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MOVES TOWARDS A EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICY

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The defence of Western Europe is posing new challenges, that the Europeans can succesfully manage only through greater coordination and unity.

The double zero

The agreement, between the Usa and the Ussr, on the Intermediate Nuclear Missiles, if and when implemented, will diminish the number of nuclear weapons based in Europe and will require a rethinking both of the possible threats and of our defensive strategy.

The double zero option eliminates 93% of the intermediate range nuclear forces of the USSR (1.113 nuclear warheads, mounted on mobile, very precise vehicles). No pre-emptive nuclear strike against NATO's main operational bases and command centers will be possible in the future, even considering the utilization of all existing, forward deployed, SS-12 MOD 2, unless the Ussr would make the difficult decision to utilize part of its strategic nuclear missiles (ICBM). A European anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense system will be easier to conceive, against a threat that will be both reduced and based essentially on conventional weapons.

The further elimination of the Shorter Range INFs would include (apparently) the Soviet SS-23s and SS-12s MOD 1 and 2, the Pershing-1A, and the maintainance of 518 Soviet SCUDs and 1.014 FROG/SS-21s , and of the 91 LANCEs of the Atlantic Alliance, plus airborne nuclear weapons, and short range nuclear shells, on both side. French and British nuclear forces would remain unaffected by the reductions.

The elimination of the Soviet SRINFs, therefore, while not eliminating either the strategic nuclear threat to Europe, or the need for a balanced strategy coupling together nuclear and conventional options, could however represent an asset for NATO, by destroying a military threat very carefully increased by the USSR in recent years, and by further diminishing the Soviet capacity of surprise attack against NATO.

The main problem is that West Germany will be left more exposed than the rest of the Alliance to the threat of the remaining Soviet nuclear forces, together with Greece, Turkey and Finmark: but NATO as a whole could be more capable of resisting surprise attacks.

It might very well be therefore that Gorbachev's motives for accepting the double zero deal have been essentially political, aiming at the "decoupling" of NATO's Europe from the American nuclear "umbrella" and at the singling out of West Germany, together with Greece, Turkey and Norway from the rest of Western Europe. The present European problem is how to counter such a threat without loosing the advantages of the proposed agreement.

Nuclear weapons will continue to be an essential element of deterrence and defence: American nuclear weapons however will be less "visible", while French and British nuclear weapons will appear to increase their "eurostrategic" role, vis à vis the permanence of the Soviet strategic threat. This evolution is not without contradictions and ambiguities.

The French and British nuclear forces are strictly national forces, with limited credibility, not designed for extended deterrence to cover non nuclear allies. French forces moreover are not integrated in Nato planning. The maintenance of a stable balance of forces between Nato and the Warsaw Pact still needs the decisive contribution of American nuclear and conventional forces, in Europe and for Europe. Existing European nuclear forces therefore cannot became a substitute for American nuclear forces. This does not mean however that we should ignore or underestimate the possible future contribution of European nuclear forces to European security.

The French President Mitterrand has recently underlined the possibility of greater coherence between French nuclear planning and Nato's strategy and posture in West Germany. While not sharing Nato's "flexible response" strategy, France might in fact contribute decisevely to it, both with ist conventional and its nuclear (pre-strategic) forces.

While Nato reject the possibility of a tactical nuclear war restricted to Europe alone, the present American strategy maintains a degree of (necessary?) ambiguity, planning for very restricted uses of tactical nuclear weapons, in limited numbers and of relatively low yields (and/or designed to limit collateral damages). These devices could be used more freely on the seas or on relatively deserted regions, and could offer viable options for interventions in non-European theatres such as South-West Asia. The presence of American long-range theatre nuclear weapons in Europe, reduces these ambiguities, bolstering deterrence by a a nuclear threat aimed directly and in depth at Soviet territory. The withdrawal of American INFs from Europe obliges Nato to look at other ways to confront these problems (putting at the disposal of Nato's strategic needs other long range nuclear weapon systems, such as sea based or air borne Cruise missiles).

Moreover, the likelihood of further reductions in the number of Nato's short-range tactical nuclear weapons and of other arms control agreements in the conventional and nuclear fields will raise once again the problem of how to avoid the "all or nothing" dilemma which is always threatenig to reduce Nato's deterrence posture to the level of a paper tiger. This must not reach the extreme case of an actual split between two kind of deterrence (the "nuclear"

and the "conventional" one), because this would crate un unfillable security vacuum. But in order to salvage what can be saved, the American nuclear deterrent must be gradually "unhooked" from its role of providing tactical support for conventional allied forces in Europe. This will not be easy to achieve.

In this perspective, the existence of a long-range, European strategic deterrent could offer a useful opportunity for combining together Europe's need for reassurance and America's decision to reduce the visibility of its nuclear presence on our continent.

This would require very imaginative proposals for a growing "Europeanization" of the French and British deterrents (without loosing the linkage with the American deterrent). It might be possible, for example, to contemplate solutions such as a European Nuclear Planning Group, inside the Western European Union and formally linked (but not dependent from) the Atlantic NPG, responsable for laying down the general planning and the common targeting for these (still national) forces. Further along this line, greater political and military integration could be accompanied by the creation of a joint European fund, to finance at least part of the corresponding nuclear programmes. Other, more amlbitious, formulas might include the peacetime redeployment of British and French nuclear forces outside national borders, and even the creation of new double-key systems.

Meanwhile, consideration could be given to the establishment of a sort of European Agency for Arms Control, similar in kind to the existing American ACDA, to enable Europe to speak with one voice in the great negotiations between East and West.

Problems on the fringes

The nuclear problem is not the only one. Nato has been in the past very much a "single scenario Alliance", centered on the problem of the Central Front (Germany), to a much greater degree than any other alternative option: a kind of "Maginot line mentality", that could unfortunately be confirmed by the more recent developments. Preoccupations over the "vulnerability" of the Central Front, and over the continuation of the presence of the American land forces in West Germany are bound to play an increasing role inside the Atlantic Alliance.

In the same time, however, the military problems related with the Southern Flank, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, are becoming increasingly important.

In the past, the military threat against Nato's Southern Region has been largely an indirect threat. Soviet troop deployments and readiness levels have all pointed toward an attack in the central European region. No Soviet divisions have stood ready for short warning attacks against Italy, Greece or Turkey.

Under the "flexible response" strategy, Nato has declared that it will meet any attack with whatever level of force is necessary, including nuclear weapons.

The intent has been to deter war by posing a grave risk of nuclear escalation. And the same risk would ensure that any war would be quickly ended through negotiations or exhaustion.

For the Southern Region, "flexible response" has meant a minimum role. If Nato held in the Center with conventional forces, or if necessary, nuclear weapons, peace would soon come, with little action on the Flanks. If Nato were defeated in the center, the Flanks would have little choice but to accomodate to Soviet desires. Thus, Southern Region countries have had a vital stake in the success or failure of Nato defenses, but have had little effect on the outcome.

The situation has changed in the '80s. The growing nuclear capabilities of both sides have culminated in a fundamental change in both Nato and Soviet perceptions. Both appear to recognize that the only way to achieve a reasonably satisfactory outcome would be to limit any conflict to conventional means. The double zero agreement is reinforcing this trend, announcing the progressive elimination of theatre nuclear weapons from Europe.

It remains true, however, that both sides have interests so vital that nuclear war at some level could appear preferable to abandoning them. For Nato, these interests are located in the Central Region of Europe: avoiding catastrofic defeat on Flanks also would be a vital Nato interest and could trigger nuclear defenses, but the fact is that there is more room for maneuver (either political or military, or both). If the Soviets choose to launch a military attack against Nato as a means toward limited gains, therefore, they will have to do so without total victory over Nato forces and without seeking to capture West Germany. Consequently, a war for limited gains would make the Southern Region of Nato as attractive a target for the Soviets as the Center Region (and a less risky target).

This trend has been somewhat confirmed by the Soviet decision to appoint, in 1984, for the first time after the Second World War, the Commanders in Chief to three of their TVDs (teatr voyennikh deystviy: theater of military action), making them operational. The three TVDs were the Western TVD, confronting Central Europe, and the Southwestern and the Southern TVDs, confronting the Southern Flank of Nato and the Middle East (with Afghanistan): two of these TVDs are bound to plan military operations for regions very far from Germany and Central Europe.

Should the trend towards increasing "conventionalization" of military strategy continue, both in Nato and in the Warsaw Pact, this could further increase the threats against the Southern Region of Nato. Nuclear deterrence as what can be termed a "unitarian" effect of common solidarity, and sharing of risks, between allied countries, while the conventional dimension is strictly linked to the the geo-strategic features of the various military theatres, widely scattered and far from each other.

Moreover, while the great concentration of allied conventional forces in the Central region (American troops included) could be regarded as a guarantee for nuclear deterrence, the absence of such a massive land presence in the Southern Region could further diminish the credibility of deterrence.

Finally, the Southern Region of Nato is not merely a European defense line. It is also the guarantee of a Western strong presence in the oil rich Middle East,

and the strategic cover for the Western dominance of the entire Mediterranean region. Thus, in the event of a Warsaw Pact-Nato conflict, the Soviets might well turn to the Southern Region of Nato as a "window of opportunity" for important military and political successes, in Europe, in the Middle East, in the Gulf, in North Africa and in the entire Mediterranean.

The recent establishment of a new US Central Command, in charge for military operations in the Middle East/Indian Ocean, and the appointment to it of a significant part of the US forces previously held in reserve for European contingencies, together with the redeployment of US naval forces from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, confirm our analysis.

The Atlantic Alliance is not supposed to confront "out of area" problems, and is particularly badly equipped for doing so. In the Middle East and in the Mediterranean, the bilateral relationship between the US and each one of its European allies are more important than the multilateral framework of the Alliance.

Nobody really wants a general war in the Mediterranean, but everyone is more or less involved in some local war or conflict: open wars, or covered and indirect wars (such as international terrorism). Permanent conflictuality seems to be the lot of the Mediterranean basin, far and beyond the existence and size of any single conflict. The problem therefore is not so much finding a rapid and satisfactory solution to one or other of the conflicts now going on, but rather to equip oureselves for life in a situation o f permanent conflict, where times of acute crisis will alternate with times when the crisis recedes, and the situation appears more peaceful.

The name of the game is "crisis management": an exercice of great difficulty and delicacy, requiring the skilful utilization of all possible instruments (from the military to the economic and the diplomatic). The Western European countries are not yet equipped for that.

The European Community does, however, have an important role to play. From the economic and commercial point of view, the vast majority (over half) of the trade of the Mediterranean countries is with the Community. Not even the growth of the Arab oil exporting countries has changed this structural factor. The Community therefore must succeed in devising a policy of economic and political relations, tacking into account the changing picture of the strategic situation, along the lines of its already existing Integrated Programme for the Mediterranean. Many of the problems of political instability in the region are linked with difficulties in economic development and this in itself offers an opening for the Community involvement. The European political cooperation, moreover, could be instrumental for setting up in the Mediterranean a system of alliances, agreements and guarantees whinch diminishes the threat of the use of force and make military imperatives less pressing.

This is where defence policy and foreign policyy should join hands to take on a mutual logic. Unfortunately, the European Community is still unable to confront the military aspects of security, while the Western European Union is far from becoming the center of a coherent European effort on defence. In the Mediterranean especially the shorthcomings of the WEU, appear similar to those of the Atlantic Alliance, with the added disadvantage that important western countries of the Mediterranean, such as Spain, Greece and Turkey, are not its members.

Increased concertation on security matters and on common policy for crisis management, both inside the WEU and the European Political cooperation, should be increased, and should evolve from the simple declaratory level, to the operational realm. The Mediterranean and the Middle East were the first areas of political co-operation inside the European Community, where substantial common wording was achieved on such critiucal issues as Cyprus, the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq War and international terrorism.

Specific policies then have been important and even successful, but no overall European strategy has been devised and we are still very far indeed from a common European security identity, either in the Mediterranean or elsewhere.

A number of European decisions could increase the effectiveness of Allied actions, improve the coordination process with the US and strengthen Nato strategy in the Mediterranean. There is no contradiction between a stronger role for Western Europe in the Mediterranean and a lasting American commitment in the region. On the contrary, they should be mutually reinforcing.

Better instruments for a common European crisis management in the Mediterranean, would require the stepping up of the European efforts of intelligence, and the sharing of informations between Allies. This could be done partly by jointly developing more sophisticated reconnaissance and communication satellites (and by developing the European capacity of electronic intelligence).

Second: European governments should show a greater determination in jointly adressing out of area crises: even when joint actions might be difficult to envisage, or might be thought to have adverse international effects, a coordinated European attitude in terms of diplomatic support and collateral initiatives is bound to increase the effectiveness and importance of the initiatives taken by single countries.

Third: European rapid deployment forces should train together, on a regular base, in specially designed exercises.

Fopurth: securing real-time communications between Allies in time of crisis should be greatly improved and exercised, and should work routinely for out of area contingencies as well. Some technical means for improving consultation and joint crisis monitoring might be established, as well as sharing of intelligence and timely circulation of information: this machinery could be linked either or both with the WEU's Council and/or the European Political Cooperation: it would be a positive step, relatively easy to take, and with no significant adverse consequences.

While the prime concern of security, in the Mediterranean region, lies in the air and naval fields, and in intelligence and communications, the real problem is to cover all these areas at the same time. If we wish to push forward the front line of air defence to cover our territory better, the answer involves better cooperation with Greece and Turkey on the control and defence of their air space. If we wish to gain strategic depth, emergency air bases and the possibility of falling back temporarily on secure positions, the French, Spanish and Portuguese hinterlands are there to back up front line states. The swiftness and effectivness of modern weapons have made the Mediterranean and

Europe a single battlefield. It is absurd to give the enemy the advantage of being able to strike us separately, if we do not use all the geographical space available for redeploying our forces as needed.

Conventional weapons

In theory, Western Europe has both the manpower and the technological, industrial and financial resources to achieve parity with the Warsaw Pact, in the conventional field, by its own efforts. In practice however, the military balance is still very much in favour of the Warsaw Pact, nothwistanding the presence in Europe of important American military land, air and naval contingents.

Land	Usa	W. Europe	W. Total	Ussr	E. Europe	WP. Total
Men (in 000)	217	1.550	1.767	1.243	717	1.965
Divisions	36	116	152	130	50	180
Tanks	5.000	15.742	20.742	36.000	14.500	50.500
Artillery	670	9.795	10.465	13.500	6 300	19.800
Anti-tanks w.	1.348	800	2.148	3.394	922	4.136
Sea						
Carriers	7	7	14	3		3
Cruisers	11	3	14	25		25
Submarines	53	130	188	188	5	193
Air						
Interceptors	96	615	711	3.190	1.310	4.500
Fighter-bombers	522	1.668	2.290	1.870	560	2.430

sources: IISS Military Balance and Nato

The "numbers game" however does not reflect fully Nato's two major weaknesses: its comparatively shallow theatre for ground operations, lacking both territorial continuity and the possibility of manoeuvering through internal lines of communications, and the lack of integration between the various national forces, tied to their respective national theatres of operations.

In reality, evene today the vast bulk of Nato's conventional defence, in Europe, is borne by the Europeans themselves. On the continent, they provide 90% of ground force divisions, 85% of tanks, 95% of artillery, 80% of combat aircraft and 70% of the naval units operating in the Nato area. Nevertheless the American contribution is still essential, not only for its nuclear component, but for its high technological imput, for the provision of Nato's only real reserve of combat-ready troops, and finally for its strategic mobility: the American forces are the only one prepared to intervene along the entire Nato crescent, according to the requirement.

The main points to be tackled by the Western Europeans, in order to increase their conventional contribution to the European security, appear to be:

- increased European conventional reserves, including both manpower and weapon systems;

- greater integration and mobility of the European forces between the various "thetres": e.g. by providing for the possible use of Italian alpine forces in Bavaria, of Spanish ground forces in the Centre and in the South-East, of Germani air and naval forces in the Mediterranean, etc.;

- greater weapons standardization (through the harmonization of strategic and tactical operational requirements);

- a new and better European system of anlarged air defence, and of command, control and communication;

- a joint planning for the gradual introduction of emerging technologies in the European Armed forces, according to an agreed schedule, harmonizing as far as possible the various national acquisition programs

A common approach could usefully study the way of better integrating various "operational tasks" performed by the armed forces of the Western European states, in order to increase their standardization and to make a more efficient and economic use of the scarse resources available. This is easier for some taskas than for others: wi think for example of the task of "controlling the sea lanes of communication" already coordinated inside the Atlantic Alliance.

The probleme would be one of identifying those operational tasks that more clearly appears of concern to the European Community as a whole (or to the WEU), so that they coul be integrated militarily, their equipment could be standardized and their operational commands might be streamlined and possibly integrated. This a partial, step by step approach to integrated European defence which could be a useful way of reaching a better "division of labour" among the various European countries and which would also simplify the discussions on the standardization, coproduction and procurement of weapons.

There are many tasks of obvious interest to all the countries of Europe but it would be difficult for a common structure to take them all on the beginning. For example: the nuclear task would clearly pose considerable problems of political and strategic definition (and that is why we have analized it separately).

If we restrict our more modest aims to the conventional field, it is however possible to identify even now a number of significant tasks which are "European" in scale and which could be dealt with more efficiently, from an operational point of view, at this level. They are, for exemple the tasks of:

- air and anti-missile defence;
- long-range interdiction and counter aviation;
- protection of convoys and of the sea lanes;
- monitoring of out of area crises, peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations, anti-terrorist special interventions;

- strategic monitoring of Arms Control agreements, threat evaluation;

- communications, command and control (part of is already integrated inside Nato, but that could be usefully backed up by special European contributions).

The problems of money

According to the last available issue of the Military Balance, the authoritative publication of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the defense budgets of the Western Alliance (at current prices and current exchange rates) are as following :

	1981	1984	1986
Nato Europe	102.28	92.03	108.91
Usa	169.89	237.05	292.55

billions of US dollars

The average estimate of the 1986 Soviet defence budget, in dollar terms, is generally being put around 120 billions of US dollars, to which should be added the expenditures of the other Warsaw Pact countries, estimated at 26 billions dollars. Around 146-150 billions of US dollars, therefore, the Warsaw Pact is supposed to spend for its defense less than half of the entire Atlantic Alliance, and about 35% more than the European members of the Alliance. The Warsaw Pact, however, deploys in Europe stronger military forces, and is acquiring new weapon systems in a quantity and at a much swifter rate.

According to the US Department of Defense, in 1985, the Warsaw Pact countries would have produced 1,900 more battle tanks than Nato, 2000 more armoured cars, 100 ICBMs against none, 100 more combat aircrafts, 75 more helicopters, a few thousands more guns, multiple rocket launchers and howitzers, and would had been outproduced only in the number of large military ships and sea launched Cruise missiles.

While it is true that the quality of weapons may vary, it is hard to argue that every tank or piece of artillery produced by Nato is worth two or three similar pieces produced by the Warsaw Pact. Although the West has a certain technological superiority in many areas, this is rarely if ever a qualitative difference which could make up for a vast inferiority in numbers. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact has some sectorial qualitative advantages too.

Other differences arise from the contrasting geopolitical nature of the two Alliances. Hence the Nato countries tend to spend more on naval forces than the Warsaw Pact: even here, however, we should note that the main differences concern big surface ships, and not smaller combatants or submarines.

If this trend continues it will be disastrous from every point of view, economic and military, allowing the Warsaw Pact to maintain its present advantages at a lesser and more affordable cost.

And we shall have no guarantee that spending could remain at the present level: new technologies, at least at their initial stages, cost more than the old one, and the new American technologies usually cost Europeans rather more again.

The direct purchase of American equipment through bilateral agreements (wich contain provision for appropriate compensation), is a highly effective and economic formula, as far as the balance of payments is concerned, but is a clear distortion of international trade, a breach in the European commercial policy of the Community and it has the sad effect of greatly increasing Europe's technological and industrial dependence on the Usa.

The openening of a European production line, under American licence, has the same drawbacks as the previous one, but does at least offer the advantage that over time it has contributed to the rebuilding of a number of European industries. It has however created industries which are too small in size to justify and independent existence and it has helped to maintain the fragmentation of the European market. Moreover, the European cost of production of American materials under licence has, in recent years, been up to 30% higher than the price of the original product for the American market. There is insufficient space to investigate all the reasons for this but basically they arise from longer decision making and production times, smaller production runs, the need for expensive modifications to meet European requirements, the need to pay for imported know-how etc.

A third metod of international cooperation with the US involves the cooperation on weapons families, which implies a division of work from the research and development stage and the allocation of planning and completion of the various complementary systems in a single weapons family, to each of the industrial centres. This appears to be an interesting approach which, however, is strongly influenced by the relative weights of the partners.

Cooperation within Europe can compete with the US only if Europe manages to reduce its costs and increase the pace of its innovations. It is very difficult to be precise or even completely credible, but is generally accepted that the joint development of a complex weapon system (such as a fighter bomber) is about 25% dearer that direct purchase, while a joint European production of an original system could be about 30%-35% more expensive than direct purchase. The increase is due to a number of factor, the most important of which is the system of dividing the work between partners (according to the so called "fair share" porinciple): a better formula must therefore be found for dividing labour and finance costs more rationally.

In practice, this means imposing a change from cooperation between national industries to industrial cooperation and competition within a single European market.

The Single European Act could play an important role in this direction, should the internal market be completed by 1992. One of the results of this would be the elimination of physical barriers, such as customs posts at internal frontiers, technical barriers, including freedom of access to public contracts, and fiscal barriers. This should go a long way towards revolutionizing areas of ministerial responsability which govern the choice of national firms, and should increase the role of the Commission (especially in the key sectors of Research and Development, and industrial policy). The European economic

interest groupings should also help national firms to cooperate on Europe-wide projects. At the same time it is reasonable to suppose that, if this process proceeds, the Community will also have to acquire powers against monopoly, as to ensure respect for the rules on concentrations laid down by the ECSC Treaty, to be managed by the Commission. The further develompent of the European Monetary System would make it easier for European companies to act as leaders of multinational cooperation schemes, so encouraging the constitution of real European consortia, responsible for carrying out joint high technology programmes.

These developments will have a direct and large effect on the armaments markets: it would be absurd, and fly in the face of all historical trends, as welle as being contrary to any industrial and financial logic, to contemplate a single "civil" European market alongside highly protected, small national "military" markets.

This is even more clear if we take into account recent developments, all showing a rapid loss of competitivity of the European armaments industry on the international markets. According to WEU figures, Armaments productions in the WEU asd a whole went up by a 5% annual growth rate from 1975 and 1983. In the same period however armaments exports increse at an average growth rate of 6% and armaments imports went up by more than 6.5% per year. In short, the European armaments industry did survive by increasing its exports (almost entirely towards the Third World), while loosing competitivity internally, in its own markets. This growing dependency from exports is now exacting its price, due to the declining demand and the growing competitivness coming from the USSR, the USA and new low cost producers (Brazil, and others).

The defence expenditure of the WEU countries, representing about 3.2% of GDP in 1983, is not expected to raise sharply, and while WEU armaments expenditures, in the period considered, did in fact increase at an average annual growth of 7%, this rate is not expected to be continued (and is in fact already declining). Therefore, a new approach is required, in order to make better use of the available resources and increase competitiveness.

Many initiatives have been tried in the past, and are now conceived, to this end. From Nato to the Eurogroup, the Indepenedet European Program Group (IEPG) and the WEU, all these bodies have tried their hand at the problem. Also the European Parliament has considered these problems on a number of occasions, ad proposed interesting solutions, in the Klepsch Report of 1978, the Greenwod Report of 1980, the Fergusson Report of 1983, and the Spinelli Plan of 1984. More recently, the IEPG has produced, in 1987, the Vredeling Report, recommending the enhancement of cooperation within Europe at both industrial and governmental levels, including recommandations for rationalization of the European industrial base and for changes in Goverment procurement policies and practices.

Taking up this last Report, it identifies as long-term objectives:

a) obstacles which restrict free trade and fuller cooperation in armaments in Europe shouild be removed;

b) contracts for armaments should be placed with suppliers in other European nations more readily than is currently the case;

c) defence research activities in Europe should be coordinated and managed in such a way as to provide for the fullest exploitation of the funds and talent available so that Europe's technology base remains strong and dynamic;

d) the national potential of the Less Developed Defence Industry (LDDI) nations for partecipating in the activities of Europe's defence industries should be adequately exploited.

Therefore the Vredeling Report recommended:

- that governments should agree to the principle of competition within Europe and refrain from distorting the market;

- more estensive use of industrial consortia, ensuring competition and juste retour on a broader base;

- more effective arrangements to share fuller information on medium and long-term equipment needs, so that collaborative opportunities are identified and exploited on time;

- more involvement by the industry in the preparation of operational requirements;

- more common specifications for components and subsystems used (this being a major weakness, the IEPG should accept the offer of CEN and CENELEC to prepare proposals on how such common specifications might be achieved);

- maintaining an IEPG register of defence companies and of bidding opportunities;

- support for a European research programme which provides for a comprehensive technology base, covering the areas of weakness identified (and making a point in favour of such programs as Esprit, Brite, etc.);

- promoting closer interaction between civilian and military applications of advanced technologies, the dual use nature of these technologies making such interaction essential;

- that a proportion of existing national defence research funds be diverted to establish a common budget and that discussions proceed in parallel to prepare an initial common research programme;

- that amongst other forms of assistance defined and given on a case by case basis, interproject compensation favoring the LDDIs and monitored by the IEPG, should be provided.

All these recommendations however failed to receive the necessary political backing at the last IEPG meeting in Spain (september 1987), underlining once again the difficulties and the slow pace of the European decision making process.

A case should be made therefore for confronting more squarely and in coordinated way all the political, military and economic problems related with

the future of European defence, through the relevant Institutions, such as the European Community and the WEU (the EC in particular, in order to exploit more fully its competences and its greater potential).

Towards a new European security identity ?

Military strategy has changed. Political factors have become of primary importance together with global, "systemic" factors. Since the Second World War the international system has changed with the richest and most powerful industrialized countries organized in two major Alliances around the two Superpowers. We do no longer envisage the traditional "national" wars, at least between industrialized countries; we talk and think rather in terms of possible wars between large coalitions. Moreover, the emergence of the nuclear era is obliging us to think more in terms of deterrence than of war, and has rendered obsolete the concept of "victory" itself. For the average European country even the concept of "national defence" has changed: nobody bellieves that any of our countries can organize its national defence all by itself.

The "nation state" , at least as far as Western Europe is concerned, is no longer a militarily credible unit by comparison with the superpowers, while the problems of defence are gradually spilling over into other fields, from politics to economics.

Indirect wars, wars at a low level of violence, limited either geographically or in their use of military force, are a growing reality. Still clearer is the importance of what used to be called propaganda or psychological warfare: today this has become a genuine strategic use of messages and the media, undertaken in full knowledge of the cimportance of communications and messages (and of "theatre") in modern society.

The de facto transnational integration of economics, commerce, finance, culture, communications and other areas has changed the nature of the international system, creating new political realities, new pressure points and new weaknesses. Our system is stronger militarily than it was in the past, fears war less, thanks to the balance of nuclear terror, but is more vulnerable in other sectors, as for exemple personal safety, economic security, political stability and social harmony.

It is therefore natural that the very idea of defence should have changed and become something different. We now talk about "security", since we believe that the defence of our lives, interests, freedom and well being depends on more complex set of national, international, political, social and economic factors than it was in the past. Hence our aim is to develop a security policy which, while including defence, also goes beyond it.

The perception of threat must be brodened and made more complex, so that is no longer restricted to the simple case of a military attack on the national territory, to achieve victory, but includes indirect threats as well, against systemic interests.

A wide range of instruments must be used for security purposes, both military and other, as well as a number of indirect strategies more complex than the surgical one, typical of the direct use of military force in wartime.

The concept of deterrence, and the existence of collective defince systems (and hence also an assessment of collective interests and threats against them) must be included directly in calculations of the needs, tasks and limits of national defence.

The greatest consideration is given to the close link between foreign policy and military policy. This involves problems such as crisis management, the political use of military force and the defensive use of other economic, political or diplomatic levers.

Security depends on a number of factors over which we have no full and direct control, such as the choices made by our allies. The more we take into account the possible range of indirect threats, the more our country's security is regarded as a variable dependent on the balance and smooth running of the international system, the less can our security policy be defined in strictly national terms.

All this means that we need a defence policy which is multilateral and integrated at the international level. In the sixties, Alistair Buchan proposed international rationalization around the United States, and considered that, if Nato were to operate effectively, many of the tasks now carried out separately by the various national defence authorities, from the various European capitals, would have to be transferred to Washington, and integrated into the American decision making system. In practice this would involve setting up in Washington a system of European military and political permanent representatives, with a very wide delegation of national authority and legitimacy.

Today we live in a different world. The country most eavily indebted with the international financial system, the United States, is now asked to protect and defend the richest countries of the world, from Japan to Western Europe. The supranational develompent of the Alliance around its major nuclear pivot is no longer a real possibility. On the contrary, many Americans would like to see the decrease of their oversea military commitments, while the US government is increasingly asking its allies to "contribute" to the defence of the international system, and to take up at least part of the burden that the US are no more willing or capable to shoulder by themselves.

The present discussion revolves around the possibility of building a new Alliance, chich would include a stronger European pillar able to bear a substantial load alongside its American partner. The discussion and proposals analysed or suggested in this paper are simply an attempt to idenfy some of the steps required for the establishment of this European pillar.

On the institutional question as such, we have not tackled the difficult problem of disputes between the various organizations which already exist in Europe. All of them has something essential, something to commend and some important shortcomings.

Nato is certainly the best structured and the most effective organization, as far as it goes (and it doesn't go out of area). It is difficult to see how it could be replaced completely, if only because it will always retain its prime role, which is to keep the defence of Europe closely linked with the United

States. Nevertheless, its is by no means a supranational body, it has not yet succeeded in organizing its European pillar and it has no real capacity or competence for crisis management out of its well defined borders. Its strategy is well centered on the defence of the central front and on its brand of "flexible response", without great flexibility and without the capacity of fully adaptingh to the changes of the threat. A kind of new conceptual "Maginot Line" is slowly reducing its effectiveness, and even its relevance in many specific crises. It would certainly be helpful to review the work done by many of its technical bodies (for example as far as common strategic concept, or amaments cooperation are concerned), but thought should also be given to improvements in European organization in this area.

The IEPG has no suitable political authority, nor has it yed developed responsabilities for the integration of operational concepts. The Eurogroup in Nato has some of these capacities, but France does not take part in its deliberations. Eurogroup could be made indipendent, just as the institutional and politica nature of the IEPG could be strenghtened, but the broader problem of a European defence and security policy going beyond mere cooperation on armaments still remains.

The WEU is an interesting structure, but it too has serious shorthcomings. Although it is concerned with defence and security, its structure and the reality of its decision making process, offers little scope for the military and remains primarily a forum for coordination between foreign ministers. It is also a multilateral organization without any of the features of a supranational body. It includes only some of the members of Nato and of the European Community. This does not mean that the WEU might not have a useful role to play, filling the gap left wide open by Nato (in the out of area business for example), by the European Political Cooperation (as far as the military aspects of security are concerned) and by the other "technical" bodies, such as the IEPG. Its destiny however is to be a kind of "crossing" and interbreeding between the competencies of the other organizations, and possibly of a "bridge", useful to overcome impasses and to allow for a step by step approach: a bridge leading to a better, more complete and more effective cooperation and integration, and not a solution in itself.

The best solution appears to be the European Union envisaged by the Spinelli Initiative and by the European Parliament. What must now be discussed is how to achieve this, without institutional prejudices, but also without groundless fears.