IAI8920

OUT OF AREA: EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
by Stefano Silvestri

This paper has been presented to an Aspen European
Strategy Group Conference, West Berlin, June 1989.

A changing world

Crisis management outside the area of direct responsibility of the Atlantic Alliance is increasing in importance. In recent years, military forces of Western Powers have been deployed in the Sinai, Beirut, the Read Sea and in the Gulf. A number of agreements have been worked out to deal with related issues such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the control of ballistic missile technology exports, weapons trade and the spreading of chemical weapons. The problem of international terrorism has been dealt with in the Summit of the Seven Most Industrialized Countries as well as by various Western European Institutions. This has lead to a number of bilateral agreements on anti-terrorist cooperation between Western countries and between Western Countries and third parties, as well as international conventions. Crises in the Third World, from Afghanistan to Angola and Cambodia, have ranked prominently in the East-West negotiations.

It goes without saying that the West has vital interests in many areas of the Third World and in the surrounding oceans and air space. If any, the growing international importance of many Third World countries and their increasing ability to take significant independent actions in the political, economic and military fields, is underlying the need for a continuous reappraisal of Western objectives, policies and means.

Apparently, we are experiencing a decrease in the North-South conflicts (end of decolonization wars; diminishing relevance of the North-South ideological confrontation in the UN). The Afghanistan war might have been an exception, due to the relative backwardness of the Ussr.

Autonomous, "national" wars and crises are increasing (coupled with new ideological self-assertion, religious fanaticism, tribal and linguistic rivalries, etc.). These conflicts are seldom international and more commonly domestic. Islamism is not a North-South issue per se either, even if it is damaging to North-South relations: the Islamic "revival" is directed first and foremost at changing the Islamic world itself.

The longer "reach" of the armed forces of some Third World countries, coupled with their greater "punch", increases the risks of the possible "spreading out" of local crises, both vertically (more damages inflicted) and horizontally (more countries involved).

While these armed forces are technologically not very advanced, and cannot keep pace with the fancy new technologies developed by the more industrialized countries, they can ,however, increase their "numbers", and attain greater "lethality", by developing some middle of the road technology (e.g. medium range missiles, chemical or atomic warheads) capable of reversing long established regional balances. The injection of "some" modern technology, through the arms market, is more than enough to complement these developments and act as a very important local force multiplier.(1)

The birth of new "regional superpowers" (like India, Brazil, and possibly Argentina, Pakistan, Vietnam, etc.) with their own ambitions to shape the local regional order, and their own military capabilities and willingness to act powerfully and purposefully, in order to impose their regional hegemony is a very important development.

While no real resource shortage is forecast, neither for energy sources nor for other strategic materials (especially if new substitute materials and technolgies will continue to develop at the present pace), local wars and regional crises can ,nevertheless, create short-term problems for some Western countries (those, for example, more dependent on oil imports, or less able to withstand financial turmoil). This could have an important divisive effect, sharpening the difference between Western national perceptions and approaches to the problem of global stability.

Demographic developments might be a crucial element of future world order. As far as Europe is concerned, the Mediterranean Basin, Africa and the Near and Middle East are experiencing a rate of increase of their populations completely at odds with that of Western Europe, where we expect the population to remain relatively stable, and become progressively older.

Presently, considering the EEC together with the other riparian countries of the Mediterranean, the population percentage of the EEC is about 61,5%. By as early as the year 2000, the EEC lot will decline to 53,8% and in 2015 to 47,3%. The year 2015, therefore, will see 372 million non-EEC Mediterranean people, as opposed to 333 million of relatively rich Western Europeans. In these few years, while the EEC population will grow by about 13 million, that of the other Mediterranean countries will grow by over 170 million. Four countries alone, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco will have a population of about 270 million: generally young, unemployed and city dwellers.(2)

The international economic environment will very likely be upset by the growing nationalist tendencies of Third World countries, by the self-protective reactions of the industrialized countries (a protection motivated more by social and cultural fears than by strictly economic factors), and obviously by wars and crises.

While the two superpowers will basically remain the most powerful military actors on the world scene, and the Western industrialized countries as a group will remain the overwhelming economic, industrial, financial and trade superpower, <u>relative</u> relations between them all, and with the other countries, will change.

The "denial" power will be more widespread than the "assertive" power, and could easily grow at a faster pace: a world in which the "opposition" is stronger than the "government" is likely to become very unstable and difficult to manage.

While other forms of world order and government can be envisaged, different from the present one, and more capable of dealing with a multipolar spreading of power, the success of such endeavours is by no means easy or evident.

Patterns of Atlantic cooperation

Past experiences offer only limited guidance. For many years, Americans and Europeans remained at odds on the problem of overseas commitments. In 1953, adressing the issue that in Nato circles was later to be called "out of area", John Foster Dulles said that the US preference was for an "Alliance without strings attached": that is, without obligation for the US to support the dwindling European empires.

The year 1956, when the US effectively dealt the death blow to the Anglo-French military intervention against Egypt, marks the highest point of US disagreement with European colonial callousness.

This situation was completly reversed shortly afterwards, when the Europeans entered a mood of retreat and complacency towards the Third World and the US began to get increasingly involved in a new role of global constabulary. The Europeans gave back the Americans the same sympathy and aid they had received in the past on similar occasions -- that is none - coupled with good words and unwanted self-righteous suggestions: the whole Vietnamese saga is a good illustration of the prevailing mood among Western allies.

Finally, however, both excesses tuned down, and were replaced by a degree of cooperation, if not of complete understanding. The US airlift of French, Moroccan and Belgian forces on the occasion of various African crises, and the benevolent neutrality shown by some European countries when American-Nato bases were used by the US for some overseas deployments, are cases in point. The UK war against Argentina to recover the Falklands islands would have been impossible, or infinitely more difficult and costly, should the US have withdrawn its logistical, intelligence, communications, and technological help (even if this choice did strain the relations between the US and its Latin American neighbours).

No common strategy was conceived, however, that could be dealt with through the common machinery of the Atlantic Alliance. The "let us do the best we can" and "if somebody wishes to do more let him" attitudes on out-of-area issues were already present in the 1967 Harmel report: "Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its (NATO) security either directly or by affecting the global balance. Allied countries contribute individually within the United Nations and other international organizations to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to the solution of important international problems. In accordance with established usage, the Allies, or those among who wish to do so, will also continue to consult on such problems without commitment and as the case may demand."

They were repeated at length in the final communiqués of the North Atlantic Council meetings of the '80s. Typical are the paragraphs on out-of-area threats from the final communiqué of the June 1983 NAC in Paris: "The Allies recognise that events outside the Treaty Area may affect their common interests as members of the Alliance. If it is established that their common interests are involved, they will engage in timely consultations. Sufficient military capabilities must be assured in the Treaty Area to maintain an adequate defense posture. Individual member governments who are in a position to do so will endeavour to support, at their request, sovereign nations whose security and independence are threatened. Those Allies in a position to facilitate the deployment of forces outside the Treaty area may do so on the basis of national decisions."

The consultative mechanism is fine and generally well accepted: it exists, it can be used and it has been used. It does not constitute a problem within the Alliance. Discussion of out of area problems take place on a regular basis within the Alliance. Regional experts meet twice a year and submit reports of a high quality to the Atlantic Council where, in turn, they are reviewed. These reports are mainly examined in terms of what is happening in different parts of the world and, by and large, it is reported that a remarkably high level of agreement is reached. Discussions do not usually go beyond what the Alliance as such should be doing about the problem.

The question is: what does consultation really mean? It stands for discussion and exchange of views, and should not be confused with a process which requires that an agreement be reached nor an action be taken. Such a process sets a standard for consultations which often cannot be attained, especially when dealing with out of area questions. On the other hand, consultation should not be confused with informing Allies after the fact that unilateral actions have been taken. (3)

Nothwistanding the better disposition of the Europeans towards out of the Nato area American commitments, the United States has tended more to inform its allies and seek their blessing than to consult, except in cases where it was felt that the issue had to be multilaterized in order to insure military support and burden sharing. Even then, reliance was placed on bilateral consultations with each European country, but with special treatment of "special" allies, in terms of the level of officials involved and the amount of information provided. The American consultation process before the April 1986 air attack on Libya is a very good example of this. It followed a period of American criticism of the European Allies, when charges of "euro-centrism" were levelled at them, and the term "euro-wimp" was even invented. Disagreements and differences were confused with lack of interest or lack of attention, increasing the drive toward American unilateralism.

Finally, the United States has, understandably, never been very willing, in the course of consultations, to provide details of its planned military operations, or those ready for implementation. The risk of very damaging leakages is considered too high to be taken lightly, and information is given out on a selective basis, and only if and when necessary. Thus, again considering the April 1986 bombing of Libya, the information provided by the United States to the British Premier, Mrs Thatcher, was more detailed than that given to French President François Mitterand, which was, in turn, more complete than that submitted to the Italian Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi.

Furthermore, the statement of the 1983 NAC final communiqué on the need to maintain "an adequate defense posture in the Treaty area" implies a willingness on the part of the Europeans to fill the gap created by the possible re-deployment of American forces and equipment from Europe, in case of an out-of-area contingency. This is far from being technically or politically feasible. The decision to facilitate the re-deployment is recognised as not being an automatic response but a choice based on a case by case evaluation.

Despite the cautious and ambiguous wording, however, the language on the out-of area problem in the Nato communiqués has constituted the framework within which it was formally possible and politically feasible for the European countries to establish bilateral agreements with the United States on the utilization of European facilities by the American Rdf and on military compensation measures if American forces are taken out from Europe.

Moreover, while the Alliance has been politically absent from overseas crises, it has been operationally present, and very much so. The most positive experience has been the coordination between Western naval forces present in the Gulf and around it.

Politically speaking, each country was following a different path. Italy, for instance, was maintaining relatively good diplomatic relations with Iran, while France was committed to sustaining Iraq militarily and the US were clearly suspicious of Iran (even if the only direct military attack against an American military vessel was performed by an Iraqi airplane). Each country, with the notable exception of the US, was engaged in protecting its own merchant vessels, or those showing its flag, and the only agreed common operation has been the clearing of mines from international waterways. Even the rules of engagement of the various Western Navies were markedly different.

As a matter of fact, however, the general consensus is that the cooperation between local commanders on the spot has worked admirably, that communications and information were exchanged rapidly and effectively, that misunderstanding were avoided and that the Western naval forces on the whole were perfectly able to act together at any given moment, sharing tactical information and in accordance with common operational lines. This positive experience was made possible by the existence of Nato common procedures and interoperable systems, established for the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, but also working outside.

In a way, the cooperation in the Gulf did even exceed Nato established experience. This cooperation has worked particularly well between French and American forces, along the lines of a general military agreement existing between the US and the French Navies, worldwide. The United States, France and the United Kingdom already benefit from sharing "out-of area" intelligence on the Middle East (on the basis of the UK-USA agreements as far as the British are concerned, and on an ad hoc basis for the French), even if there are a few limits where Israel is concerned: this information is not normally circulated between Nato allies, on the basis of the "need to know" principle.

The relative success of the Gulf operation, however, should be confronted with the bitter failure of the Beirut operation, where the same Western Powers were engaged (less the Benelux countries). Political differences and operational

commonalities were more or less the same in both cases. In Beirut, however, the key deployment was carried out by land forces, completely absent in the Gulf. There was, therefore, a difference of vulnerability. In the Gulf, the problem was to protect naval forces against easily identifiable military attacks (or mines, equally identifiable, given the right technological means). In Beirut, the problem was to protect the men in the field against a murky array of direct and indirect threats, and the most tragic losses came from the use of terrorist tactics. While it was possible to maintain a strictly defensive military posture in the Gulf, the protection of the Western forces in Beirut required offensive military actions (retaliatory and preemptive): the decision of the US government to initiate a number of air raids and the naval shelling of some military objectives on the hills surrounding Beirut has rapidly undermined the Western consensus, hastening the end of the entire exercise. (4)

Similarly, while US and European governments were in apparent agreement on the need to curb international terrorism and to exert strong pressures on the governments supporting it, the American raid against Libya was supported only by the British government.

The reality of operational cooperation between Western forces out of the Nato area, therefore, is only a limited asset and cannot compensate for the absence of more complete (and complex) political agreements.

The experience of military cooperation

In recent years, Western overseas military activities have been "multi-bilateral" operations. Functionally, a kind of star-shaped structure has been formed, with the US forces at the center, relayed with each separate Ally. Intra-european cooperation was mainly possible thanks to the interoperability each of them had established with the USA.

Moreover, only the US had the kind of staying power and retaliatory capabilities needed to guarantee a secure deterrence against unwanted or excessive escalation of the conflict. While the US forces were greatly profiting from the help of the Allies (utilizing some of their logistical assets, asking them to take up some of the military roles vacated by American forces previously committed to Nato or even compensating for some of its deficiencies, as in the minesweeping operations in the Gulf), the European presence would have been simply impossible without American help.

This same conclusion can be drawn also from other more limited experiences, albeit with a few qualifications. The French engagement in Chad or the British war in the Falklands have been largely national affairs: in both cases, however, the US strategic backing has greatly eased the European burden, minimizing the risks and allowing the Allies to take the necessary risks. The European Allies can still play a critical role in determining the success or failure of US out of area actions in many out of area contingencies. US ability to rapidly redeploy forces and equipment from Italy, the FRG and UK may be critical. So may the ability to draw down the inventories of Nato countries temporarily with key items of supply or combat equipment (as was the case during the Vietnam and the Yom Kippur wars as well). No single Ally acting in isolation, however, could oblige the US to reconsider its course of action, while the US opposition could effectively kill any European initiative.

The practical problem is that such arrangements are best handled quietly and on a bilateral basis, between the US and each concerned Ally. Few contingencies, if any, can be expected to induce an Alliance-wide consensus. Therefore, no real and urgent pressure is felt for establishing a multilateral framework of consultations and decisions, while many reasons exist for keeping them all at a much more discreet and fragmented level.

Military considerations, however, should be checked against political requirements. What has been working at the specific military level might be seen as largely insufficient at a wider political level.

New Threats

The Atlantic Alliance was conceived to deal with the Soviet threat. Thus, national interests within the Alliance only converge, almost automatically, when Allied territorial integrity or survival are actually at risk. The problem, however, is that out of area problems are indeed most likely to be the cause of conflicts in which Nato countries may become involved. When a Libyan missile almost landed on Lampedusa, Italy might well have invoked Article 5 of the Treaty. Furthermore, Article 5 might also have been invoked in another episode concerning Libya -although most observers did not realize it - when US aircrafts were attacked by Libyan aircrafts flying in the Mediterranean in an area clearly outside Libyan territory or its territorial waters. The United States and Italy did not seek to invoke Article 5 nor really contemplated having such an option. It is not clear, however, if the failure to do so was motivated by the relatively low level of the threat, by the willingness to react alone without strings coming from the Allied perception or by the sheer conviction that the Alliance would have turned down such a move.

Meanwhile, the Alliance has moved into a changing world where the probability of a war in Central Europe and the probability of a general nuclear war have been reduced. For that reason, it should not become so over-focused on those two areas that it loses sight of what is happening in the rest of the world. It is from out of area regions that the greatest dangers to peace will probably emerge. These threats already exist at several levels.

Economically, the growing poverty of many countries, linked to agricultural failure and/or bad economic management, is widening the gap between industrialized, newly industrialized and under developed countries. Demographically, huge overcrowded cities, full of young, relatively literate and unemployed dwellers, will promote instability throughout the Third World. Socially, the destruction of traditional structures and the inability of either Occidental or Marxist programs to help underdeveloped countries will increase forms of fundamentalist refusal of foreigners. Politically, ethnic or religious conflict and the emergence of new ideologies which cannot always be implemented successfully are likely to develop dangerous paths of foreign and military policies, leading to dangerous tensions ad well as future crises and wars.

Equally impressive is the growth of the Third World military potential. Excluding all Allied countries, the states of the Mediterranean and of the Middle East are fielding more than 2 million soldiers (plus about 5 million of reserve and paramilitary), more than 1.500 bombers and fighter-bombers, almost 1.900 interceptors, 35 submarines, 45 major naval surface combatants, about 150 missile armed ships and boats, around 24.000 tanks and 2.500 SAMs. Moreover, a

technological weapons race is going on, with the acquisitions of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles, sophisticated airplanes like the Tornados, F-15s, F-16s, Su-24Ds, Awacs, etc.

This arsenal is largely related to local war scenarios, but could also be used to confront outside military pressures or to widen and escalate regional crises. Moreover, we should add to that the demonstrated capacity of some Third World countries to work out less conventional strategies against their perceived foes, supporting terrorists or utilizing indirect economic pressures and inducements.

Local conflicts in the Mediterranean, and the Near and Middle East, have a tendency to become internationalized through indirect means if the direct ones are not available. A case in point is the use of terrorism against Western (mainly American) objectives located in Europe. A careful study of this matter shows how relatively ineffective international terrorism has been as a weapon of influence to shape the main policy decisions of Western states. It might even been said that we are getting used to it, downplaying or even failing to take more notice of the many precautions and regulations that are visibly hindering our freedom of movement and are enormously increasing the cost of day to day travels, communications, trade, industrial ventures and personal mobility. Nothwistanding all that, and some tragic successes of terrorist actions (such as the killing of President Sadat), one could also point to a relative decline of this problem after the strengthening of antiterrorist cooperation between the industrialized countries and some strong military reactions (like the American bombing of Libya). No solution of a more permanent nature has been found, however, and no hope should be nurtured of the terrorism slowly becoming a kind of endemic disease, incapable of killing or permanently impairing the West and slowly fading away. Its political use remains a distinct possibility against which a common approach and more efforts are still needed. (5)

The ongoing détente between Washington and Moscow is spreading toward local crises and conflict, with beneficial effects. The Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, the agreement on Namibia and Angola, the growing possibility of a Vietnamese retreat from Cambodia, have also been made possible by the better climate established between the Superpowers. The crisis in the Gulf has also benefitted from this new era: the ceasefire agreement and the establishment of a United Nation supervision was brought about by greater cooperation between the US and the USSR.

Vital and not so vital interests

Decreasing military confrontation in Europe and continuing wars and crises in the Third World might signal the beginning of new problems to be managed by the Alliance, irrespective of its willingness to deal with out of area crises.

The major military problem probably lies in the competing requirements for the relatively scarce resources (both financial and military) of the West. This problem might be exacerbated in the future by the increasing costs of new technologies and by the obvious political difficulty of gathering enough domestic consensus for further increases of the Western defence budgets, nothwithstanding the "commitment" undertaken by DPC members and confirmed as recently as the beginning of June 1989) to continue to increase their Defence budgets annually by 3% in real terms.

This problem could result in a kind of strategic interface, undermining the solidarity among Atlantic allies. An example of this can be drawn from the situation in the southern region of Nato, with respect to out-of-area contingencies.

One of the main problems for the Europeans is defining the "vital interests" defended by the Alliance. This term has a direct bearing on the extension of American nuclear deterrence: therefore, it has to be used sparingly, especially when other doubts are growing with respect to the credibility of such a deterrence. According to the traditional behaviour of the Alliance, Central European interests have been considered somewhat more "vital" than the Southern European and Mediterranean ones. It is also true, however, that , at least in principle, the Southern European allies are currently guaranteed by the concept of "vital interest": this is the key pillar of extended deterrence for the Southern Region.

Out-of-area interests are more "opinable" than "vital". In 1983, the South West Asia Impact Study of Nato stated that no "conceivable contingencies" in the area were bound to create unmanageable security problems for the Alliance. A policy of greater involvement in overseas contingencies, resulting in a de facto linking of the Southern Region of Nato with out-of-area crisis management - even for simple reasons of geographic proximity - will inevitably blur the strategic assessment of what is "vital" and what is "opinable", diminishing the strategic importance of present distinctions.

It is also true, however, that out-of-area crises are growing in strategic importance anyway, and that the American perception of the US vital interests seems to be changing in the direction feared by the European Allies. The problem, therefore, exists and cannot be avoided. It has to be "managed". Thus, NATO will have to deal with the setting up of many strategies "à la carte" without losing its political and military coherence. Differing perceptions and alternate priorities of arms procurement will grow, straining NATO internal consensus and efficiency. (6)

The recent "Discriminate Deterrence" study, while stressing the primary importance of the US commitment in Europe, was mainly concerned with the aim of identifying credible options for the American military strategy in other areas of the world, thus confirming the shift toward more limited war scenarios and more "opinable" guarantees.

Various options

Thus, various kinds of military crisis management are possible in theory:

a. Bipolar agreement between the Superpowers, substantiated and implemented mainly through United Nations mechanisms (e.g. the agreement on Namibia/Angola)

b. Unilateral American initiatives, rallying as many Allies as necessary and/or feasible (e.g.the first phase of the Gulf operation)

c. Unilateral initiatives of single European powers, backed by an explicit or implicit American strategic coverage and help (e.g. the Falklands war)

d. Unilateral initiatives of a coalition of Western European countries (e.g. the intervention at Suez in 1956)

e. Multilateral initiatives of the Atlantic Alliance, or of a number of "interested members" of the Alliance, backed by the consensus of the whole group (e.g. the Beirut operation?)

f. Joint multilateral initiatives of Western Europe and the US (no fully consistent example; something along this line did happen during the second phase of the Gulf operation).

While (a), (b) and (c) are the most common cases, and (d) seems to have become outdated, at least as far as it suggests the existence of strong disagreements between Western Europeans and Americans, only (e) and (f) would satisfy the requirement of a greater cooperation and burden sharing between Allies on a systematic base.

Making better use of Western strengths

Crisis management, however, is not simply a military affair. In general terms, the West is better equipped than the East to deal with crisis management problems: its main strengths lie in a greater military flexibility and, more important, in the control of important economic leverages, and in the greater ability of the West to manage international coalitions of independent, rich and relatively powerful Allies.

A sensible strategy of crisis management, therefore, should try to make a better use of this position of relative advantage, combining the various leverages.

The first question is how the new economic powers that are blossoming in the South can be gradually included in the international economic management system established by our side in the North, without changing the established rules too much. The second question is whether economic policies could be devised that are coherent with the objective of managing local crises and that can be usefully put into action by the West.

In a way, the two questions are linked: a Southern economic power strongly integrated with the Western mechanism of global economic management is likely to have many vested interests in common with the West and will be, therefore, more amenable to moderation and more willing to help. Exceptions might occur, if overwhelming domestic pressures come to bear a greater weight than international economic solidarity (a case in point is Iran, and might be Saudi Arabia). The old dream of Norman Angell that war would disappear between interdependent economies has been proved false many times in the past. However, while economic integration cannot guarantee the alignment of local powers with absolute certainty, it can definitely help, and in any case the reverse holds true: that is, economic isolation encourages irresponsible behaviour.

The second question can be considered in retrospect, on the basis of previous experiences. Basically, economic measures of crisis management include

a. economic aid (during the crisis; after the crisis; "linked" to the fulfillment of some preconditions)

b. free, or almost free military assistance (in the form of delivery of arms, technological assistance, others)

c. sectorial limitations on trade (arms export regimes: COCOM, Missile Regime, arms trade restrictions, others)

d. economic sanctions (including financial pressures)

e. trade embargoes (general or sectorial)

The East, while theoretically able to apply all these policies, in practice has tried measures (a) and (b) in the past (e.g. Egypt). Some limited economic assistance has been forwarded to some overseas communist countries (e.g. Cuba and Vietnam), as a defensive move to offset in part sanctions decided by the West.

The West has tried them all (7). Their success, however, depends on several conditions that must be stressed:

1. The time at our disposal: economic instruments require lot of time to produce results. The alternative is to utilize economic decision as a form of "declaratory policy": in this case, however, the negative effects over the long term generally overshadow the positive ones gained in the short term.

2. The precision of the intervention required: economic policies cannot be easily limited to certain effects. It is incredibly difficult to limit damages. Economic policies have a tendency to spread and multiply their effects in unforeseen ways (especially when market economies are involved). Their utilization, therefore, has a very low degree of discrimination and many counter-arguments.

3. No economic policy will be useful if it is not backed by the West as a whole, or at least by all the relevant Western countries. Trying to do it alone, even for the US, is a recipe for certain frustration and bitter disagreement between the allies over which one neighbour is begging the other.

4. No economic policy will be foolproof. Its objective (especially in the case of sanctions or trade limitations) is to increase the costs of some operations, not to block them altogether. Moreover, the resilience of the market economies and their ability to circumscribe the regulations trying to distort the market are a partial compensation for the negative effects described in point (2) above.

5. While destined for long periods of time, economic crisis management should not go on indefinitely. The prosecution of American sanctions against Cuba, for instance, is more a hindrance for the US - depriving them of a useful tool for influencing Cuban behaviour - than for the Cuban regime.

Finally, we should remember that the utilization of economic instruments in a political way is not typical of the West. In market economies such behaviour is mostly the exception, while it is very natural for autocratic regimes with controlled economies: that is, for the greater majority of Third World countries. This means, first, that these countries are prepared to withstand

some degree of economic pressures more than other more democratic countries; and, second, that they may want to strike back in kind (the oil embargo of 1973 being a case in point). Moreover, the very rich among them have an economic interventionist policy of their own that has to be taken into account.

Other relevant mechanisms and institutions

The United Nations is the international institution with the largest number of members, including almost all the countries of the world, with very few significant exclusions. Its crisis management activities are concentrated in its Security Council with the exception of some "preventive" actions on arms control, dealt with in other fora (like the Conference on Disarmament). The crisis management powers of the UN are defined in chapters 7 and 8 of its Charter, articles 39 through 53: chapter 7 establishes which actions can be taken with respect to threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression; chapter 8 deals with the possibility of regional arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security. The General Assembly has tried unsuccesfully to increase its crisis management powers (e.g. the "United for Peace" resolution).

Past history and recent events confirm the utility of the UN machinery. A significant change has occurred, however, from the first successful attempts of the UN to intervene directly in crises and wars, and its present utilization. Initially, from Korea to Katanga, the Security Council allowed direct military intervention of important military forces under the UN flag in actual combat to restore the independence of South Korea or to maintain the unity of Congo against attempts of secession. Afterwards, the UN military forces played only the role of observers, avoiding direct intervention in the war. In recent years, moreover, even such a limited role was put into question. The Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt provided for the creation of a Multinational Force of observers (MFO), unrelated to the UN. The case was frequently made for unilateral or multilateral actions by concerned countries "in the spirit of the UN Charter", avoiding the recourse to the UN. In the case of the military naval presence in the Gulf, the West regarded with suspicion and discarded the proposal by the USSR to create a joint UN naval force substituting the various national forces. Meanwhile, the newly established UN force of observers of the Iran-Iraq truce has been strictly limited to land operations without any naval capability.

The utilization of the UN machinery for crisis management has generally favoured the West more than the East, differently from many votes taken by the General Assembly or from some programs put forward by UN specialized agencies. There are two main reasons for this result. The first is technical: until now, the West has provided the greater bulk of money, men and logistical means for the UN peace-keeping forces. This situation may change, however, should the US withdraw a significant part of its present support of the UN actions: than the USSR could gladly take the opportunity of stepping in its place. The second reason is political: the objective of the UN action is mainly one of conservation or restoration of the previous situation, or of freezing the change and, generally speaking, the West has more to gain from the status quo than the East.

Western countries could envisage a reinforcement of the present role and powers of the Secretary General of the UN and, at the same time, increase their utilization of the Security Council machinery for crisis management (accepting to take more decisions by "consensus", renouncing to cast their vote in favour of resolutions "vetoed" by one of the permanent members of the Council, selecting and training a greater number of military forces "earmarked" for the UN, starting to utilize UN observers for arms control verifications, etc.). (8)

Apart from the UN, the greater majority of the other relevant institutions are either Western or regional. The Soviet attempt to expand the international institutions of the Soviet bloc, including other communist countries like Vietnam, Mongolia and Cuba in the COMECON and linking them with the Warsaw Pact, doesn't seem to be of great significance for crisis management (even if it increases the Soviet global capabilities).

In the aftermath of WW II, the US engaged in a number of regional military and political alliances (NATO, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS) with the aim of containing the Soviet expansion and of ensuring a stable framework of global security. Today, only NATO survives in good shape (together with a somewhat "truncated" ANZUS), but its scope is severely limited to its "area of competence". The Atlantic Alliance remains the major institutional body, however, where talks on global security problems can be arranged with continuity between Europeans and Americans.

The other forum in which these discussions are taking place, with increasing frequency is the Summit of the Seven most industrialized countries, which includes Japan. Japan is a member of other Western institutions with global ambitions: the OECD, the Energy Agency, the Atomic Energy Agency, COCOM, the IMF, GATT. All these agencies and institutions have some crisis management role. None of them has the competence, however, to link various issues and policies in a coherent approach, with the exception of the Summit of the Seven that, nevertheless, lacks the continuity and the operational capabilities of the others.

A gap has been created between the authority to take relevant decisions (lying with the Seven) and the international instruments needed to apply them. Equally, there is a growing problem of competition and superimposition of competences among existing international institutions, worsened by the tendency of the Seven to do as they like, without attempting to increase the overall coherence of the system.

Some reforms could improve the situation. The OECD could be usefully enlarged to new industrialized countries of the Third World. GATT and IMF could be linked in order to avoid a separate management of the money market and of the commodity market, with different timing and priorities. The World Bank could be strengthened and given more funding (while its operations could be linked with some initiatives taken by the IMF). The entry of the Soviet Union as a full member of some of these istitutions, particularly the IMF and GATT, should be viewed with some caution, however. This important step should be only taken if we can be sure that the Soviet entry will be fully coherent with the economic and political foundations of these institutions and the future role that we would like them to play.

The basic problem remains, however. The West has all the international institutions needed for managing the global problems of interdependence in place save one - the most important: the institution in charge of interdependent issues. While the Summit of the Seven, and the important and well-oiled network of bilateral relationships has succeeded in fulfilling this role on a case by case basis, we have some doubts that this framework will be able to withstand the stress of various concomitant crises successfully, and we are convinced, moreover, that its present abilities lie in finding stopgap measures more than anything else.

Regional institutions are beginning to play a more assertive and positive role on the international scene. Some conflicts arise between the defence of regional interests and the global approach of the superpowers and of the other international institutions. These problems should not be underestimated. The case should be made, however, in defence of regional institutions even when their decisions seem to be at odds with established international rules. No crisis management and no economic management can be effective if it doesn't take into account local perceptions and domestic consensus. No stable security can be assured without the strong backing of local countries. Regional integration, therefore, can play a useful role, provided that:

a. its capacity to deal with the management of local economic problems has been proved successfully

b. its competences mirror the competences of the international organizations (making possible direct negotiations among them)

c. its aims include the strengthening of the overall security and stability of its member countries, and of the region as a whole

d. the general thrust of its policies is coherent with that of the other international organizations.

Good examples of regional organizations of this kind in the Third World are the ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The Western European contribution

A global and integrated approach to crisis management, linking together various international actors, institutions and means, underlines the opportunity to make a better use of the Western European potential.

A better policy of crisis management has to confront squarely the problem of differing perceptions and interests, and of possible "divisions of labour" between Europeans and Americans. If the Alliance as such cannot decently deal with a problem so intimately linked with its overall security policy, than a case has to be made for other ways and means, other channels of communication, other coalitions for action.

The emerging European tendency to deal with out-of-area issues, has been underlined in some European Parliament reports, namely the 1981 Diligent Report on the protection of maritime lines of communication in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf and the 1982 Haagerup Report on European security policy. In Haagerup's judgement, it would be wrong to deny a strategic role to the

European Community, even if not supported by military means, because of the great commercial and economic importance that it holds in the world. In addition - he continues - single member states are free to act in the military field and launch military actions.

Each Western European power (with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany) is preparing its armed forces to operate with enhanced rapidity and increased flexibility far from the national borders. A rather optimistic description of these forces can be found in the table at the end of this text.

The creation of rapid employment forces has its rationale more in the need to adjust the military instrument to defend national territory against the changing threat environment, than on the need to perform overseas missions. The French FAR, for instance, has been conceived with its priority employment on the European central front in mind. However, enhancing the mobility of some units, establishing a skeleton structure of C3 for the force, and planning for integrated training exercises means creating the capability - and the mentality - to employ the military instrument rapidly, selectively, and with specialized, mission-oriented forces. These are the relevant features needed for many out-of-area military interventions in future contingencies.

To some extent, the European RDFs are more shadow than substance, especially in terms of long-range air transport capability, logistic sustainability and specialized armament. It would be naive to believe that they can effectively be employed in an overseas contingency different from relatively undemanding peacekeeping operations, without being strengthened and supported by other national forces, much less mobile, and without adequate training. The almost complete absence of adequate training grounds and staging areas is as important as the other material shortcomings, if not more. Even the mere possession of a force which can be rapidly employed outside the national territory, however, can have a beneficial political effect on the resolve of Western governments, and on their attitude to tackle overseas crisis situations. The main risk is that politicians might underestimate the shortcomings, while the military leaders might underplay them in order to carry out operations deemed politically necessary, creating a situation of grave concern.

France and Britain - and Italy and West Germany to a lesser degree - possess Naval forces capable of fulfilling the role and the missions typical of out-of-area operations requiring a maritime component. They have the proven logistical capacity to sustain limited naval forces at long range regardless of local resources. But, apart from Britain, France and Italy have inadequate long-leg air transport capacity, and airlift over long distances will either require the utilization of staging facilities en route to the crisis area or the use of the American air transport assets. Furthermore, any out-of-area military commitment, particularly if it is of some size and of long duration, will have to be considered in the context of its possible detrimental effects on the Alliance's conventional capabilities in Europe.(9)

Logistical and transportation problems, sustainabilty and staying power, as well as the need to have the backing of sufficient reinforcements at hand, and of being protected by an overall credible deterrent posture, have required in the past, and will require in the future, the European overseas interventions to be shouldered by some form of direct US commitment and/or acceptance. This necessary help doesn't come free, however, for it generally complicates the

political picture of the crisis management operation itself. No European military presence in Beirut or in the Gulf would have been possible without the presence of overwhelming American forces in the same spot, capable of decisive strategic intervention, thereby guaranteeing a much needed deterrence against escalation by the enemy. This presence, however, was badly resented by the local actors, and immediately propelled the crisis to the heights of an East-West issue, complicating its management. Any US presence, moreover, comes with its burden of previous American commitments and long established alliances and political decisions, obscuring the carefully weighted differences of political posture that the European allies would prefer to stress.

Recent experiences, however, have reshuffled the European traditional ability to deal with the local problems involved with overseas crisis management, and the existence of a better disposition of local actors toward the European forces, probably seen as "less threatening" or at least as "less interfering" than the American one. And of course the relatively greater European dependence on raw materials and energy sources located in some of these regions, and the greater European share of trade with them, make Western Europe logically suited for taking more overseas commitments.

The enlargement of the European Community in the Mediterranean, with the accession of Spain and Greece, has increased the need to work out an overall approach toward this area, taking into account the problem of Turkey, whose entry into the Community is practically excluded for the time being, but whose role for the defence and security of Western Europe remains vital and should be insured against any "islamic" drive of this country, born out of a sense of isolation and frustration in its dealing with the West. The strict interdepence existing between the Community and countries such as Morocco (whose King even asked for its admission to the EEC), Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt (not to mention Israel), coupled with the demographic trends quoted above, create an obligation for Europe to work out a better and overall crisis management approach to the Mediterranean as a whole.(10)

Direct and indirect threats to European security coming from overseas include the proliferation of armaments (including the possibility of nuclear proliferation, coupled with new missile potential); the redislocation of US forces, formerly standing in the area, and now redeployed elsewhere according to other strategic priorities; the steady USSR policy to support its military presence on the fringes of its empire by finding new allies and new support facilities (most recently in Syria); the possibility of war scenarios starting from the many "soft bellies" located overseas and spreading to continental Europe.

This prompts another question: the real capacity of Western European countries to withstand human losses while engaged in a process of peace-keeping. The fight against terrorism gives us a mixed response. On one hand, bombing and killing didn't fundamentally disrupt our way of life, nor did it diminish the domestic consensus of Western governments - if any they had the effect of increasing it, frustrating the terrorist's hopes. On the other hand, however, and especially when the life and freedom of hostages was held at bay, the Western governments showed an amazing capacity of increasing confusion and breaking long established pacts and solemnly declared policies by entering willfully into a bleak maze of deceptions and shameless pacts with the terrorists, their sponsors and their allies.

Equally difficult to forecast is the quality of the domestic consensus that has so far supported the recent renewal of European military presence in overseas contingencies. At face value, one could safely assume that some Europeans will be more prepared than others to accept the possibility of human losses, because they have in the recent past (e.g. France and United Kingdom). The roots of such national consensus, however, should be dealt with more carefully, to ascertain their permanence, and also to see how far they would support the quantum jump from what was probably felt as a "national" necessity, deeply rooted in national history, culture and tradition, and what could appear as an unnecessary stretching of European responsibilities, unsufficiently justified on the ground of national survival.

In general, Europe will have to weigh the risk of being "squeezed" between the bilateral game played by the two superpowers and the growing political and strategic importance of the countries overseas. With respect to technology, European forces could also experience a dual disadvantage, in that they are less advanced than the Americans, and have fewer numbers, and possibly also less determination, than their likely foes in the Third World. A lot will depend on the Western European capacity to maintain an acceptable technological lead, avoiding the risks of a slow decline of the technological content of their weapon systems. Without such a lead, in fact, they could have to withstand much greater risks than their American ally.

Can we imagine a single case of military intervention overseas where a European nation could act alone, really and completely alone? To be fair, however, we should also remember that the "doing it alone" approach might be forced on a country by the others for opportunistic reasons and that, while it might be presented as isolated it could receive silent but concrete help from the allies. This case borders with the Nato approach of backing the "concerned countries" without involving the Alliance officially. We should point out, however, that the main problem of national approaches is their discontinuity. No European nation alone can guarantee the long-term permanence of its resolve nor its capacity to gather enough staying and deterrent power: a divided Europe involved in overseas operations might look like a sitting (and lame) duck, waiting to be shot at, or like the weakest link to be broken.

The answer to the future European contribution to crisis management, therefore, has mainly to do with the working of European and allied institutions. The new experience of the WEU Special Working Group should be remembered here as well as the potentialities of the EPC (European Political Cooperation). While the former has the advantage of utilizing both the Foreign Affairs and the Defence machineries of its European members, its major shortcoming is that of its inclusion in a rather battered international organization like the WEU, with no clear future ambitions spelled out. The latter has the advantage of a clearer institutional setting and of its linkage with an international organization relatively strong and vital, with great European ambitions, but without working experience with the military and suffering from the suspicions held by the national governments against European supranational integration. An obvious compromise solution can be the utilization of the WEU system while waiting for its eventual integration in the wider EC setting. In order to make it work, however, the WEU should be strengthened and reformed (probably along the lines suggested by the recent paper prepared by V. van Eekelen for the European Strategy Group) (11). In any case, moreover, we should stress the need of a

global strategic approach to crisis management, including economic and political leverages, as well as military. The EC alone has the competence to deal with the demographic problems of the Mediterranean, the diversification and security of energy supplies, the "quest for industrialization" of developing countries, and so on. While the revised Bruxelles Treaty of the WEU explicitly considers economic security, no economic management has ever been carried out through it (while the EC is invited at least to the Summit of the Seven): a further reason for going toward a merger between the EC and the WEU.

The case should be made, therefore, for a number of reforms of the existing institutions, for seriously discussing the enlargement of WEU to Turkey, for the establishement of a complex and important Mediterranean policy of the EC (particularly adressed to Turkey, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria, and favouring regional integrations in the Gulf and in the Maghreb), for the strengthening of EPC. We could usefully draw some ideas from a previous paper on "The European Community: progress or decline", produced by five European institutes. (12)

Meanwhile, no sensible European choice can ignore the necessary relationship with the US, especially where overseas problems are concerned. Crisis management goes hand in hand with other transatlantic problems like burden sharing and the future of US military presence in Europe. The Atlantic Alliance, however, cannot be considered as the best institution for dealing with these matters. Moreover, the economic dimensions of crisis management are almost as important as the military ones, and are practically excluded from the competences of the Alliance (even if they are theoretically included in the Treaty and receive some attention in specialized committees of the Atlantic Council). The Summit of the Seven can deal with all these problems without guaranteeing, however, the continuity of the consultations, their time-urgency and their effective operational implementation. Thus, the case should be made either for enlarging the scope of the Atlantic machinery or for strengthening and institutionalizing the machinery of the Summits (could they also be linked to the WEU as they are connected with the EC?). Some technical decisions could help to smooth and speed up the consultations: the allied political coordination could profit from stronger links between the high level crisis management centers created in each Western country. Their connection with the American centers through technologically advanced communication means would allow for rapid transmission of information, quick consultations and real-time coordination of military initiatives. In the post-Achille Lauro affair, when American F-14 fighters forced the landing of an Egyptian aircraft with Arab terrorists on board at the Sicilian airbase of Sigonella, the communications between Washington and Rome were far from perfect, and reportedly were complicated by translation problems. The possibility for the top decision-making bodies of the Atlantic Alliance countries to communicate directly and fully, outside the existing Nato framework as well, would enhance the badly needed consultation and coordination process, thus indirectly strengthening, at least at the "technical" level, the Western response capacity to out-of-area crises.

Finally, we can agree on the need to overcome some of the major shortcomings of the European armed forces in terms of equipment, training, transport capacity (especially airlift) and sustainability. The idea should be of overcoming them through a joint investment plan and not throug individual countries acting alone. Common procurement coordinated by a European agency would be the optimum. Short of that, we could stress the need for more standardization and

interoperability of the European equipment needed for overseas contingencies. The various European rapid deployment forces could train together in specifically devised exercises, in a way similar to the training conducted by Nato Ace Mobile Force (AMF). If the possession of a rapid deployment force increases the capability to deter and to intervene overseas - even within the operational and logistic limits previously outlined - common training will facilitate a coordinated military response if and when it becomes politically feasible. In the long term, the European rapid deployment forces should become the hard core of a truly "European" military intervention capacity in overseas contingencies involving vital European interests.

Other things should be done, moreover. The European countries should intensify their intelligence collection effort in out-of-area regions, thus demonstrating their seriousness toward overseas commitments. This would be particularly useful for fighting international terrorism and for coping better with peace-keeping forces. A European satellitary capacity would be important: France has acquired a good capability for high-resolution photographic survey of areas of interest with the "Spot" satellites. European countries could jointly develop more sophisticated military reconnaissance satellites (both optical and radar). The present agreements between France, Italy and Spain on the Helios satellite are a step in the right direction. The joint European development of a new satellitary capacity, involving optical, radar and communication intelligence would be the obvious second step. Suggestions can be drawn from the recent report of the five European institutes on the future of the European space policy. (13)

Choosing between competing priorities is a very difficult business. Some of our suggestions could equally serve the objective of strengthening the European contribution to Nato and the ability to project power overseas: they will be the easiest to be approved and could be have priority among our programs. Others might look less appealing: the case should be made that European security cannot be defended simply in continental Europe, but it could not be enough (even if the eventual role of the European empires in deciding the conclusion of two WWs should perhaps be better assessed). A linkage could be made between the perspective of further arms reductions and more stable security in continental Europe and the likelihood that military threats and confrontations will shift overseas and will have to be dealt with.

The future of crisis management

In the end, however, both Europeans and Americans, as well as all the other interested parties, should try to grasp the future meaning of crisis management in a changing world, where independent states are increasingly acting along autonomous lines to fulfill legitimate objectives different from those of the developed world.

Present trends suggest the development of new crisis resolution patterns. The identification of these patterns is essential for any decision on what to do overseas and how (14). At the present stage, we can underline the following points:

    a. Crisis management operations rely more frequently on slow, homeopathic strategies, than on surgical interventions.

b. There is a tendency to avoid high risk operations (involving a high level of military commitment and high visibility of the forces of outside powers), in favour of relatively low risk operations. Ground forces are more rarely put into action, as the preference is for relatively less visible and less vulnerable Naval forces. Ground based air forces are used for transportation, warning, intelligence collection and command, control and communication, more than for actual combat. Sea based air forces are used to support both the navy and the army ashore in their military engagements, when available: their actual utility in the Beirut case, however, was greatly disputed by many.

c. There is a need (and in some cases a clear attempt) to use a better combination of various leverages other than the military ones for crisis management. The economic leverage in particular has been tried various times, with mixed results. While economic sanctions were apparently ineffective, at least in the short run (in the long run, in the case of Iran, they might have had a significant impact) economic aid proved to be of some immediate importance to help Iraq withstand the Iranian pressure. The hope of substituting the military presence with an economic one of equal effectiveness was not successful. Nevertheless, the need to work out a better global strategy encompassing economic, financial, trade and military elements at the same time seems to be generally accepted.

d. There is the idea of strengthening and enlarging the present policy of prevention of crises, with the aim of limiting damages beforehand and simplifying the following task of crisis management.
Cases in point are, for instance, the agreements worked out among the nuclear countries exporting nuclear technology, for increased limitation and circumscription of the risks of nuclear proliferation, through a combination of restraints and inducements. A similar instrument is the Missile Technology Control Regime agreed upon by the Seven most industrialized countries in April 1977, and soon to be applied in order to attempt curbing the development of a new Argentinian-Arab middle-range missile.
Like many other agreements to limit the trade of weapon systems, however, the Missile Regime also faces the major problem of including all the relevant producers and exporters in the draft. The recent Gulf experience is not encouraging: when a Chinese missile developed with Israeli technological help ends up in Saudi hands, every attempt at controlling technology looks rather farfetched. In another case, the mixed results obtained with the application of COCOM's regulations to curb the export of militarily relevant technology to the Communist countries left the matter open for further considerations. The fourfold increase in the number of countries holding chemical weapons and the spread of nuclear weapons technology to Third World countries, is another case in point. The attempt to strengthen and streamline these regulations, however, has been made, and might lead to better results in the future.
Other means of crisis prevention, or at least of setting up a better framework for dealing with it, include the renewed attention to the Geneva Convention against the use of chemical weapons, and the negotiations for a new Treaty for chemical disarmament. Also, some Western governments are showing growing interest in the possibility of increasing the respect for the existing international laws of war and neutrality: indeed, the main legal justification of the Western military presence in the Gulf was the

decision to oblige the belligerants to comply with the internationally recognized rights of neutral countries and the principle of freedom of innocent passage in international waters.

Crisis reduction centers between the nuclear powers as well as agreements to avoid accidental confrontations and to manage possible accidents peacefully (e.g. the one between US and USSR, on naval incidents in the high seas) are going in the same general direction.

e. There is an increased tendency to utilize the existing multilateral machineries, in particular the UN, as useful tools for "saving face", as frameworks for diplomatic exchanges and negotiations, as suppliers of peace-keeping forces and observers and, possibly, as impartial instruments for fact gathering and for the assessment of relative responsibilities. The importance of this development should not be underestimated: it is worth remembering how, a few years ago, the simple idea of utilizing the UN machinery was regarded with a mixture of scorn and suspicion by the US. The change has been important and should be underlined. The UN should not be overestimated, however. Its forces are able to observe peace, but not to keep it. Its "objectivity" is more a function of skillful diplomatic compromises than respect for the actual truth. Its usefulness as a diplomatic framework is a consequence of the better relations between the USSR and the US more than of its intrinsic value. The face-saving role of the UN, however, together with the possibility of handling various crises at the same time and to dispatch time-gaining mediators easily accepted by all parties are unique features whose importance we should remember.

f. Greater emphasis is put on the direct negotiations between the US and the USSR, not only on their bilateral questions but on regional crises as well, from Afghanistan to Angola and Kampuchea. This positive tendency might have negative effects, however, when a kind of "Munich syndrome" is developed by the other parties in the game - I am thinking, of course, of the Munich Conference of 1938. The idea of the superpowers deciding the future of other countries at will was never very well received by the governments concerned. This might be considered trivial when the receiving end has no way of opposing the diktat - as in the 1938 Munich case, which was not very successful, however, in the longer run. The picture changes completely when a strong opposition is possible, or when the will of the superpowers has no real means of imposing itself on the local actors. This seems to be the most common case today.

Nevertheless, the utility of the US-USSR negotiatiating framework should not be underestimated, and will continue to be significant in the future. One should not think, however, that bilateral agreements of this kind could suffice without important local backing and multilateral support from the allies.

g. The need to take into account the perceptions and actions of the local players (or at least of the more powerful among them) is now more evident than ever (see the point above). Local powers sometimes have their own crisis management and intervention strategy, and this is to be taken into careful account. The benign neglect showed by the West towards the repeated Saudi attempts to destabilize the Horn of Africa, in the name of their brand of islamization and arabization of the local governments, ended up with dire consequences and with a direct increase in civil and international wars, helping the Soviets and their proxys to establish a

firmer hold on Ethiopia. The latter is simply one example among many others, even more disruptive, such as the Egyptian-Saudi war in Yemen, the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea or the South African heavy-handed policy towards its African neighbours.

The objective of enrolling local allies should, therefore, be tempered by a careful consideration of the objectives sought by these same allies, and by a correct assessment of our capacity to influence or restrain their ambitions, if need be.

In general terms, no crisis management will be possible in the future without greater consideration of the local forces and wills.

h. Finally, the need to combine different kinds of leverage; the ability to deal with the other superpowers and with local countries at the same time; the necessity of enrolling the allies in a common strategy to be pursued both locally and internationally, both militarily and through other means, can be summarized as the capacity to manage a "coalition strategy", completely different from that of the relatively simple time when Great Powers could do it alone.

How to manage such a coalition strategy, and its basic requirements, both in terms of military and economic means and in terms of the most useful and efficient institutional machinery, will constitute the real problem of future crisis management.

Notes

1) Future trends are considered in _Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment_, a paper by the Future Security Environment Working Group, submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, Washington (DC), April 1988
See also Barry M. Blechman, _US Security in the Twenty-First Century_, Boulder (Co.), 1987, pp.67-115

2) Demographic data are taken from:
A. Golini and C. Bonifazi, _Recenti tendenze e prospettive in tema di evoluzione demografica_, in M. Pacini and others, _Abitare il pianeta: futuro demografico, migrazioni e tensioni etniche_, vol. I _Il mondo arabo, l'Italia e l'Europa_, Torino 1989, pp. 79-105
G.C. Blangiardo and L. Di Comite, _L'evoluzione demografica sulla sponda meridionale del Mediterraneo: osservazioni complessive_, in M. Pacini, quoted, pp. 461-483
A. Golini, _The Demographic Situation of the EEC and other Mediterranean Countries. Scope for Discussion_, in A. Di Vittorio (ed.), _Statistical Sources and Economy of the Mediterranean Countries_, Napoli 1987, pp.319-325

3) M. Cremasco, _Do-it-Yourself: The National Approach to the Out-of-Area Question_, in J.I. Coffey & G. Bonvicini (eds.), _The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East_, London 1989, pp. 147-191
See also J. Brown, _The NATO Challenge in the Middle East_, in Royal United Services Institute & Brassey's, _Defence Yearbook 1987_, London 1987, pp. 253-267

4) Consider the distinctions drawn by Carroll Quigley between "shock" weapons and "missile" weapons as well as between "offensive dominance" and "defensive dominance" in military history: C. Quigley, _Weapons Systems and Political Stability_, Washington (DC), 1983, pp.40-54 and 1039-40
A good appraisal of the experience in the Gulf is in A.H. Cordesman, _The Gulf and the West - Strategic Relations and Military Realities_, Boulder (Co.) & London 1988, pp. 361-455

5) Political perceptions and the changing nature of threats are described also in:
J.L. Nunes and L.J.Smith (Co-Rapporteurs), _Final Report - Sub-Committee on Terrorism_, North Atlantic Assembly Papers, Brussels January 1989
A. De Guttry, _The Trasnational Circulation of Information on Terrorism among Investigating Bodies_, The International Spectator, Vol. XXIII No. 4 October-December 1988, Roma
R. Rummel, _Political Perceptions and Military Responses_, in J.I. Coffey & G. Bonvicini, quoted, pp. 193-226

6)   S. Silvestri, Crisis Management in the Mediterranean: Italy and Cooperation with Allied Nations, in J.N. Merritt, R. Reed & R. Weissinger-Baylon (eds.), Crisis Decision Making in the Atlantic Alliance, Palo Alto (Ca.) 1988, pp. 11-1/10
See also the various national chapters in J. Chipman (ed.), Nato's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges, London & New York 1988

7)   B.M. Blechman, quoted, pp. 37-56
See also:
Commitment to Freedom: Security Assistance as a US Policy Instrument in the Third World, a paper by the Working Group on Regional Conflict submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, Washington (DC), May 1988
R. Cohen and P. A. Wilson, Superpowers in Decline? Economic Performance and National Security, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 7 No. 2, New York 1988

8)   For further reading, see also:
A. Migliazza (ed.), Le forze multinazionali nel Libano e nel Sinai, Milano 1988
N. Ronzitti, The Crisis of the Traditional Law: Regulating International Armed Conflicts at Sea and the Need for its Revision, in N. Ronzitti (ed.), The law of Naval Warfare, Dordrecht Boston & London, 1988, pp. 1-58
R.W. Jones and others, The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation, Lexington (Mass.), 1985
P. Guerrieri & P.C. Padoan, International Cooperation and the Role of Macroeconomic Regimes, in P. Guerrieri & P.C. Padoan (eds.), The Political Economy of International Co-operation, London New York & Sidney, 1988 pp. 1-27
R.O. Keohane, Bargaining Perversities, Institutions, and International Economic Relations, in P. Guerrieri & P.C. Padoan, quoted, pp. 28-51
C. Merlini (ed.), Economic Summits and Western Decision-Making, London New York & Sidney, 1984
E. Luard, The Blunted Sword: The Erosion of Military Power in Modern World Politics, London 1989, pp. 165-179

9)   A.H. Cordesman, The Uses of Force in the Middle East, in J.I. Coffey & G. Bonvicini, quoted, pp. 73-145

10)   Ideas on European Political Cooperation are mainly drawn from:
G. Bonvicini, Out-of-Area Issues: A New Challenge to the Atlantic Alliance, in J.I. Coffey & G. Bonvicini, quoted, pp. 1-16
R. Aliboni, European Security and Out of NATO Area Crises, The International Spectator Vol. XXIII No.2 April-June 1988, Roma
G. Bonvicini & E. Regelsberger, The Decisionmaking Process in the EC's European Council, The International Spectator Vol. XXII No.3 July-September 1987, Roma

G. Bonvicini, European Political Cooperation: More than Traditional Diplomacy, The International Spectator Vol. XXI No.3 July-September 1986, Roma

A. Pijpers, E. Regelsberger & W. Wessels (eds.), European Political Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?, Dordrecht Boston & London, 1988. See in particular A. Pijpers, The Twelve out-of-area: a civilian power in an uncivil world?, pp. 143-165, C. Hill, European preoccupations with terrorism, pp. 166-193, and by the Editors, A common foreign policy for Western Europe?, pp. 259-275

11) to be published

12) K. Kaiser and others, The European Community: Progress or Decline?, London, 1983

13) "Cligendael" - DGAP - IAI - IFRI - RIIA, L'Espace, un enjeu pour l'Europe, Paris 1988, pp. 165-198

14) see also The Future of Containment: America's Options for Defending its Interests on the Soviet Periphery, report by the Offense-Defense Working Group submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Washington (DC), October 1988

Western European Forces available for out of area operations
This table (taken from A.H Cordesman, Use of Force in the Middle East, in J.I.
Coffey & G Bonvicini (eds.) The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East, MacMillan
Press, 1989) has to be considered largely a myth.

Country	Land Forces	Air Forces	Naval Forces	Mobility Forces
Belgium	1 Paracomm. regiment 2 Motorized infantry bn.	Misc. Helos 18 Mirage 5B fighters	.	12 C-130H 2 Boeing 727QC
Canada	Elements of 2 light brigade groups Special service force: 1 armoured regiment, 1 infantry bn. and support units	20-40 CF-116 (F-5) fighters ? CP-140 and CP-121 MPA/SAR	Up to 10 Destroyers 1-2 replenishm. support ships	26 CC-130E 5 CC-137 (707)
Denmark	1 regimental combat team			3 C-130H
France	1 Parachute division 1 Air-Portable marine division 1 Light armoured overseas int. bgde 1 Motorized infantry bgde 1 Infantry rgt.	1-2 Combat helicopter regiments Up to 100 Jaguar, Mirage III and Mirage 5, plus 25-50 Alphajets	1 Carrier TF 1 Helicopter TF 80+ naval combat aircraft 8 Submarines 2-10 Atlantique and Neptune MPA 6 Assault ships 590 Naval Commandos	48 C-160 13 C-160NG 6 tankers 6 logistic ships

West Germany	1 Airborne division 5-10 special security/commando bns.	1-2 F-4F FGA sqns. with 20-30 fighters	3-7 Frigates and Destroyers 6 Type 206 Submarines 5-10 Minecrafts	2-4 Boeing 707-320 C
Greece	1 Paracommando regiment	1-2 F-5A/B or Mirage F-1CG sqns. with 36-40 fighters	3-5 Frigates and Destroyers	3-4 C-130H 5-7 LSD, LST, LCT 5-10 LCU/LCM
Italy	1 Airborne bqde 1-2 Mechanised or motorised bgdes 2 Amphibious btns., Misc. helos sqns.	2-6 Attack and light attack sqns with up to 72 fighters 3-4 Atlantic MPA 1-2 Interceptor/ recce sqns.	1-2 Helicopter or VSTOL TFs with 5-8 surface ships each, 1 Marine inf. group 4-8 Minecraft	8 G-222 3-5 C-130H 2 Tankers/logistics ships 4-9 LST/LCM 2 LPD
Netherlands	1 Infantry bgde	18 NF-5B Misc. Helos 1-2 MPA	2-4 Destroyers frigates/corvettes 2 Amphibious combat groups	2 Fast combat support ships

Portugal	1 Commando rgt. 1 Special Forces bn.	8-20 G-91 Lt. Attack fighters	3-6 Frigates 3 Marine bns.	1-3 C-130H
Spain	1 Paracommando bgde 1 Airportable bgde 3-5 Infantry bns. 1 "Tercio" Foreign Legion Misc. Command and other bns; and cos.	10-30 F-5A/B fighters Misc. Helos	1 VSTOL TF. with 6-8 surface ships 1 Marine rgt. 5-10 Minecrafts 5-10 Patrol crafts	2-3 C-130H 2-4 KC-130H 4-7 landing crafts 2 Attack tranport
Turkey	1 Parachute bgde 1 Commando bgde ? Infantry bgdes ? Other units	18-36 F-5/RF-5 fighters ? F-100D OCUs fighters Misc. Helos	5-8 Destroyers or frigates 1 Marine bgde 5-8 Patrol boats 6-12 Minecrafts	2 Support ships 5 Tankers 2-5 C-130E 3-5 LST ? LCT/LCU/LCM
UK	3 Parachute bns. 1 SAS rgt. ? Infantry and armoured Recce bns.	45-72 Jaguar/Bucaneer Harrier attack fighters 18-36 FGR-2 (F-4) Tornado AWX ? AEW/MPA aircraft Misc. Helos 1-2 Rapier rgts.	1-2 Helo-VSTOL TFs with 8-16 surface ships each 1 Marine cdo bgde, 1 Special boat & 2 Marine raiding cos. 3-6 SSNs 5-8 SS ? Others surface ships 7-20 Minecrafts	11 VC10C1 15 Victor K-2 & 14 CP-1 tankers 2 LPD assault 5 Landing ships 2 Support ships ? Tanker ships

World naval operations and gunboat diplomacy 1946-82

Total number of accidents and operations, involving all countries, is recorded in the last column. Main countries concerned are indicated by name or collectively under "others WEU". "Out of Area" indicates if the operations did concern non-WEU countries in the Mediterranean, Middle East, Gulf, SE Asia, Africa. (Data collected in The Times Atlas of the Oceans, London 1983, pp. 232-234).

Year	USA	USSR	FRANCE	U. K.	OTHERS WEU	OUT OF AREA	TOTAL
1946	2	2	1	1		2	5
1947	1			1		1	2
1948	2			2		1	4
1949	1			3			3
1950	3			4		5	8
1952	1	1		1		1	2
1953				1			2
1954	2			1			5
1955	2						3
1956	2		4	3	1	5	5
1957	2	1				2	3
1958	3	1	1	1		2	5
1959	2	1	1			1	4
1960	2				1	1	3
1961	3		1	1	1	2	5
1962	2				1	2	3
1963	2		1	2		1	5
1964	2			2		5	5
1965	3			3		3	4
1966				2		1	2
1967	2	1		2		5	5
1968	3	2		1		1	5
1969	1			1	1	1	4
1970	2	3			2	3	4
1971	3	1				4	7
1972	2			2	1	2	5
1973	3	2	1	2	1	7	10
1974	1			1	1	4	6
1975	4			3	1	6	9
1976		1		2		3	7
1977		2	1	1		3	5
1978	2	3	1	1		3	6
1979	4	1		1		1	5
1980	4	1	1	1	1	4	8
1981	2	1				6	8
1982		1	1	1		3	6
Totale	70	25	14	47	12	91	178