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HOW TO DEAL WITH THE GORBACHEV CHALLENGE: DETERRENCE CONTROL

by

Roberto Zadra



"It's the danger of Communist aggression. (...)
That's the very thing we're trying to keep from happening."
US-President Truman, 1952

"As long as imperialism exists the threat of aggressive wars will remain.
The C.P.S.U. is doing everything to ensure that the Soviet
Armed Forces (...) are prepared at any moment to administer
a crushing rebuff to imperialist aggressors."
Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961

() Time is running. Already more than four years have passed since Mikhail Gorbachev took the reins of power in the Soviet Union. Since that time, and as a consequence of it, a new dynamism characterizes not only Soviet politics within the country itself, but also its bi- and multilateral foreign relations with the rest of the world. The period of strong confrontation, which again had started during the second half of the Seventies up to the coldest years between 1983 and 1984 (blockade of the Geneva arms control negotiations, beginning of deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear forces in Western European NATO-countries, polemics and reciprocal incriminations over ABM and SDI) has been relieved by a new phase of detente. The signature of the INF-Treaty in Washington in December 1987 was the most evident sign of it. However, the United States and the Soviet Union are not the only ones which are experiencing a second Spring of detente. In fact, Gorbachev's new entry into Soviet political affairs affects both Eastern and Western political, economic and military alliances and all 35 countries of the CSCE-area as a whole. The signature of a joint declaration between the European Community (EC) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) to recognize each other formally (June 1988), the Paris conference on chemical weapons of January 1989 and the opening of new negotiations over conventional armaments in Europe (since March 1989) are some of the main new events which show that such a new and better East-West climate has set in (1).

() However, the new Soviet dynamism cannot be taken for granted for longer terms, and insecurity concerning both the steadiness and the real range of the Soviet wishes to reform its internal and external political relations is

not unjustified. Several Western leaders and commentators of the political and academic West have their reasons to remain skeptical and to question whether the new Soviet leadership will survive for longer terms or whether they will again loose the reins of power and give room for a renewed wave of conservatism and reactionaryism. US Secretary of Defence Cheney's recent statement (April 1989) that Gorbachev's effort to restructure the Soviet society would ultimately fail is nothing but a more explicit (and one could argue not very diplomatic) expression of this Western insecurity over the survivability of the present Soviet leadership (2). However, regardless of how one values the actual reform process in the Soviet Union, the fact remains that the new Soviet dynamism represents a challenge, not only for the United States, but for the West in general (3). The problem is that skepticism and caution can easily flow into political immobilism. In fact, at present neither American nor Western European leaders seem to know how best to deal with it, in order to prevent the East-West pendulum, which is currently moving in the direction of detente, from falling back into the opposite direction of confrontation.

() Western uncertainties and skepticisms are best seen within its institutional framework. To begin with, the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) seems to swim in a sort of limbo between the general and the specific. Even after the recent summit by its Heads of State and Government (Bruxelles 29-30 May 1989), it remains unclear which precise role single weapons systems (e.g. conventional arms and land-based short-range nuclear missiles) have to play for the guarantee of Western Europe's future security. For instance, with regard to arms control, at present the Alliance does not know which armaments should be negotiated with the East and how - and how much - they have to be linked together. In fact, the 'Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament', released at the last Alliance meeting in Bruxelles, on the one hand accepts that interrelationships amongst various arms control areas have to be "fully considered", on the other hand, only a few lines later, it also states exactly the opposite, namely that "the current negotiations concerning strategic nuclear systems, conventional faces and chemical weapons are, however, independent of one another" (4). To link or not to link, that is the question - NATO's ambiguous position suggests that its new negotiating concept is all but it pretends to be, namely comprehensive.

The situation is not much better if we look at the Western European Union (WEU). The "Platform on European Security Issues", released during a foreign and defence ministers' meeting in October 1987, contains no concrete proposals but only very vague and ambiguous formulas. In fact, the document at once suggests three crucial but not necessarily compatible aspects of Western Europe's security: (a) the creation of a European political and military Union (as in part codified by the Single European Act), (b) the desire to surmount the existing division of the old continent, and (c) a continuing American nuclear and conventional commitment (5).

Finally, the picture is less confused within the European Community (EC) at least since June 1988, when its foreign ministers agreed to install full diplomatic relations with their Eastern European counterparts of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), including the Soviet Union. As a consequence of it, in February 1989 the new Soviet Ambassador Wladimir Schemiatenko could, for the first time, start to represent his country at the EC headquarters in Bruxelles. However, there is actually no homogeneous estimation of the contents and limits of such a future relationship. The recent

provocative proposal presented by three famous senior officials to the Trilateral Commission to "devise a category of association (of Eastern European countries) with the European Community based on the Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome" touches the heart of this dispute, since it focusses on the quantitative and qualitative possibilities and limits for a future European integration which goes beyond the present community of the Twelve (6).

() Another element of Western uncertainty lies in the emotionally charged confusion around the Soviet proposal for a 'common European house', at first presented by the USSR even in 1982 but only recently reintroduced into the debate by Mikhail Gorbachev (7). Western leaders not only do not know whether or not to accept this idea in principle, but neither do they have a clear idea of which countries should be included in such a new house (especially with regard to the Soviet Union) and how it should be shaped politically, economically and/or even militarily.

(I) RETHINKING SECURITY

() Various Western analysts and political representatives have repeatedly stressed that the West needs to develop a coherent answer to the new Soviet challenges. The recent report by three senior officials to the Trilateral Commission (April 1989) states that: "Based on our collective experiences of dealing with the Communist world, discussions with present Soviet leaders including Mr. Gorbachev, and studies by experts in the West, we believe that our countries have a rare opportunity to change the nature of East-West relations in ways beneficial to the West, provided they develop a clear agenda and strategy" (8).

() However, it is always easier to formulate general proposals than to elaborate them concretely. Several problems arise in developing new strategies. Probably the main one is that of maintaining credibility. History shows us that the West, on several occasions, had troubles with it. The transition from the older US-doctrine of Massive Retaliation to the newer one of Flexible Response and the subsequent enlargement of its guiding principles to the North Atlantic Alliance area as a whole is the most prominent example. Flexible Response, accepted at first by the United States at the beginning of the Sixties, caused many reservations and doubts about its credibility among several of NATO's Western European members, so that it was not until 1967 that the Alliance as a whole could adopt its operational plans with MC 14/3 (9). After all, it required more than a half decade to make Western Europeans accept the new US doctrine also for NATO. Some of the old points of friction over its credibility persist today and come to the surface from time to time: the recent NATO controversy over short-range nuclear missiles reflects such old suspicions.

() There are at least four main factors which have to be taken into account in developing new strategies without undermining their credibility. All four factors are complexely interconnected and influence one another. These four factors relate to (1) the actors (both those who have developed and pursue them and those who perceive them), (2) the actions which have to be undertaken by the actors, (3) the times in which to implement (4) the determined goals of such strategies. It is no wonder that these four aspects have never been discussed openly and at length by individual countries of the Western

hemisphere or by the Western alliances in general. In fact, such a profound discussion would inevitably affect the heart of the existing East-West structure, rendering it necessary to reconsider compatibilities and incompatibilities within and between North American, Western European, Eastern European and Soviet interests in general (10). This will be discussed further in chapter III.

() But how can the West deal with this difficult task, without losing its present security and stability? The suggestion here is that, in order to do this, one has to go back in history and reconsider the roots of the present system of East-West confrontation. Such roots stem from the early post World War II decade, when the Western and Eastern military alliances were founded in order to defend their own territory from the potential aggression of the other side. It was during those years, the late Forties and early Fifties, that the United States started to identify the Soviet Union as the main threat to world peace (11) and that a powerful nuclear build-up started on both sides. At the same time there was a move away from the idea of a (conventional) defence and towards the emphasis of (nuclear) deterrence, the latter considered as the main new and effective way to avoid Eastern aggressions and war. Since that time, Western security has remained defined in military terms, as codified for instance by the Western European Union's Security Platform of 1987 or by NATO's Heads of State and Government, which repeatedly declared that "we will continue to be steadfast in the pursuit of our security policies, maintaining the effective defences and credible deterrence that form the necessary basis for constructive dialogue with the East" (12). Now, the problem here is that contents always change with the passing of time, but definitions remain the same or, in any case, lag behind. In other words, at least since Gorbachev's advent, Western threat perceptions are changing, being no longer the same as those established during the Forties and Fifties and maintained to the mid-Eighties. This is why the old definition of security, which has developed from such threat perceptions in early post World War II years, can no longer suffice to circumscribe the present East-West context as a whole. If the West wants to find a credible way to deal with the present Gorbachev challenge, than it will be necessary to rethink the traditional definition of military security, as established in the first decade after World War II. Admittedly, the traditional approach has worked well in the past and it will probably contribute to do so also in future. History since World War II shows us that a strong Western military rearmament, both conventional and nuclear, has successfully contributed to deterring the Soviet Union from unilaterally resolving delicate points of friction, e.g. over Berlin. But military capabilities and doctrines alone would not have sufficed to do so, since also nonmilitary, e.g. domestic, economic and (maybe also) cultural Soviet and Eastern European considerations have played their role in the game, even if only in a minor part (13). This is particularly true at present, and that is why bulls have to be taken by their horns: since the understanding of security forms the main basis for a strategy which results from it, the West has to first of all clarify which concept of security to use as such a basis. In other words, if a new concept of security contains a mix of military and nonmilitary elements, the same will be of value also for an upcoming new Western strategy, which has to consider not only conventional, chemical and nuclear capabilities and doctrines, but also include political, economic and cultural considerations into one single and coherent picture.

(II) RETHINKING DETERRENCE

() If one wants to rethink the traditional definition of the term security, one consequently must also get down to its two main pillars - deterrence and defence, as they have been identified by political and military representatives of the security establishment since World War II (14). In order to accomplish this, let us recall one of the most impressive and dramatic cases of intra- and inter-alliance difficulties which occurred during the current decade. The troubles had begun with NATO's double-track decision of December 1979 to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear missiles on European territory, with the parallel offer to negotiate the issue with the Soviet Union, in order to come to a significant reduction of Soviet nuclear systems in this field. Such a decision had not only cooled down the already difficult and tense relationship between the two superpowers and their respective alliances, but had also caused a strong opposition against the deployment of such new missiles in the West itself, with millions of people protesting in the streets of the capitals of Western Europe and the United States. The large public aversion against the decisions of the alliance establishment irritated both Western opponents and apologizers of the double-track, and, as a result, strong emotions and polemics arose and characterized the debate.

() Such dispute between opponents and apologizers of the double-track is very significative, for it reveals several flaws of argumentation which characterize not only this specific episode, but are also reflected in the Western post-war debate over security in general. To begin with the first flaw evidenced by the INF-dispute, let us briefly remember what both sides had stressed: on the one side peace movements had attacked the double-track by criticizing a further Western rearmament and by referring to the catastrophic and absurd outcome of a possible nuclear war, which would occur if nuclear deterrence failed (15). On the other side there were the apologizers of the double-track who stated their gratitude to the concept of nuclear deterrence, which in their opinion had guaranteed peace and security in the Western hemisphere since World War II (16). This is what we mean by a first flaw of the INF-dispute in particular and of the post-war security debate in general: both sides had failed to recognize that there are three phases which characterize war in the nuclear age: these three phases refer to (1) a pre-war situation, (2) a phase of effective warfare, and (3) a post-war situation. In fact, the nuclear age, as created during the first years after World War II, can no longer be characterized only by Clausewitzian (offensive and/or defensive) warfighting considerations, since the catastrophic or at least unpredictable outcome of such a war, with its necessary prevention through deterrence, have become their own equal importance in the triad. In other words, while the group of the apologizers of the double-track has concentrated on the pre-war situation, which is characterized mainly by nuclear deterrence, the group of the INF-opponents focussed on the in their view absurd nuclear defence (the phase of effective warfare) because of the resulting holocaust, the catastrophic outcome of such a nuclear war for the shocked people (post-war situation). But neither side had really attempted to understand security as an appropriate and credible mix of all three phases which characterize the nuclear age, together, simultaneously and in a comprehensive way. This flaw persisted during the whole post-war debate over security issues in general. Admittedly, the task to elaborate such a comprehensive concept of security is not easy, maybe even impossible, at least as long as nuclear weapons exist - and we are probably condemned to hold them forever. If there will ever be someone able to include all three time-phases into a comprehensive and credible concept of

security, he should be congratulated and awarded with a sort of permanent Peace Nobel Prize. However, the task may be difficult, but this is the way in which to think, if we are not satisfied with the present - and there are quite a few authors and leaders, with different political background, who are not completely comfortable with the current trend. Lawrence Freedman's conclusions, in his excellent work on the evolution of nuclear strategy, that "to believe that this can go on indefinitely without major disaster requires an optimism unjustified by any historical or political perspective" (17). Recent West German preoccupations with NATO's doctrine, to use short-range nuclear missiles on German territory if necessary, can be interpreted as such a similar political effort to consider not only pre-war, but also warfare and post-war situations together and in a comprehensive way (18).

() Let us now come to a second flaw evidenced by the INF-dispute, a flaw which again is generalizable to the Western debate over security in the nuclear age as a whole. In fact, both apologizers and critics of the double-track limited themselves to either apologizing or condemning nuclear deterrence as a whole, without realizing that the two words are distinct and only partially connected. In doing this, they both reflected the traditional wisdom of (military) security as it had been worked out after World War II. No wonder, therefore, if they were not able to go beyond a strict military definition of one of its main two pillars, namely deterrence, based on mainly nuclear (in a larger sense: military) capabilities and doctrines. Again, this flaw also holds for the post-war security debate in general.

() Admittedly, at least at an academic level, especially during the Eighties, some authors have begun to analyze conventional stabilities and instabilities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and to support the idea of a conventional deterrence as a counter-model to the nuclear one, at least in part (19). But also these authors were limited, since they too persisted in perceiving security in general and deterrence in particular in strict military categories (20). For our purpose, it does not matter how much value each author had given to conventional and/or nuclear deterrences - the fact remains that nobody has seriously attempted to interpret deterrence as a mix of military and nonmilitary elements, allocating them not between, but beyond conventional and nuclear (in other words: military) issues.

() How can this be implemented? Probably by looking at some work made by psychology and social psychology we may find some answers, but for our purpose just a bit of fantasy may suffice. In fact, our daily private and social life confronts us permanently with situations of deterrence. In other words, deterrence not only already exists much below nuclear or conventional levels, but it is fundamentally a very primitive thing. Even cats and dogs can be deterred, if we want them to respect our will by threatening voices or menacing hands. The same principle works with human beings, i.e. with children who have to be deterred from eating the cake until lunch, or, more generally, with our daily behavior on the streets, where we observe regulations such as stops and traffic lights. It is out of question that there are many situations in which this kind of nonmilitary deterrence does not work. Deterrence fails, when the deterrent itself is not big and credible enough: anyone who has experienced the daily anarchic traffic chaos in a town like Rome, can easily realize that in this case deterrence has completely failed, since the deficiency in the application of existing laws with insufficient penalties has totally swept away any sort of credibility for the perceiver of such deterrence, the Roman

citizen. However, the contrary also has its limits: hundreds of wars in human history show us that there have also been many situations in which military deterrence was destined to fail. The reasons for such failures are similar in both military and nonmilitary deterrences: credibility and the degree of a negative outcome in case of a failure of deterrence are two main factors determining its workability and durability. In sum, we can draw at least three conclusions: first, those who believe that they invented the Columbus egg with the concept of nuclear deterrence err. Second, the fact that both military and nonmilitary deterrences in some cases fail is a sign that neither of them is perfect. Third, on the contrary, to avow that both military and nonmilitary deterrences exist and in part work well is, however, a step further which allows us to look more openly at possibilities and limits for an application of their working principles, in order to guarantee security and stability (21).

() But, if security in general and deterrence in particular lie not between conventionals and nuclears but beyond, our next question must be: which specific nonmilitary factors contribute to deterring the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact from attacking Western Europe and the United States (and one could add also viceversa)? In answering this, we should look at what has already been developed between both sides: among other things, there are economic and financial issues (as joint ventures, trade agreements, exchange of sectorial workers and experts), social issues (as family and friendship ties), technological and cultural issues (exchange of technology, of information, travel facilities for touristic and professional reasons, sports and education). In other words: all those nonmilitary factors can contribute to build up deterrence, even if some in a major and some others in a minor way. Nonmilitary deterrence is based on reciprocal values and interests, which governments and privates of one side have in maintaining and/or improving its relations with the other side and viceversa. We can paraphrase such nonmilitary deterrence with the term value deterrence, since this includes not only economic, but also political and cultural aspects.

() The more one side has invested in and pursues economic, political and cultural interests with the other side and viceversa - in other words, the more the reciprocal interdependence is, the better value deterrence works (22). Therefore, we can conclude that, if security has to be strengthened, the point is not to diminish or to abolish deterrence, but on the contrary to increase it, since the more reciprocal deterrence exists, the less is the risk that war between both sides breaks out.

() Admittedly, such reciprocal rapprochements do not automatically exclude that new and unforeseen tensions between the two sides emerge sooner or later. But, in the case that strong reciprocal values and interests exist, the way pursued by the actors of both sides to deal with those new tensions may change. In order to illustrate this, let us again reconsider European history since World War II and briefly mention two cases in which value deterrence has played an important, even if very different role. The first case relates to the rapprochement between the old rivals France and West Germany, which had been old rivals and had fought against each other in several long and bitter wars during past centuries. In the late forties and early fifties, both France and the new Federal Republic of Germany had carefully begun to restore their broken relationship, both within a multilateral framework (i.e. within the various European Communities created in the fifties (23) and on a more strict bilateral level, which has finally led to the Franco-German Treaty of 1963. Since that

time, both Heads of Government met more than fifty times in summits, in order to discuss political, economic and cultural issues. The rapprochement has gone so far as to allow some common activities even in the military field, as the Council for Defence and Security (set up in January 1988) and some common military manoeuvres show (24). At present, many French and West German ministerial and subministerial representatives meet several times a year, so that it is not an exaggeration to state that, at present, the two countries have set up the best and most intense network of continuous bilateral consultations and dialogues within the whole European continent. Of course, there is also no question that during the last 40 years of rapprochement sometimes tensions have also arisen, as has been the case for example during the INF-episode, when France always expressed its strong reservations against an agreement, while the Federal Republic of Germany supported it in the end. Similarly, at present some tensions exist over the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles. But the cautious and profound way both sides were always exerted to discuss divergences, understand the other's motives and find compromises shows us how much the rapprochement has worked since the early post-war years, so that nobody can seriously affirm today that a risk of war between France and the FRG is still present. Put in other words, we can affirm that, between those two countries, at present nonmilitary deterrence works best!

() With this we come to a second case of an attempt to reduce the risks of war by reinforcing reciprocal nonmilitary deterrence. This case is very interesting because it refers more to the limits and risks than to the chances and possibilities of such an attempt. We speak about West Germany's special relationship with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in particular and of the FRG's Ostpolitik in general. As a consequence of World War II, the defeated Germany had been divided into two parts, each of them later integrated into one of the two opposing alliances. The new constellation within Central Europe has contributed considerably in building up the FRG's special political sensibility towards its Eastern neighbours (25). Now, if we posed the same question as we did before with regard to France and the FRG about the present possible risks of war between the FRG and the GDR, nobody could state with absolute certainty that such a war would be totally impossible today. In fact, despite tentative rapprochements through West German Ostpolitik, several tensions between both countries still remain unsolved on the political agenda: Erich Honecker's recent sharp verbal attacks against the FRG because of differences over chemical and nuclear arms control and over the status of Berlin show that a real dialogue between both German brotherstates has not yet evolved so far (26). But why? For our purposes two answers may suffice. First, the political framework played an important role: since both Germanies were integrated into two opposite alliances, reciprocal bi- and multilateral rapprochements could only be limited in their final results, since a more powerful effort in this respect would at least have undermined the credibility of each Alliance's cohesion. Second, in part even because of such restricting alliance conditions, it has not been possible for West Germany to pursue a comprehensive and one-dimensional strategy of appropriately decreasing both political and military tensions with the GDR in particular and with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in general. Even if on the one hand some political, economic and cultural rapprochements had been successfully achieved, on the other hand military tensions still remained. This is evidenced by the density of stationed arms and troops on both sides, constantly increased during the seventies and

the eighties because of their special geostrategic positions (27). In other words: the Federal Republic simultaneously perceived a policy of strengthening both military and nonmilitary deterrences.

() With this, we come to a central question: is a parallel strengthening of military and nonmilitary deterrence possible? In answering this, let us again remember our two cases, by leaving aside the different alliance contexts (West-West and East-West) which no doubt had their own important constraints on a bilateral rapprochement. The case of the French-West German rapprochement shows us that tensions could be effectively reduced and the risk of mutual war mostly abolished by a strengthening of nonmilitary deterrences and a simultaneous decreasing of reciprocal conventional and nuclear deterrences. The case of the less effective East-West German rapprochement instead shows us that tensions could be only partially reduced but not to a degree at which war could be completely excluded, while both military and nonmilitary deterrences had been simultaneously strengthened. In other words, the two cases suggest the general conclusion that, if military and nonmilitary deterrences are both strengthened, points of friction sooner or later emerge and therefore limit a reinforcement of reciprocal security, whereas, if nonmilitary deterrence is going to be strengthened, but military deterrence is at least maintained or even reduced, points of friction can be abolished and reciprocal security can be reinforced. However, this is nothing but a first cautious suggestion, since the two cases (and some others) should be studied more profoundly in order to confirm or negate it. Nevertheless, we can record that neither element of deterrence, whether it be conventional, chemical or nuclear (military) or whether it be based on economic, political and cultural values (nonmilitary), sufficed alone in order to reduce tensions so far as to avoid the risks of war. Depending on the respective scenarios, it will be necessary therefore to master appropriate mixtures of both military and nonmilitary elements and to reconsider those mixtures repeatedly with the passing of time, depending on the estimation of the level of confrontation which exists between adversaries.

(III) DETERRENCE CONTROL

() It has already been underlined by some initial theoretical works on arms control that such negotiations can be only part of a broader strategy, since military capabilities and doctrines alone do not suffice in order to eliminate political, economic and ideological differences, which are the real fundamentals of international antagonisms (28). Arms control alone does no longer suffice in order to reduce tensions and guarantee security and stability in Western Europe. As a result of a broader understanding of security in general and of deterrence in particular, the West should develop a new negotiating concept for its relations with the East, accepting to include all major military and nonmilitary issues which shape the current East-West relationship into one single negotiating picture. In other words, what should be created is a new forum in which all elements which contribute to strengthening reciprocal deterrence (conventionals, chemicals, nuclears, values) are subjected to negotiations. We should, therefore, substitute the old and more restricted negotiating regime of arms control with a new and broader one of deterrence control.

(B) How can such a new regime of deterrence control be translated into political action? Several factors have to be considered for such a purpose:

(1) First, one has to think about potential negotiating actors on both sides. Should be negotiated on a bilateral or on a multilateral level, maybe both? In other words: should the United States and the Soviet Union negotiate alone or should NATO and the Warsaw Pact as a whole deal with deterrence control? How far can both go hand in hand? Further: what - if any - role should be given to other existing multilateral institutions, as e.g. the Western European Union, the European Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance? However, at least for the time being, negotiations between NATO, including France, and the Warsaw Pact should have absolute priority, since the first purpose is, in fact, to alleviate current tensions between those two alliances in Europe. One separate and multilateral negotiating table should be created for all those nuclear systems which are based in Europe; not only the superpowers should participate at this table, but also the two independent European nuclear holders France and Great Britain and all those European countries which are directly or indirectly affected by the deployment of such weapons (29). The same principle should also be applicated to all other military (conventional and chemical weapons) and nonmilitary (values) matters which contribute to strenghtening reciprocal deterrence (30).

(2) Second, which organs and institutions should be competent and responsible for deterrence control negotiations? Would it be necessary to totally break with the existing arms control regime and to create a completely new infrastructure or can we satisfactorily reform the current negotiating system, as it is provided e.g. through START, CSCE, CFE and NPT? At least for the time being, present experiences should not be abolished, since they all deal at least with parts of a more comprehensive concept of deterrence control (i.e. through the multilateral and complex CSCE-CDE-CFE framework). But those experiences alone would not suffice, since there are several other military capabilities which have not yet been included into a multilateral East-West negotiating framework (e.g. chemical and nuclear proliferation, SNF), not to mention values, about which next to nothing has been worked out until today. All negotiating organs, each of them responsible for one of the four categories of deterrence (conventionals, chemicals, nuclears, values) must work simultaneously and side by side and must permanently be coordinated with each other, i.e. through respective delegation heads and their representatives. A permanent coordinating secretariate should also be created.

(3) Third, should the right to negotiate be given only to governments or also to non-governmental organizations? Since NGOs no doubt can contribute to strengthening reciprocal nonmilitary deterrence (i.e. through foreign investments and through jointventures), their role should at least not be ignored.

(4) Fourth, what is the timeframe in which we want to realize our goals, in order to sacrifice neither security nor stability in the Western hemisphere? The new negotiating concept should include and define intermediate stages, in order to better guarantee a gradual and fluid strenghtening of deterrence. General political guidelines should define which elements of deterrence (conventionals, chemicals, nuclears, values) should prevail or coexist together with some others in specific transitory stages.

(5) Fifth, which are the specific means of each of the four categories of deterrence which should be included into deterrence control negotiations? As we have noted earlier, there are still considerable problems

and deficiencies in negotiating conventional, chemical and nuclear capabilities and those difficulties would no doubt, at least at the beginning, be much greater if nonmilitary elements were also included in such negotiations (31). In fact, values are not only hard to define, but also extremely difficult to measure in an appropriate way. However, despite the difficulty with it, not everything has to be developed ex novo: past CSCE-experiences with their system of baskets and the more recent announcement to hold CSCE-summits over economic, cultural and environmental issues during the next three years shows us that some cautious steps have already been made in this direction.

(6) Sixth, with this we come to the problem of defining objectives of deterrence control negotiations. One may suggest that the ideal end of such negotiations should be a total East-West integration, based on pure nonmilitary deterrences alone and with no more armaments at all. Such an idealistic end would probably be the best thing to achieve; however, it can be questioned whether such an end will ever be reached, at least in the foreseeable future. Even if we are ever able to definitively resolve the East-West political and military contrasts in a satisfactory way, other out-of-area tensions which threaten our security and stability will remain or arise in future, i.e. in the Mediterranean region or in Asia. A complete renouncement on all our military capabilities would therefore only reduce our flexibility and power in handling with those countries and regions which, even if they are far from our borders, can directly or indirectly threaten our current ways of life? The recent Western experience with oil supplies during the Gulf war has shown that. Therefore, the West should think not so much in mutually exclusive but rather in reciprocal complementary terms and look at appropriate military and nonmilitary mixtures which could be eventually characterized by a "minimal deterrence" with regard to military matters and by a "maximal deterrence" with regard to nonmilitary matters (32).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

() The Western Alliance in general and Western Europe in particular are actually intensively wondering about the extent to which the Soviet Union will reform its system of internal and external relations and if the new Soviet leadership will survive for longer terms. Thus, they question if and how one should respond to the new "Gorbachev challenge", in order to overcome the political and military tensions which are still present on the old continent and between the superpowers. Roughly speaking, three Western schools of thought can be distinguished in answering this: the first school thinks that the Eastern reform process is not serious enough and therefore the West should stand still and try to conserve the Western and Eastern Alliances as they are now. The second school believes that the Eastern reform process is quite serious and should therefore be encouraged by the West, but with realism and pragmatism; the two existing blocs of Alliances should be maintained, but a strengthening of the European pillar, maybe on both sides, could be feasible. The third school thinks that the Eastern reform process represents a historic opportunity and the West should therefore forget caution and try to support this process actively, even by accepting some temporary sacrifices (i.e. through a new 'Marshall Plan' for Eastern Europe); also, Europe should use this historic opportunity and try to overcome the present system of two opposite blocs (33).

() However, we believe that the problem is posed in a false sequence. Since every new Western step would always depend on Eastern activities, whether they be valued in a positive or in a negative way, a real Western independence of action can not be sufficiently guaranteed. What we need is more action and less reaction. In other words, the West has to develop and pursue its own strategy not because of Gorbachev and his new staff, but because of the presence of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a long-term reality in general. A credible Western strategy cannot depend on Eastern short- or mid-term reformisms and/or reactionaryisms.

() A new and comprehensive Western strategy must work on its own and go beyond strictly military considerations. Therefore, a critical reassessment of security in general and of deterrence and defence in particular are necessary preconditions (see chapters I and II). One possible way to pursue such a strategy could be the creation of a reciprocal deterrence control regime, as has been suggested in chapter III.

() Nobody can pretend to turn things upside down from one day to another. Realism, pragmatism and caution should dominate the debate and the action, and intermediate phases of time must guarantee as much tenseless evolution as possible. But, on the contrary, how far could we go from here without long-term objectives, without utopias? Realism and utopism do not necessarily exclude, but can rather throughout complete each other in a dialectic way. That's a point which unfortunately has not yet come through to Western strategic minds.

NOTES

- (1) This article fokusses on East-West relations, but, however, it has at least to be mentioned that the new Soviet dynamism is significantly affecting also countries and regions outside Europe, for instance in China, in Southeast Asia (i.e. Vietnam, Cambogia) and in Central America (i.e. Cuba, Nicaragua).
- (2) see United States Information Service No. 80, 1 May 1989
- (3) see for this, "The Gorbachev challenge and European security", a report recently published by the European Strategy Group
- (4) "A Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament", NATO Press Communiqué M-1 (89) 20, p. 16
- (5) see Union de l'Europe Occidentale: "Plate-forme sur les intérêts européens en matière de sécurité", La Haye, 27 octobre 1987, in: UEO, Actes officiels 1987, p. 301-304
- (6) Giscard d'Estaing, Nakasone, Kissinger: "East-West relations. A draft report to the Trilateral Commission", April 1989, p. 19
- (7) see for this an interview Andrej Gromyko had given to the West German weekly magazine "Der Spiegel", No. 17/1989, p. 166-182
- (8) Giscard d'Estaing, Nakasone, Kissinger, op. cit., p. 1
- (9) see for this David Schwartz's book over NATO's nuclear dilemmas, p. 136-192; France, always critical versus the American commitment to Western Europe's security, has even preferred to leave the Alliance's military command, not at least because of Flexible Response
- (10) a recent Adelphi Paper, especially its two articles by Sonnenfeldt and Bertram, deal with this aspect
- (11) as with Truman's NSC-68, released in 1950
- (12) in: NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol. 33, No. 1, February/March 1988, p. 92; the Security Platform is mentioned in note (5)
- (13) see for this argumentation Liberman and Thomason's article over No-first-Use, p. 22. However, nobody can seriously pretend to exactly define how much each military and nonmilitary matters have contributed to do this. Some more profound studies of specific East-West crises since World War II which fokus on this aspect are needed.
- (14) again, summit declarations by NATO and the WEU can be taken as reference
- (15) for a general overview over chances and limits of peace movements' activities see Zadra 1987

(16) see Kaiser, Leber, Mertes and Schulze's article over "Nuclear weapons and the preservation of peace"

(17) p. 399

(18) see International Herald Tribune, 28 April 1989

(19) see for that Mearsheimer's book over "Conventional Deterrence" and several articles published in International Security in recent years. However, none of those authors have explicitly denied the nuclear element of deterrence, but have looked at appropriate mixtures of both nuclear and conventional

(20) see Silvestri's article, with the significant title: "West European security between nuclear and conventional"

(21) one may wonder why we have said nothing about the second pillar of security, namely defence. It goes alone that what has been said about deterrence must be of value also for a redefinition of the term defence. However, chances and limits for an application of a military and nonmilitary defence may differ considerably from the one with regard to deterrence. Further studies are needed into this respect

(22) interdependence has not to be confused with integration, which is a very different thing; engaging for more interdependence must not necessarily end into integration, which in our case would mean to totally overcome the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances

(23) the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the European Defence Community (1952-54), the European Atomic Energy Community (1957) and the European Economic Community (1957); for further details see Swann 1978, p. 13f

(24) for a general historic overview of Franco-West German security cooperation see Kaiser/Lellouche 1988

(25) a general overview of postwar inter-german relations is given by Windelen 1984

(26) Neue Zürcher Zeitung 22/1/1989, 10/2/1989, 15/2/1989, 18/3/1989

(27) see the Military Balance 1988-1989, p. 48-49, 65-67

(28) e.g. Schelling and Halperin's "Strategy and Arms Control", published in 1961

(29) a similar request to the United States had been made by several West European countries during the INF episode at the negotiations in Geneva; however, the negotiations had remained strictly bilateral

(30) however, the ATTU-solution found at the CFE negotiations in Vienna would not suffice for such a purpose, since for instance values (i.e. joint ventures) cannot be restricted to only a part of the Soviet Union's territory

(31) one may suggest that not only capabilities, but also military doctrines should be negotiated within such a forum of deterrence control. This task is very difficult, not only because of the strong differences and secretivenesses of the matter but also because of the respective Alliance incohesions and tensions with regard to the application of those doctrines. However, despite the troubles with that matter, at least on a bilateral level, the United States and the Soviet Union have made some cautious steps into this direction

(32) for instance through an exclusion of some specific categories of weapon systems, i.e. nuclear and/or chemical ones

(33) a similar categorization is given by Gerald Segal 1989; see also Treverton et al. 1988 over "Western approaches to the Soviet Union"

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