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**THE NEW WORLD ORDER
A PERCEPTION FROM THE SOUTHERN REGION**

by Stefano Silvestri

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A perception from the Southern Region

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Burden-sharing cum solidarity

A new strategic dimension is evolving, where the old meaning of deterrence is undergoing revision and where security will have to be guarded more by an active policy of crisis management than by a relatively static defense posture in Europe.

This change has been dramatically underlined by the President of the United States. A "New World Order" has been stated as an American foreign policy objective by president George Bush, for the first time, September 11, 1990, as an aftermath of the US commitment in the Gulf. In 1991, the word "order" itself has the savor of wishful thinking. The world is changing too rapidly to allow for any kind of stability and regularity.

For a while, the New World Order could have been envisioned as a revamped version of the old "Pax Americana". Gorbachev, before the "Seventy-two hours golpe" of August 1991, might have thought of it as a revised edition of the traditional "bipolar regime", dominated by the two military superpowers. Some were betting on a reinforcement of the United Nations machinery. Some others were considering the Seven's Summits (possibly enlarged to the USSR) as the only realistic path to a new global government. Bush itself has not indicated any clear institutional setting or political program. He has only spoken of a "new responsibility" imposed upon the USA by its military and political successes.

While the latter consideration might be true, the fact is that such a "responsibility" can rapidly become unbearable, overextended and blurred by the rapidity of the changes taking place and their unavoidable ambiguity. Take for instance the case of the "enlargement" of NATO (or Western) commitments to the East. The future of the USSR as well as of the former Soviet empire might impose on this new kind of NATO highly unpalatable tasks, from the curbing of national revolutions to the maintenance of domestic stability.

At the same time, the pledge to defend and foster the democratization process and to stand by the freely expressed will of the people compels the West to adopt a policy of interference in the domestic affairs of other countries which generates increasing expectations (in the economic as well as in the political and security fields) and resulting new burdens.

It is becoming quite clear that in order to manage future multi-faceted crises it might very well suit the West to have dual capabilities and options to act as NATO, as Americans or as Europeans, under different kinds of institutional and legal arrangements. Both the Gulf and the Yugoslav crisis follow this pattern: the first having seen the primary commitment of the US, with the concrete backing of NATO and of the other Western allies, and the second experiencing the beginning of a Western European leadership which will require an equivalent commitment and help from the US and from the Atlantic Alliance.

The necessity arises to devise efficient burden-sharing schemes: the simplistic idea of a future US unipolar regime could very well result in the Allies relinquishing their responsibilities by fostering the notion that all will be well if left to Washington. At the same time no New Order could be based on the assumption that only the Americans can lead, in every crisis or circumstance. Burden-sharing requires the establishment of a new multi-polar security regime in which responsibilities will be conveniently shared, but in which solidarity will be assured.

That is why the Atlantic debate will have to be put in a larger perspective, together with a new role for the UN, the strengthening of global multilateral institutions like the IMF, GATT, the Summits of the Seven most industrialized countries and the OECD, as well as new instruments and policies designed to give stability to the new political realities emerging from the crumbling of the Soviet system.

More than anything else, however, a new balanced approach to the Atlantic partnership requires a common American and European approach to defining some crisis management strategies and principles, in order to act together vis-a-vis the Third World, Eastern Europe and the USSR, through a variety of international institutions and with the mobilization of all the existing relevant assets.

I. The situation

While conceived when the Gulf was on the fore of attention, today the New World Order will have to prove itself in the East as well, the Soviet Union included. Meanwhile, the Mediterranean and Middle-Eastern regions will remain two of the major battleground where the New World Order will have to try its chances. It means that many different crises will have to be managed at the same time, with the added handicap that evolutions in one theater will influence the others.

Situations are different. Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Mediterranean regions are economically and commercially dominated by the

European Community. The Soviet Union is too large to be economically dominated, but is experiencing a systemic catastrophe in all sectors of its economy.

Militarily the situation is highly complex. First, Western Europe itself needs the military assistance and guarantee of the United States to support its own security, even if the actual permanent presence of American Armed Forces in Europe and in the Mediterranean is rapidly shrinking. Second, the USSR, albeit greatly reduced in power, holds the wider and more frightening conventional and nuclear arsenal of the continent. Third, local Middle Eastern actors are trying to build up their own conventional and unconventional arsenals. Fourth, domestic instability problems (such as economic crisis, unemployment, religious fundamentalism, radical nationalism, etc.) are increasing their importance for the overall security of these regions.

More in general, the Western perception of the main security threats is changing: indeed, the word "threat" itself has almost disappeared, replaced by "challenges" or "risks". This semantic change should not produce a false perception of nonchalant assurance and a stream of condescending accommodations, however. The fact that some old and well-known threats are disappearing does not mean that the new "risks" might not evolve in new major threats. Furthermore, while the former threats were confronted through a well-oiled and efficient political and military machinery, the new ones require major changes and adaptations, thus greatly diminishing the Western ability to deal with them.

Arduous problems of economic development, political stability and military security need a newly conceived "Grand Strategy" to deal with them. Possibly, new crisis resolution patterns are emerging, different from those of the past. If it means anything at all, the New World Order should be the first draft of such a "Grand Strategy". It has important weaknesses, however, both in political-strategic and in institutional-management terms.

A military strategy of efficient utilization of new technological advantages requires a complex management system, fully integrating a very large number of electro-magnetic, optical and space technologies, as well as advanced materials. Past experience has shown that whenever technological revolutions of this importance reach the battlefield, small numbers of well trained and well armed professionals can overwhelm a much larger mass of less trained and less armed rivals. At the same time, greater centralization and dependence from the smooth working of an highly complex set of inter-related and sophisticate technologies, create new weaknesses. The sheer amount of military hardware and software deployed in the Gulf before the crisis, the time-span it required to become fully operational, as well as its costs, inspire some apprehensions on the capacity of the West to realize similar accomplishments repeatedly.

Nuclear deterrence is also changing. While the USSR nuclear capabilities are still important enough to justify the continuous need of some form of nuclear extended deterrence for Western Europe, the perspective of nuclear (and chemical) proliferations and of increasing military instability (East and South) is establishing the need for more "discriminate" forms of nuclear strategy. In one scenario, contingencies which might require a nuclear response seem to be very remote. In other scenarios, the necessity of maintaining a highly credible (thus workable) nuclear deterrence posture, and some rational escalatory options, is an immediate necessity.

The attempted golpe of August 1991 has accelerated the end of Communism, the disbandment of the Communist Party, and the collapse of the central federal authority. It is yet unclear what kind of new common structure will emerge, if any, from the gathering together of the newly independent Republics. It is likely that the Russian Republic will attempt the formation of some kind of Commonwealth, more or less structured institutionally, with or without a common president (in the person of Mr. Gorbachev). It seems highly probable, however, that only Russia will be the real successor state of the Soviet Union in the military field, both conventional and nuclear.

A number of important decisions come to the forefront. First of all the international recognition of those Republics which will prefer to break away from any kind of future Union (i.e., as of August 1991, the Baltic Republics, Georgia and Moldavia). Second, the new economic and political relations to be established with these states and with those preserving some degree of (loose) common ties, which will allow them to maintain a high degree of freedom (or even independence) in foreign and security policy too. Third, the establishment of a new (or renovated) security framework, encompassing this large area of the Eurasian continent, to avoid the confrontations, crises and wars which might be born out of the decomposition of the Soviet empire.

It is highly plausible that a number of these Republics, starting from the Baltic but including at least Belorussia and Ukraine, and certainly Moldavia, will claim their "Europeaness", in order to grasp some benefits from the West and to consolidate their newly acquired independence vis-a-vis the Russian giant. Russia itself will be tempted by the Western way, for many sound reasons: the requirement of economic and technical help, the wish to make a clean break with its Communist past, the rediscovery of its traditional European policy, the need to maintain its relationship with the other Republics (first of all its main agricultural supplier, Ukraine), both on economic and on security grounds. Ukraine alone (a territory about 1/5 larger than France) with a population of 52 million comes sixth in Europe, after Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy, well before Spain or Poland.

An antithetical hypothesis would bet on the reorganization of a tight

Confederation of Sovereign Republics, where Russia would play the pivotal economic and security role, instead of the Western powers. While this hypothesis might be credible still on the military level, from an economic point of view is practically groundless. Russia, with 76.7% of the territory of the former Soviet Union, and 51.4% of its population, produces only slightly more than half of the total agriculture and industrial output of the Union (between 52 and 55%): that is, a percentage perfectly in line with its population share, and very little more. Moreover, the fact that Russia includes 16 Autonomous Republics, 5 Autonomous Regions and 10 National Areas, suggests that it will not be without its own "domestic" ethnic and nationalistic crises, which might greatly reduce its effectiveness as the new political center of the upcoming Confederation.

Moreover, the process of devolution from the present Soviet Union to a (still obscure) future setup is bound to take time, to suffer a number of incoherences and to precipitate various related problems, many of them in the southern rim of the present USSR.

Some of these conflicts could rapidly involve Western interests and actors (e.g., the future status of the "Uniate" religious community, the fate of the Polish or German minorities, the position of the Jews). Some others might challenge the existing infra-Soviet and international borders (e.g., between Moldavia and Ukraine, and between Moldavia and Rumania). New conflicts might spring from the establishment of strategic and political enclaves (e.g., Kaliningrad, the Nagorno-Karabakh). Displaced populations might attempt to regain their historic fatherland (e.g., the Tatars tribes of Crimea, which will come to Ukraine from territories of the Russian Republic, where they are one of the most consistent minorities). All the newly independent Republics, with the only exception of Lithuania, Armenia and Azerbaijan, will have to deal with the permanence of a mosaic of "minorities" ranging from 25% up to more than 50% of their populations (Russia: about 17-18%).

In the South, as of August 1991, only Georgia seems to have chosen the path of full independence. However, the situation is uncertain still in Azerbaijan and could rapidly worsen. Major crises could ensue the reshuffling of the Caucasus "puzzle", where the world's most complex mixture of populations is occupying a hopeless web of intermingled territories. The common cultural identity of the descendants of the Turanian nomadic populations (mixed with Turkish, Iranian and Mongolian blood), inhabiting the Asian Republics, might further increase the complexity of this picture, stressing older Pan-Turanian ambitions to "national" unity (which might directly affect Turkey).

A similar problem follows from the relationships between Azerbaijan and Iran. In 1945 a communist uprisal in the Iranian northern territories established the ground for a Soviet military intervention with the aim of unifying the entire

Azerbaijani region under the same rule. This attempt was fooled by the firm stand taken by the US (it was the beginning of the "cold war"). Tomorrow's situation might be completely different, and see the bid to build an independent unified Azerbaijan at the expenses of both the USSR and Iran, or even an Iranian annexation of this Soviet Republic.

While until now the particular varieties of Soviet Islamism have not shown a specific leaning toward fundamentalism, the situation might change for the worse if ethnic conflicts will continue unabated.

Thus, the old "domestic" ethnic conflicts of the Soviet Union can rapidly levitate to the level of "international" conflicts.

The decline of the Soviet worldwide power and military projection will change many well established regional balances and is affecting already the survival of some nations and governments in the South. Ethiopia has experienced the abrupt falling down of its Soviet-backed regime and is now undergoing a process of national fragmentation. Both Cuba and Vietnam will have to deal with a growing political and military isolation which, in the case of Cuba, might bring about the collapse of its Communist dictatorship, while it is softening already the Vietnamese regime in the direction of a kind of "perestrojka". The recent Cambodian agreement has been favored by the new preeminence gained by China (and by the West) in Asia, after the downfall of the Soviet might. The American military commitment in the Gulf has been simplified and helped greatly by the cooperative attitude taken by Moscow.

While these developments might be judged positively by the West, others have more ambiguous connotations. The relative position of India versus Pakistan might be negatively affected, re-opening the Kashmir question. Initially, the peace process in the Middle East was favored by the policy of cooperation with the US followed by Gorbachev: a complete collapse of the Soviet international role, however, might weaken the international pressures on the Arab world and diminish the value of the bargain struck between Israel and the Soviet Union on the Jewish immigrants question.

The Southern region of NATO is in a strange strategic situation. From one side it participates in the European balance and from the other side it borders with the South. These two strategic directions are not fully compatible. On the contrary, the recent events are increasing the gap between them.

There is the possibility of deep cuts of the existing nuclear and conventional arsenals, especially in Europe, in contradiction with the increasing number of local crises and new "regional" threats, both in the South and in the East. It is really possible to reduce dramatically nuclear arsenals while at the same time the perspective of

nuclear proliferation escalates its probabilities? There is the possibility that nuclear proliferation might be favored by excessive cuts of the existing arsenals, thus increasing the perception that even a very limited deterrent might become a "credible" one.

A number of "scenarios" can be drawn, highlighting various possible nuclear threats linked either to traditional nuclear proliferation threats, or to the new proliferation "by devolution" of the present Soviet nuclear arsenal to at least some of the former Soviet Republics. Among the countries that might find themselves in a troublesome situation is Turkey, which might be forced to contemplate anew its security perspectives and its nuclear non proliferation choice.

Disarmament is a limited answer to a well identified situation in a stable political and strategic environment. If the environment changes, the answer should change too.

Obviously, a great priority should be given to the extension and the enhancement of the NPT for another period, after 1995. The present crisis, however, suggests the opportunity of identifying the contents and the form of an entirely new nuclear regime, possibly giving a greater weight to supranational or international institutions, especially the UN.

At the same time it would be useful to reinforce other means of prevention of non conventional proliferation, or at least to set up a better framework for dealing with them, among them the Geneva Convention against the use of chemical weapons, and the negotiations for a new Treaty for chemical disarmament. A similarly serviceable instrument is the Missile Technology Control Regime, which should be strengthened and streamlined. COCOM's regulations to curb the export of militarily relevant technology to the Communist countries will rapidly become obsolete, but they could be used as the basis for conceiving a new control regime in order to improve the MTCR and to better contain the weapons trade to the Third World. At the same time, COCOM's lists could become the foundation of a generalized regulations and inspections system to check the changes of the various military and strategic balances and to identify at the right time eventual violations of the agreements and the emergence of new dangers and threats.

All these measures and policies will probably be of a limited importance, if no new crisis management mechanism will be established. Events in the East can further complicate crises in the South and add some new one.

II. A greater Western European commitment

The EC has been present on the international scene along with the older European national powers, slowly taking the lead and effectively shaping the overall perception of Europe from the outside. It has developed new international policy instruments, from the new "Association Agreements" with the Eastern countries to the various Lomé Agreements with the African, Caribbean and Latin American countries, to the Mediterranean policy of the EC to the Euro-Arab dialogue, to the multilateral agreement between the EC and the ASEAN and to the latest one between the EC and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

From an economic point of view, the major trade partner of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries, as well as of the Sub-Saharan countries, is the European Community. In recent years, the EC has counted for almost 50% of the total trade of the Mediterranean countries, 30% of the total trade of the Gulf countries (oil included) and about 44% of the total trade of the Sub-Saharan African countries.

Moreover, the enlargement of the European Community in the Mediterranean, with the accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece, has increased the need to work out an overall approach toward this area, taking into account the problem of Turkey, whose entry into the Community is practically excluded for the time being, but whose role for the defense and security of Western Europe remains vital. The strict interdependence existing between the Community and countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Israel, coupled with increasingly worrying demographic trends, create an obligation for Europe to work out a better and overall crisis management approach.

The question is if and how the present European civilian power can evolve and expand to become a full-sized international power, resulting in the end in the birth of a new security power, putting together, according to the same "grand strategy", all the assets presently dispersed among its various components.

There is the necessity to use a better combination of various leverages other than only the military ones for crisis management. The economic leverage in particular has been tried various times, with mixed results. While economic sanctions were apparently ineffective, at least in the short run, economic aid proved to be somewhat more significant. The need to work out a better global strategy encompassing economic, financial, trade and military elements at the same time seems to be generally accepted.

It is very likely that Western Europe will have to develop its Eastern policy much further East than it was expected, down to the Pacific Ocean, and China. Some help might be forthcoming from Japan, even if it might be limited mainly to the Asian regions of Russia (and provided that the current dispute over the possession of the Kurili Islands will be settled on Japanese terms). The United States will be greatly

interested and committed to the preservation of military stability, but its economic contribution will stay modest in relations to the demand and to the actual indigence of these countries.

In the end the main burden will fall on the Western European shoulders. Western Europe will have both to find the best way to integrate the former land of Soviet Union into the world market, and the means to sustain its domestic stability through an improved international cooperation. A truly tough assignment, especially if in the meantime the European Community will continue to lack a proper foreign policy on European questions different from its continued "enlargement".

The worst is happening already in the Balkans. Trapped between East and South, the Balkans are a problem in itself, characterized by accelerated economic collapse and exacerbated ethnic and national conflictuality.

Any European policy in this region has to blend closely security, political and economic factors, thus enormously complicating decisions and management. The policies of slow but gradual integration applied by the EC to Mitteleuropa require profound adaptations in order to confront the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, the partial democratization failure in Romania and the perspective of conflicts between Turkey and Bulgaria, and among Hungary, Serbia and Rumania, on minority rights and possibly self-determination.

Yugoslavia poses specific difficulties, given the sorrow state of its economy (which has reached again the levels of a three-digit inflation), and the intricacies of its ethnic policies. It seems almost impossible to envisage a peaceful solution to the present crisis, as well as an easy transition to fragmentation. The option of a "graceful degradation", over time, of the Yugoslav Federation has been proved optimistic, but has no real alternatives, except a greater direct involvement on the terrain.

The Western European approach is somewhat uncertain, while the other "regional" initiatives attempted until now have practically failed to have any concrete result, with the possible exception of avoiding an a multiplication of national approaches to the crisis.

The European commitments increase, however, with the decision to play a conciliatory role among Yugoslavs, to send a number of observers, to study the possibility of sending a military peace-keeping force and to accept some responsibility for the future economic development of these nations. It is a slowly creeping commitment, which might oblige to further escalations, thus engulfing Western European forces into the Yugoslav quagmire.

Should that happen, however, the US participation would become necessary

in order to provide the Europeans with the necessary mobility, the decisive technological edge, and some deterrent capability. A theoretical possibility would be the repetition of the Gulf scenario, with a Western intervention backed and authorized through the UN (or possibly the CSCE). In practice, however, this crisis seems to be much more complex than the Gulf one, both in military/operational and in political terms. If any similarity from past crises is to be considered, probably Lebanon or Cyprus are a better choice. In both these cases, however, the military intervention of the local dominant power (Syria or Israel in Lebanon, Turkey in Cyprus) had limited territorial and political objectives, thus making it possible the arrangement of an international compromise. It is not clear yet if Serbia and the Federal Yugoslav Army have the limited objective of controlling the Croatian territory inhabited by Serbs, or if they have more ambitious aims. In the latter case any intervention from the outside will have to consider the possibility of a strong armed opposition and will be highly unlikely.

In any case, the solution to the Yugoslav crisis is bound to affect profoundly all the other Balkan problems, from Albania to Macedonia, Rumania, Moldavia, and so on. Thus it will involve the direct national interests of a number of countries (old and "new"), from Turkey to Greece, Russia, Ukraine, and many others.

III. Western Europe, the US and NATO

A new multilateral crisis management policy is urgently needed, which will have to consider all the inter-relationships between regional crises and global problems (East-West, trade, financial and economic management, resources, technology, demography, etc.), and which will require a better working of the Western system of alliances: a new coherence and a fair balance of power and responsibilities between the Usa and its main allies in Europe and in the Third World.

It means that a stronger political and managerial cohesion of the Western system is urgently needed: some form of common security and foreign policy as well as joint military planning. A multi-purpose system, called upon in order to deal with multi-directional risks, in a variety of geographical theaters, with a highly discriminate strategy, utilizing different mixes of national and multi-national forces in order to manage various kind of crises, is enormously different from the present Atlantic Alliance, geographically circumscribed, strategically uni-directional, strictly defensive: it is much more similar to a real Community, a new international protagonist acting in the world with the same determination and flexibility normally associated with the national states.

However, is that a credible option for the future?

Major crises are dealt with through a wide number of institution, superimposed the one to the other without coherence. For instance, while the last crisis in the Gulf has confirmed the operational importance of NATO, its future role as a central decision-making institution has been variously challenged:

- the UN role has been revived (even NATO has presented its involvement in the Gulf operations as a way of implementing its statutory commitment to the UN Charter);
- the Atlantic Alliance is variously limited and "encompassed" by pan-European East-West agreements, such as CSCE, CFE and 2+4;
- a process of European integration, centered on the EC, is going to include foreign and security policies, and a common defence role;
- a policy of "strategic independence" is asserting itself in the United States;
- while the new security risks and challenges are generally perceived as "multi-dimensional" (comprising economic, social and political aspects, as well as military) no new competencies or functions are tested or considered for NATO in order to deal with these other dimensions of crisis management.

In the Gulf, NATO has been widely utilized, but it has never been in command. Meanwhile, Eastern Europe is the primary concern of the Group of 24, of the EC and of the OECD. The policy toward the Soviet Union is mainly dealt through bilateral relations. Even important security concerns, like nuclear proliferation, control of technology exports, limitation of missile technology spread, curbing of chemical and biological weapons, are examined through ad hoc organizations and committees, at the United Nations or at the Summits of the Seven most industrialized countries.

No sensible European choice can ignore the relationship with the US, especially where overseas problems are concerned. Crisis management goes hand in hand with other transatlantic problems like burden sharing and the future of the US military presence in Europe.

The Atlantic Alliance, however, cannot be considered the best institution for dealing with these matters. Moreover, the economic dimensions of crisis management are almost as important as the military ones, and are practically excluded from the competencies of the Alliance (even if they are theoretically included in the Treaty and receive some attention in specialized committees of the Atlantic Council).

The Strategy Review Group of the Alliance has adopted a "four category" approach, identifying possible threats/risks from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, out-of-area direct threats and out-of-area indirect threats. More in general, the Alliance

is supposed to protect the peace and to exercise crisis management functions in a large number of contingencies, thus enlarging "de facto" its areas of competence, in line with its Gulf experience.

It is quite clear, however, that the range of contingencies is increasing enormously, encompassing unconventional aspects of defense and security like civil wars, ecological threats, nuclear, chemical and technological proliferations, social and economic stability, migrations, and so on. In military terms, the Alliance is moving away from the traditional identification of unidirectional risks to multi-directional (and multi-dimensional) risks.

SACEUR has recently stated that future NATO planning will be based on "generic scenarios and exercises of a generic enemy -that is to say a generalized enemy". Instead of a specific, well determined threat confronting its borders, NATO should be ready to manage a number of less clear risks affecting its interests. He doesn't call for the setting of more specific scenarios, substituting the very precise one held by NATO during the past forty years (the Russians are coming), but for a more accurate study of generic crisis management problems.

These changes seem to postulate the need for a stronger political and managerial cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance: some form of common security and foreign policy as well as joint military planning. A multi-purpose Alliance, called upon in order to deal with multi-directional risks, in a variety of geographical theaters, with a highly discriminate strategy, utilizing different mixes of national and multi-national forces in order to manage various kind of crises, is enormously different from the present Alliance, geographically circumscribed, strategically uni-directional, strictly defensive: it is much more similar to a real Community, a new international protagonist acting in the world with the same determination and flexibility normally associated with the national states.

However, exactly at the moment at which the Atlantic Alliance should increase its capacity of global political management, its member countries are choosing different paths and giving the related competencies to other bodies. The Atlantic Alliance maintains of course its primary military function: however, can these military capabilities be automatically shifted to bear force on out-of-area theaters (not only in the Gulf, but also in Yugoslavia).

The debate on the "geographical boundaries" of the Atlantic Alliance might not have a strong juridical basis, but it shows the persistence of important political differences. Even the traditional aspiration to build a "European Pillar" of the Atlantic Alliance is turning sour, amid a complex web of infra-Atlantic misgivings, American rebukes and twisted political perceptions.

This is particularly important from a Southern Region point of view, in order to avoid a further splitting of the strategic scenario and of Western cooperation between East and South. The widening of the security scenario to embrace the former Soviet Union as well as the Middle East cannot be confronted without major institutional and political changes. We have two possibilities: the first, to quote Margaret Thatcher, is "a Europe of nation-states, a Europe that is open as soon as possible to participation of those European states currently outside of the European Community, notably the democratizing states of post-communist East Europe".

This "Tatcherite" model implies the enlargement of the EC instead of its deepening, and the delegation of any crisis management capability (if any) to the United States only. It leaves the burden of the new International Order (if any) on the shoulders of the US, while at the same time accelerating the process of change in the East. As for the South, it ignores its requests of a stronger European political and economic commitment and again leaves to the US alone the main responsibility for the maintenance of peace.

The second possibility is the development of a European identity, increasingly organic, encompassing security as well as economy. It would be a choice in favor of deepening before of instead of enlargement. This second choice might create a few problems with the US and for NATO, in the short term, but might be more forthcoming in the longer term.

In fact the main American concern seems to be the need to avoid any faction building in the Alliance undermining its cohesion and its military efficiency. Provided that these assets will be preserved, the US might be ready to recognize the attempts made by European allies to "strengthen the security dimension in the process of European political integration" even while stressing the need for transparency and complementarity.

It is therefore possible that these crisis factors will be overcome by the return to a more relaxed and outward looking atmosphere of trust and cooperation. All the necessary premises for success were already devised before the Gulf crisis, by the US administration itself. The new relationship established between the US government and the European Community, and the recently signed Trans-Atlantic declaration are cases in point. Equally significant was the formula utilized by the North Atlantic Council in December 1990, describing NATO as one of the key elements of a "framework of interlocking institutions" that will constitute the future European security system.

There will certainly be a role for NATO, but there will be also a role for the European Community, the CSCE, the United Nations and many other international fora. This is also the meaning of the "framework of interlocking institutions" described

by the Atlantic Council: it is there that "the interests of all European states can be accommodated. The three key elements of the European architecture are the Alliance, the process of European integration and the CSCE". And this framework might eventually expand to global, United Nations dimensions.

The need to combine different kinds of leverage; the ability to deal with the superpowers and with local countries at the same time; the necessity of enrolling the allies in a common strategy to be pursued both locally and internationally, both militarily and through other means, can be summarized as the capacity to manage a "coalition strategy". This requires a **better integration of the various decision making machineries involved with crisis management, both at the national and at the European levels**. The latter in particular requires major revisions if the aim is to improve the collective European crisis management ability.

Its main task will be to combine the answers to four different processes presently underway:

- the transformation of NATO and of the strategic relationship between Europe and the USA,
- the Western European integration process,
- the construction of a new system of cooperation and stability in Europe, East and West,
- the growing economic, demographic and ideological pressures from the South.

To deal with these problems, Western Europe should develop a decision making process capable of mobilizing a variety of civilian and military resources. It might accommodate a number of incongruence and competing competencies at various decision levels, but its should at least be able to determine the main aims to be reached.

But the existing European institutions are lacking exactly that: the decision-making center is still wanting, while the middle-level process of consultation and concert has been enormously dilated, without giving to it the necessary powers to check and unify the disparate behaviors of the member countries.

An empirical answer to this problem has been tried with the institutionalization of the European Summit which, however, needs to delegate more decisions to its lower levels and to concentrate only on major issues.

This hypothesis, however, will also require a more efficient and powerful

middle level of management. It exists as an embryo in the Commission, Permanent Representative Committee and Political Cooperation Secretariat of the European Community, but without all the necessary powers and decision making rapidity. It exists in an even less developed form in the Atlantic Alliance, at the military level, in the supreme military commands of NATO.

Thus, any evolutionary model will have to confront the issue of how to unify competencies distributed among various institutions and how to streamline and ameliorate the multilateral decision-making process.

Along the previous lines, an "incremental model" should consider the possibility of a step-by-step merger of the WEU in the EC (to be completed by 1998, when the Brussels revised Treaty expires), the necessary institutional changes, the possible role of the various institutions of the Community and, in particular, the role to be given to the European Parliament.

An evolutionary model might foster an interesting specialization of roles and responsibilities among institutions and among allies (including the USA), combining a different sharing of burdens, risks and responsibilities in Europe and overseas.

This development will be accelerated by the requirement to solve the present "democratic deficit" of the European decision making system: an absolute necessity in the security and defence field, in which the problem of political and social consensus is of paramount importance.

The better way to deal with the problem of a European security identity is the creation of a common, independent European Security and Defense Community or organization, which could then establish its own links with the USA, within NATO. The problem of political control of the European military command, however, requires a common political institution stronger than the present WEU, more efficient and with greater democratic legitimacy. The most likely solution allows for the survival of all the present European institutions (WEU and the EC/EPC), while increasing their coordination (and eventual integration) starting from the top, that is from the European Council. This body will increasingly address security matters and will "push down" its deliberation through the EPC and the other relevant institutions to the operational level.

The latter is likely to remain national (and conceivably NATO) for the near future, allowing for some greater coordination and possibly for the constitution of a limited number of multinational units. The new structure of the European Defense is not likely to repeat the attempt made by the European Defence Community Treaty of 1952 to fully unify all existing European Armed Forces.

This evolutionary solution, however, will not work unless much more operational flesh will be put into the existing European military structures, in terms of unified commands, pre-planning, exercises, identification of the procurement needs, and so on. That means that in the end no serious progress can be made toward a common European capability of overseas crisis management unless the national defence and military competencies will be challenged and decreased: something that has not yet been done by NATO and even less by the WEU.

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