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Europe in the Nineties:
Security and Disarmament

The Setting

The collapse of the Cold War has also meant the collapse of the philosophical framework of European security. The product of more than 40 years of effort, the slow accretion of habits of mind about the way that things work, has been wiped out. Predictability, certainty, the routine stuff of everyday life in European politics -- all gone. Thus it should be no surprise that some Western commentators mourn the passing of the Cold War, yearn for its clean lines of thought and precise formulations, its paradigms of strategic analysis that, if they lacked sympathy for mere humans, did provide a clarity of perception that let governments lurch from year to year with at least some sense of what they were about.

This harking back to the Cold War, an expanse of once-imposing dangers now safely crossed and thus diminished in recollection, is of course nonsense, a failure of imagination about what could have happened and, indeed, about the costs to people whose freedoms and flexibility were rigidly circumscribed. It is remarkable that some prize the Cold War's structure more at its end than others did at its beginning, when there was at least an argument to be made for entering into a bargain about politics that was preferable to the human chaos of mankind's most recent and most destructive war. What were some limitations on political possibilities -- imposed by Europe's formal division -- against the enormity of 1939-45?

All too widespread ambivalence about the end of Cold War reflects another sort of failure of imagination: sustained belief in the power of ideas, more correctly liberal ideas and ideals, those Western values that are the backdrop, the take-it-for-granted of daily life in

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democratic nations, but that also evoke some embarrassment in the telling. The fact is that there was so much surprise in the West at the opening of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communist regimes like dominoes -- an image borrowed from once-feared Communist-nationalist triumphs in Southeast Asia -- not just because of the magnitude of the strategic decisions taken by Mikhail Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders of his cohort; but also because nearer to home so much of the breath had gone out of belief about those self-same Western values that have sustained the free populations. The shame is that it took people in or out of communist prison, with no benefit of rich economies, with little formal schooling in the West's democratic traditions to create the first authentic and successful pluralistic revolutions in living European memory. In the West, George Orwell and Jeane Kirkpatrick had cast their dreadful spells, the one warning of the onslaught of the state because there could be no recourse against it once it won; the other, perhaps in order to score points in a partisan American debate, denying hope for self-liberation from totalitarian regimes. Both these seers, in brief, were dead wrong about the human spirit.

Assessments of European security for the future must therefore start from different premises than those which have been so prevalent during the past four decades. In fact, by pushing the study of history a bit further back can come the inspiration for guiding statesmen's footsteps in the future. Neither the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nor the Warsaw Pact, along with the panoply of subsidiary agreements and elaborated structures, sprang full-blown from the detritus of World War II. They came late; indeed, they came sometime after the emerging division of Europe came to be militarized in spirit if not yet in fact: as seen in a classic early joke comparing NATO to the Venus de Milo, "all SHAPE and no arms." At first, concerns about security in Europe, at least as seen from a Western perspective, were about economics and politics -- how people should gain the basic sustenance of life and whether they should have governments of their choosing. It was no accident that the Marshall Plan came before the Treaty of Washington -- the former reflected the prior need, indeed the more basic factor in determining the future of the Europe of the late 1940s.

The U.S. political guarantee represented by the Washington Treaty was an underpinning to efforts to make the European Recovery Program work and to ratify successes already achieved over communism in France and Spain. It took two years (less two days) and the onset of the Korean War before NATO came into being in the form of Allied Command Europe.

Today, this lesson about the priorities in analysis about the nature of security has been underscored by one of the most remarkable features of change: East-West confrontation in Central Europe collapsed during 1989 and is now almost universally believed to be non-existent; yet all this happened without the departure of more than a handful of Soviet forces or weapons. Even today, most of the vaunted Soviet military strength in Central and Eastern Europe, including the formidable Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), remain in place -- the last-named, ironically, now fed and clothed from the German treasury.

This is a valuable starting point for considering the future of European security because it helps to guard against again seeing this political phenomenon, or state of being, largely in military terms. Perhaps at some point in the future there will need to be a central preoccupation with military aspects of security; conflict is still possible; human nature has not been changed; the vagaries of history can confound this generation, or the next or the next, as it has those in the past. And prudence dictates that the military factor in security be appropriately dealt with. But that is surely not the starting point.

Indeed, to get to the starting point for looking at the future there is a premium in wrapping up the past, in terms of the artifacts of Cold War confrontation in Central Europe. Most important, from the Western point of view, are the Soviet forces that continue to be stationed in Central and Eastern Europe. It takes little imagination to argue that a major priority remains the securing of their removal. This is not, however, an exercise in classic arms control -- namely, to try reducing the risks of conflict. Indeed, arms control, at least as known and practiced in East-West relations during the past several years, has always been a second-best choice; the first-best being the elimination of the political tensions and conflicts

of interest that could lead to weapons being used. To be sure, the character of a military balance can contribute to conflict through stimulating arms races and suspicion or breeding miscalculation, but as now recently shown, these are surely secondary phenomena.

Nor is an effort to hasten the departure of Soviet forces an exercise in trying to lessen the political influence accruing to the Soviet Union from the presence of these forces. If anything, the situation now is quite the reverse: remaining Soviet forces reduce the potential for Soviet political influence, indeed, can even breed pity rather than intimidation. As soon as confrontation came to an end, it became necessary for Soviet forces to retire, as they serve no useful purpose -- neither to keep communists in power or populations down, to threaten or intimidate the West or to protect against NATO. Indeed, Soviet forces in Germany had to go as soon as the Berlin Wall opened; diplomacy during 1990, culminating in the Kohl-Gorbachev agreement in the Caucasus, the "Two-Plus-Four" agreement, and German cash payments to the Soviet Union, were primarily part of a Western effort to avoid repeating what was done to Germany in 1919. It has been largely a charade, but potentially a highly valuable one for all concerned.

There are two principal reasons for gaining the rapid withdrawal of Soviet forces: one is to hasten the pace of developing true civil societies in liberated lands; the other is to purchase insurance against something untoward happening in the Soviet Union. "Something untoward happening" is amorphous, just as is the linkage between the "something" and a possible threat to the security of any of the states West of the Soviet-Polish border from those Soviet troops still stationed abroad. But prudence dictates that the process of ridding the center of the Continent of these artifacts of confrontation continue -- continue at some pace, but perhaps not as a top priority.

Of course, the more that this process is done formally, through arms control negotiations of one sort or another, the more difficult it will be to develop concepts within which desired results can be accommodated. Already, with the agreement on force reductions deriving from the talks on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), it has become absurd to

assess a balance of forces based on counting weapons and manpower in the structures created by NATO and the Warsaw Pact; regarding the Pact, at least, this is now nonsense. This could clearly be seen in the November 1990 agreement by Warsaw Pact states to parcel out the forces that each member should be permitted to retain under the CFE agreement. One Pact member, the DDR, has even been absorbed by the nation it most directly confronted. And further arms control in Central Europe will face even more daunting conceptual problems, so much so that there is merit in mutual unilateral force reductions, with arms control relegated to something that it can do supremely well: to provide "transparency" for what is done militarily and to build confidence that new military threats are not emerging.

The Threat

Any assessment of the future of European security must deal with the concept in its full richness, beginning with its political, economic, and cultural aspects. But it must also be premised upon some sense of what it is guarding -- "securing" -- against. It is not sufficient to say simply that there is a desire to be free from war or from lesser conflicts that could lead to war, or that there could be some amorphous sense of a collective "security" such that all nations, great and small, will forever play by rules that all will find agreeable. That situation might be the outcome of a process of determining the requirements of security (thus also beggaring history), but it cannot be a premise.

Following the events of 1989, it is also tempting to see the essence of security as contained in two ideas -- often, but not inseparably, linked: the notions that democratic states do not make war on one another; and that widespread economic prosperity and some undefined level of social justice, both within and between societies, will lessen if not eliminate any impetus to prey on neighbors. There is a compelling quality to both ideas. Indeed, there are few cases in the era of democracies -- to be relevant, essentially the 20th century -- that confound the proposition advanced here; and the positive impact of vibrant economies on the

shape of societies and their external policies has at least been validated in most of the Western Europe of the past four decades, even if there have been significant exceptions in other places and at other times.

This, then, could be a clue to a method of security and also a partial explanation of its absence in one or another circumstance, but it does not dispose of the nature of threats to an underlying sense of well-being within Europe. There are, in fact, currently on the horizon only three palpable threats to European security, *potentially rising within Europe itself.* This is an important qualification: indeed, the security of Europe and Europeans is already under increasing stress from outside the Continent, as reflected in problems of migration from the "South" -- especially the Maghreb -- the possibility of resource scarcity or interruption (as with oil), factors of market competition or exhaustion, global environmental pressures, a pandemic like AIDS, potential military threats arising from beyond Europe and spilling over into the Continent (remote but not inconceivable during this decade), and the congeries of issues (like migration) that shelter under the twin terms: poverty and population. Collectively, these extra-European sources of insecurity may, indeed, merit more attention than mopping up the remnants of Cold War or guarding against some untoward developments on the Continent.

The three palpable, intra-European threats emanate from the Soviet Union, Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, and the complex task of preserving a "security culture" that has developed in the West and must be extended Eastward.

The Soviet Union

It must be recognized that there could be a recrudescence of political-military threat from the Soviet Union or its successors. Today, this is hard to imagine, but imagination needs to be stretched to encompass its possibility. It is not foolish to assume that Soviet leader with any sort of plan to reshape economy or society will almost surely embrace Mikhail Gorbachev's grand strategic bargain: strategic retreat (cutting losses) in Central and Eastern Europe -- as well as in a remarkable array of other areas -- in exchange for access to the

Western economy. This deal was sealed at the Malta superpower summit in December 1989, and it has been elaborated since then. Indeed, it represents a remarkable progression in what has classically been called East-West relations: two decades ago, the United States and the Soviet accepted mutual responsibility for each other's security against a nuclear war; about a decade ago, they accepted similar responsibility for containing regional developments that could lead to a U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation; and now East and West accept increasing responsibility for the health of one another's economies. For example, the West provides aid to the Soviet Union, in various forms, and the Soviets help against an Iraqi threat against the Western economies on which the Soviets now depend.

No one, however, can state with confidence just how the second Soviet revolution will progress. It does look doubtful that Marxism-Leninism, so widely discredited, can reemerge as a motivating force in society (and hence as a messianic principle motivating foreign policy). There is little social cohesion, today, that could easily be molded into concerted military action against the outside world, nor would it be easy -- if indeed it were possible -- to shape public attitudes to accept the existence of a foreign enemy that needed to be countered. Nevertheless, it is also hard to conceive of an indefinite period of creeping chaos within the Soviet Union in which there is no effort to impose discipline, either by current or different leaders. Whatever the odds that this will happen, whether within one or more individual republics (pertinently, Russia) or in the Union as a whole, it must not be taken for granted that a new authoritarian government would both continue the current strategic retreat in all of its dimensions and forswear any ventures that could be seen in the West as inimical to the latter's sense of security. For this analysis to be valid, details may not matter as much as direction, in part if an abrupt halt to current trends in Soviet foreign policy led to widespread disillusionment in the West. There is already risk that Soviet retreat will lead to expectations of continuing Soviet retreat that will not be fulfilled (this risk is reduced by some incalculable amount by Western forbearance in exploiting Soviet weakness in Europe). Prominently, in

Southwest Asia the Soviets do not, at least not yet, appear to have entirely abandoned the Great Game. Again, this is argument for hastening the departure of Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe and for closing the door after them -- about which more below.

Absent a development this decade within the territory that is now the Soviet Union that leads to some recrudescence of military challenge to European neighbors, there are at least two other prominent Soviet threats to European security. One is political and long-term: a general Soviet or Russian sense of having been abused, of being excluded from European society. The extent to which there is a legitimate Soviet (or Russian, or Ukrainian, etc.) political role in Europe can be debated, along with definitions of what constituents the Soviet Union. But the concern to avoid any repetition of 1919 -- kicking a defeated nation while it is down -- that has motivated the U.S. president and his European allies in their behavior toward Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, generally, reflects a good deal of wisdom. Indeed, the tactic goes beyond not wanting to create a revanchist monster that could reemerge at some unspecified date in the future; it now includes trying to engage the Soviet Union in a broader framework of European security. At least this should be the tactic, in addition to not trespassing so strongly on Soviet prerogatives that some unseen line is crossed that would provoke a reaction. It is not for nothing that the West has not simply extended NATO to the Soviet frontier.

Beyond trying to gauge the geopolitical future, calculating possibilities about the nature of Soviet (Russian, etc.) character, capability, and national ambition, the potential turmoil in the Union is itself a key cause for worry in the West. Indeed, even beyond the continued existence of sizable Soviet military forces, modernization programs, nuclear stockpiles, and the like, the very uncertainties about the course of today's Time of Troubles make the Soviet Union the central challenge to European security during the 1990s. This challenge may become reality faster than many people now believe and, indeed, in ways more threatening to some aspects of Western life than virtually anything that happened during the Cold War. Put concretely, it is not at all clear what will happen if Soviet national

disintegration continues. As early as this winter, famine or the fear of it could accelerate social and economic dislocation, uprootedness, and pressures to leave. Within the next several months, it is possible that Western Europe will see the most severe pressures by migrant populations (also from parts of Eastern Europe) since the late 1940s. The irony is that, just as Gorbachev has gained more influence in the West than did any of his Soviet predecessors with their big battalions (a phenomenon that, in retrospect, gives new poignancy to Stalin's jest, "How many divisions has the Pope?"), the West could face a greater threat of Soviet "invasion" -- indeed, at least in part a successful Russian or Ukrainian *civilian* invasion -- than at any time during the Cold War.

Central and Eastern Europe

Ranking behind the Soviet Union, in whole or in part, as a potential threat to European security in its broadest sense during this decade is the swathe of territory from the Baltic to the Black Sea that only recently was under varying forms of internal communist rule and external Soviet domination or pervasive influence. This is not a security threat in any classical sense, nor is it appropriate to regard these states as a required buffer between East and West, of necessity to be relegated to a never-never land between competing blocs or systems of thought and belief. At the most direct, Gorbachev's strategic retreat from those portions of this region under Soviet tutelage was a simple recognition that there was no profit in Moscow's continuing to finance the *glacis*, when the West was in a much better position to do so and had at least an equal interest in seeing that trouble for Europe did not cross this territory.

But even if there should be no exaggeration of this region as a buffer between East and West, especially with the collapse of political-military challenge from the Soviet Union, this does not mean that Central and Eastern Europe has no long-term strategic importance in its own right. At one level, it is simple prudence to argue for the value of this region's developing, both politically and economically, if possible before there is risk that turmoil in

the Soviet Union will spill over onto Western neighbors. And at the level of the region, itself, it is important that it not become a source of strife, tension, and conflict, such that other parts of Europe are affected adversely. How important this strategic objective is cannot easily be determined; but it is clearly not negligible.

The problems facing the newly-liberated countries, as well as Yugoslavia, lie primarily in areas that are not generally regarded as relating to security: in their need to develop pluralistic, Western-oriented societies and to transform command economies into some form of market economies, whether patterned on various Western models or developed indigenously.

As in the Soviet Union, however, internal developments can and will have the most profound impact on the posture of societies toward the outside world. Today, there is an added risk posed by events in the Persian Gulf, in three key respects: the rise in the price of oil (coupled with the shift at the beginning of 1991 from ruble oil to dollar oil supplied by the Soviet Union); the general degradation of the global economy because of the disruptions caused by the Gulf crisis; and the distracting of attention, especially on the part of the United States, to events beyond Europe. This shift of attention may represent a misperception of basic U.S. and Western interests (a point that President Bush may have been seeking to make by visiting with President Gorbachev in early September); but it is nonetheless real and, along with the added economic burdens produced by the energy factor and the Gulf crisis, makes the task of many East European states more rather than less difficult.

The potential failure of one or more of the East European experiments in politics and economics can generate a major flow of refugees, as early as this winter, that will put considerable pressures on West European states. Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to say that the most serious threat to the development of the European Community during the next several years will be from a massive influx of refugees, from both the South and the East. Furthermore, having just torn down the barriers separating various European peoples, it will be difficult for the West to erect new Eastern barriers in the face of human suffering. Some barriers will indeed be erected, but at a political and psychic cost in the West.

The twin tasks of building democracies and converting economies -- as daunting as they are -- will be complicated by the reemergence of nationalism throughout Eastern Europe. This has been a natural product of the ending of the Cold War. In much of the Third World, the West was long plagued by a marriage between nationalism and communism, for example in southeast Asia. In Central and Eastern Europe, the current marriage is between nationalism and anti-communism. Among other things, this natural rise of nationalism is inhibiting cooperation between different East European states and reinforcing general aversion to associations that derive from the days of Soviet domination. Thus proposals sometimes made in the West for preserving the Warsaw Pact, either to provide a political olive branch to the Soviets or to achieve some quality of symmetry with NATO's continuation, are largely nonsense; they could only be proposed seriously by people who have not lived under the communist regimes of the past 40 years. By the same token, proposals for an East European Marshall Plan can be faulted on at least this one ground: that the cooperation demanded of West European countries by America as the price of the European Recovery Program would not likely gain the same response in Eastern Europe.

Nationalism, however, is not the worst sin that could be imagined, even though, at least for a time, there will be a striking disparity between the evolution in the West, especially with the unprecedented voluntary merging of sovereignties in the European Community, and the fissiparous political tendencies in the East. More worrisome is the reemergence of a number of ethnic, religious, and national disputes that had been frozen by the Cold War. In Western Europe, it took four decades of effort, plus the inspiration of the European Community, to accomplish the basic purpose of reconciling West Germany to its neighbors; in the East, no comparable effort was even attempted. Thus when the boot of Soviet power and communism was lifted, unresolved tensions and conflicts reemerged, all the more so against the background of resentments against the old regimes. The catalogue of names comes from the 1930s and earlier: Transylvania, Ruthenia, Moldavia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Czechs and Slovaks, Poles and Czechs, Turks in Bulgaria, and anti-Semitism.

These tensions and potential conflicts reinforce the difficulties of transforming politics and economies, distracting needed energies and attention, even where they do not pose specific threats to peace and comity. And there are risks to the peace, most notably today in Yugoslavia which, depending on a sequence of events that are not well under control, could dissolve through a hard and bitter process, potentially leading even to civil war.

But how serious these risks are, from the standpoint of other Europeans going about their business, must also be judged. The Balkans of today are not the Balkans of 1914. There is currently little risk of another Sarajevo; indeed, all the major powers in Europe, including the United States and the Soviet Union, wish to see controversy and tension in this region contained if not resolved. This point was underscored by a suggestion made at the end of December 1989 by U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III: that, if the Romanian revolution were going sour, perhaps Soviet troops should be deployed to preserve it! The secretary soon thought better of this proposal, but the point and its qualification were both instructive: Washington and Moscow had a common interest in orderly change in Romania, but neither could easily accept unilateral intervention by the other.

The Culture of Security

For the longer term, "security" in Europe will depend upon the evolution of human institutions and attitudes. It would, indeed, be unprecedented for there to be an uninterrupted period of peace, especially without institutions in place precisely dedicated to preserving security. Yet such institutions are not limited to those that have graced the Continent during the past four decades, nor even those that represent broader aspects of security -- especially economic health and prosperity. At heart, a sense of security relates to political habits of mind and practice, which derive as much as anything else from underlying culture: a disposition to resolve differences through means that fall short of disrupting a general sense of community, shared values, and shared interests.

During the past 40 years, a pervasive sense of such a community of values has indeed developed; it has fostered what can be called a culture of security -- a set of attitudes of beliefs that, in themselves, helps to preserve the nations of Western Europe from threats to their well-being. This culture too many years to develop; its emergence was obscured, however -- like the geopolitical significance of developments in the European Community -- by the pervasive nature of the Cold War and its institutions. Yet despite the deep roots sunk by this security culture, its durability cannot be taken for granted, but needs to be made proof against untoward events such as global depression. This is, in fact, a major argument for the "deepening" of the EC as a more important priority than "widening" to include new members.

Today, this culture also has geographic bounds. The five new states added to the Federal Republic of Germany have become "Western" by fiat, as well as more complete members of the European Community than they were by dint of special arrangements made in the Treaty of Rome from its inception; but it is a long way from here to the point where these new Western Germans can be acculturated to the norms of Western society and, in addition, be part of the security culture of the West.

How much more true that is of other states in the East, especially with staggering economic burdens. Some, of course, have better prospects than others; but the chances of spreading the Western security culture are likely to be bounded in terms of historical patterns. Already, it can be argued that "the West" is extending itself (in politics and spirit, not in formal organization) to the Soviet frontier and beyond, at least into the Baltic Republics; but that Bulgaria, Romania, and parts of Yugoslavia are on the other side of a new divide. Indeed, an informal political partition is possible, more or less along the lines separating the Roman and Eastern-rite churches, and also those separating Christendom and Islam in Europe. And, lest this be seen as simply an academic comment, there is significant risk in the near future that one or more of these states will find itself slipping away from democracy into military or other authoritarian rule. Such a development could pose a security threat to neighbors, though

probably not to the structure of security in Europe as a whole. Nonetheless, the failure of democracy anywhere in Europe cannot be welcomed and would complicate other efforts to develop a new political and security order on the Continent.

The New Germany

Finally, it is important to understand what is beyond the bounds of "threat" -- meaning Germany, in particular. During the past forty years, the Federal Republic has demonstrated its firm commitment both to democracy and to the West. It has long since earned the trust of its neighbors. It is, in fact, not a source of threat, military or otherwise, to the rest of Europe. Yet as a means of reassuring other states, Germany has itself reaffirmed its commitment never to acquire atomic, biological, or chemical (ABC) weapons; to keep its principal military forces integrated as part of Allied Command Europe; and to accelerate the pace of integration within the European Community. In exchange, however, Germany has a right to expect that it will not be "singularized" -- that is, treated as special in the sense of potentially causing difficulty for European security or comity. Thus it is important that Germany's full sovereignty has been acknowledged and that, through the Two-Plus-Four talks, the residual rights of the four principal World War II victors have been abrogated.

Legitimate concerns that remain about the German future relate not to its military or political potential, but to its economic prominence. Most instructive, therefore, was the declaration made by Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the morrow of the March 1990 East German elections, in which his political allies won control of the process of unification; at that moment, Germany became united and sovereign for all practical purposes. Kohl, however, summarized his approach by quoting Thomas Mann: that he wanted not a German Europe but a European Germany, and he called for speeding up EC integration. This is indeed a strategic development, relating to the long-term security of Europe. And among EC member, only the British government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher still resists movement in the direction of guaranteeing the development of this fundamental building-block of security.

Building Security

It is premature to define the precise architectures needed for European security. Too much is still unknown, especially the future of the Soviet Union -- the most critical element. But some basic conclusions can already be drawn, especially about the process of determining new security requirements and arrangements. Yet there cannot be any set of wise men and women to lay out the blueprint and make these decisions, as was done to a considerable extent in the West 40 years ago and in the East under Soviet domination. Today, too many countries are involved, each with some form of veto over a functioning system for Europe as a whole; and individual societies are too pluralistic. A good part of the new security is being developed simply through the interaction of many people in many countries. For the West, at least, this is a benefit of the interactions among governments and individuals over so many years. Indeed, it was remarkable that, following the collapse of the Cold War, partners in the transatlantic dialogue, almost all of whom had failed to predict the pace and extent of change, did not withdraw to reassess the interests of their individual nations before deciding whether further cooperation among old allies was still worthwhile; rather, almost universally they pushed forward immediately to begin crafting new security arrangements. And one task now is to identify, to draw engage, and help to train East European and Soviet counterparts in this non-governmental world of influential specialists.

CSCE

Some specific characteristics of tomorrow's European security structure and practice are also clear. These include a major role to be played by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). More precisely, certain aspects of CSCE will definitely be needed for the future, beginning with its cardinal principle of universal European membership (this is different from the CSCE principle of reaching decisions through unanimity, which is a major limitation on its ability to deal with some key aspects of security). This principle is especially significant because it provides legitimacy as European powers for both the Soviet

Union and the United States (as well as Canada). Thus at the outset, the significant role accorded to CSCE is recognition that, without the Soviet Union, there can be no enduring or encompassing security system -- even if that country cannot now accurately project into the future its security needs or perspectives. Also implicit is that the United States has a role to play, although, unlike the need to include the Soviets, that is not based on propinquity or potential challenge to the existing order.

Two other aspects of CSCE membership are also clearly important: the immediate engagement of all Central and East European states, which universally are looking for participation in broader European institutions (as opposed to regional East European institutions); and a reserved role for smaller European states, including but not limited to the group of seven so-called Neutral and Non-aligned (NNA) countries. The CSCE framework, institutionalized by the Paris CSCE summit on November 19-21, 1990, thus insures at least a voice for all European states, even if many critical security decisions are taking by more limited groupings of countries.

CSIS also provides important philosophy, as embodied in its three baskets -- seeing security in terms of military arrangements (in this case, the invaluable Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, CSBMs), economic and commercial relations, and human rights: that is, the political dimension.

Of course, CSCE will be a considerably different institution from what it has been for the past 15 years. It essentially served the purpose of monitoring the management of the Yalta system, as modified by the Helsinki Final Act to include two principles, above all: the non-legitimacy of changing European borders except through peaceful means and the right of intervention by any member state into the affairs of any other when human rights are concerned.

Today, the Yalta Agreement has come to fruition -- in retrospect proving to have been not a failure but a success, because it gained a hypocritical Soviet Union's blessing for human freedoms when Moscow's position of power in Central and Eastern Europe did not require it

to do so. Thus CSCE must be remodeled to meet new goals, as an institution that fortuitously happens to exist so that a new one does not need to be created.

Beyond CSCE's critical role as the repository of intangible philosophies and the provider of legitimacy for other security arrangements -- already extending to the CFE talks and eventually including even alliances like NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) -- it will have two tangible functions, in particular: first, to advance the role of CSBMs, to help monitor arms control agreements, and to promote transparency in military activities across the Continent; and second to help deal with tensions and potential strife in Central and Eastern Europe through the newly-created Center for the Prevention of Conflict (CPC) and supplementary arrangements. CPC, in fact, is the only new institution required for restructuring European security.

The CPC's mandate, however, is heavily circumscribed and reflects a victory for those who favor minimalism in creating permanent institutions for CSCE. This choice reflects the old informal CSCE methodology that was appropriate to help achieve old goals but not the new post-Cold War opportunities. Based essentially on the NATO London Declaration of June 1990, the CPC will be little more than a reference point for the exchange of information and the raising of questions about such matters as "unusual military activities." Lacking is any serious effort to deal with the causes of conflicts (a lack that might be remedied at the 1991 Malta CSCE meeting on Peaceful Resolution of Disputes), a means for mediating disputes, and peacekeeping forces. To be sure, there is a host of questions that must be posed and answered, concerning criteria for defining "conflicts," standards for actions, decision-making, the composition and control of any peacekeeping forces, and the like. But it is one thing to recognize the complexities of the task; it is quite another to give up almost altogether.

A well-designed mechanism for dealing effectively with tensions in Central and Eastern Europe can also be a test of propositions about European collective security. This concept has an unfortunate past, and much skepticism is warranted. But if CSCE can work in

containing and perhaps even defusing crises in Europe, then assumptions about collective security might usefully be revisited.

Other Institutions

CSCE's role in providing a framework for considering alternatives for Continent-wide security arrangements also points to other institutions that can help. Regarding political culture, the Council of Europe can be important (although its membership is less universal than CSCE's) -- indeed, some proponents of either CSCE or the Council of Europe see the other as a rival. Economic institutions like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), OECD, GATT, and perhaps even the U.N.-sponsored Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) will be important, both tangibly and in shaping the broader political climate for security, especially in the newly-liberated states of the East. Subregional efforts like the Italian-led *Pentagonale* should not be discounted as mechanisms for organizing security -- in its broadest sense -- on a level smaller than the broadest institutions, in part as a way station for East European membership in the EC.

It will also surely be critical that Western states provide major quantities of resources, training, and support for private enterprise. Indeed, from the perspective just of the United States, it is remarkable that during the past four decades it spent more than $2 trillion to contain communism and Soviet power in Europe, but so far has disbursed only about $1 billion to consolidate those gains (although, in cash payments, it leads other donors). To the extent that the development of pluralistic societies, the conversion of economies, and the limitation of pressures for migration are security issues, then this niggardliness could prove to be a significant strategic error.

The European Community

Politically and institutionally, the European Community will play a critical part in European security. It is most important as the preeminent institutional organizer of the new European security culture. Its bonding of 12 nationalities in an unprecedented merging of

sovereignties provides the firmest foundation for preserving security, in its broadest sense, among its members. This role is no accident; from its inception the basic purpose of the European movement and its artifacts, like the EC, was to make war impossible between Germany and its Western neighbors and to reconcile long-standing enemies (that is has done so well is attested to by the relatively benign reaction in the West to Germany's unification). Concern to preserve and extend this security culture is the strongest argument for giving priority to "deepening" of the EC over "widening" it to include new members. At the very least, nothing should be done that would risk eroding the basic security culture (shared unevenly among some of its members); and any new members must clearly be shown to inculcate is as part of national life.

Formally, as well, the European Community will be a central part of the European security structure and will likely extend its reach progressively beyond the 12 as appropriate conditions for widening are realized. Not only does the success of the EC remove incentives for prosperous, democratic nations to be at odds fundamentally with one another, but also there are progressive restrictions on the ability of the Community's members to engage in hostile or threatening acts against one another. Common economic institutions, if they succeed, will also lead inevitably to an all-for-one mentality.

European Political Cooperation (EPC) will also play an increasing part, as an inevitable result of other efforts to merge sovereignty. The loss of independence of economic action perforce argues for a merging of sovereignties in foreign and defense policies: indeed, should the movement toward economic unity continue, independence of action in the foreign and security fields will also become increasingly difficult and eventually impossible. This is the last bastion of sovereignty, however, as reflected in the defeat of the European Defense Community (EDC) treaty by the French National Assembly in 1954, not because it would have meant West German rearmament (that was achieved six weeks later by the creation of WEU), but because EDC represented the ceding of too much sovereignty, too soon. Today, it is worth reconsidering the EDC or a variant as a means not only of drawing together the

military establishments of the EC countries but of extending the Community's reach to new members in this traditional security area, paralleling its reach in other areas. Given the primacy of spreading the new European security culture, this could be a successful venture in collective (common) security, because capacities and long-term inclinations to violate the agreed norms would be rooted out before membership would become possible.

EPC and other EC and related institutions -- including, in the defense production area, the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and the possible repeal of Article 223 of the Rome Treaty that exempts defense trade from Community control -- will also progressively take on further significant roles, not just in European security, but also in developing a common European foreign policy toward other parts of the world. Already, there has been considerable European national cooperation through EC and other multilateral institutions during the Persian Gulf crisis. The EC seeks formal membership in CSCE, which it should be accorded. And the Italian presidency in the fall of 1990 has even proposed that the EC take the place of Britain and France as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. This idea, too, should be advanced (to prevent risks attendant on opening up the U.N. Charter for revision until there is greater clarity about other useful changes, EC membership should be accomplished by Britain's and France's agreeing to act in the Council under EC instruction).

Western European Union

WEU is also beginning to come of age, underscored by its role during both the reflagging operations in the Persian Gulf and in the crisis of 1990. WEU membership is still limited, although it is increasingly acting as an adjunct of the EC, a cooperative venture not of nine countries but the EC twelve minus three. And the collapse of the Cold War has largely rid the WEU of one problem, the question of neutrality and non-alignment. Now that the latter term has no meaning and the former has lost most of its practical significance, WEU can be a instrument of broader European security without becoming entangled in East-West politics and attitudes.

WEU also offers a potential supplement or alternative to NATO, in those instances where a North American role might be inappropriate. France, for instance, might be prepared to be involved in an integrated military command structure, which can be important to prevent any singularization of Germany, through WEU institutions rather than through Allied Command Europe with its Cold War history. This would also relieve France of what it could see as embarrassment at being seen to reverse a policy of the 1960s, even though that policy has now been rendered obsolete. Appropriate changes could be made to the WEU agreement at any time and, in any event, WEU must be renewed when its mandate expires in 1998. WEU can also provide a framework for a development that seems inevitable: within a few years, either Western forces will be widely dispersed about Western Europe, or there will be no foreign forces remaining in Germany.

NATO

Only a year ago, many Western commentators were predicting an early demise for NATO. Now its future seems secure, at least for some time. This has happened for a number of reasons, including the willingness of the Soviet Union to see it continue, along with Germany's continued membership, albeit with some restrictions applying to the five new states. Ironically, more countries now support NATO's continuation (as well as a U.S. troop presence on the Continent) than ever before in its history. To be sure, motives differ: to generalize, in the West, there is a desire for an insurance policy against some untoward event in the Soviet Union; for East European countries, NATO is another Western institution that has appeal, even if they would not seek membership; and for the Soviet Union, NATO (along with the U.S. role) is seen as a stabilizer for NATO -- a motive, however, that the NATO states must stoutly resist.

NATO's virtues lie in several qualities: its bonding of the United States to Europe's security -- however that is defined; the fact that a new treaty does not have to be negotiated, a point especially important in the United States; the existence of Allied Command Europe as a

device for integrating forces, especially Germany's, and serving as a potential forerunner for a European Defense Community; the role of a U.S. general as SACEUR (a tradition that should be continued, both to bond the United States to European security and to avoid, at least for now, the potentially contentious issue of a German's eventually occupying that role); its institutional role in symbolizing the continued U.S. nuclear commitment to an independent Europe (even if expressed only as an "existential" deterrent based on strategic nuclear systems rather than on any weapons deployed in Europe); its engagement of flank nations, especially Norway and Turkey (the former of which is deeply concerned about the continued deployment and modernization of Soviet forces in the North); and the fact that it exists and thus helps to reinforce cooperative thought and action in the security field. As with the role of experts in the transatlantic world, in and out of government, the personal relationship and habits of cooperation engendered within NATO are a priceless part of advancing a new security culture.

NATO has already shown that it can adapt to new circumstances, as shown by the London Communique of June 1990. Its most daunting tasks in the near future are to revise its doctrine and strategy (either rewriting the doctrine of flexible response, set forth in Military Committee document MC 14/3 or interpreting the existing document most broadly); to agree upon and provide for forces and structures that do not depend upon a front line -- instead to be based more on classical notions of territorial defense, though this time on a multinational basis; to determine the appropriate levels of national forces; to integrate these military issues with arms control, arms reductions, and CSBM issues; and to create criteria for relating NATO's role and purview to the accession of new countries to the European Community. Here, a new NATO-WEU relationship needs to be created as a potential means of extending the writ of Western security to new countries without either raising new concerns in the Soviet Union (or its successors) about the penetration of Western institutions or in the United States regarding the reach of its defense commitment. In this recasting of NATO, however, two special points stand out: the requirement, discussed earlier, that Germany not in any way be

singularized or stigmatized; and the need to keep NATO as an institution limited to Europe. Proposals to extend its reach "outside-of-area" -- for instance, to the Middle East -- are as likely as before to fail, potentially jeopardizing allied understandings about the core area and issues.

The United States as European Power

The final key consideration in European security is the role of the United States. It will clearly change. Most U.S. forces will go home, leaving behind perhaps 75,000-100,000 ground and air forces for at least a few years. As compared with the past 40 years, the focus of these forces will increasing be on areas other than the Central Front, especially southeastern Europe (including the Mediterranean focus of the U.S. Sixth Fleet), and on potential double-duty use elsewhere, as in the Persian Gulf. Stockpiling will become more important -- POMCUS and a "reconstitution" strategy -- and the structure of U.S. forces in Europe will be affected somewhat by potential needs elsewhere (although, as the early stages of the Gulf crisis demonstrated, there are actually some logistical advantages in moving prepackaged forces from the continental United States rather than repackaging forces and supplies in Europe, several thousand miles closer to the scene of action). Obviously, if U.S. forces in Europe are to be used elsewhere, there must be some means for agreeing with host governments what those uses are to be; otherwise there could be a repetition of the alliance tensions that attended the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986, but this time with strong pressures in the United States simply to remove U.S. forces in Europe. Obviously, as well, the ways and means of U.S. deployments in Europe must be consonant with the political desires of the allies, individually and collectively.

Most important, however, is the overall role to be played by the United States in European security, in its broadest sense, whatever means are used to demonstrate that role. So long as the United States has a vital interest in the independence of Western, democratic states in Europe (and that definition can imply a broader compass of U.S. concern than now),

then the existence of a U.S. strategic deterrent will imply an implicit, existential deterrent for Europe. As in the past, deployed U.S. nuclear forces will relate less to military needs than to political reassurance; and there is no point for the United States to insist on old means of providing such reassurance if that would simply make matters worse, politically in Europe -- as would likely happen if there were an attempt now to deploy a new standoff nuclear bomber.

For the foreseeable future, under circumstances in which the Soviet threat has clearly seen to have gone down and not been replaced by some other Soviet-located instability that seems threatening to the West, the key issue of U.S. engagement in European security will be psychological: will the United States continue to see itself as a European power? To a degree, this question is moot: absent some compelling reason to demonstrate such a commitment, the United STates is unlikely to go to great lengths to do so. But in another sense, this question has been bypassed by history. It is a hangover from the 1940s, a question on a par with concern this past year that Germany might return, willy-nilly, to patterns of behavior of the 1930s. Reexamination in the light of 1990s circumstances is effective in both cases. For the United States, put simply, it is no longer possible to be isolated from the outside world and thus no longer possible to be isolated from Europe's security in the broadest sense. This point is underscored by a host of factors, including political affinity and modern technology of communications and transport; and it is buttressed by a mutual economic relationship with the European Community that has reached $1.4 trillion a year. There is no retreat from such a relationship.

Conclusion

This analysis of the future of European security is long on contingency planning and short on precise predictions. Given today's imponderables, that is as it should be. This is indeed a different era from that of the Cold War, when so much seemed to be certain. The very uncertainties that mark this time provide an opportunity for far greater human benefits

but they also pose added problems for planners. The precise character of America's role in the future of Europe may be in doubt, but this is the lesser of two key problems of prediction, the more important of which is the evolution of the Soviet Union.

During the past year, Western leaders have been in the curious position of having to act on the Soviets' behalf in trying to project current circumstances into the future and to begin sketching the outlines of a Europe-wide security system. Soviet representatives attend meetings and make their presentations, but by no stretch of the imagination can these be taken for granted as reflecting accurate assessments of Soviet security interests at some unspecified point in the future (at times, as on Soviet presentations on the future of CSCE, the words of the London NATO Communique are played back to Western listeners). In effect, a seat at the table is empty, even though a Soviet representative is formally there; it is all the more to the credit of Western leaders, therefore, that they have not taken short-term advantage of Soviet difficulties, mindful as they are of the long-term need to have wholehearted, ungrudging, and unresentful participation in European security by leaders from those lands beyond the Polish-Soviet frontier.

Patience is thus the watchword: patience and flexibility in planning for contingencies that perhaps can now only be dimly perceived. But if the West does its work well, effectively drawing in the Soviet Union as well as the states of Central and Eastern Europe, the era just dawning can be more secure and more productive than that which came to an end last year.

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