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**THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
FROM OUTSIDE EUROPE**

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1. Introduction

Let us first divide the title of this chapter in two parts and briefly elaborate on each of them.

"The threat of nuclear proliferation...", to start with.

Europe has been familiar with a nuclear threat for now four decades, indeed has been at the center of the most likely scenario of a major conflict involving the extensive use of nuclear weapons, with the automatic -at least in theory- involvement of the superpowers. The concentration of nuclear warheads deployed between the Atlantic and the Urals in a state of permanent readiness has been without equals around the globe.

Yet - or is it for that very reason? - the Europeans have not been, until recently, much sensitive to the risks coming from nuclear proliferation, i.e. "horizontal" proliferation as it is called the multiplication of nuclear actors. For a long time non proliferation policies were met with scepticism, at best, or reluctance or even open resistance by West European countries, with the exception of Britain. The motivations for such attitude were at the same time the perception of sanctioning the superiority of the superpowers -military and technological superiority- by giving them a near monopoly in exchange for their protection -accepted as it was in NATO, or imposed as in WTO- and the fear of such protection not going as far as "sacrificing New York for Frankfurt" in application of the theory above. Such attitude was common to a Have country like France, as well as to would-be permanent Have-nots, be they linked in the Alliance or neutral, like f.i. Germany and Sweden respectively.

In Western Europe, support for the emerging nuclear non proliferation regime came often from pacifist or at least dovish movements that were against nuclear weapons altogether. Adherence to the provisions of the regime, the NPT first of all, came gradually after quite a bit of foot dragging, more out of a desire to avoid tensions with the US than of an embracing of the basic motivations of non proliferation. The lack of sophistication of the American diplomacy and the inability to convincingly link non proliferation with effective deterrence increased the difficulties.

The above mentioned mix of scepticism, reluctance, resistance and unwilling adherence to the "regime" by the European governments was accompanied by a number of national policies that, looked at **ex post**, border irresponsibility as they were such as to generate situations potentially threatening for the very countries that took them. Roughly this phase culminated in the 1970s. The change (with small "c") began halfway through that decade, thus well before the big Change (with capital "c") that took place in the world in the magic triennium 1989-91, although it was accelerated by the upsetting of the European scene and by the Gulf war, as it happened for almost everything else.

This means that new perceptions of the risks stemming out of nuclear proliferation (and other proliferations) became evident well before the fall of the great

nuclear threat coming from the East-West confrontation. However, the collapse of the Soviet system exalted such perceptions, both because of the fragmentation of the strategic interlocutor and because of the spread of ex-Soviet know-how, materials and personnel, that is likely to dramatically increase proliferation risks all over the place. Add to this the growth of launching capabilities of several actual or potential proliferators and the discovery of the hidden nuclear programs of Saddam and you will have the full picture of the new framework for European attitudes and policies related to proliferation.

Let us turn to the second part of the title: "...from outside Europe". It implies, first of all, a definition of Europe. There are at least three: 1) the "institutional" Europe, i.e. that part of the continent that is currently or potentially affected by a process of integration, thus the European Community (EC) turning into a European Union, plus EFTA tomorrow and Central Europe after tomorrow; 2) the geographical Europe, i.e. the one that extends eastward as far as the Urals; and 3) the broader political Europe, i.e. a dimension which is extended so that to comprise all European and Asian states which have become members of the CSCE.

Although in the view of the author Europe-1 is the real Europe, the "division of labour" among the different chapters which has been adopted in this book apparently assumes a broader definition: otherwise, the proliferation risks coming from "inside Europe", to be dealt with in a different chapter, would inevitably refer to, say, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden....

The collapse of the Soviet Union has not made the Urals divide any more relevant than it was before. The geographical definition would also have most of Turkey outside, while this country has security links with the West that prevail, in the view of the author, over the connection with Asia, although growing as they are. Thus Europe-2 can also be disregarded.

We would be left with Europe-3 if it were not for some misgivings in including the new states of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, etc. in such a "Europe" simply because of the Soviet legacy. As it will be argued later, these states have real and especially potential ties with the Asian context, which must not be neglected. Thus in this paper they will constitute a gray area, preferably considered as part of the "outside Europe".

And then, what is meant by "outside Europe"? It can, of course, be the rest of the world, taken together. The world is small today and geography does not really matter as much as it did in the past. Still if one looks at the different trouble spots - in proliferation terms -, threats for Europe are different in kind and degree depending on where they come from. It has been chosen here to divide the "rest of the world" in three parts that will be called, borrowing from the way the Europeans have traditionally divided the East, the "Near Outside", the "Middle Outside" and the "Far Outside".

The Near Outside comprises North Africa, the Middle East, the Gulf Area and - case in point - the Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. The Middle Outside is constituted by a specific critical region, the South-central Asia, and particularly India and Pakistan. Under the definition of Far Outside we put three different areas of the world: Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Asia-Pacific rim. The following sections will explain this choice, analysing the threat coming from each of these three parts

2. The Threat from the "Near Outside"

When trying to list the "risks" -to borrow from the NATO jargon- which have replaced the threat that was at the center of the East-West confrontation, one comes to something like the following: 1) local conflicts, whether national or ethnical, that are likely to spill over the neighbouring areas; 2) proliferations of any kind (nuclear, chemical-biological, missile); 3) religious fundamentalism; and 4) migration pressures. All these risks are present in what has been called here the Near Outside.

It will not be attempted here to make the nth description of the recognised or alleged capabilities of Israel and the Arab countries, of their situations in, and their positions towards, the nuclear non proliferation regime. Suffice to mention that: 1) Israeli nuclear weapons provide the Arabs with a cover for national ambitions of regional hegemony, for possibly legitimate aspirations to have more bargaining power (especially since oil has lost most of it) and for a deep rooted recrimination against the West; and 2) the non proliferation regime has generated a relevant constraint against such ambitions to materialise into nuclear capabilities, but has not entirely prevented them. A war, the Gulf war, was necessary to put the problem in the limelight.

Point 1) means that if one were ever able to remove Israel from the map the proliferation problem would not be removed from the Middle East. Point 2) means that should the non proliferation regime ever collapse the Middle East would become a place for a nuclear arms race, possibly not the only but probably the most unstable one in the world.

Much less known is the situation in the southern ex-Soviet republics which prevalently are of Muslim religion and speak languages with Turkish roots, but have sizable ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. The substitution of the Soviet border with a number of more or less recognised new borders similarly to what happened in former colonies has at the same time emphasized the problem of minorities and the opportunities of new relations and connections with countries outside the former Union that have similar ethnic and religious backgrounds.

Particular uncertainties exist as to quantity, sophistication, applicability and transferability of the "nuclear stuff" that is there in terms of scientific and technical know-how, of material left behind or stolen, of equipment and facilities.

At the moment the issue of having or building up military capabilities appears to be strictly connected with internal security and with the new relationship, either "communitarian" or else, to be established with the other former republics, Russia above all, rather than with possible problems of an emerging balance of power with the other countries of Central Asia. But things may change in the future in such a way as to reduce Western influence, which is higher in the field of intra-CIS relations than in that of inter-Asian relations.

This having been noted, let us try to see which are the components of the threat to Europe coming from nuclear proliferation in this part of the world. Proliferation becomes a threat, especially as it combines with other elements: three combinations will be discussed.

1) *The technological combination.* The overall technological level of the proliferator is of course central to the threat analysis. A special focus must be put on the delivery vehicles: the types, the numbers, the sophistication and the ranges. Excluding for the moment the non military, i.e. the terrorist means of delivery, the attention is focussed today on fighter-bombers with possible on-flight refuelling and on ballistic missiles. Tomorrow we may have to look at sea-launching capabilities and/or at "cruise" missiles.

Current ballistic missile capabilities just touch the European southern coasts and borders: actually, Greece and especially Turkey are within the radii of a number of them. Any technological progress or purchase that would allow for an extension of these radii would translate into a straight increase of the threat for a growing number of European countries.

The technological level of the proliferator has also the consequence of making it a potential new supplier of sensitive technologies for other would-be proliferators. This specific risk is relatively smaller in this area than in the other two areas discussed in this paper.

2) *The political combination.* Nuclear proliferation hot spots are first of all political hot spots, because of the local conflicts or at least tensions, which are in most cases domestic as well as international. For different reasons that will not be dealt with here, several such local conflicts or tensions involve the West and particularly, but not separately, the Europeans. If and when there is a framework for negotiation associated with the conflict, the Western countries are similarly involved in it in one way or another. The prominent example is the Arab-Israeli problem with its Palestinian "core" and the associated peace process now painfully started. But other more or less independent critical knots exist with their actual or potential fora for negotiation or cooperation, from the Group of Nine in the Western Mediterranean to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in Central Asia.

Most local actors, with the possible exception of Israel, urge the European countries, taken separately or together in the EC, to show more independence from the US. Attempted nuclear capabilities aim at local strategic targets, either for alleged deterrence or for defence or de facto for offence, rather than at hitting Europe in the first place. A conceivable threat scenario seems then generated by the aspiration to force more favorable European positions, or ex post to retaliate against unfavorable ones.

3) *The ideological combination.* Besides the political hot spots two are common features to the Near Outside: the predominance of Islamism and the demographic trend which is creating a growing population imbalance with Europe. The frustrations generated by the unsatisfactory economic relationship and by the frictions stemming out of both the obstacles to migration and to the acute problems of the ethnic and religious minorities already settled in Europe fuel resentment between the Christian, secularised, affluent West and the Islamic world.

We do not have enemies only in the region, but at times the separation between friends and foes does not correspond to our preferences as far as domestic ruling is concerned. Aside from Israel, the countries that are commonly regarded as trouble makers in proliferation terms do, however, belong to the least friendly camp

in ideological terms. Thus the potentials for flagging the "bomb" or its delivery vehicles with religious or ethnic **revanchism** clearly exists.

The threat to Europe deriving from the ideological combination is due prevalently to the fact that the territory of the European continental countries is the closest and most vulnerable area of the "infidels", whatever this means on the threshold of the year 2000.

3. The Threat from the "Middle Outside"

We have chosen to make a separate case for the South- Central Asia because of the presence there of a certain degree of balance of power between two countries, India and Pakistan. Again this chapter will not make a description of what these two countries are allegedly capable of in technical terms, or which are their stated policies and likely intentions. It is assumed that the reader is familiar with all that. We will only point out the following:

- a) the collapse of the Soviet system and the end of the occupation of Afghanistan have brought with them a need for a reappraisal of the foreign policies of both India and Pakistan;
- b) possibly, the only chapter of their foreign policies which is not much affected by such profound change is the border conflict;
- c) both countries have serious domestic stability problems: India is roughly a democracy but is profoundly divided for political, ethnic and religious reasons; Pakistan is only apparently a more stable as it is an authoritarian military regime; both governments use bilateral tension for propaganda and self-perpetuation.

This having been said, the nuclear rivalry between the two states makes this region a special one on the nuclear proliferation scene. One could depict a scenario of local bipolar deterrence, reproducing on a smaller scale what has happened in the last four decades between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. The two countries would go through a nuclear arms race, possibly a slow one, which would be sufficiently balanced to discourage one "pole" from attacking the other, even if only conventionally. The two governments would be able to work out some "rules of the game" as the agreement of not attacking each other's nuclear facilities anticipates. The external powers would abstain from interfering thus the balance would remain isolated and not be upset. The J.J. Weltman theory (1) and the K. Waltz model (2) would find their perfect application.

What would be the impact on the non-proliferation regime if this scenario came true? One sub-scenario would be that the model is reproduced elsewhere, that nuclear deterrence is fragmented in a number of local theaters, more or less bi-polar, more or less stable, and that at the end the non-proliferation regime either collapses or proves useless. An other sub-scenario would on the contrary be that the case remains isolated and single, because of the special starting conditions: the regime would remain sufficiently unaffected and live with the exception.

The problem is that the main scenario has at least three major flaws that make it lack credibility:

- 1) the internal instabilities of the two countries, which are intertwined with the border conflict, make it unlikely that the rules of the game will be respected, that in no

circumstance one side will yield to the temptation of waging war to restore domestic consensus or that it would not find it irresistible if eventually an opportunity comes up of carrying out some preemptive action;

2) the clause of isolation is not easy to fulfill: either country would seek foreign support and solidarity, as Pakistan has already done successfully with China and is doing with Muslim countries; India will have to counterbalance, either through a rapprochement with the US and the West in general (to supplant Pakistan), or through a revival of the special relations with Moscow (against the "Muslim threat") or even through a reversal of the traditional rivalry with China (to confront emerging powers in Asia or the Pacific);

3) the arms race is likely to generate imbalances and/or to affect other theaters in the neighbourhood: the development of India's maritime power, possibly with nuclear submarines, is a typical case in point, but even the simple extension of the missile capabilities that both countries possess would be a destabilising factor.

The threat for Europe deriving from the local deterrence scenario going wrong could materialise in two ways, either linked or separated. A "chain reaction" may develop that would lead to the welding of the Middle Outside with the Near Outside. The Muslim galaxy would enter a boiling phase, with national rivalries mixing with fundamentalist movements. Shock waves may move in from the tense Middle East or from the unstable CIS and be reflected back by the Muslim-Hindu conflicts that underpin the Indo-Pakistani tension. Turkey would, probably, be pulled in as an important actor of this unstable theater.

Nuclear weapons or, to say the least, nuclear ambitions are likely to enter the scene. In the rethoric, at least, the Pakistani nuclear program has always been justified by both the Indian threat and the Jewish bomb. Put, then, the pretext of Israel, the Iraqi un-extinguished thrust, the Iranian attempts and the undefined Soviet remnants in the Southern States of CIS all in the same pot with Pakistani capabilities and you have, no doubt, an explosive mixture. The threat from the Near Outside discussed in the previous chapter is thus exacerbated.

Moreover, the non-proliferation regime would be put under ever growing strain by a nuclear arms race in South-Central Asia. The atmosphere of the 1995 Conference - if anything else - will likely be negatively affected by open failure to curb proliferation in a critical area. As it was argued above, even if the local deterrent scenario holds, the exemple may attract imitation among those countries, either party to the NPT or not, that would see there a way of controlling a perceived threat through a limited, or even embryonic nuclear capability.

More importantly, the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan are effective catalysers of that nuclear market that develops outside the control of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. For some years now, these two countries have been both importers of either clandestine Western technologies or of deliveries from emerging suppliers and have been emerging suppliers themselves. The arms race would increase their capabilities and, together with their thirst for hard currency, would enhance the second tier nuclear market.

4. The Threat from the "Far Outside"

What has been called here the Far Outside consists of three traditional hot spots of the nuclear proliferation scene. One - Sub-Saharan Africa, with that past "problem country" of South-Africa - is currently vanishing. As before, it is assumed that the situation is known to the reader. Possibly, the only concern here is about possible legacies of Pretoria's past programs, left either in loco or, more importantly, given to former secret partners like Israel (impact on the Near Outside).

Good news also from Latin America, even if there the process is slower. The prospect of having the Tlatelolco treaty in force all over the sub-continent seems reasonable. The problem -not a new one - remains that of export controls.

The third spot is the Asia-Pacific region, which deserves special attention in this section. Since Taiwan and South Korea are no longer on the front line of the "problem countries" (and in the assumption that they do not come back on it because of a reduced perception of the US protection), North Korea is the "bad guy" on the scene, a sombre regime with a doubtful foreign policy, particularly as far as non proliferation - nuclear and missile - is concerned.

Of course, North Korea, even a nuclear North Korea, does not pose any direct threat to Europe. There are several "buts", nevertheless. Even if Pyong-Yang's effort do not reach the end of having a rough nuclear device, the ambiguous behaviour towards the NPT and the IAEA has represented a weakness of the regime, as it has demonstrated, together with the parallel discovery of Saddam's hidden activities, that the signature of the treaty can be made meaningless, or even misleading.

But what is most salient in North Korea's nuclear activities is the potential trigger effect they might have in a region where very different kinds of power - strong power - exist: a United States that is oscillating between continuing Pax Americana in the Pacific and isolationism; the remaining Russian maritime power; the always puzzling China; and the nearly all-mighty economic power of Japan. The region cannot count, for the time being, on an array of "interlocking institutions" like those which exist in today's Europe. As Henri Kissinger pointed out at the 1986 IISS Annual Conference, "the security and foreign policies of the Asian nations, different though they are, are more similar to what European foreign policy used to be in the nineteenth century, more dependent on a perception of balance of power..." (3).

The main variable of the equation is Japan, a country which since the collapse of the US-USSR power equilibrium and with the mounting economic tensions with America, is in a phase of soul searching, which includes some inevitable change of foreign policy, especially as far as its regional dimension is concerned. A number of new facts are to be taken into consideration:

- a) a new power equilibrium is in the making in the region and smaller powers have more autonomy they can use either to contribute to, or to upset this equilibrium. North Korea is a case in point.
- b) maritime security and control of the straits, on which Japan is highly dependent, should be part of the new equilibrium;
- c) the collapse of the Soviet Union has left behind a rather unique case of border dispute, which happens to directly concern Japan, i.e. the sovereignty over the Kurili islands;
- d) economic power seems to be producing limited strategic revenues: not only Japanese offers of economic aid to Russia (apparently not very generous, though) have been unable so far to exact an agreement on the islands from Moscow (which

has been so yielding elsewhere), but also the rather sizeable financial contribution to the Gulf war has not yielded favorable returns in image and political terms:

e) the consequent, hot domestic debate over participation in international peace-keeping operations (PKOs) by a country that, even within the (imposed) constitutional limits, has now reached one of the highest levels of military expenditure in the world is not easy to understand for Western observers. It has nevertheless a number of striking similarities with the debate that has taken place in Germany;

f) the huge civil nuclear program has brought with it a highly skilled army of scientists and technicians in all sectors, including enrichment and reprocessing;

g) the deliberate large recourse to the recycling of plutonium - the largest in the world outside the militarily nuclear countries - has generated a large production of this fissile material, which can easily be diverted to military uses, well above the projected requirements of the power stations (4).

Japan, however, though it had the initial misgivings of the Europeans, has gradually become a full and sincere supporter of the emerging nuclear non proliferation regime and it is reasonable to assume that it will become increasingly active in the coming years. Japanese diplomacy, moreover and for obvious reasons, is trying hard to use the economic leverage to stop North Korea's nuclear activities. Finally Japan is seriously looking for ways to develop multilateral institutional links in the region to catch up with other parts of the world, Europe above all. At the same time, suggestions that Tokyo may find it appropriate to develop a nuclear-powered icebreaker and possibly a nuclear-powered submarine for "scientific research in deep sea" (5) are bound to raise questions especially if associated with the "new facts" above, particularly with the Plutonium bonanza: questions in the region, questions elsewhere.

So, what are the consequences for Europe? First of all, there is the one that has been mentioned for the Near Outside and the Middle Outside: the cracks in the nuclear non proliferation edifice, that might begin here, in the Asia Pacific region and then spread like a cancer through the continent. In view of the author a second scenario is more plausible and more frightening at the same time: the military "nuclearization" of the seas with more players in the game in a context of "maritimization" of nuclear deterrents. Naval capabilities are more mobile and allow for action also in distant areas. Moreover they are more difficult to control, as the recent strategic negotiations have shown.

Not only has the US been particularly keen, throughout the arms control negotiations, in maintaining its strategic sea launched capabilities or has Russia been bordering on war with Ukraine in order to keep its navy, but also second rank nuclear powers like Britain and France are increasingly attracted by reliance on nuclear submarines as the principal component of their "minimal" deterrence. Japan, an island highly sensitive to maritime security as it was already pointed out, may find it difficult to answer the question: why not me too? "Me-tooism" is a chain reaction.

This brings to the fore a final, psychological rather than strategic factor that we should take into account when discussing the impact on Europe: that is the degree of similarity existing between the Japanese position and that of the West European Have-nots. If Tokyo were to go clearly down the road of the double policy - on one side support the regime and, on the other, get ready in case it collapses - how appealing would the example be?

More than in the Near and Middle Outside, where there are considerable short term diplomatic efforts (the peace process for the Middle East and the negotiations between Delhi and Islamabad possibly assisted by external powers), the future of this Japan centered region will also depend on the general long term development of the international landscape and of the rules that characterize it - more or less shared or accepted as they may be.

If in the mix of military and politico-economic instruments to define and maintain security, the balance keeps tilting towards the latter, that is, if we move towards a "civilianization" of international relations, important non nuclear players like Japan will find their way of exerting power without the need to possess the entire array of military instruments. Smaller players, on the contrary are more likely to become pariah states, unless they are brought into institutionalised interdependence - the main challenge for those who have ambitions to shape a new order in the region. And that, in turn, explains the new interest for developing regional institutions that are able to consolidate security, following to an extent the European model. But, if on the contrary, the balance of power logics triumphs with all the traditional strategic paraphernalia that go with it, Japan may go nuclear.

Out of the points above it comes that Japan, although it is placed here in the Far Outside for geographical reasons, is in fact the country closest and most important to Europe in the nuclear non proliferation field. It will be crucial to the future of the regime in ways that are bound to influence the behaviour of the European countries and has the potential of being their best ally in working and carrying out those policy orientations that are sketched in the next section.

5. A tentative conceptual framework for future action

In the previous sections we have discussed the problems and threats that Europe - the Europe defined in the Introduction - is confronted with. Here an attempt will be made at analyzing approaches to possible actions in order to prevent such threat from materialising or to provide adequate responses if they do materialize. Action by whom? If uncertainties exist as to the definition of Europe as an object of threat, no fewer uncertainties are met when trying to define Europe as an actor.

Whichever Europe is defined as the actor, nuclear non proliferation is rather new field of action for it. Neither the CSCE nor NATO has given much attention to or had any experience with non proliferation. The European Political Cooperation (EPC), established among the twelve member countries of the Community, since the mid 1980s has set up a working group on nuclear non proliferation which has provided a useful framework for consultation and for drafting joint declarations, but not for a fulfilled common policy. The Western European Union (WEU) has only recently been given some competence in this policy area. Non proliferation has thus remained a field for national policies, where the relationship with the leading US policy remains dominant. Also very modest is the degree of consultation between the European governments and Japan, despite the numerous similarities that exist between their respective position, as it has been pointed out before.

This is not meant to suggest that the European States should gang up against the US, possibly with the addition of Japan. It is implicit in what has been said so far

that in most cases the leading role of Washington in the field of non proliferation can be considered positive. Such a role remains of paramount importance. However the new situation and the new perceptions mentioned in the Introduction require a redefinition of objectives and instruments by the European countries, namely the members of the EC, i.e. of the emerging European Union (with the WEU acting as a bridge institution in the intermediate period). Such a redefinition cannot be made with calm and detachment, since we are under the pressure of the threats discussed in the previous three sections and, above all, of the dramatic and rapid developments taking place in the former Soviet Union.

Quick response tends to emphasize the advantage of ad-hocery, unilateralism and pragmatism. On the other hand the high degree of interconnection among issues and of interdependence among players tends to emphasize the virtues of globalism, multilateralism and consistency. Let us briefly discuss these two approaches, the empirical and the systemic one.

The empirical approach: it consists of dealing separately with the problems, which can be divided in three groups.

1) Arms control and nuclear weapons reductions. Not only has the end of the Soviet Union and of the deadly East-West confrontation provided the opportunity for an unexpected, dramatic cut of the two by far largest nuclear inventories in the world, but the situation in the CIS requires rapid action, with a number of associated risks in terms of both safety and security. The US has responded promptly enough in four respects: a) by giving sufficient signals of reciprocity either in the framework of negotiations and through mutual response or in unilateral pledges for cuts; b) by providing technical assistance in men and equipments (and sky monitoring); c) by providing also specific financial support - the Nunn-Lugar amendment; d) by linking economic aid to transfers, reductions and distructions.

Particularly relevant to this paper has been the transfer to Russia of all tactical nuclear weapons from other states, particularly the southern states (we hope that no such weapons were unaccounted for, got left behind or fell off the trains).

According to the empirical approach, in view of the urgency and the sensitivity of the matter, as well as of the skills and technologies required, it is better to keep leaving it to the US, which has, in addition, established a unique experience in dealing with the Soviets and their successors. In particular, this approach requires that this complicated problem not be unduely mixed with others, like nuclear proliferation. If we come up with the result of having all the CIS member states except one - Russia - belong to the NPT as non weapons states, the regime should be happy with that, and thankful.

In other areas arms reductions are not as high on the agenda and "arms control" rather than "disarmament" is, at best, the name of the game. Except for the attempts by new countries to acquire nuclear capabilities, which will be dealt with shortly, the most critical issue as far as the subject of this paper is concerned is the spread and improvement of delivery vehicles. Export control by advanced countries is an ever present problem, made more critical today by the proliferation of new suppliers. One major question is whether it is wise to export ABM and, in general, interception technologies. The empirical approach suggests that each case be looked at separately and decided upon on its merits and consequences.

2) *Nuclear non proliferation.* Close monitoring cum intelligence and the appropriate mix of carrot and stick remain the main ingredients of dealing with the proliferation cases that are rather different from one or another as they are deeply intertwined with local situations, tensions and/or conflicts. The nuclear end of a regional tangle may not be the appropriate one for trying a solution.

Take Israel for example: would a sudden zeroing of the unacknowledged nuclear arsenal of this country provide any way out of the problem of the occupied territories? Would it not make more sense to solve this problem first (while nuclear weapons give the Israelis a certain sense of security), then improve relations with the Arab neighbours, with some sort of regional arms control agreement, which would also include a ban of production of any fissile materials, and then, only then, think of a real "nuclear weapon free zone" (NWFZ)?

Similarly the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan can only level off and eventually be reversed if a modus vivendi is found for the two countries, with some arrangement about the troubled borders that separate them. Since the end of the Soviet Union the West has now more leverage on both contenders.

Finally the problem of North Korea can only be solved by putting continuing pressure on the rulers, by using the threat of political and economic isolation (increased by the restoration of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea) and by keeping open the prospect of re-unification of the peninsula.

3) *Defensive or preemptive measures.* At the same time, the empirical school goes on to say, we should prepare for the worse, i.e. for contingencies deriving from substantive steps forward by proliferators, both in terms of acquiring nuclear devices and extending the range of delivering capabilities. Taking into account that the latter may be developed to carry conventional and chemical warheads as well, it is clear that the option for the proliferator means uncertainty for those who feel threatened.

Two solutions are at hand: to take some preemptive action and to build up defences. Preemptive action is difficult, if not such as to win wide international support, either before or after it takes place: to that end it must annihilate a well defined threat; it must do it effectively and without too much collateral damage. The option in itself has the advantage of either making proliferation activities more costly (underground facilities, dummies etc.) or of reducing the number of their possible locations or of discouraging them altogether. Because of the mentioned problems, however, action is risky and in some cases simply not a viable option.

Defensive measures can be of different scale. The transfer of a number of Patriots in Sicily, although presented as a routine NATO manoeuvre, appeared to be mainly a message to Gheddafi. It could be a prelude to larger and more systematic deployments of the improved ABM non-nuclear systems with appropriate equipment for early warning, tracking and guidance that the advocates of new SDIs are trying to sell. Some go even further and suggest a full scale re-direction of Atlantic deterrence capabilities toward the new enemies, toward the South instead of the East.

Defensive measures or the more or less open preparedness for preemptive action to confront proliferation threats for Europe relate obviously to the Near Outside. However, something of the kind has probably been in the cards as far as the Korean peninsula is concerned.

The empirical approach definitely has a number of advantages, but has drawbacks too. The hasty process of concentrating and reducing the ex-Soviet huge nuclear armaments, though exciting as it may be, risks having a negative impact on, or at least missing a tremendous opportunity to strengthen, the nuclear non proliferation regime. A more systemic response, if possible without sacrificing immediacy, may provide broader and long term advantages, as will be discussed below.

Separate, ad-hoc activities generate frictions among Western countries, which have different approaches and different instruments. One clear example is the case of Germany, a non-nuclear-weapon country which is inevitably decisive every time the economic leverage is to be used to impose non-proliferation measures. Instinctively this great economic-only power has so far tended to be driven by export imperatives: consequently, before the new export control provisions were introduced, it behaved often irresponsibly as far as non proliferation is concerned. In the future wiser behaviours and more concerted policies must go hand in hand.

Finally, new defenses aimed at proliferators have limits or even drawbacks. First they are likely to confront only direct threats and not those scenarios of local tension or conflict that can generate a broader sense of danger. Secondly, they are bound to influence the choices of the proliferators, especially as far as the delivery vehicles are concerned, be they military (for instance, sea-launched capabilities would be more appealing) or not (the famous suit-case!).

Thus, let us turn to the systemic approach to see if it has any advantage over the empirical one, so that it can usefully supplement it. Such approach will also be discussed at three levels, for the sake of symmetry if nothing else.

1) Global non proliferation. As has been shown in this paper, the threat for Europe, whether it comes from the Near, the Middle or the Far Outside, is increased by the weakening of the non proliferation regime. But the deadline of 1995 requires that the regime be strengthened. As was hinted at before, the most important opportunity to strengthen the regime comes from the developments taking place in the former Soviet Union. One frequent complaint of the new States is the sense of being discriminated against with respect to Russia. If an international non proliferation discipline with the involvement of the IAEA were imposed on all the CIS members, be they militarily nuclear or not, this sense of discrimination would be highly reduced.

Of course, discrimination would be again pointed out, this time by Moscow, with respect to the other NPT-defined nuclear countries. The answer should be that such countries should also accept a new international non proliferation discipline, well beyond the prescriptions of the treaty. The objection that their security and deterrent capabilities would be seriously affected is increasingly unable to withstand closer scrutiny. It is not the task of this chapter to elaborate what such a new discipline may consist of. Suffice it here to say that the narrowing of the gap between the Haves and Have-nots imposed by the regime would eliminate to a large extent one of the most serious reasons of opposition or half-hearted support for the regime itself.

This proposal - ça va sans dire - is not meant to be the only provision to strengthen the regime and to replace the traditional pleas to give IAEA more money, to improve safeguards, to tighten export controls, etc.. It is given a little more emphasis here simply because it might be more innovative and possibly have a

catalyzing effects on the others.

2) *Western Security*. The traditional priority the Atlantic Alliance has given to what used to be called the Central Front, possibly explains the current situation of a mission-searching NATO being pulled East so much as to nearly and gradually overlap with CSCE. The Mediterranean members of the Alliance, who have systematically complained about their Southern Flank being secondary, may find today that "plus ça change plus c'est le meme chose": the new threats coming from the South are not looked at with sufficient attention (6).

In the view of the author the sense of belonging to some sort of a security framework which NACC may possibly provide to the CIS members can also help nuclear non proliferation and thus reduce the threat for Europe, combining systemic with empirical approaches. The North-African and Middle Eastern problems as part of the threat coming from the Near Outside should, however, be the object of defensive or preemptive provisions to ensure the security of the NATO countries. This raises the old issue of the Alliance's role in out-of-area contingencies, an issue which seems able to endure even after the end of the "area".

All potential crises emanating from nuclear proliferation contemplated in this paper are by definition located out of area. The Alliance would then be prevented from dealing with them until the very moment they translate into a direct offense against a member country. The result is the dominance of bilateral relations with the US with the possible corollary of the usual, though obsolete and divisive attempts to revive a special role of the "nuclear countries". Rather it may be of some use to consider the formation of a permanent consultative group, emanating from the Council (to by-pass the problem of participation of those countries not belonging to the integrated structure of NATO) to deal with non proliferation policies.

Something of the kind should also be envisaged in the Asia-Pacific region, with the obvious important participation of Japan. The G-7 may then usefully operate some sort of coordination between the two frameworks, especially insofar as the economic leverage is likely to be used frequently.

All that may be part of a general movement toward the gradual disappearance of the geographic limits of the competence of the Alliance or the G-7, something the Europeans should accept in exchange for an American acceptance, less half-hearted than has been so far, of an integrated security policy of the members of WEU, today, and those of the European Union, tomorrow. Which brings us to the third and final level.

3) *A common European Security policy*. The working group on nuclear non proliferation that was set up in the framework of the EPC may provide a model for the one to be considered by the Atlantic Alliance, as suggested here. But it is no longer sufficient for a Community which has the ambition of becoming integrated also in the political realm along the lines of the process set in motion by the European Council of Maastricht.

The European Union is being given an embryo of common security policy, and in January 1992 the French President went as far as proposing (somewhat vaguely) a "common reflection" on the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe, to include the two existing national nuclear forces of member states. Any discussion of

what this European security policy may consist of is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is only stressed here that the non proliferation field has been defined as an area of "common and security policy" under the terms of art.D of the Maastricht Treaty by the European Council in Lisbon. This implies that the related "decisions must be taken by a qualified majority" (art. C).

A solid framework for concerted action would allow the Europeans to join in as leaders of the non proliferation regime, both in broader multilateral fora, Western and global - the systemic approach -, and in those fields which require prompt action to enhance arms reductions, to prevent proliferation and to confront proliferators with some sort of common defense provisions - the empirical approach.

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