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THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

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The sudden advent of a new period of detente has given rise to the formulation of a variety of diverse strategies for European security. For some, the situation, no matter how much it has changed, still requires the maintenance of an Allied defence effort and American presence in Europe with the ultimate guarantee of a nuclear deterrent. Others are thinking of an East-West "collective security system" and believe that a new "common European house" can replace the former military alliances. Furthermore, European governments have adopted a syncretic line and maintain that the new system of collective security should rest on the Atlantic pillar.

I. CURRENT CHANGES

The fact is that the Atlantic Alliance is already undergoing change. The following proposals have been made in light of the current conditions:

- A. A reduction of the American forces in Europe, particularly those stationed in Germany. Bush has proposed the reduction of US troops (i.e. army and air force; the proposal does not apply to the navy or to the marines) in Germany to 195,000, and those in the rest of Europe to 30,000. Further reductions in the American presence in Germany may include the following options:
1. reducing the forces to the level of a single army corps with its necessary air force support (120,000-150,000 men);
 2. limiting the military presence to a "skeleton" for possible reinforcements, surveillance and maintenance of depots, etc., in addition to a modest air presence (50,000-60,000 men);
 3. ensuring only a Headquarters, Planning and Intelligence presence with Air Forces present on a rotational basis (5,000 -10,000 men).

Such reductions could not help but influence the decisions of the other Western countries with a military presence in Germany. The options proposed in A.2 and A.3 would lead to the de facto elimination of the collective NATO presence in Germany; the A.1. option, on the other hand, is compatible with the maintenance of a "defensive" NATO presence.

B. A reduction of nuclear theatre forces in Germany and in Europe. Several options have also been proposed for these reductions:

1. the elimination (negotiated or unilateral) of American Lance missiles deployed in Europe and of American and British nuclear artillery;
2. the maintenance of a small quantity of nuclear theatre weapons -- airborne, free-falling or medium-long range air launched missiles (250-500 warheads with respect to the approximately 4,000 currently deployed); and the modernization of French and British air forces by the adoption of a new air launched medium-long range missile;
3. the elimination of all NATO nuclear warheads from Germany. This might make it possible to maintain a few airborne nuclear forces in Britain and would raise the question of whether such forces should also be present on the ground in the Southern Flank (Italy?, Turkey?) in addition to the VI Fleet.

C. The USSR has used German unification for leverage to obtain an agreement on a ceiling for German armed forces, but the agreement has also called for the absence of NATO troops from East German territory. This accord has many consequences for the future of the Alliance, though it seems to refer to a limited period (the 3-4 years necessary for a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from East German territory). First, it is a prelude to the establishment of operational **Bundeswehr** units that are not "assigned to NATO". Second, it poses the problem of a future redeployment of NATO troops in that territory: a politically "sensitive" decision, which Germany will certainly not make lightly. Finally, it necessitates a revision of NATO operational strategy for Central Europe. The USSR would probably attempt to extend such an agreement to the levels of allied forces in Germany (in any case, it has succeeded in excluding theatre nuclear forces from East Germany).

D. Proposals have also been made for "political" revisions in the Alliance, that is for increasing its role in matters that are not strictly military or related to arms control and reduction. Several additional proposals for structural and political reorganization of the Alliance have been made:

1. an increase of the weight of the aero-naval components, giving greater importance the US-Britain-France axis; there are also thoughts of a US-Italy (or US-France-Italy) axis for the Mediterranean;

2. German withdrawal from the Nuclear Planning Group with the return to the old "directorate" model of "nuclear powers" discussed in the late fifties and early sixties: this would be a prelude to the return of France to NATO;
3. the formation of a few "sub-regional" groups allied with the US: one in the Mediterranean (France-Spain-Italy-Turkey) and one in the North Sea (Britain-Belgium-Netherlands-Norway).

All of the above proposals, however, are flawed in that they isolate the new Germany or at least keep it in an anomalous and idiosyncratic position.

Germany is no longer a state with limited sovereignty, nor the residual "n-state" around which Western security requirements revolve and which must be made to pay for European security, in terms of human, territorial, geostrategic and economic costs.

German unification, though it will formally occur within the framework of NATO, involves fundamental changes in its military strategy, which has already been accepted at the London Summit of the Alliance: renunciation of forward defence and a profound revision of its nuclear strategy, that is, one with less flexibility and a greater resemblance to a "last resort". This is all very difficult to translate into operational plans that satisfy the security requirements of individual European states in times of crisis. Thus, it looks like a "peacetime strategy", that could fall apart if it were to be put to the test.

If Germany were to remain in a "semi-detached" position, there would be a general rush --lead by the US and the USSR--to become its ally. A pessimistic view would see the agreement reached in Moscow between Helmut Kohl and Mikhail Gorbachev as a new kind of Rapallo. This situation could change profoundly and for the better with the consolidation of the new Germany; there is the danger, however, that the Soviet domination in East Germany has left a legacy of its policies and of several old commitments and old German guarantees to the Soviet Union which would be incompatible with the current structure of NATO. The body may have disappeared, but the grin lives on -- as in the case of the Cheshire cat of Alice in Wonderland.

II. INCOMPLETE RESPONSES

There do not yet seem to be any satisfactory responses to these significant changes, apart from perhaps two -- but even these two offer more for the future than for the immediate predicament. The first of these concentrates on the so-called pan-European security framework (CSCE); the second begins with the strengthening of West European integration. Both take full consideration of Germany, though in different ways and with different results.

All these changes could be dealt with in a new pan-European security system. The problem, however, is that of reaching a common understanding of the terms "system" and "security".

"System", for example, can refer both to the creation of a complex, binding, and highly institutionalized mechanism of inter-European military relationships; and to the consolidation of a body of more or less optional rules, which are not enforced by sanctions or part of a strong institutional system, and which respect the sovereignty of individual nations.

"Security" may be taken in the military sense to mean the establishment of effective guarantees designed to defend the members of the "system" from possible violations of the pact of which they are a part; or it may be taken in the political/diplomatic sense, as the creation of a spirit of detente and cooperation.

NATO adopts the former interpretation; CSCE, the second.

The real problem that we are faced with does not seem to be one of creating something radically new, but rather one of finding a evolutionary alternative that would allow us to keep the positive aspects of NATO and to include the new unified Germany within it.

Several of the conditions that have been crucial for the process of detente and disarmament in Europe have changed or become meaningless within the space of a few months. There is no longer a symmetrical relationship between the two alliances; the stability of the Eastern bloc has been compromised; the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe will be more rapid and complete than could have been predicted only a few months ago; the division between the two Germanys and the "iron curtain" no longer exist and the Soviet Union is experiencing a difficult time of internal adjustment.

In such a situation, it is difficult to imagine East-West multilateral agreements or negotiations that would amount to more than useful safety belts, necessary to reduce risks during the process of change, but unable to exert a significant influence on its direction.

Any system of multilateral guarantees is only as credible as the stability of its member countries and the power relationships among them. In Europe, however, the system would have to manage the relationship between two nuclear superpowers, one of which is on the opposite side of the ocean, and the other of which is in the midst of a domestic crisis; two other nuclear powers that are experiencing a relative decline; an economic superpower enjoying a period of renewed vigor but faced with the problem of redefining its international status; and a myriad of other powers with diverse domestic and international problems and perceptions. To think that such a system would not disintegrate into a series of sub-alliances and fragile systems of counter-

assurances is rather optimistic.

The most stable solution lies in the acceleration and "approfondissement" of West European integration, as has often been stated by various governments and European summits, as well as by the Atlantic Alliance itself at the London Summit: the problem is that of agreeing on the timeframe and methods necessary to achieve this goal. Three different processes must be coordinated:

1. the process of transformation within NATO such that the positive effects of the US presence in Europe are maintained;
2. the process of West European integration;
3. the process of constructing a multilateral system of European security involving East and West.

III. THE SOVIET THREAT

The first problem is that of understanding whether the traditional "enemy" of NATO still exists, or whether it is true, as some maintain, that there is no longer a "threat".

The USSR is experiencing a period of profound economic and political crisis, but it does not seem that this crisis has affected its military forces -- although they do have serious problems of restructuring; they must withdraw from Eastern Europe; and they are clearly influenced by the general crisis in Soviet society (beyond their role in controlling domestic uprisings, ethnic nationalism, etc.).

In the nuclear arena, the Soviet Union is continuing to modernize and to maintain its balance with the United States. Even after the agreed reductions within the framework of the START negotiations, it is unlikely that the level of Soviet strategic forces will fall below that of the early 1970s and they will be significantly more modern. As for tactical nuclear weapons, the USSR maintains a level of forces at least equal to NATO forces (with a greater emphasis on missiles). The redeployment of these forces outside of Eastern Europe could lead the USSR to dismantle them; however, the new "defensive" strategy of the Soviet armed forces could place new value on the deterrent role of tactical nuclear forces. In any case, a certain number of Soviet strategic forces may continue to play European Theatre roles.

The most significant reductions are in conventional weapons and forces, particularly the army (the navy is undergoing other reductions). They are also rapidly withdrawing many forces from Eastern Europe, though they appear to be following a long-range plan.

Heavy mechanized elements are being reduced within the divisions. The Operational Maneuver Group has been eliminated, but will be substituted with the creation of new Army corps composed of smaller and more agile units than the former divisions, i.e. flexible, multi-operational brigades and battalions. Gorbachev is reducing the number of Soviet forces to a level comparable to that which existed approximately 22 years ago, on the eve of the invasion of Czechoslovakia -- but the current forces are more modern and better structured.

Though their structure may be defined as "defensive", they are perfectly capable of conducting offensive operations. In fact, it could be claimed that these reductions could actually increase the military efficiency of Soviet armed forces by reducing the burden of mobilization (almost all the new "corps" could always be manned at the optimal level, unlike the current divisions), and by improving the operational flexibility and the capacity for conducting combined operations.

The Warsaw Pact is certainly losing its quantitative advantage with respect to NATO, and its forward deployment is shrinking, partly as a result of the unilateral reductions in East European countries and their political transformations. What had formerly been as much as a 3:1 advantage with respect to NATO (in Central Europe) has now fallen to 1:1. Nevertheless,

- A. the maintenance of this more favorable relationship for NATO will depend on the future reductions that NATO countries may decide to make;
- B. if they were to mobilize their troops, the Warsaw Pact would maintain its advantage;
- C. the effectiveness of a surprise attack does not depend solely on the ratio of forces in the field, but also on a series of political and strategic factors: the attack by the III Reich on France came at a time when the ratio of forces was approximately 1:1.

IV. THE NEW THREATS

This evaluation of the possible threats that NATO should be ready to confront must also consider the emerging "threat from the South".

The threat from the "South" is certainly less evident than that from the "East"; in any case it is much more difficult to define as a NATO concern since it falls into what has been designated the "out-of-area". The following is a brief outline of the situation in the Mediterranean:

- A. The main countries in the Middle East have been accumulating an impressive quantity of weapons comparable to levels in major European

countries. The following are the figures for combat planes: Egypt (441), Iraq (500), Israel (577), Libya (509), Syria (448); France (580), FRG (459), Great Britain (553), Italy (390). The comparison of the number of tanks is even more impressive: Egypt (2,425), Iraq (4,500), Israel (3,850), Libya (1,800), Syria (4,050); France (1,340), FRG (4,973), Great Britain (1,170), and Italy (1,720).

- B. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa also have very sophisticated planes, such as fighter bombers (American F-15s, F-16s, F-18s), (Soviet MiG-27, MiG-29 and Su-24), (European Tornado, Mirage 2000 and Mirage F-1). Tanks include those purchased directly from the West and from the USSR, as well as those produced in the Third World, such as the Israeli Merkava and the Brazilian Osorio (purchased from Saudi Arabia).
- C. The arsenal on the "Southern front" has become particularly threatening with the inclusion of missiles as these long-range systems can extend the scope of local or regional conflicts beyond their traditional borders (as in the case of the Libyan attempt to strike the island of Lampedusa with two ballistic missiles). Many countries in the region have medium-short range missiles such as the Soviet Frog-7 or Scud-B (with a range of 70-300 km). Others either already possess medium-long range missiles, or are actively seeking to acquire them. For example, it is believed that Iraq has several "improved" SCUDS (range: 700 km), and that it is developing a new medium-range missile (range 800-950 km). Furthermore, Iraq is believed to have launched a missile into outer space. Saudi Arabia has acquired CSS-2 missiles (range: 2,500 km) from China, and Israel has produced a missile with a range of 1,450 km, the Jerico II (it also has a missile which was used for space launches that could be the forerunner of a missile with an even greater range and used for military purposes -- the Shavit). Other Third World countries, such as Brazil, India and Taiwan have also developed medium-long range missiles.
- D. Missile technology now constitutes a greater threat with the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons. It is believed that only one country in the region (Israel) has some nuclear warheads in its arsenal, but others (e.g. Iraq and Pakistan) are attempting to develop similar capacities. Iraq, Iran, Egypt and probably Libya already have the capacity for chemical warfare.
- E. The population of the non-EC Mediterranean countries is growing at an extremely rapid rate -- much greater than that of EC countries. In 1985, the EC countries accounted for 61.5% of the total population of the Community and the littoral Mediterranean countries, with the latter

accounting for the remaining 38,5% (the Mediterranean EC countries accounted for 22,2% of the total). By the year 2000, the population of the EC will account for only 53,8% and by 2015 it will have fallen to 47,3% (with the EC Mediterranean countries dropping first to 20% and then to 18,1%). Thus by 2015, there will be 372 million people in the Mediterranean littoral countries as opposed to 333 million in the EC (including 127 million in the Mediterranean EC countries). Four countries --Turkey, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco-- will account for almost 270 million people.

- F. There is a downward trend in the rate of industrial and agricultural production in the Mediterranean countries. In countries with the lowest income, the rate dropped from almost 6% in the period 1965-80, to little more than 2% in the period 1980-87. Figures for countries of medium income are 6.5% and 3.5% for the same periods. Industrial growth was particularly affected, registering a decrease from 6% to 1.9% in low income countries and from 5.9% to 3.8% in medium income countries.
- G. Mediterranean countries have registered an increase in their collective foreign debt, which in 1987 had reached 200 billion dollars (with respect to 120 billion in 1984). Their ratio of foreign debt to exports of goods and services, which in 1984 had been approximately 160, in 1987 had increased to over 218.
- H. The Gulf crisis has dramatically illustrated these problems, forcing the US to undertake a massive military mobilization -- on the scale of a conflict of "European" proportions despite political cooperation from Moscow -- to respond to a relatively limited threat. The consequences of this crisis could have a lasting effect on the political future of the region, whatever the solution (diplomatic or military) that may be reached. For the first time, several Arab countries have openly joined forces against a fellow Arab country, aligning themselves with the US. This can not help but reinforce old divisions, reviving the Nasser (and Baathist) dream of Arab nationalism (which will give rise to instability and perhaps international terrorism as well) and force the US as well as West European countries to reconsider their alliances and policies in this region.
- I. The Balkans also seem to be becoming a focal point of possible crisis because of serious outbreaks of ethnic nationalism, a weak and uncertain process of democratization, and significant economic underdevelopment in many regions. The area is characterized by great regional disparity: it includes an area of Eastern Europe, no more than 200 km wide, which borders on the West and has a concentration of industrial wealth. This

area, which could be most easily integrated into the strong economies of the EC, is clearly distinct from the more eastern and southern countries of the region, which are poorer and underdeveloped. This creates a new duality, similar to that of the North-South oppositions within Italy, which could be a source of new conflicts and crises that may be accelerated by the process of "rapprochement" to the West.

J. The European Community is the main economic and trading partner of the Mediterranean countries. It accounts for almost 49% of the trade of Mediterranean countries and 30% of that of the Gulf countries (the US accounts for only 10.2% and 10.3% of the trade of these regions respectively, while the figures for Japan are 2,8% and 18.7%). And the EC is, of course, also the major investor in the Mediterranean (in the period 1984-87, the flow of capital and government investments in the region reached 14 million dollars -- a contribution much greater than that of any other industrial power).

The above considerations are not comforting. There is increasing cause for concern about stability in the Mediterranean and in the Danube-Balkan region. It is therefore necessary to pay closer attention to the strategic-military developments underway in the Mediterranean (Middle East and North Africa), and to bear in mind the increasing demographic trends in these populations as well as any possible military threats.

On the whole, the strategic framework no longer rests on a high-risk, low probability threat, but rather on many low-risk, high probability threats.

A second result is that Europe will have an increasing role in **crisis management (even in the out-of-area) as opposed to its former more traditional defence commitments within NATO.**

The third (and perhaps most important) consequence is that there is an emerging need for an **integrated security policy, which regulates the use of both military deterrents and economic and social instruments in crisis management.**

Above all, it is necessary to prevent the domestic crises caused by problems of overpopulation and economic underdevelopment in Mediterranean countries from destabilizing these countries to the point that any attempt at a peaceful solution to latent conflicts becomes impossible. As far as Italy is concerned, this would be much easier if the EC could establish a responsible and far-reaching policy toward the Mediterranean, and if positive and, preferably, multilateral/NATO ties could be maintained between Italy and the United States.

V. THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION

European "grand strategy" options may be of three types:

1. a weak internal cohesion ("**Open Europe**"), involving relatively passive participation in the developments of the international system, relying on the maintenance of a security framework ensured by an alliance with the United States;
2. a closed and protectionist position ("**Fortress Europe**"), which would combine the protection of the European internal market with an increasingly independent defence policy for European security;
3. an active role ("**European protagonism**"), in which elements of increased integration are combined with the formulation of an active policy (elements of a "grand strategy" for Europe) designed to enable a greater management of the global situation.

As for the future of the security framework in Europe, the second model ("**Fortress Europe**") is the most difficult to achieve and the least likely; the first, ("**Open Europe**") could be compatible with the trend toward a "common European house", but it would significantly reduce any possibility for a collective West European role, and is incompatible (at least in the long term) with the preservation of NATO -- though it could coexist with a "political" and militarily diluted Atlantic Alliance.

The third model is the most interesting, and is compatible with the possibility of an evolution of the current security framework. This model cannot be achieved, however, without taking military factors into account.

VI. PROSPECTS FOR EUROPE AS A MILITARY ACTOR

Throughout the process of European integration, from the immediate postwar period to the present, it has been necessary to face security issues including the containment of Germany (Treaty of Brussels and its follow-on, the North Atlantic Treaty, the complex history of colonial wars, and European involvement in local conflicts). This has conditioned European participation in the international arena, in both economic and military decisions, though they are more hesitant in the latter and slower to reach consensus.

The nuclear strategy has afforded NATO forty years of peace at low cost. The majority of defence expenditures have been made to finance several non-European wars (in Indochina, Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands), or have been wasted on the renewal of the many separate and non-standardized Western forces.

Recently, however, it has been realized that there has been an overconfidence in the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, underestimating other more likely scenarios of

conflict.

Thus, a series of political and strategic considerations have led to a major re-evaluation of conventional weapons.

In economic terms, this means the end of an era of low-cost defence, frustrating expectations of cashing in on the peace dividend (i.e. significantly reducing expenses) in the short term. New technology is generally more efficient, but also considerably more expensive. The cost of labour and the social costs of maintaining armed forces are also increasing. Furthermore, projections of government spending in this sector tend to be calculated on the basis of an inflation rate that is lower than the actual rate. Clearly, the issue of cost is not easy to resolve.

At a time characterized by relatively limited resources, there is a considerable comparative advantage in being able to redistribute resources through the significant savings that can be gained from a more selective allocation of expenses. This requires initiatives in the field of industry; a greater liberalization of the movement of arms within the internal market; and the harmonization, coordination and unification of the diverse military doctrines, procedures and, in general, the instruments that are fundamental to the regulation of the use of military forces -- all of which currently meet criteria that are strictly national in scope, thus limiting the possibility of creating a single, integrated market for defence products in Europe. Production can not be standardized (much less unified) in the absence of uniform doctrines, procedures and institutions. Thus, the problem becomes one of arms legislation and regulation, which is not within the present scope of European economic integration.

Such far-reaching considerations, involving significant economic, political and institutional decisions may also entail interesting economic/political/strategic trade-offs between European countries, such as France and Germany. Such trade-offs may include both European nuclear powers and could affect major projects in the defence industry, e.g. the creation of a new system of air and anti-missile defence for the continent, new command, control, communication and discovery systems, new families of weapons systems, emerging technologies, etc.

In this light, the following are among the problems that must be dealt with in the field of conventional defence:

1. The creation of larger European strategic reserves, both in terms of men (reserves that may be mobilized quickly, and annexed to armed forces with higher percentages of professional soldiers, though the actual numbers may be smaller than those today), and in terms of equipment to stockpile for major contingencies.
2. A greater integration of the European forces engaged in defending various segments of the front (e.g. by providing for the use of Italian alpine forces in

Bavaria; Spanish forces in the Central and Southern regions; European forces in south-east Turkey and in the north-eastern Norwegian and Baltic region; a unified effort of allied air and naval forces in the various theatres, etc.)

3. An increasing capacity of strategic mobility of the permanent operational component of the armed forces -- both within Europe and in other theatres of primary strategic interest (Middle East, Africa)
4. Standardization and integration of the strategic and tactical operational concepts
5. weapons standardization
6. the creation of integrated anti-aircraft, antimissile, and C31 networks, and above all, more advanced systems for information gathering in theatres of major strategic interest
7. a single plan for the progressive introduction of emerging technologies and the associated operational changes in weapons systems.

VII. A EUROPEAN ACTOR: INSTITUTIONS

The scope and the complexity of the problems call for effective government and strong political legitimacy of the entire system. A "European actor" would be called on to deal with problems such as management of out-of-area crises, monetary policy, resources management, etc. The government may be "unbalanced" (i.e., with much authority in one sector and little in another), but it requires an overall ability for strategic guidance.

European integration has established a number of institutions with authority in various sectors, but has not provided for this central function of strategic guidance. Some experts feel that it may develop gradually with the slow extension of the authority of European institutions (in particular, of the European Community, which has proven to be the most "omnivorous" European institution). Others believe the solution lies in the institutional change and hope for the transformation of the European Parliament into a Constitutional Assembly and the immediate inclusion of defence and monetary issues among Community competences.

It is likely that even with a united defence, Europe will nevertheless be characterized by a flexible structure at different "speeds".

This results from the marked differences in the institutions with competences in the field of security and defence. Although the Atlantic Alliance includes fourteen European nations (Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Great Britain,

Iceland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, the German Federal Republic, Denmark and Norway), the situation is somewhat different in the military organization of NATO: France does not belong to it; Spain has made a "conditional" commitment; Iceland has no army; and Greece has assumed a position of "reserve" in the past.

The Summits of the Seven Most Industrialized Countries (in which representatives of France, the German Federal Republic, Great Britain and Italy meet with those of the United States, Japan and Canada) have occasionally discussed the overall security picture. In fact, preliminary decisions concerning the installation of the Euromissiles were taken at a summit of four nations (France, the German Federal Republic, Great Britain and the United States) in 1979.

France has once again become an active member of the IEPG, along with other European countries of the Atlantic Alliance. Eleven European members of the Alliance (excluding Turkey, Norway and Iceland), as well as Ireland, a neutral country, participate in European Political Cooperation.

While nine EEC countries (France, Great Britain, Italy, the German Federal Republic, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) belong to the WEU, those that do not belong (Denmark, Greece and Ireland) have recently been invited to participate. Contacts have also been established with Turkey. Thus, the WEU may evolve in such a way as to reduce the current institutional differences in Europe.

The increasingly urgent need for unification is exemplified by the difficulties that these diverse structures (plus their various "special" bilateral relations) have in making decisions during crisis: times when an urgent decision is generally more effective than the best decision and is, in any case, the only decision that can affect the crisis.

NATO is still the most efficient organization from a military point of view. It is unlikely that it will be completely superceded, given its continuing and important role as a link between European defence and the commitment of the United States.

Nonetheless, it is not a supranational structure. To date, it has not been able to establish the "European pillar", or achieve out-of-area capacity, or control and crisis management in new international crises. On the contrary, all attempts to extend the out-of-area competences or cooperation of the Atlantic allies through use of NATO structures meet with strong political objections and tend to slow down and block cooperation which is successfully progressing in other fora (bilateral, EC, WEU, etc.) This does not mean that NATO should not discuss and analyze out-of-area problems (as has been recommended in the Harmel Report and repeatedly in the Atlantic Council since then). But such analyses fail to have collective operational consequences, except for the need to compensate for the transfer of forces from the NATO area.

The capacities for political guidance of the IEPG are insufficient. Moreover, it is unable to integrate operational concepts. The Eurogroup does not include France and shares the structural and political limitations of NATO.

The WEU also has serious shortcomings. It is a multilateral organization, but lacks supranational characteristics and effective decision-making and operational structures, which have been delegated to the member states and NATO. Its ability to play a useful role of political and institutional coordination was manifested during the two Gulf crises. But it also became evident that it was unable to go beyond forming committees for political and military coordination (as useful and necessary as they are). The idea of a unified command clashed with the diverging national points of view. But then again, this role did not evolve from the institution itself; it was the consequence of agreements in principle taken in European Political Cooperation by the twelve Community countries, which felt it more opportune (for contingent tactical reasons) to delegate the actual military decisions to the WEU.

This organization also hosts debates and working groups on East-West problems, arms control and reductions, and the possibility of increasing West European operational cooperation (see the proposal to establish large multinational forces). But it is not at the center nor is it the promoter of any of them. It seems to see itself more as a useful "bridge" or the least controversial institutional container to host them. Therefore, the WEU can be defined as a European institution of residual vitality and reflected usefulness - residual vitality in that it is resorted to only when a political decision cannot be brought into the framework of other (more vital and more important) institutions, such as the EC or NATO; reflected usefulness in that its function is subordinate rather than autonomous, offering the opportunity to consolidate other strategies of European integration rather than pursue one of its own.

VII. A DECISION-MAKING SUMMIT

Thus, the problem is one of unifying the numerous institutions directly or indirectly involved in European defence.

Past attempts to deal with this problem have mainly raised the level of decision-making. This occurred when the EC institutionalized the European Council of the heads of state and government (and the same thing happened to the Summit of the seven most industrialized countries). But summits cannot totally replace a more complex and multifaceted decision-making mechanism.

That kind of mechanism exists in the EC, although it does not always work as it should and tends to delegate too many top level decisions to the European Council. It

also exists to some extent in the Atlantic Alliance, especially at the military level, thanks to integrated commands and the decisive weight of the United States. But it does not seem to work properly in either the Secretariat or the many committees at the Atlantic and European levels. It either does not exist, or is not effective in other organizations.

Furthermore, with the exception of the EC Commission (which is a multilateral structure with supranational characteristics), the mechanism relies on some of the ministerial decision-making structures of the member states. In particular, it depends upon the directors of political affairs of the Foreign Ministries and upon the Defence General Staffs. This brings national divisions to the international level.

The advantage of the summit mechanism is in the greater domestic authority of the heads of government over all government activity. The nomination of "personal representatives" of the heads of government, who use the communications network of the Foreign Ministries, has accentuated this hierarchical structure and, therefore, the tendency to ignore "details" and concentrate on major political issues.

Thus, the success or failure of the process of European integration may well depend upon the ability to develop a European decision-making mechanism at the middle level.

The drawbacks of strictly intergovernmental cooperation must be emphasized. It is a foregone conclusion that there are different national perceptions and interests; they can, however, lead to paralysis and take advantage of alternative channels for consultation to block all decision-making. This is the trend underway among international institutions today.

The solution to this problem is twofold. On one hand, institutions must be unified; on the other, the supranational competences of a European decision-making body representing common interests must be extended and strengthened. This is the structure of the EC. It has proven to be quite successful, but it is nevertheless the structure that meets with the most opposition.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

European cooperation in the field of security may be achieved in many ways and within different frameworks. The choice among the various options will depend on political considerations and the pressure of events.

A model of integrated European security may be constructed on the basis of one of the following hypotheses.

A. There will be a continued presence of the US commitment in Europe (and,

therefore, an essentially American leadership in the field of security)

B. There will no longer be an American presence in Europe, or the US will no longer be willing to assume a leadership role.

The first of these would lead to the least drastic choices because it would essentially call for the continuation of the existing model, while incorporating some possible changes (the most interesting of these is the so-called European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance).

The second hypothesis, on the other hand, requires more complex considerations and could lead either to a "pan-European" security model, or to a model of European integration in the field of defence, which would not include the US. These two models remain rather undefined (and could only become more concrete in the case of a significant acceleration of the political and economic processes of European integration). This would then lead to a formalized transfer of responsibility for defence from the US to Europe.

These two alternatives have become more complex and the choice has become more urgent with the collapse of the political and security system of the Warsaw Pact -- though this collapse has contributed to increasing the security of Western Europe in the immediate term.

At this stage, the problem is one of the relative timeframes of the transformations underway. That is, reform in the Soviet Union has one timeframe, while changes in Eastern Europe and in certain "peripheral republics" of the USSR seem to be concentrated within a different timeframe. As long as these differences are limited to internal political transformations, the discrepancies between the two timeframes can be managed relatively easily. The problem becomes much more complex and delicate, however, when internal transformations influence the broader East-West security framework. And this brings us back to the German question.

In any scenario, the attempt is that of strengthening the ties of the Federal Republic of Germany with Europe. In addition, certain scenarios aim to make the European Community a more substantial international actor, capable of taking an active role in channelling and guiding the process of transformation underway in the East, while guaranteeing the USSR the containment of unilateral and destabilizing tendencies.

Significant results are bound to be obtained, given the positive outcome of a several negotiations (particularly, CFE and START) and the commitment to the resumption of the CSCE process (provided for by the CSCE Summit in Paris, in November 1990). Nevertheless, this can only be secondary to the cardinal goal of stability, which can only be assured by a greater West European initiative. No agreement on disarmament -- not even one which reiterates and reinforces the general principles set out in the Helsinki Charter of 1975 -- is capable of withstanding such profound and radical

changes in its political basis as those underway in Eastern Europe (and maybe even in the USSR) in the absence of other essential elements of stability.

In this context, the main responsibility and role of a greater European identity within the framework of the Alliance could be that of facilitating the achievement of a kind of specialization of roles for the various members. This is certainly not a new idea (e.g. it is also suggested as a long-term objective in the Report on Burden Sharing approved by the DPC in December, 1988), and in its most basic form recommends countries to concentrate on particular areas of strategic interest to them and on selected military roles in which they have a comparative advantage. This, of course, would require a long-term commitment to the collective defence, since such choices could upset individual national models of defence and are only meaningful within an integrated model.

To date, NATO has not been able to overcome national mistrust of greater role differentiation-- perhaps because of the significant difference in the weights of the US and the other allies. It could, however, be achieved among the European allies and be extended later to the Europe-US relationship, if it were guaranteed by the development and strengthening of the process of European integration.

In any case, the process of the specialization of roles could prove to be inevitable (or considered the "lesser evil" by even the most ardent supporters of perfectly balanced national defence models) for the following reasons:

1. The US will tend to reduce its forces and commitment in Europe below the level required to continue to compensate for the weaknesses of every individual ally and every single strategic front. Europeans will thus be required to make a greater joint-effort.
2. The reduction in the available resources and expenses allocated for defence, together with the increase in investment expenditures necessary for maintaining an appropriate level of technology, will require individual European countries (and the United States) to make several difficult choices that risk upsetting current individual national defence models.

There is thus a natural synergy between the Atlantic model and the model of European cooperation and integration for the realization of such a scenario.

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