mediterranean implications of NATO's extensive reform during the last three years is one area of adaptation. The decision to remain confined to NATO's borders, but to extend its reach by using the alliance as an instrument for UN or CSCE mandated policy leads to a new encounter between NATO, Mediterranean and Middle East countries, the efficiency of which remains to be tested, but which already changes the

⁶ Are the colonial ties altogether a help in organizing the rencontre of two political cultures in the MM? They are, like in the case of the francophone zone, a multipurpose framework to allow "crosscultural" protection and influence, but they can also be a barrier to a genuinely "crosscultural" dialog.

strategic behavior of some of the countries concerned.⁷ WEU which has a longtime record of "Mediterranean watching" has always had a southern inclination whenever action was in demand and brought about. The present WEU and NATO roles to enforce sanctions in the Adriatic by way of a UN mandate displays some of the features of concerted action among appropriate actors (interlocking institutions).

How to develop the idea of interlocking institutions into a system of mutually reinforcing instruments? Now that security has become a more comprehensive concept including economic, social, and cultural aspects the EC (and its Mediterranean policy developed since the seventies) figures more prominently on the ranks of security structures for Europe. This non-military approach to creating regional stability used to be particular to the Mediterranean, but is not anymore. The EC has reached for a prominent role in Eastern Europe taking over the longtime leadership of the US in East-West security related relations and exploiting its comparative advantage: economic instruments and networks of group-to-group relations. From the perspective of Brussels and its Maastricht plans on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European East and South East as well as the Mediterranean are priority areas for common action. (see the Lisbon European Council). These are the geographical regions where the EC-12 have decided to show particular engagement once the European Union Treaty is ratified.

Initiatives and impediments for integrating the Mediterranean in the European security architecture

The Mediterranean has been characterized by bilateral treaties and relations between Mediterranean countries and the US in addition to NATO. This is likely to become the dominant feature in the rest of Europe as well, where NATO used to be the major structuring frame for US-European relations. Thus, the ambiguity between national and allied interests along the former Southern flank may be repeated in other parts of Europe and may cause problems to host countries both in regional relations and domestically. Take the case that Washington wants to support a Baltic country by drawing on military facilities in Germany. This type of problem has come up recently with Turkey and the question was whether or not US/NATO facilities in

⁷ The situation of France is a case in point here. The commitment to make forces from NATO available to CSCE and NATO for peacekeeping tasks affects French security interests, especially in the Mediterranean. "French military and diplomatic officials realized that NATO was bound to change faster than had been anticipated and that France's voice should be heard during the dress rehearsal, which meant that once again France had to be represented on NATO's Military Committee. This reappraisal was also propelled by the US domestic debate on the future size of the country's military presence in Europe." (Heinz Schulte, France Could play the Spoiler in NATO, The Wall Street Journal, 21 October 1992, p. 8).

Turkey may be used by the US to patrol the no-flying zone of Northern Iraq.⁸ On the other hand, NATO allies are less dependent on formerly crucial connections with its fellow member states, which shows that discipline or solidarity has become a new problem in European-American relations.⁹

A solidarity problem exists also among Europeans. Theoretically, a restructuring of instruments and a redistribution of means according to the redistribution of risks in Europe would be required, but it will not be easy to bring about such a process given both the relatively high degree of uncertainty of how exactly the risk posture will develop and the well-known inflexibility of the present multilateral fora or, more accurately, their member states. To develop a rationale for a new burden-sharing among regions in Europe will be one of the tasks ahead which cuts deep into traditional understandings of vital interests, collective defense and common security. As an example, Spain will not allow an Eastern enlargement of the Community prior to the approval of the Maastricht package which in turn is linked with the establishment of a cohesion fund in the EC in favor of Mediterranean countries. The competition for resources within the EC is overlapping and potentially conflicting with the burden-sharing in the context of the Alliance. The solidarity problem is reenforced.

Most of the non-military challenges in the Mediterranean demand answers from the EC, mainly by way of trade liberalization, financial and technological cooperation, migration and proliferation regimes. These are all fields where the EC wants to extend its competences. In this respect, "the key to security across the Mediterranean lies in the direction the EC will take" (Aliboni). So far, the doubts of ratification of the European Union blueprints do not stem from southern European countries. The fate of Maastricht will not only affect any wider solution to Mediterranean security problems, it will determine whether Europe can demonstrate that the unique type of governance which is represented by the European Union approach is viable. The other test field is ex-Yugoslavia. While it is true that European norms and values have not been able to avoid two world wars, a code of conduct needs to be established and internalized, its implementation needs to be organized and institutionalized in order to make it effective as a reliable security structure in the future. At both fronts, Maastricht and ex-Yugoslavia, Europe has to prove its ability to political evolution. If it gives up, the process could lead to political and cultural self-destruction.

8 Turkey is close to a decision to stop allowing its bases to be used by the United States to support the no-flight zone over northern Iraq and relief operations for the Kurds. (IHT, 9 November 1992, p.7). Without Turkey a Clinton administration would have much less room to maneuver against any new Iraqi military threat.

9 To illustrate the point, Russia has signed an agreement to sell arms worth \$ 75 million to Turkey. The deal, the first such sale to a NATO member, includes Mi-17 helicopters, armored personnel carriers, weapons and other equipment. (IHT, 10 November 1992, p. 7)

iai ISTITUTO AFFARI
INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

n° Inv. 12398

3 DIC. 1992

BIBLIOTECA