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EUROPEAN NATO-COUNTRIES AND THE INF-NEGOTIATIONS

by
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(I) INTRODUCTION

Is NATO in crisis? Is there, or better, has there ever been a "real" common purpose within the Atlantic Alliance? According to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, there is everything at best: "the Alliance has survived - indeed more than survived, it has demonstrated a political solidarity and steadfastness that has led to a situation where the peace and freedom of the West rests on sounder foundations than ever" (Wörner 1989: 3). Indipendently if one agrees or not with that statement, however, it remembers us that questions on NATO cohesion, on its failures and successes are nothing new, since they touch the heart of political, military and academic debates over European security, reemerging regularly since the Alliance was founded in 1949. So, nobody has to wonder if there often is more repetition than innovation in these discussions, although the political and military circumstances, during which they repeatedly break out, may leave the impression that everything is new in the debate (Halperin 1982; Bertram 1987). This values also for the more recent debate over intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe, since several of the questions and issues, posed and reshaken years before, came again to surface during that occasion.

Was NATO's double-track decision of 1979 really a "common position" of the Alliance, as was asserted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS 1980: 103)? And today, even after signature of the INF-Treaty in June 1988, does the whole INF-episode represent a failure or a success for Alliance cohesion? It is not easy to find clear and unambiguous answers to this kind of questions, since academic opinions and estimations of the INF-episode diverge considerably, as do many of the proposals which have been published in well-known journals and books of the security community. On the one hand, even before the fateful double-track, some authors started to criticize the Western decision to modernize its tactical nuclear forces in Europe because of its impreparedness and ambivalence, characterizing NATO's double-track decision as a "quick fix" (Treverton 1979: 1080f; Gliksman 1980: 45). On the other hand there were some who tended to apologize the double-track, believing that the 1979 decision reflected an improvement of NATO's cohesion, since it represented "the first occasion when the Alliance - as opposed to individual nuclear weapons states - took a decision on the production (not merely the introduction) of nuclear weapons" (Bertram 1981/82: 306).

The picture gets more shaked if we look at the proposals, presented by academicians as alternatives instead of ground-launched NATO-modernization. Some authors focussed on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) and marked them as more reliable than ground-launched ones (GLCM) because of their higher deterrence credibility, since "the cruise missile force would be highly survivable - much more so than any theater-nuclear weapons in Europe today - as it would be virtually impossible for the Soviets to launch a successful simultaneous attack on all cruise-missile-carrying ships at sea" (Hughes 1978: 323). Others, also in favour of a Western TNF modernization but more preoccupied with command and control and the credibility of extended deterrence, went a step further and proposed a sort of "three-key system", which would give the control over nuclear forces in Europe to more than one or two actors: "giving a direct role in the use of American systems to those who are most threatened by aggression in Western Europe makes it more certain that these systems will be used" (Gliksman 1980: 56). Finally, opponents of the

nuclear modernization programme stressed conventional aspects of deterrence and defence and came to the conclusion that "coupling", one of the major reasons for NATO's double-track decision (Schmidt 1978), could be assured also without intermediate nuclear forces (Canby/Dörfer 1983/84: 4).

Admittedly, nobody can seriously pretend to find the truth in a word, least in security affairs, which often link national, regional and global aspects into a single scenario. However, if one focusses on a stable and durable guarantee of security on the old continent, then the signature of the INF Treaty can be taken as an incentive to better analyze and understand its economic, political and military dimensions, including NATO, since it is no more "too early to be sure about the implications for political cohesion and nuclear issues in the Alliance" (Bertram 1981/82: 326). More profound studies, both empirically and theoretically, will be necessary in future, in order to overcome some failures and gaps, which have characterized the debate up to now. If we look at the debate over modernization of nuclear missiles in Europe, it is not hard to identify one of these gaps: **the absence of a comprehensive and profound analysis of the connections between the special structure and character of the Atlantic Alliance on one side and the negotiations and consultations over INFs on the other side**. In fact, nearly all authors dealing with that matter handled mainly either with the troubled relationship between the two superpowers (e.g. Freedman 1981; Snyder 1984; Dean 1988) or with political and military difficulties between American and Western European allies (e.g. Treverton 1983; Bertram 1987; Davis 1988), but none of them dared to emphasize and explain the fact that several large differences over INFs were present also within Western Europeans themselves. Admittedly, some authors dealt with selected European attitudes towards the INFs, especcially with those countries which had accepted to deploy the new nuclear systems on their territory (e.g. Sharp 1987; Politique Etrangere 1/1988). But this is not enough, since NATO comprehends not only a few but alltogether fourteen European nations, and they all have to be taken into account, if the aim is to better manage the future of the transatlantic Alliance by credibly guaranteeing both deterrence and defence of all countries involved into NATO on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

This article wants to contribute to that, since it analyzes the attitudes of all Western European NATO-countries towards the double-track decision and the subsequent INF-negotiations. Surprisingly, this has never been done before, even not on a theoretical level. Especcially considered is the space of time between October 1986 (the Reykjavik summit) and June 1988 (signature of the INF-Treaty in Moscow), the final and probably most dynamic negotiating phase of the whole period. A detailed chronology of the whole phase between 1979 and 1988, included as appendix, concludes the paper.

(II) US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON INF

(A) NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN 1979 AND 1986

After two years of continous preparations and partially intense consultations, on 12 December 1979 NATO foreign and defence ministers finally agreed to modernize its intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, at the same time offering arms control negotiations to the Soviet Union on that matter

(this parallelity between modernization and arms control offer explains the term 'double-track decision'). Totally 572 new medium-range missiles, among them 108 US ground-launched Pershing II ballistic missiles (IRBM) and 464 US ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), each with a single nuclear warhead, had to be deployed on European ground in the following years. From these, the Pershing II missiles (108 launchers) plus 96 GLCM (24 launchers, since one GLCM-launcher receives 4 missiles) had to be allocated to the Federal Republic of Germany, while the remaining cruise missiles had to be distributed as follows: 160 to Great Britain (40 launchers), 112 to Italy (28 launchers) and 48 (12 launchers) each to Belgium and the Netherlands. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, there have been six main military and political reasons for the double-track decision: 1) compensate for the consequences of strategic parity caused by the US-USSR SALT-II agreement (never ratified by the US Senate), 2) close the gap caused by Soviet TNF modernization (especcially SS-20s and Backfire bombers), 3) replace old and vulnerable Alliance systems, 4) reinforce the Alliance strategy of deterrence trough more flexible response, 5) demonstrate NATO's cohesion in the face of Soviet force expansionism and 6) reinforce coupling, i.e. the American nuclear commitment to the security of Western Europe (IISS 1980: 101). We come back to this point later.

After four years of intense but troubled negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union (Freedman 1981; Snyder 1983), in November 1983 first GLCMs and Pershing II missile parts arrived to British and West German bases, and, as a consequence of it, the USSR walked out of the Geneva arms control negotiations, which had begun in 1981, accusing both the United States and Western Europeans for their implementation of the double-track decision and warning of retaliation. A very cold 1984 followed, during which both sides matched with their muscles: the West continued its deployment in the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and Italy, and the East replaced old systems with further SS-20s and hasty tested new SS-X-4 GLCMs. Only one year later, in January 1985, some relaxation of tensions occured, since US Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrej Gromyko met in Geneva and agreed to restart bilateral arms control negotiations; the INF-negotiations reopened two months later, again in Geneva. In November of the same year, US-President Reagan and his new Soviet counterpart Gorbachev hold a first two-day summit meeting in Geneva, suggesting that there were possibilities for an INF agreement. In the previous and following months, both sides continued to deal with the matter in Geneva, especcially after Gorbachev's January '86 proposal, in which for the first time he suggested a sort of 'zero option' in Europe as a first step towards elimination of all nuclear weapons from earth by the year 2000. Shortly before the October 1986 summit in Reykjavik, on 18 September the US proposed a sort of interim agreement, putting a global limit of 200 INF-warheads for each side, with a sub-ceiling of 100 warheads in range of Europe.

(B) NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN OCTOBER 1986 AND JUNE 1988

The Reykjavik summit on 11 and 12 October 1986 brought substantial progress on the INF issue, going far beyond what the US had offered, only three weeks earlier, for an interim agreement. After two days of discussions, four major elements of a draft agreement were provisionally identified: 1)

elimination of all LRINF in Europe, 2) no more than 100 warheads for each side outside Europe, 3) a freeze on short-range missiles (SRINF) with subsequent separate negotiations and 4) strict verification measures with regular data-exchanges and on-site inspections of missiles and missile factories (see table 1). However, even if the meeting settled many issues which had been unresolved for years, finally it foundered, since Gorbachev persisted to link the outcome of an agreement over INFs with the strategic defence issue. But the dialogue was revitalized, and both US and Soviet delegates returned to Geneva in January 1987 and started their new negotiations from the point where Reagan and Gorbachev had arrived at the summit.

The next initiative came on 28 February 1987, when the Soviet leader repeated the Reykjavik formula and for the first time dropped his insistence on a link between INFs and Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative. The US side reacted with acclamation and started to work for a draft treaty in Geneva. Three of the four main elements for an INF agreement settled down in Reykjavik were primarily out of debate, since they no more represented a major point of disagreement between both sides (zero-solution in Europe, 100 remaining missiles each, verification). But there remained the unresolved short-range missiles (SRINF) issue, since until that time there was only a common but vague purpose of a provisional freeze with subsequent talks on their reduction, but without concrete proposals on to which levels freeze and/or reduce their numbers.

On 15 April, at a three-day meeting in Moscow with US Secretary of State George Shultz, the Soviet leader again took the initiative and proposed a partial double-zero solution, eliminating both LRINF and SRINF (with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km) from European soil. Shultz' initially favourable response was immediately braken by European NATO allies, who, only after intense bi- and multilateral consultation in the following months, finally proposed a global double-zero solution on 11 June, with some reservations by West Germany, who did not want to renounce on its 72 old Pershing IAs, hold under a dual-key arrangement with the United States. 5 days later, on 16 June the United States tabled its own global double-zero proposals at the INF talks in Geneva. Unlike at Reykjavik, this time intra-Alliance consultation had worked better.

So, after 8 months of intense negotiations, many major issues concerning an INF-agreement had been settled out, while only a few remaining points of friction regarding details persisted (100 remaining warheads outside Europe, Pershing IAs, verification measures). On 23 July, the USSR formally proposed to remove all medium-range nuclear missiles (LRINF plus SRINF) from Asia as well as Europe, if West German Pershing IAs were included in an INF deal. Since this sort of global double-zero solution would have easered much more any kind of verification measures, the United States reacted positively and pressured on West Germany to accept a linkage to its Pershing IAs and to renounce on a future modernization of these missiles. The West German government finally agreed to scrap its old missiles, and so, on 2 September, the United States accepted to withdraw all US-controlled nuclear warheads from the Pershing IAs.

table 1: USA and Soviet proposals between Reykjavik and Washington summits

date	United States	Soviet Union
11-12 October 1986	() LRINF: zero-solution in Europe; no more than 100 remaining warheads on each side outside Europe () SRINF: temporary freeze () yes to on-site verification	
28 February 1987		() repeats Reykjavik-formula () drops insistence on linkage between INF and SDI
15 April 1987		() LRINF+SRINF: proposes partial double-zero solution for Europe
16 June 1987	() LRINF+SRINF: proposes global double-zero solution (without Pershing IAs)	
23 July 1987		() LRINF+SRINF: agrees to global double-zero, if Pershing IA included
2 September 1987	() LRINF+SRINF: agrees to global double-zero and renounces on Pershing IA warheads in West Germany	

On 18 September, after 3-day-talks in Washington, the United States and the Soviet Union announced that both sides had agreed to hold a summit in Washington to sign an INF agreement. In November, all final US-USSR-differences, especcially over extensive verification measures, had been resolved, and between 8 and 10 December, US President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev signed the INF agreement at a summit in Washington, banning all intermediate-range nuclear forces from earth. Ratification in both countries occured at the end of May 1988, and at a new summit in Moscow, Reagan and Gorbachev exchanged their ratification protocols on 1 June and signed the INF-Treaty, which definitely concluded 8 years of troubled negotiations.

(III) NATO AND THE INF-NEGOTIATIONS

Between October 1986 (the Reykjavik summit) and December 1987 (the Washington summit), one of the most intensive negotiating phases on intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO hold several meetings on ministerial and consultative levels, within both its political and its military organisations. But, since the INF-negotiations were under a strict bilateral

control of both superpowers, NATO had no possibilities of a direct influence (Bertram 1981/82: 313). However, at Geneva, a permanent NATO consultative group with representatives of three European countries (West Germany, Great Britain and Italy) had the task to better follow the negotiations.

On 21 and 22 October 1986, ten days after the Reykjavik summit, NATO's consultative Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) met in Gleneagles (Scotland). Here, the Alliance's defence ministers discussed with US Defence Minister Weinberger, who informed them on the results of the summit. In a final communique, the NPG, after having in principle approved Reagan's negotiations in Reykjavik, repeated the offer to stop or to reduce the INF deployment, therefore not explicitedly excluding the possibility of a LRINF zero-solution for Europe.

On 4 and 5 December, the Defence Planning Committee (DPC), again consisting of NATO's defence ministers, met in Bruxelles. Surprisingly, this time, contrarily to the final NPG-communique of last October, there was no explicit mention of neither a partial nor a global LRINF zero-option, and Secretary General Lord Carrington suggested that this depended from a necessity of a deeper reflection within the Alliance over the Reykjavik proposals. Temporary confusion over NATO-cohesion on the INF-question could be mitigated only one week later (11-12 December), at a meeting of the Atlantic Council, NATO's leading organ in decision-making. Exactly two months after Reykjavik, in Bruxelles the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance endorsed the US-Soviet proposal for a - either partial or global - LRINF zero-solution in Europe and favoured further negotiations on the SRINF-issue.

Before the next Nuclear Planning Group's meeting occured on 14 and 15 May 1987 in Norway, Soviet leader Gorbachev had made some further advances, first dropping his insistence on a link between the INF-negotiations and SDI (28 February), and secondly by proposing a partial double-zero solution for Europe on 15 April, eliminating both LRINF and SRINF (see table 1). So, a quite new situation was created, and US Secretary of State Shultz, back from a three-day visit in Moscow, had to inform NATO allies on the latest INF negotiations (17 April). Therefore, NATO's NPG spring meeting in Stavanger (Norway) served to discuss several new issues related to the INF-question. In their final communique, the 14 defence ministers (without France and Iceland) expressed their support for a LRINF zero-solution, underlying their preferrence for a global more than for a partial solution (especcially because of easier verification measures), but, with regard to the SRINF-question, they leaved a definite answer outstanding, preferring to wait clarifications by some allied Europeans (i.e. West Germany on their Pershing IAs under dual-key arrangement). Ten days later, a meeting of the Defence Planning Committee in Bruxelles (26-27 May), again with NATO's defence ministers, did not alter this view.

A major diplomatic initiative was undertaken at the Atlantic Council's spring meeting in Reykjavik, between 11 and 12 June: NATO's foreign ministers agreed to a global double-zero solution and asked that both LRINF and SRINF should be included into one single agreement. Nevertheless, they avoided to mention one of the few remaining points of friction, namely the 72 Pershing IAs, since the Federal Republic of Germany had decided not to include these missiles into an INF-agreement just one week earlier. So, five days after the Council's meeting, on 16 June the United States could, after deep consultation with ist allies this time, table its global double-zero proposals at the Geneva arms talks.

After some confusing statements, on 26 August West Germany had finally agreed to scrap its Pershing IAs, and during the following months the United States and the Soviet Union resolved some remaining open questions with regard to INF-verification. On 25 November US Secretary of State Shultz stopped in Bruxelles and informed NATO allies on a proximate INF agreement, to be signed in a Washington summit in early December. Therefore, only one week before signature of the INF agreement, at NATO's Defence Planning Committee meeting in Bruxelles (1-2 December), the Alliance's defence ministers had nothing to add but to officially give their full support for the agreement. After signature at the Washington summit by Reagan and Gorbachev (8-10 December), NATO's Atlantic Council met on 11 and 12 December in Bruxelles and again welcomed the agreement, emphasizing that it was fully consistent with the security requirements of the Alliance. At the margin of the meeting, US Secretary of State Shultz and the foreign ministers of the five European countries involved into the deployment (West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands) signed a Memorandum of Understanding which set out the conditions for inspections of INF-bases and facilities on their territorium by the Soviet Union. These inspections began in July 1988, after the exchange of the ratification protocols and signature of the INF Treaty at the Moscow summit on 1 June.

(IV) WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED INTO INF-DEPLOYMENT (I):1979-86 (II):1986-88

(A) THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

(I). The Federal Republic of Germany has always been on the frontline of the whole INF-episode since its very early beginnings: it not only pressured the Alliance for unanimously accepting the double-track decision in 1979, but it also was the only country, in which both ballistic missiles (108 Pershing IIs) and cruise missiles (96 GLCM) had to be deployed (deployment begun in November 1983). Interestingly, the general governmental support for the new nuclear systems has been always guaranteed, first under the socialdemocratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and later, after elections in 1983, under his christiandemocratic counterpart and successor Helmut Kohl. However, also considerable quantitative and qualitative opposition against the INF-deployment occured through the whole country, on intra- and extraparlamentary levels. A large public aversion against the new missiles persisted over years, with strong peace movements and mass demonstrations, with at times more than 1 million people on the streets (see Rühl 1980; Rühle 1981; Pond 1986; Legrand 1987).

(II). When the United States and the Soviet Union surprisingly started to seriously consider a LRINF zero-solution for Europe during the Reykjavik summit, Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher urged clarification and visited Washington (21-23 October). After having received a detailed briefing by President Reagan on the summit, Kohl expressed his aversion against an elimination of LRINF in Europe, stating that this would not only reinforce Eastern conventional superiority but also reduce coupling, the American guarantee for Western Europe's security.

However, in the following months bi- and multilateral consultations and attempts of pressure occured, and NATO's Council had endorsed the US-Soviet proposal for a LRINF zero-option for Europe. Probably not wanting neither political isolation nor military singularization in Europe, the Bonn government gave its aversion against LRINF elimination up, and so Gorbachev's 28 February '87 proposal to drop his insistence on a linkage between INF and SDI was taken up with favour also in Bonn. In an official declaration on his new governmental programme at the West German Bundestag (the Christiandemocratic-Liberal coalition had been confirmed after the general elections of 25 January), Chancellor Kohl repeated the formula for a zero-solution in Europe and asked for further but separate negotiations for short-range systems (this position was again confirmed in a letter sent by Kohl to US-President Reagan in the first days of April).

Gorbachev's 15 April-proposal for an elimination of both LRINF and SRINF from Europe (double zero) brought a new impetus in West Germany's debate over that issue, since this now involved also the old 72 Pershing IAs, which were under a US-German dual-key control (with a range of 750 km). The Bonn government reacted carefully at first, not laying down a firm statement before having consulted with its NATO allies (there were also some political frictions over that issue not only within the ruling Christian-Democrats, but also between Foreign Minister Genscher and Defence Minister Wörner). On 3 May Chancellor Kohl met French Prime Minister Chirac in Strasbourg: both leaders expressed their preferrence for a step-by-step approach, starting at first to agree over long-range and only afterwards to consider short-range reductions and eventual zero-solutions. On 11 and 12 May, Foreign Minister Genscher visited Washington, consulting over the Pershing IAs, again without definitely deciding over an eventual double-zero solution. During the whole month further diplomatic consultations over double-zero were held again with France, but also with Great Britain, Italy and Belgium, in order to guarantee a European coordination and harmonization over that matter (Chancellor Kohl had repeatedly expressed this desire), which had to be expressed explicitely at the next Atlantic Council's meeting. Confusion in West Germany grew when Chancellor Kohl, in a 'private' statement on 15 May, declared his aversion against a zero-solution for missiles between 500 and 1,000 km of range, preferring to include into negotiations also systems with ranges between 0 and 500 km. Kohl's statement considerably excited France, which initially misunderstood and feared a triple-zero-solution, suspected behind Kohl's words; only later, after the 49th French-West German summit in Paris (21-22 May), emotions could be calmed.

On 4 June Chancellor Kohl declared at the Bundestag to prefer a global zero-solution instead of only a partial one (since the remaining 100 warheads on both sides would only aggravate verification measures) and agreed also to a SRINF zero-solution. So, even if not explicitedly, the double-zero solution proposed by the Soviet Union in mid-April was finally accepted. However, Kohl reaffirmed his government's position not to include Pershing IAs into the INF negotiations. Kohl's speech at the Bundestag contributed considerably to a European harmonization over that matter, and freed the acceptance by NATO's Atlantic Council of the double-zero option one week later (in Reykjavik) and the subsequent US proposals tabled on 16 June in Geneva.

On 23 July, the Soviet Union agreed to the US proposal to eliminate all LRINF and SRINF on a global basis, but linked this to an inclusion of West German Pershing IAs into an INF-agreement. So, again Bonn was under pressure to

move, since the Pershing-IA-issue was one of the few remaining points of friction at the negotiations. After initially confused and unclear statements (on 24 July the government vague responded it would only agree if the Soviet Union were incapable of invading its territory) and allied pressures, especcially by the United States, on 26 August the government finally agreed to scrap its 72 Pershing IAs and to renounce on its modernization. As a consequence, on 2 September the United States could accept to withdraw all its nuclear warheads from West German Pershing IAs (which were under a dual-key arrangement) and, two weeks later, on 18 September, the superpowers could announce to have reached consensus to hold a summit to sign an INF agreement.

After signature in Washington during the summit (8-10 December), Chancellor Kohl thanked US-President Reagan and Soviet leader Gprbachev for the realization of the INF-agreement and emphasized NATO's steadfastness and solidarity. On 11 December, at the meeting of the Atlantic Alliance in Bruxelles, the Federal Republic of Germany signed the Memorandum of Understanding which permitted to the Soviet Union to inspect bases and facilities on its territory. These begun on 5 July 1988, after US and Soviet ratification and signature of the INF Treaty in Moscow.

(B) GREAT BRITAIN

(I). The Conservative government, which had come to power in May 1979, fully supported NATO's double-track decision and subsequently accepted to install 160 GLCM on its airfields at Molesworth and Greenham Common, if the negotiations would have failed (Menaul 1981). So, Great Britain accepted to add the new systems controlled by the United States to its own ones, which were under exclusive British operational control (Pym 1980). The Conservative British government was reelected in June 1983, despite a growing opposition to the INF both in Parliament (Labour Party) and on the streets (peace movements, mass demonstrations). Therefore, Premier Minister Margareth Thatcher and her staff could with calm prosecute their policy on that matter, not only by their firm commitment to NATO's December 1979 decision (deployment began on 14 November 1983), but also by refusing from the beginning to include its own British missiles into the INF-negotiations, a proposal which Soviet leader Andropov had first launched in November 1982.

(II). After the Reykjavik summit with its unforeseen surprising new options, British Prime Minister Thatcher was alarmed by the eventuality of a LRINF zero-solution in Europe and urged to consult with other allies, in order to clarify the new issues: on 15 October, only three days after the summit, she met French President Mitterand in London and discussed over Reykjavik. One month later, on 16 November Miss Thatcher visited US-President Reagan in Camp David: in a common declaration over arms control priorities after Reykjavik, both leaders only generally indicated the necessity of LRINF-agreement with further negotiations over SRINF, but without explicitedly pronouncing the zero-option.

Gorbachev's 28 February '87 offer to renounce on a link between INFs and SDI, therefore consenting on a separate agreement with the United States on that issue, was recepted by the British government with 'careful optimism', preferring not to give a more detailed statement until the new Soviet offer was

tabled at Geneva. On 23 March, Prime Minister Thatcher again met French President Mitterand in Cacu, in order to consult over West European attitudes towards a LRINF-zero solution for Europe (on the same day she visited also the Bonn government). Both consultations with France and West Germany permitted Miss Thatcher to present a firm stand on the INF-issue during her visit in Moscow, between 29 March and 2 April: speaking with the Soviet leader, she did not explicitedly refuse a LRINF zero-solution for Europe and proposed to start further separate negotiations on an eventual reduction of short-range systems as well.

Gorbachev's mid-April proposal to eliminate both LRINF and SRINF from European soil again was taken up by the British government with care and reserve, since it had always spoken only of reductions, but not of elimination of SRINFs. The Foreign Office realized that a diplomatic consultation with its other NATO-allies was necessary in order to achieve to a common position by NATO (which came up only in June, after the Atlantic Council's meeting in Reykjavik, where the double-zero proposal was finally accepted).

So, the signature of the INF-agreement in Washington in December '87 was accepted by the British government, as by all other Western European NATO allies as well (Mellor 1988). On 11 December, Britain signed the Memorandum of Understanding regarding INF inspections on its territory; these begun on 21 July 1988.

(C) ITALY

(I). After the Parliament had by majority approved - by including a 'dissolving clause', a sort of first LRINF-zero-option for Europe - the government's policy over INF modernization and negotiation (4-10 December 1979), on 12 December Italy's Foreign Minister Malfatti could agree to NATO's double-track decision. Accordingly, 112 GLCM should be installed on Italian territory, and two years later, on 8 August 1981, the government decided to deploy them at Comiso, in Sicily. After three years of fruitless negotiations, a beginning of deployment could not be further delayed: on 14-15 November 1983, the new Italian Parliament (after elections in June had confirmed the coalition government) again approved the governmental policy on that issue. The first deployed cruise missiles became operational in March 1984, despite a large public aversion against the new systems (Caligaris 1983; Cremasco 1984; De Andreis 1986; Zadra 1987).

(II). After Reykjavik, on 18 and 22 October 1986 US Defence Minister Weinberger and Chief Negotiator Kampelman visited Rome, in order to inform the Italian government over the results of the summit. Ironically, the Soviets had been quicker, since Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnyk had already done the same three days earlier (15). However, Weinberger took the opportunity of his visit by refusing some NATO-critics, which had accused the United States of not having sufficiently informed its European allies over eventual negotiating results before the summit. Italian consultation with its Western European allies had begun shortly after Weinberger's visit: on 29 October Defence Minister Spadolini visited Bonn, consulting on INFs, and one month later, on 28 November, a French-Italian summit was held in Paris, where both sides gave a cautious assessment with regard to an eventual LRINF zero-solution in Europe.

In January 1987, after the Atlantic Alliance's endorsment of the zero-proposal made at Reykjavik, on 22 January Defence Minister Spadolini visited Washington, emphasizing the value of a LRINF zero-solution for Europe. One week later, between 30 January and 4 February, during a seven-day visit in the United States, Foreign Minister Andreotti again supported this view. On 10 February, Italian Prime Minister Craxi and Foreign Minister Andreotti met their British colleagues in London, consulting, among others, also over INFs. So, after having exchanged views with West Germany, France and Britain, Foreign Minister Andreotti could visit the Soviet Union on 25 February: here he repeated NATO's acceptance of a LRINF zero-solution and asked for a reduction (not elimination) of short-range systems as well.

On 28 February, Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev renounced to link the INF-negotiations to the SDI-issue. So, again consultation among NATO-allies was needed, and on 2 March US-Ambassador Nitze, coming from the Geneva arms control negotiations, visited Rome, in order to inform and discuss over Gorbachev's newest effort. Defence Minister Spadolini took the occasion and expressed his preferrence for a global LRINF solution, but he wanted to link these negotiations to short-range systems as well.

On 11 May the Soviet Chief arms control negotiator in Geneva, Worontsow, met the new government in Rome (Craxi had resigned in March), in order to inform on Gorbachev's newest proposal for a double-zero solution in Europe. Prime Minister Fanfani agreed to the first zero over LRINFs, but he did not want to declare anything new on short-range missiles as well, since NATO's consultations had not been sufficiently held until that time. During the last ten days of May Prime Minister Fanfani and Foreign Minister Andreotti made some short-visits in West Germany (20), Belgium (22) and the United States (27), in order to present his new government and to talk also over INFs.

After the US-Soviet announcment that an INF-agreement was proxime (18 September), Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti reacted with satisfaction and emphasized that Italy had been the first European NATO-ally to adhere to the zero-proposal made at Reykjavik one year earlier (Andreotti 1988). On 2 October, the new Prime Minister Goria visited Paris, exchanging some last opinions on the repercussions of the proxime INF agreement for Europe's security. On 11 December, after INF signature in Washington, Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti signed the Memorandum of Understanding regarding Soviet inspections on its territory. These begun on 26 August 1988, after the signature of the INF-Treaty in Moscow.

(D) BELGIUM

(I). In Belgium, which is member of NATO since 1949 (Snoeck 1981), there was large public uneasiness about the role of nuclear weapons in NATO, especcially since the so-called Neutron-Bomb-episode of the late Seventies (Legrand 1987). The coalition government was not completely hardened against this antinuclear attitudes: at the Atlantic Council's meeting of 12 December 1979, the Belgian Foreign Minister expressed his willingness to postpone for six months a definitive decision to accept an eventual deployment of cruise missiles on his territory (Rühl 1980: 106-107). Continuing government crises caused further delays until 1983, when the Parliament accepted a proxime

deployment on Belgian territory. However, it was only in March 1985, more than one year after first deployments in other countries, that the Belgian government definitively decided to accept the first 16 of the 48 GLCMs it was expected to receive. Shortly after, deployment begun on the air base at Florennes.

(II). During the period of the Reykjavik summit, Belgium had not yet installed the remaining 32 Cruise missiles scheduled by NATO seven years before, since the government had made further installations dependent from a clear failure of the Geneva negotiations in 1987. Therefore, nobody was really surprised when Prime Minister Martens, taking the occasion of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, emphasized that his country had always been in favour of a LRINF zero-solution in Europe.

These view did not change significantly after Gorbachev's February and April proposals, in which the Soviet leader first accepted to come to separate INF negotiations and secondly proposed a double-zero for Europe. However, even if the Belgian government had always been in favour of both first LRINF and than also SRINF zero-solutions, it tried not to give too polemic statements, preferring to wait and pressure for an Alliance consensus on that matter. Unlike West Germany, Britain and Italy, which were more cautious and sometimes tried to brake overhasty decisions on that matter, Belgium has been always on the frontline against tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, favouring not only any kind of nuclear reductions between 500 and 5500 km of range, but also supporting reductions and eventual zero-solutions for very short-range systems between 0 and 500 km (Prime Minister Martens expressed this view immediately after the Washington summit in December 1987). After signature of the Memorandum of Understanding on 11-12 December 1987, Soviet inspections on its territory begun on 10 August 1988.

(E) THE NETHERLANDS

(I). If Belgium had caused some problems by delaying its decision to accept and begin deployment of new intermediate-range systems on its territory, we should better not speak about the Netherlands, which had created much bigger troubles for Alliance cohesion on that issue (Weers 1981). The Dutch government, since widespread public aversion to nuclear weapons was very strong here too, had agreed only with several reservations to NATO's double-track decision in 1979, declaring that it would not decide on a deployment of scheduled 48 GLCMs on its territory until December 1981, and even then basing its decision on the results of the proposed arms control talks between the superpowers. Other delayes followed in the following years, especcially in 1984, when other countries had in the meantime begun with deployment. Only on 1 November 1985, the Dutch government agreed to accept the new cruise missiles on its territory (at the air base of Woensdrecht). Deployment had to occur not later than December 1988, the final date of the NATO siting scheme (Survival 5/1984; Survival 2/1986; Bik 1986), but, however, the Dutch linked this to nuclear reductions of other armament types. In May 1986, general elections confirmed the coalition under Prime Minister Lubbers: so, the government's difficulties on the INF issue remained on the agenda.

(II). One month after the Reykjavik summit, Prime Minister Lubbers and Foreign Minister van den Broek visited the Soviet Union (20-22 November). The Dutch leaders expressed Gorbachev their acceptance of an eventual LRINF zero-solution for Europe, but added that the Soviets should abandon its linkage policy (INF and SDI), in order to come to a separate agreement on intermediate-range missiles. Dutch nervousism and haste were no more unspoken, since the Lubbers cabinet could not wait with official statements over INFs until the Alliance's Council at the whole had to decide on the issue. In fact, NATO officially endorsed the Reykjavik zero-proposals for Europe only in December.

In February 1987 Gorbachev finally renounced on a link between INF and SDI, by this indirectly accepting the suggestions made in November by the Dutch visitors, who now reacted enthusiastically after the Soviet announcement. Lubbers and his staff reacted favourably also on the subsequent proposals of April (partial double-zero), June (global double-zero) and July (global double-zero including West German Pershing IAs). Instead of coordinating their views with other Western European allies, the Dutch hastily started to discuss, if, since the possibility of a proxime INF-agreement grew more and more, an interim deployment on their territory should in the meantime begun or not. Finally, after signature of the INF-agreement at the Washington summit and Dutch enthusiastic comments (van Eekelen 1988), on 11-12 December the Netherlands signed the Memorandum of Understanding (regarding Soviet inspections on its territory) and a bilateral agreement with the United States regarding finishment of the INF base at Woensdrecht. Parliamentary ratification of these agreements occured in April 1988. During the whole negotiating phase between 1979 and 1987, the Netherlands had remained the only NATO-country in which, even if directly involved into deployment, no new nuclear intermediate-range missiles had been stationed.

(V) WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INDIRECTLY INVOLVED INTO INF-DEPLOYMENT

(A) FRANCE

(I). In 1979, at the time of NATO's double-track decision, France was not (and still is not) integrated into the military command of the Alliance (it had walked out in 1966), and therefore it could neither accept a deployment of new intermediate-range missiles on its territory nor contribute to INF infrastructure funding. Nevertheless, the French government under Giscard d'Estaign had fully endorsed the realization of the decision and urged its Western European allies to adopt a firm stance towards the Eastern bloc (Lellouche 1983/84; Kreile 1984; Yost 1984/85). The new Socialist government under Mitterand, who came into power in 1981, did confirm its predecessor's view on the INF-issue. In November 1982 Soviet leader Andropov for the first time had proposed to include French and British self owned nuclear missiles into the INF-negotiations, but both French President Mitterand and British Prime Minister Thatcher had firmly rejected this idea from the very beginnings (this Soviet idea reemerged - and was again rejected - several times until 1985).

(II). Only three days after the Reykjavik summit, on 15 October 1986 Mitterand and Thatcher urged to meet in London, in order to consult on the

summit's negotiating prospectives. Foreign Minister Raimond had already expressed his hesitations over eventual LRINF zero-options for Europe shortly after the summit, and the French uneasiness was repeated again two months later, when US-Defence Minister Weinberger visited Paris.

After Gorbachev's February 1987 offer for separate INF negotiations, concern was again France's main reaction. Both Foreign Minister Raimond and Defence Minister Giraud emphasized nuclear, conventional and chemical imbalances which in their opinion favoured the East, and therefore they apologized the necessity of the new theater nuclear weapons on the Western side (Marshall 1987; Lellouche 1987; Schütze 1987). Nevertheless, even if having tried to indirectly pressure on the other European nations on that issue, especcially on West Germany, the French government did not want to openly get into troubles with the Alliance's consensus on LRINFs, which has been already reached in December 1986. So, on 4 March 1987, President Mitterand, not at least wanting to calm down some divergences within the coalition government, stated that the Soviet proposals, "having already been accepted by NATO, ... they are in conformity with French interest" (Marshall 1987: 24). On 24-25 March, Prime Minister Chirac visited Washington, not explicitedly opposing a LRINF zero-solution, but stressing again the importance of adequate verification measures, of SRINF reductions and of conventional and chemical imbalances.

In mid-April the Soviet leader proposed a double-zero solution for Europe, including both LRINFs and SRINFs into one single agreement. Again, the French government expressed its concern, and President Mitterand urged to meet its British and West German colleaques for consultation on that matter (respectively on 26 April and 3 May). Two days later, Foreign Minister Raimond visited Washington, consulting on the same issue and repeating French objections against a SRINF zero-solution. Between 14 and 16 May, Prime Minister Chirac and Foreign Minister Raimond officially visited the Soviet Union, but both were troubled not to reexpress French reservations against a double-zero solution, since they did not want to interfere too much into NATO's Nuclear Planning Group session, where the Alliance's defence ministers discussed this point during the same days. One week later, on 21-22 May, the 49th West German-French summit in Paris concluded a very intense month of consultations between the two countries on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe: only at this occasion some French irritations because of overhasty and ambiguous West German declarations over eventual triple-zero solutions could be calmed down (see chapter IV-A-II).

After NATO's decision to accept a double-zero solution for Europe (11 June) and the final US-Soviet elimination of remaining points of friction in July, the French government could nothing but accept the fact that an agreement on that matter would be signed soon in Washington. Visiting Paris on 1 October, two weeks after US-Soviet announcment of a proxime INF-agreement, US Vice President Bush had officially to admit that differences between the American and French governments on that matter persisted, but he tried to mitigate French concerns by emphasizing that French nuclear forces would however not be included into the INF-agreement. The fact that France was not integrated into the Alliance's military command has revealed to be more and more its Achilles' heel, since it has not given to the French government the chance of powerfully influencing both American and West European NATO-allies on that issue.

(B) NORTHERN EUROPEAN NATO-COUNTRIES

In 1979, Norway had supported NATO's double-track decision, but it insisted from the beginnings that the new INFs under consideration could not be deployed on Norwegian territory (Holst 1982). During the whole negotiating phase between 1979 and 1986, Norway had always put its focus on negotiations instead of on modernization of INFs, and this view was mantained and reinforced also after general elections in 1986 brought a minority Labour government into power. Shortly after the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, the new Prime Minister Brundtland fully supported the eventuality of a LRINF zero-solution for Europe, and he also was in favour of the following partial and global double-zero proposals, which were presented by the Soviet Union and the United States between April and July 1987.

Denmark has severally been a thorn in NATO's side, not at least because of the INF issue. Even if supporting the double-track decision in 1979 in principle, the Danish government too refused to accept an eventual deployment on his territory. A weak governmental coalition and strong antinuclear opposition in both Parliament and on the streets repeatedly had promoted internal crises on that matter. These provisionally culminated in December 1982, when the Folketing (the Danish Parliament) voted 49 to 13, with 90 abstensions, to suspend the Danish commitment to the double-track decision, i.e. Denmark's financial support for siting US Pershing IIs and Cruise missiles in Western Europe. A similar voting occured again in May 1984, after deployment in some Western countries had in the meantime begun. During the whole negotiating phase, Denmark had often dissociated itself from the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe with footnotes to NATO communiques. Thus, in October 1986, since the Reykjavik summit for the first time had shown a serious chance for a LRINF zero-option in Europe, Denmark had fully supported this envisaged outcome. On 22 October 1986, Prime Minister Schlüter visited the Soviet Union as first European NATO-country after the summit and, talking over INFs, expressed his hope that a future INF-agreement would come out, suggesting that Moscow should abandon a link between INF and SDI and work for a separate agreement. Gorbachev's final abandonement of this linkage was therefore acclaimed in February 1987, and the same happened with all the following proposals and offers made by the superpowers between April and July of the same year, until the agreement was signed at the Washington summit in December.

(C) SOUTHERN EUROPEAN NATO-COUNTRIES

In December 1979, Turkey had supported the Atlantic Alliance's Council decision to modernize theatre nuclear weapons in Europe, but expressed its view not to accept them on its territory if asked (Sezer 1981:43). Since Greece has not been integrated into NATO's military command between 1974 and 1980, the Alliance's double-track decision of 1979 has not been a real subject for the country (Veremis 1982). The new Socialist government under Prime Minister Papandreou, who came into power after general elections in October 1981, had always stated its opposition to the double-track decision, preferring to occasionally side with the USSR, by demanding non-deployment of Pershing IIs and Cruise missiles even without withdrawal of the Soviet SS-20s (Loulis 1984/85: 388).

As for Greece, also for Spain the double-track decision had no repercussions, since the country not only entered into the Atlantic Alliance only in 1982 (Vinas 1986), but a deployment on its territory would, however, have made not much sense because of its geostrategic distance from the Eastern side. The same values for Portugal, who, even if NATO member since 1949, had no aspiration for entering into NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, which had been the Alliance's primary instance for the debate over modernization during the second half of the Seventies. However, this marginal interest for the INF-debate has not prevented the Portuguese government to agree to a very general statement on that matter, together with French President Mitterand, at the occasion of an official bilateral meeting in Lisbona in April 1987.

(VI) CONCLUSIONS

The signature of the INF Treaty in June 1988 definitively put a stop on the question of land-based intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, which had lasted and occupied NATO for 9 years. Thus, the time to realize the lessions has finally arrived, at least for Europeans, since they have been the most directly concerned into the matter. In doing that, it will be necessary not only to reconsider the complexity of the US-European relationship with regard to security policy and politics, but also to critically rethink Western European cohesions, incohesions and paranoias in this field. It has been a central purpose of this article to contribute to that.

Let us first of all reconsider the INF-episode from a historic perspective, fokussing on the very special structure and character of the North Atlantic Alliance. In 1979, at the time of NATO's double-track decision, thirteen Western European countries have been members of the North Atlantic Alliance. From these, only five were involved directly into the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, by having, even with some reservations, accepted them on their territory. From the eight remaining ones, some had explicitedly refused a deployment on their territory (Norway, Denmark and Turkey did so), agreeing only to contribute to the financment of the new INF-facilities, while the others (Island, Luxembourg and Portugal) preferred to leave a decision on that matter to the members of the Nuclear Planning Group, the NATO-organ who decided at first, at ministerial levels, to strenghten its nuclear forces in Europe (April 1979). France and Greece had anyway to remaine passive, since they were not integrated into the Alliance's military command on that time. But with this not enough: from the five directly involved countries only three (West Germany, Great Britain and Italy) agreed from the very beginnings to accept an eventual deployment on their territory, while the others (Belgium and the Netherlands) had delayed permanently a final decision on that issue. Only Belgium finally agreed to allow deployment, while the Netherlands never received any of the 48 GLCMs previoused for its territory.

So, there is no questions that to speak about NATO cohesion on INF, either at the decision-phase in 1979 or during the negotiations afterwards, is at least overstated, if not completely off beam. But why and how could NATO come to a common decision in 1979? The main reason lies in the complex compromize character of the double-track, which consisted of three different but interrelated steps. The first step of compromise was the double-track itself, since it had included both the decision to modernize and the offer to

negotiate: only for that reason all NATO-members had agreed to the formula, focussing their attention either to the first (modernize) or to the second track (negotiate) of the compromise. The second step of compromise was to in principle accept an eventual deployment on their own territory: here the situation got more troubled, since only five from thirteen had agreed to that eventuality, but only in principle, with two of them having already expressed reservations. The third step of compromise was to effectively begin the installation, while contemporarily offering to the East to retake them away if a superpower-agreement would have been reached: here the group of supporters again had shrinked to four. Table 2 shows how far NATO's cohesion had worked on that issue.

table 2: European allies and the double-track decision

country	accept double-track (first compromise)	accept deployment (second compromise)	begin deployment (third compromise)
West Germany	x	x	x
Great Britain	x	x	x
Italy	x	x	x
Belgium	x	x **	x
Netherlands	x	x **	-
France *	x	-	-
Norway	x	-	-
Denmark	x	-	-
Turkey	x	-	-
Greece *	x	-	-
Portugal	x	-	-
Island	x	-	-
Luxembourg	x	-	-

* not integrated into NATO's military command
** express reservations

This very complex compromise character of the double-track decision of course had its repercussions on Western Europeans' governmental attitudes towards the INF-negotiations. Every time a new INF-proposal had been presented either by the United States or by the Soviet Union, Western Europeans never had reacted uniform. If we consider the period of time between 1986 and 1987 (see table 1), we see that, while some countries immediately had accepted the possibility of a LRINF zero-solution (Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark did so repeatedly), others had already expressed their cautious reservations but preferred to wait until NATO as a whole had agreed on a common position (West Germany, Great Britain and Italy). On the contrary, France had always kept its objections until the agreement has been finally signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. So, if we remember that one of the main original reasons for the double-track decision was to strengthen Alliance cohesion, we definitely cannot say that the final result has been a success,

even if official circles in NATO prefere to remain evasive on that point (Wörner 1989).

Indeed, one could ask if Alliance cohesion is actually necessary in a so important field as nuclear matters are. In fact, it has been suggested that it would maybe have been better not to distribute the INFs on so many European countries, since "the request to European non-nuclear Alliance states to stand up and be counted in a nuclear procurement decision practically invited these governments to attach conditions to the decision and, in order to gain domestic political support, to link it to an arms control initiative in a way which rendered the whole program ambiguous" (Bertram 1981/82: 311). In a similar way, it has been questioned if so important issues like INFs should be decided from the Alliance as a whole, since "such a procedure implies a particularly heavy political burden for the small nations whose worldviews and international ambitions are difficult to reconcile with participation in the deployment of nuclear weapons" (Holst 1983: 45). There is indeed some value behind this argumentation, since on the one hand too many differing opinions cannot but water down the final outcome because of its compromize character, while on the other hand it raises the risk of an enhanced fragmentation within the Alliance as a whole, as the Alliance's troubles with countries like Belgium and the Netherlands has shown. That is why either implicitedly or explicitedly excluding dissenting countries from the decision-making process would maybe work for a while; it did so for instance during the first years of the US Nixon-Kissinger administration, when only a very small staff was able to successfully decide on American foreign and security policy (Garthoff 1985). But is is also a fact that the US-President and his National Security Adviser could succeed in their way only for a couple of years, since the other members of the administration pressured more and more in order to participate at the decision-making process and to see all cards openly on the table.

That is why we have to consider the importance of the factor time: if we want to create the basis for a long-term survivability of the Alliance as a whole, then these proposed selective and discriminate approaches are doomed to fail, since latent points of friction always emerge sooner or later. We all remember the considerable opposition against the INF in mainly all European countries, especcially in those five which have been directly involved into the deployment, and many had nightmares that this could force some countries to abandon the Alliance, as a result of no more controllable chain reactions.

But let us now come to the other main political and military reasons for the double-track decision that the IISS had elaborated in 1980 (see chapter II). Ironically, contrary to some authors' false beliefs that "over the course of the negotiations the West accomplished all its objectives" (Davis 1988: 731), not one single point has been completely and satisfactorily solved by the Treaty. Even not the most prominent one regarding the gap caused by Soviet TNF modernization: in fact, since the Soviet land and sea-based Backfire bombers - at that time mentioned by NATO's High Level Group near the SS-20s as the main new nuclear Eastern threat to the Western theatre - have not been included into the Treaty, their number has been increased, growing from 80 in 1978 to totally 290 in 1987 (according to The Military Balance 1979-1980;1987-1988).

Another reason for the Alliance's double-track decision of 1979 was the reinforcment of coupling, the American commitment to the security of Western Europe. Since the missiles are being retired and probably will never be

redeployed, even not on European ground, this original Western aim too could not be realized. However, it remains at odds if limited wars within Europe will now be again more probable or not (Treverton 1979), since this depends not only from INFs, but also from other nuclear, conventional and chemical capabilities and threat perceptions on both sides.

Let us now come to the desire by some Western Europeans to generally compensate for the consequences of strategic parity caused by the SALT-II agreement (ironically, the agreement has never been ratified by the US-Senate). Also here, indipendently from the judgement one can give over this point, since both ground-launched Pershing IIs and cruise missiles have to be retired and destroyed in the coming years, finally a gap remains open, even if we consider that some other Western nuclear systems have been modernized and/or increased (i.e. bombers, see- and submarine-launched missiles).

Another reason for NATO's double-track was the need to replace old and vulnerable Alliance systems. Probably here the consequences will be much more weighty, since West European leaders would today have much more domestic difficulties as before 1979 to accept a nuclear modernization, not at least because of large public aversion against such a programme (Legrand 1987). The actual debate over modernization of systems between 0 and 500 km evidences this, and the apparent Alliance inconesion and caution over that issue is no doubt also a result of the INF-experience.

Since another reason for the acceptance of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles has been the reinforcement of the ruling Alliance strategy trough more flexible response, nobody can seriously affirm that, after having retired the new missiles, this will be easier implemented today, after the new systems have been retired. Even without considering the credibility of this strategy, at least for Western Europe, flexible response has no doubt receded and given again more room to the older and superseded doctrine of massive retaliation.

With this we do not want to affirm that the INF-Treaty has had only negative repercussions for Western Europe's security. It is no doubt that the relations between both superpowers have considerably improved during and after the last negotiating phase over INFs, and the agreement over very detailed verification measures with intrusive on-site inspections also show some new directions for eventual future arms control agreements in other fields. Especcially if we compare the recent INF-debate with the older one over American Thor and Yupiter missiles of the late Fifties and early Sixties, then another positive element arises, at least for a European self-reliance in these matters. We speak about the improvement of intra-Alliance consultation, not only between Western Europe and the United States, but also within Western Europe itself. Especially West Germany, Britain and France have considerably intensified their bilateral data and opinion exchanges on security matters, showing a cautious new approach which goes beyond pure national considerations within this field. However, we are in a very first stage with uncertain outcomes within this new process, since several other European countries still remain excluded from this kind of mainly triangular diplomacy.

Nevertheless, indipendently from how one values the final outcome of the INF negotiations, overhasty enthusiasm about the INF conclusion is not appropriate, since too many issues have remained unsolved. It is no doubt that

the Alliance needs to begin a general and serious reflection over its goals in a comprehensive way, in order to reinstall a credible and efficacious guarantee for a long-term security on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean (Dunn 1988). It has been a major purpose of this article to evidence this. Nevertheless, realism and pragmatism have to be essential elements of every kind of future debatings over European security concerns. If we accept that Nato incohesion on nuclear matters is a fact of life and that strong and probable durable antinuclear feelings - in both ruling and opposing parties of each country - are a new reality that cannot be dismissed, then we can start to seriously work for a credible future scenario for the security of the old continent, which probably has to include a reallocation and a retargeting of existing and proxime conventional and nuclear weapons.

The current debate over modernization of very short-range nuclear systems (with ranges between 0 and 500 km), together with the Western uneasiness about if or not to agree on an eventual arms control negotiation on them, shows us that the signature of the INF Treaty has not marked the end but only the beginnings of a more approfondite discussion over nuclear matters in Europe. However, if a comprehensive approach to European security remains outstanding, we have nothing but to accept that Alliance credibility, with regard to both deterrence and warfighting capabilities, is going again to suffer enormously, as it did during the whole period between 1979 and 1987. NATO as a whole and especcially its Western European members have to start to realize that extended deterrence, especcially if it is divided by an ocean, will always mantain some degree of uncertainity and uneasiness (Bull 1983). It will be interesting to see if some lessons can emerge permanently, in order to be translated into action.

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APPENDIX
Chronology of INF-negotiations
(1979-1988) *

1979

April
24 NATO Nuclear Planning Group, meeting in Forida, agrees to strengthen nuclear forces

November
8 Dutch government gives qualified support to deployment of new nuclear weapons in Western Europe
22 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in Bonn, warns new nuclear missiles in Europe could seriously undermine East-West detente
29 NATO's Council of Permanent Representatives rejects Danish proposals for a 6-month moratorium on nuclear modernization

December
12 NATO meeting in Brussels agrees to deploy 572 new intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe

1980

January
25 After the first meeting of special consultative group on arms control NATO renews offer to continue arms-control negotiations with Moscow

February
18 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko says USSR will agree to talks on reducing nuclear arms in Europe if NATO repeals its decision to deploy new US cruise missiles in Europe

May
14 US begins withdrawing 1,000 outdated nuclear warheads from Europe according to December 1979 NATO decision

June
12 Pravda calls on West Germany to abandon its central role in NATO decision to station US nuclear missiles in Europe
30 West German Chancellor Schmidt, visiting Moscow, calls on Brezhnev to begin talks without preconditions on limiting medium-range missiles in Europe

July
1 After talks with Soviet President Brezhnev, Chancellor Schmidt says he has made progress towards negotiations with the USSR on medium-range missiles in Europe

3	Chancellor Schmidt tells Bundestag USSR has agreed to drop conditions for negotiating with US on limiting medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe
4	USSR confirms Schmidt's affirmation
September	
7	Carter agrees to talk with USSR on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe
25	Secretary of State Muskie meets Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York to discuss medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe
October	
16	US and Soviet delegations begin preliminary talks on limiting medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe
November	
17	US-Soviet talks end with no resumption date given

1981

May	
26	West German Bundestag approves 1979 NATO LRTNF decision
March	
31	At Brussels meeting of NATO special consultative group, US confirms commitment to resumption of arms-control talks with USSR and delegates discuss prospects for US-USSR agreement on reduction of theater nuclear forces (TNF) in Europe
May	
4-5	At NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Rome, US says she will resume negotiations with USSR on limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe by 1981
June	
21	West German Chancellor Schmidt reaffirms West Germany's willingness to have US nuclear missiles on her territory
July	
26	In Pravda article, Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov renews Soviet offer to reduce nuclear missiles if NATO drops planned deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe
September	
23	Haig and Gromyko meet in New York: announce that talks on nuclear weapons in Europe will begin 30 November in Geneva
October	
20	NATO defence ministers confirm commitment to nuclear missile deployment in Europe while seeking agreement on arms control and reduction with USSR

November

18 President Reagan presents 'zero option' plan as negotiating plank for Geneva talks

23-25 Brezhnev holds talks with Chancellor Schmidt in Bonn, offers to unilaterally reduce the number of nuclear weapons in European USSR

26 In Geneva US-USSR talks on reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe begin

December

16 Brezhnev accuses US of talking about arms control while at same time 'accelerating the arms race'. Calls Reagan's 'zero-option' proposal one-sided disarmament process

22 In television interview, President Brezhnev stresses importance of Geneva talks, says Moscow wants active dialogue with US, including summit meeting

1982

January

12 INF talks between US and USSR resume in Geneva

February

2 In Geneva, US submits a draft treaty to carry out 'Zero Option' proposal

3 Brezhnev proposes reduction of at least two-thirds in medium-range nuclear weapons by 1990

10 US rejects Soviet offer

March

16 INF talks adjourn until May 19, so that delegations can consult with their governments
Brezhnev announces unilateral freeze on Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe, threatens NATO with 'retaliatory steps' if it proceeds with plans to deploy new cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe

24 NATO's Defence Ministers meeting in Colorado Springs reject Brezhnev's freeze offer, agree that Western INF deployment should proceed as planned

May

19 In Geneva, second round of US-USSR talks on INF

July

20 INF talks in Geneva are recessed until 30 September

September

30 In Geneva, INF talks reopen (third round)

November

11 US rejects Soviet offer to reduce her INF by more than half, if US agrees not to deploy planned missiles in Europe

19 After three failures, a Pershing II medium-range missile is successfully launched

21	Andropov proposes USSR will reduce medium-range missiles to number possessed by Britain and France if US forgoes planned NATO missile deployment; Britain, France and US reject proposal
30	In Brussels, NATO Defence Ministers pledge to begin deploying 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles by end of 1983 'in absence of concrete arms-control agreement'
	In Geneva, INF talks adjourn
December	
7	In Denmark, the Folketing (Parliament) votes 49 to 13 with 90 abstensions to suspend Denmark's payments for siting US Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe

1983

January	
2	France refuses to include her nuclear forces in INF talks
10	Britain does the same
21	US succesfully tests Persning II missile after two failures
26	INF negotiations resume in Geneva (fourth round)
February	
14	US rejects USSR's offer to reduce her IRBM strength to British and French totals
	Britain's Defence Secretary Heseltine gives an absolute assurance that cruise missiles cannot be launched from the UK without approval of the British Prime Minister
March	
23	NATO's Nuclear Planning Group ends meeting with renewed agreement to deploy missiles if INF talks fail
29	In Geneva, INF talks adjourn
30	President Reagan announces new INF proposal for 'Interim Agreement' involving equal US/Soviet warheads world-wide
April	
2	Soviet Foreign Minister rejects interim accord proposal
6	In East Berlin, Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov warns that if USSR were attacked by US missiles based in Europe, she would retaliate against both Europe and US
May	
3	Andropov says USSR willing to negotiate on basis of warheads, as well as missiles in INF talks, and offers to reduce Soviet warheads in European Russia to number of British and French warheads
5	Britain rejects Soviet offer
17	In Geneva, INF talks resume (fifth round)
28	USSR threatens to deploy IRBM on Warsaw Pact territory if NATO installs missiles in Europe as planned

June

1-10 NATO Defence Ministers meet in Brussels; final communique reiterates 1979 twin-track INF-decision

July

14 INF talks in Geneva adjourn until 6 September

30 Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov warns that the USSR will take counter-measures if US medium-range nuclear missiles are deployed in Western Europe

August

26 Andropov offers to destroy all SS-20 missiles over the number of British and French missiles if US does not deploy new missiles in Europe

September

6 Geneva INF talks resume (sixth round)

18 Final test launch of Pershing II is described as a success

20 US rejects Soviet offer to remove all but 162 land-based medium-range missiles in European Russia if NATO does not deploy new nuclear weapons

26 Reagan announces new US INF proposals involving: willingness not to deploy in Europe US INF missiles in numbers equal to Soviet INF missile deployment world-wide; reductions in Pershing II numbers; and limits on aircraft as well as missiles

October

6 North Atlantic Assembly calls on NATO governments to support a unilateral reduction of short-range nuclear warheads deployed in Europe to coincide with deployment of US medium-range missiles in Europe

12 Soviet spokesman warns USSR will pull out of INF talks if new US missiles are deployed in Western Europe

24 USSR announces that she has begun moves to station nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe and will go ahead if missiles are deployed in Western Europe

25 Romanian President Ceausescu criticizes Soviet plans to start preparations for deployment of new tactical missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia

26 Andropov proposes that Moscow would cut SS-20s in European theatre to about 140, freeze SS-20s in East, and shows flexibility about aircraft, if US missiles are not deployed

27 US rejects missile sub-limit, shows interest in other elements

November

13 Soviet INF negotiator Kvitsinsky reported to have suggested equal US and Soviet reductions of 572 warheads

14 US announces INF proposal that each side limit its force of medium-range nuclear missiles to 420 warheads world-wide
First cruise missile delivered to British base

14-15 Italian Parliament votes in favour of deployment

17 Soviet note to NATO capitals claim US made the offer of 13th November

22	West German Bundestag 286-226 votes in favour of deployment
23	First Pershing II missile parts arrive in West Germany USSR walks out of INF talks after US missiles arrive in Germany
24	Andropov says talks have become impossible and warns of retaliation. In a written statement, he says USSR will deploy seaborne nuclear missiles against the US to counter threat posed by deployment of US missiles in Europe
December	
7	In Sofia, Warsaw Pact Defence Ministers unanimously endorse planned Soviet military measures to counter NATO deployment of nuclear missiles in Western Europe

1984

January	
16	According to Baltic World Conference, USSR is replacing SS-5 short-range nuclear missiles deployed in Baltic states with intermediate-range SS-20s
March	
29	US Defense Secretary Weinberger visits Netherlands, appeals to government to accept 48 cruise missiles, says deployment vital to Western defence
April	
3	US Air Force succesfully tests ground launched cruise missile
9	In Pravda interview Soviet leader Chernenko says US must remove cruise and Pershing missiles from Europe before arms talks resume
May	
10	Danish parliament votes 49-12 (all 77 ruling coalition party members abstaining or absent) to halt payments for NATO's deployment of nuclear missiles in Western Europe
16-17	NATO defence ministers meet in Brussels, urge Netherlands to deploy cruise missiles
June	
1	Dutch government announces it will accept cruise missile deployment in 1988 if USSR continues deploying SS-20s
14	Dutch parliament votes 79-71 for government's plan
August	
25	USSR announces successful test of the SSC-X-4, a new long-range GLCM
October	
13	Soviet Defence Ministry announces USSR has begun deploying long-range cruise missiles to offset 'massive deployment' of US cruise missiles

November
26 Chernenko tells British Labour Party leader no Soviet nuclear missiles will be targeted on Britain if future Labour government pursues non-nuclear defence policy

December
28 Soviet tactical cruise missile, fired during exercise in Barents Sea, passes through Norwegian airspace and crashes in Finland

1985

January
4 USSR apologizes to Norway and Finland for cruise missile which overflew Norway and crashed in Finland on 28 December 1984
7-8 US Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko meet in Geneva and agree to restart INF negotiations

February
19 First free-flight test of US cruise missile over Canada completed

March
10 French Foreign Minister Dumas in Moscow to discuss arms control before second round of US-Soviet talks in Geneva, opening 11 March
12 US and Soviet negotiators reopen talks in Geneva
14 Belgian government decides to deploy initially 16 of the 48 ground-launched cruise missiles it is expected to receive

April
7 In Pravda interview Gorbachev says USSR will unilaterally freeze deployment of INF missiles in Europe till November, asks US to join in
8 US dismisses Gorbachev proposal
9-10 Dutch Foreign Minister van den Broek in Moscow for 2-day visit, outlines Dutch position on deployment of US medium-range missiles in talks with Gromyko

June
26 US Vice President Bush arrives in Netherlands and talks with premier Lubbers about cruise missiles deployment

October
3 In Paris speech, Gorbachev presents a package of arms-control proposals, including offer of direct negotiations with Britain and France on medium-range missiles, and restriction of SS-20 deployments in Europe to 243
29-30 NATO Defence Ministers 2-day meeting in Brussels endorses US summit negotiating position on arms control and SDI

November
1 Holland agrees to deployment of 48 US cruise missiles on its territory
19-20 Reagan and Gorbachev hold 2-day summit meeting in Geneva

1986

January	
15	Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev proposes 3-stage plan to remove all nuclear weapons from earth by year 2000, including European INFs in a first phase
February	
23	President Reagan sends letter to Gorbachev welcoming his 15 January proposal to remove all INF from Europe, but insisting that Soviet missiles in Asia also be included
24	US position tabled at INF talks in Geneva
May	
26	During 10-day visit of British MPs in USSR, Gorbachev proposes bilateral arms-control negotiations
August	
27	West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) conference in Nürnberg votes to remove all US cruise missiles and Pershing nuclear missiles from West Germany
September	
18	Sixth round of US-USSR Geneva talks begins, US tables new INF proposal
October	
2	British Labour Party conference votes to remove all nuclear weapons from Britain and renegotiate terms of US military base agreements
11-12	Reagan and Gorbachev begin two-day meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland; make substantial progress on INF
15	French President Mitterand and British Prime Minister Thatcher meet in London, discussing Reykjavik summit
	Vice Foreign Minister of USSR, Bessmertnyk, in Rome
18	US Defence Minister Weinberger visits Rome and informs on Reykjavik summit
21-22	NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meets in Gleneagles (Scotland); US Defence Minister Weinberger informes on Reykjavik
22	US arms control delegate Kampelman visits Rome and informs on Geneva INF-talks
	Danish Prime Minister Schlüter visits Moscow
21-23	West German Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher in Washington
29	Italian Defence Minister Spadolini in Bonn
November	
16	British Prime Minister Thatcher meets US President Reagan in Camp David (USA)
20-22	Prime Minister Lubbers and Foreign Minister Van den Broek (Nederlands) visit USSR
28	French-Italian Summit in Paris

December

2	Sowjet Ambassador Suslov in Rome
2-3	US Defence Minister Weinberger in Paris
4-5	NATO's Defence Planning Commitee (DPC) meets in Bruxelles
11-12	NATO foreign ministers meet in Bruxelles; endorsment of the zero INF proposals made at Reykjavik

1987

January

22	Italian Defence Minister Spadolini in Washington
25	general elections in the Federal Republic of Germany
30	5-day-visit of Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti in Washington (ends 4th February)

February

10	Italian Prime Minister Craxi and Foreign Minister Andreotti meet British Prime Minister Thatcher in London
25	Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti in Moscow
28	Gorbachev proposes separate negotiations on medium-range missiles in Europe, dropping insistence on link to restrictions on US SDI programme and freeze on French and British nuclear weapons

March

2	INF talks in Geneva extended to discuss Soviet offer; US tables its INF proposals, including strict verification (4); talks adjourn (26)
	US ambassador Nitze in Rome, coming from Geneva arms control negotiations
6-10	Sowjet arms control delegate Vorontsov in Paris: informs on Geneva INF talks and Gorbachev's newest proposals
16-18	US Defence Minister Weinberger in Madrid
23	French President Mitterand and British Prime Minister Thatcher meet in Cacu (France); in afternoon she visits Bonn
24-25	French Prime Minister Chirac in Washington
29-	Five-day-visit of British Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Minister Howe in Moscow (ends 2nd April)

April

7-8	governmental French-Portuguese meeting in Lisbona
10	In Prague speech, Gorbachev proposes immediate, separate talks on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe
15	Gorbachev proposes a double-zero solution,on INFs, including SRINFs
17	After three-day-visit in Moscow, US Secretary of State Shultz stops in Bruxelles and informs NATO allies on latest arms control talks with USSR, including INF
23	INF talks resume in Geneva
26	French Prime Minister Chirac meets British Prime Minister Thatcher in Paris
27	In Geneva, USSR presents draft treaty containing Gorbachev's proposals

27-28	Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU meet in Luxembourg: no common declaration on INF
28	French Foreign Minister Raimond in Washington
May	
3	West German Chancellor Kohl meets French Prime Minister Chirac in Strasbourg: common declaration on INF
7	debate on INF in West German Bundestag
11	Sowjet arms control delegate, Vorontsov, in Rome
11-12	West German Foreign Minister Genscher in Washington
14-15	NATO's NPG meets in Stavangen (Norway) and discusses Gorbachev's double-zero (LRINF + SRINF) proposals
14-16	French Prime Minister Chirac and Foreign Minister Raimond visit USSR
20	Italian Prime Minister Fanfani in Bonn
21-22	49th West German-French Summit in Paris
26-27	NATO's DPC meets in Bruxelles, accepting double-zero-solution on INF
27	Prime Minister Fanfani in Washington
June	
4	West Germany agrees to double-zero solution for Europe, but excludes to involve Pershing IAs
11-12	NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Reykjavik, accept 'double zero' INF proposal
16	US tables its 'double zero' proposals at Geneva arms talks
July	
20	in Washington, Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti and US Secretary of State Shultz discuss on INF
23	USSR formally proposes removing all medium-range nuclear missiles from Asia as well as Europe, if Pershing IA are included in any INF deal
24	West Germany says it will only agree if USSR is incapable of invading its territory
28	US tables counter-proposal, including concessions on inspection terms and timetable for dismantling missiles, and pledges not to modernize Pershing IAs
August	
26	West German government agrees to scrap Pershing IAs if US and USSR reach INF agreement
September	
2	US offers to withdraw US-controlled nuclear warheads from West German Pershing IAs
9	USSR says 400 such warheads on American soil must be destroyed too and demands right to inspect all US cruise missile launch sites in Europe
18	After 3-day talks in Washington between US and USSR, agreement is reached to hold super-power summit in US to sign INF agreement
25	US Vice President Bush begins 9-day tour of Europe in Italy; stops over in Paris and Bonn (30), London (1 Oct), Brussels (2 Oct)

October	
1	US Vice President Bush in Paris
2	Italian Prime Minister Goria and Foreign Minister Andreotti in Paris
5	US Assistant Secretary of State, Ridgway, informes Defence Minister van den Broek (Nederlands) on latest arms control talks between superpowers; further, similar stops in Bruxelles and Bonn
19-22	French President Mitterand visits FRG officially
November	
4	NATO Nuclear Planning Group endorses planned INF treaty
24	Final differences between US and USSR on INF agreement resolved after 2 days of meetings
25	NATO foreign ministers give unconditional support to agreement to be signed in December
December	
1-2	NATO's NPG meets in Bruxelles
8-10	At Washington summit, Reagan and Gorbachev sign agreement banning intermediate-range nuclear forces
11-12	NATO foreign ministers meet in Bruxelles; Belgium, the Nederlands, the FRG, GB and Italy sign additional treaties regarding INF inspections
13	general elections in Belgium
14	British and French Defence Ministers, Younger and Giraud, meet in London, consulting on INF-agreement
15	US Secretary of State Shultz visits West German Government in Bonn, informing on INF-agreement

1988

May	
23	Supreme Soviet ratifies INF agreement
27	US Senate ratifies INF agreement
June	
1	Reagan and Gorbachev sign INF Treaty at Moscow summit

*(sources: IISS Strategic Survey 1979-87; Snyder 1984; Neue Zürcher Zeitung 1986-87; Nouvelles Atlantiques 1986-87)