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PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

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1. THE RECENT PAST. THE VIENNA TALKS AND THE INF TREATY.

a. The Vienna talks.

Not much can be said about the Vienna talks, except that they were the longest, inconclusive East-West arms control negotiation: in fact, all efforts to reach an agreement on reducing conventional forces and weapons in central Europe were consistently met with failure.

NATO and Warsaw Pact arms control approach and negotiation positions were too far apart. The approaches were so different that, while NATO was using the acronym MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) to indicate the Vienna talks, the Soviets were addressing it as the MFR only. For Moscow, the reductions were to be mutual but not necessarily balanced. And the distance in negotiating posture between the two alliances was such that in thirteen years the Vienna negotiators were not even capable of resolving the "number puzzle", agreeing on the basic question of how many soldiers and airmen were deployed in the designated European territories, and then which level of forces had to be considered as the baseline for reductions.

One could argue that it was a mistake to limit the geographical scope of the negotiations to central Europe and that excessive importance was attributed to the problem of the differing totals in the force count. Or one could argue that the MBFR goals were too complex to be reached, or that the negotiating efforts were not bold and strong enough, and not supported by the necessary political will. Or one could note that the military and political environment in Europe, and the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union were not as conducive to an agreement as they seem to be today.

Whatever the rationale, the MBFR talks stand as the best example of how the complexities and the difficulties of conventional arms control negotiations can become the insurmountable obstacle to an agreement when the military balance is characterized by very uneven quantitative and qualitative factors, and the political will is not called into play.

b. The INF Treaty.

The December 1979 NATO decision to deploy Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Europe as a response to the new threat posed

by the Soviet SS-20 IRBMs did not preclude the possibility of negotiating that deployment away. In fact, the NATO communique' issued at the end of the special meeting of the NATO foreign and defense ministers stated very clearly that:

Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF (Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces) and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines:

a. Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitation on Soviet theater systems.

b. Limitations on United States and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

c. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on United States and Soviet land-based long-range theater nuclear missile systems.

d. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality in ceilings and in rights.

e. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable (1).

For the first time in East-West arms control NATO adopted two parallel and complementary approaches. The NATO "dual-track" decision meant that, while the Pershing II and cruise missile deployment was chosen as the way to redress the balance in the theater nuclear forces and to preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defense, an offer was made to the Soviet Union to negotiate before the anticipated missile deployment in Europe in 1983, a limitation in the LRTNF of the two alliances.

This "dual-track" decision implied that NATO was ready to modify and even forgo the missile deployment on the basis of the Soviet willingness to limit or reduce its own SS-20 deployment.

It is interesting to note that, even though many in the Western alliance considered the Pershing II and cruise missiles a long overdue modernization of NATO theater nuclear forces, necessary irrespective of the Soviet SS-20s, everyone was aware that their deployment could be accepted by the European governments and societies only as a response to the new threat posed by the Soviet missiles, and only if inserted in an arms control framework.

It is also interesting to note that offering to negotiate its own deployment even before the missiles were in place, NATO was actually giving the Soviet Union the possibility to influence and shape it with its own position on arms control, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. This precious leverage was overlooked by the Soviets, too concentrated on their traditional stonewalling attitude -- in January 1980, Moscow rejected the American approach indicating it would not negotiate as long as

the NATO decision stood and while the SALT II treaty remained unratified (2) -- and convinced that their strategy towards the European governments and public opinions would eventually be the winning card against the deployment .

It is beyond the scope of this discussion paper to rewrite the history of the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces as they were eventually named) negotiations from the initial opening of discussions on November 30, 1981 to the signing of the treaty during the September 1987 Washington summit between President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev.

Instead, I would like to underline some elements of the INF negotiations from which lessons can be learned, and indicate four precedents set by the INF treaty, which could be useful as a guideline for the still pending arms control process, and for whatever agreement might emerge in the future.

It is of paramount importance to adopt a negotiation position which has clearly taken into consideration the full spectrum of its own legitimate security interests, and to adhere to it. The developments of the INF process have shown that the NATO willingness to stand firm on the initial approach -- the missile deployment will take place unless an agreement is reached on the reduction of all theater nuclear forces -- without immediately searching for a compromise solution when the Soviets walked away from the negotiating table in 1983, payed its dividends. Two years later, the Soviet Union returned to the table with a more flexible attitude and a more constructive approach. In other words, there is no point in changing a good and sound position for the sake of reaching an agreement. Compromises are acceptable only if and when they do not affect western security negatively.

One should not forget that even when the negotiation is between the Soviet Union and the United States, and only American weapons systems are considered for the reduction as in the case of INF and START, the European expectations, attitudes and reactions are bound to influence its course somewhat. The Soviet Union has always been aware of this "European" factor, which has sometimes turned out to be effective, and has always tried to extract the maximum benefit from it to the point of directly approaching the European governments with misrepresented information on the negotiation process in an attempt to divide the United States from its allies. The note signed by the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, Semenov, and delivered to the West German Foreign Office on 17 November 1983, in which the Soviet proposal of equal reduction in the INF negotiation was presented as an American proposal is a good case in point (3).

The Soviet Union, instead, has been less influenced and constrained by its European allies, thus enjoying greater flexibility in the negotiation. Furthermore, no East European peace movement has ever demonstrated against Soviet missile deployments, not even when SS-23s and SS-12s were deployed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

However, the dramatic political changes currently taking place in Eastern Europe could eventually modify this situation and in the future the Soviet Union will likely be forced to pay greater attention to the security requirements of its presumably more vocal and critical Warsaw Pact allies.

The INF treaty, with the elimination of Pershing II and cruise missiles from Europe, has raised some concern regarding the viability of NATO deterrence and the credibility of the NATO doctrine of flexible and graduated response.

I believe that the INF treaty is a good treaty and I think that it is a mistake to tie deterrence organically to the possession of a specific type or category of nuclear weapons systems. If an overall military balance is maintained in Europe, with nuclear weapons an integral part of NATO arsenal in support of a rational and applicable strategy, deterrence is more the result of a clearly visible political will to stand together as a true alliance before any threat than the result of purely military capabilities within war scenarios in which nuclear weapons are seen as plausible fighting weapons.

If the political will is felt to be uncertain by the allies themselves, or if it is perceived as weak by the potential adversary, then even the possession of sophisticated INF would not increase the level of deterrence per se. If the political will to escalate if necessary to the nuclear threshold is perceived as strong and credible by all, then the significance of deterrence will not suffer, even though the eventual strike is to be conducted with nuclear weapons different from European-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

If nuclear weapons were ever to hit Soviet territory, I doubt the Soviets would make a distinction between a nuclear bomb dropped by a NATO assigned F-111 fighter bomber and a nuclear missile launched by a NATO assigned Poseidon submarine. And I doubt that they would react very differently in either case.

Deterrence -- this has been said so many times as to become almost a truism -- is basically a parametric function of the projected and perceived NATO willingness to risk Boston for Frankfurt or Washington for Rome.

The deployment of a particular type of nuclear weapon -- even though it could enhance deterrence through its operational capabilities -- is a poor substitute for the willingness to escalate to nuclear weapons if and when necessary, especially considering that the final employment decision rests in the hands of only one country.

Similarly, such willingness is not necessarily weakened by the elimination of a particular type of nuclear weapon, especially when it is done in the framework of a bilateral disarmament agreement and when a significant nuclear capability still remains.

The four positive precedents set by the INF treaty are as follows:

1. The INF treaty is the first arms control agreement which led to a real reduction in nuclear weapons, eliminating an entire category of nuclear missiles. Contrary to the SALT I and SALT II treaties where the limitations imposed by the accords did not prevent the expansion of the two superpowers' strategic arsenal, the INF treaty has totally banned surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and land based cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5500 kilometers.

2. The INF treaty resulted in "unequal reductions to equal limits". To meet the "zero option" the Soviet Union had to eliminate more systems than did the United States. In particular, in the intermediate-range category the United States had to destroy 689 missiles, 236 second stages and 282 launchers; the Soviet Union had to destroy 826 missiles, 650 second stages and 608 launchers. In the shorter-range missiles category the differences were even more pronounced: for the United States, 178 missiles, 182 second stages and 1 launcher; for the Soviet Union 926 missiles, 726 second stages and 237 launchers (4).

3. The INF treaty for the first time established new and stricter verification techniques. The so-called "national technical means of verification" (intelligence satellites) were integrated with exchanges of data covering hundreds of pages, on-site inspections, and continuous monitoring around production facilities to last for 13 years after entry into force of the treaty. This is certainly the most important precedent since it broke a long-lasting arms control rule of not permitting intrusive means of verification. The verification provisions and the inspection regime of the INF treaty appear destined to stand as a guideline for future arms control agreements. Indeed, the United States and the Soviet Union have already agreed to incorporate into START many of the same on-site inspection provisions contained in the INF treaty.

4. The INF treaty dealt exclusively with American and Soviet weapons systems. Even though Moscow initially insisted on considering the French and British nuclear systems, they were eventually excluded from the negotiation. Moreover, the treaty was concluded regardless of the progress made on the other two ongoing negotiating processes, START and SDI.

2. THE PRESENT. THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE TALKS (CFE).

In 1985, NATO tabled a new proposal at the MBFR talks. The Warsaw Pact response fell short of Western expectations. It was then clear that the Vienna negotiations had exhausted their useful life.

In April and June 1986, Soviet Secretary Gorbachev and the Warsaw Pact Consultative Committee called for a renewed effort

in reducing conventional forces in Europe, for the expansion of the geographical limits of the reduction area, and for initial cuts of 100,000 - 150,000 troops on each side within one to two years.

In December 1986, the NATO Foreign Ministers proposed two sets of autonomous negotiations on conventional arms control. The first involved the 35 countries of the CSCE and dealt mainly with the definition of confidence building measures (CBMs) in Europe. The second was restricted to the 23 countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and dealt with the establishment of a new conventional stability in Europe through a significant reduction in troops and weapons levels in an area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The NATO-Warsaw Pact "mandate talks" began in February 1987 in Vienna. In May, at the end of the Warsaw Pact meeting in East Berlin, a communique was issued expressing the willingness of the Eastern bloc to redress imbalances in both alliances' conventional forces through appropriate cutbacks by whichever side had an advantage in a specific type of weapon. For the first time the Warsaw Pact implicitly suggested that it was ready to accept NATO's demands for unequal reductions.

In March 1988, the NATO Council outlined the alliance negotiating strategy in the CFE. Three were the objectives which the negotiation should strive for: the establishment of a stable and secure balance between the conventional forces of the two alliances at lower levels; the elimination of those disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter of high priority, of the capability for launching surprise attacks and for initiating and conducting large-scale offensive operations. The NATO requirement for highly asymmetrical reductions of those weapons significant components of a forward-deployed offensive posture, and relevant for a surprise attack capability (i.e. tanks and artillery), was specifically and forcefully mentioned.

At the June 1988 USA-USSR summit meeting, the Soviet Union put forward its proposal for a three-phase reduction in conventional forces, and on 7 December, 1988, in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Soviet Secretary Gorbachev announced a plan for a unilateral reduction of 500,000 troops and 10,000 tanks in the period 1989-1990. For Eastern Europe, the plan provided for the withdrawal of six tank divisions from East-Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, for a total of 5,000 tanks and 50,000 men (5).

One day later, NATO Foreign Ministers issued an arms control statement which, while welcoming the Soviet unilateral reductions and the Soviet declared readiness to adjust its military forces in a more defensive-oriented posture, outlined the NATO opening proposal for an overall limit on the total holdings of armaments in Europe, at about 90-95 percent of current NATO levels. Moreover, the NATO negotiation position called for a fixed proportion in each equipment category for any one country.

Finally, limits were to be imposed on armed forces stationed on the territories of other countries. The proposed limits and sublimits were intended for application to the whole of Europe (6).

In March 1989, the CFE negotiations began with the two negotiating positions not too far apart, and the apparent willingness of the two delegations to work seriously for a timely agreement.

One of the Soviet requests, the inclusion of the air forces in the CFE talks, was met by the United States two months later. At NATO's 40th anniversary summit, President Bush proposed, and the European allies agreed, to expand the NATO current proposal "to include reductions by each side to equal ceilings at the level 15 percent below current Alliance holdings of helicopters and of all land-based combat aircraft in the Atlantic-to-Urals zone, with all the withdrawn equipment to be destroyed" (7).

Eventually, the NATO proposals for the reductions of ground and air forces were substantiated in a Position Paper presented at the CFE in Vienna on 6 March and 13 July 1989 respectively.

The NATO position on ground forces was as follows (8) :

Rule 1: Overall limit

The overall total weapons in each of the three categories identified below will at no time exceed:

Main Battle Tanks:	40,000
Artillery Pieces:	33,000
Armored Troop Carriers:	56,000

Rule 2: Sufficiency

No one country may retain more than 30 percent of the overall limits in these three categories, i.e.:

Main Battle Tanks:	12,000
Artillery Pieces:	10,000
Armored Troop Carriers:	16,800

Rule 3: Stationed Forces

Among countries belonging to a treaty of alliance neither side will station armaments outside national territory in active units exceeding the following levels:

Main Battle Tanks:	3,200
Artillery Pieces:	1,700
Armored Troop Carriers:	6,000

Rule 4: Sub-limits

In the areas indicated below, each group of countries belonging to the same treaty of alliance shall not exceed the following levels:

(1) In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, The United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the territory of the

Soviet Union west of the Urals comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Moscow, Volga, Urals, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, Trans-Caucasus, North-Caucasus military districts:

Main Battle Tanks:	20,000
Artillery:	16,500
Armored Troop Carriers:	28,000 (of which no more than 12,000 AIFVs)

(2) In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, The United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the territory of the Soviet Union west of the Urals comprising of the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Moscow, Volga, Urals military districts in active units:

Main Battle Tanks:	11,300
Artillery:	9,000
Armored Troop Carriers:	20,000

(3) In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the territory of the Soviet Union comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian military districts in active units:

Main Battle Tanks:	10,300
Artillery:	7,600
Armored Troop Carriers:	18,000

(4) In the area consisting of Belgium, The Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic, and Poland in active units:

Main Battle Tanks:	8,000
Artillery:	4,500
Armored Troop Carriers:	11,000

(5) Rule 4 is to be seen as an integrated whole which will only be applied simultaneously and across the entire area from the Atlantic-to-the-Urals. It will be for the members of each alliance to decide how they exercise their entitlement under all of these measures.

The following rules on air assets were established (9):

Rule A: Overall limit

The overall total of combat aircraft and combat helicopters will at no time exceed: Combat aircraft: 11,400. Combat helicopters: 3,800.

Rule B: Sufficiency

No one country may retain more than 30% of the overall limits in these two categories, i.e.: Combat aircraft: 3,420. Combat helicopters: 1,140.

Rule C: Sublimits

Within the area of application delineated under Rule 4 (I),

(ATTU) each group of countries belonging of the same treaty of alliance shall not exceed the following levels: Combat aircraft: 5,700. Combat helicopters: 1,900.

Rule D: Disposition of Reduced Weapons Systems

Those aircraft and helicopters withdrawn from service in order to achieve compliance with Rules A to C above shall be destroyed in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon.

There were differences between NATO and the Warsaw Pact negotiating positions, but not such as to be considered an unsurmountable obstacle to an agreement.

In the domain of air forces reductions, the Soviet Union is insisting on the exclusion of the interceptor aircraft, which the Soviets see as purely defensive aircraft. In a working paper tabled at the CFE on 28 September 1989, the Warsaw Pact proposed that each alliance reduce to 4700 attack aircraft, excluding air defense forces. The position paper also included ceilings for single countries (3400 aircraft) and for stationed forces (1200 aircraft). Combat helicopters were limited to 1900, the same level proposed by NATO. Single country and stationed forces ceilings were 1500 and 600 helicopters respectively.

As for the ground forces, the main differences are in the numbers of weapons systems in service and the percentages of reductions in specific categories of armaments. The Warsaw Pact May proposal were revised on 27 June 1989 in zones and zonal sub-limits. The Warsaw Pact position on ground forces reduction is as follows (10):

	single nation	foreign deployed	exten. central zone 1	north flank zone 2	south flank zone 3	rear area zone 4	ATTU
Tanks	14,000	4,500	13,300	200	5,200	1,300	20,000
Artill	17,000	4,000	11,500	1,000	8,500	3,000	24,000
APCs	18,000	7,500	20,750	150	5,750	1,350	28,000
Troops	920,000	350,000	910,000	20,000	270,000	150,000	1,350,000

Extended Central Zone (zone 1): Belgium, Denmark, France, The Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, The United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev military districts.

Northern Flank (zone 2): Norway, northern part of Leningrad military district.

Southern Flank (zone 3): Italy, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Odessa, North-Caucasus, Trans-Caucasus military districts.

Rear area (zone 4): Iceland, Portugal, Spain, southern part of Leningrad military district, and Moscow, Ural, Volga military districts.

ATTU: Atlantic-to-the-Urals area.

3. THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE.

One way to look at the future would be to take the NATO and the Warsaw Pact CFE proposals and then try to assess which solutions and compromises could or should be likely to lead to an agreement capable of preserving the security of the two alliances at lower levels of military confrontation.

However, today, in consideration of the dramatic events in Eastern Europe and the rapidity of their developments, that kind of analysis is bound to become a futile exercise.

The profound political changes taking place in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania could affect the CFE talks before the two delegations, anchored to their belief in the eventual survivability of the two military alliances in Europe, will be ready for an agreement.

The risk is that the two superpowers -- which are the more directly involved in the initial reductions and the more pressed by economic and political pressures -- will be overtaken by the East European events and will not be prepared and able, the Soviet Union in particular, to find alternative solutions to the CFE talks, quickly enough to control the impact of the political changes on the arms control process, and to reduce the Soviet and American military presence without creating a situation of security instability in Europe.

Thus, it would be more interesting to draw a series of scenarios of the possible evolution of the European situation in a near-medium term period, and then try assessing if and how the present East-West conventional arms control effort will be affected.

First scenario.

In the first scenario one could imagine that by the time a CFE treaty is ready for signature -- presumably between 1990 and 1991 -- the modifications in the political structures of the Eastern European countries, even though radical enough to give birth to multiparties, democratic systems similar to those of Western Europe, have not yet touched the international agreements undertaken by the previous communist regimes. In other words, in the next two to three years the Warsaw Pact will still be a viable political and military alliance, and Soviet and American forces will still be deployed in Eastern and Western Europe.

In this case, the CFE arms control process would not be radically affected. However, it is logical to assume that the "new" Eastern European governments would insist more vocally and effectively than before to have their security concerns and requirements taken into due consideration in the course of the negotiations. The Soviet Union will be faced -- as the United States has always been in the past -- with the difficult and time consuming task of coordinating the Warsaw Pact negotiating position thoroughly with its allies. And what has happened in

NATO in the past, i.e. a dispute among the allies complicating and stalling the NATO arms control posture, could also happen in the Warsaw Pact. The dispute between Greece and Turkey which has blocked and delayed the introduction of a draft treaty at the CFE talks is the most recent example of NATO internal squabbles on arms control, and a good case in point (11). One or more countries could object to specific reduction measures, or to particularly intrusive verification provisions to be performed on their territories, or to the percentage of their own armed forces cuts as decided by the alliance.

Nevertheless, in this scenario, it appears safe to assume that the CFE will eventually succeed and a reduction of the ground and air forces of the blocs will be achieved along the basic lines previously outlined. And it is also probable that some countries could even anticipate the conclusion of the CFE with unilateral reductions deemed necessary for economic and political reasons. This is the case of Hungary, whose government has announced a supplementary reduction of its armed forces by 25 per cent in the next two years, over and above the 9 per cent reduction announced in December 1988 and sought by the end of 1990 (12).

Furthermore, it is likely that a solution to the problem of the very short range nuclear systems will be found. Today, the issue of the modernization of the NATO LANCE battlefield surface-to-surface missiles, so important and controversial, and so intensely debated within the Western Alliance in the last part of 1988 and the first months of 1989, is considered a dead issue. In the present situation of political upheaval in the East, no one in NATO is expecting the Federal Republic of Germany (or any other NATO European country) to endorse the deployment in its territory of new American nuclear weapons systems with only enough range to reach Eastern Europe.

If a third "zero" option will eventually be negotiated and concluded -- including in the "zero" also the nuclear artillery and those especially devised verification measures necessary to be sure of the treaty's compliance -- the NATO strategy of flexible and graduated response will be affected, but not to the point that many strategic analysts have predicted.

In this scenario, American nuclear warheads will still be positioned in Europe to be utilized by the NATO strike aircraft. The elimination of all surface-launched nuclear systems will certainly reduce the spectrum of choices in the operational employment of nuclear weapons by the ground commanders. However, the strike aircraft are flexible assets, capable of performing the basic nuclear missions needed for the viability and credibility of the NATO doctrine.

Finally, if it is assumed that in the near future the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances will remain two valid and effective military organizations, then probably the problem of arms control in the naval field (naval aviation and surface combatants) will be addressed.

Second scenario.

In the second scenario, one can suppose that the speed of change in Eastern Europe would overcome the negotiating speed at the CFE talks. In particular, one can assume that the reunification of the two Germanys will take place, under the political pressure of the East German people, in the very near future, before the end of 1990, the date set by the superpowers for the conclusion of a CFE treaty.

In this case, even without considering the possible Soviet reaction to such an event, it is difficult to see how the Warsaw Pact could still be considered a viable military alliance vis-a-vis NATO, and how the current conventional arms control process in Europe could survive.

Obviously, it is not easy to predict the extent of the impact of German reunification on the European security setting which has been in place for forty years, maintaining peace and stability between East and West.

On the one hand, the idea of a single state belonging to two different politico-military blocs appears unrealistic. On the other hand, as U.S. and West German officials have noted, it is hard to imagine a unified Germany continuing to house hundreds of thousands of troops from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact (13).

There are several hypotheses presently circulating in Europe, dealing with the problem of German reunification and European security.

One of them considers a unified but neutralized Germany in the framework of the continued existence of the two alliances on the fringe of the new German state, the reintegration of France in NATO, the redeployment from the FRG to France, Belgium and Holland of the American troops remaining after the reductions decided in the CFE talks, and from the GDR to Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia of the remaining Soviet troops.

Another hypothesis considers the German reunification and the gradual dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact within the concept of the "common European house" put forward by Secretary Gorbachev in the past and recently reiterated after the EC Strasbourg summit 8-9 December 1989.

Another one is centered on an association or confederation of the two German states not necessarily leading to a single state entity. East Germany would be capable of maintaining its "socialist" structure and of keeping its Warsaw Pact membership while engaging with West Germany in a vast array of economic, scientific, ecological, and social cooperative ventures. The old European security environment would then remain intact.

But these hypotheses either lack political credibility or

strategic sense.

At the Strasbourg summit the EC member states resolved to speed up the monetary and economic European union, together with the post-1992 integration of the European markets, and to endorse the free self-determination of the German people within the framework of the European integration. However, they have not considered the problem of how to manage and control the two processes. If the reunification bid of the East German people moves faster than the EC economic and political integration, then problems would arise both for West Germany and for the European Community which could disrupt the EC attempt to manage this double transition in a stable way.

Moreover, the Strasbourg summit did not indicate how the EC viewed the future of the European security picture after the completion of the European integration process and the eventual German reunification, nor did it indicate how the East-West arms control negotiations would fit within this context.

This appears as an evident sign that the scenario previously outlined is considered too difficult to deal with, and too destabilizing to be considered even by the European countries most directly involved in the East European turmoil and most directly affected by its repercussions.

As for the future of the arms control process in Europe, there will be the tendency for the West and East European countries to stress their particular security and defense requirements. Perhaps, in this scenario, the European countries will eventually revert to bilateral or strictly sub-regional (the Balkans, northern Europe, central Europe, the Mediterranean, etc.) arms control negotiations.

In this context, it is interesting to note that the tendency for the national security requirements to emerge with greater force is surfacing even today, in particular in the Warsaw Pact, as a result of looser alliance ties.

Hungary's redefinition of its security appears a good example of this new attitude. In fact, a Hungarian Government spokesman has declared that "in the past we organized our armed forces in the interests of the Pact...but this is no longer the case. We are now developing our own doctrine of national security, defensive in character and in accordance with new assessment of potential dangers. Today the great majority of Hungarians know that an attack would not come from the west but the south-east."
(14)

Hungarian forces were redeployed from the Austrian to the Romanian border. As the Austrian border were dismantled, the Hungarian HOR Border Guards were strengthened along the Romanian border. Today, after the Romanian revolution, these measures have lost a great deal of their significance.

Third scenario.

A third scenario is the one which appears to be constitute the blueprint of current American foreign policy. The Atlantic Alliance will have to be remodeled or modified in accordance with the new political and military situation in Eastern Europe and the lessening of the threat. However, NATO will be capable of holding together, outlasting a slowly decaying and decomposing Warsaw Pact. NATO, and not the EC (no matter if and how unified) will still be the organization responsible for providing for the security and the defense of Europe. And NATO will be capable of facing both the possibility of renewed tensions and the opportunities created by a further positive modification of the East European and Soviet political scene. In this context, German reunification would be a slow process, essentially dependent on the stability of the old continent.

In this scenario of two different evolutions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, NATO would be able to play from a position of strength in the East-West arms control negotiations, with less need to compensate for the changes in Eastern Europe by dismantling Western security arrangements.

This does not necessarily mean that the CFE process will be discontinued by NATO, taking advantage of the reductions and restructuring of the Warsaw Pact armed forces imposed by the political and economic situation in the Eastern European countries. In fact, there are also strong political and social forces in the Western European countries calling for a reduction of military expenditures, the continuation of the arms control process in Europe, and the increase of the political and economic ties between the two formerly antagonistic blocs.

Thus, in this scenario the CFE talks in Vienna would go on beyond the conclusion of a first accord in 1990 to the so-called CFE 2 for even more drastic reductions and more stringent verification provisions.

Fourth scenario.

A fourth scenario, slightly different from the previous one, could be depicted.

In this scenario, the Warsaw Pact progressive disintegration and the German reunification process would be diluted and delayed using the framework of a "Helsinki Two" conference -- a conference to be held during 1990 as called for by the Soviet Union. At the same time, NATO would assume an increasingly political role -- a new course which, by the way, has been stressed at the December 1989 NATO Ministerial meeting.

The idea, very simply put, would be to convene a second pan-European conference with the responsibility of dealing with and presiding over the realignment of the postwar order in Europe in

a way which would safeguard the stability and the security of all the countries involved. There would be a pledge by all countries to refrain from taking any action which could possibly jeopardize the outcome of the conference while it is in progress. Considering the years necessary to organize, conduct, and conclude the Helsinki Two exercise with the approval of a new European charter by all 35 nations, precious time would be gained, useful for an orderly transition in Europe and a re-affirmation of the European borders as recognized by the first Helsinki Conference in 1975.

In this scenario, the CFE would continue on the present path, but with the possibility that its continuation would be integrated in the Helsinki Two process with a fusion of the eventual CFE 2 negotiations with the CSBM talks presently going on in Geneva.

Fifth scenario.

A fifth scenario could be depicted on the basis of two different hypotheses leading basically to the same results: a Soviet military move to stop the East German drive toward reunification, a drive which is moving too fast with respect to Soviet security requirements and political expectations; a Soviet internal "counter-revolution" directed against Gorbachev and his national and international programs with a direct, negative effect on the democratization of the East European communist regimes.

This is the worst-case scenario, one which will impose an abrupt and sudden halt to the whole East-West arms control process and will return East-West relations (in particular American-Soviet relations) to the chill of that Cold War declared to be relegated to the past by the Bush-Gorbachev Malta summit.

However, it is presumable that, no matter how strong the U.S. and allied reaction to such a Soviet behaviour would be, it would not be irrational to the point of jeopardizing the European security and initiating a war in Europe. And it is logical to assume, on the basis of the past arms control history, that the break in the East-West relations will not last forever. The American-Soviet arms control negotiations have tended to be only partially and temporarily affected by the international events. The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the bloody crush of Alexander Dubcek's political experiment, did put arms control on hold, but for a very short time. In November 1969, the first session of the USA-USSR Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began in Helsinki. President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the SALT I treaty at their summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972, while the U.S. Air Force was conducting an intensive and widespread air offensive campaign against North Vietnam, bombing, among other targets, Hanoi and the port of Haiphong where Soviet ships were hit and damaged. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 forced President Carter to withhold the SALT II treaty from being submitted to the

Senate, since it had no chance of being ratified, and to freeze the SALT process. Little more than two years later, in the summer of 1982, the new Reagan Administration was ready to reopen the strategic armaments talks (renamed START or Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) with the Soviet Union. When the West German government approved the actual initiation of the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in November 1983, the Soviet Union walked away from the INF negotiations and froze the STAR talks. In March 1985 the INF negotiations were resumed, together with START and talks dealing with space arms.

It can be assumed, then, that the break in the superpower relations which would certainly follow a Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe would be sooner or later mended in the name of the "realpolitik" and of their mutual economic requirements.

The CFE process is expected to disappear in its present form to be replaced by a new conventional arms control negotiation with the objective of looking for a set of stability rules, taking into consideration the new military situation thus created in Europe.

4. CONCLUSIONS.

In conclusion, in all the scenarios previously considered (except the last one), the armed confrontation between East and West in Europe is destined to decrease -- either through a series of unilateral moves, or through the albeit unequal dissolution of the two military alliances and the emergence of a "new" Europe, or through the continuation of the conventional arms control process (CFE today, CFE 2 tomorrow), or through a combination of these.

This could appear to be an optimistic prospect. In fact it is realistic because the changes in Europe have assumed an irreversible nature and trend. This does not mean that slowdowns or partial setbacks are impossible. Nor does it mean that the significance of arms control will lose its value, or that its difficulties and complexities will vanish with the new spirit of good will and friendship throughout Europe.

Total disarmament will still be a utopian dream and arms control will remain the only way to reach military stability, while taking into due consideration the legitimate security requirements of all the countries involved in the negotiations. Thus there is no alternative to pursuing the present set of arms control talks. The aim should be that of concluding a fully verifiable treaty capable of furthering the ongoing political transformation in Europe by solving the equation of the East-West military balance.

ROME, DECEMBER 1989.

NOTES.

1. Annex A, North Atlantic Assembly, Interim Report of the Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, October 1981.

2. The New York Times (NYT), 6 January 1980. See also the Final Communiqué of the meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee, 14 May 1980.

3. On the whole episode, Paul A. Nitze, "From Hiroshima to Glasnost", Grove Weidenfeld, New York, 1989, pp.393-395.

4. Treaty between the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, December 1987, p. 10.

5. Michael R. Gordon, "Western Officials Term Soviet Cuts Significant", NYT, 8 December 1988, pp. A-1 and A-12. For the details of the arms cut, see Jane's Defense Weekly (JDW), 18 February 1989, p. 279.

6. On the NATO statement on arms control, see NYT, 9 December 1988, p. A-19.

7. NATO Press Communiqué, 30 May 1989.

8. Western Position Paper presented by NATO Delegations to the CFE Talks, 6 March 1989.

9. Position Paper presented by NATO Delegations to the CFE Talks, 13 July 1989.

10. The Arms Control Reporter, 407. B 195, idds 7-89.

11. Jeffrey Smith, "Dispute Between Greece and Turkey Delaying Action on Treaty", The Washington Post (WP), 23 November 1989, p. A-68.

12. The International Herald Tribune, 2-3 December 1989, p. 4.

13. WP, 24 November 1989, p. A-33.

14. JDW, 9 September 1989, p. 436.

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