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THREATS FROM THE SOUTH AND THE SECURITY OF SOUTHERN EUROPE

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Introduction

A vague geographic term, the "South", is used in the political parlance to indicate the area contiguous to the Western European land mass and its maritime frontiers. The term "South" immediately brings to mind the worldwide North-South divide whose existence and implications became a political issue in the seventies. Moreover, "South" bears an implicit reference to another geographic term, "East", which has provided a useful shorthand in international relations in the last forty-five years.

Indeed, what the term "South" indicates today in relation to the European security environment is more a direction from which certain threats may arise than a precise geographic area.

In fact, the boundaries of the area South of Western Europe that has a direct impact on European security vary not only according to the issue considered, but also to the fragmented and variable collective and national interests of the Western countries. Any attempt at a strict geographic definition of the area is, therefore, doomed from the outset, as the history of the NATO debate on the out-of-area confirms.

For the purpose of this paper, the South of Southern Europe consists of the enlarged Mediterranean, i.e. of the countries that compose the North African, Middle Eastern and Balkan regional sub-systems (for the sake of brevity, this region will be referred to in this study as "South" or "Southern area"). This definition leaves many questions open, but it does provide a working definition.

The choice of including the Balkan area and excluding the Sahel and the Horn of Africa is tentative and merits an explanation, however brief.

In the recent past, only the North African and Middle Eastern sectors of the region lying South of Western Europe posed autonomous security concerns to the West, while the Balkan sector was part of the global threat coming from the East. The dissolution of the communist regimes and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact is thawing political life in the Balkans, too. While it is still far from clear what configuration the region will assume in the future, it is already obvious that many of the deep-seated problems of the area (political weakness, economic underdevelopment, socio-cultural disorientation) are similar to those of the Arab-Islamic areas.

Granted this similarity, it may be a useful exercise to try to apply to the Balkans the

same analysis of threat developed from the examples of North Africa and the Middle East.

As for the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, they have been left out as they are felt to constitute distinct sub-regional compounds which are only marginally linked to the enlarged Mediterranean area. Since the line has to be drawn somewhere, a reasonable distinction is felt to be between the core area of concern - the enlarged Mediterranean - and its adjoining areas (including the Afghanistan-Pakistan compound).

Finally, another issue that needs to be clarified is the prevalence of reference to the South in terms of threat. While this reference is justified in a study whose focus is the security landscape of Southern Europe, this cannot conceal the fact that the South comes up in European political discourse in almost exclusively negative terms: "problems of the South", "crisis in the South", "threats coming from the South".

Although the present study originates precisely from these preoccupations, it must be pointed out that there is another side to the coin. The negative sides are more in evidence in the complex web of relations between Western Europe and the South because they affect the main object of political analysis, that is, the level of state relations. However, other levels and other analytical angles exist; from the cultural, demographic or individual points of view, the relationship between Western Europe and the South may appear less negative and often seem positive, especially in a long-term perspective. The existence of these other dimensions must be kept in mind if the future of political relations with the South is not to be hopelessly compromised.

1. The South and Western European Security: What Threats?

Table 1-A provides a systematic survey of the overall developments in the South that could negatively affect European security.

Briefly listed from left to right are 1) the causes of the current instability in the countries of the South; 2) the factors of structural instability; 3) the likely factors of crisis and conflict; 4) the threats to Europe. Table 1-B shows the military, political and economic consequences for European security of the materialization of threats from the South highlighted in Table 1-A.

1.1. Roots

The most evident roots of the present crisis in the South are sunk deep in modern history: from colonialism to forced modernization, the recent history of the regions to the South of Europe is a succession of events that have been poorly assimilated and have left the nations with fragile foundations. In this sense, he effects of Soviet domination on the Balkans can perhaps be compared to those ofe colonialism.

These recent traumas are accentuated by the religious and ethnic fragmentation (which is weaker, but not totally absent in North Africa) and the legacy of a rich and complex culture like the Arab-Islamic culture (to which countries not ethically Arab such as Turkey, Iran, and other countries with Muslim minorities such as Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria also belong).

Economic underdevelopment is obviously among the causes of the present instability; this underdevelopment is in most cases more the result of the disadvantageous conditions under which these countries entered the international economic market than

objective poverty in terms of resources.

1.2. Structural factors of instability

Three fundamental structural factors of instability are behind the crises that arose in the South during the seventies and eighties:

1) political weakness;
2) economic underdevelopment;
3) social and cultural disorientation.

Although some countries of the South can boast military strength and abundant economic resources (for example, Turkey, Algeria, Iran and Iraq), all are weak as states. This weakness is manifest at various levels: in some states, the concept of the state is weak, that is, widespread consensus on the existence of a single state in a certain territory (this is the case, for example, in Lebanon, Sudan and Yugoslavia) is lacking.

Furthermore, the distinction between the state and the political regime is vague everywhere in the South. This confusion leads the elites to identify their survival with that of the state and leads the oppositions to undermine the state in order to bring down a regime. The resulting cycle of "opposition-repression" impedes the development of a system of real democratic participation in the political process.

No country in the area to the South of Western Europe has a fully democratic political system and even where political pluralism exists to some degree, it is very fragile. The events in Turkey, Egypt and, recently in some Balkan countries attest to the risks inherent in the transition to democracy.

Still generally weak, although much stronger than two decades ago, are the instruments of the government apparatus, that is, the central and peripheral institutions administering the territory and the population, providing those goods and services (justice, security etc.) that legitimize the existence of the state.

In conclusion, one of the main centers of latent instability in countries in the area to the South of Western Europe is the weakness of their political structures[1].

Another source of latent crisis is economic underdevelopment. It also has a number of causes: the paucity of resources (absolute and relative to needs); poor management of available resources; the negative consequences of interdependence with the international market.

Today, underdevelopment in the countries of the South is evident in the downswing in growth rate (as compared to the 1960-80 period), in increased foreign debt and in the inability to meet the (sometimes primary) needs of the population and to ensure sufficient growth to fulfill future ones.

The strong cutback in financial transfers to the South, the worsening of the terms of trade and growing protectionism in industrialized countries are the main external causes for the development crisis afflicting the countries of the South. Some internal factors are equally important in determining the persistence of underdevelopment: the ideological rigidity of the economic strategies, the inadequacy of the instruments for economic management and the inefficient implementation of reforms.

Last but not least, the widespread social and cultural crisis must be considered a structural factor of instability. Its origins and mechanisms are sufficiently well-known in the area of Arab-Islamic culture; it remains to be seen whether the same mechanisms are also at work in the formerly communist countries of the Balkans and what specific forms the socio-

cultural crisis will take there: for example, the anti-Western bias of the Arab-Islamic peoples has no reason to be spreading in the Balkans .

All societies experimenting with accelerated economic, social and political modernization are extremely vulnerable. When the objectives in the name of which the dismantling of the traditional social order has been undertaken are not achieved or are late in coming, the pressures towards alternative models - often of restoration - become very strong indeed.

In the Arab-Islamic world, modernization was begun under colonialism (although only memories of the abuse remain) and continued in the name of pan-Arab nationalism espousing anti-imperialism. Delegitimized by the debacle of defeat in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, pan-Arab nationalism has been partially replaced by the mobilizing ideology of an Islamic rebirth. The religious renaissance has been flanked and at times juxtaposed politically by patriotic nationalism drawn from the Western cultural model but often marked by anti-imperialist and, therefore, anti-Western tones.

Thus, the ideological and cultural frame of reference of the Arab-Islamic world today is dishomogeneous and contradictory as it embraces three mobilizing ideologies (pan-Arabism, Islamic fundamentalism, patriotic nationalism) and the various social and political models of behaviour related to each.

1.3. Forms and factors of destabilization

When catalyzing events take place, the latent instability of political weakness, economic underdevelopment and social and cultural discontent can surface in acute crises and conflicts.

Although it is impossible to predict where and why a crisis will erupt and what kind of conflict it may generate, a number of factors can be considered likely catalyzers of both inter-state and internal crises and conflicts. One example is unsettled territorial disputes: from the Spanish enclaves in Morocco to the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus and borders in the Aegean, from the numerous disputes in Northern Africa (Western Sahara, Azou Strip, Eastern Nubia), to the Middle East (Golan, Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank), from the Gulf (Shatt al-Arab, Iraq-Kuwait, land and maritime frontiers of the Arabian Peninsula) to the Balkans (Kossovo, Macedonia, inter-Yugoslavian borders).

Another possible source of crisis are the demands of the ethnic-religious minorities in the Southern area: the Algerian Berbers, the Egyptian Copts, the Sciites on the Arabian Peninsula, the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, in Lebanon and the Gulf, the Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, the Armenians, the Turks in Thrace, the Romanians in Bulgaria (Dobruja) and Moldavia, the Hungarians in Serbia to mention only a few.

Other factors that could have a catalyzing effect on crises in the South can only be described in general categories. These include conflicts of an economic nature, in particular, relative to the control of primary resources such as water and hydrocarbons; in some special geopolitical situations transit and access rights are of extreme economic importance. For example, a series of factors (population boom, growing industrialization, urbanization, pollution) are making water an ever more precious and sought after resource in the Middle East; rival projects involving the three main basins of the region - the Tigris-Euphrates, the Jordan and the Nile - are already creating tensions among the riparian countries.[2]

The long Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait are clear examples of inter-state conflicts in which economic factors (access to the Gulf and control of oil

production) have played a catalyzing role. At the same time, they demonstrate that in absence of notable political incentives in the regional environment (the fear of contagion from Khomeinism in the first case and the quest for regional leadership in the second), these economic factors are insufficient to generate a conflict.

Furthermore, although mitigated by the diplomatic efforts of post-1973, the reciprocal refusal of Arab countries and Israel to recognize each other is still a strong motive for conflict. The same cannot be said of religion: it is unlikely that the acute rivalry among the promoters of Islam (Cairo, Riyadh, Teheran) and among the followers of its various interpretations (Sunnites, Sciites, fundamentalists and moderates) can provide sufficient stimulus for inter-state conflict today or in the foreseeable future.

The crisis precipitated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is bound to significantly affect the structure of conflict in the Southern area, both because of the modality and the level of regional and international involvement. Yet, the trends that will be strengthened or modified will depend on the outcome of the crisis; it is, however, reasonable to assume that the influence of political and ideological factors such as anti-imperialism and nationalism will be strengthened by it.

It is more difficult to classify the catalyzers of domestic crisis in distinct categories; they can actually only be identified through analysis of each national situation. It must be underlined, though, that while domestic crises and conflicts in the Arab-Islamic world from the fifties to the seventies were triggered above all by political factors (recurrent coups in Syria and Iraq, the Lebanese crisis from 1958 to 1975, the Iranian revolution in 1978), popular uprisings demanding staple products have been more frequent and destabilizing in the eighties than political plots or clashes between opposing political fronts.

The strengthening of government controls, the Islamic fundamentalists' monopoly of the opposition and the limited openings to democratic political participation are the main determinants of this change. As they are likely to persist in the short term, as are the economic difficulties, the catalyzers of internal crisis in the South in the nineties will probably be similar to the ones experienced in the eighties.

The demographic factor deserves special consideration. The average rate of population growth on the southern shores of the Mediterranean was 2.7 per cent between 1985 and 1990. It is expected to level out at approximately 2.1 per cent in the coming decade. This high rate of growth of the Southern populations exacerbates the effects of economic underdevelopment (in the next decade, the countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean would require a 7 to 8 per cent annual growth in GDP to ensure employment for the young people entering the work force) and contributes to the political volatility in the area (41 per cent of the population outside of the Community in the Mediterranean area is between 0 and 14 years old).

However, it would be incorrect to consider demographic growth a crisis factor in itself; destined to subside after having peaked in the eighties,[3] it is actually only a variable linked to the problem of development.

Yet, the constant migratory flows towards Western Europe which it has spawned and the fear of an overwhelming exodus in case of crisis or conflict give it special significance from a European point of view.

1.4. The threats and their impact on Western European security

Tables 1-A and 1-B illustrate the overall links between instabilty in the South and

European security. Therefore, in the following paragraphs only some specific aspects will be analized in detail (see also points 2.1.1-3): crisis prevention; high intensity conflicts and the strategic significance of Southern arsenals; terrorism and immigrant community; anti-Western prejudice as a threat.

1.4.1 Crisis prevention

First, Southern instability forces Europe to undertake some form of crisis prevention. This is achieved indirectly through a wide range of Western European (and US) bilateral and multilateral policies involving diplomacy and economic cooperation.

More direct forms of prevention include political or military deterrence, which is sometimes difficult to distinguish from intervention. To be put in this category are the "gun boat diplomacy" actions undertaken by France during the eighties (in support of the Bourguiba regime during the Libya-Tunisia crisis in 1980, in support of the Maronite community in Lebanon in 1989 and other undrtakings in Su-Saharian Afria).[4]

Preventive or deterrent action can also be multilateral and this was the form most frequently chosen for prevention of crises in the South during the last decade (the UN peace-keeping forces, multinational operations in the Sinai and the Red Sea).

1.4.2 High-intensity conflicts

The greatest risks and costs for European security stem from possible high-intensity armed conflicts, that is, widespread inter-state conflicts involving the theatres of both the Southern region and Europe.

Fortunately, the history of the area in the eighties does not provide examples of this kind of conflict, and the limited armed conflicts in the South involving European forces always took place in the framework of national or multinational Western intervention in loco. The episode that most closely resembles the high intensity scenario took place in 1986 following the second Libyan-American crisis. On that occasion, Libya launched a missile attack against an American military installation on Italian territory, but missed its target (the island of Lampedusa).[5]

While the attack on Lampedusa is the only example of military action against Europe by a Southern country, it is feared that Europe will no longer be seen as a sanctuary in the future. It could both be directly drawn into a high-intensity conflict or involved as a reaction to European intervention in medium- and low-intensity conflicts.

The major factor underlying this fear is the qualitative and quantitative growth of the military arsenals of Southern countries.

1.4.3 The strategic significance of Southern arsenals

It would be nonsense to numerically list the forces of the countries of the enlarged Mediterranean: the countries in the Southern region do not form a military alliance whose overall offensive capabilities can be assessed, as was done for decades with the Warsaw Pact. In fact, there are not even any significant subregional military alliances.[6]

Thus, it can be hypothesized that in all scenarios of high-intensity conflict, the Southern state involved would be called upon to face the European country/ies single-handedly, helped, at best, by an ad hoc regional coalition. On the other hand, as long as NATO exists, its members are committed by Art.6 of its founding Treaty to provide a collective armed response to an armed attack of an allied territory (and the Bruxelles Treaty

that regulates the Western European Union is even more stringent).

Furthermore, the overall military capability of each of the principal European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy) is superior to that of any of the major military powers in the South (Egypt, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Israel).[7] This is also true of all weapons categories (only the numerical balance of land forces is sometimes in favour of the countries of the South) and depends mainly on the technological superiority of European forces.

This means that the probability of a widespread or limited conflict issuing from the South and taking in the European territory is infinitesmal, as it would lead to sure defeat.

It does not mean, however, that the arsenals being built up in the South are strategically irrelevant. On the contrary, the qualitative and quantitative growth of the military capability of the Third World - limited at present in the Southern area to the Middle Eastern countries - has three main consequences:
1) increased crisis instability: increase in the propensity of the regional actors to use military force in case of crisis; increase in the lethality of possible armed conflicts; increased range of targets that can be reached militarily by the regional powers; 2) withering supremacy: decrease in the Western (European and American) ability to influence the actions of regional actors through (threatened or actual) use of the military instrument and greater costs in exercising this influence; 3) greater Western vulnerability: to attack during peace-keeping or peace-enforcing missions; relative increase in the feasibility of limited military attacks against European territory.

The political, military and economic difficulties encountered by the Western coalition mobilized against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait are a clear example of the loss of effectiveness of the West's deterrent capacity in the South.

Whatever the outcome, the crisis precipitated by Iraq has evidenced the West's reluctance to shoulder the human and material costs of a conflict with an adversary that has the military capability to inflict considerable damage.

The cost of the "Desert Shield" operation, estimated by the American Defence Department as 11.3 billion dollars per year is a significant example of the economic impact of deterrent action (and war would obviously cost much more). Simply for the sake of comparison, the escorting and mine-clearing operations in the Gulf in 1987-88 costed a total of 240 billion dollars.[8]

The vulnerability of European territory to limited attacks raises another problem. At the moment, only the southern portion of Western Europe is vulnerable and then only to air, missile and limited amphibious attacks (see also point 2.1.1).

The probability of a terrorist military attack or retaliation is limited by 1) political and strategic factors (it would be rational only in the scenario of a single European country exposed to a conflict in the South, and only in relation to the limited political objectives attainable through such an attack; if not, it would lead to the scenario of high-intensity conflict mentioned earlier); 2) technical and military factors (the success of air and amphibious attacks is strongly conditioned by existing defence structures and the availability of power projection means (air and naval systems capable of delivering a long-distance attack): only Israel and perhaps Libya has this capability today; as for missile attacks, Israel, Iraq and Saudi Arabia all have the missile capability to reach the southeastern parts of Europe (but only Israel's missiles have nuclear warheads and are felt to be technicalyy mature).

Thus, the present direct miliatary threat poased by the countries of the Southern region to Europe is minimal. However, the existence of a limited capability and the rapid spread of the military technology needed to expand it in the short-term constitute a threat to European security that requires forces to be kept at a level able to cope with possible direct limited attacks and capable of action in the South, with the political and economic burdens this implies. The burden is also political in that it calls for domestic, inter-European and Euro-Atlantic consensus on the existence, quality and quantity of forces aimed at dealing with this kind of threat.

1.4.4 Terrorism and immigrant communities

Of the threats from the South, terrorism is perhaps the most familiar and the one which Western European countries are best equipped to handle. Terrorist attacks on European territory and against citizens and interests abroad were in the headlines throughout the eighties. Their implications were studied and a series of preventive measures worked out at the national and international levels.

Although this familiarity and the preventive measures taken do not eliminate the threat, they do partially reduce its impact on European security. For example, the political and economic costs deriving from the choice of response strategies and their formulation have already been paid. In other words, because of this readiness alreafy in place terrorist attacks would have a less destabilizing effect on Europe today than they had in the seventies and eighties; this in turn partially cuts down their probability, as the main objective of terrorism is destabilization.[9]

Anti-terrorist prevention also has collateral effects, however. It affects legislation and, more generally, collective attitudes towards immigrants from the South.

In the absence of a Community policy towards immigration from the South, the individual European countries have adopted restrictive legislation mainly motivated by economic considerations, but also based on the desire to gain better control over the immigrants' origins and movements.

The hypothesis that immigrant communities provide a spawning ground for terrorism seems to be belied by experience in France and Italy, where the terrorist networks discovered were not organically linked to permanent immigrant communities.

The social problems created in Europe by large communities of immigrants from the South are of quite a different nature and intensity, and tend to strengthen the xenophobic trends emerging in Western Europe today. Immigration creaes problems of law and order and cultural assimilation, while xenophobia reinforces the anti-Western prejudices that is discussed below.

In particular, German, French and British experience shows that the difficulties caused by immigration from the South can be dealt with by far-sighted economic and cultural policies: in fact, it is the transition from a permissive to a restrictive attitude that causes problems; it should not be forgotten that France and Germany both encouraged immigration in the sixties -although with different expectations- only to cut it back in the seventies.

Generally, foreign communities only present a security threat in terms of law and order (as occurred during the Rushdie case in Great Britain and when charges were levelled against lay schools in France). The matter is altogether different if there are links with terrorism, but this is by no means a foregone conclusion).

1.4.5 Anti-Western prejudice as a threat

In analyzing the structural components of the instability of the Southern area, it was pointed out that one of the characteristics of the current social and cultural crises in the Arab-Islamic world is the contradictory nature of the ideological frame of reference, which includes appeals to Arab nationalism, religious rebirth and patriotic nationalism. Although rival on political and cultural planes, all three ideological models promise to protect "Arab dignity" and "the Arab personality" (recurrent terms in Arab political discourse) from the oppression of hostile international forces (imperialism and Zionism). The Arab-Islamic masses see this oppression as taking on different forms, from the denial of Arab rights in Palestine, to a subordinate role in the international hierarchy and the intrusion of foreign models of individual behaviour (for example, women's liberation), but all forms of denial of their "dignity" have a common Western origin.

Whether or not these perceptions are legitimate is beside the point, what is of concern is that anti-Western prejudice is the point of intersection of the main ideological movements in the Southern area (the same cannot be said of the different expressions of Balkan nationalism which all claim to be firmly European).

This convergence and its potential danger became clear to all from the regional reactions to the crisis provoked by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Not only did countries such as Tunisia, Yemen and Sudan unexpectedly side with Iraq, the "champion of anti-imperialism", but Arab public opinion was mobilized and proved to be quite independent of government positions (this occurred in Jordan and Syria). Finally, even some countries, such as Turkey and Iran, whose governments are evidently against Iraqi policy, took cautiously their anti-Iraqi stand for fear of internal repercussions.

However, the anti-Western bias (which is matched by an anti-Arab and anti-Islamic bias in the West) must not be mixed up with indiscriminate and aggressive anti-Westernism; only the more radical nationalists and fundamentalists are aggressively anti-Western - and they can be isolated - but in formulating policies for crisis prevention and management an anti-Western prejudice nevertheless must be taken into account.

As long as this reflection of collective mistrust towards the West is not eliminated or attenuated by more sagacious Western policies than those of appeasement (often pursued by the Europeans) and of confrontation (which has marked American policy towards the area in the last deacade), this prejudice will continue to amplify all the crisis factors examined previously.

1.5. Threats and Perceptions: a View from the South

A threat is by definition a highly subjective question and the perceptions of the actors involved can contribute to a large extent in creating or concealing a threat: when the Libyan leader, Khadaffi, claimed in 1981 that the INFs installed at the base in Comiso, Italy, were aimed directly against Libya, he expressed a perception that was exactly opposite of the Italian one, which saw the "Euromissiles" in a purely East-West perspective.

During the crumbling in 1989 of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the political certainties generated by the Cold War, the South wondered what its role in the new world order would be. At the beginning of 1990, the Arab world started to draw some intial conclusions: the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel and the withdrawal of Warsaw Pact

technicians involved in cooperation with Arab countries clearly signalled that the East was turning its back; in the West, the urgency of the East European question displaced the South, both in Europe and in Washington.

The dominant analysis among Arab intellectuals, which has reached Europe via commentators traditionally attentive to the mood of the area,[10] is that the 1989 revolution has had substantially negative repercussions on the South, whose room for maneuver and specific weight in international relations has been further reduced by the collapse of bipolarism and by the concentration of the political and economic energies of the industrialized world on the reconstruction of Europe.

The only exception felt to the general perception of marginalization in the South was a negative one: the South was being shifted into the role of enemy number one as a consequence of the fading of the traditional Soviet threat. In other words, the Arab world assumed that the industrialized countries and specifically the West was beginning to see the Third World in general and the Middle East in particular as the main threat to international security, thus satisfying a psycological need and justifeying the upkeep and perhaps even the buildup of its military apparatus, its political and economic control of the region, etc.

This fear, born of a distorted interpretation of some objective data[11], provided one of the most immediate justifications for the Arab world's support for Saddam Hussein's neo-nationalist line.[12]

2. Southern Europe and the Threats from the South

The definition of "Southern Europe", like that of "the South" is not unproblematic. If the former is used to refer to the economically less developed region of Western Europe, it would include Portugal, Greece, Southern Italy and, to a lesser extent, Spain. If the degree of integration in the EC is used as a criterion for defining this region, it would include only Spain, Portugal and Greece, which constitute a separate group even if the degree of internal political stability and maturity is used as the defining criterion.

What is at issue is not the whether a "Southern European" compound may be defined (though its parameters may change according to the vantage point from which it is considered), but rather which countries may be considered part of the group and under what circumstances. This problem has been repeatedly posed in considerations of the specificity of Southern Europe with respect to the impact of threats arising from instability in the South: in this case, France would be included among the most vulnerable European countries, while it would not be deemed part of Southern Europe on the basis of any other of the criteria mentioned above.

France, in fact, is affected by at least two of the three factors on the basis of which it may be argued that the countries of Southern Europe are more exposed to threats from the South than are the countries of Northern and Central Europe.

2.1. The Particular Vulnerability of Southern Europe

The three factors that make Southern Europe particularly vulnerable to threats from the Southern region are

(1) territorial proximity
(2) special politico-economic relations with the Southern region
(3) exposure to political consequences of crises in the South

2.1.1 Territorial proximity

The countries of Southern Europe are directly exposed to threats that by their nature cannot extend to the other countries of Western Europe. As indicated in the analysis on military aspects (see point 1.4.2-3), theoretically the greatest (and least likely) threat is that of military attacks on European territory, to which the countries of Southern Europe would be most exposed for obvious geographic reasons. Given the current assessment of military capabilities (whose assumptions would require a detailed analysis to be qualified), Greece and Southern Italy are within the range of missile attacks by Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iraq and Libya (with regards to Italian targets only), and within the range of air attacks by Egypt, Libya and Israel. The territories of France, Spain and Portugal are vulnerable to air attacks from the Maghreb and to attacks by the longer range Saudi, Iraqi and Israeli missiles. However, if essential sea lanes and ground routes are taken into consideration, it is clear that each country's area of vulnerability is much larger.

But the vulnerability resulting from territorial proximity is not limited to the military dimension. At least in the case of Spain, France and Italy, geographic proximity has facilitated the transit of individuals, thereby increasing the threat of terrorism and problems arising from immigration. In fact, Italy and France have been subjected to more terrorist attacks of "Middle Eastern origin" in the course of the 1980s than have the other Western European countries (ease of access, however, is only one of the contributing factors).

2.1.2 Politico-economic relations

Certain preferential relations between Southern Europe and the Southern Region derive from colonial ties (Spain in the Western Maghreb; France in the Maghreb and in Lebanon; Italy in Eastern Maghreb and in the Adriatic; Greece in the Balkans); others stem from more recent trade and cooperation policies (i.e. the case of Greece and Italy in the Near East; France in the Gulf).

Whether historic or recent, these ties have created a concentration of political and economic interests on the part of Southern European countries with respect to the South -- interests which often assume (and create) the existence special politico-cultural affinities and responsabilities in the region. This concentration of interests and the political discourse which frequently accompany them, (but not necessarily, as in the casel of Germany whose attention toward the South is not commensurate with its economic interests) create special relationships between the Southern European countries and their respective areas of interest in the South.

In times of crisis or conflict, the existence of these special relationships may have a series of implications: the country of the South could perceive its most proximate European partner as a privileged target ; the potential risk to nationals abroad and economic interests could precipitate intervention by the European partner, thereby raising the conflict from the local to the international level; the nearest European country could become the destination

of a mass exodus of refugees, or it could be turned into a base by one of the parties in the conflict...

Of course, preferential relations also offer advantages as well as risks (for instance nationals or economic interests of a close European partner could be given a privileged treatment), but the foregoing discussion suggests that in a cost-benefit analysis, the specificity of Southern European countries with respect to the threat from the South results more in a vulnerability than in an opportunity.

2.1.3 Political Consequences of Threats from the South

In Table 1-B, the political costs of instability in the South are summarised in a list of tensions and/or fractures in political alliances among European countries that could result from the debate on crisis prevention and management in the South. Such tensions have consistently accompanied all major crises in the South since 1973, though they have not all had the same weight or the same consequences in all European countries.

The political debate in Western Europe on crisis prevention and management in the out-of-area is on three different but interrelated levels: (i) inter-Western alliances (multilateral relations within NATO and bilateral relations with the United States); inter-European relations (European Political Cooperation and bilateral relations); (iii) domestic politics (relations within the government majority and between the majority and the opposition).

A review of the debates that accompanied Western responses to crises in the South during the 1980s (from the establishment of the first multinational force for Lebanon to the Iraqi crisis currently in progress) clearly indicates recurring tensions at the Euro-American level (differences in US and European assessments of the nature an management of the threats), the inter-European level (differences in the positions of Northern and Southern European members of the EC, "nationalist" reactions in Britain and France). Attracting less attention, but significant nevertheless have been tensions in internal political equilibria (particularly as a consequence of the debates on national participation to multinational interventions in the out-of-area).

Southern European countries have been most affected by the political cost of these tensions because of their relatively low degree of "cover" and integration within the multilateral alliances (NATO and the EC) and their comparitively fragile internal political consensus with respect to other West European countries.

During the course of the 1980s, this vulnerability was especially felt by Italy, which, given its geopolitical position and internal political equilibria, is intrinsically more exposed to threats from the South than are other countries of Southern Europe. It is likely that similar effects would be felt by Greece in the case of a crisis in the Balkans, or by Spain if there were a crisis in the Maghreb.

3. The Italian case

Italy is an ideal subject for a case-study to test the hypotheses discussed in the two preceding sections, as it was directly affected over the course of the 1980s by every type of threat considered here, including terrorist attacks of Middle Eastern origin within its borders,

attacks on its forces in the out-of-area (Beirut 1983), and even direct attacks on its territory (Libyan Scuds fired at Lampedusa in 1986).

The Italian response to the increased threat from the South during the 1980s has been the formulation, currently in progress, of a series of micro and macro policies in two main fields: foreign policy and defence policy (economic policy directions have been linked to these two areas only sporadically).

An analysis of the debate among the various political forces in Italy over the course taken by its various governments with respect both to specific instances and to general policy lines demonstrates that there has been a substantial consensus, but that it has often been insufficient to ensure a consistent and rapid Italian response to the problems for Western European security arising from the South.

3.1. External determinants of Italian foreign policy

Italy is a medium power whose foreign policy has been firmly anchored in modern times to alliances [13] which, given their geopolitical centre of gravity in continental Europe, have relegated the Mediterranean dimension to a marginal position.

This relative lack of emphasis on the Mediterranean on the part of the anchors of Italian foreign policy has been the source of a potential political contraddiction, as most of the areas of interest proximate to Italy are in the Mediterranean basin: the littoral countries of the Adriatic, the Strait of Sicily and the maritime regions extending west to the Balearic islands and east to Crete.

During the postwar period, in an effort to minimize this potential contraddiction, Italy's foreign policy had the dual objective of consolidation within NATO and the EC, and the achievement of full integration of Italy within these alliances. The attainment of these objectives was appropriately identified as the essential (but not the only) condition for involving the allies in the Mediterranean dimension which was marginal to the centre of gravity of these alliances, but geopolitically indispensible for Italy.

Since the mid-1970s, the impact of instability in the South on European security has been becoming more intense and increasingly visible, particularly with the diminishing threat from the East.

During the 1980s, crises in the South demonstrated the vulnerability specific to the Southern Europeans. Especially open to threats from the South because of their marked exposure to the area (see section 2), Southern European members of the Atlantic Alliance have found that they have no automatic cover from NATO in the South, as there has been no agreement on jurisdiction in the out-of-area. This has left them only with the option of responding to such crises at the national level. But national action does not solve the problem, as different national initiatives by the various Western allies may be insufficient and create additional repercussions.

While the out-of-area predicament constitutes a problem common to all Southern European countries, it is particularly acute for Italy. The only NATO member that is a full participant in the Southern flank (France and Spain are not part of the integrated command; the participation of Greece and Turkey is severely limited by their bilateral disputes), Italy is also the only country in which the presence of military bases used by the US for its own national requirements has never been a source of bilateral conflict. [14]

Furthermore, Italy's geopolitical position is such that it has historic as well as recent interests in each of the areas of the South -- the Maghreb, the Balkans (particularly on the Adriatic front) the Near East, and the Gulf -- making it particulalry sensitive to each of these areas, though the nature of its political relations and the degree of its economic interest may vary.

Since this "sensitivity" involves economic interests, bilateral diplomacy and territorial proximity, Italy has an exposure tout azimout with respect to the South. This makes hte Italian situation unique even within the group of Southern European countries: no other country is at once vulnerable in all three domains with respect to all three areas in the Southern region, although certain countries may be more vulnerable with respect to specific areas or countries in the region (e.g. France is more vulnerable with respect to the Maghreb).

The singularity of the Italian position has other implications. The nature of its participation in NATO, together with its geopolitical position, have made Italy one of the essential bases for US national military actions in the Mediterranean; these factors, as well as Italy's firm atlanticism, have made it the only dependable political ally in the Southern flank. Every time the US has taken action in the South and has sought politico-military support from its European allies, Italy has been particularly subject pressure at the bilateral level.

Such pressure has been exerted, for example, through requests for the use of Italian NATO bases for US national requirements. At least at the official level, Italy has consented to the use of bases and related facilites (e.g. transit in its air space) only as support for out-of-area intervention involving Italian participation: the multinational force in the Sinai (1981-), Lebanon (1982-83), the Gulf (1987-88, and 1990-), the 1986 attack against Libya; use was denied in the case of the air bridge and support for Israel in 1973, and in the 1986 attack against Libya. The Sigonella episode, in which consent was granted only to achieve Italian objectives in the Achille Lauro crisi [15] is a case apart.

This bilateral pressure, has had particularly serious effects on Italian political equilibria because of the nature of the internal debate (considered in the following section), has not yet been counterbalanced by the other anchor of Italian foreign policy, i.e. that created by its membership in the EC. Community institutions have not provided an adequate forum for the coordination of a collective European response in out-of-area issues, both because they do not have competence in military aspects of European security, and because political integration is relatively weak.

Within the framework of national responses that characterized the Western reaction in the 1980s to crises in the South, Italy, unlike France, for example, was not able to adopt national power politics to its advantage. The objective limitations of the instruments available to Italin foreign policy and the subjective limitations imposed by the historic need for a continental anchor precluded postwar Italy from pursuing an independent policy of national affirmation in the Mediterranean (despite a marginal current in domestic politics that had been promoting such action).

In sum, the singularity of the Italian case with respect to the South derives from two main factors: (i) the exposure tout azimout with respect to the South; (ii) the incapacity of NATO and the EC to formulate a multilateral response to the threat from the South.

3.2. Internal determinants of Italian foreign policy

If it is self-evident in political theory that foreign policy in a given country is the intersection point between the domestic and international political systems, it is much less clear exactly how this linkage acts. In the case of Italy, two fundamental elements must be considered: (i) the particular model of the Italian political system and its development since the postwar period; (ii) political culture with reference to the parties that constitute the Italian political system.

In the immediate postwar period, the Italian political system was a "polarized pluralism" that gradually become a "centripetal pluralism"[16] . From 1949 until the end of the 1960s, the Italian political system was dominated by the debate between the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), relegating other minor parties to an auxilliary role. The polarization became less marked during the 1970s as the centre of the system shifted from the DC to a multipolar axis including the DC, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and the so-called lay parties (the Italian Republican Party -PRI, the Italian Liberal Party (PLI) and the Italian Social-Democratic Party (PSDI).

The immobility apparent passivity that characterized Italian foreign policy from 1949 until the end of the 1970s resulted from the "polarized pluralism": the government foreign policy, set out by the DC could neither be particulary flexible, nor particulary active, as 30-40 per cent of the electorate dominated by the PCI openly opposed the political anchors and ideals of the government strategy.

As the relative weight of the various parties shifted within the national political framework and the international landscape changed during the 1970s, Italian foreign policy gradually became more active and sophisticated. This was a result of both the move (if only partial) from the original polarization and the achievement of consensus on the guiding principles underlying its orientation (participation in the Western system as part of the Atlantic Alliance and the process of European integration) [17].

Another historical determinant in the making of Italian foreign policy is the international outlook of the political elite of the various Italian political parties. In this regard, there has long been a fundamental difference between the so-called lay parties (including the PSI), on one hand, and the PCI and DC, on the other.

In terms of political culture, the Catholic universalism of the DC and the ideological ilnternationalilsm of the PCI have a common globalist and moral vision of the international system that draws them closer to one another than to the lay parties. The latter share the concepts (nation-state, national interests, activism) and modalities (cosmopolitanism, anglo-francophilia/phobia) typical of liberal, pre-fascist Italy and are generally anchored to a nationalist (though not necessarily nationalistic) view of foreign policy [18].

Both the peculiarities of the Italian political culture in issues of foreign policy and the constraints imposed on its management by the mechanisms of the internal political system have undergone important changes during the last fifteen years. Nevertheless, the constraints that characterized the previous period have not entirely disappeared and coexist with new elements, influencing both the decision-making process and the operation of the bureaucracy that sustain and implement the decision-making process.

3.3. Italian polices toward the Mediterranean in the 1980s

Italian responses to the challenges of the 1980s that grew out of the instability and increased international importance of the South may be divided considered on three levels:

(1) multilateral policies
(2) bilateral policies
(3) national policies

Italian participation in multilateral policies toward the South in this period were carried out within the Western system (military interventions in the out-of-area, aid and loan policy), the European Community (EC 'global Mediterranean policy, Euro-Arab Dialogue) and with organizations of countries of Southern Europe (mostly remained at the projectual level: the Mediterranean Support Group, Western Mediterranean Forum, Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean).

Bilateral policies have been primarily conducted through bilateral diplomacy (at the government level and, occasionally, at the party level) and through development cooperation.

As for national policies, those on defence and, more recently, immigration have been most directly affected by developments in the South.

Of the three policy levels outlined above, the present analysis will address only the national level and namely the domestic debate on participation in military operations in the out-of area and the formulation of a "new Italian model for defence".

3.3.1 The internal debate on operations in the out-of-area

During the 1980s, the course of the internal debate was shaped by the internal and external determinants of Italian foreign policy discussed in the previous section. The debate took on different tones in response to national interventions by allied countries (i.e. US actions against Libya) and those of Western multinational forces; however, since these two types of intervention often overlapped, for all practical purposes, there was essentially only one debate.

With regard to the response to participation in multinational operations, political forces in Italy may be divided into two main camps, often even cutting within a given party and characterized by further internal differentiation:

(i) supporters of out-of-area missions as opportunities for increasing the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance, promoting European integration (in that it would favour the development of a European security policy), and increasing Italian authority and prestige within these alliances. This view was held by the lay parties (PRI, PLI, PSDI, PR), a part of the DC, and the majority in the PSI;

(ii) opponents of intervention -- except as a last resort after all diplomatic means have failed -- favouring instead cooperation in the Third World and management of international relations within the UN rather than along East-West or Euro-American axis. The proponents of this second position (the left, ie. the PCI plus some minor parties; as well as the faction of the DC led by Giulio Andreotti, who, in the capacity of foreign affairs minister or prime minister significantly influenced the government position) sought an independent role for

Italy in response to crises in the South; only a minority had neo-nationalistic ambitions in this regard, with the majority viewing such a role as a way of improving the Italian position within NATO and the EC.

The juxtapposition of interventionist realism of the former group and pacifist universalism of the latter never came to the point of open conflict; such a conflict would have led to the fall of the fragile coalition governments characterizerd Italian politics throughout the 1980s.

Thus, the two Italian approaches to the problem of out-of-area intervention were usually manifested in a double-track policy adopted each time there was a multinational intervention in the 1980s (Sinai, the two interventions in Lebanon, and in the Gulf). Italian intervention was approved, but with the lowest possible level of forces and the longest possible delay in their deployment; at the same time, the government engaged in diplomatic initiatives, both in support of UN intervention (as a mediator and as a coordintator), and in independent good-will missions to the parties in conflict.

This pattern -- with several significant variations -- has been followed in the recent decision to participate in the multinational intervention in the Iraqi crisis. The decision to participate in the naval mission was taken by the Council of Ministers on 14 August 1990, with mobilization of the fleet in the western Mediterranean on the same day; the actual deployment to the Gulf, however, was dependent on the expected WEU decision on this matter, which was not taken until 21 August.

As tradition required, Prime minister Andreotti maintained the need to exhaust all diplomatic means before resorting to intervention, and recommended that the multinational forces be under UN command. In this instance, however, the lack of diplomatic avenues resulting from Iraqi unwillingness to negotiate and divisions within the Arab world limited Italian efforts at mediation (with the exception of information meetings held by the EC troika under the Italian presidency). Another substantial innovation has been PCI support of the intervention; the historical significance of this is limited, however, by fragmentation within the party as demonstrated by the lack of internal consensus on the motion in the Chamber of deputies on 23 August.

3.3.2 Defence Policy

The first signs of the process of revision currently underway in Italian defence policy --the "new model of defence" began to emerge in 1980. The timing coincides with several internal and international developments: the achievement of consensus on the basic directions of Italian foreign policy; the inclusion of the lay parties in the centre of gravity of the Italian political system; an increase in the importance to global security of Third world conflicts (extension of power to regional actors; linkage betwen out-of-area crises and East-West balance managed by the US).

The debate on the "new model of defence" (NMD) was opened by the first Socialist defence minister in postwar Italy, Lelio Lagorio. Lagorio, who held this position from April 1980 to August 1983 (withdtanding three changes of government in that period), opened the debated with a series of declarations and initiatives that provoked immediate reactions, in political as well as military circles.

Based on the premise that there was an increasing strategic importance and complexity in the role of Italian armed forces in the defence of the Southern Flank of the

Alliance in NATO missions, Lagorio maintained that any restructuring would have to allow for a certain degree of independent action by Italian forces; this has resulted in the need to create a rapid intervention force [19].

Although some political observers refer to the "Lagorio doctrine" the Minister's position was expressed in a series of statements which were often contradictory (e.g. the future rapid intervention forces were assigned both military functions in times of conflict and civil protection in times of natural disaster).

The Minister's statements did, however, succeed in challenging the traditional Italian defence policy: the PCI was disturbed by the prospect of increasing the range of missions assigned to the national armed forces; military leaders were openly opposed to Lagorio's proposals; the army chief of staff maintained that the proposals were based on "totally inadequate foundations"[20].

Nevertheless, some progress was made as early as 1981 with provisions in the defence budget for civil protection (i.e. the creation of the proposed Rapid Intervention Forces); at the same time, the army and air force initiated processes of restructuring in order to improve deployment of their respective forces in the central-southern region of the country. [21]

Thus, the politico-military situation seemed to be developing along the lines indicated by Lagorio: in the period 1980-82, Italy made military commitments beyond its borders and outside the Atlantic Alliance for the first time since the end of the second world war: in September 1980, a treaty was concluded guaranteeing Maltese neutrality also through explicit provisions for military assistance; in October 1981 the Italian government authorized participating in the multinational force in the Sinai in order to guarantee agreements between Israel and Egypt; in 1982-83, Italy participated in two multinational forces sent to Lebanon following the Israeli invasion in June 1982.

Italian participation in the multinational forces in Lebanon was the turning point in the context of the debate on the new model of defence, constituting a concrete test for possible future missions of the armed forces and making them more acceptable to the public. In the immediate term, however, the debated remained at an impasse because of the increasing DC opposition to Lagorio's administration of the Ministry of Defence, the opposition of military leaders to cuts in the defence budget and the emergence of disagreement within the armed forces on priorities of possible future defence missions.

The first phase of the debate on the new defence model lasted until 1983 when a new government took office under the Socialist leadership of Craxi, who appointed a Repubblican defence minister, Spadolini; this change of government allowed for the necessary reformulation of the debate on the new model of defence begun in 1980.

The government platform that Craxi presented to Parliament, foreign policy was given top priority for the first time in the history of the Republic, and the existence of a new Mediterranean front in Italian security policy was taken as a given. The following statement was made:

Within the framework of the vital balance of power for East-West security and in light of increasing tensions in the Mediterranean, the Government considers it essential to maintain modern armed forces, with balanced numbers in air, navy and ground forces, capable of defending the most exposed borders.... As regards the Mediterranean, our armed forces must be capable of participating in peace initiatives to guarantee regional stability. [22]

On taking office, the new defence minister , in the Directives presented to Parliament, pledged a general review which would address the main issues related to a new model of defence: the political point of reference (national action, or action within the alliances?); a definition of new threats; directions for the restructuring of the forces necessary to respond to the new threats (including the definition of the chain of comand of the armed forces in times of crisis, as this issue is left unresolved by the Italian Constitution).

Spadolini's commitment was maintained with the 1984 publication of Defence-White Paper 1985, which constituted a radical innovation in the formulation and management of Italian military policy.

Beginning with a broad and, in some ways, innovative analysis of the international situation, the White Paper identified the vital interests for national security (integrity and inviolability of the national territory, protection of the system of production, the politico-military decision-making process, supply lines -- particularly energy sources). This was followed by the identification of possible threats:
(i) "threats to the territory" (distinguishing between the North-East region and the rest of the country);
(ii) "threats to the South and to the lines of communication; (iii) "air threat";
(iv) "threats to other Allied countries and to the stability of the Mediterranean".

In light of these threats, the ministry document identified five new interforce missions to be carried out simultaneously by the army, air force and navy:

(i) defence of the north-east border
(ii) defence of the south and of the lines of communication
(iii) operational defence of the territory
(iv) peace-keeping and "security" missions (e.g. protection and evacuation of nationals resident abroad and civilian protection)

A full appreciation of the innovation contained in Defence White Paper 1985 would require a detailed comparison to the previous debate on Italian defence. Suffice it here to say that its main innovations consist in the conceptual shift from a "defence" to a "security policy"; the recognition of the spectrum of threats broader than that traditionally identified by NATO in connection with its confrontation with the Warsaw Pact; the new correspondence between threats and interforce missions of the armed forces.

In regard to the threats from the South, in particular, the politico-theoretical innovations in the White Paper (as late as 1984) still did not include recognition of the existence of threats originating anywhere other than in the East; however, in various points, it did acknowledge specific threats to national security interests distinct from those associated with Italian commitments to NATO. [23]

In the introduction, the defence minister clarified the political point of reference for these innovations:

Relaunching [Italian armed forces] is certainly not an alternative to NATO... Europe and the Atlantic Alliance: aside from these two complementary fora, no independent politico-military role is possible for our country... pride and provincial nationalist sensibilities have no place in the ethics or logic of the Constitution of the Republic. [24]

The 1984 White Paper undoubtedly constituted an important contribution to the clarification of the implications for the Italian defence policy in the new strategic framework. Nevertheless, this "new thinking" has not yet been fully translated into new defence planning. The following has been observed in a recent study:

The [new] missions... have ended up overlapping in a kind of abstract theoretico-politico point of reference for the organizational and operational conditions of armed forces that have continued to operate according to old sectorial criteria. Decisions of the various armed forces obviously take account of the need to satisfy the defence requirements indicated in the individual missions, but in the absence of clearly defined priorities, they are structured according to the sectorial priorities of every individual armed force. [25]

Thus, while the political and theoretical definition of the objectives and limitations of a Southern orientation of italian defence policy was gradually clarified over the course of the 1980s, the corresponding military plan is to a significant extent yet to be rationalized and implemented.

NOTES

[1]. A systematic analysis of the impact of the weakness of the State in the Third World on the dynamics of local and international security may be found in Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear, Wheatsheaf Books, Broghton:1983.

[2]. See Fida Nasrallah, "Middle Eastern Waters: the hydraulic imperative", Middle East International, 27 April 1990, p. 16-17; for more details see C. Gischeler,water Resources in the Arab Middle East and North Africa, menas Press, London: 1979; A. Drysdale and G. Blake, The Middle East and North Africa: A Political Geography, Oxford University Press, New York: 1985.

[3].The statistical data given in this section is illustrated in Massimo Livi Bacci and Fosca Martuzzi Veronesi Le risorse umane del Mediterraneo, Bologna, il Mulino, 1990.a

[4].Italy also undertook at least one action of this type: in October 1982 it briefly sent the XII fleet to Mogadiscio with the explicit intention, according to the Minister of Defence of the time, to "intervene in the Horn of Africa in order to balance the parties in conflict".(see L'Italia nella politica internazionale 1982-83, Bologna, il Mulino, 1985, p.9

[5]. For greater details on the attack, which the Libyans claim was an act of "self-defence and anti-American retaliation", see L'Italia nella politica internazionale 1985-86, Franco Angeli, Milan, 1988, chap.1, 2, and 6.

[6].The only regional with a minimum of military integration is the Gulf Cooperation Council (see L.Guazzone, "Gulf Cooperation Council: The security policies", Survival, March-April 1988, pp.134-148); military cooperation has, however, been negligible during the recent Gulf crises.

[7]. Israel is the only country in the Southern area with military capabilities that equal or exceed

those of the major European countries in some significant sectors.
[8].Data provided in "In the Gulf US Faces Imbalance of Costs", International Herald Tribune, 8-9 Sept. 1990, p.3.
[9]. This seems to be the opinion of the American administration as well (see "International anti-terrorist trends warrant optimism", USIS Wireless File (Rome), 31 July, pp.7-8.
[10]. See, for example, Jean-Pierre Langellier, "Les Arabes orphelins de la perestroika", Le Monde, 10 Feb. 1990; less sympathetic but equally significant is the title, "Squeezed: When history passes by", of the special survey by the Economist of 12 May 1990 dedicated to the Arab world.
[11]. In keeping with this interpretation is the emphasis put on intervention in the out of NATO area by US military planners (see, for example, the Defence Planning Guidance of 24 January 1990).
[12]. At the summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (April 1990) and later at that of the Arab League (May 1990), Arab governments asserted their right to expand their independent military capabilities and defended the Iraqi right to possess chemical weapons despite growing Western (and Israeli) concern.
[13]. The "Triple Alliance": 1882-1914; the "Iron Pact": 1939-1943; NATO and the EC since 1950.
[14]. Except for recurrent general objections by the left and extreme left and the controversy about the use of the Sigonella base in 1985, the presence of NATO and US military bases has always been accepted. So much so that a study on the legal status of the bases in Italy carried out in 1990 by the Ufficio Studi della Camera dei Deputati (Research Dept. of the Chamber of Deputies) states, "it is difficult to establish whether the bases, installations and infrastructures located on the territory of the Italian Republic ... are covered by NATO agreements, bilateral accords ... (or) are simply there in "co-ownership", so to speak" (Camera dei Deputati - Ufficio Pubblicazioni, Le basi militari della NATO e di paesi esteri in Italia, 1990, p.23).
[15]. The Achille Lauro-Sigonella crisis is described and analyzed at length in L'Italia nella politica internazionale 1985-86, pp. 25-72 and 338-344.
[16]. The two models were proposed and analized respectively by Giovanni Sartori ("European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism", in J. La Palombara (ed.) Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton U.P., Princeton:1966) and Paolo Farneti (Il sistema dei partiti in Italia, 1946-1979, Il Mulino, Bolobna: 1983); The interaction between the internal political system, foreign policy and the international system is analized by Carlo Maria Santoro in "Sistema politico e politica estera", in Santoro, L'Italia e il Mediterraneo, Franco Angeli, Milano:1990.
[17]. This consensus was reached in 1977 with the PCI vote supporting the foreign policy directions presented to Parliament by the government di unità nazionale.
[18]. For a historical consideration of this aspect, see Federico Chabod Storia della politica estera italiana dal 1870 al 1896: le premesse, Laterza, Bari:1952; see also Santoro, op.cit., p.39-40.
[19]. The first formulation of the "Lagorio doctrine", appeared in Indirizzi di politica militare, Servizio pubblica informazione difesa, Rome, June-July 1980, p. 12-13; this "doctrine" was subsequently detailed in a series of presentations by the Minister to the Defence Commission

in the Chamber of Deputies (for details see L'Italia nella politica internazionale 1980-81 (henceforth: INPI), pp. 178-183.
[20]. Ibidem, p. 179.
[21]. INPI 1981-82, pp. 88-89.
[22]. quoted in INPI 1983-84, p. 168.
[23]. For example, threats against the territory include the polssibility of "attacks... which tend... to affect areas of limited size, but of significant politico-strategic value, particularly in the islands"; with respect to threats to the South (while referring to "USSR involvement in the Mediterranean") a "form of indirect strategy...constituted by the embargo on materials of crucial strategic importance such as oil..."may be identified; with respect to the fourth threat, it is stressed that "specific elements of threat to Italy are represented by actions of destabilization in areas of strategic interest, particularly in the Mediterranena... in this framework, Italy may be asked to participate in peace-keeping operations within the framework of the United Nations or Multinational forces".
[24]. Ministero della Difesa, La Difesa -- Libro Bianco 1985, Ministero della Difesa, Roma:1984, p.xv.
[25]. Centro Militare di Studi Strategici Nuove concezioni del modello difensivo italiano, Rivista Militare, Rome:1990, p. 18.

Table 1 - A.

INSTABILITY IN THE SOUTH

ROOTS	UNDERLYING CAUSES	FORMS OF CRISIS	FACTORS OF CRISIS/CONFLICT	THREATS
* COLONIALISM/ MODERNIZATION	* POLITICAL WEAKNESS	* LOW INTENSITY	(INTERNAL:)	* INTERCULTURAL
		- terrorism (domestic and transnational)	* ECONOMIC HARDISHIP (shortages, corruption..)	* MASS MIGRATION
* ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS FRAGMENTATION	* SOCIO/CULTURAL CRISIS	- civil unrest - limited intrastate armed clashes	* POLITICAL POWER STRUGGLES	* TERRORISM
				* MILITARY CONFLICTS
* ECONOMIC UNDERDEVELOPMENT	* IMPASSE IN DEVELOPMENT	* MEDIUM INTENSITY - civil war - limited interstate armed clashes	(INTERSTATE:) * TERRITORIAL DISPUTES * MINORITY CLAIMS	
		* HIGH INTENSITY - interstate/ regional inter-regional armed Conflicts	* DISPUTES OVER STRATEGIC RESOURCES * COMPETING IDEOLOGIES	

Table I - B.

INSTABILITY IN THE SOUTH: CONSEQUENCES FOR WESTERN SECURITY

MILITARY	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC
- Anti-terrorism	- TENSIONS/FRACTURES IN:	- TEMPORARY/PERMANENT DAMAGE TO:
- Peace keeping/ peace enforcing)ut of area operations	. Domestic political alliances/Public opinion	. Local economic interests
- Defence of national territory and vital interests	. Intereuropean alliances	. National Economic interests
	. Transatlantic alliances	- COSTS OF:
sea lines of communications, trategic supplies, rescue of ationals abroad...)		. Military preparation/action
		. Standing/Emergency aid