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THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION:
THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION
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The Mediterranean was a region in its own right -consistent and cohesive on both cultural and political grounds- in the Greek-Roman era. With the end of the classical world, the division between the West and the Orient established a frontier across the Mediterranean. The rise of Islam and the long struggle between Christendom and Islam reinforced the frontier.

The discovery of the American continent at the fall of the XVth century marked the end of the Mediterranean centrality. At the same time, the reconquest of Granada transformed the frontier into a fracture. Since then, the two worlds will live for a long while two substantially separated lives. As a result, the Mediterranean frontier from a line of encounters and clashes became one of neglect and segregation, and so it remained until the end of the XVIIIth century.

This is not to say that the Mediterranean is a place of confrontation and division only. A political frontier must not necessarily be conflictual. Nor must it necessarily separate different cultures. At many points in its history there has been cooperation across the Mediterranean frontier. By the same token, despite the frontier across it, the core basin has kept alive its cultural homogeneity. Only the rapid modernization undergone by the Mediterranean area after the Second World War, especially on its Northern side, has disrupted the ancient values and behaviours; has brought sweeping differences in revenues; and has even changed the environment that was the basis of the Mediterranean cultural unity. Nonetheless, the Mediterranean cultural homogeneity has not disappeared. It still gives Mediterranean peoples some sense of community. Furthermore, the segregation that had prevailed between the XVIth and the XVIIIth centuries has given way to a new, intense rapprochement in the course of the colonization/decolonization period, once again alternating between conflict and cooperation across the frontier.

One aspect that is worth noting is the difficulty to identify this Mediterranean frontier clearly, because of the existing cultural interpenetration and because of the coexistence of cooperation and conflict. This is particularly true in our times, when Western political and social values have spilled over to Arab and Islamic countries and economic and political interdependence is a paramount factor in international relations. The most evident case in point is Turkey, a prevaillingly Islamic country that having embodied European-like political values wants to be identified as European and is pressing to become a full member of the EC. Other cases -as those of a number of Arab Mediterranean countries now heading towards forms of democracy- are perhaps less evident. Nonetheless they are not unlike Turkey's case.

Now that momentous changes in the East-West relations are harbingers to no less momentous changes in the inter-European relations, one may wonder how the Mediterranean space will enter the coming equation; where the Mediterranean frontier will be drawn; and how Mediterranean identities and solidarities may affect changes underway in Europe. This is the question that will be addressed in this chapter.

1. Patterns of Mediterranean solidarities

In addressing the question we have just mentioned, the first step will be that of defining Mediterranean patterns of solidarity on subjective grounds. Then we will ask how effective they are. Finally, we will discuss the relationship between Mediterranean patterns of solidarity and the changing European space.

Regional Mediterranean solidarity - Let us first refer to what one could define as the "regional" pattern of Mediterranean solidarity, that is one including Southern European, North African and Near Eastern countries. This notion is rooted in a shared cultural and historical heritage, that gives Mediterranean peoples a sense of community and "spécificité". However, this Mediterranean pride for its illustrious past doesn't match its present political, economic and military capacities. For this reason the Mediterranean man often lives a neurotic situation due to the tremendous gap between his impotence to govern his political and social environment and his historical memory (1).

This syndrome of frustration is also at the root of the present Islamic revivalism, as pointed out by many Arab authors (2). The despair brought about by the unexpected defeat of the Egyptian army in 1967 caused numerous crises in identity and personality that could be solved only by a return to cultural and religious roots. Events in the other Arab countries and Iran followed similar paths.

The "regional" Mediterranean solidarity is directed at overcoming frustration and marginalisation by redeeming political autonomy. Marginal actors seek to unite against those new political and ideological forces that have defeated the old Mediterranean centrality and reduced old and sophisticated cultures into sub-cultures. This is the case of those nations (the Catalans, the Sicilians, the Sardinians, the Basques, the Kabyles, etc.) that have been absorbed by the modern, centrally organized Mediterranean nation-states. It is also the case of the Arab and Islamic nations in relation to the powerful, technologically advanced Western countries. Finally, it is the case of the less developed Mediterranean regions, both in Southern European and Arab countries, in relation to the "Americanization", that is the sudden change in values and social order imposed on a more general level by Western modernization.

When looked at from such an angle, the "regional" Mediterranean solidarity is nothing other than one form of non-alignment or a sort of North-South tension that cuts across Arab as well as European solidarities at both national and international levels.

Inter-regional Mediterranean solidarity - A second kind of Mediterranean solidarity regards the different sets of "Mediterranean association agreements" and the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD). This time the Mediterranean solidarity goes beyond the Mediterranean basin, reaching the Northern EC countries on the one hand, and the Gulf countries, on the other. One can talk about an "inter-regional" Mediterranean solidarity.

Different trends have combined to explain this form of solidarity. The first trend was due to the necessity for some members of the then European Economic Community to settle their special economic relations with the former colonies at the very moment they entered the EC custom area. This led to the association agreements with Tunisia, Morocco and later Algeria. A second trend resulted from purely economic factors: the extension of the EC's agricultural protectionism to the Mediterranean products and the proximity of the large EC market to economies committed to export-led development policies. This brought

about a proliferation of agreements and later on the attempt to give them order by the so called "overall Mediterranean policy". A third trend arose as a consequence of the first oil crisis in 1973-74 and gave way to the EAD.

The "inter-regional" pattern of Mediterranean solidarity has notable implications. First, it gives the Mediterranean countries a status formally (i.e., politically) equal to that of other regional groupings cooperating with the EC, as the EFTA countries. It must be noted, however, that this status is backed by a very weak structure, because the relationship is not group to group, as in the case of EC-EFTA relations. Each Mediterranean country has its own individual relation with the EC. Though this doesn't put in question the equality of their status as compared to other groupings, their relationship is comparatively weakened by its star-shaped structure.

Second, whereas the "regional" pattern of solidarity identifies a South-South region, more or less in conflict with the North and cutting across the European solidarity, the "inter-regional" pattern is a regular North-South frame whose aims are explained by definition in terms of cooperation for attaining development.

In sum, the EC-Mediterranean relationship is a cooperative framework, competing with other cooperative inter-group EC relations -though possibly weaker than the latter. In contrast, the "regional" pattern is a conflictual one.

Perceptions and "inter-regional" patterns - Perceptions about the rationale of this "inter-regional" solidarity differ. This may affect the ordinary cooperative character of the pattern and give way to conflictual "inter-regional" patterns of solidarity.

When at the end of 1973 a team of Arab Ministers went to propose the EAD to the European Ministers gathering in Copenhagen, what they had in mind was a Euro-Arab trade-off: Arab oil in exchange for European support of the Arabs with respect to Israel and the USA. As in the case of the "regional" pattern of solidarity, again we discover a form of North-South tension under a Mediterranean cover. However, this conflictual pattern -cutting across both Atlantic and European solidarities- has failed to materialize. The EAD has never really taken off and it is being replaced by more fruitful relations between the EC and sub-regional entities, like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and probably the newly-born Union du Maghreb Arabe (UAM).

Yet, many Mediterranean Arab countries remain firm in their belief that the European countries, and specifically the EC, are more sensitive to their aims and grievances and that this could help put pressure on the USA. This belief is supported by the existing network of commercial and economic agreements; by the 1980 Venice resolution whereby the EC Governments recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative of the Palestinians; by the EC countries attitude to emphasize political and local factors in managing Mediterranean crises (as opposed to the US attitude to emphasize global and military factors). This perceived pattern of solidarity, based as it is on the assumption of an Arab-European "spécificité" with respect to the USA, is close to that related to the EAD. However, on political grounds, it is very different, because here the Euro-Arab combination is expected to help persuade the USA not to attack it or separate the EC from it (3).

In conclusion, while the early Arab motivations for the EAD put forward a conflictual pattern of solidarity that cuts across Atlantic and European solidarities, Euro-Arab relations as a whole -marked by the Arab ever-present second goal of enjoying the Europeans' good offices with the Americans- constitute a case of a cooperative pattern of "inter-regional" solidarity.

Southern European patterns of solidarity We come now to the Southern European solidarity, that is the specific identity that would put together the Southern members of the EC: France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain -and maybe those still waiting at the EC door, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey.

The first question is whether this group of countries perceives itself as specific with respect to other internal EC groupings. The second question is that some Southern Europeans feel they have a special role to play within the "inter-regional" patterns of Mediterranean solidarity, that is between EC Northern countries and non-EC Mediterranean countries. As a consequence, Southern European solidarity can be at once a "domestic" cross-cutting pattern -when it works as an EC grouping inside the EC- and a factor in the "inter-regional" patterns of Mediterranean solidarity. It can also act on both grounds.

The rationale for Southern "domestic" solidarity often claimed by the Southern European leaders is the interest for the Southern European EC countries to unite in order to balance the influence of the Northern members inside the EC. During the process of the enlargement of the EC to Greece, Portugal and Spain, along with the necessity to support democracy in these countries by including them into the EC, the balance of power inside the EC has been one of the standard arguments of the debate carried out in the Southern European countries (4).

This position, firmly held by the Socialist parties -that for a short period happened to head all the Southern European Governments- is not shared by all political forces. However, it must be noted that, whenever effective, this "domestic" cross-cutting pattern of solidarity would be a conflictual one.

As for the role the Southern European countries are expected to play within the extra-EC patterns of Mediterranean solidarity, the argument is that their natural sensitivity to the problems and claims of the Southern Mediterranean countries would push them to represent and to support the latter inside the EC. (This argument is parallel to the one we presented when discussing the Euro-Arab solidarity with respect to the USA).

As a matter of fact, because of their agricultural interests the Southern European countries fiercely compete with the Southern Mediterranean countries to preserve their preference on the EC market. However, the "regional" sense of community existing among the countries concerned and the definite importance of their multiple economic and political ties on bilateral grounds make this solidarity credible. It may be interesting to report here that the final resolution approved by the 2nd Forum of the Western Mediterranean countries (held on May 25-28, 1989 in Tangiers) defined the role of the South-western European countries as that of "mentors" of the Maghreb countries with respect to the EC (5).

This would mean that within the "inter-regional" pattern of Mediterranean solidarity, the EC Southern solidarity plays a positive role and that it contributes to reinforcing the cooperative brand of the "inter-regional" pattern. However, on the other side of the coin, there is the fact that the Southern members of the EC may look at the "mandate" entrusted to them by the Mediterranean countries as a factor reinforcing their bargaining position within the EC policy framework. This would bring us back to the conflictual pattern already noted in the discussion about "domestic" Southern European solidarity.

In the discussion to follow we will give full consideration to both the cooperative and conflictual cross-cutting patterns of Southern European solidarity. Enforced as they would be by a group of full members of the EC, these patterns would definitely have a special impact on the future shape of

the European solidarity. We will consider, but give less importance the cooperative "inter-regional" pattern of Mediterranean solidarity. Finally, we will not consider the conflictual types of the "inter-regional" solidarity nor the pattern of "regional" solidarity. This is not to say that they have no chances. However, as much as things may change in Europe, it seems highly improbable that the Southern Europeans will opt for a North-South solidarity against other possible frameworks of West-West and/or East-West solidarity. Also, it seems equally improbable that the EC will split along a North-South divide with the Southern European countries -or some of them- sailing towards the Mediterranean and its surroundings.

2. Mediterranean solidarities: how effective?

How effective are the solidarities we have just mentioned? The aim of this section is to examine a number of indicators, both on political and economic grounds, so as to test their effectiveness.

Trade - Trade is an important item for Mediterranean relations, both inside the EC -as part of the enlargement negotiations that brought the new Southern European members into the EC- and as part of the preferential "association agreements" between the EC and the Southern Mediterranean countries.

Table 1 (6) shows the shares of three areas (Northern EC countries; Southern EC countries; and the non-EC Mediterranean countries) in the total imports and exports of the Southern EC countries. Figures are provided for two years, 1980 and 1986, so as to appreciate the impact of the enlargement of the EC to Greece, Portugal and Spain.

The first conclusion suggested by Table 1 is that the Southern EC countries are increasing their integration into the EC to a very remarkable extent. If the figures of Northern and Southern EC countries are combined, it emerges that the Southern EC countries increased their import shares from the EC as a whole by 14.2 points and their export share to the EC by 26.1. If one distinguishes the two areas, it is evident that the Southern EC countries' trade with their Northern partners is increasing more than their mutual trade inside the Southern EC region. This may suggest that the "pull" comes from the Northern EC countries and that the perceived solidarity of Southern EC countries is not supported by a special importance of their commercial relations.

The second conclusion is that trade relations of Southern EC countries with the non-EC Mediterranean countries are stagnating, in startling contrast with their relations inside the EC. This stagnation is confirmed by data on the EC as a whole (not included in Table 1): the shares of the non-EC Mediterranean countries in the total imports and exports of the EC diminished from 4 to 3.7 and from 5.4 to 4.4 respectively.

For our purposes it would be helpful to ascribe this adverse tendency affecting the non-EC Mediterranean countries to the fall of oil prices or to the displacement effect caused by the entry of Greece, Portugal and Spain into the EC. If it were caused by the effects of the enlargement, one conclusion could be that the "inter-regional" Mediterranean solidarity is diminishing at the expense of the EC and Southern EC countries' solidarities. It may be, however, that in 1986 the impact of the fall in oil prices was still more important than that of the EC enlargement. George N. Yannopoulos, who authoritatively analysed the trade effects of the second EC enlargement, had some reservations about the ability of Spain to supply all the more industrial products the EC preference would warrant, whereas he had no doubt about agricultural products -as already witnessed by the early Greek case (7). Thus

Table 1 - Shares of Selected Areas in Southern EC Countries' Total Import and Export, 1980 and 1986

	Northern EC Countries	Southern EC Countries	Non-EC Mediterranean Countries
Import			
1980	28.5	14.6	6.2
1986	38.9	18.4	5.8
Export			
1980	30.4	18.9	9.3
1986	47.3	26.1	8.4

Source: elaboration of ENI data

he seemed to imply that some room was left for the non-EC Mediterranean countries. In a seminar given later at Wiston House (8), however, he was more explicit about the adverse consequences affecting the Southern Mediterranean countries, especially the Maghreb countries: "It may be argued that entry has undermined the EC's system of preferences for associated non-EC Mediterranean countries.... Although agreement has been reached that their exports will be maintained at 1986 levels ... the expanding EC market has been denied to the Maghreb states.... In response to this situation a number of countries (Cyprus, Malta, Morocco and Turkey) have applied for EC membership or requested closer links."

To conclude the discussion on Table 1, the enforcement of the EC preference is redirecting considerable amounts of the new Southern European members' trade towards the EC. As part of their integration into the EC, the new Southern European members are increasing their trade within the Southern European region itself. This "sub-regional" trend, however, is less -and not more important- than the general trend towards an increased integration into the whole of the EC.

The accession of the new Southern European members to the EC, coupled with the decrease in the price of oil, is diminishing the already modest importance of the Southern Mediterranean countries to the EC trade, whereas the EC importance to the former is not diminishing -and perhaps even growing (9).

In other words, Southern EC countries' solidarity seems less than that of the EC. Furthermore, the EC-Southern Mediterranean solidarity is weakening and its future appears linked less to an inherent economic logic than to political options. This is the meaning of the applications made by Cyprus, Malta and Morocco and of the insistence of Turkey to speed up its own accession to the EC.

Table 2 gives a more detailed insight into the Mediterranean trade relations. It shows the shares of the five Southern EC countries, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and the USA in the total 1987 import of the Mediterranean countries, both EC and non-EC.

The importing EC and non-EC Mediterranean countries are divided into four groups, according to the dominance of four exporting countries: FRG, Italy, USA and France. France is the most important partner of the three Maghreb countries. Similarly, Italy is an important partner for Libya, in addition to a heterogeneous group including Cyprus, Lebanon and Malta. The USA has a special relation with Egypt, Israel and Jordan, clearly brought about by the regular aid programmes devoted to these countries. The FRG is the first partner of all the Southern EC countries plus Turkey and Yugoslavia. Moreover, in every group it is second to the dominant partner and, normally, extremely close to it -as in the case of Italy.

What is remarkable -though not very surprising- in this picture is that the central role in Mediterranean trade relations is played by two non-Mediterranean countries, FRG and partly by the USA, rather than by some Mediterranean powers. Another remarkable feature is the parallel between trade relations and traditional political links, with the UK role being substantially replaced by the USA. Fifteen years ago Marcello De Cecco (10) came to the same conclusion. Following his analysis, one can still note that the FRG shows a surplus in its trade balance in relation to all the EC and non-EC importing countries listed in Table 2 -except for Algeria and Tunisia. The Southern EC countries show surpluses in relation to other Mediterranean countries (though less regularly than FRG's) but not so in relation to the latter. The way deficits are paid gives a very clear picture of the Mediterranean economy and its international integration. In fact, they are offset by tourism and labour.

Table 2 - EC and Non-EC Mediterranean Countries: Imports from Selected EC Countries and the USA as Shares of their Total Imports, 1987

	France	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Spain	FRG	USA
France	-	0.4	11.7	1.0	4.3	19.6	7.1
Greece	8.0	-	13.1	0.2	1.7	22.1	2.8
Italy	14.6	1.0	-	0.3	2.2	21.1	5.3
Portugal	11.1	0.03	8.7	-	11.8	14.7	4.9
Spain	12.8	0.3	8.8	1.7	-	16.1	8.3
Turkey	4.9	0.7	8.4	0.1	1.5	19.1	11.7
Yugoslavia	4.2	0.4	10.6	0.04	0.4	22.4	2.9
Cyprus	4.6	7.6	11.5	0.5	2.4	9.2	4.5
Lebanon	15.0	3.3	19.8	0.2	4.8	10.9	10.2
Libya	5.3	0.8	24.7	0.04	2.8	11.3	...
Malta	3.4	1.5	18.9	0.3	1.8	17.4	10.7
Syria	10.3	1.7	10.7	0.06	3.4	9.9	5.8
Egypt	8.0	1.1	6.7	0.07	1.5	9.5	19.6
Israel	3.8	0.2	5.2	0.2	0.9	10.7	13.4
Jordan	3.3	0.4	4.9	0.03	0.9	6.7	8.8
Algeria	29.8	0.5	11.8	0.3	5.2	10.3	6.5
Morocco	22.8	0.1	5.6	0.6	9.1	6.0	9.2
Tunisia	27.3	2.4	11.3	0.2	4.5	12.6	5.9

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade

While tourism is exported by all the countries concerned, labour is now immigrating from the less developed non-EC Mediterranean countries more than from the Southern EC countries as in the recent past.

These observations seem to suggest that the Southern EC countries' role in representing non-EC Mediterranean countries in the EC is highly debatable. The non-EC Mediterranean countries are highly integrated with the EC as a whole, especially with the FRG, though in a frame of generally dwindling relations. The notable exception to this picture seems to be France's solidarity with the Maghreb. Its current effort to associate the Southern EC partners to institutionalize a specific Western Mediterranean solidarity may have the sense of opposing this strong German teleology in the Mediterranean. If France were to succeed in its endeavour, it would give substance to a Southern European solidarity that would cut across the EC.

Immigration - From what we have just said about the structure of the Mediterranean economy, one can argue that migration is an outstanding issue in the "inter-regional" Mediterranean frame. To its inherent importance, one has to add the fact that migration is going to increase sharply because of growing demographic differentials between the EC countries and the non-EC Mediterranean countries.

According to several studies and especially the UNEP's "Blue Plan" (11), the demographic structure of the Mediterranean is undergoing a sweeping change. In 1980, the Northern shore accounted for 56% of the overall Mediterranean population. In 2020 it will account for no more than one third of it.

This tendency is coupled with a growing proportion of youngsters in the non-EC Mediterranean countries. The slow growth foreseen in these countries will not allow for younger generations to be fully employed. Prospects for a persistent growth differential with respect to the EC will induce a large number of people to migrate to the EC. As a result the migration pattern already inherent in the Mediterranean economy will be markedly emphasized. According to Massimo Livi Bacci (12), the work force from abroad will amount to an average 10% of the total Western European work force, i.e. more or less 250,000 immigrants per year. To complete the picture, one has to think of the fact that the end of the boom undergone by the Arab world during the seventies brought strong limitations to inter-Arab migration. As a consequence, pressure on the EC may be even higher.

Until now, only the Northern EC countries, especially the FRG and France, have acted as receiving countries. Today, the Southern EC countries, especially Italy and Spain -historically countries of emigration- are beginning to transform into receiving countries. On the other hand, sending countries are changing, too. To Turkey and the Maghreb countries, other non-EC Mediterranean countries must be added, like Egypt and Lebanon. Again, to complete the picture, there are new and considerable extra-Mediterranean flows of migrants now competing with old and new Mediterranean flows. They come from Africa South of Sahara, South-western Asia and Eastern Europe. Developments in Poland and the growing EC commitment to support Eastern European economies may bring about a large immigration of educated and skilled Poles. Competition will also take place on religious and cultural grounds. It is interesting to note that presently, despite the absence of a conscious migration policy, migrant flows to Italy are mainly from Christian backgrounds: Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Poland and the Philippines. For all these reasons, only part of the 250,000 jobs calculated by Livi Bacci will be available to people coming from the non-EC Mediterranean countries.

Will the "inter-regional" EC-Mediterranean solidarity work by giving preference to Mediterranean migrant workers? The FRG, and partly, Italy will

definitely prove sensitive to Eastern European migration. France will try to preserve a preference for the Maghreb countries. Different solidarities will cut across the EC.

Will the Southern EC countries unite with respect to the immigration issue? Attitudes and perceptions seem very different, though all of them are interested in maintaining a high degree of openness because of tourism. In Italy there is the recognition that foreign manpower is needed for the economy to work. However, the government and the political forces are reluctant to regulate immigration because they feel regulation is ungenerous discrimination that could lead to racism. Portugal and Spain see immigration as a threat to both domestic manpower and security. In France a strong racist movement has emerged and, given the wave of Lebanese-French terrorism since 1985, they worry that immigrants may become involved in terrorist activities (13). In conclusion, situations are too diverse to produce solidarity among the Southern EC countries, unless France manages to convince its Southern EC partners to espouse its policy of promoting special solidarity with the Maghreb countries within the framework of a "Western Mediterranean Community", a development that seems improbable.

The British Prime Minister in her 1988 speech at the Collège d'Europe in Bruges expressed doubts about the permeability of the frontiers of the Southern EC members after 1992, i.e. as soon as people are able to move without any police control within the EC. Italy is willing to join the Schengen Group, but continues to be ambiguous on its willingness to follow stricter immigration policies. Is there a prospect of a split on immigration and security between Northern and Southern EC countries? The question definitely deserves negotiation among the EC members. If such negotiations begin, Southern EC countries will not necessarily act as a group, though this cannot be ruled out.

Security - In contrast with the issues previously examined, security against the new threats coming from the Southern approaches to Western Europe (14) is the field in which a specific Southern European solidarity may emerge. Differences in Southern European perceptions in relation to East-West security as well as to the new threats from the South have been illustrated in detail by a recent set of analyses (15). Solidarities may be less clear.

The question of Southern Europe's role in the security South of the NATO area has multilateral and bilateral aspects. Let us start with multilateral aspects.

There are two dimensions to Western European countries' ever more frequent interventions in the out of the NATO area. First the geopolitical dimension justifying intervention on the basis of threats to national security interests: France, for example, intervened in Chad, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, etc. because it was required by French political and economic interests. The same threat may concern more than one country at the same time, thus leading to so-called multinational interventions. These are the result of the convergence of the interests of different countries and not of a predetermined solidarity within a multilateral alliance. This is proven by the fact that in both Lebanon and the Persian Gulf there was no formal coordination.

Besides this, there is a dimension which might be called "transatlantic". Within this dimension, Western European countries intervene in relation to threats which they may not necessarily consider as such, but which the United States does. Thus, the "transatlantic" dimension justifies intervention on the basis of the Western European countries' interest in supporting the USA, in that it is a fundamental factor in their security in Europe, regardless of their opinion of the threat. As is obvious, and as was seen in the eighties, very serious inter-Atlantic conflicts can arise in this dimension.

Another but not less important aspect of out-of-area intervention concerns the specific organization of Western European allies. The Western European countries' recognition of their common economic interests and the resulting institutionalization in the framework of the EC has made it possible to define common objectives in this area and to organize communitarian policies, agreements and institutions, which have certainly had considerable impact South of Western Europe. The absence of a common security concept and common defence institutions, along with the institutional weakness of European Political Cooperation (EPC), has resulted in the fact that an analogous politico-military EC presence in the out-of-area sphere has never been developed. Whenever it has occurred, the joint presence of European countries in the out of NATO area has been a multinational presence, not based on European solidarity.

This is not the only consequence of the lack of European political integration; another important offshoot is the Western European countries' weakness in negotiating American requests and motivations in the "transatlantic" dimension of out of the NATO area intervention.

Within this context, what may unite Southern European countries is the fact that they are particularly exposed to the conflict implicit in the "transatlantic" dimension and to the weakness of the EC political-military institutions.

Where the institutional framework of the Alliance is lacking, such as in out-of-area operations, bilateral relations end up prevailing between the United States and its European allies. It is no coincidence that these bilateral relations, which parallel multilateral ones, are more important between US and Southern European countries. Taken individually, the countries in the south of Europe are objectively weak with respect to the US. In the discussions or controversies which arise time and again in relations between the two parties, the Southern European nations try to find compensation in anti-American rhetoric or price of bases or constituencies' increases, but in the end, they do not prevent the United States from pursuing policies which would have to be negotiated on totally different grounds in a multilateral context. The hijacking of the "Achille Lauro" liner in 1985 and the events that followed at the Sigonella base provide a clear lesson in this sense. The US bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986 is another example.

In relation to this situation, the Southern European countries may develop two kinds of policies. They may understand that they have a common interest in fostering a more organic EC presence in the Mediterranean and, more generally speaking, in the south of NATO area, on economic as well as on political and military grounds. In this case they will evolve a Southern European solidarity to try to direct EC and other European policies towards a renewed and stronger solidarity with the Southern Mediterranean countries. On the other hand, they may reinforce their bilateral relations. This is what they are doing, though this development is limited to the south-western European countries, especially France, Italy and Spain, because of the conflict prevailing between Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean (16).

The difference between the two courses of action -that obviously are not mutually exclusive- is that, with respect to EC solidarity, the multilateral course is a cooperative pattern of Southern European solidarity, whereas the bilateral course may emerge as a conflictual pattern. So much so that European multilateralism may include Greece, whereas bilateral relations have the tendency to leave this country in dangerous isolation.

3. Mediterranean dimension and European changes

Economic relations - With respect to the present evolution of the EC, the Mediterranean dimension, with its various solidarities, is competing with two more dimensions, that of EFTA and that of Eastern Europe.

The completion of the Single European Market in 1992 is prompting a number of EFTA members to apply for EC membership, as a consequence of the fact that today EFTA is the most important commercial partner of the EC. In turn, EC is also EFTA's most important export market. There is a tendency for the two areas to set up a privileged relationship so as to materialize the "natural" potential of integration (17) of the European region as a whole - a tendency that may include Eastern Europe as well. A first step in this direction was the Declaration on the creation of a European "dynamic space" signed in 1984 between the two entities.

Will a greater EC-EFTA solidarity emerge at the expense of the non-EC Mediterranean countries? So far the proximity of the large industrialized area of the EC, giving free and/or preferential access to LDCs' manufactured products proved beneficial to those non-EC Mediterranean countries (like Turkey) that are carrying out industrialization and export-led growth policies. In contrast, the Maghreb countries proved unable to take advantage of the EC because of their accentuated agricultural specialization (Morocco and Tunisia), inward-looking and ambitious industrialization policies (Algeria), and the existence of strategic limitation to export to the EC (textile and petroleum products). As a result, if the EC were to enlarge further to industrialized countries, while maintaining its present "protectionist" policies, it would create new difficulties for the Maghreb countries, though it would increase the advantages presently enjoyed by other non-EC Mediterranean countries. In particular, such an enlargement to some EFTA countries would warrant new markets for Spain's agriculture, but it would deny further markets to the Maghreb countries and to other non-EC Mediterranean countries specializing in agricultural products.

The evolution of the EC and the whole of Western Europe with respect to Eastern European countries, especially those in Central Europe, is a more competitive process than that discussed above. Besides commerce, it competes with the Mediterranean dimension on other grounds: migration, investment -both private and public- and even food aid. This tendency, already at work, was confirmed by the July 1989 decision made at the Paris Summit of the Seven most important industrialized countries that has given the EC the task of organizing Western aid to Poland and Hungary. In any case, the tendency to divert developmental and economic resources towards the Eastern countries is reinforced by strong political and emotional factors presiding over the whole of the evolution.

The combination of the two processes -EFTA and Eastern Europe- will make the non-EC Mediterranean countries' situation in relation to the EC definitely difficult, unless the "inter-regional" EC-Mediterranean solidarity and/or the help of the Southern EC countries works in some way.

Too strong a diversion of resources away from the non-EC Mediterranean countries, despite the EC solidarity with respect to the necessity of facilitating changes in the Eastern European countries, may bring about some splits among EC members. Some of the Southern EC countries, especially France, may feel that their interests are at risk and, most of all, some fears may arise as to the overall imbalance among Northern, Central and Southern approaches brought about by a concentration of resources towards Eastern and Northern Europe. This reaction might take the form of a Southern EC solidarity to give special advantages to the Maghreb countries with the creation of the

"Western Mediterranean Community" we have already hinted at. This would be a divisive decision with respect to the EC. However, it might also assume an enlarged form, as a new type of "overall Mediterranean policy". One should not overlook the fact, in the end, that the FRG has more economic interests in the wider Mediterranean area than has France, Italy or Spain. It is evident that this would be a political decision, motivated by political and security rather than truly economic motives. The political motive would be that of preserving a fair balance of interest among the EC members. The security motive would be that of giving room and reinforcing the emergence of moderate forces and factors in the Arab/Islamic world.

"Where to draw the line" - One important aspect of this probable evolution in the Mediterranean is the question raised by the recent multiplication of membership application. As we said, this is fundamentally due to the fear of being excluded from the EC market as a consequence of the enlargement to Greece, Portugal and Spain, though political motives are not failing to be present as well. Turkey and now Morocco want to become members of the EC as a means of asserting their secular and democratic identity, though this motive is definitely more powerful in Turkey than in Morocco. Malta, with the change in its leadership, wants to become a member in order to rebuff the neutralist policies adopted by the previous government and thereby asserting its Western and European identity. Cyprus is looking for an EC guarantee in its difficult predicament between Greece and Turkey. If a policy of renovation and reinforcement of the Mediterranean solidarity were decided upon, where would the EC draw the line?

Moroccan membership seems out of the question. Its application is most of all a somewhat ironical way to complain about the consequences of the EC enlargement. Furthermore, after having applied to the EC, Morocco has signed the treaty setting up the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UMA), an important attempt of Arab unification. No one -not even the EC or the Moroccan government- will distract it from such attempt.

As for Malta, its membership in the EC entails a decision about its neutrality, a status that is unilaterally guaranteed by Italy. In contrast with Austria's application, which seems to be conditional on maintaining its neutral status, Malta's present leadership seems open to change or to qualifying the island's status. However, one has to add that this change may bring about problems more with Libya than with the USSR. Even the Italian government may prefer that Malta keep neutral so as to prevent arguments with Libya. This is not a specific Mediterranean problem, nor is it new to the EC. If the EC is willing to develop the Single Act in all its implications, the compatibility of neutral status with membership in the EC must be clarified on general grounds.

The most complicated question regards the Eastern Mediterranean. A success in the CFE talks would probably weaken Western motives to reinforce Turkey's alliance by integrating it into the EC and the wider circle of Western institutions. The weakening of such motives would combine with existing strong oppositions to Turkey's entry into the EC. On the other hand, Cyprus's membership is fully linked to the dispute between Greece and Turkey and to Turkey's possible membership in the EC. If Cyprus's membership becomes a factor in the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, no one will oppose it. The same would be true if Turkey were to become a full member of the EC -possibly having settled with Greece.

In conclusion, we can foresee two possible "lines". The first line would enlarge the EC to Turkey, Cyprus and, possibly, Malta. The second line would leave these countries outside the EC. In any case, it remains to be seen what the status of the non-EC Mediterranean countries will be in relation to the EC:

a new attempt at setting up a single "overall Mediterranean policy" with its star-shaped pattern of relations; differentiated individual statuses; a special status for the Maghreb/UMA countries under the cover of the EC or that of a "Western Mediterranean Community".

Security relations - Until now we have considered the economic aspects of the question. However, the most important evolution in Central Europe concerns security and political relations.

Though it may be very difficult to foresee the East-West evolution in Eastern Europe, what is seemingly happening in the region is a form of reverse "finlandization". Whereas Finland is a "Western" country that maintains a special political and security relationship with the USSR, Poland and Hungary (and maybe others to follow among Eastern European countries) are maintaining their security and political relationships with the USSR but are "westernizing" their political and economic systems. If carried out fairly, this process may warrant détente and disarmament without implying destabilization of the wider East-West framework. It may probably also allow for the longer period of time that the completion of the Soviet "restructuring" is likely to require. For these reasons there is no doubt that the general interest -on both the Western and Eastern sides- is converging on the necessity to avoid destabilization in Central-Eastern Europe (a task the Catholic Church may ease by prompting to power forces that would help substitute and liquidate the discredited local communist parties).

One may understand that this fascinating political horizon will attract the best of the Western European political forces and consequently distract them from the Mediterranean. This is not to say that it will obscure the necessity for the EC to rearrange its Mediterranean policies. However, it will make more difficult and laborious a process that, as indicated above, is already difficult in its own right.

Disarmament measures expected from the CFE talks, besides nuclear measures that have already taken place and that may multiply in the future, are going to have special consequences for the Mediterranean situation. If we look at the Mediterranean basin as the Southern Flank of NATO, two scenarios may be envisaged: first, an increase of tension on the Northern and Southern wings of the central European front, unless arms control, political understandings and confidence building measures are expanded (e.g., to naval arms); second, the propagation of the central front's détente as the consequence of a wider East-West understanding (e.g., an understanding expanded to regional crises).

The second scenario would contribute to an attitude of neglect with respect to the Mediterranean. The first, would expose first of all the Southern EC countries and Turkey, while pushing the Northern EC countries to the back of the stage. This differentiation would not go without consequences for the EC solidarity. This solidarity would also be tested because the special Mediterranean exposure of the Southern EC countries will create a closer association between them and the USA, the dominant power in the area. This association would bring about cooperation and conflict, as in the past, and would not facilitate on the whole any "inter-regional" EC-Mediterranean relationship.

Southern EC countries' exposure to Mediterranean tension and to American "bilateralism" may also emerge in a situation of decreasing East-West tension in the Mediterranean basin. If the out-of-area threat continues or increases, and if the Southern EC countries are left alone to tackle it in a framework in which NATO's perception of the East-West threat is diminishing, again this would contribute to dividing Southern and Northern EC members. At the time of writing this chapter, France's lonely attempt at influencing the Lebanon crisis

with its strange mix of humanitarian and military instruments may be a harbinger to such developments.

In conclusion, the most evident Mediterranean question that may arise from the new *détente* in Central/Eastern Europe is the isolation of the Southern European countries in dealing with threats south of NATO, both in the East-West and in the out-of-area frameworks. As indicated in the second section, this predicament may also combine with a difficult bilateral relationship with the USA. This creeping split within the EC and within NATO is of no interest to anyone. If a solidarity among the Southern EC countries must be established in order to tackle Mediterranean problems, it must be done with the aim of strengthening EC political and military solidarity and enforcing EC rather than Southern European policies.

Notes

(1) This is the way a contemporary French novelist, Dominique Fernandez, has observed this gap and the consequent neuroses in Naples (Italy): "Nous descendons via Costantinopoli, entre les belles demeures décrépites qui n'ont jamais eu le temps sans doute d'être tout à fait des palais. La contradiction entre le génie inventif et l'insuccès pratique, entre la fécondité intellectuelle et la malchance, le sous-développement, le marasme chronique, est l'aspect le plus émouvant de Naples. ... (As a consequence) Cris et pleurs s'échappent par les fenêtres. Les femmes s'interpellent en se frappant la poitrine à grands coups.... Larmes, gesticulation et cris. Les Napolitains n'expriment pas ainsi une obtuse énergie vitale, comme tant de voyageurs l'ont cru, mais la fragilité, la pathétique labilité de leur être, aux limites de la dislocation et de l'égarement". Mère Méditerranée (Paris, Grasset, 1965), pp. 12-15.

(2) Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "The Resurgence of Islamic Organisations in Egypt: An Interpretation", in Alexander S. Cudsi, Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds.), Islam and Power (London, Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 107-118; Walid W. Kazziha, Palestine in the Arab Dilemma (London, Croom Helm, 1979), pp. 23-24. Emmanuel Sivan, "Mubarak's Egypt", The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1982, pp. 183-188, reports that in a field survey "carried out among Muslim terrorists jailed since 1974 and 1977, the interviewers came upon typical stories like that of a 25-year-old who was a secularized high school student during the June War. The defeat put him in a state of shock, not knowing 'whether I am heading, whether does Egypt go'. He locked himself up in his room, crying and wailing for hours. It was only with great pain that his mother managed to persuade him to return to prayers learned during childhood, which indeed brought him some peace of mind ... Soon enough he returned to the faith and began to grow a beard".

(3) Beside the political factors underpinning this pattern of solidarity, there is also the conviction of sharing with the Europeans an ancient civilization and a mutual understanding that cannot be shared with the Americans. Sharam Chubin has well noted this ironical attraction towards the old oppressors, though in a context somewhat peripheral with respect to our focus: "There is no doubt that in the Gulf-Indian Ocean region the Europeans enjoy certain advantages, especially a receptivity to them as more acceptable, less intrusive, less polarizing partners in the development process. This regional acceptability -an irony given their historical antecedents- is of course flattering to the European States, which pride themselves on a sophisticated understanding of complex societies derived from historical contact. But regional acceptability is not without its costs; the Arab States count on using the Europeans as a pressure group to weaken U. S. ties with Israel". "Western European Perceptions of Europe's Stake in Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean Security", in Alvin Z. Rubinstein (ed.), The Great Game. Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia, (New York, Praeger, 1983), pp. 117-147.

(4) In 1985, while the Italian Parliament was about to ratify the enlargement, in an interview to the Italian Socialist Party newspaper, Avanti!, Nov. 20, 1985, p. 16, Mr. González, the Spanish Prime Minister, said: "On the other hand, the entry of Spain into the EC brings about the strengthening of the Mediterranean flank of the Community. And I think that in this field Italy and Spain have to play an important common role for a better balance inside the Community".

(5) The Forum of the Western Mediterranean countries is the non-official arm of a wider inter-governmental policy destined to arrange a special solidarity among the countries surrounding the Western Mediterranean Basin. The first session was held in Marseilles in February 1988.

- (6) My elaboration was made possible by the kindness of Dr. Mauro Scarfone, ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi), who elaborated a Mediterranean data bank on OECD and IMF trade statistics.
- (7) "Trade Effects from the Extension of Customs Unions on Third Countries: A Case Study of the Spanish Accession to the EEC", Applied Economics, 19, 1987, pp. 39-50.
- (8) The quotation is from the resumé provided by the House staff: Southern Europe in Transition: Roles in Nato and Integration into the European Community, Wilton Park Papers, 6, 1988, pp. 5-7. This author was among the participants in the seminar.
- (9) Abdelfettah Ghorbel, "Les relations commerciales Euro-Arabs. éléments d'analyse factuelle des échanges intra-méditerranéens" in Bichara Khader (sous la direction de), Coopération Euro-Arabe (Actes du Colloque organisé à Louvain-la-Neuve, 2-4 décembre 1982) vol. III, pp. 257-279; Fabio Barizza, Il commercio della Comunità Economica Europea con il resto del mondo (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1984) p. 250.
- (10) "Sulla vocazione mediterranea dell'economia italiana: una nota", Prospettive Settanta, I, 1, 1975, pp. 5-9.
- (11) PNUF, Le Plan Bleu. Avenirs du Bassin Méditerranéen. Résumé et Orientations pour l'Action, Centre d'Activités Régionales du Plan Bleu pour la Méditerranée, Sophia Antipolis, 1988.
- (12) Demographic Trends: Consequences on the Labour Market, paper presented at the "Third Conference on the Mediterranean World's Crossroads: The Approach to Mediterranean Development", Aspen Institute Italia, Barcelona, June 1987.
- (13) See the special issue of the Revue Française de Science Politique, 37, 6, December 1987 on "Les Musulmans dans la société française".
- (14) Gianni Bonvicini, "Out-of-Area Issues: A New Challenge in the Atlantic Alliance" and Reinhardt Rummel, "Political Perceptions and Military Responses to Out-of Area Challenges", in Joseph I. Coffey and Gianni Bonvicini (eds.), The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East (London, MacMillan Press, 1989), pp. 1-16 and 193-226. See also Christopher Coker (ed.), The United States, Western Europe and Military Intervention Overseas, RUSI Defence Studies Series (London, MacMillan Press, 1987).
- (15) See John Chipman (ed.), Nato's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges, The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs (London and New York, Routledge, 1988), and Douglas T. Stuart, Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance (London, MacMillan Press, 1988).
- (16) Early attempts by Italy to involve the two countries in a trilateral relation have failed. See Stefano Silvestri, "Political Factors Affecting Cooperation Between Italy, Greece and Turkey", The International Spectator, 22, 1, January-March 1987, pp. 20-23.
- (17) Kari Möttölä, Heikki Patomäki (eds.), Facing the Change in Europe. EFTA Countries' Integration Strategies (Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, 1989); Helen Wallace, Wolfgang Wessels, Towards a New Partnership: the EC and EFTA in the Wider Western Europe (EFTA, Occasional Papers, 28, Geneva, March 1989).

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