

# **DOCUMENTI**

**IAI**

## **ECONOMY AND SECURITY: ...AND A MISSING LINK FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

*by Susumu Yamakage*

Paper prepared for the conference "International Political Economy in a Tripolar  
World", Hakone, Japan, January 12-13, 1991

**ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI**

Paper for the 1991 NIRA-IAI Workshop at Hakone, Japan

This is a draft, and not for quotation

Economy and Security:  
... and a Missing Link for International Cooperation

Susumu Yamakage  
University of Tokyo, Komaba

Introduction

"Fogjad. Fogjad. Itt a hetedik kulcs."

(Bela Bartok (words by Bela Balazs), Bluebeard's Castle, 1911, the close of Scene VIII)

Some years ago David Baldwin depicts the logic of linkage between economy and security in a hypothetical hierarchy as follows:

1. Getting Japan to export fewer cars to the United States, which in turn means to
2. Supporting the price of domestically made autos, which is in turn means to
3. ensuring the survival of the domestic automobile industry, which is in turn means to, which is in turn means to
4. Promoting the U.S. "national interest," which is in turn means to
5. Serving God's will by saving the world from the scourge of atheitic communism, which is in turn means to
6. Ensuring peace for one's soul in the hereafter." (Economic Statecraft, 1985,

Princeton. N. J. : Princeton University Press, p. 48)

His point is that "almost all foreign policy goals are . . . means to promote the welfare and/or security of the domestic populace or some segment thereof" (p. 49). In the post-war era, at least, the sovereign state must be in the form of the nation-state that is supposed to be sufficiently responsive to people's politicized demand or expectations. More generally, and extensively, economy has never been separated from other aspects of state's concern. "During the last twenty-five centuries, isolationists, internationalists, nationalists, warmongers, pacifists, and ideological crusaders have advocated economic statecraft in pursuit of their goals." (p. 94)

The U.S.-Soviet ideological confrontation has provided a framework of not only conflict but also cooperation on a global scale for some forty years. It seems over. Neither anti-communism nor anti-capitalism remain the way to ensure peace for one's soul. Will the traditional logic and practice of the nation-state system revive in the interdependent world of today? Alternatively, will a new system emerge after presumably dangerous years of transition? In general, how will the society of nations respond to mounting problems in front of the entire human beings? More specifically, how can more or less matured nations with relatively rich endowment of resources to spare, namely the Americans, the Europeans and the Japanese, successfully cooperate with one another to cope with global predicament? More fundamentally, will those peoples of leading nations transform themselves to create a global community? To state differently, will they be able to propose the value-system to incorporate not only themselves, but more importantly the rest of human beings into the global community?

Keeping in mind the possibility of our conscious, if painful, departure from the era of the nation-state system to make our global problematiques

solvable. I will discuss the nature of post-World War II international system, and its background. In this regard, I will touch more on community than on economy and security.

## 1. The Monolith

"It was a great period for the U.S. The roles in the comedy were clear: The Bad Guys were the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists, along with the treacherous, yellow Japs. . . . Yes, we sometimes bombed civil populations, but a la guerre come a la guerre. Those years were still far from Hiroshima."  
(Lina Wertmüller, the Head of Alvis, 1982, New York: Morrow, pp. 157-158)

The rules to regulate the society of sovereign states after the war seems to me better characterised not by the Cold War, but by the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, even during the era of the Cold War. It is most well known that the Charter outlawed one of the two modes of "Civilized" interstate relationship, and called for a peaceful settlement of conflict between states. Notwithstanding a few notable exceptions like the Iran-Iraq War and the territorial dispute between China and the Soviet Union, the society of states well maintained this fundamental transformation of the norm to eliminate a classical type of warfare.

The Charter also adopted the principle of territorial integrity and political independence as part of the essential implications of the sovereignty. Along with the prohibition of the war, this principle made the realignment of sovereign states extremely difficult. In the post-war era, except for the merger and separation between Egypt and Syria, and the recent merger of North

and South Yemen, no case has been observed in terms of the merger or separation of "established" sovereign states. The annexation of South Vietnam by North Vietnam, and of East Germany by West Germany was, of course, unifications of a divided state. If Iraqi attempt to annex Kuwait turns out failure, all the remaining cases, i. e., the disintegration of the Mali Federation, the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the merger and separation of Malaya (Malaysia later) and Singapore, the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, took place in the course of nation-building following post-war decolonization. A seemingly classical warfare between Britain and Argentina was over the decolonization of the Falkland islands.

Another principle spelled out in the Charter that regulated the post-war society of states is concerned with the sovereign statehood, viz. the membership condition of the society. This is decolonization. The existence of a "Civilized" "nation" was no longer a necessary condition of the sovereign statehood. Instead, the self-determination of a "peace-loving" "people" is to be recognized to form a sovereign state on the condition that its territory accords the colonial order of geographical and administrative divisions, which is closely linked with the abovementioned principle of territorial integrity. The post-war principle of self-determination was much more fictitious compared with the Willsonian principle of national self-determination. The lack of national integration was more obvious in most of the cases of decolonization. Post-independent experiences of those countries proved how the process of national integration had been considered extremely optimistically.

Altogether, intentionally or not, the United Nations has worked to maintain the status quo order of inter-state system, and hence failed to solve the conflict over the status quo effectively. Most of the armed conflicts since

the Second World War have been over the status quo of sovereign statehood taking in either of the two form. One is the revolutionary movement which accepts the current sovereignty while rejecting to accept the incumbent regime (the constitutional form of government). The other is the secessionist movement which denies the territorial order of the current state. While the former category does not necessarily challenge the order between states, the latter does by definition. Only one successful case during the last half century is the independence of Bangladesh, which remarkably contrast numerous successes in revolution.

(If successful, the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq will become an exceptional case: an established sovereign state absorbed by another forcefully. Since World War II, the society of states have prohibited the annexation following occupation for years, which no state had attempted until a few months ago. The Iraqi government argued that Iraq did not violate such a rule, however, explaining that a people's liberation government toppled down the dictatorial Sabaha regime so as to take over the state of Kwait, and invited Iraqi forces to maintain security, and agreed to become part of Iraq. On the background of such an argument, there is a widely-accepted assumption that the sovereign state must be the nation-state, and that the ruled people can "liberate" themselves to become a nation-state. It is needless to say questionable if Kuwait under the control of the Sabaha family, which had dissolved the National Congress, was not a nation-state, if the liberation government was established as the Iraqi government insists, and if military intervention is allowed in trying to "nationalize" the state. But for annexation, the Iraqi conduct would have been quite a familiar case for both Americans and Russians.)

In many of the sovereign states, especially developing countries whether or

not newly independent, the incumbent government have tended to define national security in terms of national integration in the sense that the support of the current regime was more crucial than the threat from outside. Where external threat was felt, it tended to be influence, intervention or interference rather than overt aggression. Armed forces have tended to be organized and equipped for likely mobilization against own people. In those countries where people got mobilized socio-economically and politicized, the government, either military or civilian, either authoritarian or democratic, have tended to try to keep legitimacy on its side through economic development so as to provide people with opportunities for better life and material wellbeing. It was inconceivable for those governments to separate economy from security.

The Cold War simply complicated the situation. It prolonged the division of Germany between four powers of the United Nations. Although German unification symbolized the end of the Cold War, it left two divided states in Asia intact. In fact, of the four divided states the Cold War created, three were in Asia. While the occupation by allied forces resulted German division, no Germans fought each other to protect own cause or to eliminate the other's existence. In all the cases in Asia, peoples in question experienced the civil war for years. The two camps led by the two nuclear superpowers kept fueling the antagonists, respectively. The U.S. withdrawal was followed by Vietnamese unification in 1976. The Chinese and the Koreans remain divided. In many other cases where the state was not so clearly divided, we are too familiar, the ideological confrontation overshadowed civil strifes concerning the revolution or secession. Some are still under such a circumstance. Despite rapprochement between Americans and Russians, mutual distrust, nurtured, if not inseminated, by the Cold War, was deeply imprinted in the people individually as well as

collectively, which made national reconciliation very difficult. What would deserve the lost lives and resources during the proxy war?

The Cold War also distorted the development of world economy in terms of institutionalization and of dissemination. The Bretton-Woods System, originally conceived for restoration of Europe, and the GATT regime, a half-success in trade liberalization, became combined together closely to exclude the communist camp under the U.S. hegemony. Economic interdependence deepened within this international economic regime complex. The discrimination of socialist states was due less to the economic system of individual countries, than to the strategic consideration of the United States. The operation of the COCOM exemplified how American interest was often in conflict with other capitalist nations'. Extra-territorial application of American laws, the Anti-Trust Law and the Export Administration Act in particular, based on the effect doctrine revealed how the U.S. government was concerned not only with the Soviet strategic strength but with American companies' interests.

The United States government might have been less generous and tolerant to other anti-communist countries without the context of the Cold War. The economic development and growth was seen more the success of the Western camp than a increasing challenge to the U.S. economy. Eventually, at expense of a relative decline of her economic power, the United States successfully showed the superiority of capitalism, and announced the victory over communism. What else did American people want more?

World security is now managed best by the United Nations Security Council with the Soviet Union being most cooperative in the past half century. The mutual security system designed just before the end of World War II seem to have become effective in 1990. The UNSC's permanent members seem to be

determined to maintain the status quo order. One of the major differences in international society between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War is the distribution of economic power. Precisely because of this, while they want Germany and Japan to cooperate with them, and contribute to the society, these two nations are the potential source of threat for them today as they were a half century ago for slightly different reasons.

## 2. Where the Civilized People Were

Dr. Helmholtz: John Stuart Mill says the good is that which brings the greatest pleasure to the greatest number.

Woody: I see that. But what if there's disagreement over what brings pleasure?

Dr. H.: In that case you kill one another.

(Stuart Hample, Non-Being and Somethingness, 1978, New York: Random House)

The establishment of the United Nations System was a departure from a traditional system of international law. Not all regarded this change as the development of international society. For instance, aside the controversy over his political position, Carl Schmitt criticized the departure from "justus hostis" in the twentieth century, and the revival of "justa causa," which is accepted in the Charter of the United Nations. Arguing that reciprocity in the warfare was no longer recognized, Schmitt concluded a book which he had been writing in jail as follows:

"Der Unterlegene wird den Unterschied von Macht und Recht in die Räume des bellum intestinum verlagen. Der Überlegene hält seine Waffen-Überlegenheit für

einen Beweis seiner justa causa und erklärt den Feind für einen Verbrecher, weil man den Begriff des justus hostis nicht mehr zu realisieren vermag. Die Diskriminierung des Feindes zum Verbrecher und die gleichzeitige hineinziehung der justa causa laufen parallel mit der Steigerung der Vernichtungsmittel und mit der Entortung des Kriegsschauplatzes." (Der Nomos der Erde, 1950, p. 298)

Schmitt was not merely nostalgic. He was opposed to the widely accepted view of international order: the distinction between a universal overlay of law among nations and various domestic orders interrelated with one another. Instead, he emphasized the co-existence (dualism in his word) of public and private laws in both international and domestic societies. As for international society, in fact Europe in his mind, Schmitt maintained,

"Neben dem jus gentium im Sinne eines (nach den Strukturformen der gentes verschiedenen) jus inter gentes kann es ein über die Grenzen der in sich geschlossenen gentes (Völker, Staaten, Reiche) hinweggehendes, durchgängiges Gemeinrecht geben. Es kann in einem gemeinsamen Verfassungsstandard oder in einem Minimum von vorausgesetzter innerer Organization, in gemeinsamen religiösen, zivilisatorischen und wirtschaftlichen Auffassungen und Einrichtungen bestehen." (p. 185)

Beneath such a dualistic legal order in Europe, Carl Schmitt saw the co-existence of two different systems in European international society as follows:

". . . über, unter und neben den staatlich-politischen Grenzen eines scheinbar rein zwischen-staatlichen politischen Völkerrechts verbreitete sich, alles durchdringend, der Raum einer freien, d. h. nicht-staatlichen Wirtschaft, die eine Weltwirtschaft war." (p. 208)

Instead of identifying the Westfalia Conference in 1648 as the beginning of

European inter-state system. Schmitt emphasized the continuity from the medieval Europe, whose order was the combination of Roman and German ideas by Christianity. The foundation of the society of sovereign states was born, according to Schmitt, with the coming of the age of geographical discoveries.

Schmitt shared with scholars in the late nineteenth century the belief in the superiority of the Civilization, which means the Christendom. James Lorimer's well-known classification of human beings into the three categories (Civilized, barbarian and savage) was well taken by Schmitt, too. Lorimer and his contemporaries took effort to rationalize European expansion into Islamic, Chinese and other civilizations, empires and state-like entities. They were so successful that such unequal inter-state relationship as suzerainty, extraterritoriality, capitulation, etc., became established practices between the Civilized and other peoples like the Japanese, the Chinese and the Gulf chieftens. In the course of the application of international law to Asia and Africa, they generalized the concept of the Civilization for the recognizance of non-Christian states. On this important point, Schmitt was strongly critical:

"Der Untergang des jus publicum Europeaeum in einem unterschiedslos universalen Weltrecht war nicht mehr aufzuhalten. Die Auflösung ins Allgemein-Universale war zugleich die Zerstörung der bisherigen globalen Ordnung der Erde." (p. 200)

Theoretically, he was opposed to the application of international law to the areas where the infrastructure of the law does not exist. In this sense he saw international law more specific geographically than the Christendom in general.

More specifically, he felt the generalization of European international order was not the victory of Europe as contemporaries naively believed so. Including

non-European spheres, especially the Western Hemisphere, in the order between peoples, Schmitt regretted. Europe became under control of the society of nations (= Société des Nations = League of Nations = Völkerbund). Although he wrote nothing of the United Nations, it seems so clear how he saw it.

Schmitt was sensitive enough to perceive that Europe lost its supremacy during the First World War. World War I broke out between *justi hostes*, according to Schmitt, but after the United States participated, it ended between the winner with *justa causa* and the loser having allegedly committed international crimes. But was it because generalized international law was no longer based on the order between and among peoples? He did not hide his resentment primarily toward the United States (and secondarily toward the Soviet Union) for making international order chaotic. But did he convincingly argue that the Civilization Europeans had enhanced was challenged and defeated by a universal and self-righteous principle maintained by the United States of America?

No matter if he rightly pointed out the change in the meaning of the warfare after the outbreak of World War I, it is perplexing, grotesquely embarrassing, that in his book written in 1950 Schmitt mentioned nothing about what he was involved in during the 1930s and World War II. As for Europe in the inter-war period, George Steiner seems much more appropriate than Carl Schmitt to have explicate the fate of the Civilization. Being a Jewish, Steiner is concerned not with the Civilization, i. e., the Christian civilization, but with the Western civilization, i. e., the civilization originated in Europe. While he discussed the crisis of Europe in In Bluebeard's Castle (1971), his standpoint was far from Schmitt's or Spenglerian apocalypse. He began his discourse by paying attention to what political scientists may call the age of

the nation-state. He drew a demarcation line in 1789. Liberation, nationalism and industrialization in the 19th century is symbolized by "accelerando" or "stringendo," which was contrasting to pervasive "ennui" (according to Steiner, the meaning is more akin to "la noia" than to boredom or Langweile) inside individual people. Romanticism in literature, fine arts and music reflected such instability, or dissonance between intensifying society and penetrating ennui, or decaying spirit (= decadence). For Steiner, however, this motif is used in only a melancholic prelude for the self-destruction of Western civilization within the period of only one generation, 1915-1945. The leitmotif here is "une saison en enfer." This was doubtlessly taken from the work by Arthur Rimbaud (1873). Only the extraordinarily sensitive prodigy like him could possibly sense the forthcoming inferno, that turned out literally the Inferno. "Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939" was not Steiner's theme. "Thirty Years' War 1915-1945" was. However, he was not interested much in the warfare. He paid attention to the extinction of best stocks of human beings in European civilization during the first war.

"We cannot think clearly about the crises of Western culture, about the origins and forms of totalitarian movements in the European heartland and the recurrence of world war, without bearing sharply in mind that Europe, after 1918, was damaged in its center of life. Decisive reserves of intelligence, of nervous resilience, of political talent, had been annihilated." (p. 32-33)

He paid more attention to the "distance" between Munich and Dachau, between Weimar and Buchenwald, between playing Bach's Klaviermusik in the evening and industrious slaughter in the daytime, and between civilized culture and cruelty.

The human beings came to build Hell made immanent. "Lo pianto stesso li pianger non lascia / e' l duol che truova in sugli occhi rintoppo / si volge in

entro a far crescer l'ambascia" (canto 33 of the Inferno, part of Dante's Divine Comedy) was one of the best sources of imagination for Steiner, and should be for those having no personal experience. At the core of Europe, the civilization has been dead for a half century. According to Steiner, human beings are living in "post-culture." (His thesis to explain this formidable phenomenon in our century is extremely interesting and controversial, but it is a different subject from this paper's theme.)

Human beings, at least those Europeans like Steiner himself who are sensitive as well as sensible enough to reconsider what took place on the very same soil they are standing on, have lost the sense of rationality, of the language (the logos) that was supposed to represent the truth, the God's will, and of the truth itself. Such intellectuals as Nietzsche, Freud, Einstein, Heisenberg, and Gödel (not all were Jewish) had contributed to the fundamental transformation on both ontological and epistemological understanding. In the post-war era, or post-culture according to Steiner, the conventional wisdom on humanity and society have kept challenged by Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, Derrida, etc. Profound scepticism goes beyond literary criticism: being conscious of the insufficiency and limitation of Western methodology on representation, philosophers are increasingly inclined to extraterritoriality.

Europeans destroyed their own civilization. The European community of nations survived, however. This community had not been free from war; on the contrary, it had succeeded in civilizing the warfare. Schmitt was right up to this point. Europeans started to institutionalize their more-or-less-accepted endeavor to create a security community (in the Deutchean sense) in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community. They succeeded, even though partly, in transcending the relationship between sovereign states to institutionalize the

community. For the first time in modern times, Europeans find their enemy not within but outside Europe. The creation of a security community became promising more than ever. The European community expanded in scope by creating two other institutions, and to combine the three as the European Communities. At the same time, the community expanded in domain as well with such peripheral states as Britain, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal joining the Communities.

It is yet to be seen whether or not such geographical expansion will strengthen the orientation toward a security community.

Another Jewish intellect, and former communist, Edgar Morin used to be anti-European, but when he realized Europe was dying, he became an European, which is manifested in his recent essay, Pensée l'Europe (1987) (I read Japanese translation only). Unlike Steiner, Morin thinks the revitalization of Europe is possible, although he rejects the millennial expectation. The localization, instead of globalization, of Europe took place resulting the resurgence of provincial and European identities with deminishing national identity. Decline of Europe in the post-war era ironically made Europeans interconnected. He believes Europe is now "Schicksalgemeinschaft" or "communauté de destin." The issue is how European peoples would accept this fact, and share the will to realize the community that is more substantial than the security community in political sense.

To what extent can the community, the medium to substantiate a culture and to represent the shared value, transcend the language idiosyncrasy? Morin advocates multilingualism, which he believes is not difficult for Europeans. If he is right on the relative ease of European multilingualism, however, it would not guarantee European identity. Being a polyglot himself, Steiner identified Nabokov, Borges and Beckett as the three representatives in the

literature of exile. Their "dialectical hesitance" toward not only a native language but several languages is closely related to the problem of a lost center. Such literary revolution reflects, according to Steiner, the failure of humane literacy in 20th century Europe. Serious doubts on language are prevailed: a long tradition (from the logos in the Greek civilization to modern linguistics) of phonocentrism is under attack; l'écriture is now at issue; the meaning of communicability is in question. In such an intellectual atmosphere, the linguistic community has lost credibility, and is dealt with as if it is obscene. But no promising community has been found to substitute the linguistic community as the basic component of political community.

Would Steiner disagree to add Curtzio Malaparte on his list of the multilingual representatives? Resembling Schmitt in many senses, Malaparte might not be regarded to be cosmopolitan enough. But certainly, he wrote in French as well; he was in exile. (I read his works in Japanese translations.) If one believes that he was a fascist, or alternatively if one believes Malaparte was much more complicated than he looked, he or she must not be as optimistic as Morin. Even Steiner must take note on the following point. When neither British nor American bombers were trying to destroy any railways toward the death camps, not to mention death camps, Malaparte observed and left the record on decaying Europe. Wandering in Europe was neither Leviathan nor Behemoth. It was, as Malaparte discovered. Kaputt.

### 3. Where the Wild Things Are

Woody: Dr. Helmholtz, are humans in a state of nature savages--as Hobbes thought-- or innocent, loving creatures--as Rousseau thought?

Dr. H. : It depends. Weekdays, Hobbes was right. Weekends, Rousseau.

(Stuart Hample, Non-Being and Somethingness, 1978, New York: Random House)

Before the death of the Civilization, however, Europeans disseminated the generalized fundamental concept of the Civilization. In a secular and universal version, the civilization meant the the constitution of the nation-state represented in the Constitution. The case of Japan illustrates this point most clearly. When the Tokugawa government opened a few ports for trading with Westerners in the mid 19th century, extraterritoriality was introduced. The Western powers obtained capitulation, and Japan lost tariff autonomy. An English statesman, Palmerston wrote in the 1860s (on the occasion of British-Satsuma hostilities), "I am inclined to think that our relations with Japanese are going through the usual and unavoidable stages of the Intercourse of strong and Civilised [sic] nations with weaker and less civilised ones." No matter how arrogant, he was absolutely right. As for Japan, leaders were well aware that the country's entrance in Western system meant her separation from the Chinese imperial order. Soon after its establishment, the Meiji government disputed with China on the suzerainty over the Ryukyu (Okinawa). The relationship with Korea, which remained in the Chinese emporium, became problematical too: the Korean government initially refused to recognize the new revolutionary government of the Meiji Japan; soon the Japanese insisted Korean independence of China; later Chinese intervention in Korean affairs was encountered with a similar attempt by Japan, which eventually led to Sino-Japanese War of 1894. Westernization of Japan's constitution was pursued extensively in order to prove the sovereign statehood. In 1889 Japan promulgated the Constitution, the first in Asia. Japan was extraordinarily attentive to observe *droi public*

international, too. Both government and military studied *jus in bello* in the war with China, and later with Russia. Those efforts made Japan succeed in revising unequal treaties at the turn of the century, almost a half century after opening the country. In the 19th century, to obtain a full-fledged membership of international society was not so easy task for the non-Christian body politic. (It has been so in this century, too. Although abolished in 1899 in the case of Japan, capitulation had continued until 1947 for China, until 1956 for Morocco, and until the 1960s for Gulf states.)

As long as the Civilized nations cooperated with each other to apply the self-righteous order of the international society forcefully to "l'humanité barbare" and "l'humanité sauvage," the latter peoples had to either respond barbarically/savagely to the West (but probably less so than the West did to them because unmistakable differences in power), or try to imitate the non-religious part of the Civilization, which was almost a self-contradicting notion however. The latter option was the Meiji Japan's case. Modernization, which is almost identical with Westernization at least at the time, was the adoption of secularized civilization. Or, it may be more accurate to say that modernization became religious to replace the Christianity in the Civilization. Because of the difficulties to become an equal member of the society, the leadership had to propagate and direct nationalism, the aspiration to create a nation-state. Involving the concept of sovereignty, nationalism had two facets:

externally to prove the integrity so as to be recognized as a Civilized nation; and internally to incorporate a certain class of people into the nation in order to be in effective control of the entire population and territory.

Benedict Anderson's "imagined community" is as much the success story of the rising nation-state as Steiner's "imagined garden." (p. 4f). This represents

a widely shared view of ascendant European civilization and of flourishing liberalism in the 19th century. The garden, by which he meant an Earthly Paradise, stood on intolerant nationalism which was associated with drastic mobilization, and on rapid industrialization associated with massive alienation.

Steiner's penetrating examination stripped off the imagery to expose the decay of humanities. As for "imagined community," Anderson focused the national community, "[the] fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings." (Imagined Communities, 1983, p. 16) Consonant with Steiner's starting point, Anderson pointed out as follows:

"The slow, uneven decline of these interlinked certainties [of three axiomatic beliefs: (1) a particular script-language offering privileged access to ontological truth, (2) the order of rule by some form of cosmological (divine) dispensation, and (3) temporality in which cosmology and history are indistinguishable], first in Western Europe, later elsewhere, under the impact of economic change, 'discoveries' (social and scientific), and the development of increasingly rapid communications, drove a harsh wedge between cosmology and history. No surprise then that the search was on, . . . , for a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together." (p. 40)

Anderson's answer was print-capitalism. Beyond this point, Anderson's analysis departed from Steiner's. (Both of them paid attention to the problematique of the language; Anderson's analysis is shallower in terms of the nature of the language, but broader in terms of geography and variety of languages.) Print-capitalism worked to standardize and homogenize the value and knowledge among the population in question to create an imagined community. "Pilgrimage" from periphery to the center substantiate the administrative unit

as the bureaucratic state. Political use of print-capitalism and pilgrimage in Anderson's terminology is what Seaton-Watson calls "official nationalism" (Nations and States, 1977). The formation of a nation-state, based on whichever a people or a government at the outset, is more or less the conscious political process, where official nationalism is expected to provide populace with the symbol of national identity, the legitimacy of rule, the apparatus for mobilization, the official interpretation of "national" history, and public education. For "less civilized" nations, official nationalism was as much needed, if not more, as for "Civilized" nations.

When "Civilized" nations in Europe waged war mutually to result in fatigue, two peripheral empires involved in the war became disintegrated. From the Civilized Russian Empire, several Civilized peoples were liberated to organize nation states, respectively. From the Ottoman Empire, however, no Civilized nations came into being, except for Turkish nationalists to form a republic. Such Empires as British, American, and French ones remain intact. National self-determination turned out selective. However, many of "less civilized (both barbarian and savage)" peoples began to show their aspiration to become nations. Nationalism was much more infectious than believed. The metropolis of each empire, a nation-states in itself, played a role of the nersary for colonial nationalism, where elite students from less-civilized countries transformed themselvs into nationalists. Indonesia nationalism, for instance, had its root in the Netherlands. Similarly, Vietnamese nationalism grew in Paris; even leaders of the notorious Pol Pot regime, including Pol Pot himself, of Cambodia studied (but never graduated) in France.

Ironically enough, the territorial order of colonial state or administrative unit had not provided sufficient "pilgrimage" in most of the

less civilized area. In terms of Anderson's condition, the spread of nationalism had been narrowly limited. Those who were enlightened in the civilized metropolis by and large failed to make local people imagine a state-wide community. "Fortunately" where the independence war took place involving various strata and clusters of populace, nationalism penetrated deeply enough to integrate post-independent countries. The formation of the nation-state became concern not only for elite and intellectuals but for much larger fraction of people. They felt to have liberated themselves, and the state became in their possession. However, in many cases, those who succeeded in becoming a nation hastily began to attempt to exclude (from discrimination to extermination) other population in the territory of their state. Official nationalism turned out cruelly oppressive.

In many of independences after World War II, the sovereignty was cordially awarded to "savage" people. "Civilized" nations only half-reluctantly, i. e., half-willingly abandoned their noble responsibility for realizing the divine rule. Driven either by sudden enlightenment on universal humanism, by eventual confession of guilt, or by rational calculation of economic cost and benefit, they let the "savage" be free. Did they expect that Rousseauian primordial communities would come into being as a nation, on which the state could possibly be built at all? The new leadership was supposed to effectively govern the sovereign state, but whose political basis was hardly national either geographically or ethnically or both. The lack of the national community in various states was not, of course, ignored. With self-appointed messianic responsibility, and with quite an understandable hatred toward communism, U.S. civilization had its academia theorize an unbelievably optimistic scenario of the parallel process of modernization, democratization and national integration.

Various leverages were attempted mainly in the form of foreign assistance, but the national community did not emerge in many countries. The theory had retreated by the end of the 1960s. Integration policy was criticized as "nation-destroying" rather than "nation-building" (Conner 1972). But the problem was not that simple. In most, if not all, of the cases, the conflict over national integration was not that the government was trying to destroy an existing nation, and that the nation was resisting such a violent attempt. It was the conflict between a small fraction of people in control of the state, namely the nation however small in number, on the one hand, and those who are politicized as the counter-force among the rest of people on the other. They speak different languages, they have different vocabularies, they believe different value-systems: they are incommensurable.

#### 4. A Mirror

"'The Rise of the West' may serve as a shorthand description of the upshot of the history of the human community to date."


(William McNeill, *The Rise of the West*, Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1964, p. 807. This book was the winner of the National Book Award for history in 1964. In 1964.)

Post-war international society has been managed by the relationship between the sovereign, and presumably nation-, states. The management has been more or less successful in the sense that the society has survived, and that it has developed from a widely accepted, but not consensual, viewpoint. The nuclear war between nuclear powers has been avoided. The world-wide economic

depression has been avoided, too. Such fortunate situation is based on the fact that no nation-state has triggered the chain reaction toward the disaster.

But there seems no fail-safe apparatus; the human beings may have been extremely lucky.

Paradoxically enough, nation-states have become increasingly dependent upon other government's controllability of the state one another in the course of deepening economic interdependence. This is partly because the liberalization of trans-national flows of peoples, commodities, money and information, which was the intended and agreed outcome of leading nations, paralyzed various discretionary leverages, primarily at the national border, to protect national interest, and left the government domestic measures. If intervention in internal affairs is not allowed in the society of states, mutual initiative such as Structural Impediment Initiative between Japan the United States may suffice. The result depends less on the distribution of power between states than on the controllability of the nation-state by the government. While international society expanded by ignoring much domestic differences, economic interdependence increasingly calls for the harmonization of domestic societies.



Dependence on governability of domestic society is not limited to a more or less closed club of advanced industrial nations. IMF conditionality, for instance, necessitates that the government of the recipient country has sufficient power over own bureaucracy, military, economic elite, and labor forces, if not over revolutionary forces. The effect of official development assistance also depend on this governmental power; power not abroad, but over own people and territory, which no one can assume.

It has been true for years that no nation can decide the fate of own. But

this truth has to be recalled especially today because some nation seem to be able to decide the fate of the earth, hence of all the nations. A few resourceful countries; a few most populous state; a few nuclear powers; a few industrial economies, which are not needless-to-say mutually exclusive, can at least limit teh future trajectory of the globe. It is highly questionable that even those relatively small number of nation-states share a fundemantal value for the survival of human beings. Before one is convinced that nations are trapped by the Prisoners' \*Dilemma, one should carefully examine that the perceived pay-offs of all the players, the nation in our context, constitute such a game-structure.

Matters are complicated because one is not convinced that all the human beings are represented by one of the nation. Should one forget the existence of such people? Should one let the sovereign state solve mounting problems affecting the fate of the human being at the expense of those who are not represented. Or, should one believe that what the society of states is doing is on behalf of the alienated?

The global stabilization does not seem the answer for the human being even if it could be so among some nations. The relationship between human beings has profoundly transformed. If traditional frame of reference has to be employed, it has transofrmed, domestically as well as internationally. But such a dichotomy is obsolete: "intermestically" sounds too euphemistic. One needs the political decision, but the political community to make, legitimize, and implement the decision seems wanting.

It seems to me that the human being will find what it is in not so remote future. According to Jacques Lacan's mirror theory, the man realizes the "self" not through cogito but through a looking glass. As if the history of

the twentieth century has not been the mirror for the human beings. we are looking for a looking glass. Or have we found one?

"These roads were footsteps and echoes. / women, men, agonies, rebirths. / days and nights / falling asleep and dreams. / each single moment of my yesterdays / and of the world's yesterdays. / the firm sword of the Dane and the moon of the Persians. / the deeds of the dead. / shared love. words. / Emerson. and snow. and so many things. / Now I can forget them. I reach my center. / my mirror. / Soon I shall know who I am."

(Jorge Luis Borges, from "In Praise of Darkness.")

iai ISTITUTO AFFARI  
INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

n° Inv. 10577..

[12 LUG. 1991]

BIBLIOTECA