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JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICE: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DIMENSIONS

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ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

IAI9105

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Political, Economic and Military Dimensions

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October 1990

The end of the Cold War in Europe, the crisis in the Mideast over Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, and the possible disintegration of the Soviet Union as a major pole in world politics signal a momentous change in the structure of the international system. The political coordinates which variants of political realism offered for analyzing global politics in the era of bipolarity are no longer adequate for comprehending a world in which the crucial question of German unification is settled largely in bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic and in which the Soviet Union is invited by the United States to join the process of searching for a comprehensive political settlement of the Mideast conflict. Familiar categories resting on the notion of the distribution of capabilities in a bipolar world dominated by two nuclear superpowers look like a phantasy when the Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia are becoming nuclear threshold states by virtue of a possible disintegration of the Soviet army, ethnic strife or secession of several republics from the Soviet Union. And the buildup of American forces under UN auspices in the Middle East in 1990 hardly looks like Korea in 1950. The President of a superpower does not dispatch members of his inner circle at the beginning of a major test of political will and military strength around the globe to shake down allies to foot most of the bill for the deployment of American troops. In short neither the Soviet Union nor the United States are any longer the kind of superpowers which are central

to the analytical perspective of political realism.

With the opening of a political dialogue between the Soviet Union and Korea, the conclusion of an agreement to end the war in Cambodia, and the likelihood of serious negotiations between the Soviet Union and Japan over the return of the Four Islands, an end to the Cold War in Asia has become a very likely event. The unsettled and potentially explosive political situation in the Peoples Republic of China and the security implications of a strategic retreat of the Soviet navy to the Sea of Okhotsk, beneficial for global detente but possibly threatening for Japan's regional security, make it unlikely that the change will be as dramatic as in Europe. But the reorganization of the global political system will have a profound impact on Asian security. How Japan and its security policy will be affected by these changes is far from clear.

In order to understand the logic that informs Japanese choices, this paper argues, we must let go of a central argument of political realism. International structures that are in rapid flux give ambiguous cues to policy makers of how to define the purposes of policy. The international state system is thus becoming a less important determinant of the interests that inform Japanese security policy. These interests, we argue in this paper, are shaped primarily by two other sets of factors, Japan's domestic structure and the normative context that informs

the definition of security interests. In contrast to the dramatic change in international politics, Japan's domestic structures and norms have been changing only gradually.

1. Domestic Structures

Japan's security policy is formulated within an institutional structure that biases policy strongly against a forceful articulation of military security objectives. It is no accident that the ministry that is formally in charge of some aspects of Japan's military security is MITI. Its jurisdiction does not only extend over questions of trade. and investment but also over the military security field especially on questions of military procurement. The Defense Agency is run by civilians who are in full control over the three branches of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The Ministry of Finance plays a central role on defense as it does on all other issues. Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of providing the 'comprehensive coordination' of the activities of all ministries and agencies, including the Defense Agency, that are involved in Japan's external relations.

MITI is deeply enmeshed in security issues for the simple reason that it has jurisdiction over Japan's defense industries. Operational control over defense industry related issues rests

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with the Aircraft and Ordnance Division in the Machinery and Information Industry Bureau of MITI. In the early 1950s the Security Agency, which in 1954 would become the Defence Agency, challenged MITI's control over Japan's small defense industry by proposing the nationalization of specific industries for national security reasons. MITI, on the other hand, insisted until the mid-1950s that its mission was to develop an export industry in defense which would have technological spin-off effects advantageous for civilian industries. The Defense Agency's attempt was defeated in part also because of the opposition of a fiscally conservative Finance Ministry. One important consequence of this political defeat was that the Agency lost much of its interest in developing an indigenous defense industry and remained instead content with a substantial degree of import dependence especially on the American armaments industry [Otake, 1984, pp.31-33]. A second consequence was to affirm pride of place to MITI's economic orientation in decisions involving Japan's defense industries. It is thus no accident that MITI reviews still today the Defense Agency's procurement plans with an eye toward what its impact might be on Japan's industrial development [Kataoka and Myers, 1989, p.66].

Despite its links to Japan's defense industries, MITI's policy perspective is characterized by the lack of a military security perspective in its thinking. The Toshiba incident is one example. In response to what the United States government felt

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was a deplorable lapse of policy judgement, MITI imposed greater controls over the export of high-technology products. Personnel was transferred from the Defense Agency and the National Police Agency to MITI's Trade Bureau Export Division to implement stronger controls. MITI also set up the Strategic Technology Trade Information Center which was to engage in intelligence activities concerning high technologies. It was staffed by former officials of the Defense Agency and the National Police Agency as well as experts from the industries which are militarily most sensitive [Asahi Shimbun Keizai-bu, 1989, pp.112-17]. It is too early to tell to which extent this institutional innovation will shape the ministry's perspective in a period of declining global tension.

Because of its interest in balancing the government's budget the Ministry of Finance has been a very important brake on the unrestrained growth of the Self Defense Forces and the defense industries. But the ministry's influence extends only over those issues which involve substantial outlays of government funds. The Ministry has been largely excluded from other questions of considerable military significance, like the development of joint operational planning between the United States and the Self Defense Forces since the mid-1970s [Otake, 1983, p.142].

Throughout the postwar era the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has suffered from a chronic budget and personnel shortage. West

Germany's Foreign Ministry, for example, in 1984-85 had a budget that was twice as large and a staff that was one and a half time as large as that of the Japanese Foreign Ministry [Drifte, 1990, p.22]. But the Ministry derives considerable strength from its close political relations with the United States, forged during the Occupation under the political leadership of former diplomats like Ashida and Yoshida. The widespread perception, especially among members of the political elite, that Japan's military security is dependent on a stable relationship with the United States, as well as the subordinate position of the Defense Agency in the bureaucracy, all have contributed much to the important position of the Foreign Ministry on questions of military security. Indeed, the Ministry's North American Affairs Bureau includes the Security Division, a key unit in the Japanese government dealing with defense policy. Despite occasional encroachments of the Defense Agency, it has been the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that has been in charge of administering the Security Treaty with the United States [Otake, 1983, pp.143,226, 277-78,306].

Although the relationship with the United States is politically central, it is less important on questions of economic than military security. However, any economic policy that is likely to have harmful effects on the US-Japanese relationship the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tries to modify. Well known is the example of Japan's energy policy. While MITI is

interested in maintaining good relations with the Middle East oil producing states, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs works hard to avoid an Arab tilt in foreign policy that might damage Japan's political relations with the United States. This was the pattern during the two oil crises in the 1970s and again in the recent decision to impose sanctions against Iraq in August 1990. After the invasion of Kuwait on August 1, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that the request of the United States for Japan's participation in the sanctions against Iraq be honored, especially since Japan had adequate oil reserves. The Ministry wanted to avoid at all cost a repetition of the unseemly scramble of Japanese trading firms for scarce supplies on the spot market as had occurred, to the consternation of Japan's Western allies, in 1979. MITI on the other hand focused on the issue of energy supply. About 12 percent of Japan's oil imports come from Kuwait and Iraq. The Prime Minister was caught between these opposing sides and was planning to defer a decision until after the U.N. Security Council had passed its resolution on sanctions. But when the European Communities (EC) decided in favor of sanctions on August 4, Prime Minister Kaifu, fearing "international isolation" decided in favor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs position on August 5 [Asahi Shimbun, 1990a].

Japanese security policy is formulated and implemented largely by these three major ministries operating along two dimensions. On questions of economic security MITI, the Ministry

of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are the core in which Japanese policy is articulated. On questions of military security the central bureaucratic organizations are the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency. While an informal interministerial coordination routinely takes place between both areas of security policy, distinctive institutional arrangements affecting issues of military security assure that political and economic perspectives retain paramount importance in national security policy making.

First, major defense decisions requiring the approval of the Cabinet need to be cleared first by the Security Council, called until 1986 the National Defense Council. This Council advises the Prime MInister. It is composed of the Prime MInister, Vice Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, and the Directors of the Defense Agency and the Economic Planning Agency. Other ministers are invited to meetings of the Security Council on an ad hoc basis. Significantly, MITI was excluded from formal membership when the National Defense Council was originally established in 1956, on the grounds that the inclusion of MITI would necessitate the incorporation of other economic ministries, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries or the Ministry of Transportation [Ishiguro, 1978, p.287]. The MITI minister became a formal member in 1972 but was again excluded when the Council was reconstituted in 1986

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[Hirose, 1989, p.54].

The Security Office of the Cabinet Secretariat functions as the staff for the Council. Officials from various ministries are serving in the Office, which consists of eleven councilors. Six of them serve concurrently in their respective parent ministries -- among others, for example, as the Defense Agency's Defense Planning Division Chief, the Finance Ministry's Budget Examiner in charge of defense, MITI's Aircraft and Ordnance Division Chief. The Security Council and the Security Office are an institutional expression of the notion that any important defense policy proposal must go through an especially cautious consensus-building process, in which all relevant ministries participate. The Defense Agency is thus firmly embedded in an interministerial coordination framework.

Secondly, certain ministries have in fact placed their officials inside the Defense Agency thus colonizing the process of defense policy making at its inner core. Officials "detached" from a number of important ministries constitute a significant part of the Agency's personnel. For example, the Agency has eleven top bureaucratic posts: the Administrative Vice-Minister, Chief Secretary, five Bureau Chiefs and four Councilors. (Since the Chief Secretary and the Bureau Chiefs serve concurrently as Councilors, the organization chart of the Defense Agency shows ten Councilors). Of these eleven positions a

minimum of four are always reserved for officials from other ministries. One Bureau Chief position (Equipment) is always held by a MITI official, another one (Finance) is almost always occupied by an official from the Finance Ministry. Two Councilor posts (one in charge of international relations, the other in charge of health) are reserved for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Health and Welfare. In addition to these four positions the Finance Ministry as well as the National Police Agency frequently place their officials in the posts of Administrative Vice-Minister, Chief Secretary, and Bureau Chief. For example, from the 1950s to the 1970s, nine of the twelve Administrative Vice-Ministers came from the National Police Agency. Five of them first entered the Defense Agency at the Bureau Chief level and went on to become the top bureaucratic official of the Agency. In the 1980s four of the six Administrative Vice-Ministers came from the Finance Ministry. Two of them were first sent to the Defense Agency at the Bureau Chief level. In such cases typically officials have had no prior working experience in the Agency. Thus with only one exception all of the Bureau Chiefs recruited from MITI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health and Welfare who have occupied the positions, respectively, of Equipment Bureau Chief, Councillor in charge of International Relations and Councillor in charge of Health joined the Agency for the first time at this senior stage of their careers. Such late rotation makes it virtually impossible for them to be inculcated with the

perspectives of a professional military [Hirose, 1989, pp.85-89, Appendix 1,2].

In the lower echelons of the Agency this pattern of outside penetration recurs. Several additional positions are also staffed by officials from other ministries who serve in the Agency for the first time in their careers. Among the about 25 division chiefs of the Defense Agency, for example, at least four are always recruited from outside the Agency: the Finance Division Chief in the Finance Bureau (Finance MInistry), the Health and Medical Division Chief in the Education and Training Bureau (Ministry of Health and Welfare), the Coordination Division Chief in the Equipment Bureau (MITI), and the First Defense Intelligence Division Chief in the Defence Policy Bureau (National Police Agency) [Hirose, 1989, p.89. Appendix 3]. And outside appointments occur of course also among some of the remaining 21 division chiefs. Furthermore, it took those who started their careers in the Agency between 1955 and 1968 16 to 21 years to reach the position of Division Chief. The average number of officials entering the Agency in this period was only 3.4. But with the gradual increase in the number of officials who made their career in the Agency, several ministries and agencies, in addition to the four mentioned above, have had to relinquish division posts that used to be staffed from the outside [Hirose, 1989, pp.89-95, Appendix 3]. Despite this change the Defense Agency remains deeply penetrated by other economic and political

ministries in top- and middle-level appointments.

And it is chiefly through this layer of civilian personnel that the uniformed officers of the SDF interact with the outside world, including other ministries, the Diet and the mass media. The chain of command is very clear. The administrative hierarchy for military operation is subordinate to that for military administration which in turn answers to the Director of the Agency, an elected official with cabinet rank, who is accountable to the Diet [Hirose, 1989, pp.60-72. Kataoka and Myers, 1989, p.72]. Because several of the opposition parties have regarded the Self Defense Forces as unconstitutional, the Diet's exercise of "civilian control" has been weak. These parties have simply refused to create institutional mechanisms for controlling the Defense Agency. Doing so, they argued, would amount to nothing less than a tacit assent to the constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces. Although a special committee on defense was created in the Lower House in 1979 and in the Upper House in 1981, the Diet still has no standing committees specializing in defense issues. Instead Parliamentary debates on defense issues take place primarily in the Budget Committees and in the Cabinet Committees which have jurisdiction over the laws that established the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces [Hirose, 1989, pp.44-45,48-49,248-49].

In the absence of an effective system of Parliamentary

oversight the tight control which the civilian staff of the Defense Agency exercises over the professional military in Japan is called "civilian control". This system of strict supervision of the professional military by a civilian bureaucracy that lacks a military ethos and perspective was introduced by the Occupation. It has been wholeheartedly endorsed by Japan's postwar political and economic elite which on the basis of its prewar experiences have a profound distrust of the professional military. The military professionals have chafed under this system of civilian control, without being able to dislodge or seriously undermine it. In the eyes of the professional military the principle of "civilian control" implies that it is the exclusive responsibility of the professional military to advise the Prime Minister on matters requiring professional military expertise [Hirose, 1989, p.5]. But neither the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council nor the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services brief the Prime Minister on military issues [Otake, 1983, pp.189-91. Kataoka and Myers, 1989, p.75]. And uniformed officials do not take part in the deliberations of the Diet [Hirose, 1989, p.48]. It is even considered a challenge to the principle of "civilian control" for top officers of the Self Defence Forces to speak to the general public on important defense issues. In June 1978, for example, Hiroomi Kurisu, then Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, spoke on television about the Soviet military exercises on one of the Kuril Islands and was subsequently subjected to public criticism by the Defense Agency's civilian

officials. In the following month Kurisu was summarily dismissed, after he had ventured to discuss in a press conference what he regarded as defects in the Self Defense Forces Law and the possibilities of the Forces' extralegal operations in an emergency [Otake, 1983, pp.184-87].

At times the two policy making axes intersect. For example, in the early 1980s one of the contentious issues was whether Japan should make an exception to the 1967 ban on exporting arms or armament-related technologies. The proponents of granting such an exception, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency, argued that basing the export of militarily sensitive technology on the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 would sidestep possible problems with other countries, for example in the Middle East as MITI feared, because in contrast to the United States these states did not have a defensive alliance with Japan [Gotoda, 1989, pp.30-35].

But more normal is the separation of the two dimensions and of economic and military security issues. This separation rests on the premise that the use or threat of military force to ensure economic security is simply no longer a viable political option for Japan. This premise was not shaken by the Persian Gulf crisis of 1987 when the United States requested Japanese military contributions to the Western effort to ensure the safe passage of Kuwait's tankers in the Gulf. According to the memoirs of the

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then Cabinet Secretary, the Prime Minister and the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially favored a military deployment. They eventually changed their minds. First, Japanese ships might become entangled in belligerent acts, thus violating Japan's basic principle of the non-use of military force in all cases other than a direct attack on Japan. Secondly, the deployment of Japanese ships was in open contradiction to Japan's policy of maintaining friendly relations with all states in the area. Since Cabinet Secretary Gotoda refused to sign, as member of the Cabinet, a cabnet decision to deploy military force, Prime Minister Nakasone would have had to dismiss Gotoda, an act for wich the government would have paid a heavy political price. Because it became clear that the United States would accept nonmilitary contributions to a joint defense effort, the opposition of the Cabinet Secretariat to the proposal for deploying military force was unyielding and in the end successful [Gotoda, 1989, pp.104-08].

The current crisis in the Gulf is not likely to undermine Japan's basic policy of shunning military force. In response to American requests for military cooperation the government is preparing legislation that would establish a "Peace Cooperation Corps" to be deployed as part of an U.N. sponsored peace keeping operations. The legislation provides for the participation of unites of the Self Defense Forces in such a corps. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency are in disagreement

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over points such as the carrying of light arms by SDF personnel for personal protection and whether such forces will be on leave from the SDF while on such international assignments. The Defense Agency in particular advocates letting members of such forces serve concurrently in the proposed Corps and the Forces so that, for instance, they may be able to use SDF equipment. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, is concerned about the negative reactions of Asian countries about any deployment of SDF forces outside of Japan. While these issues have been subject of open and acrimonious debate inside and outside of government, there is a widespread consensus that the proposed Corps will not be allowed to exercise military force [Asahi Shimbun, 1990b]. If or when, some time in the future, the use of military force in defense of Japan's economic security were to become accepted policy, the two distinct dimensions of Japan's domestic structure in charge of security policy would merge.

Despite the growth in its bureaucratic power the Defense Agency remains politically colonized by other ministries. In contrast to its uniformed personnel, the civilian staff of the Agency is characterized by a lack of strong organizational identity and its tendency to subordinate the military to the economic and political aspects of security policy [Hirose, 1989, pp.116-18]. And the principle of "civilian control" within the executive branch of government reinforces the bias against any attempt to introduce a military definition of security.

In sum, Japanese security policy is shaped by distinctive political arrangements that revolve, within the government, around two dimensions that connect the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs with the Defense Agency on the one hand and with MITI on the other. But the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs are not the only institution by which Japanese politics integrates the economic and military requirements of security policy into an overarching political strategy carried by a broad consensus. The Defense Agency is staffed to a substantial degree by the political appointees of other ministries. This reinforces the economic and political bias against a military interpretation of Japan's national security requirements. These political arrangements in the structure of the Japanese government are deeply entrenched and make it highly unlikely that dramatic changes in the international state system will lead in the foreseeable future to an ascendance of the military dimension of Japanese security policy.

This conclusion could be supported further if we had analyzed, as we did not in this paper, the effects of state-society and transnational relations on Japanese security policy. The Defense Agency is small and isolated from Japanese society. It has no allies commanding large resources and prestige. And it lacks a mission with which it could build a political constituency in the foreseeable future. Japan's small defense

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economy and Japan's far-reaching ban on weapons exports, unique among all of the major industrial states, are two telling examples that contrast sharply, for example, with the role of the German chemicals industry in the Middle East. The links between Japan's domestic and transnational structures create similar effects. The security treaty with the United States provides for various links with the US military and imposes a number of limitations on the growth of Japan's military organizations -- in terms of procurement, personnel training, and the development of strategic doctrine. Furthermore, these restraints in the military field must be seen within a broader context of transnational relations. There has been a sharp increase in the importance of American bureaucratic organizations and political interests in the formulation of Japanese economic policy. And in the United States a powerful Japanese lobby has emerged that seeks to shape the general climate of opinion and thus, in the long-run, a public policy favorable to Japanese interests. In other words, the transnational links of Japan's domestic political structures add further constraints to the independent role of the military and enhance the influence of economic and political actors. The subordination of military to economic and political considerations in Japan's policy of comprehensive security is thus no surprise and should not be affected greatly in the foreseeable future by the dramatic changes in the international state system.

2. Normative Contexts

Japan's national security policy is not simply a story about how domestic structures shape the international pursuit of wealth and power. It is also a story about the different principles and practices that inform Japanese politics and that are, in the case of this powerful state, projected into the arena of international politics. National security policy is a hollow and dangerous symbol if it undermines the norms of a society. "The realist view does not go far enough when it defines interest (i.e., wealth and power) and ignores identity (i.e. whose wealth and power), and the Wilsonian view goes too far when it assumes a common political identity (i.e. all nations express similar political values) and considers relative power and wealth to be irrelevant" [Nau, 1990b, p.8. Nau, 1990a].

In a recent article David Bobrow has taken stock of a voluminous literature on Japanese public opinion on international affairs [Bobrow, 1989]. His findings are in broad agreement with established findings and assumptions about the Japanese public. Public attitudes favor a passive over an active stance, alignment with the United States over a policy of equidistance between the United States and the Soviet Union, political dependence over autonomy, and minimal over extensive military spending. Furthermore, generational effects have been relatively small in the last two decades. The overwhelming majority of the Japanese

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is skeptical about any departure from the status quo. Among the major industrial states "Japanese public opinion on basic security policy" concludes Thomas Risse-Kappen, "has been the most stable" [Risse-Kappen, 1990, p.39]. On questions of national security public opinion favors economic strength, peaceful diplomacy, and a low-key consensus approach; it does not feel threatened by the Soviet Union and does not think much of the Self-Defense Forces; it overwhelmingly supports Article 9 of the Constitution; and it opposes nuclear weapons probably more strongly than the public in any other Western state [Risse-Kappen, 1990, p.39]. In short, the military is viewed as marginal, and the public shows a marked lack of willingness to resort to armed defense even if Japan should be attacked. "Fewer than one in five respondents would resort to force to resist invasion" [Bobrow, 1989, p.597].

These public attitudes reflect the depth of social learning which came with the disastrous loss of World War II and the American occupation. Many, although by no means all, studies of Japanese foreign policy credit public opinion with a substantial impact on national security policy. This is due to the combined weight of the left-wing opposition in the Diet, the possibility of popular demonstrations in the streets, and the critical attitude of the mass media of any attempt to enhance the status of the military and to develop a more active defense policy.

But public opinion does not dictate Japan's security policy. If it did, how could we account for the substantial changes in Japan's defense policy (for example, a decline in defense spending after the early 1950s and an increase in the 1980s) that have occurred since the early 1950s. Public opinion, as Risse-Kappen argues, sets limits that are fairly broad and unspecified and leave substantial room for different factions of the LDP to fight internal battles and to mobilize public opinion in an unending struggle for power in the party as well as over government policy. Such conflicts were very much in evidence when the Mutual Security Treaty was renewed in 1960, and when the Japanese government negotiated with the United States the return of Okinawa in 1969. In the 1970s and 1980s such conflicts have not been prominent. But the intense discussion over the modalities of Japan's possible participation in an international military force in the Mideast in September 1990 have once again revealed the complex interaction between factional politics and public opinion in Japan [Sanger, 1990].

The norms that are expressed by Japanese public opinion are informed by the constitutional and anti-militaristic principles that have distinguished Japanese security policy over the last two decades. But these norms have permitted in the 1980s important changes in policy -- a substantial increase in defense spending and build-up of Japan's military capabilities, an active rather than a passive integration of the Self-Defense Forces

in the military defense planning the United States for the Asia-Pacific region, and a partial relaxation of the ban on the export of weapons and defense-related technologies for the Strategic Defense Initiative of the United States [Hook, 1988]. The normative context of Japan's security policy is thus both firmly anchored in public opinion and at the same time remarkably open to incremental modification and change.

This pattern of norms that are both firmly fixed and at the same time open to a process of informal and incremental change is also in evidence in how the Japanese government has dealt with the explicit restraints that Article 9 of the constitution has imposed on the conduct of Japan's security policy. Since the LDP could never muster the two-thirds majority in the Diet required to revise Article 9, the government has chosen the principle of constitutional interpretation rather than revision to make its policy conform to explicitly stated norms. "In other words, the LDP does not admit to abrogating constitutional principles; it rather claims to observe them, as in the case of the Self-Defense Forces -- these are not 'land,sea and air forces' as prohibited by the Article 9, but forces for 'self-defense'" [Hook, 1988, p.388]. In the 1980s the practice of constitutional interpretation was, for example, evident in the expansion of the boundaries of the term self-defense to include collective-defense activities -- including convoying US ships, patrolling sea lanes of communication up to one thousand miles and participating in

the SDI program [Hook, 1988, p.386]. In an internationalizing world, at least in the area of security policy Japanese leaders have apparently been willing to reconceive of the "Japanese self" in broader terms. And they have done so in a manner that acknowledges the existence of important norms that constrain how Japanese security interests are defined, while at the same time modifying some of these norms.

But the interests informing Japan's security policy are not just shaped by domestic norms that express the lessons of Japan's historical experiences and the dynamics of its domestic politics. Security interests are also shaped by the redefinition of Japanese interests that emanate from the international system. Yutaka Tsujinaka overstates the point only a little when he argues that the source of the important norms that help define the interests informing Japanese foreign policy has changed dramatically since 1945. Since the end of World War II the US-Japan relationship has increasingly displaced the Emperor system as the source of a change in norms and interests [Tsujinaka, 1990]. Scholarly and journalistic writings on Japan argue overwhelmingly that Japanese decision makers, and the Japanese public at large, view the world largely through the prism of the relationship between the United States and Japan. Questions of Latin American debt, political unrest in the Mideast, the end of the Cold War in Europe as well as many political issues in Japanese domestic politics are interpreted not so much on their

merits as on how they are likely to affect Japan's relation with the United States, its most important trading partner and the main guarantor of its military security.

The redefinition of interests is clearly evident in the process of external pressures that have increasingly affected Japanese policymaking (gaiatsu). The coalitional politics between the "nationalist" and the "internationalist" camp that is increasingly characterizing Japanese policymaking in the 1980s is significant not only because it, as is frequently noted, encompasses either directly or indirectly foreign actors into the domestic policy coalitions [Campbell, 1989. Yamaguchi, 1988. Weatherford and Fukui, 1986]. It is also important because it incorporates in the policy process new norms -- for example, full reciprocity, open market access, burden sharing in the defense sector, and the responsibilities that attend the role of a financial superpower -- that affect how Japanese policymakers reconceive their policy interests from short-term to long-term. These new norms affect how Japanese policymakers conceive of the policy interests that they wish to pursue.

Much of the writings on the Japanese politics and policy of liberalization in trade, finance and services can be read from this perspective. This literature is too voluminous to be reviewed here. But in our judgement it supports the general conclusion that a secular shift in norms and interests is

underway that, in the economic and social realm, is likely to be irreversible. Not known as a proponent of arguments celebrating the early convergence between Japan's developmental state and other forms of capitalism, Chalmers Johnson nonetheless concludes that "young and middle-aged Japanese born in the 1950s and 1960s, are just now achieving responsible positions in government and private industry. They differ from all other Japanese born in this century in their ready familiarity with peace and prosperity . . . They can be expected to persist with the internationalization of the economy since it has become fundamental to Japan's continued prosperity" [Johnson, 1983, p.24].

A reallocation of political and military responsibilities reflecting the shifting balance of economic strength between the United States and Japan is for Chalmers Johnson an essential part of bringing the postwar world to a satisfactory end. Such a reallocation depends on the norms and conceptions of interest that motivate different sectors of the Japanese political class. Susan Pharr argues that traditionally strong sectors speaking for nationalism and neutralism are now distinctive minorities compared to the forces speaking for neo-mercantilism and internationalism.

Neo-mercantilists have a narrow and short-term conception of interest, favor domestic economic growth and social stability,

and seek to limit costly responsibilities abroad. The architects of Japan's postwar success, Pharr argues, "carried with them long-term costs that Japan struggles with today: the development of an extremely narrow, economics-centered definition of national self-interest rather than a major global view that takes into account political, economic and strategic factors simultaneously, a passivity in the political and strategic (as opposed to economic) dimensions of foreign policy, and a national political leadership chosen almost exclusively on the basis of their ability to manage the economy and domestic concerns" [Pharr, 1988, p.35]. And ne-mercantilists view Japan either as an "Eastern" power or a country which is unique, neither "Eastern" nor "Western". This, according to Pharr, is still the majority view in Japan's mass public and in the LDP.

But this view is now increasingly challenged by the internationalist camp which argues for a break with past policies and the need for a new stance in global affairs. In pushing for economic, social and political change across a broad array of issues, proponents of internationalization (kokusaika) make this Japan's perestroika. They view Japan as a "Western" power, that is subscribing to the tenets of the Anglo-Saxon liberalism that has left such a deep imprint on the modern world during the last three centuries. "This perception of themselves as 'Western' colors how internationalists think and the reasoning they bring to their foreign policy choices, even when they back policies

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that also enjoy the support of neo-mercantilists" [Pharr, 1988, p.36]. Internationalists renounce a strong military build-up and favor a more active international stance on other issues such as economic aid and international debt relief. But internationalists are more likely to judge Japan's actual strategic needs rather than, as do neo-mercantilists, judging military issues in terms of the necessity of maintaining good political relations with the United States. Although the internationalists are still, according to Pharr, a minority, their influence has increased greatly during the last two decades. And internationalists, aided by the structural changes in the international system, certainly occupy the center stage in the policy discussions that inform many of the important policy choices that Japan is facing today. Pharr's conclusion echoes those of Johnson "In the future, the internationalist line may well come to predominate in the debate, but I see this shift coming rather slowly. The fact that the debate is where it is, though, reflects a profound change in Japan. Twenty years ago, the tension and debate in Japanese society was not between the internationalists and neo-mercantilists, but between a powerful majority and a neutralist position that, especially in the 1950's and the early 1960s, carried strong moral authority" [Pharr, 1988, p.38].

In sum, the normative consensus which embraces Japanese security policy is shaped by the historical lessons of World War II and the reemergence of Japan as a peaceful and prosperous,

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major actor in world politics since 1945. Characteristically for Japan's political culture is the fact that a deeply ingrained pacifism is not primarily rooted in the constitutional mandate imposed by Article 9. What counts more heavily is the weight of public opinion. The constitution has been reinterpreted in the past to fit an evolving public consensus on what were the requirements of Japanese security policy in a changing world. This process of reinterpretation is grounded in a deep public resentment and fear of any experimentation with a policy that might rely on the threat or use of military force. Japan's consensus culture facilitates gradual and incremental policy change that might be more difficult in a legal culture requiring that a redefinition of Japan's interest be codified in law. The future evolution of Japan's security policy, we argue, will be shaped to a substantial degree by a gradual adjustment and change in the normative restraints that inform domestic public opinion rather than dramatic changes in global structures.

Carried by a broad political consensus the Japanese elite views the relationship with the United States as the only prism through which all major events in world politics must be interpreted. The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, the possible disintegration of the Soviet Union, a thawing of the Cold War in Asia or the threat of war in the Mideast, all of the momentous events of 1990 are viewed, as have all major developments in international politics during the last three

decades, primarily in terms of the effect they have on the alliance between Japan and the United States. The primacy of the United States in Japan's foreign relations has accelerated greatly the process of a redefinition of Japan's security interest from short-term to long-term interests and from a restrictive to a broader conception of self. Internationalization in the 1980s brought about this remarkable change in Japan thus strengthening the relationship.

The domestic norms that inform policy, we argue, are probably more firmly established in the institutions and political practices of Japanese democracy than are the more recent redefinition of short-term into long-term interests that have affected Japan's security policy so substantially in the past decade. Until we understand better how to analyze the process by which long-term interests get eventually internalized as norms that inform behavior, we can be only very tentative in our conclusions about the normative constraints that act on Japan's security policy. But this much we can conclude safely. The gradualism that marks Japanese security policy in a world of rapid flux is rooted in both domestic norms and a conception of self-interest that during the last two decades increasingly has taken on a long-term perspective.

3. Conclusion

The evolution of Japanese security policy is often interpreted in broad analytical categories that highlight the effect of different international structures on Japan's policy options, typically around a recalibration of power and purpose in the US-Japanese relation: Pax Nipponica, the reassertion of American leadership, a continuation of Japan as a supporter state, or the establishment of a new "bigemony" uniting Japan and the United States around the Pacific as the nucleus of future growth and vitality in the global economy [Inoguchi 1986,1989].

We have argued in this paper that the recent, dramatic changes in the structure of international politics will not lead to radical changes in Japan's security policy. Both its domestic structures and the normative context in which security interests are defined appear to be evolving only very gradually. And it is these domestic features rather than the rapidly changing, and dimly perceived determinants in the international system that help us analyze Japanese security policy.

A comparison with Japan's policy of internal security offers some suggestive insights into why Japan's external security policy is likely to evolve only gradually in a time of dramatic international change [Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1990]. The penetration of the Japanese military by other bureaucratic and political organizations is markedly greater than that of the powerful police. And while the military is less closely linked to

Japanese society, transnational military ties, especially with the United States, are probably stronger on questions of external than internal security. And the low degree of vulnerability of Japan to any serious threat to its internal security has favored an autonomous policy stance in contrast to Japan's reliance on the American political guarantee of its external security. Japan's domestic structure thus makes an independent policy more likely for questions of internal than external security.

On both internal and external security issues social rather than legal norms help define and redefine Japanese policy interests. In the case of internal security this has facilitated the gradual expansion of police power in state and society while impeding international policies by underlining, until very recently, the importance of Japanese uniqueness. On questions of external security, in contrast, informalism has facilitated a gradual redefinition of Japan's international role by providing the margin of political flexibility necessary for making some important policy changes that have broadened Japan's policy profile on important economic and security issues in the 1980s. The normative context in which the interests of Japanese security policy are defined and redefined thus favor increasingly international over national policy solutions. In contrast to questions of internal security Japan's domestic structures and norms, thus tend to favor on the issue of external security policy approaches that emphasize international interdependence

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over national autonomy.

Japanese security policy will be focused in the foreseeable future on the US-Japan relationship. This alliance is of such cardinal importance in economic, political and military terms that Japan's government may well seek to intensify mutual vulnerabilities to create stronger political bonds between the two countries. A European comparison may be helpful here. The unexpected turn of French foreign policy on questions of European integration during the last five years appears to be motivated primarily by the objective of tying down in a European framework a Germany that otherwise might be too strong and threatening to French interests. France appears to be prepared to move ahead with monetary integration while continuing to regard questions of defense policy as a matter of exclusively national control. Tying down a potentially volatile and unpredictable ally is a daunting task not only for the French but also the Japanese. Within a changing context of norms and interests it is quite conceivable that a Japanese government may be prepared to accept, especially in the sphere of military security, a structural integration of defense and defense related high-technology industries across the Pacific.

Such integration would contradict not only the relentless push of Japanese corporations for a position of leadership in world markets but also the American preference for national

autonomy and political unilateralism, especially on questions of national defense. But it would be congruent with the Japanese notion of sovereignty as permitting for inequalities of rank and cultural significance. Accepting the position of junior partner in the provision of military security fits the Japanese ethic of mutual hostage taking which creates a system of self-deterrence- - with the effect of keeping fears of repeating past crimes firmly in check. Acceptance of the norm of vulnerability interdependence does not disagree with the Japanese understanding of sovereignty as juridical equality of actors differentiated by status and cultural legacies. Since it vitiates the existence of any one decisive source of political power and influence, such an international system of asymmetric vulnerabilities may not agree with American notions of autonomy. It acknowledges instead the existence of multiple nodes of power that require playing a skillful game of politics. It is the kind of politics that the Japanese have cultivated so successfully at home in the last 40 years, and that they now seek to project abroad.

Japan's domestic structures and the norms that help define Japanese security interests make possible a second choice that is not necessarily antithetical to a contentious deepening of the structural relations between Japan and the United States.
Within the established political-economic framework for interpreting Japanese security in broadly international terms Japan appears to be prepared to pursue a more activist policy in

Asia, supported by a continued close alliance with the United States. This outcome would conform to the emergence of a new regionalism in Europe centering around EC92 and a united Germany but involving also the United States as a participant in a region-wide, collective security agreement and as both a partner and competitor in the European single market. Compared to Germany the structural integration of Japan with its neighbors as well as the United States is much smaller. But as in Germany the domestic and normative determinants of Japan's security policy point to a continuation of a policy that favors international cooperation with the United States and the Western Alliance. The political pluralism of the new postwar order, though, may require the exercise of new political leadership qualities in a world of soft regions managed by a political process of trilateral policy coordination that is both tested and sustained by a self-imposed integration between some of the central powers of world politics during the next decade or two.

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