




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**EUROPE IN THE NINETIES
Toward a New International Order**



Paper presented by

CARLO JEAN

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SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT SCENARIO

Gen. D. Carlo Jean
Director of the Strategic Studies Military Centre

INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS

The CFE-1 negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe imply - as any negotiation on security - the stability of the political framework, which does not exist.

Furthermore, their goals are limited. As a matter of fact, the above-mentioned negotiations are aimed at the elimination of asymmetries and not at the creation of a new European security system. In other words, their object is to achieve a balance of forces and not to determine a new strategic stability in Europe.

The rapid evolution of the situation, the uncertainty of its future developments, the internal instability of the USSR and of the Eastern European and Balcanic countries, together with the effects of the German unification, make the future European political structure uncertain. Previously, the security of Western Europe, based on a dangerous though stable and reassuring contraposition between East and West, rested mainly on military aspects. However, it is now putting on more global and complex aspects, combining economic, social and internal policy factors. This has gone beyond and, in a way, lessened the importance of the Vienna talks, as the unilateral arms reduction adopted or in the process of being adopted by different nations, have exceeded or are exceeding those envisaged by the negotiations.

A new political reference framework for armaments reduction and for the new strategic arrangement as well as for the control of crises and instabilities - that is, for the new European security order or system - can be determined only when the main problem concerning the new European balance, i.e. Europe's new political and strategic stability along the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis, will find a solution.

The new European security structure will depend, in part, on the decisions made by the "2+4" negotiations concerning Germany. The focus of attention has moved from Vienna to Berlin, in view

of the fact that from the decisions made in Germany will also depend the European Community's and NATO's future, especially now that the USSR, thanks to the Caucasus agreements between Gorbachev and Kohl, has removed all claims regarding unified Germany's membership in NATO, without imposing any discriminatory conditions on the future choices of the German people. Moreover, the USSR, accepting even with enthusiasm the proposal of the Atlantic Summit held in London on 5 and 6 February 1990, concerning NATO's direct contacts not with the Warsaw Pact but with the individual countries belonging to it, has almost completely dropped its opposition to an extension of NATO influence on its western borders. If so, this would not be a merely realistic acceptance of the new situation - which the USSR is not in a position of avert - but also an act of great political far-sightedness. The instability of Eastern Europe, closely connected with the turbulent non-Russian Republics that are striving for independence from Moscow, would represent a great danger for the survival of the USSR itself, also jeopardizing its possibility of becoming a Federation, thus avoiding its dismemberment and perhaps even the outbreak of a civil war.

The West lacks a forum for the unitary management of a policy of detente and cooperation with the USSR, such as that of the Atlantic Pact which has guaranteed a unitary security policy. There are, on the contrary, a number of Ostpolitiks, in potential conflict with each other, such as the German one, which is the main one, together with the Italian one, which is complementary as well as in competition with it. Most European countries and the USA have their own Ostpolitik, each bearing a distinctive character. The security policy's economic aspect increased significance is responsible for the direct repercussions which the conflicts among different Ostpolitiks have on Western strategic cohesion, which is threatened by the Atlantic Alliance's limited flexibility to assimilate such conflicts. When the Soviet threat was well defined, allowing some simplification of East-West relations and of the security policy itself, these conflicts did not emerge quite as frequently and were confined to the military field. Having overcome the almost exclusively military approach to the security issue, the risk now arises of underestimating the strategic and military aspects which are still important. The arms control itself runs the risk of becoming aimless and devoid of a general outlook on the future security policy and of a defense planning. Both negotiations and global concepts worked out by NATO must face the often impromptu decisions concerning unilateral arms reduction made by various countries urged by the "peace dividends" rhetoric and by economic difficulties. Such unilateral decisions engender confusion, besides taking away the incentive to reach multilateral agreements. The slackening of the Vienna talks as of the end of 1989 was due not only to the problems raised by the German unification and by the breaking off of the Warsaw Pact, but also by the conflicts among Western nations and by the unilateral arms reduction decisions made by various NATO countries. The

latter have evidently deterred the USSR from seeking agreements subjected to a very intrusive control and inspection system, such as the one envisaged in Vienna, without which the USSR would be able to reduce the conditions imposed by the West on Soviet mobilization capacity. In the meantime, Europe is faced with the task of opposing the conflicts which have arisen in Eastern Europe - above all in the Balcanic-Danubian area - previously put out by the imperialistic presence of the USSR. From the security viewpoint, as far as the West is concerned, this problem presents connotations analogous to those of the out-of-area and is liable to cause its fragmentation due to overlapping and often conflicting interests and perceptions of individual nations. The West's main goal is the political and economic recomposition of Europe, according to the principles of democracy and free trade. The consolidation of democracy and the strengthening of the economy are closely interdependent. This is the common purpose of all NATO member states. Nevertheless, each of them is trying to take advantage of the empty spaces left by the power vacuum which has originated in Eastern Europe and in the USSR itself or, at least, to make sure that the integration with the West does not strengthen one of its allies - who are also competitors - thus modifying the balance (economic one included) now existing in the West. Geoeconomics has partially replaced and put aside geopolitics. Besides, the economic development of the East will only be feasible in the presence of a political and strategic stability, otherwise, massive investments of international capitals in these areas will be considered too risky while the government's guarantees will never exceed a certain limit. Consequently, any real economic and democratic perspective in Balcanic and Eastern Europe will depend on strategic stability, which should possibly be implemented in a collective, cooperative and reciprocal manner (a Pan-European version is for the time being unrealistic). If this will not be feasible, then it will have to be achieved unilaterally, by strengthening the individual Eastern countries's security and defense systems.

The Soviet Union must take part in this process, which must take into account the need to retain USSR presence and influence in Europe, in a way which is compatible with the political values and goals and with the security of Western Europe. Otherwise, if the USSR should be given the opportunity, it could find itself, in the future, in a position to attain that predominance in Europe which it was not able to do in the past through the use of force and military threat. The West, by providing economic and technological aid, would only contribute to create the necessary conditions for re-establishment and to avert a Soviet military threat against Europe.

The European security perspectives are affected by this structural conflict between short and long-term goals. They can only be reconciled through the joint action and institutional balancing of NATO, the EEC and the Conference on European Security

and Economic Cooperation (CESC). Such institutions will contribute to determine the new European Security framework in its dynamic and, in many ways, competitive relationship.

WARSAW PACT AND EASTERN EUROPE

The Warsaw Pact no longer has the capacity to act as an integrated military body and is about to disappear as an institution. Its rigid structure is jeopardizing its survival. The Warsaw Pact was an instrument of Communist internationalism and, in this sense, a successor of the COMINFORM, which was dissolved a few months after the signing of the Pact's Treaty. It is therefore unthinkable to transform it into a political institution, nor, as Mrs. Thatcher wished, to designate it for the coordination of Western European countries's policies during the arms control negotiations and for the control of the tensions among them. Eastern European countries want nothing to do with it. The Warsaw Pact survives as a mere fiction in Vienna. The problem is not how to turn into a political institution, but to determine what type of cooperation for Eastern European security can be established after its dissolution. Aside from the ethnic conflicts and the political and economic instabilities existing in various states, there are also a number of internal problems which have not yet found a solution and which are liable to be enhanced by the internal difficulties that the new ruling class will no doubt have to face. It is thus necessary to single out institutions and policies capable of containing the negative effects engendered by the so-called "security dilemma" which could involve a remilitarization and the outbreak of crises and conflicts if such issues should be handled only at a national level. An overall re-nationalization of the Eastern European countries's defense systems would be disastrous. There are other feasible solutions: 1) these countries could join NATO, which would not only take them under its wing, but also assist them in the solution of internal crises and conflicts, combining it with the EEC's economic support; 2) various types of "guaranteed neutrality" which would make Western protection more acceptable to the USSR.

The Red Army's presence in Eastern Europe is temporary. Besides the agreements concerning its withdrawal from Czechoslovakia by the middle of 1991, the Red Army will hardly be able to remain in East Germany due to the hostility of the local populations, even for the 3-4 years envisaged by the Caucasus agreement between President Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl. The Red Army might be able to keep its presence in Poland in case the Polish government - and this is also questionable - should regard its presence as a security measure against unlikely German territorial claims over Silesia and Pomerania. Also in this case, however, it would only be a temporary presence. A German irredentism in Poland could not be withstood by using force but, on the contrary, by developing the economy and thus diminishing the attraction that Germany's welfare has on Polish citizens of

German origin. This could also be achieved through the EEC's progressive extension to Poland, even though, in case of the Soviet army's presence as a safeguard against Germany, it would occur at a much slower pace for the very good reason that most of the economic and financial aid is provided to Poland by Germany. It is desirable that Poland put aside such unrealistic reactions inspired by memories of the past, which, in the present situation, are quite suicidal and liable to stimulate a Russian-German approach. Certainly, Poland is not alone; as a matter of fact, the unjustified and emotional reactions of certain French and British politicians vis-à-vis the "German danger" run the risk of endangering European political integration and NATO cohesion. The situation takes on different aspects in each country. Its evolution will depend on internal economic and political stability. Although Soviet influence in Hungary and Czechoslovakia is by now about to disappear, the outlook is different for Romania and Bulgaria and, from certain angles, also for Serbia. The states that have originated from the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire are much more unstable and the problems posed by their democratization and economic development are far greater as compared to the states that once belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. A conservative Soviet government - once it has succeeded in solving the USSR's internal problems or even in order to contribute to their solution - could take advantage of such instability so as to regain military influence in South-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans. With the progressive separation of mid-Eastern European countries from the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia and Albania will also find themselves part of this wide area of instability, characterized by internal and external tensions. Due to the enormous differences existing among the various states and at their interior, the issue cannot be handled in a unitary way. A part of Western public opinion is more favourable to a step-by-step reduction of the Soviet influence in these areas, instead of its sudden elimination. This would not only favour a more balanced transition towards new and more stable structures, but it would also avoid negative repercussions on Soviet domestic policy, strengthening the conservative trends and blocking the process of detente and cooperation with the West.

In order to determine the policy which the West, the USSR and Eastern Europe should adopt, it is fundamental to evaluate the extent and speed of the action to be undertaken, without provoking the reaction of the more conservative powers in the USSR. This kind of approach, however, appears to be motivated more by public relations worries than by a realistic evaluation of the Western behaviour's repercussions on that of the Soviet Union. Though not agreeing with Henry Kissinger's view that the West should avail itself of the present Soviet vulnerability to make endeavours for the dissolution of the USSR, it is true that Western cohesion and firmness can put an end to the present stalemate, due not only to the Soviet hope for larger political and economic concessions, but also to the difficulties which the

Soviet leadership is facing in the process of disposing of the empire.

SOVIET UNION

Even if the Soviet Union should be dismembered and be left only with Russia, it will nevertheless continue to be a nuclear power and the predominant European nation from a geopolitical viewpoint, and therefore represent a potential threat to Western security, though in quite different terms as compared to the past 40 years. Meanwhile, should it remain united, it would jeopardize the establishment of a "European common house", which would evidently be incompatible with the presence of such a big and weighty co-tenant, who would make it hard to work out acceptable condominium rules. If the USSR will remain a Union, Europe must continue to depend on American military protection, even in the event that more integrated forms of European political unity should be achieved and the creation of a European nuclear dissuasion force become feasible.

Up to now, USSR military power has not been significantly reduced. However, the chance of a Soviet attack on the West is rapidly losing credibility and, in any case, the West would have ample forewarning. Not only can the Red Army no longer count on the support of the satellite countries' armed forces, but its strategic plans should also consider the possibility of a direct resistance on their part against an attack on the West.

One of the most critical factors in the future European order (order or disorder?) is the evolution of the Soviet internal situation. The erosion of present Soviet leadership's power and control capabilities, as well as the economic and national crisis, which is getting worse, are liable to cause the political collapse of the USSR and even its disintegration. The outbreak of a civil war is not unlikely, and even more disquieting in view of the possibility that the conflicting parties employ nuclear weapons or that, in any case, the Union's fight for survival will weaken the power to control them and, to some degree, the operation of the rational mechanisms which guarantee nuclear dissuasion stability.

It is impossible to make reliable predictions on what will happen in the Soviet Union. Regardless of the aforementioned explosive scenario, Moscow's future politics can be considered as an extremely changeable factor. This corroborates the view of the desirability to persevere in the traditional approach of arms control based on the counterpart's military capacity and not on its probable intentions. Although such a conservative approach must certainly face the considerable obstacles created by the pressure of public opinion and of the NATO countries' Ministries of finance, the West cannot negotiate its future security and must keep in mind that peace's main dividend is peace itself.

In the light of its new military philosophy, which is based on the principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency and places previous offensive strategy on a technical and operational level, the Soviet security system no longer relies on the presence of massive forces in forward position aimed at a large-scale attack on the West on short notice. Mid-Eastern Europe has become technically less important for USSR security. The Red Army's new goal, directed at preventing the outbreak of a conflict instead of winning a war; its denial of the dogma concerning capitalism's intrinsically aggressive nature and the acceptance of the legitimate security interests of the West, entail a different Soviet attitude towards nuclear dissuasion. This is confirmed by President Gorbachev's assertions and by those of a number of Soviet strategy experts, on minimum nuclear deterrence and by his giving up of the intent to denuclearize Western Europe which, in the past, hampered all serious negotiations with NATO on sub-strategic nuclear weapons. This change in strategic and operational concepts, which did not as yet have repercussions on the structure of Soviet forces, is extremely important for the determination of an agreed upon security system, acceptable to the West.

There are, however, other factors which are contingent for Western security's future structures. The first factor is represented by Soviet nuclear forces which, in any case, will continue to be a threat for Western Europe. This threat can be neutralized only thanks to the USA's nuclear safeguard and the protection of non-nuclear states.

The second factor concerns the Red Army's residual military capacity and, above all, its mobilization capacity, also taking into account the possible employment of the weapons located in the eastern part of the Urals, where part of the equipment withdrawn from Eastern Europe and from the Soviet western military Districts is being stored.

The third factor is represented by the ability to keep up the Soviet military industry and by the as yet only marginal reduction of its productivity.

As has been repeatedly asserted by Gorbachev and by the USSR political and military leadership, the need to keep up Soviet military industry production and technological capacity is a restraint for its reorganization. The 1990 Soviet defense budget shows a reduction of only 1.5% of expenses for the purchase of new materials, as compared to an 8.2% reduction of the overall budget. It must be considered, however, that such data are far from being significant, due to the inconvertibility of the ruble and the unsuccessful reform of the pricing system. The overall budget reduction could be ascribed to the transfer (which took place in 1990) of the 800.000 men who belonged to the border Guard,

railroad departments and internal security troops, to other ministries. The last uncertainty factor derives from the evolutionary trends of military technology. The technological revolution under way lessens the importance of traditional weapons intended for territorial occupation - such as tanks - enhancing that of the means of remote destruction of antagonist forces. This affects the efficacy of the balancing measures envisaged by the CFE-1 negotiations which, at least as far as ground operations are concerned, refer to territorial occupation equipment. Incidentally, such technological evolution of armaments, which is symmetrical to the one taking place in the West, should have a stabilizing effect on defense. Long-range firing equipment has a linear effect on operational capacity, while contact combat equipment has a quadratic effect. The latter is therefore more liable to modify operational balances making them unstable. In fact, the attacking party, having the initiative, can concentrate it in the attack gravitation sectors.

Europe's future security critical element is the forewarning time of Soviet mobilization which determines the time at the West's disposal to countermobilize and receive reinforcements from over the Atlantic. However, the West will not run the risk of having to face a wide-range massive offensive. The Red Army's offensive operations - which could become likely in the future - will be concentrated on much narrower sectors. On that account, the importance of forces flexibility and ability to oppose actions carried out with forces that, though limited, can count on high strategic mobility and are capable of disorganizing surveillance, command, control and long-range firing integrated systems, will be enhanced. On account of this, the West will be compelled to be able to perform maneuvers at a high strategic and operational level - and this is more than the present advanced defense system can afford - and thus to have at its disposal an efficient command and control integrated organization, especially in Central Europe.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE - EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

The Atlantic Alliance has more adaptable and flexible structures. Its survival is not only possible but fundamental for the solution of a number of problems. First, the problem of keeping the political and strategical link between Europe and the United States, on which European security must continue to rely, as well as the possibility of establishing a balance between nuclear and non-nuclear countries on the one hand, and between unified Germany and other European countries on the other. Second, the presence of the USA represents the cohesion factor between Southern and Central regions. In other words, this will serve to prevent the fragmentation of Southern Europe, which would cause a destabilization, above all in the Eastern Mediterranean, due to the Greek-Turkish contention. Third, the USA's nuclear guaranty ensures Germany's adhesion to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is in fact evident that a country such as Germany cannot do

without an efficient security system. Therefore, it will either continue to benefit from American nuclear dissuasion, or, at the outbreak of the first crisis, it will equip itself with nuclear weapons. Fourth, the survival of the Atlantic Alliance allows the reduction of European forces, in view of the fact that strategic reinforcements can be furnished by the USA in reasonable time, enough to ensure the full operativeness of European mobilization forces. Only an alliance with the United States will counterbalance the geostrategic structural superiority of the USSR which no negotiation will be able to change.

Aside from the above, NATO will also be useful in order to coordinate the control and arms reduction policies among Western countries and to handle crises likely to occur within or without, and particularly in Balcanic-Danubian Europe. In other words, NATO's task would be to avoid - or at least contain - the re-nationalization of security systems, which could generate an unstable situation analogous to the one which occurred at the beginning of the century. The main problem that has to be solved concerns the preservation of NATO's vitality, by adapting it both to the new type of threat and to the disruptive tendencies emerging at its interior and caused by European national-neutrality on the one hand, and by American isolationism on the other. The keystone of NATO's re-establishment, preventing the fragmentation of the West which could entail unforeseeable effects on Europe's stability, is European political and military integration. It is a matter of resuming the plans drawn up at the beginning of the fifties. The conjuncture of that time (extreme weakness of Europe and immanence of the Soviet army threat) induced the awareness that the American guaranty made European military integration and the equal participation to the Alliance's responsibilities and burdens superfluous if not dangerous. This transfer of NATO's load to Europe and the United States must be accomplished step by step. The intention of making NATO a political institution, as was proposed by United States Secretary of State Baker during his Berlin speech in December 1989, is unrealistic, as that of extending the participation of Japan and charging NATO with the management of out-of-area issues. In order to perform the above-mentioned duties, NATO must continue to be an integrated military organization. It cannot take the place of G-7 nor coordinate the overall policy between Europe and the EEC.

EUROPE AND EUROPEAN DEFENSE

European political integration is not in contrast with but may even represent a premise for the Community's progressive expansion towards the East. Political integration also implies some kind of integration in the security sector. Failing this, the de facto bilateral relationship between USA and Germany will become even more central than at present, and it will also involve the progressive and strategic marginalization of France and Great Britain. Otherwise, Germany could loosen its ties with the West

and become attracted by the East. With regard to these factors, a number of scenarios are possible.

The first scenario would entail the fragmentation of the European security system which would also cause the Community's economic fragmentation, the rebirth of an unstable Central Europe, a Russian-German reconciliation and the United States withdrawal from Central Europe. The fragmentation of European security would surely have severe repercussions on Southern Europe which would run the risk of having its security requirements subordinated to those of the United States in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East or, in case of American withdrawal also from the Mediterranean, of finding itself isolated in safeguarding not only its own security but also that of the rest of Europe. This situation would increase the risks of nuclear proliferation. Fortunately, such a scenario is not very likely because of the ties existing between Germany and Western Europe and of the US interests in keeping their presence in Europe. In case it did come true, however, it could be disguised as a weak Pan-European security framework, such as CESC (not very efficient in practice).

The second scenario implies the preservation of a Western security system, whose unity would be ensured only - or at least for the most part - by the United States. However, this also seems unlikely. In fact, the USA apparently do not intend to further pay the costs of European leadership and safeguard nor do the Europeans intend to make compensation to the United States for their efforts in the financial, commercial or economic field, which would induce them to keep up their present military commitment. This scenario would be equally dangerous for Southern Europe, whose security would thus completely depend on United States policy fluctuations and, in any case, on the contingent interests of the United States in the area.

The third scenario consists in the strengthening of the so-called European pillar, i.e. the Atlantic Alliance. The overall security framework (nuclear dissuasion, external reinforcements, command and control integrated system, sharing in the strategic protection of the Southern side) would continue to be ensured by the United States, in the NATO ambit, with an always more substantial participation of a more integrated Europe. In view of this, a partial transfer of European security responsibilities from NATO to the W.E.U. can be envisaged, which would include all the European members of the Alliance and would be connected, in some way or other, to the Community/European Union. French conventional forces should also be integrated in the Alliance, while the French and British nuclear forces would remain on a national level, and a European nuclear deterrent would not be established, even at a sub-strategic level. The W.E.U. would be transferred to Brussels, it would absorb the CPE Secretariat and its structure would reflect that of the Atlantic Board. The W.E.U. Parliamentary Assembly, extended to the European Parliament members, could be

combined with the European Community Assembly. The issue concerning the incorporation of neutral and non-aligned countries as well as countries now belonging to the Warsaw Pact, into the Community and Atlantic Alliance, would be significantly reappraised by the fact that the political changes in Europe will have also changed the meaning of neutrality and non-alignment.

The fourth scenario consists in a greater autonomy of European security, compatible moreover with the preservation of the Alliance with the United States. This would imply a very emphasized European political Union and the limitation of the "common house" from Brest to Brest (Litvosk). It would also entail the Europeanization of the French and English nuclear forces, the creation of a European planning team and the establishment of a European sub-strategic dissuasion force. This solution would mean the transformation of the Alliance between Europe and the United States from an integrated one into a traditional one. The United States, instead of playing the principal role of the Alliance's bearing structure, would only have a complementary and integrative one. The European sub-strategic nuclear dissuasion force would be connected to the United States's global force and could be integrated either with nuclear weapons (cruise or aircraft) on board ships and submarines, or with U.S. nuclear systems dislocated in Europe in case of emergency. This scenario entails a degree of European political integration which cannot be accomplished in the short-term, although it could be accelerated by the United States's almost total military disengagement and the simultaneous re-emergence of a more immediate Soviet threat.

GREY AREA FROM THE BALTIC TO THE ADRIATIC AND BLACK SEAS AND "OUT-OF-AREA" PROBLEMS

We have already mentioned the European security problems deriving from the instability area which is the consequence of the breaking up of the Warsaw Pact in ex-satellite countries (including Yugoslavia and Albania, which may, in many ways, be assimilated to them). In addition to the problems posed by the transition from a planned economy to a market economy and by internal political stability, there are the dangers of populism, nationalism and ethnic conflicts. The area cannot be handled in a homogeneous manner, due to the structural differences among the different states (and at times even within them) which do not permit to work out a unitary policy.

The national and ethnic conflicts, the possibility that the new democratic regime may collapse owing to economic and social crises and the chance that a new conservative Soviet leadership may try to regain some influence over Mid-Eastern Europe, are also liable to affect Western security. Evidently, these problems cannot be solved by means of Western military intervention if not to a limited degree, i.e. interposition and peace preservation actions, to be taken by the United Nations or the CESC. Regional agreements, such as the Balcanic, Adriatic and pentagonal ones

involving political coordination among Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, proposed by Czech president Havel, can contribute to the area's stability, to establish a dialogue and to contain and handle any crisis that may arise, though it cannot be the basis for the area's security system.

It is necessary to provide these countries with some wide-ranging defense capacity, which would be especially useful in case of an attack from the East. As all these countries must almost completely depend on the USSR for spare parts, this could easily affect their defense capacity. Therefore, the principal countermeasure consists in the differentiation of the suppliers of spare parts for Soviet equipment. Furthermore, in addition to economic assistance, sooner or later, the West will have to provide military assistance, starting from the self-defense sector (mines, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, electronic warfare equipment, etc.) External military assistance is necessary because it is unthinkable that, in such weak economic conditions, these countries will ever be able to purchase their own armaments. In the CESC process framework, which will be discussed later, they could be provided with some type of guaranty from both the West and the USSR, which would not, however, replace the need for their own defense capacity. Only the already mentioned extension of NATO's protection to these countries could both spare them from a considerable military reinforcement and from the dangers deriving from the complete re-nationalization of their security systems.

The "out-of-area" issue requires special consideration. From a military viewpoint, we must single out those countries connected with the South-South conflictuality (i.e., Iran- Iraq) which are liable to jeopardize the West's vital interests, mainly with regard to the access to petroleum resources (i.e. Iraq-Kuwait); the threat to Turkey from the South; Israel's survival; the threats deriving from the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and missiles in the Middle East and North Africa.

In general, European security interests are linked to internal political, economic and social stability of the countries on the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean shore basin and of the areas connected to it from a geopolitical viewpoint. Only this stability can prevent anti-Western behaviour and, above all, mass immigration of the more Europeanized populations escaping from intégriste regimes. Only thanks to it, economic cooperation and peaceful coexistence between North and South will be possible. The security policy's political aspects are clearly less important than the military ones. Western security's most efficient tools will continue to be the economic and military strengthening of those countries that can act as regional stabilizers, such as Egypt and, above all, Turkey.

The Gulf crisis - the first real crisis of the post- bipolar world - has shown, among other things, the difficulty for the countries involved, to achieve an efficient operational and political coordination. Moreover, it is likely that the arms control will not achieve significant results in the area. It is nevertheless advisable to attempt the extension of arms control to the Mediterranean, though without setting oneself too ambitious or global goals. In the present situation, the establishment of a dialogue would already be a positive result. As yet, the problem of out-of-area threats has not concerned Europe, thanks to the US military presence, which has always solved it. It would however pose itself in the event of a United States withdrawal from the Mediterranean. If a European policy will not be set up (also including Germany's direct commitment), Southern European countries would be facing this threat each on their own, and would hardly be in a position to oppose it. It is thus desirable to adopt a policy of prevention and, in the event of direct attack, one of reaction, multilaterally planned.

In the framework of out-of-area threats, the present Gulf crisis is the most serious threat to Western internal balance both from an economic and from a political viewpoint (Islamic world radicalization). The crisis repercussions on Turkey, whose economic and social cohesion is becoming weaker and weaker, is especially worrying, also because this country is surrounded by potentially hostile countries, some of which can count on a very large quantity of armaments (besides Iraq, Syria) and might easily take advantage of any internal crisis. In this event, a logistic as well as direct support from the West may become necessary. It must be pointed out that the AMF (L) has a contingency area in the South of Turkey and that the Atlantic Alliance and Europe might be significantly involved in case of an attack from the South against Turkey.

Otherwise, in order to ensure the security of Western nations - aside from the already mentioned preventive measures which should, in any case, be coordinated - it is necessary to improve the strategic intelligence and surveillance equipment, the inter-workability of crises handling systems, of intervention forces, of sea and air defense forces, as well as the establishment of a European conventional dissuasion force. This is the most important lesson that we can learn from the Gulf crisis.

THE FUTURE OF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

The USSR's in many ways unexpected acceptance of the rule according to which any one nation is not allowed to own more than 30% of equipment in each category present in the ATTU area, will enable the positive outcome of the CFE-1 negotiations - at least in a temporary and limited way - with the agreement to continue them in order to solve the issues needing further discussion. The

negotiations must then go on without interruption with a CFE-1 bis and also include staff and other armaments, while the negotiation on sub-strategic nuclear weapons could be started, extending it from short-range missiles, as was initially scheduled, to other items, i.e. artillery and weapons launched by bivalent fighter-bombers.

The second phase, or phase 1-bis of the CFE negotiations (which comprise 22 countries), could be drawn out taking into account the following geostrategic groupings: NATO; USSR and what is left of the Warsaw Pact in Romania and Bulgaria; the nations belonging to the "Grey Zone" which is emerging between USSR and NATO, i.e. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, to which may be added Austria, Yugoslavia and Albania. Finally, another point of interest concerns the extension of the CSBM agreements and the CFE - at least as far as their stability measures - to the Navy. This problem, which was at the center of Soviet proposal, has lost most of its significance. Until now, the West has always refused to extend the negotiations to the Navy, alleging that it would be impossible to verify any agreement and because the mobility of naval forces would make it impossible to determine regional balances even in internal waters (i.e. in the Mediterranean and in the North sea to the East of the GIUK line). In addition to this, there is a wide structural dyssimmetry among the different naval items of sea denial, sea control and power projection, which make the definition of stability concepts virtually impossible. Equal "ceiling" as for the ground and air forces would serve no practical purpose. A likely approach to naval negotiations - which will probably start sooner or later (the issue has been already discussed as far as the Baltic is concerned and will be brought up in the CSCM) - could be the following: 1) do not take into consideration the sea control forces, as the freight escort requirements depend on their number and not on the gravity of the threat, and since this force category has no direct influence on ground-air operations; 2) foresee ad hoc ceilings and security and reliance measures for the sea denial forces; set a limit to power projection component forces and activities (as already done for the amphibian forces), considering them together with the ground-air balances in the ATTU region.

CESC'S ROLE

The possibility of setting up a common European security system depends solely on the USSR's participation and association to it. The CESC's negotiation mechanisms - and perhaps also the decisional ones - relating to the three Helsinki agreement "baskets", will surely be strengthened by the so-called Conference institutionalization, which could be decided on at the Paris summit that will take place in mid November or during the 1992 Helsinki follow-up Conference.

There were two discordant positions: the USSR wanted the CESC to become - at least temporarily - the only European common security institution, even after having abandoned the proposal of dissolving NATO together with the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, Western nations asserted the existence of a structural dyssimmetry between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and that the latter could thus continue to exist without the former. The CESC would in fact be more effective than the United Nations, even if a de jure or de facto Security Board or a major power Directorate were to be established at its interior. It would only be a "ceiling" without a common house, which would not be able to balance the USSR geopolitical and nuclear power. Its composition would in itself raise difficulties in making decisions, since its decision-making mechanisms would require unanimity and agreement - quite impracticable with 34 nations. The USSR will not be satisfied with any other system, though it will continue to be a minority.

The Western position was essentially accepted by the USSR in July 1990, although during the Atlantic summit in London the Soviet request to institutionalize it through high level (European Security Board) periodic meetings and the establishment of a small Secretariat and a Parliamentary Assembly was granted.

In other words, if the CESC will not represent the basis of European security order, which will continue to rely on collective and regional or perhaps even national systems, it could, however, play some useful role in the management of it.

The CESC Secretariat would have functions analogous to those of the United Nations and could comprise a risk reduction and crises handling Centre, an inspection Agency and, in case, a planning, study and proposal military technical body in order to stimulate strategic considerations in view of future agreements on military doctrine and forces structures.

To the CESC General Secretariat could be linked interposition forces as well as civil protection and, in case, environmental protection forces.

The CESC will in any case remain more a process than an institution and it will have to be flexible in order to adapt to European political evolution. Only in the long-term, if a "confederation" or a "European common house" will be set up, the European Security Board and the General Secretariat would be able to perform the duties now carried out by the Atlantic Board and the bodies depending from it. If such an unlikely assumption were to come true, integrated Pan-European regional headquarters could be established, placed in command of the residual forces of different nations. The presence of a minimal military force would not only allow to face threats external to the ATTU area (this would, however, pose many problems, such as the status of territories located to the East of the Urals), but also to prevent

an individual state from changing the strategic balances in its favour by means of unilateral rearmament measures.

THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DISSUASION IN EUROPE

A merely conventional stability, even if extended from the opposite forces in peace time to the mobilization and reinforcement capabilities, to the technological and production capacities and to the handling of crises, will always be intrinsically limited, owing to the nature of conventional forces. From the structural viewpoint, it is impossible to achieve a superiority of defense on attack because the attacking party has the initiative and is able to concentrate its forces by surprise in the critical points which he intends to attack. A stable conflict prevention system cannot leave out of consideration the existence of a minimal nuclear force on the European scene. Its role cannot be played by external nuclear forces nor by nuclear forces whose assignment is the "second hit", i.e. the dissuasion of the opposing party's nuclear forces.

Therefore, a stable war-prevention system presupposes the symbiosis between sub-strategic nuclear forces and conventional defence, with the former having the function of linking the impossible war - i.e. nuclear war - level with that of the possible war - i.e. conventional - making the latter also impossible. Paradoxically (but it is one of the typical paradoxes of strategy), in order to accomplish such an impossibility of war, some nuclear weapons employment possibility must be maintained. This is why stability must rely on the principle of "first use". Any guaranty requires the guarantor to be in a position to threaten the guarantor's aggressor. Otherwise it does not work. Here, the concept of first use is also perfectly compatible with the drawing up of a non-aggression agreement and with the resort to force only for self-defense purposes. This proposal was made to the USSR and to the other Warsaw Pact member countries during the London Atlantic Summit. On the other hand, aside from any theological discussion on first use and no first use, which has a merely declaratory validity, the crux of the matter are the qualitative and quantitative structures of the sub-strategic nuclear forces that will remain in Europe. The meaning of the term "war prevention" used in the USSR, is analogous to the Western term "dissuasion". The difference between the two is essentially semantic. This has allowed a certain convergence between the West and the USSR toward an agreement according to which the so-called "minimum nuclear deterrent" should be retained in Europe. Its composition should be such that it would not determine the outcome of conventional operations, though, from an operational viewpoint, its impact should be significant (e.g., the capacity of destroying 10 armoured divisions). It could be made up of a few hundred air-delivered nuclear warheads, probably with stand-off missiles. So as to ensure an effective European control, while the

warheads will be American, the carriers could be European and should be supplied by different states, among which Germany.

Germany constitutes a problem, due to growing public opinion's (and also many political forces's) intolerance towards any limitation of sovereignty (the lack of nuclear weapons is one) and towards the keeping of the various cold war and military occupation "paraphernalia". Nevertheless, the fact that in the Gorbachev-Kohl agreement the prohibition to draw up NATO nuclear forces and weapons on the territory now belonging to East Germany is not absolute (it is in fact valid for the 3-4 years necessary for the withdrawal of the Red Army and then it will depend on the autonomous decision of the FRG) should allow to overcome any German perplexity concerning NATO participation. As a matter of fact, it will not necessarily entail a differentiated status among the different parts of unified Germany's territory.

Germany's denuclearization would mean the end of NATO since it is unthinkable that the United States would accept any further commitment or military presence in Europe. In this case, the Alliance could perhaps survive on the sides, and especially in the Mediterranean, but only in the form of bilateral agreements made by individual countries with the United States. In Mid-Eastern Europe this would entail a power vacuum which would turn it into a geopolitically unstable area, subject to the unforeseeable fluctuations of the different countries' internal political struggle.

EUROPE'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE AND THE LEVEL OF AMERICAN RESIDUAL FORCES

NATO's future military conventional equipment in Central Europe could comprise a cover force, counterattack mobile units deployed in the rear and forces for the protection of defense positions. Of the latter, only the more sophisticated units, meant for in depth barrage and fast laying of obstacles, would exist. The bulk of forces would be used for mobilization purposes and mainly made up of light units. They would be intended for the protection of advanced defense positions on difficult ground and open areas, of in depth defence and chess-board formation, in support of mobile forces.

Both the USSR and the West have put aside alternative defense systems, based on internal in depth defense with small light infantry units intended to wear out enemy penetrations, according to the concept inspired by more radical "defensive defense" proposals. Such systems are too vulnerable to predictable technological innovations and, in any case, too weak with respect to offensive operations carried out even with simple infantry units similar in structure to the infantries who fought in the two World Wars. This statement, however, cannot obviously apply to mountainous, highly urbanized and wooded areas. Here, a type of

defense which is anchored to positions, supported by obstacles, by semi-permanent and/or field fortifications and by adequate firing and counterattack equipment, is still fully valid.

The forces used to cover the Central Region must be multinational ones and integrated at the Division and Army Corps level. Obviously, as a consequence of the multinational aspect, a reduction of the actual operating capacity will be inevitable due to logistic and language complications which it will entail. Nevertheless, this aspect is very important as a means of dissuasion, for stability and, above all, in order to make the presence of other nations's forces on its territory, acceptable to Germany.

The present state of advanced defense will undergo some attenuations and become more flexible in its application. This does not mean that, in the case of an attack, defense operations would be a priori conducted in depth. It simply means that the peace formation of NATO forces will not be concentrated, as it is now, near the Alliance's eastern border. In case of an attack, their advancement along the borders is envisaged, as all nations have always done, unless they were prevented to do so by their absolute military inferiority.

The amount of NATO's resources available for defense purposes would represent a limiting factor for its actual security system.

An element of flexibility could be realized through the alteration of operational readiness, that is, of the relationship between active and mobilization units. This will be mainly employed to cut down on working expenses and to assign a larger amount of funds to investments and, most of all, to research and development.

The enhancement of the importance of force mobilization is parallel to that of industrial mobilization, which is made possible by longer forewarning time. The latter must be accurately organized.

As far as the American presence in Europe is concerned, the minimum level necessary for the preservation of the Alliance's strategic cohesion should be such as to ensure:

- the sub-strategic nuclear deterrent, that is the 400-500 air delivered nuclear warheads, mostly if not exclusively belonging to European countries, indispensable for the fulfilment of the only really effective and unequivocal "double key";
- United States participation to strategic surveillance and intelligence systems and to integrated command, control and communications systems;

- the presence of a number of fast reaction USA units belonging, if necessary, to multinational forces, supported by air tactical forces. In principle, 3 brigades in Germany, 1 battalion in Italy and 3 aircraft formations in Great Britain, Germany and Italy can be envisaged;

- the participation to the air defense system which should be kept integrated;

- the presence of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, although limited to a group of aircraft-carriers and to one amphibious battalion;

- the existence of pre-positioned equipment for at least 6 divisions in Germany and of infrastructures for 12-15 aircraft tactical formations in NATO countries;

- the preservation of transportation and protection capacity for transatlantic SLOCs.

CONCLUSIVE CONSIDERATIONS

Past stability is over. The European security system has entered a phase of changes the future developments of which are not clear. They could be both characterized either by integration or disintegration trends, which are difficult to comprehend since, among other things, the security policy, as well as the power policy, has assumed those prevailing military connotations which it had earlier, becoming much more complex and incorporating political and economic factors.

Moreover, security will be affected - to a much larger extent than in the past - by the different states's domestic situations. A European security system can no longer leave out of consideration the possibility of deep changes in the USSR and in Eastern European countries. From a certain angle, all of Balcanic and Eastern Europe, to which may be added the Baltic and Transcaucasian Republics, Ukraine and Belorussia, has turned into an unstable area which, under the security aspect, poses to the West problems very similar to those of the out-of-area. European security order may be established on condition that a stable security structure be set up in Central Europe. It must therefore be founded on unified Germany and on the issues concerning its policy with Eastern nations and its links with Western nations. Undoubtedly Germany, who has become the Soviet Union's and Eastern Europe's banker, will be attracted to it, among other things because of the drive to establish a relationship with Eastern nations, which will be a consequence of the preservation of East Germany's economic agreements and contacts. Surely Germany might be tempted to fill the gap created by the collapse of the Soviet Empire on her own and to use the economy as a power policy

instrument, with direct repercussions on the whole geopolitical and geostrategic European system.

If during the initial phase of the transition to new set ups, Germany will continue to be a member of NATO and to take part in the European integration process, such conditioning factors could be considered in the future as a constraint for the German interest in a more balanced relationship between East and West. This could also produce an impulse to enhance the importance of CESC compared to NATO, and therefore a progressive depletion - from within - of the main integrative institution of the West. The CESC would allow Germany to handle, together with the USSR, Eastern Europe's instability problems, thus not having to face them alone.

This would not necessarily mean the end of NATO and of the alliance with the United States, though it could involve a progressive subordination of NATO compared with the CESC and therefore the prevalence of security's national aspects vis-à-vis the collective ones.

The emerging trends of German public opinion, which is unfavourable to sovereignty limitations deriving from the contraposition of the blocks, from Soviet military threat and from the consequent US guaranty, also push in this direction. They risk, however, to bring about a situation of fragmentariness and instability, where the traditional power policies will regain their positions.

The only concrete possibility for a stable political and strategic anchorage of Germany to Western Europe, consists in the speeding up of Western Europe's integration, by converting the Community into a Union and by involving, in an organic manner, the other EEC member countries in the process of development of the relationship with Eastern Europe and in the extension of NATO to Eastern Europe.

A big problem is posed by the fact that Mid-Eastern European countries are not homogeneous. Their external vertical connections clearly prevail on the horizontal ones and, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, their perspectives of democratic consolidation and transition to a market economy are not very favourable or, in any case, cannot be taken for granted. This is liable to entail great difficulties and instability, owing to the tensions which are likely to emerge between security military and economic aspects, to the lack of political and strategical stabilizers in the event of ethnic and national crises and to the necessity of incorporating in the strategic changes between East and West, the dynamics of internal instability and, further South, that of the out-of-area conflictuality. Finally, the local actors will play more and more important roles, as well as the sub-regional association, which will help prevent the emergence of crises and

to contain them, by means of a network of collective agreements, in the ambit of which, solely national approaches can find their balance and settlement.

From a reassuring and stable bi-polar world, we could find ourselves in a disquieting, though less dangerous, situation of instability.

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