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# EUROPEAN GOALS AND INTERESTS

*by Stefano Silvestri*

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For centuries, the major European powers have dealt with world problems, more or less effectively, from the center of the world system. It was a gigantic undertaking, though it involved relatively few men and scarce resources: it ended, however, with the incredible waste of two European and World Wars after which Europe has lost is position of world supremacy. Until then, the cost-efficiency of building empires was great, and its cultural and economic motivations went unchallenged.

The situation completely changed in the XX century. After World War II, and during the de-colonization period a new mood was felt in the West: a nearly unexpungable guilt, full of sophistry, bombast and plain bad faith has become the legacy of the greater part of Western Europe, denying the idea itself that Europe could and should have an international role, which could be different from its past, but nonetheless consistent with its economic and political strength.

Recent events are finally dissipating this political shyness. A new awareness of the realities and necessities of international politics and of crisis management is slowly taking its place.

The perception and reality of the main security threats to the West are changing, and these changes are greatly affecting the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, the word threat itself has almost disappeared, replaced by "challenges" or "risks".

Gigantic problems of economic development, political stability and military security require a "Grand Strategy" to deal with them. Possibly, new crisis resolution patterns are emerging, different from those of the past.

The Strategy Review Group of the Atlantic Alliance has adopted a "four category" approach, identifying possible threats/risks from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, out-of-area direct threats and out-of-area indirect threats. More in general, the Alliance is supposed to protect the peace and to exercise crisis management functions in a large number of contingencies.

It is quite clear, however, that the range of contingencies is increasing enormously, encompassing unconventional aspects of defense and security like civil wars, ecological threats, nuclear, chemical and technological proliferations, social and economic stability, migrations, and so on. The European security policy is moving away from the traditional identification of the unidirectional threat from the East to

multi-directional (and multi-dimensional) risks from all around.

During the Seventies and about half of the Eighties, the expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World created the impression that a new bipolar system was being established, at least in the military sphere. These were the years of the "Soviet Paradox", when the USSR was seen as a military giant and an economic dwarf. The paradox is now ending, with the retreat of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the settlement on Namibia and Angola and the overall reduction of Soviet military assistance to Third World countries, the moderate and helpful behaviour of the Soviet government during the war against Iraq.

The diminished importance of the East-West confrontation does not mean a complete withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the world strategic arena. However, it could increase the importance of future Western decisions to shape and prepare the future world order.

The new powers coming into age in the Third World, will have a greater role in the future of world order, assessing and trying to impose their own set of priorities, often unrelated with the East-West relationship. The new crisis management, therefore, will be a multilateral process, which will have to consider all the inter-relationships between regional crises and global problems (East-West, trade, financial and economic management, resources, technology, demography, etc.), and which will not be possible without a better working of the Western system of alliances: a new coherence and a fair balance of power and responsibilities between the Usa and its main allies in Europe and Asia.

Nuclear deterrence is also changing. While the USSR nuclear capabilities are still important enough to justify the continuous need of some form of nuclear extended deterrence for Western Europe, the perspective of nuclear (and chemical) proliferations and of increasing military instability (East and South) is establishing the need for more "discriminate" forms of nuclear strategy (along the lines of the well known report published in 1989). In one scenario, contingencies which might require a nuclear response seem to be very remote. In other scenarios, the necessity of maintaining a highly credible (thus workable) nuclear deterrence posture, and some rational escalatory options, is an immediate necessity.

The gross military capabilities of Third World countries are growing. While these crises are threatening conflicts of a higher intensity than in the past, the "quantity" of the Western Armies is declining: the choice made by the Western powers in order to be able to confront and manage future "limited" contingencies has been to develop and maintain a large technological gap in their favor. However, "quality" is more and more expensive and the Western defence budgets are declining: while some quantitive cuts might compensate the cost of some qualitative improvements, this marginal adjustment will rapidly wear out its expediency.

Moreover, a military strategy of efficient utilization of new qualitative edges requires a complex management system, fully integrating a very large number of electro-magnetic, optical and space technologies, as well as advanced materials. Past experience has shown that whenever technological revolutions of this importance reach the battlefield, small numbers of well trained and well armed professionals can overwhelm a much larger mass of less trained and less armed rivals. In this case, the large conscript armies which have dominated the conventional military scene since Napoleon (up to the Korean war), might well be on their way out.

Summing up, these changes seem to postulate the need for a stronger political and managerial cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance: some form of common security and foreign policy as well as joint military planning. A multi-purpose Alliance, called upon in order to deal with multi-directional risks, in a variety of geographical theaters, with a highly discriminate strategy, utilizing different mixes of national and multi-national forces in order to manage various kind of crises, is enormously different from the present Alliance, geographically circumscribed, strategically uni-directional, strictly defensive: it is much more similar to a real Community, a new international protagonist acting in the world with the same determination and flexibility normally associated with the national states.

However, is that a credible option for the future?

Present Atlantic trends seem to point in the contrary direction, certainly in the political and economic fields, possibly in some military cases too. While the last crisis in the Gulf has confirmed the operational importance of NATO, its role as a central decision-making institution has been variously challenged:

- the UN role has been revived (even NATO has presented its involvement in the Gulf operations as a way of implementing its statutory commitment to the UN Charter);

- the Atlantic Alliance is variously limited and "encompassed" by pan-European East-West agreements, such as CSCE, CFE and 2+4;

- a process of European integration, centered on the EC, is going to include foreign and security policies, and a common defence role;

- a policy of "strategic independence" is asserting itself in the United Stated;

- while the new security risks and challenges are generally perceived as "multi-dimensional" (comprising economic, social and political aspects, as well as military) no new competencies or functions are tested or considered for NATO in order to deal with these other dimensions of crisis management.

Major crises are dealt with through other institutions. In the Gulf, NATO has been widely utilized, but it has never been in command. Eastern Europe is the primary concern of the Group of 24, of the EC and of the OECD. The Soviet Union calls for mainly bilateral relations. Even important security concerns, like nuclear proliferation, control of technology exports, limitation of missile technology spread, curbing of chemical and biological weapons, are examined through ad hoc organizations and committees, at the United Nations or at the Summits of the Seven most industrialized countries.

The Atlantic Alliance maintains of course its primary military function: however, can these military capabilities be automatically shifted to bear force on extra-European theaters? And anyway, even assuming that the answer to the latter is positive, could NATO become simply the new worldwide enforcer of security and peace? how would that affect its internal cohesion?

To answer these difficult questions, some suggest a stronger linkage between the Alliance and the United Nations. Since NATO is officially based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, this argument goes, it could be more widely used in order to give to the UN the enforcement capacity envisaged by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is quite clear, however, that any evolution of this kind would further change the present NATO beyond any recognition, allowing its enlargement to many other countries, USSR included. In Europe, this new kind of NATO, might become the enforcement agency of the CSCE agreement.

The future of the Soviet empire might impose on this new kind of NATO highly unpalatable tasks, from the curbing of national revolutions to the maintenance of domestic stability. While the West should not indulge in a kind of generalized and acritical support of the principle of self-determination, it would also be inappropriate to commit forces in order to curb the aspirations to independence of Croatia, Transylvania or Ukraine, as well as Quebec or the Basque countries.

Moreover, the debate on the "geographical boundaries" of the Atlantic Alliance shows the persistence of important political differences among the Allies.

The first conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that while NATO countries will have to face a large number of contingencies, the Alliance itself should not be made responsible for managing them all. It is easy to imagine how politically damaging it would be if the Alliance began to discuss contingencies having to do with Poland or Yugoslavia (not to mention the Soviet Union itself). There will certainly be a role for NATO, but there will be also a role for the European Community, the CSCE, the United Nations and many other international fora.

This is also the meaning of the "framework of interlocking institutions"

identified by the Atlantic Council in December 1990, in London, and further explained in detail in june 1991, in Copenaghen: it is there that "the interests of all European states can be accommodated. The three key elements of the European architecture are the Alliance, the process of European integration and the CSCE". And this framework might eventually expand to global, United Nations dimensions.

It is quite clear that the European Community is attempting to build a European Union, inserting a common security policy into its framework. What remains to be decided is the exact meaning of the term "security", loosely utilized to cover widely different options, from a new common European military policy to a simple strengthening of the present mechanism of foreign policy consultations. The solution to this dilemma will depend more on the decisions of the Inter-governmental Conference on the European Political Union.

Meanwhile, the recent Gulf war has clearly demonstrated the present limits of the European capabilities and the importance of the American military role. At present (and for the next five to ten years at least) no European military options will be possible without a NATO infrastructure, much of which is American, especially in space and in the fields of C3I, EW, precision guided munitions, stealth technologies, anti-missile systems and so on, including what has been called the ability to "orchestrate" all these factors to produce the decisive force multiplier.

At the same time it is also true that the Gulf operation would have been proved impossible or much more risky and costly without the logistical, financial and political help immediately given to the US forces by the European allies (and Japan).

It is also apparent, however, that in order to manage future multi-faceted crises it might very well suit the West to have dual capabilities and options to act as NATO, as Americans or as Europeans, under different kinds of institutional and legal arrangements.

The nature of security shifts from clearly identifiable defense issues to much more difficult, less clearly identifiable, political (multi-dimensional) issues. The name of the game, therefore, is not really (or not only) defense coordination, but <u>policy coordination</u>, which requires a greater institutional sophistication and the mobilization of political and economic assets, as well as military.

Nor we should underrate the importance of European integration for the political legitimitization of the move toward greater security and defense commitments by a number of European states, first among them Germany and Italy. A number of deadlines will increase the importance of a common European stance: in 1994 the Soviet and possibly also the French forces in Germany will be gone; in 1998 the WEU Treaty will reach the end of its established period of validity. Among other things, this revised Brussel's Treaty defines the necessity of a British Army on the

Rhine. While this does not necessarily mean that the French or the British will leave, or that the WEU will terminate, it is quite clear that new life and new substance will have to be put in the existing old agreements in order to maintain a credible multilateral military presence in Germany. A new political logic will have to be endorsed: something that can be done easily through a European Union, and only with great difficulty through NATO only.

And anyway, what should the new German armed forces do? WEU, and the future European Union provide a multinational (and eventually supranational) framework for Germany's national defense in a new period in which the Soviet army will leave Germany and Eastern Europe. A uniting Western Europe can inhibit the tendencies toward re-nationalization of defense policies, which would cause the rebirth of unstable balance of power policies (first of all in Central Europe).

Moreover, the WEU, as a part of a larger European integration process, and through the creation of European multilateral forces, contributes the only framework for out-of-area contingencies that provides a political legitimacy for the active participation of many European countries. In particular, this would present major political advantages for confronting the German constitutional issue. And these same agreements permit French participation and closer cooperation with all Western partners. That is why WEU and the European integration process are part of the solution, and not part of the problem.

The Gulf war has apparently reinstated the US at the summit of the World order, demonstrating that only the US has real superpower capabilities in the military sphere. Saying this, however, does not necessarily mean that the world will move in the direction of a unipolar order in which the US military might plays the pivotal role. On the contrary, it is quite clear that the US itself is not willing to play a much greater stabilizing role. Nor does that mean that it will be capable of shouldering all the political and economic tasks bound to arise from the Gulf crisis, or from the many other looming crises.

The necessity arises to devise efficient burden-sharing schemes: but even the simple idea of a future US unipolar regime could very well result in the Allies relinquishing their responsibilities by fostering the notion that all will be well if left to Washington. Burden-sharing requires the establishment of a new multi-polar security regime in which responsibilities will be conveniently shared.

That is why the Atlantic debate will have to be put in a larger perspective, together with a new role for the UN, the strengthening of global multilateral institutions like the IMF, GATT, the Summits of the Seven most industrialized countries and the OECD, as well as new instruments and policies designed to give stability to the new political realities emerging from the crumbling of the Soviet system.

The solution to these problems cannot come from a confrontation on middle-level (regional) issues, outside the redefinition of the global regime and the various regional roles and arrangements in it.

More than anything else, however, a new balanced approach to the Atlantic partnership requires a common American and European approach to defining some crisis management strategies and principles, in order to act together vis-à-vis the Thirld World, Eastern Europe and the USSR, through a variety of international institutions and with the mobilization of all the existing relevant assets.

In order to have a credible and coherent "identity" of foreign policy and security, however, Western Europe should have a clearer idea of its world role and of its security preferences. Unfortunately, the "goals" of Western Europe are extremely difficult to define - and this difficulty is bound to become hopeless in the case of a larger Europe, ecompassing the new Eastern democracies. Nor it is easier to identify the European "interests". Thus, while it is possible to speculate about the future "European international role", it is much harder to understand its purposes and its final outcome.

## I.. Europe in the international system

The European future international role will be shaped by two processes: the need to answer external pressures or demands, and the autonomous identification of interests and priorities.

The recent evolutions of the international system have resulted in the need for reaching new agreements and establishing new codes of conduct: the interdependence is growing. A country like Japan is playing a major strategic role through its support of the US dollar regime. Japan and the European Community, together, are heavily influencing the future of international trade. The economic relationship between these economic powers and the US is increasingly shaped by an American defensive posture.

Since WW II, the Europeans have been militarily underdeveloped while the United States has been militarily overextended. The same, in an even greater way, has been the case of Japan. This diversification among allies has favored (and indeed required) the US tendency to intervene overseas, but in more recent times it has also increasingly shown a propensity of the American administration to seek contributions and support from the allies, both militarily and economically. While in the previous situation the American interventions were accepted without many qualms, this new American policy has put in the forefront differences of interest, perception and

vulnerability among the allies.

In fact, a number of "incomplete powers" (lame powers) are challenging the status of the US as a superpower, and obliging it to a redistribution of roles and shares. The USSR is the most important "lame" power (a military superpower, economically underdeveloped and politically on the brink of a major domestic crisis). Others are mainly trade and economic powers, in a process of asserting their greater political role (West Germany, Japan). Others are simply demographic powers (China, India). Others are bellicist powers: countries still accepting the risks of war, and willing to go to war easily (Israel, Iraq). Others are controlling strategic reserves of raw materials (South Africa, Saudi Arabia). None has a power of control of the international system. Many, however, have some power of denial of the American control of the international system.

It is a confused regime in transition, characterized by a greater importance of coalition policies among volatile partners, unable or unwilling to define their international security role and to take up their responsibilities.

The future possibility of governing of the international system, therefore, is based upon two alternative developments:

A. - the establishment of a more stable and equitable "cartel" (a more equitable and efficient sharing of burdens, responsibilities and power; a better coalition policy) among the major countries, reducing the precariousness of the present situation. The precondition for the realization of this "cartel", however, is that at least some of the existing "lame powers" accept to shoulder a greater direct responsibility for the overall stability of the international system;

B. - the establishment of an effective Soviet-American military duopoly and crisis management, with detailed working agreements and division of roles between the two superpowers. The difficult preconditions of this second development are, however, that the USSR is able to rapidly overcome its present systemic crisis, and that the existing economic powers of the Western World agree to continue to buy out the large deficits of both superpowers' national budgets.

Western Europe (and possibly Japan) could and shall fulfill the preconditions for the success of the first model, thus opening the way for a new, more stable and balanced international system, where economic and military factors will mold in a coherent pattern of global management.

In order to do that, a number of decisions will have to be carried over and some institutional re-drawing will be required. Some of these requirements are institutional (a more efficient European government), others are related to the international system itself and involve the reform of such institutions as the GATT, the IMF, the OECD,

the UN, etc.

II. Demands of Europe (from the outside)

Europe is in great demand. The Eastern European countries want to join the European Community (or at least to secure an important association agreement) and to obtain some guarantees from the Atlantic Alliance. The Mediterranean countries are competing among themselves in order to establish preferential economic and trade 0agreements. In the security sphere, the Western Europeans are asked to perform a moderating role of the USA. The Third World, and particularly the ACP countries, are asking for money, a better trade relationship and a contribution to their domestic and international security. Both the USA and the USSR are establishing new ties and treaties with the Western European countries, the EC and NATO.

Some of these demands are contradictory, however. Weaker countries, such as those from the South and from the East, need discriminatory agreements and policies, geared toward the satisfaction of their development needs and to consolidate domestic consensus and national security.

The USA and Japan, on the contrary, underline the necessity of new global and non discriminatory agreements and policies to counter protectionist tendencies and the establishment of various spheres of influence and closed regional areas.

In the security field, the USA as well as the majority of Eastern and Western European countries would like to see a strengthening of the Western security cooperation (be it in the Atlantic Alliance or/and through the Western European institutions): their main objective being to confirm the credibility of the Western support for security and freedom in Europe.

The USSR, on the contrary, has the paramount problem of finding its own stability in a world of rapid changes and of contrasting its own fragmentation. These soviet aims are shared also by Western powers in so far as they might help to avoid major military crises, proliferation of nuclear weapons, global strategic uncertainty and new "societal threats" (migrations, religious, linguistic and cultural conflicts, exacerbated nationalistic policies). Moreover, the continued existence of the USSR as a credible interlocutor allows for important crisis management agreements among few principal protagonists.

These demands might lead to contradictory policy choices. On one side, Western Europe should act in Eastern Europe as a political and economic magnet and a defender of the freedom to choose - thus, it would act as a reformist power, promoting changes of the international scenario. On the other side, Western Europe

should join forces with the USSR and with other world powers in order to maintain the present security system in place (the CSCE "new" order), thereby trying to support existing national institutions and political governments and to fight any drastically new proposal - thus it would become a kind of conservative power, hostile to changes of the international scenario.

The first option could be compared with the anti-colonial policy pursued by the US after WW.II (against the interests of the major Western European powers). The second option has a famous antecedent in the Holy Alliance opposing Napoleon and the disbandment of the Soviet and Austro-Hungarian empires.

Understandably, Western Europe hesitates. While its own basic interests might be labeled as "conservative", its international role has generally had "reformist" effects (and is prompting more "reformist" demands from the outside). Even the identification of a unified European "space", from Brest to Brest, or from the Atlantic to the Urals, will inevitably challenge the present international system. Only the CSCE "space" (from San Francisco to Vladivostok, via Atlantic Ocean) is coherent with the conservation of the present international setup.

The question, therefore, is to verify if Western Europe has the will and the capability to play along its "reformist" potential or if it will constrain itself (or will be constrained) in a "conservative" straitjacket.

Many challenges lie ahead. Among them,

A.. the future relationship with the USA, after the end of the cold war and the decline of the Soviet military threat in Europe: this large question envelops many other problems, from the burden-sharing in the security field to trade conflicts.

The fact is that the Atlantic Alliance, while remaining the most important institutionalized tie across the Ocean, is losing its military cohesion and is not finding a different rationale: can Europe and the USA stick together without NATO or with a severely weakened NATO? Moreover, is NATO relevant for the kind of crisis management that will be needed in the future? The answer lies in a renewed pact between the USA and Western Europe: the question is that Western Europe is not yet a protagonist on the international scene;

B.. Central Eastern Europe: the EC is trying to identify the elements of a common European policy toward this region, through some form of newly conceived "European Association Agreement", especially tailored for these countries, to allow for a slower process of economic integration, tuned with the difficult problems of the transition from a centralized socialist system to a market system.

Meanwhile, these countries are integrating with the West in political and juridical terms through the Council of Europe, the CSCE machinery and other institutions with a pan-European vocation.

The question is if this "slow" integration of Eastern Europe into Western Europe will be enough or if more radical measures will have to be conceived (peace keeping, development aid, domestic political stability). In this latter case, Western European institutions and decision making would need important improvements;

C.. the Balkans are a problem in itself, only partly related to the more general question of Eastern Europe: the policies of slow bat gradual integration applied for Mitteleuropa require profound changes in order to confront the fragmentation of Yugoslavia (both Slovenia and Croatia want to associate with the EC, while Serbia and Bosnia are reluctant), the partial democratization failure in Romania and the perspective of a conflict between Turkey and Bulgaria on minorities.

The European approach is somewhat uncertain, while other "regional" initiatives are attempted (the "Pentagonale", the "Alpe-Adria", the proposal to establish greater vertical links among Eastern countries of Central and Southern Europe). Any European policy in this region should strictly combine security, political and economic factors, thus enormously complicating decisions and management.

D.. Turkey: this country, theoretically associated with the EC, and candidate to full membership, is practically maintained at arm's length by the present members: meanwhile, however, its strategic importance for the West is increasing, as well as the "Islamization" of its political culture. New European discriminatory policies (the Schengen Agreement) might enlarge the gap between Turkey and the West.

Even if full EC membership is probably far away, Turkey should be granted some kind of special concessions, greater than those earmarked for newcomers like the Eastern European countries or for other troubled areas like the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Moreover, the case should be made for seriously discussing the enlargement to Turkey of some kind of common security consultation machinery.

E.. The Mediterranean and the Middle East are greatly dependent from Western Europe. From an economic point of view, for instance, the major trade partner of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries, as well as of the Sub-Saharan countries, is the European Community. In recent years, the EC has counted for almost 50% of the total trade of the Mediterranean countries, 30%

of the total trade of the Gulf countries (oil included) and about 44% of the total trade of the Sub-Saharan African countries, thus being by far their most important commercial partner. Moreover, already before the present liberalization, the EC was the receiver of about 27% of the Eastern European trade and is the second trade partner of Latin America (with a share of 23%, to be compared with the 41% of the USA). Only in Asia the EC comes third after Japan and the USA (19%, 18% and 15.5% respectively).

The ACP agreements, those with the Maghreb countries, the Association Treaty with Turkey, the EC-UMA and EC-GCC pacts, are the reflection of this European preeminence.

Moreover, the enlargement of the European Community in the Mediterranean, with the accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece, has increased the need to work out an overall approach toward this area. The strict interdependence existing between the Community and countries such as Morocco (whose King even asked for its admission to the EC), Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt (not to mention Israel), coupled with increasingly worrying demographic trends, create an obligation for Europe to work out a better and overall crisis management approach.

Behind the common European facade, however, different bilateral relationships survive and prosper. Some European countries are more important than others in relation with each third state: thus Germany is by far the most important economic partner of all the southern European countries (as for Spain, slightly behind France), plus Turkey, Yugoslavia and Malta. Moreover, in every country the FRG is very often only second to the other dominant Western partner. France is the most important partner of the three Maghreb countries and Spain. Italy is the most important partner of Libya, Syria, Lebanon and Cyprus. Italy is also the most important European trade partner of Egypt.

These problems are connected with the strategic and military questions of the Middle East, the Gulf and North Africa (from the Horn to the former Spanish Sahara): while the EC is relatively well equipped to deal with the economic and social aspects, security and military matters are still outside its domain, and are not coordinated in any other multilateral institution.

In practical terms, there is the need to investigate carefully the option to establish some stronger preferential ties and alliances with a number of "key" countries, while maintaining a more generalized cooperation with the entire region. Ideally, these special relationships should be conceived in such a way as to support the creation of larger regional groupings (i.e.: the UMA). As for some of the previous cases, a military dimension should be added to the economic and political one.

III.. Some Western European "domestic" problems

The answer to the previous questions is confused by the fact that there is no Western European protagonist as such: foreign and security policy decisions are taken mainly by the various national European governments, according to their own national priorities and perceptions. These governments, while engaged in a "reformist" process of European integration, have a vested interest in the maintenance of the present international system and share with the major powers the distrust and the fear of "new" solutions which might endanger their strength.

The dialectic between the national and the international levels of European policy choices is apparent in the military field. Present European national defense policies have been given credibility by the all-encompassing presence and military commitment of the USA, and by the strategic polarization prompted by the Soviet threat. The decline of the military threat and the progressive weakening of the US permanent military presence in Europe have a twofold effect on these defense policies. On one side they increase the room for manoeuvre and the freedom of choice of the European nation-states. On the other side, however, they diminish the national ability to cope with a growing number of threats and risks, and increase the demands over their limited resources.

In the economic field, moreover, the wealth of the Western European countries is strictly tied to an internationalization and europeanization of their markets which is bound to further increase, thus critically diminishing the autonomy of the national governments - a process clearly spelled out by the intention to establish a European Monetary System with a central monetary authority.

The contrast between the national "conservative" and the European "reformist" factors is increasing the difficulty to conceive and implement a coherent European "grand strategy".

Meanwhile, however, Western Europe as a whole has regained a place of economic and commercial preeminence and has become a clear center of political influence and great magnetism for many countries of the Third World and for Eastern Europe. The rapid and flourishing development of the European Community, coupled with the stability and security guaranteed by the Atlantic Alliance, constitutes the most notable success in the international domain and has been perceived as such by the rest of the world.

A new influential international actor, generally identified with the EC, has been present on the international scene along with the older European national powers,

slowly taking the lead and effectively shaping the overall perception of Europe from the outside. It has developed new international policy instruments, from the "association agreements" to the various Lomé agreements with the African, Caribbean and Latin American countries, from the Mediterranean policy of the EC to the Euro-Arab dialogue, from the multilateral agreement between the EC and the ASEAN to the latest one between the EC and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The existence of the EC, and its economic might, might well be the most important factor expediting the break up of the Eastern Bloc.

The main question will be what kind of European international protagonist will be acting on the future international scene: a well unified, coherent subject or a combination of multiple infra-European "special relationships", without a strong center. The answer to this question might not be clearcut, however, allowing for the existence of a kind of "incremental" European integration process, largely compatible (at least for a while) with both options.

The idea of a common European defence and foreign policy identity (in other words: of a common European security policy) is not new. It was the foundation of the European Defence Community Treaty, signed in 1952 by the original six members of the EC, which was not ratified by the French Assembly in 1954. It is present in the Brussels Treaty as revised in Paris in 1954 with the creation of the Western European Union. It was evoked many times in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance under the name of the European pillar and with the establishment of the Eurogroup (1968). It is the political foundation of the Independent European Programs Group (formed in 1976) and of other institutionalized forms of European cooperation such as the Finabel. A Report published by the IEPG in 1986 (Towards a Stronger Europe) calls for greater integration between the IEPG and the EC in the field of industrial and research policy, and has been reinforced by the conclusion reached in 1991 by a joint EC-IEPG Working Group on the future of the Internal Market.

In the European Community, the Genscher-Colombo declaration of 1983 spoke of a security dimension of the common European policy in the economic and political fields: something that was included in the Single European Act of 1986, with emphasis added on the European Political Cooperation and on the problem of the internal market of defence products. Recent political declarations of European leaders and of the WEU council confirm the tendency toward the establishment of some form of European security and defence indentity or inter-related identities.

The European Parliament has confronted these questions various times in the past: it will suffice to recall, among others, the Klepsch Report on European armaments procurement cooperation (1978), the Greenwood Report on the policy to promote military and technological cooperation among Western European countries (1980), the Diligent Report on the protection of maritime lines of communication in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf (1981), the Haagerup Report on the European

security policy (1982), the Fergusson Report on arms procurement within a common industrial policy (1983) and the Galluzzi Report on European security policy (1986).

A difficult question is to decide whether a common European security policy will be dealt with through a number of different international institutions and organization or through a single one. This question has enormously complicated the debate in the past, fostering unnecessary competition among institutions and generating a number of misunderstandings.

The present debate concentrate on the possibility of a greater coordination as well as a positive interaction among all the existing institutions, while at the same time pursuing the longer term aim of building a full-fledged European Union with clear and exclusive competencies in security and defence as well as in foreign policy matters. As in the monetary and economic field, also for defence and security it is possible to identify a number of incremental steps and a process of identification of those competencies that could be shifted to the European Community, along the lines of subsidiarity.

The implementation of this idea requires a careful study of all possible convergences and conflicts among existing international organizations as well as the exploration of the major security and defence questions confronting Europe.

This evolutionary model is founded on the progressive "deepening" of the European integration without directly challenging the foundations of the present security system, and without excluding the possibility of further "enlargements" of the EC. Some might judge it to be a covert attempt to build a Fortress Europe, while others might consider it as a disguised form of fragmentation of Europe among its nationalities. Both might be right, since the evolutionary nature of this model leaves the door open to both outcomes. Its ambiguity, however, is also its main "raison d'être" and the primary factor that might bring about its success.

Its main problem is how to combine the different answers to four processes presently underway, without losing its coherence:

- the transformation of NATO and of the strategic relationship between Europe and the USA,

- the Western European integration process,

- the construction of a new system of cooperation and security in Europe between East and West,

- the growing economic, demographic and ideological pressures from the South and from the East.

To deal with these problems, the "incremental" European model should develop a capacity of devising and implementing a consistent strategy, utilizing many different tools: a decision-making process capable of mobilizing a variety of civilian and military resources. It would not require necessarily a full-fledged European "government", it might accommodate a number of incongruences and competing competencies at various decision-making levels, but it should at least be able to determine the main aims to be reached.

But the existing European institutions are lacking exactly that: the decision-making centre is still wanting, while the middle-level process of consultation and concert has been enormously dilated.

The empirical answer to this problem has been found in the institutionalization of the European Summit which, however, needs to delegate more decisions to its lower levels and to concentrate only on major issues.

This model, however, will also require a more efficient and powerful middle level of management. It exists as an embryo in the Commission, Permanent Representative Committee and Political Cooperation Secretariat of the European Community, but without all the necessary powers and decision making rapidity. It exists in an even less developed form in the Atlantic Alliance, at the military level, in the supreme military commands of NATO.

Thus, any evolutionary model will have to confront the issue of how to unify competencies distributed among various institutions and how to streamline and ameliorate the multilateral decision-making process.

An evolutionary model might foster an interesting specialization of roles and responsibilities among institutions and among allies (including the USA), combining a different sharing of burdens, risks and responsibilities in Europe and overseas.

In the end, however, this model cannot escape the need to identify a process of formal institutionalization and unification of the European decision-making inside a single European institution, which can only be the European Community.

This development will be accelerated by the requirement to solve the present "democratic deficit" of the European decision making system: an absolute necessity in the security and defence field, in which the problem of political and social consensus is of paramount importance.

Along the previous lines, this "incremental model" will consider the possibility of a step-by-step merger of the WEU in the EC (to be completed by 1998, when the Brussels revised Treaty expires), the necessary institutional changes, the possible role

of the various institutions of the Community and, in particular, the role to be given to the European Parliament.

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